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Cagandahan

Facts: Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC. In
her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus,
she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. The RTC granted the petition. The OSG, however, sought a reversal of the ruling.
Issue: Whether or not respondent can change his gender in his birth certificate from female to male
Ruling: The SC ruled that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks
of his/her sex. Furthermore, respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Thus, the
court respected respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male.
Silverio
Facts: petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the RTC. He was born in the City of Manila with a name registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio".
His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a
man’s body, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex
from "male" to "female."
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can change his first name and gender in his birth certificate from female to male
Ruling: The petition lacks merit. A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment. A
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose
may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Also, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable. While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal
basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Star Paper Corp.
Facts: Petitioner a corporation engaged in trading principally of paper products. Respondent Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol)
is a regular employee of the company. Simbol was employed by the company where He met Alma Dayrit, also an
employee, whom he married. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married,
one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995. Simbol resigned.
However, Simbol denied this. Simbol alleged that he did not resign voluntarily; he was compelled to resign. He averred
that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code
Issue: whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of the
employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management prerogative
Ruling:
No, it is not a valid exercise of management prerogative and violates the rights of employees under the constitution. In the
case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-
employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol to Alma Dayrit could be detrimental to its business
operations. Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but they are
free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor
Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial
scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of
petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right
to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
Duncan vs Glaxo
Facts: Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representativ. The contract stipulates that he agrees to disclose to
management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing
drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the
company.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Bicol area and entered into a romantic relationship with
Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. They got married. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of
conflict of interest. Despite several reminders and time allowance, Tecson was not able to resolve the issue, which led to
his constructive dismissal. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid.

Issue: Whether or not the policy of Glaxo is valid

Ruling: Glaxo has a right to guard its confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against
personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its
economic interest cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce
such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.

Makati Shangrila vs Harper

Facts: Christian Harper was a Norweigian who came to Manila on a business trip. He checked-in at Makati Shangri-la Hotel,
but he was murdered inside his hotel room. The heirs of the victim blame the hotel's gross negligence in providing the most
basic security system of its guests. Respondents sought to recover for various damages from petitioner. RTC ruled in favor
of them while petitioner contended that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLEES ARE THEHEIRS OF THE LATE CHRISTIAN HARPER, AS THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE
ONRECORD SUPPORTING SUCH RULING.

Issue: Whether or not THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WERE ABLE TO PROVE WITH COMPETENTEVIDENCE THE
AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT THEY ARE THEWIDOW AND SON OF MR.
CHRISTIAN HARPER

Ruling:
Republic vs Albios

Facts: Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios got married before Judge Calo in Mandaluyong. 2 years after their marriage,
Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage
was a marriage in jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship. Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor
of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of consent because the parties failed to freely give their
consent to the marriage.

Issue: Whether or not a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship is void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent

Ruling: The marriage is valid. their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. The court does not look at the underlying secrets behind consent. marriages entered into for other purposes such
as convenience and money provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31are equally valid.

Trinidad vs CA

Facts: Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad and thus he is demands from the defendants to partition
the land into three equal shares and to give him the (1/3) individual share of his late father Defendants denied that plaintiff
was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendantscontended that Inocentes was single when he died, before plaintiff’s
birth. Witness Gerardo testified that Inocentes and Felicidad Molato are the parents of Arturio and also identified pictures
where the respondents were with Arturio and his family. Another witness, Meren, that she was present when the two were
married. Arturio also presented his baptismal certificate as his birth certificate was destroyed during the war.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented are sufficient to prove filiation

Ruling: Although a marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner’s failure to present
it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. Gerardo’s testimony that
arturio’s parents cohabitated gives rise to the presumption that they have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The
baptismal certificate and family pictures are likewise sufficient. Use of surname without objection is also presumptive
evidence of legitimacy.

Macua Vda. De Avenido vs Avenido

Facts: This case involves a contest between Tecla Avenido and Peregrina Avenido both claiming to have been validly
married to the same man, now deceased. Tecla instituted a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Peregrina on the ground that she is the lawful wife of the deceased. RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Tecla’s
failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio as the same while recorded with the local civil registrar, were
destroyed during the war. The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla as there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
them as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four children.

Issue: Who between the two is the legal wife of Eustaquio

Ruling: Tecla is the legal wife. While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO
was established by the testimonial evidence furnished by a witness who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony,
and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR
of Talibon, Bohol. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

Wiegel vs Sempio-Diy

Facts: Respondent Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with herein petitioner Lilia Wiegel on the
ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to Maxion. Lilia claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first
husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union.

Issue: whether or not said prior marriage void or merely voidable

Ruling: Petitioner said that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband. The court
said that there is no need for petitioner to prove this because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
voidable therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent,
she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is void. A marriage though void
still needs a judicial declaration of such fact otherwise they would still be regarded as married.
Cosca vs Judge Palaypayon

Facts: Complainants alleged that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage licenses. Thus,
some couples were able to get married the absence of a marriage license. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the
marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, The marriage
contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent are guilty of violating the provision of Article 4 of the Family Code

Ruling: An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting
parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what the court provides for pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that priests or ministers
of any religious denominationor sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall
be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial
agencies of the Government. Thus, the judge, having acted with serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in
the performance of judicial duties, shall be punished with a fine and a stern warning.

Geronimo vs CA and Antonio Esman

Facts: Graciana Geronimo died without leaving will no descendants nor ascendants. She was survived by her 2 brothers
Tomas and petitioner, her nephew Salvador and her husband-oppositor Antonio Esman. However, the husband capacity as
an heir is now being questioned in view of the discovery by the petitioner that the marriage between the oppositor and
decedent was celebrated without marriage license. The petitioner contend that the a certification issued by Local Civil
Registrar shows that the marriage license number is not indicated in the contract and marriage license was issued.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A.Esman was valid
Ruling: Yes.
Judgment of the trial court by public respondent stated that the non-indication of the number could only serve to prove
that the number was not recorded. It could not be accepted as convincing proof of non-issuance of the required marriage
license. The issue of validity of the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law requires that the marriage
license number would be indicated in the marriage contract itself. The non-indication of the number may just be a mistake
on the part of the registrar.

Alcantara vs Alcantara

Facts: Restituto Alcantara (petitioner) filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Rosita Alcantara (respondent)
before the RTC of Manila alleging that on Decemeber 1982, without securing the required marriage license, he and
respondent went to the City Hall of Manila to look for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a fixer
who arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went through another
marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, appearing on the marriage contract, was procured in Carmona,
Cavite, neither party was a resident of Carmona. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
cannot be given weight because the certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr.
Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage
license number. The petition for annulment was dismissed by the RTC of Manila and was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: whether the marriage is void ab initio on the ground that no valid marriage license existed during the solemnization
of the marriage

Ruling: The marriage contract between the two reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also
issued by the local civil registrar specifically identifying them further validating the fact that it was in fact issued to the
them. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a
marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.

Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are residents of the city or
municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that does not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. As to the discrepancy in the
marriage license number, the court held that it is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error.
Negre vs Rivera

Facts: Rivera, the municipal judge of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, was administratively charged for having performed an illegal
marriage ceremony as there was no marriage license. He allegedly performed the marriage between Corazon Negre and
Amado Orpilla. when the marriage was allegedly solemnized, Miss Negre and Orpilla had filed applications for a
marriage license with the local civil registrar of Bacarra. However, no license was issued because it turned out that Orpilla
is a married man. He had misrepresented to Judge Rivera that he was single. The marriage contract was already signed by
the parties when it was presented to Judge Rivera. However, Judge Rivera stressed that he signed the marriage contract
without having performed marriage ceremony. He wanted the parties to obtain a marriage license.

Issue: whether or not Judge Rivera should be absolved of the crime charged

Ruling: He acted imprudently in signing the marriage contract. It seems that in doing so he acted without malice. At the
time he signed the contract the parties had pending applications for a marriage license in the office of the local civil
registrar. The respondent assumed that a marriage license would be issued in due course after the expiration of ten days or
on September 15, 1972. Lack of malice mitigates respondent's negligence or indiscretion. he Court resolved to reprimand
him. He is admonished to exercise more care and circumspection in the performance of his duties.

People vs Bitdu

Facts: Mora Bitdu was married to Moro Halid, and she was also married to Moro Hajirol. She claims, however, that the
second marriage contracted by her with Hajirol took place after she had been divorced from her first husband Halid in
accordance with Mohammedan customs.

Issue: whether or not the divorce is legal as it took place in accordance with their customs

Ruling: The court recognized that both marriages were contracted according to tradition, but was unsatisfied to accept that
the divorce follows rules stated in the Koran. The court adds that even if it did, laws governing marriage are moral in
nature and as such are laws relating to public policy. Customs cannot have precedence over the laws. Although appellant
acted in good faith, everyone is presumed to know the law and in violating it, is not exempt from the consequences.
Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613) provides that marriages between Mohammedans may be performed according
to their religious practices, but no provision of the law exists the granting of divorce in accordance to their rites or
practices.

Ninal vs Badayog

Facts: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones. They had 3 children. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in
her death leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. A year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at
least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. In 1977, Pepito died in a car accident. After his death,
petitioners, whose successional rights would be affected, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
“annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is void

Ruling: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even
though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed.

Morigo vs People

Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete
lost contact with each other. However, they had exchanged letters and became sweethearts. They got married, but Lucia
went back to Canada. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which
was granted by the court. Then, Lucio married Lumbago. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the RTC of Bohol on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Lucio was charged with
Bigamy. Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification
of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy
Ruling: In the instant case no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. They signed
a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Under the circumstances of the present case, Supreme Court held that
petitioner has not committed bigamy.
Alcazar

Facts: Respondent Rey Alcazar married Veronica Cabacungan. After the wedding, they livedtogether for five days in
Mindoro where they consummated their marriage. However, after they went back to Manila, Rey left for Riyadh to work
for a year and a half. The couple did not communicate the whole time he was abroad despite numerous attempts by
petitioner to call him. And upon his return, he did not go home to Veronica nor did he contact her. Thus, Veronica filed a
complaint for nullity of marriage due to Rey’s physical incapability to consummate his marriage under Art. 45. Dr. Tayag
testified that Rey was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, hence, it is a sufficient ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations
Ruling: No, the Court scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough
to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated. Art 45 (5) of the Family Code refers to the lack of
power to copulate. However, Veronica admitted that they had intercourse at least once after their wedding and before Rey
left for abroad. Hence, this cannot be a ground for annulment. Furthermore, Dr. Tayag’s psychological report concluding
that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder did not help petitioner’s cause. It must be noted that
Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent. Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely
on information provided by petitioner.

De Castro vs De Castro
Facts: Annabelle and Reinel applied for a marriage license. However, the marriage license had expired. Thus, in order to
get married as soon as possible, they executed an Affidavit showing that they had been living together as husband and wife
for the last five years, hence, exempt from the marriage license requirement. They got married on the same date before a
judge. After the ceremony, however, they did not live together as husband and wife. Annabelle, then gave birth to a child.
nnabelle filed a petition for support against Reinel, claiming that he had not given support to her and their child.

In his answer, Reinel denied that he is married to Annabelle, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage
was facilitated by a fake affidavit. He alleged that they never cohabited with each other five years before their marriage,
hence they were not exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. He also denied being the father of Tricia.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Annabelle and Reinel is valid
Ruling: In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together
for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit. Falsity of the affidavit
cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement as they did not cohabitate. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage
void ab initio. The child however is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter; hence, she is entitled to support.
Abbas vs Abbas
Facts: Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas filed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the
ground of absence of marriage license. Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan. When they arrived in the Philippines, a
ceremony was conducted between them. In the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not
know the nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.

To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as the solemnizing
officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license issued to Abbas. Syed
presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the marriage license, based on its number,
indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to someone else.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid

Ruling: No. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the issuance of a valid marriage
license. The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in fact a valid
marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to Abbas. he fact that Abbas
did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in fact a valid marriage license issued to him nor
does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to Abbas. Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy
relied on the marriage contract and testimonies to prove the existence of the said license.
Republic vs Dayot
Facts: Jose and Felisa were married on 1986 through the execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with Rufina Pascual. Then, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Jose
also filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. He contended that his marriage with
Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the
marriage was secured through fraud.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is valid
Ruling: No, it is void ab initio for lacking the requirements of valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa
executed is merely a scrap of paper because they only started living together five months before their marriage. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. The falsity of
the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified
their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath.
Aranes vs Occiano
Facts: Judge Salvador Occiano solemnized the marriage of Mercedita Mata Arañes and Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. When Orobia died, the
petitioner’s right to inherit the properties of Orobia was not recognized, because the marriage was void. Petitioner prays
that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly
caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. Respondent judge said that he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite Marriage
License, he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to compassion, he proceeded to solemnize the
marriage. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and told the parties that their
failure to give it would render the marriage void. However, petitioner failed to comply.
Issue: Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction and without the requisite
marriage license
Ruling: The court held that “the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage in Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage
out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage”. Respondent judge
should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite Marriage License.
Navarro vs Judge Domagtoy
Facts: Domagtoy allegedly solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite the knowledge that the
groom has a subsisting marriage was merely separated. It was told that the wife of Gaspar left their conjugal home and has
not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said Judge likewise solemnized a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of the
law

Ruling: In the first allegation, Gaspar did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s
presumptive death. Thus, he remained married to Ida Penaranda. Therefore, there was error on the part of judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage. Likewise, he was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage outside his jurisdiction.
Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases, the Court finds respondent to have
acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is suspended for a period of six months.

Sy vs CA

Facts: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married on 1973. After some time, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Filipina
then filed for legal separation. Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of their
children to her. Later on, Filipina was punched and choked by Fernando. The Trial Court convicted him for slight
physical injuries only. Filipina then filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological
incapacity.

The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she assailed for the first time that
there was no marriage license during their marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony

Ruling: The Court concluded that the marriage between the petitioner and private respondent was void from the
beginning. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The issue on
psychological incapacity of private respondent was mooted by the conclusion that the marriage was void ab initio for lack
of marriage license at the time the marriage was solemnized.

Corpuz vs Santo Tomas


Facts: Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. Thereafter, he
went back to Canada for work and upon his return to the Philippines found out Daisylyn has an affair with another man.
Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce. Planning to remarry, he went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his
Canadian divorce decree but was denied considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law,
that the foregin divorce must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court.
Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce with The RTC which deniedthe petition on the basis that the
petitioner lacked locus standi and according to art 26 of the Family Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.
Issue: Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the foreign divorce decree
Ruling: The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of Filipino spouses. The legislative
intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the marital status of the Filipino spouse.
Fujiki vs Marinay
Facts: Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Marinay Philippines on 2004. In 2008, Marinay met another
Japanese, Maekara.. Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married in the Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara
and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Then, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment “. RTC denied the same based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, as a "third person” in
the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now
seeks to be judicially recognized.
Issue: Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
Ruling: Yes, because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize
the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
Petition was granted.

Bayot vs CA
Facts: Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix, born in
California. In 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which resulted to judgment ordering
the dissolution of the marriage and the distribution of conjugal properties.

After obtaining a Department of Justice affirmation of her Filipino citizenship, she then filed a declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological incapacity. Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss but CA reversed lower court’s decision. According to the CA, RTC ought to
have granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce
decree was granted since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.
Ruling: Yes, the divorce is valid. Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code states that: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” Foreign divorce can be
recognized in the Philippines provided that the divorce decree is fact and valid under the national law of the alien spouse.
The reckoning point is the citizenship of parties at the time the divorce was obtained. Thus, Rebecca was bound by the
national laws of USA where divorce was valid.

Ando vs DFA
Facts: Tungul married Kobayash, a Japanese. In 2004, Kobayashi obtained a divorce decree against Edelina in Japan.
Kobayashi later married someone else. In 2005, Edelina married Ando, also a Japanese.

Thereafter, Edelina tried to renew her passport but this time she wanted to use her married name – she wanted to use Ando’s
name. However, the DFA told her that same cannot be issued to her until she can prove by competent court decision that
her marriage with Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
In 2010, Edelina filed a petition for declaratory relief as she insists that she should be issued a passport bearing her married
name even without a judicial declaration that her marriage with Ando is valid because, according to the law, void and
voidable marriages enjoy the presumption of validity until proven otherwise.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief should prosper.
Ruling: No. She incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first appealed before the
secretary of foreign affair because the remedy available to her is provided in Section 9 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA8239 (Philippine Passport Act).
Second, her prayer to have her second marriage be “honored” is not proper. The proper remedy is for her to file a petition
for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven.

Garcia vs Recio
Facts: Recio, a Filipino, was married to Samson, an Australian citizen, in the Philippines. They lived together as husband
and wife in Australia. On 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court.
On 1994, Recio married Garcia where it was solemnized in Cabanatuan City. Since 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on 1998, claiming that she learned only in 1997,
Recio’s marriage with Samson.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of bigamy
Ruling: It was unclear whether or not the respondent was absolutely or limitedly divorced from his previous marriage. The
Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. It
did not absolutely establish petitioner’s legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.

Republic vs Orbecido
Facts: Orbecido was married to Villanueva in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter. In 1986, the wife left for US
bringing along their son. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen
and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He
thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry

HELD: Article 26 Par.2 includes cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. Hence, because Orbecido’s wife was already an American Citizen at the time she obtained the divorce, and such
capacitated her to remarry, Orbecido should likewise be allowed to remarry. However, since Cipriano was not able to
prove as fact his wife’s naturalization he is still barred from remarrying.
Van Dorn vs Romillo
Facts: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a Filipina while respondent Upton is an American. They were married in Hongkong in
1972 and lived in the Philippines. They had two children. They got divorced in Nevada, United States, and the petitioner
had remarried also in Nevada, this time to Van Dorn. Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be
ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property.

Issue: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling: Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. The divorce is binding on Upton as an American Citizen. Pursuant to his national law, private
respondent Richard Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue her to exercise control
over conjugal assets.

Quita vs CA
Facts: Quita and Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines. No children were born out of their marriage. On
1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of divorce in the US. Arturo died leaving no will. Then, Inciong filed a petition
with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine
Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Padlan and the surviving children,
all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted
until the death of Arturo, that the marriage between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated
during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
Issue: whether or not Dandan is the heir of the decedent

Ruling: No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that
they have been duly acknowledged by him. Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this
status presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage is considered void ab inito
rendering her not the surviving spouse.

The decision of the CA ordering the remand of the case is affirmed. The question to be determined by the trial court should
be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship
was already resolved by the trial court.

Pilapil vs Ibay Somera


Facts: Pilapil, a Filipino, was married with respondent, Geiling, a German in Germany. They had a daughter. However,
private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The petitioner then filed an action for
legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC in Manila.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was
granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while
still married to Pilapil, the latter had an affair with another men.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no
longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
Ruling: In prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should only be the
offended spouse. Since private respondent already obtained a valid divorce in his country, its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner
and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case.
Llorente vs CA
Facts: Lorenzo, and petitioner Paula were married in the Philippines. Soon after, he left for the US he became a US
Citizen through naturalization. Thereafter, he discovered that his wife was living with his brother and a child was born.
Llorente filed a divorce in the US, which later on became final. Then, he married Alicia and had 3 children. He made his
last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate
that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo
died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. The trial court ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia
is void because the divorce he obtained abroad is void. The trial court ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence divorce
is not applicable to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized


Ruling: Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he
married Alicia and executed his will Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is
not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen, and the
US approve of the same.
Insofar as the issue on Lorenzo’s last will and testament is concerned, it must be respected. He is an alien and is not
covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was submitted to our courts for probate, then the case was
remanded to the lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to prove the validity of the will.

Roehr vs Rodriguez
Facts: Petitioner Roehr, a German, married private respondent Rodriguez, a Filipina, in Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified in Negros Oriental. Then, Rodriguez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Makati RTC. Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree
also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang. Wolfgang filed another motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public
Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards child custody
and support.
Ruling: Yes. the divorce was validly obtained in Germany and was recognized in the Philippines. The legal effects of
divorce, even if obtained abroad, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res
judicata to a foreign judgment, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so. The proceedings in the German court were merely summary. It cannot be said that Carmen
Rodriguez was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court. Therefore, the divorce decree did
not provide for the finality of the custody of children.
In addition, the divorce decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that
private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to
determine the issue of parental custody.

Catalan vs Catalan-Lee

Facts: Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the US from his first
wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner Merope. When Orlando died intestate in the
Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. Then, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando
from his first marriage, filed a similar petition. Respondent also alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested
person qualified to file such petition. Furthermore, she alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner
by Amor saying that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to Bristol. The RTC
had acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and that divorce was
not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.

Issue: Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.

Ruling: Yes. Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself. The trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws
of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, the proceedings were remanded to the trial
court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

Barnuevo vs Fuster
Facts: Fuster and Yanez were married in Spain. Fuster came to the Philippines, settled, and acquire property. After several
years, Yanez also went to the Philippines to live with his husband. Subsequently, they made an agreement in a public
instrument by which they resolved to live apart and authorizing Yanez to go back to Spain and reside therein. Yanez returned
to the Philippines and commenced divorce proceedings against her husband. She prayed the conjugal society be liquidated,
and that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her, and, as to the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her,
that the defendant be ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas. As a special preferred defense, Fuster alleged
that neither the trial court nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint, because, as to the allowance for support, since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of Manila, or
of any other place in the Philippine Islands.
Issue: Whether the courts of the Philippines are competent or have jurisdiction to decree the divorce now on appeal
Ruling: The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within the personal status of the
husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go
beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private law of
persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. The jurisdiction of courts are generally submitted to the territorial
principle. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within the dominions of Spain. Foreign
Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the
Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their nation which
gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of their nation. In
the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of
the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein.
Llave vs Republic

Facts: Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice before his death, initially under the Islamic laws and tradition and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status
was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife,
and upon his death, his widow.

Private respondents Zorayda and her son, Adib, filed a complaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda under
civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita.

Issue: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous

Ruling: Yes. The marriage between Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim
rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code
of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of
the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of
during its effectivity.

Estrellita claims that Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita because Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But it was already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that
"Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil
Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.

Iwasawa vs Gangan
Facts: Iwasawa met respondent in the Philippines. Respondent presented herself as “single” and “has never married
before.” They eventually got married in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In 2009, respondent
confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband passed away. Petitioner confirmed that she was indeed
married to one Arambulo. This prompted him to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as
null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one.

Issue: Whether or not their marriage is bigamous


Ruling: Petitioner was able to submit documentary evidence establishing the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private
respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that
respondent married Arambulo on 1994; (2) that respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner on 2002; (3) that
there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married
petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondent's marriage with
Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved. Thus, the marriage between respondent and petitioner is bigamous, hence
null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when they contracted marriage.

Manzano vs Sanchez

Facts: Herminia avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David. On 1993, however, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to
know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
“separated.” He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living
together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit. Respondent Judge alleges that
he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage valid

Ruling: No. Respondent Judge cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David and Payao stating that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the
impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Santos vs Santos

Facts: The RTC declared petitioner Celerina presumptively dead after her husband respondent Ricardo had filed a petition
for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage. It was almost 12 years since Celerina left
so he believed that she already passed away. Ricardo alleged that Celerina went to Hong Kong to work there but he never
heard anything from her again. Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. On 2008, Celerina filed a
petition for annulment of judgment before the CA on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina
claimed that she never resided in Tarlac, and that she also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a
wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death
Ruling: Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has
become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Celerina is correct when she said that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent
marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage. She sought not
merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects.
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity or
annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
Republic vs Cantor

Facts: In 1998, Jerry Cantor left his wife Maria Fe after a violent quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or
hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband. She alleged that she
conducted a diligent search for her husband and exerted efforts to find him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the declaration of presumptive death should be granted

HELD: The respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry. These efforts,
however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence because the respondent
did not actively look for her missing husband. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her
hospital visits were not primarily directed to look for him. Also, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did
she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. She also failed to present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their
neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to
support the respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent search.
Republic vs Granada
Facts: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993. Cyrus went to
Taiwan to seek employment. Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment.
After nine years, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. The RTC rendered a Decision
declaring such. The OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that Yolanda failed to prove her well-founded belief
that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case to the CA. Yolanda argued that her
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial
proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
Issue: Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.
Ruling: Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory. Even if the RTC erred in granting
the petition, such order can no longer be assailed. Even if petitioner’s argument that Yolanda was not able to prove her
well-founded belief is well-taken. Nevertheless, the court is constrained to deny the Petition.
Mallion vs Alcantara

Facts: Petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the RTC seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Alcantara
on the ground of psychological incapacity. It was denied by the RTC and the CA. Afterwards, petitioner filed
another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that their marriage null and void because it was celebrated
without a valid marriage license. Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping.

Issue: Whether or not the action of Mallion is tenable

Ruling: No. Section 47(c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness
of judgment” or the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Therefore, having
expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived
any defects therein. The Court finds then that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
lack of marriage license is barred.

Santos vs CA
Facts: Leouel Santos and Julia Bedia got married. The couple lived with Julia’s parents. Their marriage, however, was
marred by the frequent interference of Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s
opposition. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. He then desperately tried to locate
his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed a petition to nullify their marriage
due to Julia’s alleged psychological incapacity. Julia filed an opposition; she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent.
Issue: Whether or not failure to communicate and inform her husband about her whereabouts for a long time constitutes
psychological incapacity
Ruling: The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not
clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree
a nullity of marriage.
Yambao vs Republic vs Yambao
Facts: Cynthia filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her marriage with respondent Patricio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. She alleged that their marriage had been marred quarrels, that she was the only one who earned a
living and took care of the children and that Patricio is lazy, and is a gambler, that he would venture into several businesses
but would fail, and that he is insecure and overly jealous
Issue: Whether or not the totality of petitioner wife’s evidence establishes respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform
the essential obligations of marriage
Ruling: No. There was no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that he was
unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. His behavior may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty,
but none have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondent’s faults
amount to psychological incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Halili vs Halili and Republic
Facts: Lester filed a petition to declare his marriage to Chona null and void on the ground of his psychological incapacity
to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that he married respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a
joke. They never lived together as husband and wife, and started fighting constantly a year later. Lester then decided to
stop seeing Chona and started dating other women. It was only when he received calls telling him to stop dating other
women as he was already a married man that he found out that the marriage was not fake. Eventually, the RTC found him
to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder as diagnosed by an expert witness.
Issue: Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his
psychological incapacity
Ruling: Basing from the case of Te vs Yu-Te, it has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological
condition which is a personality disorder that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause., and such effectively
renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Velasco vs Velasco
Facts: Norma Velasco lived separately from her husband, maintained sexual relations with another man, and even boasted
to her husband how physically big and macho her paramour is. This shows a clear lack of love, respect and fidelity to her
husband. The Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court’s decision denying the action for declaration of nullity of
the marriage on the ground of “psychological incapacity.”

Marcos vs Marcos
Facts: Wilson and Brenda Marcos first met at the Malacanang Palace. They eventually got married. After the downfall of
Marcos, Wilson left the military service and then engaged in different business ventures but failed. Due to this, they
would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would also inflict physical harm on their
children. Thus, Brenda filed for annulment of marriage in the RTC on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Issue: Whether or not there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent to prove psychological incapacity,
and Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity
Ruling: There is no requirement that a person be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non to
prove psychological incapacity. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. His alleged psychological illness was also traced only to said period
and not to the inception of the marriage. Furthermore, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Matias vs Matias
Facts: Erlinda Matias married Avelino Dagdag. However, Avelino is a drunkard, would disappear for months without
explanation, force his wife to have sex with him, and would inflict injure to her. Sometime, he left again and Erlinda
learned that he was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail who remains at-large at date. Erlinda filed
for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Issue: Whether or not being emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice
constitute psychological incapacity
Ruling: In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA, the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family
Code. Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned
evidentiary requirements. Since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband, Erlinda failed to comply with a guideline which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically proven by experts, Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not
sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged.
Rumbaua vs Rumbaua
Facts: Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua filed a complain for declaration of nullity of marriage against Respondent
Edward before the RTC on the ground of psychological incapacity. She alleged that respondent reneged on his promise to
live with her under one roof after finding work, failed to extend financial support to her, blamed her for his mother’s
death, represented himself as single, and was cohabitating with someone in Novaliches.
Issue: Whether or not Edward is psychologically incapacitated as to declare their marriage as null and void
Ruling: The court said that Edward’s acts do not rise to the level of the “psychological incapacity” that the law requires,
and should be distinguished from the “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations that characterize some marriages. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital
obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition or illness
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA
Facts:

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