University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

Locke on "Voluntary Agreement" and Political Power
Author(s): Patrick Riley
Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1976), pp. 136-145
Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/447589
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7 Occasionally. Locke."5 And the "power"which "executes"that law must be set up by consent and contract. Locke. ed. 1Cf. is a sufficient standard of right in Locke (W."3 Locke's view. natural law and natural rights is examined in detail. that common- wealths are constituted by God for ends which he has appointed. where the notion of an equilib- rium between consent. Two Treatises of Government.2 This is true not only of the Second Treatise (though it is the best example). however.. 475. contractarianism. a political order which guarantees the natural rights which one has in virtue of natural law.. consent to"). cf. VI. and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors. Now Locke's most familiar contractarian arguments are of course to be found in the Second Treatise..he contents himself with the bare claim that consent creates political right.4 the "consent and contrivance" of men is necessary if those "ends" are to be effective on earth because men must voluntarily set up a "known and indifferent judge" who will require men to conform their conduct to God's appointed ends: "The law of nature would . p. but of such works as the Third Letter for Toleration (1692)-a work in which Locke. where the natural (or rather divine) law is defined as the law "which God has set to the actions of men" and which is "the only true touchstone of moral rectitude. argue that consent. and forms of government").. repeatedly. I shall desireyou to prove it.. even if these do not displace or replace natural laws and rights. was that even though God has "appointed" moral and political "ends" in the form of natural laws and rights. and such that in Lockean politics one sets up. 1812). in The Works of John Locke (11th ed. Laslett ed. p.). since there is no natural political authority. London.. The Social Contract)... had a power to execute that law. p. without the con- sent and contrivance of men. and by men freely entered into. above. Locke's Essay Concerning Human Under- standing.1 In all of Locke's mature works. Fraser (New York 1959). by voluntary consent and contract." (The Essay is cited hereafter as Essay -Fraser ed. consent. finally exclaims: "If you will say. 379. I. . C. exasperated with an opponent's claim that "civil societies are instituted [by God] for the attaining all the benefits which civil society or political government can yield" (including salvation). December 1974. be in vain. while others make the same claim for natural law (Sir Ernest Barker..."Political Studies. Ibid. Some Locke scholars. p. certainly.. For a catalogue of claims about what constitutes a complete concept of right in Locke. as they willingly. however. Kendall. such that no one of these (taken by itself) constitutes his complete concept of right.. the author's "On Finding an Equilibriumbetween Consent and Natural Law in Locke's Political Philosophy.. Ibid. voluntarily produced polities and obligations. the author'sarticle mentioned in note 1. 212. Sometimes-indeed. A. P. [that]. taken by itself. 441.). if there were nobody. as is well known. 312. and natural rights. 5 Two Treatises . Laslett (New York. A Third Letter for Toleration. as in section 102 ("politic societies all began from a voluntary union. and of choice. LOCKE ON "VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT" AND POLITICAL POWER PATRICK RILEY University of Wisconsin JT SEEMS to be the case that in his political writings John Locke was trying to find an equilibrium between consent. natural law. Cf.6 and in section 192 (rulers must put the people "under such a frame of government. that commonwealths are not volun- tary societies constituted by men. have a great deal of weight. 311 (cited here- after as Two Treatises -Laslett ed.. Locke provides a more elaborate argument. John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule). 1965).ed.

But there has always been a question whether Locke provides -in Book II Chapter 21 of the Essay. 228. despotical power to lords for their own benefit.. Nature gives the first of these. paternal power to parents for the bene- fit of their children during their minority. II That Locke himself. between natural and free agents. and political legitimacy. p. Some of the passages already cited make this plain enough . are not taken by anyone to be "free agents"12. to secure them in the possessionand use of their properties.an account of will and volition ade- quate to account for his (apparent) moral and political purposes. viz.and the operations of "voluntary agents.. to supply their want of ability. Of the Conduct of the Understanding. Locke on "VoluntaryAgreement"and Political Power 137 particularly when he wants to distinguish legitimate political power from both paternal and despotic power.." which are "observable in the ordinary operations of bodies one upon another'"". that he thought "voluntary union. how- ever substantially revising most of the first half. 430.p." that is "the actions of men in society. (One of the main reasons for this questionability is that Locke completely recast the last half of Book II Chapter 21 in the second [1694] edition of the Essay--without.""0But one could also refer to other important passages. instituted or voluntary. For if it is "voluntary agreement" which "gives . 9 Essay." it is natural and reasonable to ask: does Locke in fact provide a conception of will and of voluntary action which is adequate to account for consent and "voluntary agreement" as one foun- dation of what is right? It is to this question that the rest of this study is devoted.Fraser ed. 430."between natural history and civil history. p. this does not exhaust problems of interpretation." the "consent and contrivance of men" essential in setting up a known and indifferent judge to enforce natural law and to protect the natural rights which flow from natural law. I.. 316."l3 Clearly. 3Locke.Laslett ed.. 472-73. . in consequence those sections of Book II Chapter 21 which were re-done in 1694 often depart widely from the first 47 sections of the 8 Ibid. viz. then. Voluntary agreement gives the second. political power to gover- nors for the benefit of their subjects.bodies which."9 and those in which he distinguishes between paternal and despotic power (which do not involve consent) and political power. contract. And forfeiture gives the third. which makes civil and moral history. Of the Conduct of the Understanding. political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects. took voluntariness to be an essential component in the ideas of consent.." "mutual agreement. Locke thought that the notion of voluntariness was essential in distinguish- ing between different kinds of "powers. like the tennis balls of the Essay.. 2 Essay-Fraser ed. much of which was then incon- gruent with the new part. political obligation.as do others from the Essay Concerning Human Understanding in which Locke calls the political rights and obligations of "a citizen or a burgher" dependent upon "men's wills or agreement in society. . III..in The Works of John Locke. such as the one in The Conduct of the Under- standing in which Locke draws a distinction between "natural agents. 228.. is created by "voluntary agreement. which. Book II Chapter 21.8 But if it can be shown decisively that Locke at least meant to give consent a great deal of weight as one standard of political right. which contains his most extended treatment of the notion of willing -.. p. 10 Two Treatises-. over those who are stripped of all property.. is quite clear from his own works. at least in his later writings. he says. [and therefore]. "Locke.

imagination. but from his letters to his friend Molyneux. cf. The power which the human mind has to "order the consideration of any idea" or to "prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest. choice. memory. Locke continues. 1957). one argues that "the last appetite makes the essence of all cove- nants" . p.. Fraser's introduction to his edition of that work. 20Ibid. since it tries to derive a concept of right from a fact of psychology. 15 Cf. and even selfconsciousnessto 'appetite' and 'aversion'."20 It is useless and confusing.this does not add up to a coherent moral theory." and who therebywill not allow "Hobbes' cosmology to contain intelligent movement" (such as the choice of a political order). will. that will is simply the "last appetite" in deliberation. 307.14) Here it may be useful to recall that Locke's predecessor Hobbes.l9 Locke agrees with Hobbes (in effect." Political Studies. "is that which we call the will"." since the notion of "faculties of the mind" has led (he says) to "a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us. public and even inter- national obligationson promiseand voluntaryagreement. despite his passing rejection of "Hobbism" in Book I Chapter 2 of the Essay.that is.. what one might question is whether Hobbes himself did not set this reductionism in motion by treating will precisely as the "last appetite" in "deliberation. to ask whether this power is free or not: for the 14 For an account of the revising and recasting of Book II Chapter 21 of the Essay. . p. p. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford.Locke's theory of volition has much in common with Hobbes's. 18 Ibid. Cf. Hobbes's physiologico-psychological treatment of the concept of will as the "last" of any appetities renders nearly mean- ingless the idea (stated in Leviathan. To make matters more complicated." Locke urges. comes close to falling into these same difficulties. though not by name) that this power should not be called a "faculty. He is right in saying that Hobbesian politics becomes unintelligible on an ex- treme "reductionist"view. Indeed. who is or- dinarily taken to be the first great social contract theorist (though this may involve injustice to a writer such as Suarez) .. Now it sometimes looks as if Locke. the author's "Will and Political Legitimacy in the Philosophy of Hobbes. "Logos and Telos" (nominally a review of Spragens' The Politics of Motion: the World of Thomas Hobbes)."'1 since if the last part of this dictum really means "last appetitive act of his own" the notion of duty vanishes. " Hobbes. 86. in those sections which were not revised very much in the second. ed. deliberation. and at his death left behind still other revisions which were never incorporated into the work. In this piece Oakeshott castigates those who reduce Hobbesian "emotion. whenever the revisions and recastings have an important bearing on Locke's argument. p. in Gov- ernment and Opposition. which were left more or less as they had been in 1690.138 Western Political Quarterly chapter. that is. agreement and disagreement. pp. third and fourth editions . for the passages which were never actually incorporatedinto the Essay. Spring 1974. That Locke was more dissatisfied with this chapter than with any other part of the Essay is clear not just from his many efforts to better it. 1830). in Chapter VI.l7 If one substitutes his use of the notion of will for his definition of it -if. 313-14. Leviathan. they will be pointed out. 38. see Lord King's The Life of John Locke (London. Cf. Suarez' A Treatise on Laws and God the Law-giver for a remarkablycomplete volun- tarist and contractarian doctrine which bases many private.. Chapter XIV) that once a man has freely obligated himself to obey a political authority "it is his duty not to make void that voluntary act of his own. Michael Oakeshott's splendid new article."ls he also claimed.15 had got into difficulties in trying to repre- sent political obligation as the consequence of voluntary actions. December 1973. 17 Ibid. speech. Though he held in Chapter XL of Leviathan that human wills "make the essence of all cove- nants." to that "inertialmotion which is common to all bodies. Locke inserted some further revisionsof this chapter in the third and fourth editions of the Essay. 315." " Essay-Fraser ed. in the first 47 sections of Book II Chapter 21 of the Essay . and the actual exercise of that power is called volition or will- ing.

"capable of such a free- dom of will. Ibid. of course. Therefore it makes sense to ask whether a man is free.Fraser ed. indeed. Locke adds. 326-27."24 Now this. the mind." according to the preference of one's mind . namely that "a man in respect of willing" cannot be free because it is "unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist or not exist. drops the notion that the "mind" determines the will. which is also but a power. that it can forbear to will. p. though his own theory of volition." while if he treats will as a power. In any case..is another kind of power. particularly in the Theodicy. mais s'il y a assez d'independancedans sa volont6 meme."21 This is clearer. and sees that freedom or liberty is another power. on ne demande pas si l'homme peut faire ce qu'il veut..p. to move or not to move.pp.: "Quand on raisonne sur la liberte de la volont6.25 Locke's argument in this connection is not only unrelated to the real problem. Ibid. . cited in Essay. There is. and turns to the idea that it is "uneasiness"which does so. but one power cannot be a modification of another power. where Locke writes that. Locke says.. is not what is at issue in the traditional free will controversy: no advocate of free will ever urged that such freedom involved forbearing to will something . If one asks what de- termines the mind in its determination of the will. 325. What is it determines the will? the true and proper answer is. but not whether his will is free. p. but arguably incongruent with the idea (which he begins to develop after section 47."27 This seems to make intelligible (for example) the notion of obligating oneself reasonably and voluntarily.. since freedom can properly be attributed to nothing else. p. or whatever -but only that whatever choice was made not be determined or caused. arguing that "the power of thinking operates not on the power of choosing. 2Ibid.. then. was apparently not content with this "refutation"of free will. the "mind" could determine the will to enter into such obliga- tions rather than allow the law of nature to be upheld by men's self-help without an indifferent judge. p. Locke. 322. Locke says. at least momentarily.Fraser ed. an agent . when one treats the will as a power than when one treats it as a "faculty": if an advocate of free will speaks of "faculties" he can conceal from himself the fact that he is demanding that the will be "a substance..which is simply "the power to think or not to think.22 Will. Leibniz' Nouveaux Essais. 320. liberty the power to do what one prefers. to have duties as a citizen. is not completely co- herent either. is the power to prefer something. Locke on "VoluntaryAgreement"and Political Power 139 will is one kind of power."23 There is no being. For a "mind" would be required to understand the concept of citizenship or the concept of civic obligations. Cf. a hint of this later operation in section 29. .. and this is perhaps why Locke. one finds that the f Ibid. But this would come perilously close to one power (thinking) operating on (or "modifying") another power (willing).. 321." Leibniz is surely correct here. 2"Ibid. ' Essay. in essence.whether a social con- tract. nor the power of choosing on the power of thinking"26. "to this question. p. "liberty. for he added another less plausible one. and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will. he ends these early sections of Book II Chapter 21 by revert- ing to the theory of distinct "powers" of the mind. he cannot fall into this error. however. and freedom. belongs only to agents. which is but a power.an argument perfectly congruent with the notion that one power cannot "modify" another. 330. in the recast parts of the chapter added in 1694) that the mind can "suspend" the power of willing while it rationally de- termines its own greatest good. but tends to weaken the more effective arguments about the impossibility of conceiving one power as a modification of another power which he had made earlier. 329 n.

If it is true that the re-formulation.. p. but rather some pressing "un- easiness.. mean that such restless de- sire is excluded from his political system.as he did. is the uneasiness of desire. 332.. suggests in a crucial passage that. to every voluntary action. and uneasiness determines the mind.. perhaps forgetting that he had said in section 29 that the "mind" determines the will. On the contrary. 333. that these men are moved by their uneasiness 28Ibid..140 Western Political Quarterly "motive for continuing in the same state or action. "Ibid. The fact that Locke intended "voluntary" to mean something more than a restless desire for some absent good does not."29 Whatever Locke's reason for trying to distinguish between will and desire - and it is at least conceivable that he did so because he wanted "voluntary agree- ment" to mean something other than "desirousagreement". is only the present satisfaction in it. 430. 331. political power to governors"32into "uneasy or desirous agreement gives . 30Ibid. p. raised proportionately to it. in the first edition of the Essay .. standing judge who can enforce natural law. that ultimately determines the will." Since uneasiness simply becomes desire (for all practical purposes). 334. p. as enjoyment of pleasure. Good and evil. work upon the mind.. But that which immediately determines the will." Plainly Locke intended "voluntary" in the Second Treatise to mean something more than a restless desire for some absent good.. from time to time. as indolence to one in pain."30 Here the distinction between uneasiness and desire (and hence between willing and desiring) is rapidly crumbling. fixed on some absent good: either negative.. and a Lockean volition is a desire or an "uneasiness. it is ultimately desire that determines the will. Then in sections 33 and 34 Locke. 2Ibid. in effect." throws Hobbes's problems into high relief. makes us uneasy in the want of it.Lockeanism would clearly be mired in problems fully comparable to Hobbes's: after all. 82Two Treatises. Locke adds that it is im- portant that one be able to distinguish between "will" and "desire.31 By this point the distinction between uneasiness and desire has been conflated in the phrase. "the last appetite makes the essence of all covenants."Locke goes on to allow that this causal uneasinessmay be called "desire. or if Locke had stopped here . does not determine the will. If one stopped here." which is "an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good. "uneasinessof desire."it is equally difficult to derive a voluntarist and contractarian theory of right and obligation from either of them.Laslett ed. or positive. if a Hobbesian volition is an appetite.. but his account of volition in the early sections of Book II Chapter 21 of the Essay seems not to allow for that something more. ."28 It is this uneasiness. And desire Locke treats largely as determined by pain and pleasure.. political power to governors.it is certain that he does not long succeed in keeping them distinct." but that the motive for change "is always some uneasiness. and the mind deter- mines the will. p.. present and absent. Observing that it is not the "greater good in view" that determines the will. one can say that Lock- ean men in the state of nature are in an "uneasy"and uncertain condition precisely because of an absent good which they desire--namely an impartial... The greater good. so too Locke's contractarian utterances lose most of their intelligibility if one translates "voluntary agreement gives. so that the determination of the will must in the end turn on pain and pleasure. of course. then." since will is active but desire may be more-or-less passive and not issue in any actual result: "whence it is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind. it is true. until our desire. p.

for those that would. VII. that does not settle the question of whom one is obligated to obey: "A man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power. but section 81 is of the greatest importance. the notion of "voluntary agreement" seems to involve more than simple restlessness and de- sire: Locke's claim that "voluntary agreement gives . "voluntariness" refers not just to the psychological facts of restlessness and desire . to claim that when Locke uses the notion of "voluntary" he is sometimes.political power to gover- nors for the benefit of their subjects" is meant to distinguish legitimate rule from patriarchy and despotism. stood on their true foundations... the consent of men"35 . 240. 140)..." Indeed."34 And since natural law does not appoint "persons" who have a natural enforcing authority. at least implicitly. as Locke says in the Essay. until he can be satisfied who is the person.. p.no ment.. cannot give laws. and if there is no natural authority. or would not obey him" (in The Works of John Locke." Unless one knows who are the persons who are entitled to govern in virtue of consent and voluntary agree- .. 'Tis in vain to talk of subjection and obedience. unless there were a way also taught how to know the person. Locke on "Voluntary Agreement" and Political Power 141 to make an agreement which institutes civil society and does away with the "in- convenience" of the state of nature. says that "those just measures of right and wrong..though those are not excluded . in section 81 of the First Treatise Locke says that even if one is persuaded that there ought to be govern- ment and law (perhaps so that natural law can be enforced). ..Laslett ed. or agreement in society.." It is not extravagant. treating human will as a "moral cause" which can produce moral "effects" . indeed. then there is no legitimate government unless men's wills "institute" rightful power. In this important passage Locke also says that "since men cannot obey any thing. that is. to whom it belonged to have this power. and the great rewards and punishments. the law of nature? That could not be. Still. 88 Ibid.. One might want to say. p.. 5 Ibid. 178. and ideas of government in the fancy. but the person who by right is vested with this power. but in terms of "divine law" which is the "only true touch- stone of moral rectitude. p. that one is "obligated" only in virtue of acknowledging God as a "law-maker" who attaches rewards and . 240." and are therefore "instituted. who has a right to exercise that power over him."36 Apparently." 7Essay -Fraser ed.but to a kind of moral causality which produces political power "by right. But where was it that their obligation was thoroughly known and allowed. though never so right. and they received as. which.that is.33 So a restless desire for an absent good is cer- tainly present in the transition from the state of nature to society..IV of the Second Treatise. then. 472-73. political laws and rights depend "upon men's wills.. in The Reasonableness of Christianity Locke."37 "3This seems to be a reasonable construction to place on Chapters II . pp. that cannot command. and legitimacy is not a question of "restlessness. It might be objected that Locke defines "obligation" not in terms of will and consent. though never so perfect. there is no political "obligation to obedience" (to use Locke's phrase) obligation until consent and voluntary agreement show "not only that there is a power somewhere in the world.. If Locke does not at least occasionally understand human will as a moral cause then what he says about political obligation (to a "person") being conventional rather than natural doesn't make sense: if a political obligation isn't simply a moral obligation.such as a political obligation which is not also a natural obligation (under natural law)." which produces political obligations as distinguished from natural obligations. Thus will must be creative of (political) right: for. it would be of no behoof for the settling of order.. and is not duplicated in the Second Treatise. and the establishment of government. by the "voluntary agreement" which "gives political power to governors. 84 Two Treatises . "governments must be left again to be made by. For example.. or voluntary and may be distinguished from the natural. [ancient] philosophy recom- mended. The general neglect of the First Treatise is not wholly unmerited.. without a clear knowledge and acknowledgement of the law-maker.. without telling us whom we are to obey.. reject- ing the view that moral obligation was sufficiently explained by ancient philosophy.

we have done our duty. p. 4 Same as note 33." Essay. else he would be under the determination of some other than himself. thus the "voluntary agree- ment" establishing civil society represents an expression of "free will" in relation to man's desires. a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires. as will be recalled. it is the mind's power to suspend "the prosecution of this or that desire" that constitutes liberty: the mind (in a rational sense of the word "mind") seems now to be ascendant. call this power of suspension "free will..142 Western Political Quarterly Fortunately for Locke as a contractarian and voluntarist. in this seems to consist that which is (as I think im- properly) called free-will.. in any case (though not perhaps as a completely consistent theorist of volition). will and act according to the last result of a fair examination.but political obligation involves "the consent and contrivanceof men.." and his argument in the Second Treatise that men understand and are subject to natural law even in the state of nature. X Ibid. after section 47 of Book II Chapter 21.and this is certainly congruent with being able (for example) to commit oneself to civic obligations under a social contract because one understands what he does. however. 345. and since there is no natural authority.41And one could surely draw a connection between Locke's claim in the revised version of the Essay that will is subject to "thought and judgment. and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do. arguing that every man as an intelligent being is necessarily "determined in willing by his own thought and judgment. but not so con- gruent with Locke's earlier claims that the "power" of thinking "operates not" on the "power" of choosing. and so all. u Ibid. view. in a rather Hobbesian way. Locke says clearly in section 81 of the First Treatise that no one can be "obligated in conscience" to obey a given government until he knows who is the "person"who has a title to rule. made free- dom or liberty consist in a man's power to do what he preferred to do. Locke had." this is "not always"the case." There is."40Here liberty seems to be not merely the power of suspension. during this suspension of any desire. and it is not a fault.)42 Locke moves still further in the new punishmentsto our actions. in pursuit of our happiness. no problem in this: one sets up by "contrivance"a governmentwhich ought to shape its policies in congruence with "the law of nature.a 1694 revision for the second edition. .. is at liberty to consider the objects of them.. p. In the present recast passage. and weigh them with others. which is want of liberty. and one may even (though not quite properly)." it does not explain political obligation. or willed. that title is conveyed by voluntary consent. as is evident in experience. This seems to me the source of all liberty. but a perfection of our nature. and to break away from some of the difficulties which had bedevilled Hobbes. For. however. For the mind having in most cases. Locke says. which Locke always distinguishescare- fully from moral obligation. upon due examination. In section 48. to desire. 346. and when. his notion of will be- gins to undergo a metamorphosis. or ought to do... we have judged.Fraser ed. above. examine them on all sides. we have opportunity to examine. be- fore the will be determined to action . Moral obligation for Locke does indeed arise from acknowledgingthe will of God as law-maker."39 Locke reenforces this position in section 49. Locke's state of nature can reasonably be seen as a reflection of men's ability to "suspend" the execution of their desires- which might otherwise lead them into a state of war. all that we can.but the capacity to be determined by "thought and judgment" ..38 Earlier. But even if this explainsthe obligatoriness of "the law of nature. (Moreover. 40Ibid. one after another.Locke is already urging that while "for the most part" it is some "great" and "pressing"uneasiness which is "ready to determine the will.

Locke's theory of will is moving away from "uneasiness" as something causal.45 Apparently..1949). then one is quite rea- sonable in allowing his will to be determined by desire for present pleasures (what- ever their "intrinsic" character). Locke is able to treat moral and political principles which one understandsas kinds of knowledge which may (and ought to) determine one's will. we have done our duty. Kant. or from within.. are of weight enough to determine the choice. until we have "made ourselves uneasy in the want" of such a good. when the eternal state is con- sidered but in its bare possibility. Locke on "VoluntaryAgreement"and Political Power 143 rationalist direction of viewing liberty as the power to determine oneself by "thought and judgment" when he declares (in section 69) that "without under- standing.46 One's knowledge of God's eternal rewards still makes one "uneasy"in the want of them. p. there is no intrinsic good beyond one's present earthly life." PoliticalTheory.trans. but one sees too that they are "intrinsically"good. p." Morality.which nobody can make any doubt of. "the measures of good and evil that govern his choice are mightily changed. K. as seems to me. but may be determined by "knowledge" which guides one's choice. . Locke goes on. Setting aside his quasi-Hobbesian opinion that good and evil are relative only to our own pleasures and pains (sec- tion 43). liberty (if it could be) would signify nothing" because "the being acted by a blind impulse from without. till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it. it is possible to suspend the will's being determined by a present pleasure. The rewardsand punishments of another life. For the author'sdetailedtreatmentof Kanton this point.. For. pp. This much Locke makes clear above all in section 57. which contains the best statement of his conviction that men are responsible for their voluntary actions because they have a capacity to act better or worse. as the enforcements of his law. cannot but determine the choice in any one that will but consider. Here. that it is reason- able to desire them. theory of volition in a key passage from section 53: This. to "govern" one's choices by a rational consideration of greater and lesser goods. 349. Locke now insists that "we should take pains to suit the relish of our minds to the true and intrinsic good that is in things. then. That they can suspend their desires. or at least much altered... in the revised version of the Essay. 364. This we are able to do. " Ibid. Abbott(Indian- apolis."43 Finally he sums up his new. against what- ever pleasure or pain this life can show. and moving toward a more-or-less Kantian notion of will as the capacity to bring oneself to act accord- ing to the conception of a law that one understands and uses in shaping his con- duct.44 Having established that the will is only ordinarily determined by uneasiness. and stop them from determining their wills to any action. and when we have done it. is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings.." and that we can do this by reflecting on this intrinsic good. and such a person's motto may well be "let us enjoy what we delight in. established upon its true foundations. " Ibid. If. since the will supposes knowledge to guide its choice. 4 Essay-Fraser ed. 63 ff.see his "OnKantas the MostAdequateof the SocialContractTheorists.." But to a man who reflects on the probability (to say no more) of an eternal life governed by God's laws. all that we can do is to hold our wills undetermined. till we have examined the good and evil of what we desire."(forthcoming). November1973. and indeed all that needs.. is little odds.. 'for tomorrow we die'.T. which the Almighty has established. 361..and his "Kanton the Will as 'MoralCausality'.. p. and suspending our desire for a lesser good. and all that is in our power. FundamentalPrinciplesof the Metaphysicof Morals.

""5 4 Essay. As Locke urged in a letter to his friend Molyneux. by a too hasty choice of his own making. But against this one can counterbalancea passage contra the "occasionalism"of Male- branche in Locke's "Remarks upon some of Mr. Wherein he asserts P[ere] Malebranche'sOpinion of our seeing all Things in God": "A man cannot move his arm or his tongue.144 Western Political Quarterly And here we may see how it comes to pass that a man may justly incur punishment.. God moves it. he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil. or else God. in the Second Reply to the Bishop of Worcester. for example. Norris's Books. To this one can add the fact that Locke occasionally treats the freedom which makes responsibilityand obligation possible as something which philosophy (alone) cannot demonstrate. o Essay. at least. and if it is not an act of will. 255-56).Frasered.as. p. IX. The man wills. 1693). and brings us at last to the religion of Hobbes and Spinosa [sic]. produced this will.in the 1694 revisions. X. 492. to conclude men are free enough to be made answerable for their actions. and suspend immediate desire as something causal. For.. then. and not the least of these is the question put by Fraser.. Locke largely avoids Hobbes's difficulties with the will - at least in the recast sections of Book II Chapter 21 when he speaks of "suspend- ing" the will. which he himself did before. p. the man willing it. yet it excuses him not. it is clear that this is the law Locke has in mind in speaking of "the eternal law and nature of things" which men are responsiblefor not violating. and which shows why Locke had to argue. in The Works of John Locke. into an irresistible fatal necessity"(The Worksof John Locke." But Locke at least appears to say that this is knowable only through the "light of revelation. by resolving all. .47 It is the last sentence which is decisive.Frasered. Locke. Second Reply to the Bishop of Worcester.in The Works of John Locke."49 On the whole. 326. it is "the result of our judgment" that ultimately determines a man. upon the occasion of some- thing. Locke. 353. 347 n. 8Ibid. he doth something. because. of letting it be determined only by "intrinsic"goods. as Book II Chapter 28 of the Essay insists. what is it?"50 This is an important question which never gets a perfectly clear answer in Locke.." and concludes by remarking that "how man is a free agent" surpasseshis "explication or comprehension. letter to Molyneux (August 23. though his will be always determined by that which is judged good by his understanding. avoid imposing on a man "wrong measures of good and evil." revelation must serve as "foun- dation enough. namely the "intrinsic" superiority of those eternal re- wards. This is the hypothesis that clears all doubts. IV.that the mind can suspend the operation of the will.. But to be able to appreciate this one must think. but there must be a reason for preferring that "remote" good to some present one. who could not be free "if his will were determined by anything but his own desire. the editor of the "standard" edition of the Essay: "Are our determinations to suspend our desires naturally necessitated by uneasiness... The eternal law and nature of things must not be altered to comply with his ill-orderedchoice. It is true that men must feel uneasiness in the want of God's eternal rewards before their wills can be determinedby such a want. guided by his own judgment..." For. he has no power."48In the case of divine or natural law. and this action in him. even the thoughts and will of men. a "moral relation" involves "the conformity or disagreement men's voluntary actions have to a rule [such as natural law] to which they are referred. 473. as something which only revelation can make intelligible . only upon occasion. or is this 'suspending' not a voluntary deter- mination at all. p. of its being "of little odds" when it is not determined by the understanding. Problems of course remain. but they could not have such a responsibilityif their wills were inevitably determined by whatever "uneasiness" happened to be most "pressing"and "great"at a given moment. where Locke says that since God has "revealed that there shall be a day of judgment.

which is not simply voluntarist and contractarian." in Democratic Theory (Oxford 1973). MacPherson. 1953). in Political Writings. Two Treatises . 234: "Locke's doctrine of property. p."54 Cf. over what Locke's theory of property "does" to the rest of his political system. Natural Right and History (Chicago. it leads to reducing consent.. if one were trying to account for Locke's complete concept of right." This is not so much false as one-sided. political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects". is certainly its most characteristic part.at its best it allows one to place a reasonable construction on his claim that "voluntary agreement gives. particularly p. . MacPherson and Leo Strauss. Cf. or of reputation) which one under- stands. B.as it could have been had he recast the whole of Book II Chapter 21 of the Essay . 441. 40. pp.53 One need not think that dis- pute fruitless (as indeed it is not) in order to insist a little on examining the co- herence of the voluntarist strand of Locke's political thought.. March 1970.")52 While one might well wish that Locke's theory of will were clearer and more consistent. 1953). u"Cf. his theory of will does not exclude the possibility of determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of a law (whether divine. though." American Political Science Review. Watkins. but which has nearly been lost sight of in disputes. as they willingly. (Edinburgh. Rousseau. pp... The Social Contract. ultimately. one would have to balance in some sort of equilibrium with natural law and natural rights. C.a strand which led to his claim that men are free of political obligation (though not of course of moral obligation) until they are put "under such a frame of government. civil. 228 ff. F.elements which. And that is all that is necessaryto make the voluntarist and contractarian elements of the Second Treatise relatively intelligible. p.. Leo Strauss. contract and natural rights in Locke to a marginal status. ed. (In Locke there is no General Will which is "always right. Locke on "VoluntaryAgreement"and Political Power 145 Apart from a few passages such as this. it leaves open the possibility of obligating oneself in a reasonable sense. initiated by C. "Natural Rights in Hobbes and Locke. which is almost literally the central part of his political teaching. B. 234 ff.a claim that is an essential part of his complete concept of right. the author's "A Possible Explanation of Rousseau's General Will. and of choice consent to.Laslett ed.