Maximo Soliven vs Ramon Makasiar
January 26, 2000
167 SCRA 393 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
President’s Immunity From Suit – Must Be Invoked by the
President
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He,
together with others, was charged with libel by the then
president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-
affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory
cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat
her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the
principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a
president would sue then the president would allow herself to
be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she
would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the
functions of a president, the president may not be able to
appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be
liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran,
a person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a
criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot
raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the
case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether
to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.
G.R. No. 107395.
ROMAN A. CRUZ, JR., petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division),
and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
FACTS:
The Omnibus Motion of accused Roman A. Cruz, Jr. is
denied for lack of merit. That petitioner filed a motion for
Reconsideration, dated April 12, 1993. On May 12, 1993,
respondents Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution of the
motion for Reconsideration of the accused of the Court’s
Resolution and herein DENIED for lack of merit. Hence,
petitioner filed the instant petition. Petitioner contends
that respondent Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
The information filed against petitioner charging
with estafa through falsification of public documents and for
which he stands to be tried before respondent court
alleges.Respoindents, aver the office of the Ombudsman is not
exercising quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative powers because
“it does not act as a court” when it conducts preliminary
investigation of cases failing under its jurisdiction.
The main function of the government prosecutor
during the preliminary investigation is merely to determine
the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding
information if he finds it to be so. And, probable cause has
been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances
as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.
 In the case at bar, the Ombudsman found that there
was sufficient ground to believe that petitioner is guilty of
the crime charged on the basis of the factual findings of
Prosecutor Tamayo in the latter’s Order dated February 11,
1992 which were arrived at after taking into consideration the
evidence presented by the parties. A cursory perusal of the
records of this case will show that the findings of fact by
the Office of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial
evidence, hence the same should be considered conclusive.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not that there was a grave discretion.
2. Did the petitioner rely on the provisions applied on
the Rules on Criminal Procedures?
3. Whether or not that no grave abuse of discretion has
been committed by respondents, which would warrant the
granting of the writ certiorari.
RULING:
No. This rule refers to the right of the accused to
move for production or inspection of material evidence in the
possession of the prosecution. It authorizes the defense to
inspect copy or photograph any evidence of the prosecution in
its possession after obtaining the permission of the court. A
motion showing good reasons for the granting of the permission
must be filed by the defense for this purpose, with notice to
all parties.
It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the
persons against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
The established rule is that a preliminary investigation
is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence
only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.
The resolutions appealed are hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that respondent Ombudsman is DIRECTED to produce
the pertinent records of the preliminary investigation before
the Sandiganbayan at the proper juncture of the proceedings
therein and on sufficient justification therefore.
LIM VS FELIX
FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the
morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate
Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate
province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his
security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes,
Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by
a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An
investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation,
the designated investigator filed an amended complaint with
the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr.
et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in
connection with the airport incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court
issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been
established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named
accused..
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of
murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation
of no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana
Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue w/c
was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati
to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to
Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the
respondent court several motions and manifestations, among
others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the
initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation
conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the
best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima
facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence
of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the
constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing
magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of
such probable cause.
Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the
motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest
against the accused including the petitioners herein.
ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest
without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's
certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the
Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally
determined probable cause. The determination is made by the
Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not
been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
Bache & Co. Inc. et al vs BIR Commissioner Vivencio Ruiz et al
depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to
him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked
respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if
his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis,
he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leon’s
application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The
search was subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and
his witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his
witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the
existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four
distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled
in Stonehill “Such is the seriousness of the irregularities
committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122
of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense.

Search and Seizure – Personal Examination of the Judge 3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the
things to be seized.
On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a
letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are
warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the described in the Search Warrant
NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, “Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers,
particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books,
Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for customers ledgers); receipts for payments received;
search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory
de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business
search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain communications, accounting and business records; checks and
case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and
of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to
After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the 1970.”
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec.
1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe
the things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the
things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when
the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by
which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search
and seizure or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)
FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the
respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The petitioner's house was
searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the
warrant was discovered. However, the officers conducting the
search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and
eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the
bases of the charge against the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa
personally filed his application for a search warrant on May
10, 1984, he appeared before him in the company of his two (2)
witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom
likewise presented to him their respective affidavits taken by
Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator. As the
application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded
to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same.
Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before him.
ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the
proper procedure in issuing the Search Warrant.
HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be
able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of
the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to
have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he
was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the
information provided by the witnesses whose depositions had
already been taken by the undersigned.
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of
the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of
information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence.
ALVAREZ VS CFI
FACTS: On June 3, 1936, the chief of the secret service of the
Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to
Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that
according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his
house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists,
chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of
interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the and of
the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his
answers to the questions were correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his
statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the
information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the
affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the
warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering
the search of the petitioner's house at any time of the day or
night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned
and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in
accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of
the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and
residence at seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and
seized and took possession of the following articles: internal
revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two
journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks,
four checks stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two
contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of
copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one
bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of
copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book
belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and
other papers many documents and loan contracts with security
and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of
used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation.
The search for and a seizure of said articles were made with
the the opposition of the petitioner who stated his protest
below the inventories on the ground that agents seized even
the originals of the documents.
ISSUE: WON the Search Warrant issued by the respondent court
valid.
HELD: The seizure of books and documents by means of a search
warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a
criminal case against the person in whose possession they were
found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant
unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the
constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an
accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal,
42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs.
U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd
vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132).
Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the
documents in question were seized for the purpose of using
them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal
proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold
that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the
documents should be returned to him.
Microsoft Corporation vs Maxicorp, Inc.
438 SCRA 224 – Mercantile Law – Intellectual Property – Law on
Copyright – Probable Cause in Issuing Search Warrant
In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a surveillance against
Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares (Windows
Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged within the
premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian
witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a computer unit
from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy
of Windows. For their purchase, they were issued a receipt,
however, the receipt was in the name of a certain “Joel Diaz”.
Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the
RTC. He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought
the computer unit they bought as evidence as well as the
receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto
Pante), a computer technician, who showed the judge that the
software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp
was pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is a
probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and
unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the
corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the
warrant before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted
the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s or
Sacriz’ name hence the proceeding in the trial court was
infirm from the onset.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with
the object and documentary evidence they presented, are
sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From
what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that
Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair
competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the
counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable
Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced, packaged and in particularity of description of the things to be seized is
some cases, installed there. primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s name nor warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized
was it in Sacriz’ name does not render the issuance of the and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2)
warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the
requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches
for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in
the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.Thus, and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search
it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping
findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent descriptions, which will authorize police officers to
Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name. undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and
all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense.
However, it is not required that technical precision of
PEOPLE VS TEE description be required, particularly, where by the nature of
the goods to be seized, their description must be rather
general, since the requirement of a technical description
FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a
would mean that no warrant could issue.
businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted
by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE [246 SCRA 184; G.R. NO. 89103; 14 JUL
and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) 1995]
at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence
yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
Facts: In August 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied for issuance of
Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that search warrant alleging that he received information that
it was too general and that the NBI had not complied with the
requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The Petitioner had in his possession at his house “M-16 Armalite
pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of rifles, hand grenades, .45 Cal. pistols, dynamite sticks and
the appropriate charges against appellant. In an information
subversive documents”, which were “used orintended to be used”
dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City
charged Modesto Tee, alias “Estoy Tee,” with illegal for illegal purposes. The application was granted.
possession of marijuana.
In September, a police team, searched the house of petitioner
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the
description on the serach warrant which says “an undetermined and seized “2 envelopes containing P14000, handset
amount of marijuana,” was too general and hence makes the with antennae, transceiver withantennae, regulator supply,
warrant void for vagueness.
academy notebook and assorted papers and handset battery

HELD: SC held that the appellant’s contention, has no leg to pack”. In October, petitioner moved that the search and
 He was also the manager of the club.-The police of Manila had
seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be
reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was
returned to him. In December, MTCC, in its order, directed Lt. nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19,
1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had
Col. Torres to return the money seized to petitioner ruling been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May
that any seizure should be limited to the specified items 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of
the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant
covered thereby. SolGen petitioned with the RTC for from Judge Garduño of the municipal court. Thus provided, the
theannulment of the order of MTCC citing that pending the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after
three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They
determination of legality of seizure of the articles, they found the doors to the premises closed and barred.
should remain in custogia legis. RTC granted the petition. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker,
ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the
house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were door.-Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons
were apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant
not mentioned in the search warrant was legal. Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter
showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told
Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe,
Held: Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend
answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's
that a search warrant should particularly describe the things pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils,
to be seized. The police acts beyond the parameters of their Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game.
About five minutes was consumed in conversation between the
authority if they seize articles not described in the search policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching
warrants. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the
search.-At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So
to limit the things to be seized, to leave the officers of the policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his
law with no discretion; that unreasonable search and seizure resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave
him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the
may not be made and that abuses may not be committed. policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of
Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the
floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards,
Petition granted. People of the Philippines is ordered to cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.-All of the
persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the
return the money seized.
patrol wagons. Veloso again refusedto obey and shouted
PEOPLE VS VELOSO48 PHIL. 169 (1925)MALCOLM, J. offensive epithets against the police department. It was
necessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the
Facts:- door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were
In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, needed to place him in the patrol wagon.-The warrant read as
City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the follows:…SEARCH WARRANT (G) The People of the Philippine Islands,
Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member to any member of the Police Force of the City
of the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. of Manila.GREETING Proof by affidavit having this day been made
before me by Andres Geronimo that he has good reason to be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons
believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in his upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his
possession in the building occupied by him and which is under personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and
his control, namely in the building numbered 124 Calle place of residence, and any other circumstances by means
Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain of which he can be identified. In the first place, the
devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself
to wit: money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs described the building to be searched as "the building No.
and other utensils used in connection with the game commonly 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands."
known as monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the
said devices and effects with the illegal and criminal premises to be searched. As the search warrant stated that
intention of using them in violation of the Gambling Law. Now John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the
therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
day or night within ten (10) days on or after this date to Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager
make a search on the person of said John Doe and in the house of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose
situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
Philippine Islands, in quest of the above described devices
and effects and if you find the same or any part thereof, you
are commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided for Yousef Al Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals
by law. Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, GR No.126859, September 4, 2001
1923.(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO Judge, Municipal Court
Issue: Facts: Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the
WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was valid. Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
Ruling:
125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-953 and 55-954
Yes.
for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2
RD: at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City.
It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on
Criminal Procedure that “a search warrant shall not issue On April 1, 1995, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the
except for probable cause and upon application supported by same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol.
oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the
Found in Apartment No. 2 were firearms, ammunitions and
person of thing to be seized.” The name and description of the
accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and explosives.
where the name is unknown there must be such a description of Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of
the person accused as will enable the officer to identify him
Kalookan City accusing them with illegal possession of
when found. A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose
true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or" Richard firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential
Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, Decree No. 1866.6 Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and
without other and further descriptions of the person to be
apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer detained.
in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders
the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as
person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must
Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specifity in
not described with particularity. They argue that the two- the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to
witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126 was ignored be seized did not require a technical description.
when only one witness signed the receipt for the properties Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be
seized during the search, and said witness was not presented seized must be described in precise and minute details as to
at the trial. leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for
ISSUE: W/N the items described in the warrant were the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not
sufficiently described with particularity. know exactly what kind of things they are looking for.
Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class
HELD: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched or species would suffice.
cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police.
The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz , 37 SCRA 823,
Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with 835 (1971), pointed out that one of the tests to determine the
vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional particularity in the description of objects to be seized under
and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of a search warrant is when the things described are limited to
unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable warrant is being issued. A careful examination of the Search
searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare
Warrants shows that they were worded in such a manner that the
that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45
enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct relation to
caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence
the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential
against petitioners.
Decree No.1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives.
Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2
could not be similarly faulted. The search warrants in
question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search
was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, Frank Uy & Unifish Packing Corp. vs Bureau of Internal Revenue
in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of et al
Court. Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the Search and Seizure – Requisites of a Valid Search Warrant
description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warrants. In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported
That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was
are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing
a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal
the search warrant appears to be beyond cavil. The items Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu
to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant
on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains
the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated
Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged
violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the
same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in
relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents
of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993,
searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other
things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said
search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC
filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the
RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA
dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper
remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it
ordered the return of the seized items but sustained the
validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant
issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search
warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the
foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These
requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to
be searched and persons or things to be seized.
The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the
description of the place to be searched as indicated in the
said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly
defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The
warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched.
One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was
against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the
inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the latter
warrant as it has revoked the two others.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the
right of the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
NOTES
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. – A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Go Vs. Court of Appeals 206 SCRA 138 G.R. No. 101837 subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There
was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113.
February 11, 1992 This is because the arresting officers were not actually there
during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and
their information regarding petitioner were derived from other
Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.
one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the
Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of
police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any
the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the
statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a
incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and
complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary
reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a
investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable
manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner
cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is
presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2
entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a
lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal
criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat.
charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the
Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary
prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and
investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended
commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor
pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is
reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
ordered released upon posting a bail bond.
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that
such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a
warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section
7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations
of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for
certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and
files for a preliminary investigation.

Issue:

Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.

Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to

preliminary investigation.

Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v.

Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as
valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the
offenses, which however constituted “continuing crimes,” i.e.
 for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his
PADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS [269 SCRA 402 (1997)]
apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests
are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Criminal Procedure—a peace officer or a private person may,
CA.
without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence
Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
1992. He was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught
witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were
in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm
found in his possession:
and ammo, petitioner’s warrantless arrest was proper since he
1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition
was actually committing another offence in the presence of all
2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo
those officers. There was no supervening event or a
3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the
4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver
actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of
Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for
evidence are admissible.
hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal
Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is
Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994,
valid:
Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms
? Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” elements of
under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and
which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months,
arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of
1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of
official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by
reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed
police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately
decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was
apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of
directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration
evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects
was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other
whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in
petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a
plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant)
complete turnaround and filed “Manifestation in Lieu of
? Search of moving vehicle
Comment” praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).
? Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest
Issues:
recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by
1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and
prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course
(not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be
thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary
searched must be within arrestee’s custody or area of
rule
immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest.
No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality
of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his
arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him
were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to
disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more
success when law enforcers function in collaboration with
private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled
jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending
an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.
2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized,
under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the
subject firearms
No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two
requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the
subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned
or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond
dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized
from petitioner’s possession via a valid warrantless search,
identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the
second element, the same was convincingly proven by the
prosecution. Indeed, petitioner’s purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more
formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous
review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and
issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift
from respondent court’s incisive observation. Furthermore, the
Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as
required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of
Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform
personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the
PNP, which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated
in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher
than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.
3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession
constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the
1987 Constitution
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court
“in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a
non-subversive context” and adds that respondent court should
have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession
of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under
P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17
years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession
of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the
Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial
court and the respondent court are bound to apply the
governing law at the time of appellant’s commission of the
offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers
to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its
repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D.
1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by
petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s allegation that the
penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The
penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be
stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua contrary to appellant’s erroneous averment. The
severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel
and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the
statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we
note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify
nullification of the law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the
constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this
Court. Just recently, the Court declared that “the pertinent
laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to
any provision of the Constitution…” Appellant’s grievances on
the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed
to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or
morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the
province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive
who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts,
we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA
sustaining petitioner’s conviction by the lower court of the
crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions
is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner’s indeterminate penalty is
MODIFIED to “10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1
day, as maximum.
RODOLFO ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998
Facts:
Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers
went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports
of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling
something to another person. After the alleged buyer left,
they approached petitioner, identified themselves as
policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The
policemen went to his residence where they found ten more
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to
the police headquarters where he was charged of possession of
prohibited drugs.
Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense . . . “
Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited
rule. He was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy bust
operation conducted by police officers on the basis of
information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs
within the area. The police officer saw petitioner handling
over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they
searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His
arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of
OF THE marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being fruits of
the crime.
People v. Mengote y Tejas
Unlawful warrantless arrest; violation of right against
illegal search and seizure
FACTS
August 8, 1987: Western Police District received a telephone
call from an informer that there were 3 suspicious-looking
persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard,
Tondo Manila and because of it, a surveillance team
plainclothesmen were then dispatched to the place.
Patrolmen saw 2 men “looking from side to side”, one of whom
was holding his abdomen. The patrolmen approached these
persons and identified themselves as policemen where the 2
“suspicious-looking men” allegedly tried to run away but were
unable to escape because other lawmen surrounded them.
The suspects were then searched and one of them who turned out
to be Mengote y Tejas was found with .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson revolver with 6 live bullets in the chamber. His
companion, identified as Morellos had a fan knife secreted in
his front right pants pocket. The weapons were then taken and
Mengote and Morellos were turned over police headquarters for
investigation.
August 11, 1987: Mengote y Tejas was then filed before RTC for
a violation of PD 1866 “Illegal Possession of Firearms”.
Aside from the policemen, the prosecution also presented
Rigoberto Danganan who identified the .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson revolver as among the articles stolen from him during a
robbery in his house in Malabon. Danganan pointed at Mengote y
Tejas as one of the robbers.
The defense side however, Mengote, made no effort to prove
that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess
it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "planted" on
him at the time of his arrest.
RTC: Mengote was convicted for violation of PD 1866
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
As appeal however by Mengote, it is submitted in
Appellant's Brief that:
of -the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence
because of its illegal seizure, no warrant therefor having
been previously obtained.
-Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful
arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful,
having been also effected without a warrant.
-also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged
robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also
have been disregarded by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure was illegal?
Whether the warrantless arrest was illegal?
HELD:
Yes, the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an
illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding
for any purpose. In fact, illegal search or seizure is an
absolute prohibition of Article 3(2) of the Constitution. The
Solicitor General, however, while conceding the rule,
maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His
reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the
seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113,
Section 5, of the Rules of Court:
and
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. —
A peace officer or private person may without a
the warrant, arrest a person: Cdpr
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
 committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
SC: Does not agree with the Solicitor General.
Par.c of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote
was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was
arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determine
lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par.
(b) of this section.
Paragraphs a and b however, have not been established in
the case.
At the time of the arrest in question, Mengote y Tejas was
merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen,"
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was
apparently no offense that had just been committed or was
being actually committed or at least being attempted by
Mengote in their presence.
As to the argument actual existence of an offense was not
necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in
them the belief that an offense had been committed and that
the accused-appellant had committed it."
SC: “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen” and
in a place not exactly forsaken certainly do not constitute
sinister acts.
It would have been different if Mengote had been apprehended
at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to
be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he
was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street
shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his
companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in
the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about
his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the
noonday sun.
People v. Malmstedt (Court sustained the warrantless arrest of
the accused because there was a bulge in his waist that
excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon
inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish) and
People v. Claudio (accused boarded a bus and placed the buri
bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer
while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion
aroused, he surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found
to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless
arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground
that probable cause had been sufficiently established) do not
apply to this case. These cases do not apply for there was
nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other
than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no
stretch of imagination could it have been inferred from these
acts that an offense has been committed, was actually being
committed or was at least being attempted in their presence.
Instead, the case before us is similar to People v. Aminnudin
where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while he was
coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than
the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor
was he actually committing or attempting to commit an offense
in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even
acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause
that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with
the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
SC: Moreover, Paragraph b is all the more not applicable for
its requirements have not been satisfied. The prosecution has
not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had
in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had
committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be
committed.
As for the illegal possession or the firearm found on tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and
Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he asked what he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried to
had been searched and the investigation conducted later resist, but the policemen were persistent until he yielded his
revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to wallet which they examined and found to contain crushed
possess it. Before these events, the peace officers had no marijuana residue. Further examination by the Forensic
knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or Chemistry Section of the NBI confirmed the findings. Trial
suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that court convicted Manalili of violation of Section 8, Article
he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house. (In short II, of RA 6425. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
there was no investigation done, policemen had no personal decision of the trial court.(In his defense, Manalili claimed
knowledge about Mengote) that he was not walking; that he was riding a tricycle until
the three policemenordered the driver of the tricycle to stop
because the driver and passenger were allegedly under the
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be influence of marijuana. He claimed that he was searched and his pants
summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his were turned inside-out but nothing was found. To some extent he
abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomachache, or implied that the marijuana sample found in his entity was
if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a framed up by the policemen.)
shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal
act or is actually committing or attempting it. Without the Issue: WON the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk
evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his operation is admissible.
illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important
exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence Held: YesRatio: The general rule is that a search and seizure
against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not must be validated by a previously secured judicial
sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the warrant.However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been
crime imputed to him. contemplated by the law:
There is no need therefore to discuss the other issue in depth
as the ruling is sufficient enough to sustain Mengote's 1.Search incidental to a lawful rrest
exoneration.
2.Search of moving vehicles
FINAL DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Decision is reversed and set aside.
Mengote is acquitted. 3.Seizure in plain view

Manalili vs Court of Appeals 4. Customs search5.

(October 9, 1997) Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against

Ponente: Panaganiban
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of AppealsFacts:Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas
were patrolling the vicinity of the Kalookan City Cemetery dueto
reports of drug addicts roaming the area. They chanced upon a male
(who turned out to be petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon) who seemed to
be ´highµ on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was observed to have
reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When Manalili
unreasonable search and seizure. In the cited cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as
essential requirement. Probable cause (in relation to
search and seizure): Existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the item,
article, or object sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to
be searched. A ´stop-and-friskµ operation is another exception
to the general rule. In this case, probable cause was
established with Manalili·s suspicious behaviour.
[RULE 126, SEC. 13] Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court
allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there
to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of
arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule
113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE VS. COGAED
June 30, 2014, G.R. No. 200334
LEONEN, J.
FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from
Barangay Lun-Oy and during a checkpoint, the driver of the
jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that
Cogaed was carrying marijuana inside Cogaed’s bag; the police
officer then approached Cogaed and asked the accused about the
contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what
was inside and that he was just transporting the bag in favor
of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed subsequently opened the bag
revealing the bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested
by the police officers.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and,
whether the marijuana confiscated is admissible as evidence.
HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the
marijuana confiscated shall not be admissible as evidence.
As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that
meets all the requirements of Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the
existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a
judge.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even
when warrantless. The known jurisprudential instances of
reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2) Seizure of evidence in “plain view,”
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and
frisk” search, but it did not comply with all the requirements
of reasonability required by the Constitution.
“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry
searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law
enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with
the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies
in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation
where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may
be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer.
It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere
suspicion. It has to be a “genuine reason to serve the
purposes of the “stop and frisk” exception.
The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer
clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case,
and there was no approximation for the probable cause
requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was
not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant
gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was
Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by
saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this
still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have
been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without
a valid search warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. The apprehension of Cogaed was
not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were
present when the arrest was made. At the time of his
apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or
was about to commit a crime. There were no overt acts within
plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed
was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not
an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have
qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights
even if we assume that he did not object when the police asked
him to open his bags. Appellant’s silence should not be
lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered
no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.
The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in
violation of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule prohibits the
issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to
go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful
seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is “the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.” It
ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses,
papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are
upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were
founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the
illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left
to convict Cogaed.
FAJARDO VS COURT OF APPEAL GR no. 128508 February 01, 1999
Petitioner: Daniel G. Fajardo
Respondent (s): Court of Appeals, Hon. Florentino P. Pedronio
(in his capacity as presiding Judge, RTC Br 31, Iloilo City,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Station Commander of Iloilo City
FACTS:
On May 26, 1988, the RTC Br 31 of Iloilo City convicted
petitioner of violation of BP Blg 22 and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of 8 months imprisonment and pay the costs.
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. By decision
promulgated on February 27, 1990, the CA affirmed the
conviction. Petitioner filed a petition for review on
certiorari of the conviction before the SC but latter also
denied said petition.
On June 2, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for probation
before the trial court contending that he was eligible for
probation because at the time he committed the offense in
1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction was still
qualified to apply for probation and that the law that barred
an application for probation of an accused who had interposed
an appeal was ex post facto in its application and hence, not
applicable to him. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
probation and so did CA.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner could qualify to apply for
probation under PD No. 986 since he had appealed from his
conviction in 1988, after PD 1990 amending PD 986 become
effective in 1986.
(2) Whether or not PD 1990 is an ex post facto law hence,
invalid.

HELD:
(1) NO. PD 1990 provides, “no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction”. At the time of
the commission of the offense in 1981, petitioner could have
appealed if convicted and still availed himself of probation
but he was convicted on May 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that
time, PD 1990 was then in full effect. He could no longer
apply for probation since he had appealed.
(2) NO. PD 1990 is valid. It is not an ex post facto law in
its application and neither is it considered as such. The law
applies only to accused convicted after its effectivity. An ex
post facto law is one that punishes an act as a crime which
was innocent at the time of its commission. PD 1990 is not
penal in character just like the Probation Law that it amends.
A Case of a Warrantless Arrest: MALACAT vs. Court of Appeals
MALACAT vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand
grenade after he was searched by a group of policemen when he
was said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging around
Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with other
Muslim-looking men. When the policemen approached the group of
men, they scattered in all directions which prompted the
police to give chase and petitioner was then apprehended and a
search was made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence,
the present petition wherein petitioner contended that the
lower court erred in holding that the search made on him and
the seizure of the hand grenade from him was an appropriate
incident to his arrest and that it erred in admitting the hand
grenade as evidence since it was admissible because it was a
product of an unreasonable and illegal search.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was
valid.
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is
that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the
same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain
exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated
under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante
delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as
a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;34 and
(6) a "stop and frisk.’
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . .

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is
concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop
in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
validly effected and in their allowable scope. police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-
arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that
these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in
pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to
person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
any money or property found which was used in the commission used against the police officer.
of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be
used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the
means of escaping or committing violence.
PEOPLE VS. MUSA [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993]
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of
a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this civilian informer guided Ani to Musa’s house and gave the
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his dried marijuana for P10.00.
 premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in
right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’ doctrine is
about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the
Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the
came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried object is not apparent from the ‘plain view’ of the object.
marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right
hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain
moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked view’ of the police. They arrested the accused in the living
Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences
(gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana
Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a ‘cellophane inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the
colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of ‘plain view’ of said object.
the kitchen.’ They asked Musa about its contents but failed to
get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag
leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest. was seizedillegally and cannot be presented in evidence
pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the
marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as
evidence.

Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus

it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and
seizure, as anincident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT
FACTS:
A search warrant was shown to the accused-appellant and the
police operatives started searching the house. They found
heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a
white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves
which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of the items seized
was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.
Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of
Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and
marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358,
respectively) were filed, and after hearing, the trial court
convicted him in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for
violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively.
The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against him
was inadmissible because the warrant used in obtaining it was
invalid.
ISSUES:
Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing
evidence to support the seizure of “drug paraphernalia”, and
whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of
the “plain view doctrine.”
HELD:
Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined
quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.” Evidence was
presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there
was no probable cause to support the application for the
seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion
that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material
only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police.
The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search
warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is
void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was
presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum,
with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguit’s
residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such
warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined
by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the
“plain view doctrine,” the police failed to allege the time
when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or
whether it was recovered on Salanguit’s person or in an area
within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had
been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua
in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the
decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.
PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN [163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988]
Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June
25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who
were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one
their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and
finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to
the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found to contain
three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by
an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a
information wasamended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all
also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana
Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the
against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime
officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The as charged.
motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the
accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BELEN MARIACOS
defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all
he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two GR NO. 188611 June 16 2010
shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was FACTS:
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with
confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed
he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a passenger
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent
mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent
in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he described a backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc
was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top
marijuana looked like and that his business was selling thereof. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers.
He them asked the other passengers about the owner of the bag,
watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his but no one know.
allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that
time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries
allegedly sustained. When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted
together with other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not
noticed who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He
Issue: Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal. only realized a few moments later that the said bag and 3
other bags were already being carried away by two (2) women.
He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a
Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but on
flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or the women got away.

DOCTRINES:
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
PROVIDES: The right of the People to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the Judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)
This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought.
This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in
the absence of probable cause when a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search
has been held to be valid only as long as officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
MALUM PROHIBITUM
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or
transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is
immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the
confiscated marijuana is not necessary.
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a
valid defence. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not
exempting circumstances where the crime charge is malum
prohibitum
People of the Philippines vs Rosa Aruta y Menguin
Search and Seizure – Informer’s Tip
In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers
received information from an informant named “Benjie” that a
certain “Aling Rosa” would be leaving for Baguio City on 14
Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day
carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the
evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner
Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed
her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM
agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her
travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened
the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then
brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is
constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some
drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta
cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about
to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was
merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner
that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents
to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It
was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified
her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was
singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the
informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on
record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect
that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the
pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither
sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance
with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless
arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM
agents to effect a warrantless search of Aruta’s bag, there
being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having
been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being
incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent
search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a
lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor
of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not
be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are
“fruits of a poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected,
pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
NOTES:
When is a warrantless search allowed?
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by
prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which
are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
Facts:
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first
regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered
his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of
checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The
order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also
was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding
stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and
announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they
would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan
noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s
passport and other identification papers. When accused failed
to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it
was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a
pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer
noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
 Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the
bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus
accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer
inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened
the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The
two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the
stuff toy contained also hashish.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the
accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the
search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the object sought in connection with the offense are in
the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian
travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a
prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
PAPA VS. MAGO
Facts: Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized, when the
truck transporting the goods was intercepted by the BOC,
questioned the validity of the search conducted by them since
it was made without any search warrant and whether the BOC has
jurisdiction over the forfeited goods.
Issue: Was the search conducted by the BOC valid?
Held:
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had
authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant
issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does
not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203
of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or
search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not
being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or
envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or
conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into
the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need
of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a
dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house
may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a
judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered
view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a
dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for customs officers not
only to board and search vessels within their own and
adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect
there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been
introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to
law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast
or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or
merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe
had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and
secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial
and forfeiture.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly
Reyes, went to the booth of the “Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders” carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could
examine and inspect the packages. She refused and assures her
that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.
Before the delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of
Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor),
following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and
that the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and
reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations.
The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside
the cellophane wrappers.
The accused – appellant assigns the following errors: The
lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegality of
search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?
HELD:
Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution
Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON
obtained by virtue of a defective search warrant, abandoning G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002
in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Mercado vs
People’s Court. FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act).
The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the The antecedent facts of his conviction are as follows:
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an
evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and
interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999,
without the intervention and participation of state the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when
authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused / appellant its security officer, Diesmo, received a complaint from
validly claim that his constitutional right against passenger Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one
unreasonable search and seizure. of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo
and four (4) other members of the vessel security force
The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later
of the government without the latter transgressing appellants found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as
the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of
rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106.
no cogent reason whty the same should not be admitted. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was
found. He was then escorted by 2 security agents back to the
economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a
Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When
FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS – Readily foreclose the proportion that requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase,
NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white
prohibited merchandise, clearly that the NBI agents made no crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be “shabu,”
search and seizure much less an illegal one, contrary to the the security personnel immediately reported the matter to the
postulate of accused / appellant. ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the
suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine
CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where Coast Guard for assistance.
no trespass has been committed in aid thereof
But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite
BILL OF RIGHTS suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or
“shabu” was forcibly opened and searched without his consent,
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of
and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against
constitutional democracy, protection against whom, protection unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired
against the STATE. pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is
inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid

HELD: YES
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a
fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Evidence
acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this right is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed,
however, that protection is against transgression committed by
the government or its agent. The constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant
was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only
after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that they called
the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and
seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore
carried out without government intervention, and hence, the
constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant
that the search and seizure performed by the vessel security
personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police
authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and
tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security
officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not
discharge any governmental function.
NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the following facts must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified
as a prohibited or a regulated drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be
owned by him. To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to
present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this
case, the accused points to a certain Alican “Alex” Macapudi
as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to
support his claim. No witnesses were presented to prove that
there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person
named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the
accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow
businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support
the claim of the accused. Mere denial of ownership will not
suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the
keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can
easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone
allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous
drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to
possess the same.
Right against unreasonable searches and seizures
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs.SUSAN CANTON, appellant
G.R. No. 148825 December 27, 2002
FACTS:
Appellant Susan Canton was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City with the violation of Section 16 of
Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425), as amended, under an Information whose accusatory
portion reads as follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously has in her possession NINE HUNDRED
NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809)
GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
without the corresponding prescription or license.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN
imputing to the trial court the following errors: (1) in
justifying the warrantless search against her based on the
alleged existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she
was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search
was incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the
frisker went beyond the limits of the “Terry search” doctrine;
(4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial investigation
without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case
the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, which was not
testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in
determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on
judicial notice its cognizance of the medical report that has
not been offered in evidence; and (7) in applying the ruling
in People v. Johnson.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless search and subsequent seizure

of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of Susan were
violative of her constitutional rights.

RULING:

No, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security

procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 6235, “ Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline
or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the
following condition printed thereon: “Holder hereof and his
hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and
seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the
aircraft,” which shall constitute a part of the contract
between the passenger and the air carrier.
SECTION 2 - The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by a judge under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

CASE DOCTRINES

A. When is a search a “reasonable search”?

Valmonte v. De Villa – checkpoints – Section 2 is a personal

right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed
or threatened to be infringed; reasonableness is determined by
a fixed formula but from the circumstances of the case; not
all searches and seizures are not allowed; between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual; right
against warrantless search which was reasonably conductedm the
former should prevail

B. Requisites of a Valid Warrant

Alvarez v. CFI of Tayabas – definition of a search warrant –

an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the
Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or justice of peace and
directed to a peace officer commanding him to search for
personal property and bring it before court, OATH - any form
of
attestation that a party signifies that he is bound by
conscience to perform an act faithfully or truthfully

People v. CA – the general rule is that search warrants must

be served during the daytime (protect the public from the
abrasiveness of official intrusions). Exception: a search at
any reasonable hour
of day or night may be made when the application asserts that
the property in on the person or place ordered to be searched.
Absence of abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night
where so allowed is not improper
People v. Veloso – parliamentary club - JOHN DOE WARRANTS –
Valid IF the best description possible is given in the arrest
warrant – it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it
is to be served by stating his occupation, personal appearance
or peculiarities, place of residence or other circumstances
which he may be identified
Microsoft v. Maxicorp – software – probable cause – such
reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant
a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means
taken in prosecuting it are
legally just and proper; OATH must refer to the truth of the
facts WITHIN THE PERSONAL KNOLEDGE OF THE PETITIONER OR HIS
WITNESSES; probable cause deals with probability and not
absolute certainty
Burgos Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP – Metropolitan Mail and We
Forum – typographical error in specifying the address to be
searched not sufficient to invalidate search warrant where the
address intended appears on the face of the warrant; probable
cause – such facts or circumstances which would lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched
People v. CA – Abigail’s Variety Store – VOID warrant – the
claim that the place actually searched – although not the one
specified in the warrant – is exactly what they had in view
when they applied for the warrant is unacceptable. What is
material in determining the validity of the warrant is the
place stated in the warrant, not the one they had in their
thoughts; particularization of description may properly be
done only by the judge and only in the warrant itself
Corro v. Lising – Philippine Times – conclusions of law of
military officers will not satisfy probable cause requirement
for issuance of search warrants
Soliven v. Makasiar – The judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. He shall: 1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest OR 2) if on the basis
thereof, he does not find probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal’s report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion of the existence of
probable cause
Lim Sr. v. Felix – certification by the fiscal of the
existence of probable cause does not bind the judge.
Preliminary inquiry – determines probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant (prosecutor);
preliminary examination (judge) - investigation for the
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest; preliminary investigation proper –
ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or be released.
Yao Sr. v. People – GASUL and SHELLANE v. MASAGANA -
examination of complainant and witnesses – must be probing and
exhaustive not merely routinary, general, peripheral,
perfunctory or pro forma; law
does not require that the thihgs to be seized should be
described in very precise and minute details.
C. Warrantless Searches and Seizures
Nolasco v. Pano – articles seized by void warrants should be
retuned to its owners Papa v. Mago – Customs Search – search
warrant not necessary except if the place to be searched is a
dwelling or house – Tariff and Customs Code

People v. CFI of Rizal – search of moving vehicle – Carroll
doctrine – search of moving vehicles or automobiles – no
search warrant needed
People. V. Lo Ho Wing - exception to the issuance of search
warrant: 1) search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2) search of
moving vehicle; 3) seizure of evidence in plain view
People v. Evaristo – evidence in plain view – Harris v.
Coolidge, Coolidge v. New Hampshire – no search warrant
needed; Malacat v. CA – valid waiver – must be made in writing
and in the presence of
counsel; search incidental to a lawful arrest v. stop and
frisk – Terry Case – probable cause is not required to conduct
stop and frisk but mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate
it. A genuine reason must exist.
People v. De Gracia – Eurocar Sales Office – crime was in fact
being committed – search incidental to lawful arrest valid
People v. Johnson – inspection at airports – Persons may lose
the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting
lack of subjective
expectation of privacy
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo – PP 1017 case – doctrines same as
the ones above (related topics: freedom of expression; freedom
to peaceably assemble)
People v. Nuevas – illegal possession of marijuana - in cases
of searches incidental to a lawful arrest, the arrest must
precede the search; warrantless search, when valid: 1)
incidental to lawful arrest; 2) evidence in plain view [a)
valid prior intrusion, police are legally present in the
pursuit of their
official duties, b) evidence was inadvertently discovered, c)
evidence immediately apparent, d) plain view justified mere
seizure with =out further search]; 3) search of moving
vehicle; 4) consented warrantless search; 5) customs search;
6) stop and frisk; 7) exigent and emergency circumstances
D. Searches and seizures “of whatever nature for any purpose”
E. Warrantless Arrests
Umil v. Ramos – subversion a continuing offense - arrest
without a warrant is justified if the person arrested in
caught in flagrante delicto
People v. Aminudin - M/V Wilcon; marijuana – not caught in
flagrante delicto; search was unreasonable; evidence
inadmissible
Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago – pedophiles – the rights granted
in Section 2 are available to all persons including aliens,
whether accused of a crime or not People v. Mengote –
suspicious man outside – a person may not be stopped and
frisked in broad daylight on a bust street on a mere
unexplained suspicion
Posadas v. Ombudsan – Sigma Rho v. Scintilla Juris – Arrest
made without a valid warrant: Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court – when in the presence of a police officer or a
private individual: 1) the person arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or attempting to commit an offense; 2)
when an offense has actually been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person to be arrested commited it; 3) when the person arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where his is serving final or temporary judgment
(pending), escaped while being transferred
Ladlad v. Velasco – imprisoned by PP 1017; rebellion/sedition
– doctrine same as above and People v. De Gracia