International Journal of Mathematical Education in

Science and Technology

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Scaffolding and metacognition

Derek Holton & David Clarke

To cite this article: Derek Holton & David Clarke (2006) Scaffolding and metacognition,
International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology, 37:2, 127-143, DOI:
10.1080/00207390500285818

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International Journal of Mathematical Education in
Science and Technology, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2006, 127–143

Scaffolding and metacognition

DEREK HOLTON* and DAVID CLARKE

Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Otago,
Box 56, Dunedin, New Zealand
Department of Science and Mathematics Education, Faculty of Education,
University of Melbourne, 3010, Victoria, Australia

(Received 18 August 2004)

This paper proposes an expanded conception of scaffolding with four key

elements:
(i) scaffolding agency – expert, reciprocal, and self-scaffolding;
(ii) scaffolding domain – conceptual and heuristic scaffolding;
(iii) the identification of self-scaffolding with metacognition; and
(iv) the identification of six zones of scaffolding activity; each zone distinguished
by the matter under construction and the relative positioning of the
participant(s) in the act of scaffolding.

These key elements are illustrated with empirical examples drawn from a variety
of research studies. Scaffolding, thus conceived, brings together several theoretical
domains, and by situating metacognition within a framework derived from the
social activity of scaffolding, a bridge is formed between the instructional support
a teacher might provide and the learner’s self-control of the learning process.
With regard to instruction and the role of the teacher, it is the authors’ contention
that a major object of instruction is the progressive relocation of scaffolding
agency in the direction of the learner with the long-term goal of equipping the
learner to take control of their own learning.

1. Introduction

Central to this paper is the broadening of the idea of scaffolding. Related to this
expanded conception of scaffolding is the notion of agency. Our ultimate aim is to
empower the learner. We suggest that this involves progressively devolving the role
of scaffolding agent from teacher to learner. In proposing this, we go well beyond the
original conception of scaffolding as an activity whose agent was the teacher and
whose purpose was to support the constructive learning activity of the learner. As an
aside, we find sufficient similarity between the activities of problem solving and
learning to see relevance to both activities in our reconstruction of scaffolding.
Steffe [1] identified one object of the teacher’s activity as the construction of a
model of the ‘epistemic student’ (that is, the student as constructor of knowledge).
Informed by this model, the teacher is in a position to optimally scaffold the learner’s
construction of mathematical knowledge. We posit a progression in scaffolding

*Corresponding author. Email: dholton@maths.otago.ac.nz

International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology

ISSN 0020–739X print/ISSN 1464–5211 online # 2006 Taylor & Francis
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/00207390500285818
128 D. Holton and D. Clarke

agency that culminates in the student scaffolding their own learning. This self-
scaffolding, first proposed by Holton and Thomas [2], is essentially equivalent to
metacognition. The case will be made later in this paper that the self-interrogating
questions of metacognition strongly resemble the prompts of the process that we
have termed ‘heuristic scaffolding’. By drawing this parallel between one form of
scaffolding and the individual process of metacognition, we are prompted to
consider analogues between the key concepts in both domains. If the teacher-
scaffolder is empowered by the quality of their model of the epistemic student,
then the student self-scaffolder is empowered by the quality of their model of what
we would call the ‘epistemic self’.
The connection between the social and the individual in the context of learning
has challenged theorists for some time now [3–5]. In this paper, scaffolding provides
a metaphorical bridge between the social and the personal. In its original conception,
as a social process whereby a learner is supported in their construction of knowledge,
scaffolding can be seen as a form of conversation between teacher and learner. As
the agency is relocated to the student, self-scaffolding or metacognition can be seen
as a form of internalised conversation in which the student interrogates their
epistemic self.
An incidental consequence of this reconception of scaffolding from the
perspective of multiple agencies is a recognition of (i) the constructive role of
peers in the process we have called ‘reciprocal scaffolding’ and (ii) the role of
the teacher in scaffolding not only the students’ construction of mathematical
knowledge, but also the students’ construction of scaffolding practice, for use in
both reciprocal scaffolding and self-scaffolding (ie metacognitive contexts).
In the discussion that follows we provide more detail on our expanded
conception of scaffolding and the role of agency, on the posited equivalence of
self-scaffolding and metacognition, and on the nature of scaffolding in various
‘construction zones’ (to borrow a term from Newman, Griffin and Cole [6],
see table 1).

2. Scaffolding

Although the word ‘scaffolding’ was first coined by Wood, Bruner and Ross [7], the
concept predates them. Wood et al. [7] were undoubtedly influenced by Vygotsky in
whose writings the concept was implicit. Vygotsky [8, p. 86] introduced the zone of
proximal development (zpd) as defining
those functions that have not yet matured but are in the process of maturation,
functions that will mature tomorrow but are currently in an embryonic state.
These functions could be termed ‘buds’ or ‘flowers’ of development rather than
‘fruits’ of development.
So for Vygotsky, a learner has an actual level of development and a potential for
development. The difference between these two he called the zone of proximal
development. Vygotsky [8, p. 86], says that the zone of proximal development is
the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by
independent problem solving and the level of potential development as
determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration
with more capable peers.
 Scaffolding and metacognition 129

The zone represents the potential for a child’s development when aided by others.
Wood et al. [7] were considering the successful intervention of a tutor when
they wrote
More often than not, it involves a kind of ‘scaffolding’ process that enables a
child or novice to solve a problem, carry out a task or achieve a goal which
would be beyond his unassisted effort. This scaffolding consists essentially of
the adult ‘controlling’ those elements of the task that are initially beyond the
learner’s capacity . . .
Wood et al. [7] suggest that scaffolding has six key functions. These are
. recruitment: engaging the child in an interesting and meaningful activity;
. reduction: developing the activity around manageable components;
. maintenance: ensuring that the child is on-task and on-task for a solution;
. marking: accentuating the main parts of the activity;
. control: reducing the frustration level of the activity;
. demonstration: providing a model of the solution method for the child.
Bruner [9] talks about scaffolding and the zpd in the following terms:
I have puzzled about this matter (zone of proximal development) for many
years, and I think that I understand what Vygotsky may have meant. Or at
least I understand the matter as follows . . . If the child is enabled to advance by
being under the tutelage of an adult or more competent peer, then the tutor or
the aiding peer serves the learner as a vicarious form of consciousness and
control. When the child achieves that conscious control over a new function
or conceptual system, it is then that he is able to use it as a tool. Up to that
point, the tutor in effect performs the critical function of ‘scaffolding’ the
learning task to make it possible for the child, in Vygotsky’s word, to
internalize external knowledge and convert it into a tool for conscious
control. (p. 215)
In the world of building construction, scaffolding is a tool used to allow workers
to construct or repair buildings. This is achieved by placing a structure against the
building that supports workers and enables them to reach places that are otherwise
inaccessible. In the case of construction, a bricklayer may be able to put bricks onto
the side of the new structure at a height unreachable on foot. In the case of repair, a
painter may need scaffolding to reach otherwise inaccessible gutters.
The analogy with construction of knowledge is that cognitive scaffolding allows
learners to reach places that they would otherwise be unable to reach. With the right
word or question or other device a teacher may put in place the scaffolding that will
allow new knowledge to be constructed, incomplete or wrong concepts to be
challenged or corrected, or forgotten knowledge to be recalled. This scaffolding
stimulates learner activity in the zone of proximal development. Further, when the
building is finished or the renovation complete, the scaffolding is removed. It is not
seen in the final product. This is also the case in cognitive scaffolding. When a piece
of knowledge has been learned and understood, the mechanism by which it was
constructed is no longer apparent. However, the ‘memory’ of the scaffolding may
still remain. Just as a builder knows how to construct the next scaffold for the next
building, a teacher will know how to assist the learner to construct more knowledge
at a later time.
130 D. Holton and D. Clarke

It is also worth mentioning that scaffolding is used on all buildings, all over the
world. Whether a house or factory or public building is being constructed, scaffold-
ing is a necessary and useful part of the building process. In the cognitive domain,
scaffolding is valuable for all subject areas and for all learners. Although the
examples given here are from mathematics, the same processes are available and
fruitful in all other areas of learning.
In recent times in mathematics education, scaffolding has become associated
strongly with problem solving and the use of open questions to facilitate the
construction of a students’ knowledge. In that context, a number of generic
scaffolding questions have been suggested. For instance, Schoenfeld [10, p. 356]
proposes that the instructor
reserves the right to ask the following three questions at any time:
What (exactly) are you doing? (Can you describe it precisely?)
Why are you doing it? (How does it fit into the solution?)
How does it help you? (What will you do with the outcome when you obtain it?)
Holton, Anderson and Thomas [11] report that generic scaffolding questions may
be broken into three general types, each relating to a stage of problem solving. At the
start, a teacher may ask ‘‘Have you seen a problem like this before? What are the
important ideas here? What information is given?’’ While students are working on
the problem the teacher might ask ‘‘Tell me what you are doing here? Why is this
idea better than this one?’’ In the final stage of problem solving a teacher may ask
‘‘Does the answer look reasonable? Is there another solution? Can you extend the
problem to cover different situations?’’ (For the complete list of these questions see
section 5.)
The questions of Holton et al. [11] provide a background to support the
scaffolding that a teacher provides in practice. Naturally though, a problem may
require a host of specific scaffolding ploys in order for students to surmount the
individual and group obstacles that arise in the process of solving a particular
problem.
But scaffolding does not require the teacher and student to be actually physically
present together. Scaffolding may be provided in book form, over the internet, by
telephone, and so on. However, we suspect that it is more valuable when student and
teacher are together because then the teacher can detect and use the many subtle cues
that are not otherwise available in order to provide appropriate scaffolding. Yet
again, scaffolding is not restricted to language. It may be provided by looks and
gestures.
Because the scaffolding of knowledge is a vital aspect of learning, it is impor-
tant that learners become aware of the scaffolding process. This process can then
be internalized for future use so that knowledge can be built or problems
solved without the assistance of the teacher. So there may be two purposes for
a given act of scaffolding. The first of these is the focus of the discussion above.
That purpose is to solve an immediate difficulty, to move a student forward to
gain new knowledge, new insight or a new skill or possibly to recall something
that has been learned and forgotten. But Pólya alerts us to a more long-term goal.
Pólya says
If the same question is repeated helpfully, the student will scarcely fail to notice
it and he will be induced to ask the same question by himself in a similar
 Scaffolding and metacognition 131

situation. Asking the question repeatedly, he may succeed once in eliciting the
right idea. By such a success, he discovers the right way of using the question,
and then he has assimilated it. [12, p. 4]
It is for this long-term goal as much as for its immediate use, that Schoenfeld’s
instructor reserves the right to ask the same key questions time after time.
The direction that scaffolding has taken in mathematics is almost certainly that
intended by Wood et al. [7]. However, if scaffolding is taken to signify any device
used to span a learner’s zone of proximal development, then any means that
accomplishes this must, by definition, be scaffolding. From this perspective, no
matter what a teacher’s basic pedagogical philosophy, scaffolding in some form or
other would be whatever they do to assist learning. If this were the case, then any act
of teaching is an act of scaffolding. To identify all acts of teaching with scaffolding
seems to us to be unhelpful and we will not use the word ‘scaffolding’ here in this
all-embracing sense.
We define scaffolding to be an act of teaching that (i) supports the immediate
construction of knowledge by the learner; and (ii) provides the basis for the future
independent learning of the individual.
It is important to note here that there are two aspects to our use of scaffolding.
The first is the immediate intent of supporting knowledge construction. The second
is the long-term intent. So, telling a student the formula for solving a quadratic
equation is not, by itself, an act of scaffolding even though it may be an act of
teaching. This is because there is nothing in the ‘telling’ that would appear to
anticipate any aspect of future learning. Scaffolding anticipates some act of con-
struction. It is not an act of closure. In this sense, the kinds of generic questions we
noted above and problem-related specific questions are acts of scaffolding. They
enable both the construction of immediate new knowledge by the student and will
provide a basis for the student’s further exploration of a topic or a problem, as well
as stimulating the development of heuristics that will later promote independent
learning or the independent solving of problems.
We should also point out that we do not believe it is possible to provide an
act of teaching that solely supports item (ii) of the definition alone. Item (i)
provides the context and the pretext for the interaction: without (i), item (ii) lacks
purpose.
The definition that we have proposed above does not tell us what an act of
scaffolding is but it does tell us how we can judge whether a given teaching act is an
act of scaffolding; that is, it identifies scaffolding by its function rather than its form
(cf Clarke and Lobato [13]). Finally, we note that an act of scaffolding (or even a
sequence of such acts) may not necessarily lead to successful learning or to the
solution of the problem being tackled.

3. Cognition and metacognition

Thinking takes place in a variety of ways. Where thinking is purposeful and is based
on experiential data, we call it cognition. So where the objects of purposeful thinking
are real objects (as perceived by the individual concerned) or are abstractions of real
objects and their properties, then the thinking is cognition. In this sense, cognition
mediates between the learner and the experiential world and the objects of cognition
132 D. Holton and D. Clarke

metacognition

cognition

‘real world’

Figure 1. The relationship between metacognition, cognition and the ‘real world’.

are real objects, ideas and abstractions. Hence learners can be engaging in cognition
when they are working with parallel lines, whether or not a drawing of parallel lines
exists in their sight.
Another form of purposeful thought, and one that is also involved with problem
solving, is metacognition. (For a discussion of metacognition in relation to school
mathematics see Schoenfeld, [10].) Metacognition mediates between the learner and
their cognition. While cognition can be considered as the way learners’ minds act on
the ‘real world’, metacognition is the way that their minds act on their cognition.
This relationship is indicated in figure 1.
It is worth noting that metacognition comes into play when cognition becomes
problematic. As Wilson and Clarke [14] say ‘Metacognition becomes essential when
tasks are more challenging’. This may occur at any stage in a contemplative situation
from the beginning to the end. Hence metacognition has been strongly linked with
problem solving where problems are usually not of any standard type.
Schoenfeld [10] suggests that metacognition involves three aspects. These are:
(i) control or self-regulation; (ii) knowledge of one’s own thought processes; and
(iii) beliefs and intuitions. Schoenfeld [10, p. 355] describes the first of these in the
following way
In the midst of intellectual activity . . . you kept tabs on how well things were
going. If things appeared to be proceeding well, you continued along the same
path; if they appeared to be problematic, you took stock and considered other
options. Monitoring and assessing progress ‘on line’, and acting in response to
the assessments of on line progress, are the components of self-regulation.
Further, Schoenfeld [10, p. 358ff ] makes a strong case for the importance of
beliefs in practice. For instance, if students believe that all mathematical problems
can be solved in 5 minutes that will have a significant effect on the time that they are
prepared to spend thinking about a problem. Intuition is also an important aspect of
professional mathematicians’ armouries and leads them to try directions in solving
problems that are not necessarily even clear to their peers.
Wilson and Clarke [14], define metacognition as the awareness that individuals
have of their own thinking; their evaluation of that thinking; and their regulation of
 Scaffolding and metacognition 133

that thinking. This seems to cover the first two of Schoenfeld’s aspects of metacogni-
tion but says nothing about beliefs and intuition which would appear to have an
important role in ‘thinking about one’s thinking’. This is because Wilson and Clarke
were interested in the processes of metacognition and not on issues that inform the
metacognitive decision making. Certainly, beliefs and intuition incline the learners’
actions to certain directions, as we have seen above, but then so do the learners’
health and other conditions relating to their general comfort and well-being. Wilson
and Clarke [14] acknowledge this when they say
Personal attributes, such as prior knowledge and motivation . . . can also
impact upon a student’s success in problem solving.
Wilson and Clarke [14] have some interesting contributions to make concerning
the processes of awareness, evaluation, regulation and their interaction. By meta-
cognitive awareness, they mean the individual’s cumulative knowledge of their own
acquired competencies and their on-going knowledge of the mental processes that
are in progress. Evaluation refers to the judgements that are made regarding the
individual’s thinking in particular situations. Finally, regulation involves the use of
metacognition to deploy the individual’s knowledge and direct their thinking.
When faced with a problem solving activity, Wilson and Clarke [14] found that
students consistently began by utilizing awareness. Regulation and evaluation were
then used in a variety of different orders but the problem-solving process generally
ended with evaluation.
The results obtained by Wilson and Clarke [14] were partly based on
Metacognitive Action Cards. These were used to help review students’ use of
metacognition and to support the students’ reflection and reconstruction of their
thought processes. We list the contents of the 14 cards in section 5 of this paper.
In order to parallel our discussion on scaffolding we propose a definition of
metacognition. By metacognition we mean any thinking act that operates on a
cognitive thought in order to assist in the process of learning or the solution of a
problem. Note that we refer to acts of metacognition and we may use this definition
in order to assess whether or not a given thinking act is one of metacognition or not.
There are a number of things to be said about this definition. First, although
metacognition functions to solve problems (or to support learning), a given
metacognitive act may not eventually assist in solving a particular problem: the
thought may lead to a dead end. Second, metacognitive control, self-regulation,
awareness, and evaluation all describe purposeful acts. They all operate on cognitive
objects and only have meaning in the presence of a problem. Here the problem may
be how to understand a new concept or procedure; that is, a problem of learning.
Third, according to the definition above, beliefs, intuition and knowledge of one’s
own thought processes are not metacognitive. This is because they are not thinking
acts. They may indeed influence metacognition as we have described above, but they
are not in themselves metacognitive.

4. Scaffolding agents and domains

It would seem from the literature, that scaffolding is required when the scaffoldee
encounters a situation they find difficult to understand or a problem that they are
unable to solve by their own ‘unassisted efforts’ (Wood, Bruner and Ross [7]).
134 D. Holton and D. Clarke

Further, this scaffolding is provided by an expert – an ‘adult or a more competent

peer’ (Bruner [9]). Presumably, the expert assistant, in a situation where the
scaffoldee is having difficulty with a problem, not only knows the solution but can
also suggest a pathway for the scaffoldee to follow in order to obtain a solution.
But this suggests the questions: What if there is no expert present? Can there then
be no scaffolding? Who else can provide the scaffolding act? We believe that the
scaffolding metaphor is still a useful one to describe the act that is involved and,
importantly, to suggest some form of pedagogical action. As far as this latter
purpose is concerned, it is important to provide students with a means to solve
problems when no potential external scaffolder is at hand. Indeed, we consider that
one of the major goals of education is to promote such learner independence. We
therefore propose that there are three scaffolding types: expert scaffolding, reciprocal
scaffolding, and self-scaffolding that operate in two scaffolding domains: conceptual
scaffolding and heuristic scaffolding.
We consider the domains first. Conceptual scaffolding is scaffolding the aim of
which is the promotion of conceptual development, while heuristic scaffolding relates
to the development of heuristics for learning or problem solving, that transcend
specific content. In a mathematical situation, ‘concept’ refers to mathematical
content while ‘heuristic’ is concerned with approaches that may be taken. We give
examples of each of these below in the explanation to table 1. In view of the fact that
scaffolding has a two-fold purpose, it may not be possible for an act of scaffolding to
be associated purely with concepts or heuristics.

4.1. Expert scaffolding

Situations of expert scaffolding involve a scaffolder with specific responsibility for the
learning of others. This is largely the notion of scaffolding that was originally
proposed by Wood et al. [7], but we want to amplify this notion somewhat. In Wood
et al., the scaffolder was an expert in the subject or problem under investigation and
was most likely a teacher in the widest sense of the word. For instance, a parent
helping a child to talk could be thought of as scaffolding the child to talk. This
traditional scaffolder is one who thoroughly knows all of the material that they wish
to teach and so is able to give both concept and heuristic scaffolding.
However, an expert may find themselves in a situation where they are unable to
give conceptual scaffolding and are only able to use their expertise to provide
heuristic scaffolding. This is because they are in a position where they do not know
‘the answer’. The prototypical example of this is the scaffolding that takes place
between a supervising professor and a graduate student. Here the supervisor knows
the area of research well but does not know precisely what the student will discover.
So the supervisor is unable to provide much conceptual scaffolding. The supervisor
does, however, have certain skills and knowledge that can be used to guide the
student to finding the result for her(him)self. Hence they are certainly able to provide
the required heuristic scaffolding. It should be noted however, that heuristic
scaffolding does not exclusively take place in an academic’s office. We provide
such an example below that took place in the classroom.
We would like to emphasize here that, in the interest of promoting the long-term
goal of learner independence, the expert may choose to engage in heuristic scaffold-
ing in preference to conceptual scaffolding.
 Scaffolding and metacognition 135

The subtle difference between an expert acting with and without complete
concept knowledge may potentially be significant in at least two ways. First,
knowing the possibilities of the situation, the expert with full knowledge of the
mathematical situation may be able to guide the learners to a greater depth of
knowledge simply because they know that this knowledge exists. Otherwise the
expert may not persist with learners when they seem to be making no progress
because such a scaffolder does not know that valuable ideas are close at hand. These
scaffolders may not recognize the appropriate scaffolding required to reach these
interesting goals.
We illustrate this with the following problem. Consider two subtraction
problems. They both have the same answer. What are the values of a and b?

4ab 400
400 ab4
... ...

An expert without full knowledge of the solution may be satisfied when the
learners find the values of a and b here. However, it is possible for the students to
develop an interesting generalization. An expert scaffolder may move learners to
considering what happens if the 4 s are changed to 5 s or to any other digit. This is
because of the relation between this number and the values of a and b. If we change
the 4 to an n, where n is any non-zero digit, then 10a þ b ¼ 9n.
The second resulting difference is that an expert without full knowledge may not
know that there is a ‘nicer’ method of solution than the first one that is produced and
so will accept that method and move on. In the example above, where we are
interested in solving the original problem, the learners prompted by such a scaffolder
may find that this problem can be solved using algebra. For instance, by setting up
and solving the equation

400 þ 10a þ b
400 ¼ 400
ð100a þ 10b þ 4Þ:

As a result the scaffolder may stop at this point. However, there is a much simpler
solution technique that only requires knowledge of the subtraction algorithm. With
the sum on the right, when we subtract 4 from 0 we have to rearrange things so that
we take 4 from 10. This gives 6 as the units’ digit of the answer on the right. But this
has to be the same as the units’ digit in the sum on the left. Hence b ¼ 6. Similarly we
can determine that a ¼ 3.
The latter method is ‘nicer’ in that it uses a simpler technique, is more efficient
and is accessible to a wider range of students. The expert may or may not be aware of
such alternative solutions and their acts of scaffolding will inevitably reflect this.
It should be noted though, that the extra knowledge of the expert could be a
disadvantage if it is used to lead a student away from a solution that they might have
found for themselves toward a nice one known to the scaffolder. This tension
between the personal value of a student-generated solution and the need to make
students aware of the existence of a more elegant solution represents one of the most
fundamental pedagogical decisions regularly confronted by teachers.
Finally, it is worth noting that an expert with full knowledge has more options
open to them than one less well informed, but the actions taken by either may be
identical in certain situations.
136 D. Holton and D. Clarke

4.2. Reciprocal scaffolding

Situations of reciprocal scaffolding take place where two (or more) people are
involved in working collaboratively on a common task. This may be a problem or
a situation involving the learning of new content knowledge. Because of the different
skills that they bring to the work, each may provide a contribution that is a form of
scaffolding. Typically such scaffolding occurs in the classroom when students are
working in groups but the same scaffolding will occur when a research group is
working together or in other team situations that involve people of comparable
ability. In this type of scaffolding, both conceptual and heuristic scaffolding domains
may be involved. The term ‘reciprocal scaffolding’ was first used in Holton and
Thomas [2].
At a given moment, an individual engaged in reciprocal scaffolding may play the
part of an ‘expert’ or a ‘student’ peer. For a particular interaction, any one of the
group of peers may take either of these roles. However, such situations are fluid and
change from moment to moment and from interaction to interaction. In such
situations, the group draws upon the different experience and knowledge of the
individuals involved. As each member brings their knowledge to bear, they may take
the transient role of an expert. However, over the total period of involvement, the
lead in scaffolding passes from one person to another and is not totally the domain
of any individual.

4.3. Self-scaffolding
Finally, by self-scaffolding (see Holton and Thomas [2]) we mean situations in which
an individual is able to provide scaffolding for her(him)self when any problem or
concept that is new to the individual is being tackled. We argue that this form of
scaffolding is an essential tool for the individual when learning new material or
solving significant problems of any kind. Both scaffolding domains can be used by
the self-scaffolder.
Generally a self-scaffolder will not have the same heuristic knowledge to hand as
an expert; nor will they have the experience in their use; nor will they know the
answer to the problem being considered. Almost certainly they will not have the
same superior subject knowledge that an expert would have. In mathematics, for
instance, they would not have the same immediate access to a range of definitions,
theorems, algorithms, etc. (Note, however, that this may not be the case if the self-
scaffolder is a research mathematician.) But there is one aspect where self-scaffolders
exceed the ability of the other two types of scaffolder mentioned above; that is, in
self- knowledge. Self-scaffolders know, to a large extent, what they know in terms of
content knowledge, heuristic knowledge and learning styles. So they know whether
or not they know the formula for solving a quadratic. They know if they prefer to
draw a diagram. These things are not always known to expert scaffolders. Hence
such scaffolders may provide scaffolding on the incorrect assumption that a student
can use the quadratic formula. They may also not see, for example, the value of
suggesting a diagram to that student in an algebraic context.
It should be pointed out that anyone may participate as scaffolder in any of the
three scaffolding situations depending on the context in which they are involved. For
instance, a teacher working with a class or group of students may be an expert using
either conceptual or heuristic scaffolding as they feel is appropriate. But that same
 Scaffolding and metacognition 137

person may be in a reciprocal scaffolding situation with peers in the staff room. On the
other hand, when working on a problem of their own, they may be a self- scaffolder.
In general, scaffolding seems to be both ‘learned’ from the scaffolding activity of
others and also to be invented by the individual. In our experience, much of
scaffolding is intuitive (even expert scaffolding) and possibly will only be consciously
employed when the problem under consideration is so difficult that it is not amenable
to well-known methods of attack.

4.4. Zones
In the order that we have listed them in table 1, there is a gradation through the types
of scaffolding situation. In going from expert to self-scaffolding, the locus of
authority changes from being external to the learner (or problem solver) to being
internal. At the same time, the expert ability of the agent of the scaffolding will
generally decrease.
In using the word ‘zone’ in this context we are deliberately invoking two related
uses of the term. For us, the zones in question share the characteristics of the
‘construction zones’ of Newman, Griffith and Cole [6] and the ‘zone of proximal
development’ posited by Vygotsky [8]. What distinguishes one zone from the other in
our scheme is the matter under construction and the relative positioning of the
participants in the act of scaffolding.
At this point, we provide some examples of scaffolding in the various zones.
Zone 1: Conceptual scaffolding by an expert.
‘The teacher asked if someone could draw two non-identical ramps with the
same steepness - a difficult question that prompted argumentation’ (Clarke and
Lobato, [13, p. 20]).
Here the teacher is the expert who is seeking to get students to bring to bear their
content knowledge in a learning situation relating to gradient.
Zone 2: Heuristic scaffolding by an expert.
In this example, the teacher was interacting with a group of students trying to
find the answer to a problem that she had posed to the class. Lauren and Karen were
students in the group.
The teacher asked the following questions of Lauren and Karen: ‘What have
you done so far?’ ‘Explain your working’. ‘Where’d you get one hundred and
eighty from?’ ‘Why did you multiply them together? Why not add?’ ‘And
what’s the answer?’ (Holton and Thomas [2, pp. 92–93]).

Table 1. Scaffolding types, agents and domains.

Scaffolding Scaffolding Instructional Scaffolding domain
type agent location
conceptual heuristic

expert expert external zone 1 zone 2

reciprocal peer mutual zone 3 zone 4
self self interior zone 5 zone 6
138 D. Holton and D. Clarke

In this interaction, even a numerically specific question like ‘Where’d you get one
hundred and eighty from?’, is intended to encourage the heuristic of regular
evaluation rather than to develop a particular procedure.
Zone 3: Conceptual scaffolding in the situation of reciprocal scaffolding.
Here two students were working together on a problem posed by the teacher to
the class. Karen was one of the two students.
‘Karen: That’s quite high, isn’t it?’ and ‘But why do we divide a million by five
hundred to get that answer?’ (Holton and Thomas [2, pp. 96–97]).
Karen’s questions prompted Lauren to reflect on the mathematical legitimacy of
the procedure they were employing.
Zone 4: Heuristic scaffolding in a reciprocal scaffolding situation.
Here a group of students were working on a problem posed by the teacher to the
class. Lauren and Karen were two of the students in the group.
‘Lauren: Does everyone understand what we did with number one’ and ‘Karen:
What are we doing?’ (Holton and Thomas [2, pp. 95–96]).
These questions stimulated discussion of general issues of understanding rather
than problem-specific details of mathematical correctness or procedure.
Zone 5: Conceptual scaffolding by a self-scaffolder.
In this example, Lucas was recounting his thoughts while solving a number
problem.
‘Lucas: I was thinking to put the 5 in the middle and then go 6, 8 down here but
that wouldn’t work because you’d have to put the odd numbers across here and
they’d add up to less’ (Wilson and Clarke [14, p. 16]).
Lucas was reflecting on the mathematical justification of the particular numbers he
had selected. He was recounting an evaluation of mathematical correctness.
Zone 6: Heuristic scaffolding by a self-scaffolder.
In this situation, Lucas described his thoughts in terms that were less
content-specific and more related to generic problem solving strategies.
‘Lucas: After I started off doing it that way and I realised it wouldn’t work so
the other part of the plan was to do it a different way, and then I sort of
checked it mentally by putting a 2 in there’ (Wilson and Clarke [14, p. 15]).
Each of the preceding six examples are distinguished by the relative positioning
of the scaffolder within the scaffolding situation, and by whether it was a math-
ematical concept or procedure that was being scaffolded or a more general approach
to problem solving or learning.

5. Self-scaffolding and metacognition

It is our contention that scaffolding acts are analogous to metacognitive acts. In fact,
we propose that self-scaffolding is essentially the same as metacognition. We base
 Scaffolding and metacognition 139

our argument on the discussion above and on a comparison of Scaffolding Questions

taken from Holton, Anderson and Thomas ([11, pp. 114–115], where they are
derived from the scaffolding literature) and the Metacognitive Action Cards of
Wilson and Clarke [14].
The Scaffolding Questions were designed to provide examples of scaffolding for
use by teachers who were implementing problem solving. The questions are generic
in nature first because such questions are valuable in themselves in a variety of
situations and second because it is hard to provide more specific examples of
scaffolding without going into a detailed discussion of a particular problem. The
questions were presented to teachers in the order given below, as it was expected that
problem solving would pass through three stages with a beginning (Getting started),
a middle (While students are working on the problem) and an ending (After students
think they are finished).

Getting started
What are the important ideas here?
Can you rephrase the problem in your own words?
What is this asking us to find?
What information is given?
What conditions apply?
Anyone want to guess the answer?
Anyone seen a problem like this before?
What strategy could we use to get started?
Which one of these ideas should we pursue?

While students are working

Tell me what you are doing?
Why did you think of that?
Why are you doing this?
What are you going to do with the result once you have it?
Why do you think that that stage is reasonable?
Why is that idea better than that one?
You’ve been trying that idea for 5 minutes. Are you getting anywhere with it?
Do you really understand what the problem is about?
Can you justify that step?
Are you convinced that that bit is correct?
Can you find a counterexample?

After students are finished

Have you answered the problem?
Have you considered all the cases?
Have you checked your solution?
Does it look reasonable?
Is there another solution?
Could you explain your answer to the class?
Is there another way to solve the problem?
Could you generalise the problem?
Can you extend the problem to cover different situations?
Can you make up another similar problem?
140 D. Holton and D. Clarke

The Metacognitive Action Cards of Wilson and Clarke [14] had a different goal
from the Scaffolding Questions above. They were used in an experimental situation
in order to help students recall what metacognitive actions they had taken in various
problem-solving situations. To serve this purpose, the authors had designed the
cards to display specific metacognitive acts. They were fewer in number than the
Scaffolding Questions, but empirical trialling of their use demonstrated that students
found the range sufficient for adequate description of their thought processes. The
Cards were also generic in nature as the research project was more focused on the
way metacognition functioned generally than in any variation due to the content
domain of the task.
Awareness
I thought about what I already knew
I tried to remember if I had ever done a problem like this before
I thought about something I had done another time that had been helpful
I thought ‘I know this sort of problem’
I thought ‘I know what to do’

Evaluation
I thought about how I was going
I thought about whether what I was doing was working
I checked my work
I thought ‘Is this right?’
I thought ‘I can’t do it’

Regulation
I made a plan to work it through
I thought about a different way to solve the problem
I thought about what I would do next
I changed the way I was working
Despite their different purposes and the fact that one was concerned with
scaffolding and the other with metacognition, there is a remarkable correspon-
dence between the two lists. Item by item almost every card can be identified with a
question and vice versa. For instance, we cite the following five closely-related
instances:
‘I tried to remember if I had ever done a problem like this before’ and ‘Anyone
seen a problem like this before?’
‘I thought about something I had done another time that had been helpful’ and
‘What strategy could we use to get started?’
‘I thought ‘‘Is this right?’’ ’ and ‘Are you convinced that that bit is correct?’
‘I checked my work’ and ‘Can you justify that step?’
‘I thought about a different way to solve the problem’ and ‘Is there another
way to solve the problem?’
One of the few Action Cards that does not have a Scaffolding Question
equivalent is ‘I thought ‘‘I can’t do it’’ ’. Although a teacher may expect students
to think this way they will almost certainly observe when a student is unable to solve
 Scaffolding and metacognition 141

a problem and would more than likely work round the issue to build up the student’s
confidence. Hence such an acknowledgment of lack of success is unlikely to appear
in a list of generic scaffolding questions.
Of course it should be asked whether the similarities here owe more to
their problem-solving roots than to the fact that scaffolding and metacognition
are closely related. For example, both lists might reflect the influence of pre-existing
theoretical frameworks, such as Pólya’s three phase model (Pólya [12]). However,
the utility of both lists in their respective domains suggests instead that such
theoretical frameworks reflect the structure of our metacognitive thinking around
problems as well as our scaffolding of others to solve problems. Certainly, it is our
contention that there is essentially very little difference between acts of scaffolding
and acts of metacognition. In particular, self-scaffolding is essentially metacognition
and vice versa.

6. Conclusions

What we have tried to show in this paper is that the scaffolding act, the mechanism
that may take a learner to their potential for development, is something that can be
applied in a variety of recognizable situations. It can be applied by an agent in a
situation where the agent knows the end result of the learner’s activity; it can be
applied by an agent to assist the learner where the agent does not have complete
knowledge of the situation; it can be applied mutually in a group of learners; and it
can be applied by an individual to their own thinking. Scaffolding supports the
process of knowledge construction, and we have distinguished between two domains
of construction: conceptual and heuristic. The combination of agency and domain
produce six construction zones of scaffolding activity and we have attempted to
illustrate these with brief examples from research in which we have been involved.
In combination, these zones chart a range of situations that relate the scaffolding
of the mathematics teacher to the metacognitive self-scaffolding of the mathematics
learner (or problem solver). As such, this structure suggests a new pedagogy, the
goal of which is the progressive relocation of scaffolding agency from teacher
to learner.
We have argued that scaffolding and metacognition draw upon the same set of
actions. The outward signs that we see of scaffolding in a learning environment are
equivalent to those used by the individual when engaging in metacognition. The
external dialogue of scaffolding becomes the inner dialogue of metacognition. Bruner
[9] recognized this when he said ‘. . . then the tutor or the aiding peer serves the
learner as a vicarious form of consciousness and control’. In this situation, the expert
is acting as an external ‘brain’ to provide the consciousness and control that the
individual could have provided for themselves had they been aware of what might
have been useful. In proposing the recognition of reciprocal scaffolding and self-
scaffolding as legitimate and important classroom activities, we are advocating the
progressive devolution of the role of scaffolding agent from teacher to learner as a
significant curricular goal.
A knowledge of conceptual and heuristic scaffolding in relationship to specific
acts of scaffolding and metacognition is of great importance in the classroom. We
believe that teachers need to be aware of these relationships in order to employ
scaffolding effectively in their teaching. By providing activities that promote the use
142 D. Holton and D. Clarke

of scaffolding acts by students through reciprocal and self-scaffolding, teachers will

enable their students to become better learners and better problem solvers in
situations when they do not have expert assistance to hand. To implement such a
curriculum, teachers must make conceptual and heuristic scaffolding a part of
the classroom conversation. It should be noted that the student who cannot
make a contribution of content can certainly be encouraged to make one
of heuristics and teachers should encourage such contributions. Such classroom
conversations and activities will provide an important bridge between the instruc-
tional support provided by the teacher’s scaffolding activity and the students’
development of self-scaffolding expertise and increasing self-control of their own
learning.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Les Steffe, Alan Schoenfeld, and Pat Thompson for
their comments on an earlier version of this paper presented in New Orleans on
April 3 2002, at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research
Association.

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