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SALES – RISK OF LOSS – IN GENERAL – LOSS BY FORTUITOUS EVENTS PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment as follows:

G.R. No. L-55684 December 19, 1984 (1) The complaint against defendant Negros Navigation is dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
CHRYSLER PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. (2) Defendant Sambok Motors Co. (Bacolod) is ordered to pay plaintiff Chrysler Philippines
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SAMBOK MOTORS CO. (BACOLOD), respondents, Corporation:

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J: (a) The sum of Thirty-One Thousand Thirty Seven Pesos and Fifty Six Centavos
(P31,037.56) with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12) per annum from January 1,
Subject of this Petition for Review is the Decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 1971 until fully paid;
65328-R reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XX, in Civil
Case No. 16624, and dismissing petitioner Chrysler Philippines Corporation's suit for Damages (b) The sum of Five Thousand Pesos as and for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation;
against private respondent Sambok Motors Company (Bacolod) arising from breach of
contract. (c) The costs of the suit.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the assembling and sale of motor vehicles and (3) The counterclaim of defendant Negros Navigation and Sambok Motors Co. (Bacolod) are
other automotive products. Respondent Sambok Motors Co., a general partnership, during the dismissed for lack of merit.
period relevant to these proceedings, was its dealer for automotive products with offices at
Bacolod (Sambok, Bacolod) and Iloilo (Sambok, Iloilo). The two offices were run by relatives.
The case against Negros Navigation was dismissed for failure of petitioner and Sambok,
Miguel Ng was Assistant Manager for Sambok, Bacolod, while an elder brother, Pepito Ng, was
Bacolod, to file the necessary notices and claims as conditions precedent for a judicial action.
the President. 1 2

On September 7, 1972, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XX,
On the other hand, the Trial Court found that the act of Sambok, Bacolod, "in refusing to take
Pasig, Rizal, a Complaint for Damages against Allied Brokerage Corporation, Negros Navigation
delivery of the shipment for no justifiable reason from Negros Navigation despite having
Company and Sambok, Bacolod, alleging that on October 2, 1970, Sambok, Bacolod, ordered
received the Bill of Lading constituted wrongful neglect or refusal to accept and pay for the
from petitioner various automotive products worth P30,909.61, payable in 45 days; that on
subject shipment, by reason of which defendant Sambok Motors may be held liable for
November 25, 1970, petitioner delivered said products to its forwarding agent, Allied
damages."
Brokerage Corporation, for shipment; that Allied Brokerage loaded the goods on board the
M/S Doña Florentina, a vessel owned and operated by Negros Navigation Company, for
delivery to Sambok, Bacolod; that when petitioner tried to collect from the latter the amount Sambok, Bacolod, appealed. On November 26, 1980, respondent Appellate Court set aside the
of P31,037.56, representing the price of the spare parts plus handling charges, Sambok, appealed judgment and dismissed petitioner's Complaint, after finding that the latter had not
Bacolod, refused to pay claiming that it had not received the merchandise; that petitioner also performed its part of the obligation under the contract by not delivering the goods at Sambok,
demanded the return of the merchandise or their value from Allied Brokerage and Negros Iloilo, the place designated in the Parts Order Form (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to "A-6"), and must,
Navigation, but both denied any liability. therefore, suffer the loss. In other words, respondent Appellate Court found. that there was
misdelivery.
In its Answer, Sambok, Bacolod, denied having received from petitioner or from any of its co-
defendants, the automotive products referred to in the Complaint, and professed no Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, with the following errors assigned to respondent
knowledge of having ordered from petitioner said articles. Court:

Upon a Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner and Allied Brokerage, the Trial Court. on I
October 23, 1975, dismissed the case with prejudice against Allied Brokerage for lack of cause
of action, and also dismissed the latter's counterclaim against petitioner. The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in finding that the issue of misshipment or
misdelivery of the automotive spare parts involved in the litigation was raised by the private
On July 31, 1978, the Trial Court rendered its Decision dismissing the Complaint against Negros respondent Sambok Motors Co. (Bacolod) in the Trial Court.
Navigation for lack of cause of action, but finding Sambok, Bacolod, liable for the claim of
petitioner, thus: II
The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in refusing to apply the provisions of Section 18, the time Sambok, Bacolod, was ready to take delivery. Where the seller delivers to the buyer
Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court quoted below, that since the question of misshipment a quantity of goods less than he contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them. 6
or misdelivery was not raised by the private respondent in the Trial Court, this issue cannot
for the first time be raised on appeal. From the evidentiary record, Negros Navigation was the party negligent in failing to deliver the
complete shipment either to Sambok, Bacolod, or to Sambok, Iloilo, but as the Trial Court
Section 18. Questions that may be raised on appeal. Whether or not the appellant has found, petitioner failed to comply with the conditions precedent to the filing of a judicial
filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors action. Thus, in the last analysis, it is petitioner that must shoulder the resulting loss. The
any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the general rule that before, delivery, the risk of loss is home by the seller who is still the owner,
issues framed by the parties. under the principle of "res petit domino", 7 is applicable in petitioner's case.

III In sum, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court, will have to be sustained not on the basis
of misdelivery but on non-delivery since the merchandise was never placed in the control and
The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in finding that the private respondent gave the possession of Sambok, Bacolod, the vendee. 8
alleged instruction to the petitioner to ship the automotive spare parts to Iloilo City and not
to Bacolod City. WHEREFORE, we hereby affirm the Decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 65328-
R, without pronouncement as to costs.
IV
SO ORDERED.
The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in finding that the defendant Negros Navigation
notified the private respondent of the arrival of the shipment at Bacolod City.

The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Trial Court that the
act of the private respondent in refusing to take delivery of the automotive spare parts that
it purchased from the petitioner after having been notified of the shipment constitutes
wrongful neglect resulting in the loss of the cargo for which it should be liable in damages
to the petitioner.

To our minds, the matter of misdelivery is not the decisive factor for relieving Sambok,
Bacolod, of liability herein. While it may be that the Parts Order Form (E exhibits "A", "A-1" to
"A-6") specifically indicated Iloilo as the destination, as testified to by Ernesto Ordonez, Parts
Sales Representative of petitioner, 3 Sambok, Bacolod, and Sambok, Iloilo, are actually one. In
fact, admittedly, the order for spare parts was made by the President of Sambok, Pepito Ng,
through its marketing consultant. Notwithstanding, upon receipt of the Bill of Lading, Sambok,
Bacolod, initiated, but did not pursue, steps to take delivery as they were advised by Negros
Navigation that because some parts were missing. they would just be informed as soon as the
missing parts were located. 4

It was only four years later, however, or in 1974, when a warehouseman of Negros Navigation,
Severino Aguarte, found in their off-shore bodega, parts of the shipment.- in question, but
already deteriorated and valueless. 5

Under the circumstances, Sambok, Bacolod, cannot be faulted for not accepting or refusing to
accept the shipment from Negros Navigation four years after shipment. The evidence is clear
that Negros Navigation could not produce the merchandise nor ascertain its whereabouts at
SALES – RISK OF LOSS – IN GENERAL – FRUITS OR IMPROVEMENTS On March 20, 1980, DBP released the proceeds of private respondent's motorcycle loan to
Norkis in the total sum of P7,500. As the price of the motorcycle later increased to P7,828 in
G.R. No. 91029 February 7, 1991 March, 1980, Nepales paid the difference of P328 (p. 13, Rollo) and demanded the delivery of
the motorcycle. When Norkis could not deliver, he filed an action for specific performance with
damages against Norkis in the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, Sixth
NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS, INC., petitioner,
(6th) Judicial Region, Branch LVI, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 1272. He alleged that
vs.
Norkis failed to deliver the motorcycle which he purchased, thereby causing him damages.
THE COURT OF APPEALS & ALBERTO NEPALES, respondents.

Norkis answered that the motorcycle had already been delivered to private respondent before
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
the accident, hence, the risk of loss or damage had to be borne by him as owner of the unit.
Subject of this petition for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals (Seventeenth Division)
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered a decision dated August 27, 1985 ruling in
in CA-G.R. No. 09149, affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
favor of private respondent (p. 28, Rollo.) thus:
Sixth (6th) Judicial Region, Branch LVI. Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, in Civil Case No. 1272,
which was private respondent Alberto Nepales' action for specific performance of a contract
of sale with damages against petitioner Norkis Distributors, Inc. WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The
defendants are ordered to pay solidarity to the plaintiff the present value of the motorcycle
which was totally destroyed, plus interest equivalent to what the Kabankalan Sub-Branch of
The facts borne out by the record are as follows:
the Development Bank of the Philippines will have to charge the plaintiff on fits account,
plus P50.00 per day from February 3, 1980 until full payment of the said present value of
Petitioner Norkis Distributors, Inc. (Norkis for brevity), is the distributor of Yamaha motorcycles the motorcycle, plus P1,000.00 as exemplary damages, and costs of the litigation. In lieu of
in Negros Occidental with office in Bacolod City with Avelino Labajo as its Branch Manager. On paying the present value of the motorcycle, the defendants can deliver to the plaintiff a
September 20, 1979, private respondent Alberto Nepales bought from the Norkis-Bacolod brand-new motorcycle of the same brand, kind, and quality as the one which was totally
branch a brand new Yamaha Wonderbike motorcycle Model YL2DX with Engine No. L2- destroyed in their possession last February 3, 1980. (pp. 28-29, Rollo.)
329401K Frame No. NL2-0329401, Color Maroon, then displayed in the Norkis showroom. The
price of P7,500.00 was payable by means of a Letter of Guaranty from the Development Bank
On appeal, the Court of appeals affirmed the appealed judgment on August 21, 1989, but
of the Philippines (DBP), Kabankalan Branch, which Norkis' Branch Manager Labajo agreed to
deleted the award of damages "in the amount of Fifty (P50.00) Pesos a day from February 3,
accept. Hence, credit was extended to Nepales for the price of the motorcycle payable by DBP
1980 until payment of the present value of the damaged vehicle" (p35, Rollo). The Court of
upon release of his motorcycle loan. As security for the loan, Nepales would execute a chattel
Appeals denied Norkis' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this Petition for Review.
mortgage on the motorcycle in favor of DBP. Branch Manager Labajo issued Norkis Sales
Invoice No. 0120 (Exh.1) showing that the contract of sale of the motorcycle had been
perfected. Nepales signed the sales invoice to signify his conformity with the terms of the sale. The principal issue in this case is who should bear the loss of the motorcycle. The answer to
In the meantime, however, the motorcycle remained in Norkis' possession. this question would depend on whether there had already been a transfer of ownership of the
motorcycle to private respondent at the time it was destroyed.
On November 6, 1979, the motorcycle was registered in the Land Transportation Commission
in the name of Alberto Nepales. A registration certificate (Exh. 2) in his name was issued by Norkis' theory is that:
the Land Transportation Commission on November 6, 1979 (Exh. 2-b). The registration fees
were paid by him, evidenced by an official receipt, Exhibit 3. . . . After the contract of sale has been perfected (Art. 1475) and even before delivery, that
is, even before the ownership is transferred to the vendee, the risk of loss is shifted from
On January 22, 1980, the motorcycle was delivered to a certain Julian Nepales who was the vendor to the vendee. Under Art. 1262, the obligation of the vendor to deliver a
allegedly the agent of Alberto Nepales but the latter denies it (p. 15, t.s.n., August 2, 1984). determinate thing becomes extinguished if the thing is lost by fortuitous event (Art. 1174),
The record shows that Alberto and Julian Nepales presented the unit to DBP's Appraiser- that is, without the fault or fraud of the vendor and before he has incurred in delay (Art. 11
Investigator Ernesto Arriesta at the DBP offices in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental Branch (p. 65, par. 3). If the thing sold is generic, the loss or destruction does not extinguish the
12, Rollo). The motorcycle met an accident on February 3, 1980 at Binalbagan, Negros obligation (Art. 1263). A thing is determinate when it is particularly designated or physically
Occidental. An investigation conducted by the DBP revealed that the unit was being driven by segregated from all others of the same class (Art. 1460). Thus, the vendor becomes released
a certain Zacarias Payba at the time of the accident (p. 33, Rollo). The unit was a total wreck from his obligation to deliver the determinate thing sold while the vendee's obligation to
(p. 36, t.s.n., August 2,1984; p. 13, Rollo), was returned, and stored inside Norkis' warehouse. pay the price subsists. If the vendee had paid the price in advance the vendor may retain the
same. The legal effect, therefore, is that the vendee assumes the risk of loss by fortuitous
event (Art. 1262) after the perfection of the contract to the time of delivery. (Civil Code of interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality-the delivery has riot been effects
the Philippines, Ambrosio Padilla, Vol. 5,1987 Ed., p. 87.) .(Emphasis supplied.)

Norkis concedes that there was no "actual" delivery of the vehicle. However, it insists that The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the purpose of the execution of the sales invoice
there was constructive delivery of the unit upon: (1) the issuance of the Sales Invoice No. 0120 dated September 20, 1979 (Exh. B) and the registration of the vehicle in the name of plaintiff-
(Exh. 1) in the name of the private respondent and the affixing of his signature thereon; (2) the appellee (private respondent) with the Land Registration Commission (Exhibit C) was not to
registration of the vehicle on November 6, 1979 with the Land Transportation Commission in transfer to Nepales the ownership and dominion over the motorcycle, but only to comply with
private respondent's name (Exh. 2); and (3) the issuance of official receipt (Exh. 3) for payment the requirements of the Development Bank of the Philippines for processing private
of registration fees (p. 33, Rollo). respondent's motorcycle loan. On March 20, 1980, before private respondent's loan was
released and before he even paid Norkis, the motorcycle had already figured in an accident
That argument is not well taken. As pointed out by the private respondent, the issuance of a while driven by one Zacarias Payba. Payba was not shown by Norkis to be a representative or
sales invoice does not prove transfer of ownership of the thing sold to the buyer. An invoice is relative of private respondent. The latter's supposed relative, who allegedly took possession
nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity and cost of the thing sold and of the vehicle from Norkis did not explain how Payba got hold of the vehicle on February 3,
has been considered not a bill of sale (Am. Jur. 2nd Ed., Vol. 67, p. 378). 1980. Norkis' claim that Julian Nepales was acting as Alberto's agent when he allegedly took
delivery of the motorcycle (p. 20, Appellants' Brief), is controverted by the latter. Alberto
denied having authorized Julian Nepales to get the motorcycle from Norkis Distributors or to
In all forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act of delivery whether constructive or actual,
enter into any transaction with Norkis relative to said motorcycle. (p. 5, t.s.n., February 6,
be coupled with the intention of delivering the thing. The act, without the intention, is
1985). This circumstances more than amply rebut the disputable presumption of delivery upon
insufficient (De Leon, Comments and Cases on Sales, 1978 Ed., citing Manresa, p. 94).
which Norkis anchors its defense to Nepales' action (pp. 33-34, Rollo).
When the motorcycle was registered by Norkis in the name of private respondent, Norkis did
Article 1496 of the Civil Code which provides that "in the absence of an express assumption of
not intend yet to transfer the title or ownership to Nepales, but only to facilitate the execution
risk by the buyer, the things sold remain at seller's risk until the ownership thereof is
of a chattel mortgage in favor of the DBP for the release of the buyer's motorcycle loan. The
transferred to the buyer," is applicable to this case, for there was neither an actual nor
Letter of Guarantee (Exh. 5) issued by the DBP, reveals that the execution in its favor of a
constructive delivery of the thing sold, hence, the risk of loss should be borne by the seller,
chattel mortgage over the purchased vehicle is a pre-requisite for the approval of the buyer's
Norkis, which was still the owner and possessor of the motorcycle when it was wrecked. This
loan. If Norkis would not accede to that arrangement, DBP would not approve private
is in accordance with the well-known doctrine of res perit domino.
respondent's loan application and, consequently, there would be no sale.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
In other words, the critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery, which gives legal
09149, we deny the petition for review and hereby affirm the appealed decision, with costs
effect to the act, is the actual intention of the vendor to deliver, and its acceptance by the
against the petitioner.
vendee. Without that intention, there is no tradition (Abuan vs. Garcia, 14 SCRA 759).

SO ORDERED.
In the case of Addison vs. Felix and Tioco (38 Phil. 404, 408), this Court held:

The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing is
considered to be delivered when it is "placed in the hands and possession of the vendee."
(Civil Code, Art. 1462). It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public
instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but,
in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that
the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its
material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the
ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control. When
there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the
purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public
instrument is sufficient. But if notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser
cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or
through another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the
SALES – RISK OF LOSS – IN GENERAL – FRUITS OR IMPROVEMENTS believing that plaintiff had perfected his title, wrote to him on the 23d of June and set the
following day for the execution of the contract, but, upon being informed that plaintiff had
G.R. No. L-2412 April 11, 1906 done nothing to perfect his title, he insisted that he would buy the vessel only when the title
papers were perfected and the vessel duly inspected.
PEDRO ROMAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. Defendant also denied the other allegations of the complaint inconsistent with his own
ANDRES GRIMALT, defendant-appellee. allegations and further denied the statement contained in paragraph 4 of the complaint to the
effect that the contract was completed as to the vessel; that the purchase price and method
of payment had been agreed upon; that the vessel was ready for delivery to the purchaser and
TORRES, J.:
that an attempt had been made to deliver the same, but admitted, however, the allegations
contained in the last part of the said paragraph.
On July 2, 1904, counsel for Pedro Roman filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of this
city against Andres Grimalt, praying that judgment be entered in his favor and against the
The court below found that the parties had not arrived at a definite understanding. We think
defendant (1) for the purchase price of the schooner Santa Marina, to wit, 1,500 pesos or its
that this finding is supported by the evidence introduced at the trial.
equivalent in Philippine currency, payable by installments in the manner stipulated; (2) for
legal interest on the installments due on the dates set forth in the complaint; (3) for costs of
proceedings; and (4) for such other and further remedy as might be considered just and A sale shall be considered perfected and binding as between vendor and vendee when they
equitable. have agreed as to the thing which is the object of the contract and as to the price, even though
neither has been actually delivered. (Art. 1450 of the Civil Code.)
On October 24 of the same year the court made an order sustaining the demurer filed by
defendant to the complaint and allowing plaintiff ten days within which to amend his Ownership is not considered transmitted until the property is actually delivered and the
complaint. To this order the plaintiff duly excepted. purchaser has taken possession of the value and paid the price agreed upon, in which case the
sale is considered perfected.
Counsel for plaintiff on November 5 amended his complaint and alleged that between the 13th
and the 23rd day of June, 1904, both parties, through one Fernando Agustin Pastor, verbally When the sale is made by means of a public instrument the execution thereof shall be
agreed upon the sale of the said schooner; that the defendant in a letter dated June 23 had equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract. (Art. 1462 of the Civil
agreed to purchase the said schooner and of offered to pay therefor in three installment of Code.)
500 pesos each, to wit, on July 15, September 15, and November 15, adding in his letter that
if the plaintiff accepted the plan of payment suggested by him the sale would become effective Pedro Roman, the owner, and Andres Grimalt, the purchaser, had been for several days
on the following day; that plaintiff on or about the 24th of the same month had notified the negotiating for the purchase of the schooner Santa Marina — from the 13th to the 23d of
defendant through Agustin Pastor that he accepted the plan of payment suggested by him and June, 1904. They agreed upon the sale of the vessel for the sum of 1,500 pesos, payable in
that from that date the vessel was at his disposal, and offered to deliver the same at once to three installments, provided the title papers to the vessel were in proper form. It is so stated
defendant if he so desired; that the contract having been closed and the vessel being ready for in the letter written by the purchaser to the owner on the 23rd of June.
delivery to the purchaser, it was sunk about 3 o'clock p. m., June 25, in the harbor of Manila
and is a total loss, as a result of a severe storm; and that on the 30th of the same month The sale of the schooner was not perfected and the purchaser did not consent to the execution
demand was made upon the defendant for the payment of the purchase price of the vessel in of the deed of transfer for the reason that the title of the vessel was in the name of one Paulina
the manner stipulated and defendant failed to pay. Plaintiff finally prayed that judgment be Giron and not in the name of Pedro Roman, the alleged owner. Roman promised, however, to
rendered in accordance with the prayer of his previous complaint. perfect his title to the vessel, but he failed to do so. The papers presented by him did not show
that he was the owner of the vessel.
Defendant in his answer asked that the complaint be dismissed with costs to the plaintiff,
alleging that on or about June 13 both parties met in a public establishment of this city and the If no contract of sale was actually executed by the parties the loss of the vessel must be borne
plaintiff personally proposed to the defendant the sale of the said vessel, the plaintiff stating by its owner and not by a party who only intended to purchase it and who was unable to do
that the vessel belonged to him and that it was then in a sea worthy condition; that defendant so on account of failure on the part of the owner to show proper title to the vessel and thus
accepted the offer of sale on condition that the title papers were found to be satisfactory, also enable them to draw up the contract of sale.
that the vessel was in a seaworthy condition; that both parties then called on Calixto Reyes, a
notary public, who, after examining the documents, informed them that they were insufficient
The vessel was sunk in the bay on the afternoon of the 25th of June, 1904, during a severe
to show the ownership of the vessel and to transfer title thereto; that plaintiff then promised
storm and before the owner had complied with the condition exacted by the proposed
to perfect his title and about June 23 called on defendant to close the sale, and the defendant
purchaser, to wit, the production of the proper papers showing that the plaintiff was in fact
the owner of the vessel in question.

The defendant was under no obligation to pay the price of the vessel, the purchase of which
had not been concluded. The conversations had between the parties and the letter written by
defendant to plaintiff did not establish a contract sufficient in itself to create reciprocal rights
between the parties.

It follows, therefore, that article 1452 of the Civil Code relative to the injury or benefit of the
thing sold after a contract has been perfected and articles 1096 and 1182 of the same code
relative to the obligation to deliver a specified thing and the extinction of such obligation when
the thing is either lost or destroyed, are not applicable to the case at bar.

The first paragraph of article 1460 of the Civil Code and section 335 of the Code of Civil
Procedure are not applicable. These provisions contemplate the existence of a perfected
contract which can not, however, be enforced on account of the entire loss of the thing or
made the basis of an action in court through failure to conform to the requisites provided by
law.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed and the complaint is dismissed with costs against
the plaintiff. After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered
in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the Court of First
Instance for proper action. So ordered.
SALES – RISK OF LOSS – EFFECT OF LOSS OF THING SOLD 6. That after defendant presents evidence to prove that the Air Conditioner was burned
where it was installed by the plaintiff to the satisfaction of this Honorable Court, the parties
G.R. No. L-17527 April 30, 1963 agree to leave to this Honorable Court the resolution of the issue whether loss by fire
extinguishes the obligation of the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the subsequent
installments of the initial payment;"
SUN BROTHERS APPLIANCES, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DAMASO P. PEREZ, defendant-appellant. The Court of First Instance before which the action was brought rendered judgment
condemning the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount demanded in the complaint,
including interest and attorney's fees. The defendant has appealed the case directly to us as
LABRADOR, J.:
involving only a question of law.
This is an action brought by the plaintiff to recover from defendant the sum of P1,404.00, the
The conditional sale executed by the plaintiff and defendant contained the following
price of one Admiral Air Conditioner, Slim Style, Model 100-23-1 H.P., Serial No. 2978828,
stipulation:
delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff under a conditional sale agreement entered into by
and between them on December 6, 1958, in the City of Manila, plus stipulated interest of 12%
from January 6, 1959 until the same is fully paid, together with P200 as attorney's fees, and "2. Title to said property shall vest in the Buyer only upon full payment of the entire account
costs. Defendant answered that the air-conditioner in question was delivered to him installed as herein provided, and only upon complete performance of all the other conditions herein
in the office of the defendant located at Gardiner street, Lucena, Quezon on December 14, specified:
1959 but that said air-conditioner was totally destroyed by fire which occured in the morning
of December 28, 1958 at 2 o'clock. Defendant further claimed that the machine was destroyed "3. The Buyer shall keep said property in good condition and properly protected against the
by force majeure, not by the defendant's fault and/or negligence and, therefore, he is not liable elements, at his/its address above-stated, and undertakes that if said property or any part
under the conditional sale, Annex "A", which the parties, plaintiff and defendant, had thereof be lost, damaged, or destroyed for any causes, he shall suffer such loss, or repair
executed. such damage, it being distinctly understood and agreed that said property remains at
Buyer's risk after delivery;"
At the trial of the case the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, the most important
provision of which are as follows: The Court below declared that as the buyer would be liable in case of loss for any cause, such
buyer assumed liability even in case of loss by fortuitous event; so it rendered judgment
1. That defendant admits that on December 6, 1958, he entered into a Conditional Sale declaring defendant liable for the sun demanded together with interest and attorney's fees.
Agreement with the plaintiff, copy of which contract is attached to the complaint as Annex
"A"; Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
2. That pursuant to the terms and conditions provided in the said Conditional Sale evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Agreement the plaintiff delivered to the defendant (1) Admiral Air Conditioner Slim Style
Model 100-23-1 HP, Serial No. 2978828 with the contract price of P1,678.00 and that said In this Court on appeal defendant-appellant argues that inasmuch as the title to the property
Air Conditioner was received by the defendant; sold shall vest in the buyer only upon full payment of the price, the loss of the vendor; that the
phrase "for any cause" used in paragraph 2 of the agreement may not be interpreted to include
3. That defendant made a down payment of P274.00 on December 6, 1958, pursuant to the a fortuitous event absolutely beyond the control of the appellant; and that although Article
terms and conditions of the Conditional Sales Agreement; and Air Conditioner was installed 1174 of the new Civil Code recognizes the exception on fortuitous event when the parties to a
by the plaintiff, thru its representative, at Lucena, Quezon; contract expressly so stipulate, the phrase "for any cause" used in the contract did not indicate
any intention of the parties that the loss of the unit due to fortuitous event is to be included
within the responsibility of the vendor.
4. That said Air Conditioner was burned on December 27,1958, on or about 2:00 o'clock in
the morning, however, defendant will present evidence to show that the Air Conditioner
subject of the complaint herein was burned where it was installed by the plaintiff; In answer to the arguments above set forth the appellee argues that the stipulation in the
contract of sale whereby the buyer shall be liable for any loss, damage or destruction for any
cause, is not contrary to law, morals or public policy and is specifically authorized to be
5. That defendant, after making down payment of P274.00 to the plaintiff, did not pay any
stipulated upon between the parties by Article 1174 of the Civil Code; that the risk of loss was
of the monthly installments of P78.00 thereafter, leaving a balance of P1,404.00 in favor of
expressly stipulated to be undertaken by the buyer, even if the title to the property sold
the plaintiff;
remained, also by stipulation, in the vendor; that the terms "any cause" used in the agreement
includes a fortuitous event, and an express stipulation making the vendee responsible in such
case is valid.

We believe that the agreement making the buyer responsible for any loss whatsoever,
fortuitous or otherwise, even if the title to the property remains in the vendor, is neither
contrary to law, nor to morals or public policy. We have held such stipulation to be legal in the
case of Government vs. Amechazurra, 10 Phil. 637 (Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil Code,
Vol. IV, p. 120)and declare it to be based on a sound public policy in conditional sales according
to American decisions.

"The weight of authority support the rule that where goods are sold and delivered to the
vendor under an agreement that the title is to remain in the vendor until payment, the loss or
destruction of the property while in the possession of the vendor before payment, without his
fault, does not relieve him from the obligation to pay the price, and he, therefore, suffers the
loss. In accord with this rule are the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act. There are several basis for this rule. First is the absolute and
unconditional nature of the vendee's promise to pay for the goods. The promise is nowise
dependent upon the transfer of the absolute title. Second is the fact that the vendor has fully
performed his contract and has nothing further to do except receive payment, and the vendee
received what he bargained for when he obtained the right of possession and use of the goods
and the right to acquire title upon making full payment of the price. A third basis advanced for
the rule is the policy of providing an incentive to care properly for the goods, they being
exclusively under the control and dominion of the vendee." (47 Am. Jur., pp. 81-82).

We, therefore, agree with the trial court that the loss by fire or fortuitous event was expressly
agreed in the contract to be borne by the buyer and this express agreement is not contrary to
law but sanctioned by it as well as by the demands of sound, public policy. The judgment of
the court below is affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant.
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR – TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP AND TITLE At a place on Azcarraga, Irineo Santos and L. De Dios alighted from the car and entered a house
– SALE BY ONE PERSON NOT THE OWNER while their unidentified companion remained in the car. Once inside, L. De Dios asked Irineo
Santos to wait at the sala while he went inside a room. That was the last that Irineo saw of
G.R. No. L-18536 March 31, 1965 him. For, after a considerable length of time waiting in vain for De Dios to return, Irineo went
down to discover that neither the car nor their unidentified companion was there anymore.
Going back to the house, he inquired from a woman he saw for L. De Dios and he was told that
JOSE B. AZNAR, plaintiff-appellant,
no such name lived or was even known therein. Whereupon, Irineo Santos rushed to 1642
vs.
Crisostomo to see Marella. He found the house closed and Marella gone. Finally, he reported
RAFAEL YAPDIANGCO, defendant-appellee;
the matter to his father who promptly advised the police authorities.
TEODORO SANTOS, intervenor-appellee.
That very same day, or on the afternoon of May 29, 1959 Vicente Marella was able to sell the
REGALA, J.: car in question to the plaintiff-appellant herein, Jose B. Aznar, for P15,000.00. Insofar as the
above incidents are concerned, we are bound by the factual finding of the trial court that Jose
This is an appeal, on purely legal questions, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of B. Aznar acquired the said car from Vicente Marella in good faith, for a valuable consideration
Quezon City, Branch IV, declaring the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos, entitled to the and without notice of the defect appertaining to the vendor's title.
possession of the car in dispute.
While the car in question was thus in the possession of Jose B. Aznar and while he was
The records before this Court disclose that sometime in May, 1959, Teodoro Santos advertised attending to its registration in his name, agents of the Philippine Constabulary seized and
in two metropolitan papers the sale of his FORD FAIRLANE 500. In the afternoon of May 28, confiscated the same in consequence of the report to them by Teodoro Santos that the said
1959, a certain L. De Dios, claiming to be a nephew of Vicente Marella, went to the Santos car was unlawfully taken from him.
residence to answer the ad. However, Teodoro Santos was out during this call and only the
latter's son, Irineo Santos, received and talked with De Dios. The latter told the young Santos In due time, Jose B. Aznar filed a complaint for replevin against Captain Rafael Yapdiangco, the
that he had come in behalf of his uncle, Vicente Marella, who was interested to buy the head of the Philippine Constabulary unit which seized the car in question Claiming ownership
advertised car. of the vehicle, he prayed for its delivery to him. In the course of the litigation, however,
Teodoro Santos moved and was allowed to intervene by the lower court.
On being informed of the above, Teodoro Santos instructed his son to see the said Vicente
Marella the following day at his given address: 1642 Crisostomo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. And At the end of the trial, the lower court rendered a decision awarding the disputed motor
so, in the morning of May 29, 1959, Irineo Santos went to the above address. At this meeting, vehicle to the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos. In brief, it ruled that Teodoro Santos had
Marella agreed to buy the car for P14,700.00 on the understanding that the price would be been unlawfully deprived of his personal property by Vicente Marella, from whom the plaintiff-
paid only after the car had been registered in his name. appellant traced his right. Consequently, although the plaintiff-appellant acquired the car in
good faith and for a valuable consideration from Vicente Marella, the said decision concluded,
Irineo Santos then fetched his father who, together with L. De Dios, went to the office of a still the intervenor-appellee was entitled to its recovery on the mandate of Article 559 of the
certain Atty. Jose Padolina where the deed of the sale for the car was executed in Marella's New Civil Code which provides:
favor. The parties to the contract thereafter proceeded to the Motor Vehicles Office in Quezon
City where the registration of the car in Marella's name was effected. Up to this stage of the ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to title.
transaction, the purchased price had not been paid. Nevertheless, one who lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same.
From the Motor Vehicles Office, Teodoro Santos returned to his house. He gave the
registration papers and a copy of the deed of sale to his son, Irineo, and instructed him not to If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
part with them until Marella shall have given the full payment for the car. Irineo Santos and L. acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
De Dios then proceeded to 1642 Crisostomo Street, Sampaloc, Manila where the former reimbursing the price paid therefor.
demanded the payment from Vicente Marella. Marella said that the amount he had on hand
then was short by some P2,000.00 and begged off to be allowed to secure the shortage from From this decision, Jose B. Aznar appeals.
a sister supposedly living somewhere on Azcarraga Street, also in Manila. Thereafter, he
ordered L. De Dios to go to the said sister and suggested that Irineo Santos go with him. At the The issue at bar is one and simple, to wit: Between Teodoro Santos and the plaintiff-appellant,
same time, he requested the registration papers and the deed of sale from Irineo Santos on Jose B. Aznar, who has a better right to the possession of the disputed automobile?
the pretext that he would like to show them to his lawyer. Trusting the good faith of Marella,
We find for the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos.
Irineo handed over the same to the latter and thereupon, in the company of L. De Dios and
another unidentified person, proceeded to the alleged house of Marella's sister. The plaintiff-appellant accepts that the car in question originally belonged to and was owned
by the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos, and that the latter was unlawfully deprived of the
same by Vicente Marella. However, the appellant contends that upon the facts of this case, The lower court was correct in applying Article 559 of the Civil Code to the case at bar, for
the applicable provision of the Civil Code is Article 1506 and not Article 559 as was held by the under it, the rule is to the effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully
decision under review. Article 1506 provides: deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the finder, thief or robber, but also
from third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or robber.
ART. 1506. Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his, title has not been The said article establishes two exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicability, to wit, when
voided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases,
them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller's defect of title. the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who may recover it without paying
any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale. (Del Rosario v. Lucena,
The contention is clearly unmeritorious. Under the aforequoted provision, it is essential that
8 Phil. 535; Varela v. Finnick, 9 Phil. 482; Varela v. Matute, 9 Phil. 479; Arenas v. Raymundo, 19
the seller should have a voidable title at least. It is very clearly inapplicable where, as in this
Phil. 46. Tolentino, id., Vol. II, p. 261.)
case, the seller had no title at all.
In the case of Cruz v. Pahati, et al., 52 O.G. 3053 this Court has already ruled
Vicente Marella did not have any title to the property under litigation because the same was
that —
never delivered to him. He sought ownership or acquisition of it by virtue of the contract.
Vicente Marella could have acquired ownership or title to the subject matter thereof only by Under Article 559 of the new Civil Code, a person illegally deprived of any movable may
the delivery or tradition of the car to him. recover it from the person in possession of the same and the only defense the latter may
have is if he has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, in which case, the owner cannot
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, "ownership and other real rights over property are
obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. In the present case, plaintiff
acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in
has been illegally deprived of his car through the ingenious scheme of defendant B to enable
consequence of certain contracts, by tradition." As interpreted by this Court in a host of cases,
the latter to dispose of it as if he were the owner thereof. Plaintiff, therefore, can still recover
by this provision, ownership is not transferred by contract merely but by tradition or delivery.
possession of the car even if it is in the possession of a third party who had acquired it in
Contracts only constitute titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while
good faith from defendant B. The maxim that "no man can transfer to another a better title
delivery or tradition is the mode of accomplishing the same (Gonzales v. Rojas, 16 Phil. 51;
than he had himself" obtains in the civil as well as in the common law. (U.S. v. Sotelo, 28
Ocejo, Perez and Co. v. International Bank, 37 Phil. 631, Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Wilson, 8
Phil. 147)
Phil. 51; Kuenzle & Streiff v. Wacke & Chandler, 14 Phil. 610; Easton v. Diaz Co., 32 Phil. 180).
Finally, the plaintiff-appellant here contends that inasmuch as it was the intervenor-appellee
For the legal acquisition and transfer of ownership and other property rights, the thing
who had caused the fraud to be perpetrated by his misplaced confidence on Vicente Marella,
transferred must be delivered, inasmuch as, according to settled jurisprudence, the tradition
he, the intervenor-appellee, should be made to suffer the consequences arising therefrom,
of the thing is a necessary and indispensable requisite in the acquisition of said ownership by
following the equitable principle to that effect. Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of
virtue of contract. (Walter Laston v. E. Diaz & Co. & the Provincial Sheriff of Albay, supra.)
the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith by another, is based on his being
So long as property is not delivered, the ownership over it is not transferred by contract dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that where one of two innocent
merely but by delivery. Contracts only constitute titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the
of ownership, while delivery or tradition is the method of accomplishing the same, the title party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be
and the method of acquiring it being different in our law. (Gonzales v. Roxas, 16 Phil. 51) applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically
Article 559. Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail
In the case on hand, the car in question was never delivered to the vendee by the vendor as in this jurisdiction. (Cruz v. Pahati, supra)
to complete or consummate the transfer of ownership by virtue of the contract. It should be
recalled that while there was indeed a contract of sale between Vicente Marella and Teodoro UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed and the decision of the
Santos, the former, as vendee, took possession of the subject matter thereof by stealing the lower court affirmed in full. Costs against the appellant.
same while it was in the custody of the latter's son.

There is no adequate evidence on record as to whether Irineo Santos voluntarily delivered the
key to the car to the unidentified person who went with him and L. De Dios to the place on
Azcarraga where a sister of Marella allegedly lived. But even if Irineo Santos did, it was not the
delivery contemplated by Article 712 of the Civil Code. For then, it would be indisputable that
he turned it over to the unidentified companion only so that he may drive Irineo Santos and
De Dios to the said place on Azcarraga and not to vest the title to the said vehicle to him as
agent of Vicente Marella. Article 712 above contemplates that the act be coupled with the
intent of delivering the thing. (10 Manresa 132)
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR – TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP AND TITLE pawn-shop owner the big diamond on Exhibit 1 was before the trial never dismantled. When
– SALE BY ONE HAVING VOIDABLE TITLE dismantled, defendant's diamond was found to weigh 2.57 cts."3

G.R. No. L-20264 January 30, 1971 Plaintiff lost in the lower court. She elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals with
the judgment of the lower court being reversed. It is this decision now under review.
CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA and ANASTACIO GARCIA, petitioners,
vs. These are the facts as found by respondent Court of Appeals: "That the ring brought by the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA D. GUEVARA and JUAN B. GUEVARA, respondents. parties for examination by Rafael Rebullida on December 14, 1953 was the same ring
purchased by plaintiff from R. Rebullida, Inc. on October 27, 1947 and stolen in February, 1952
FERNANDO, J.: has been abundantly established by plaintiff's evidence. Before plaintiff lost the ring, she had
been wearing it for six years and became familiar with it. Thus, when she saw the missing ring
in the finger of defendant, she readily and definitely identified it. Her identification was
This petition for certiorari to review a decision of respondent Court of Appeals was given due
confirmed by Mr. Rafael Rebullida, whose candid testimony is entitled to great weight, with
course because it was therein vigorously asserted that legal questions of gravity and of
his 30 years experience behind him in the jewelry business and being a disinterested witness
moment, there being allegations of an unwarranted departure from and a patent misreading
since both parties are his customers. Indeed, defendant made no comment when in her
of applicable and controlling decisions, called for determination by this Tribunal. The brief for
presence Rebullida after examining the ring and stock card told plaintiff that that was her ring,
petitioners-spouses, however, failed to substantiate such imputed failings of respondent
nor did she answer plaintiff's letter of demand, ... asserting ownership. Further confirmation
Court. The performance did not live up to the promise. On the basis of the facts as duly found
may be found in the extra-judicial admissions, contained in defendant's original and first
by respondent Court, which we are not at liberty to disregard, and the governing legal
amended answers ..."4
provisions, there is no basis for reversal. We affirm.

These further facts likewise appeal therein: "The foregoing proof is not counter-balanced by
The nature of the case presented before the lower court by private respondent Angelina D.
the denial on the part of defendant or the presentation of the ring, Exhibit I, which has a
Guevara, assisted by her spouse, Juan B. Guevara, as plaintiffs, was noted in the decision of
diamond-solitaire 2.57 cts., or much heavier than the lost diamond weighing 2.05 cts. only. It
respondent Court of Appeals thus: "Plaintiff seeks recovery of `one (1) lady's diamond ring 18
is noteworthy that defendant gave a rather dubious source of her ring. Aling Petring from
cts. white gold mounting, with one (1) 2.05 cts. diamond-solitaire, and four (4) brills 0.10 cts.
whom the ring supposedly came turned out to be a mysterious and ephemeral figure. Miss
total weight' which she bought on October 27, 1947 from R. Rebullida, Inc." 1 Then came a
Hinahon did not even know her true and full name, nor her forwarding address. She appeared
summary of now respondent Guevara of her evidence: "Plaintiff's evidence tends to show that
from nowhere, boarded three months in the house of Miss Hinahon long enough to sell her
around October 11, 1953 plaintiff while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La Bulakeña
diamond ring, disappearing from the scene a week thereafter. Indeed, the case was terminated
restaurant recognized her ring in the finger of Mrs. Garcia and inquired where she bought it,
without any hearing on the third-party and fourth-party complaints, which would have shown
which the defendant answered from her comadre. Plaintiff explained that that ring was stolen
up the falsity of defendant's theory. Moreover, Mrs. Baldomera Miranda, third-party
from her house in February, 1952. Defendant handed the ring to plaintiff and it fitted her
defendant, who tried to corroborate defendant on the latter's alleged attempt to exchange
finger. Two or three days later, at the request of plaintiff, plaintiff, her husband Lt. Col. Juan
the ring defendant bought through her, is [belied] by her judicial admission in her Answer that
Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, defendant and her attorney proceeded to the store of
appellee `suggested that she would make alterations to the mounting and structural design of
Mr. Rebullida to whom they showed the ring in question. Mr. Rebullida a examined the ring
the ring to hide the true identity and appearance of the original one' (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 45
with the aid of high power lens and after consulting the stock card thereon, concluded that it
O.G. 3796). Finally, defendant is refuted by her own extra-judicial admissions ... although made
was the very ring that plaintiff bought from him in 1947. The ring was returned to defendant
by defendant's counsel. For an attorney who acts as counsel of record and is permitted to act
who despite a written request therefor failed to deliver the ring to plaintiff. Hence, this case.
such, has the authority to manage the cause, and this includes the authority to make admission
Later on when the sheriff tried to serve the writ of seizure (replevin), defendant refused to
for the purpose of the litigation... Her proffered explanation that her counsel misunderstood
deliver the ring which had been examined by Mr. Rebullida, claiming it was lost."2
her is puerile because the liability to error as to the identity of the vendor and the exchange of
the ring with another ring of the same value, was rather remote." 5
How the defendant, Consuelo S. de Garcia, the present petitioner before us, along with her
husband Anastacio Garcia, sought to meet plaintiff's claim was narrated thus: "On the other
It is in the light of the above facts as well as the finding that the discrepancy as to the weight
hand, defendant denied having made any admission before plaintiff or Mr. Rebullida or the
between the diamond-solitaire in Exhibit I and the lost diamond was due to defendant having
sheriff. Her evidence tends to show that the ring (Exhibit 1) was purchased by her from Mrs.
"substituted a diamond-solitaire of plaintiff with a heavier stone" that the decision was
Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from the owner, Aling
rendered, respondent Court reversing the lower court and ordering defendant, now petitioner
Petring, who was boarding in her house; that the ring she bought could be similar to, but not
Consuelo S. de Garcia, to return plaintiff's ring or fact value of P1,000.00 and costs, as well as
the same ring plaintiff purchased from Mr. Rebullida which was stolen; that according to a
to pay plaintiff P1,000.00 as attorney's fee and P1,000.00 as exemplary damages. Hence this
appeal.
To repeat, there is no occasion to reverse respondent Court. It correctly applied the law to the possession of the same.' As stated by the Honorable Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court in
facts as found. Sotto vs. Enage (C.A.), 43 Off. Gaz. 5075, Dec. 1947: `Article 559 in fact assumes that possessor
is as yet not the owner; for it is obvious that where the possessor has come to acquire
1. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads thus: "The possession of indefeasible title by, let us say, adverse possession for the necessary period, no proof of loss
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost or illegal deprivation could avail the former owner of the chattel. He would no longer be
any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in entitled to recover it under any condition.' "9
possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its The second assigned error is centered on the alleged failure to prove the identity of the
return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having diamond ring. Clearly the question raised is one of the fact. What the Court of Appeals found
been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it from is conclusive. Again, petitioner could not demonstrate that in reaching such a conclusion the
petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. The only exception Court of Appeals acted in an arbitrary manner. As made mention of in the brief for respondents
the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in two disinterested witnesses, Mr. Rafael Rebullida as well as Lt. Col. Reynaldo Cementina of the
which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price. As authoritative Pasay City Police Department, both of whom could not be accused of being biased in favor of
interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati,6 the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof that respondent Angelina D. Guevara, did testify as to the identity of the ring.
there was good faith by the acquisition by the possessor. There is a reiteration of this principle
in Aznar v. Yapdiangco.7 Thus: "Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to The third assigned error of petitioners would find fault with respondent Court relying "on the
recover personal property acquired in good faith by another, is based on his being weakness of the title or evidence" of petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia. It is true, in the decision
dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that where one of two innocent under review, mention was made of petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia making no comment
persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the another, the law imposes the loss upon the when in her presence Rebullida, after examining the ring the stock card, told respondent
party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be Angelina L. Guevara that that was her ring, nor did petitioner answer a letter of the latter
applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically asserting ownership. It was likewise stated in such decision that there were extra-judicial
Article 559. Between a common law principle and statutory provision, the latter must prevail admissions in the original and first amended answers of petitioner. In the appraisal of her
in this jurisdiction."8 testimony, respondent Court likewise spoke of her giving a rather dubious source of her ring,
the person from whom she allegedly bought it turning out "to be a mysterious and ephemeral
2. It is thus immediately apparent that there is no merit to the contention raised in the first figure." As a matter of fact, as set forth a few pages back, respondent Court did enumerate the
assigned error that her possession in good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat flaws in the version given by petitioner. From the weakness of the testimony offered which, as
respondent Guevara's claim. As the above cases demonstrate, even on that assumption the thus made clear, petitioner, did not even seek to refute, she would raise the legal question
owner can recover the same once she can show illegal deprivation. Respondent Court of that respondent Court relied on the "weakness of [her] title or evidence" rather than on the
Appeals was so convinced from the evidence submitted that the owner of the ring in litigation proof justifying respondent Angelina D. Guevara's claim of ownership. Petitioner here would
is such respondent. That is a factual determination to which we must pay heed. Instead of ignore the finding of fact of respondent Court that such ownership on her part "has been
proving any alleged departure from legal norms by respondent Court, petitioner would stress abundantly established" by her evidence. Again here, in essence, the question raised is one of
Article 541 of the Civil Code, which provides: 'A possessor in the concept of owner has in his fact, and there is no justification for us to reverse respondent Court.
favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to
show or prove it." She would accord to it a greater legal significance than that to which under The legal question raised in the fourth assignment of error is that the matter of the substitution
the controlling doctrines it is entitled.lâwphî1.ñèt The brief for respondents did clearly point of the diamond on the ring was a question raised for the first time on appeal as it was never
out why petitioner's assertion is lacking in support not only from the cases but even from put in issue by the pleadings nor the subject of reception of evidence by both parties and not
commentators. Thus: "Actually, even under the first clause, possession in good faith does not touched upon in the decision of the lower court. Why no such question could be raised in the
really amount to title, for the reason that Art. 1132 of the Code provides for a period of pleadings of respondent Angelina D. Guevara was clarified by the fact that the substitution
acquisitive prescription for movables through `uninterrupted possession for four years in good came after it was brought for examination to Mr. Rebullida. After the knowledge of such
faith' (Art. 1955 of the old Spanish Code, which provided a period of three years), so that many substitution was gained, however, the issue was raised at the trial according to the said
Spanish writers, including Manresa, Sanchez Roman, Scaevola, De Buen, and Ramos, assert respondent resulting in that portion of the decision where the lower court reached a negative
that under Art. 464 of the Spanish Code (Art. 559 of the New Civil Code), the title of the conclusion. As a result, in the motion for reconsideration, one of the points raised as to such
possessor is not that of ownership, but is merely a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis decision being contrary to the evidence is the finding that there was no substitution. It is not
of acquisitive prescription (II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil. p. 258: IV Manresa, Derecho Civil necessary to state that respondent Court, exercising its appellate power reversed the lower
Español, 6th Ed., p. 380). And it is for the very reason that the title established by the first court. What was held by it is controlling. What is clear is that there is no factual basis for the
clause of Art. 559 is only a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive legal arguments on which the fourth assigned error is predicated.
prescription, that the clause immediately following provides that `one who has lost any
movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
What is said takes care of the fifth assigned error that respondent Court was mistaken in its
finding that there was such a substitution. Again petitioner would have us pass on a question
of credibility which is left to respondent Court of Appeals. The sixth assigned error would
complain against the reversal of the lower court judgment as well as petitioner Consuelo S. de
Garcia being made to pay respondent Angelina D. Guevara exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and costs. The reversal is called for in the light of the appraisal of the evidence of record as
meticulously weighed by respondent Court. As to the attorney's fees and exemplary damages,
this is what respondent Court said in the decision under review: "Likewise, plaintiff is entitled
to recover reasonable attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000, it being just and equitable under
the circumstances, and another P1,000 as exemplary damages for the public good to
discourage litigants from resorting to fraudulent devices to frustrate the ends of justice, as
defendant herein tried to substitute the ring, Exhibit 1, for plaintiff's ring." 10 Considering the
circumstances, the cursory discussion of the sixth assigned error on the matter by petitioner
fails to demonstrate that respondent Court's actuation is blemished by legal defects.
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR – TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP AND TITLE On the night of the same date, EDCA sought the assistance of the police in Precinct 5 at the UN
– SALE BY ONE HAVING VOIDABLE TITLE Avenue, which forced their way into the store of the private respondents and threatened
Leonor Santos with prosecution for buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books without
G.R. No. 80298 April 26, 1990 warrant, loading them in a van belonging to EDCA, and thereafter turned them over to the
petitioner. 9
EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner,
vs. Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents sued for recovery of the books
THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and style of after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment was
"SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. issued and the petitioner, after initial refusal, finally surrendered the books to the private
respondents. 10 As previously stated, the petitioner was successively rebuffed in the three
courts below and now hopes to secure relief from us.
CRUZ, J.:

To begin with, the Court expresses its disapproval of the arbitrary action of the petitioner in
The case before us calls for the interpretation of Article 559 of the Civil Code and raises the
taking the law into its own hands and forcibly recovering the disputed books from the private
particular question of when a person may be deemed to have been "unlawfully deprived" of
respondents. The circumstance that it did so with the assistance of the police, which should
movable property in the hands of another. The article runs in full as follows:
have been the first to uphold legal and peaceful processes, has compounded the wrong even
more deplorably. Questions like the one at bar are decided not by policemen but by judges
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. and with the use not of brute force but of lawful writs.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same.
Now to the merits
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has
It is the contention of the petitioner that the private respondents have not established their
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
ownership of the disputed books because they have not even produced a receipt to prove they
reimbursing the price paid therefor.
had bought the stock. This is unacceptable. Precisely, the first sentence of Article 559 provides
that "the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title," thus
The movable property in this case consists of books, which were bought from the petitioner dispensing with further proof.
by an impostor who sold it to the private respondents. Ownership of the books was recognized
in the private respondents by the Municipal Trial Court, 1 which was sustained by the Regional
The argument that the private respondents did not acquire the books in good faith has been
Trial Court, 2 which was in turn sustained by the Court of Appeals. 3 The petitioner asks us to
dismissed by the lower courts, and we agree. Leonor Santos first ascertained the ownership of
declare that all these courts have erred and should be reversed.
the books from the EDCA invoice showing that they had been sold to Cruz, who said he was
selling them for a discount because he was in financial need. Private respondents are in the
This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz business of buying and selling books and often deal with hard-up sellers who urgently have to
placed an order by telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books, payable on delivery. part with their books at reduced prices. To Leonor Santos, Cruz must have been only one of
4 EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz
the many such sellers she was accustomed to dealing with. It is hardly bad faith for any one in
issued a personal check covering the purchase price of P8,995.65. 5 On October 7, 1981, Cruz the business of buying and selling books to buy them at a discount and resell them for a profit.
sold 120 of the books to private respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's
ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him P1,700.00. 6
But the real issue here is whether the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books
because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before
clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to
In its extended memorandum, EDCA cites numerous cases holding that the owner who has
be a dean and was informed that there was no such person in its employ. Further verification
been unlawfully deprived of personal property is entitled to its recovery except only where the
revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against
property was purchased at a public sale, in which event its return is subject to reimbursement
which he had drawn the payment check. 7 EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and
of the purchase price. The petitioner is begging the question. It is putting the cart before the
arrested Cruz on October 7, 1981. Investigation disclosed his real name as Tomas de la Peña
horse. Unlike in the cases invoked, it has yet to be established in the case at bar that EDCA has
and his sale of 120 of the books he had ordered from EDCA to the private respondents. 8
been unlawfully deprived of the books.
The petitioner argues that it was, because the impostor acquired no title to the books that he In Tagatac v. Jimenez,13 the plaintiff sold her car to Feist, who sold it to Sanchez, who sold it to
could have validly transferred to the private respondents. Its reason is that as the payment Jimenez. When the payment check issued to Tagatac by Feist was dishonored, the plaintiff
check bounced for lack of funds, there was a failure of consideration that nullified the contract sued to recover the vehicle from Jimenez on the ground that she had been unlawfully deprived
of sale between it and Cruz. of it by reason of Feist's deception. In ruling for Jimenez, the Court of Appeals held:

The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between the The point of inquiry is whether plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac has been unlawfully
parties on the subject matter and the consideration. According to the Civil Code: deprived of her car. At first blush, it would seem that she was unlawfully deprived thereof,
considering that she was induced to part with it by reason of the chicanery practiced on her
Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon by Warner L. Feist. Certainly, swindling, like robbery, is an illegal method of deprivation of
the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. property. In a manner of speaking, plaintiff-appellant was "illegally deprived" of her car, for
the way by which Warner L. Feist induced her to part with it is illegal and is punished by law.
But does this "unlawful deprivation" come within the scope of Article 559 of the New Civil
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the
Code?
provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.

xxx xxx xxx


xxx xxx xxx

. . . The fraud and deceit practiced by Warner L. Feist earmarks this sale as a voidable
Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual
contract (Article 1390 N.C.C.). Being a voidable contract, it is susceptible of either ratification
or constructive delivery thereof.
or annulment. If the contract is ratified, the action to annul it is extinguished (Article 1392,
N.C.C.) and the contract is cleansed from all its defects (Article 1396, N.C.C.); if the contract
Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the is annulled, the contracting parties are restored to their respective situations before the
purchaser until he has fully paid the price. contract and mutual restitution follows as a consequence (Article 1398, N.C.C.).

It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one quoted, that ownership in the However, as long as no action is taken by the party entitled, either that of annulment or of
thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a ratification, the contract of sale remains valid and binding. When plaintiff-appellant Trinidad
stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor C. Tagatac delivered the car to Feist by virtue of said voidable contract of sale, the title to
to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase the car passed to Feist. Of course, the title that Feist acquired was defective and voidable.
price has not yet been paid. Nevertheless, at the time he sold the car to Felix Sanchez, his title thereto had not been
avoided and he therefore conferred a good title on the latter, provided he bought the car in
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal good faith, for value and without notice of the defect in Feist's title (Article 1506, N.C.C.).
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery There being no proof on record that Felix Sanchez acted in bad faith, it is safe to assume that
of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to he acted in good faith.
another.
The above rulings are sound doctrine and reflect our own interpretation of Article 559 as
In Asiatic Commercial Corporation v. Ang,11 the plaintiff sold some cosmetics to Francisco Ang, applied to the case before us.
who in turn sold them to Tan Sit Bin. Asiatic not having been paid by Ang, it sued for the
recovery of the articles from Tan, who claimed he had validly bought them from Ang, paying Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which
for the same in cash. Finding that there was no conspiracy between Tan and Ang to deceive he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for
Asiatic the Court of Appeals declared: them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by
the private respondents to the books.
Yet the defendant invoked Article 464 12 of the Civil Code providing, among other things that
"one who has been unlawfully deprived of personal property may recover it from any person One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully deprived" were to
possessing it." We do not believe that the plaintiff has been unlawfully deprived of the be interpreted in the manner suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the seller's title
cartons of Gloco Tonic within the scope of this legal provision. It has voluntarily parted with who buys a movable property from him would have to surrender it to another person claiming
them pursuant to a contract of purchase and sale. The circumstance that the price was not to be the original owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor. The buyer in
subsequently paid did not render illegal a transaction which was valid and legal at the the second sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak, and would be compelled to return
beginning.
the thing bought by him in good faith without even the right to reimbursement of the amount
he had paid for it.

It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the
books belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed
her assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was less than
cautious — in fact, too trusting in dealing with the impostor. Although it had never transacted
with him before, it readily delivered the books he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily
accepted his personal check in payment. It did not verify his identity although it was easy
enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated
in the sales invoice issued to him, by the printed terms thereon, that the books had been paid
for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in the buyer.

Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that
the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the title of
Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books, these being
movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to buy
them.

It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the prejudice sustained
by EDCA as a result of its own negligence.1âwphi1 We cannot see the justice in transferring
EDCA's loss to the Santoses who had acted in good faith, and with proper care, when they
bought the books from Cruz.

While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy is not against
the private respondents but against Tomas de la Peña, who has apparently caused all this
trouble. The private respondents have themselves been unduly inconvenienced, and for
merely transacting a customary deal not really unusual in their kind of business. It is they and
not EDCA who have a right to complain.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR – TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP AND TITLE 2 Siy Cong Bieng & Co., Inc do 2
– SALE BY ONE HAVING VOIDABLE TITLE 1702 The Philippine Warehouse Company Siy Cong Bieng & Co., Inc. 39

G.R. No. L-34655 March 5, 1932 And that the baled hemp covered by these warehouse receipts was worth P31,635; receipts
number 1707,133,1722, 1723, 1634, and 1702 being endorsed in blank by the plaintiff and
SIY CONG BIENG & CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee, Otto Ranft, and numbers 1918 and 2, by Otto Ranft alone.
vs.
HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, defendant-appellant. 4. That in the night of June 25, 1926, said Otto Ranft died suddenly at his house in the City
of Manila.
OSTRAND, J.:
5. That both parties submit this agreed statement of facts, but reserve their right to have
This action was brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the sum of P31,645, in evidence upon other points not included herein, and upon which they cannot come to
the value of 464 bales of hemp deposited in certain bonded warehouses as evidenced by the an agreement.
quedans (warehouse receipts) described in the complaint, said quedans having been delivered
as pledge by one Otto Ranft to the herein defendant, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Manila, August 7, 1929.
Corporation, for the guarantee of a preexisting debt of the former to the latter. The record
shows that both parties, through their respective counsel, subscriber and submitted to the The evidence shows that on June 25, 1926, Ranft called at the office of the herein plaintiff to
court below the following agreement of facts: purchase hemp (abaca), and he was offered the bales of hemp as described in the quedans
above mentioned. The parties agreed to the aforesaid price, and on the same date the
STIPULATION OF FACTS quedans, together with the covering invoice, were sent to Ranft by the plaintiff, without having
been paid for the hemp, but the plaintiff's understanding was that the payment would be made
(Translated into English) against the same quedans, and it appear that in previous transaction of the same kind between
the bank and the plaintiff, quedans were paid one or two days after their delivery to them.
Come now the parties, both the plaintiff and the defendant Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation, through their respective counsel in the above entitled case, and respectfully In the evening of the day upon which the quedans in question were delivered to the herein
submit to the court the following agreed statements of facts: defendant, Ranft died, and when the plaintiff found that such was the case, it immediately
demanded the return of the quedans, or the payment of the value, but was told that the
quedans had been sent to the herein defendant as soon as they were received by Ranft.
1. That both the plaintiff and the defendant Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation are
corporations domicile in the City of Manila and duly authorized to transact business in
accordance with the laws of the Philippine Islands. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff filed a claim for the aforesaid sum of P31,645 in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of the deceased Otto Ranft, which on an appeal form the decision of
the committee on claims, was allowed by the Court of First Instance in case No. 31372 (City of
2. That the plaintiff is a corporation engaged in business generally, and that the defendant
Manila). In the meantime, demand had been made by the plaintiff on the defendant bank for
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation is a foreign bank authorized to engage in the
the return of the quedans, or their value, which demand was refused by the bank on the
banking business in the Philippines.
ground that it was a holder of the quedans in due course. Thereupon the plaintiff filed its first
complaint against the defendant, wherein it alleged that it has "sold" the quedans in question
3. That on June 25, 1926, certain negotiable warehouse receipts described below were to the deceased O. Ranft for cash, but that the said O. Ranft had not fulfilled the conditions of
pledge by Otto Ranft to the defendant Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation to secure the sale. Later on, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, wherein they changed the word "sold"
the payment of his preexisting debts to the latter: referred to in the first complaint to the words "attempted to sell".

No. Warehouseman Depositor Bales Upon trial the judge of the court below rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff principally
1707 Public Warehouse Co Siy Cong Bieng & Co., Inc. 27 on the ground that in the opinion of the court the defendant bank "could not have acted in
133 W.F. Stevenson Co do 67 good faith for the reason that according to the statements of its own witness, Thiele, the
1722 Public Warehouse Co do 60 quedans were delivered to the bank in order to secure the debts of Ranft for the payment of
1723 do do 4 their value and from which it might be deduced that the said bank knew that the value of the
1634 The Philippine Warehouse Company do 99 said quedans was not as yet paid when the same were endorsed to it, and its alleged belief
1918 Public Warehouse Co O. Ranft 166 that Ranft was the owner of the said quedans was not in accordance with the facts proved at
the time"; and that, moreover, the circumstances were such that "the bank knew, or should SEC. 38. Negotiation of negotiable receipts by indorsement. — A negotiable receipt may be
have known, that Ranft had not yet acquired the ownership of the said quedans and that it negotiated by the indorsement of the person to whose order the goods are, by the terms of
therefore could not invoke the presumption that it was acting in good faith and without the receipt, deliverable. Such indorsement may be in blank, to bearer or to a specified
negligence on its part". person. . . . Subsequent negotiation may be made in like manner.

In our opinion the judgment of the court below is not tenable. It may be noted, first, that the SEC. 40. Who may negotiate a receipt. — A negotiable receipt may be negotiated:
quedans in question were negotiable in form; second, that they were pledge by Otto Ranft to
the defendant bank to secure the payment of his preexisting debts to said bank (paragraph 3 (a) By the owner thereof, or
of the Stipulation of Facts); third, that such of the quedans as were issued in the name of the
plaintiff were duly endorsed in blank by the plaintiff and by Otto Ranft; and fourth, that the
(b) By any person to whom the possession or custody of the receipt has been entrusted by
two remaining quedans which were duly endorsed in blank by him.
the owner, if, by the terms of the receipt, the warehouseman undertakes to deliver the
goods to the order of the person to whom the possession or custody of the receipt has been
When these quedans were thus negotiated, Otto Ranft was indebted to the Hongkong & entrusted, or if at the time of such entrusting the receipt is in such form that it may be
Shanghai Banking Corporation in the sum of P622,753.22, which indebtedness was partly negotiated by delivery.
covered by quedans. He was also being pressed to deposit additional payments as a further
security to the bank, and there is no doubt that the quedans here in question were received
The question as to the rights the defendant bank acquired over the aforesaid quedans after
by the bank to secure the payment of Ranft's preexisting debts; it is so stated in paragraph 3
indorsement and delivery to it by Ranft, we find in section 41 of the Warehouse Receipts Act
of the stipulation of the facts agreed on by the parties and hereinbefore quoted.
(Act No. 2137):

It further appears that it has been the practice of the bank in its transactions with Ranft that
SEC. 41. Rights of person to whom a receipt has been negotiated. — A person to whom a
the value of the quedans has been entered in the current accounts between Ranft and the
negotiable receipt has been duly negotiated acquires thereby:
bank, but there is no evidence to the effect that the bank was at any time bound to pay back
to Ranft the amount of any of the quedans, and there is nothing in the record to show that the
bank has promised to pay the values of the quedans neither to Ranft nor to the herein plaintiff; (a) Such title to the goods as the person negotiating the receipt to him had or had ability to
on the contrary, as stated in the stipulation of facts, the "negotiable warehouse receipts — convey to a purchaser in good faith for value, and also such title to the goods as the depositor
were pledged by Otto Ranft to the defendant Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation of person to whose order the goods were to be delivered by the terms of the receipt had or
secure the payment of his preexisting debts to the latter", and taking into consideration that had ability to convey to a purchaser in good faith for value, and. . . .
the quedans were negotiable in form and duly endorsed in blank by the plaintiff and by Otto
Ranft, it follows that on the delivery of the qeudans to the bank they were no longer the In the case of the Commercial National Bank of New Orleans vs. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust
property of the indorser unless he liquidated his debt with the bank. Co. (239 U.S., 520), Chief Justice Hughes said in regard to negotiation of receipts:

In his brief the plaintiff insists that the defendant, before the delivery of the quedans, should It will be observed that "one who takes by trespass or a finder is not included within the
have ascertained whether Ranft had any authority to negotiate the quedans. description of those who may negotiate." (Report of Commissioner on Uniform States Laws,
January 1, 1910, p. 204.) Aside from this, the intention is plain to facilitate the use of
We are unable to find anything in the record which in any manner would have compelled the warehouse receipts as documents of title. Under sec. 40, the person who may negotiate the
bank to investigate the indorser. The bank had a perfect right to act as it did, and its action is receipt is either the "owner thereof", or a "person to whom the possession or custody of the
in accordance with sections 47, 38, and 40 of the Warehouse Receipts Act (Act No. 2137), receipt has been intrusted by the owner" if the receipt is in the form described. The
which read as follows: warehouse receipt represents the goods, but the intrustion of the receipt, as stated, is more
than the mere delivery of the goods; it is a representation that the one to whom the
possession of the receipt has been so intrusted has the title to the goods. By sec. 47, the
SEC. 47. When negotiation not impaired by fraud, mistake, or duress. — The validity of the
negotiation of the receipt to a purchaser for value without notice is not impaired by the fact
negotiation of a receipt is not impaired by the fact that such negotiation was a breach of
that it is a breach of duty, or that the owner of the receipt was induced "by fraud, mistake,
duty on the part of the person making the negotiation, or by the fact that the owner of the
or duree" to intrust the receipt to the person who negotiated it. And, under sec. 41, one to
receipt was induced by fraud, mistake, or duress to intrust the possession or custody of the
whom the negotiable receipt has been duly negotiated acquires such title to the goods as
receipt was negotiated, or a person to whom the receipt was subsequent negotiated, paid
the person negotiating the receipt to him, or the depositor or person whose order the goods
value therefor, without notice of the breach of duty, or fraud, mistake, or duress.
were delivered by the terms of the receipt, either had or "had ability to convey to a
purchaser in good faith for value." The clear import of these provisions is that if the owner
of the goods permit another to have the possession or custody of negotiable warehouse
receipts running to the order of the latter, or to bearer, it is a representation of title upon
which bona fide purchasers for value are entitled to rely, despite breaches of trust or
violations of agreement on the part of the apparent owner.

In its second assignment of error, the defendant-appellant maintains that the plaintiff-appellee
is estopped to deny that the bank had a valid title to the quedans for the reason that the
plaintiff had voluntarily clothed Ranft with all the attributes of ownership and upon which the
defendant bank relied. In our opinion, the appellant's view is correct. In the National Safe
Deposit vs. Hibbs (229 U.S., 391), certain certificates of stock were pledged as collateral by the
defendant in error to the plaintiff bank, which certificates were converted by one of the trusted
employees of the bank to his own use and sold by him. The stock certificates were unqualified
endorsed in blank by the defendant when delivered to the bank. The Supreme Court of the
United States through Justice Day applied the familiar rule of equitable estoppel that where
one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss he who by his conduct made the loss possible
must bear it, using the following language:

We think this case correctly states the principle, and, applied to the case in hand, is decisive
of it. Here one of two innocent person must suffer and the question at last is, Where shall
the loss fall? It is undeniable that the broker obtained the stock certificates, containing all
the indicia of ownership and possible of ready transfer, from one who had possession with
the bank's consent, and who brought the certificates to him, apparently clothed with the
full ownership thereof by all the tests usually applied by business men to gain knowledge
upon the subject before making a purchase of such property. On the other hand, the bank,
for a legitimate purpose, with confidence in one of its own employees, instrusted the
certificates to him, with every evidence of title and transferability upon them. The bank's
trusted agent, in gross breach of his duty, whether with technical criminality or not is
unimportant, took such certificates, thus authenticated with evidence of title, to one who,
in the ordinary course of business, sold them to parties who paid full value for them. In such
case we think the principles which underlie equitable estoppel place the loss upon him
whose misplaced confidence has made the wrong possible. . . .

We regret that the plaintiff in this case has suffered the loss of the quedans, but as far as we
can see, there is now no remedy available to the plaintiff. The bank is not responsible for the
loss; the negotiable quedans were duly negotiated to the bank and as far as the record shows,
there has been no fraud on the part of the defendant.

The appealed judgment is reversed and the appellant is absolved from the plaintiff's complaint.
Without costs. So ordered.
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR – TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP AND TITLE – That rule is that the holder [Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos] of a prior equitable right has priority
ESTOPPEL over the purchaser [Rosendo Hernandez y Espinosa] of a subsequent estate (whether legal or
equitable) without value, or with notice of the equitable right, but not as against a subsequent
G.R. No. L-10027 November 13, 1915 purchaser for value and without notice. (Ewart on Estoppel, p. 199.)

Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos has acquired in his interest in the estate of the deceased spouses
ROSENDO HERNAEZ y ESPINOSA, plaintiff-appellant, for a valuable consideration and in good faith, and there remains to the plaintiff, Rosendo Hernaez
vs. y Espinosa, only the right of subrogation allowed him by article 1067 of the Civil Code, which reads
MATEO HERNAEZ y ESPINOSA, ET AL., defendants-appellants. as follows:
TRENT, J.: If any of the heirs should sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the division, all or any of
the co-heirs may subrogate himself in the place of the purchaser, reimbursing him for the value
The spouses, Pedro Hernaez and Juana Espinosa, died, leaving several legitimate descendants.
of the purchase, provided they do so within the period of a month, to be counted from the time
Neither of their estates had been divided up to the date of the institution of this action, but were
they were informed thereof.
both under administration. Their son, Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa, sold all his interest in both his
father's and mother's estate to his son, Vicente Hernaez y Tuason, on November 6, 1901. On January 24, 1913, the plaintiff instituted this action seeking to subrogate himself in the rights
Notwithstanding the fact that Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa had thus parted with all his interest in acquired by Montelibano in the estate. Unless the plaintiff can be charged with actual notice of the
the estates of his two parents, he executed a document of sale in favor of Alejandro Montelibano y conveyance by which Montelibano acquired these interests, prior to January 8, 1913, it is clear that
Ramos on February 27, 1907, in which he purported to convey all his undivided interest in his he has opportunely asserted his right of subrogation. This is purely a question of fact. As to the sales
mother's estate. On the same date he executed another document of sale in which he purported to whereby Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa parted with that portion of his interest in the estate which is
convey to Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana four-eighteenths of his interest in his mother's estate. Both of now held by Alejandro Montelibano, as well as to those sales made by other heirs to Montelibano,
these sales were made with the connivance of his son, Vicente Hernaez y Tuason. Hence, although the trial court found that the plaintiff, Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa, was not chargeable with notice
Vicente Hernaez y Tuason had actually purchased all of his father's interests in the estates of Pedro prior to January 8, 1913. After a careful examination of the record we see no reason for disturbing
Hernaez and Juana Espinosa as early as November 6, 1901, and was, on February 27, 1907, the this finding of fact. As a consequence, the plaintiff, Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa, is entitled to
undoubted owner thereof, he is effectually estopped from asserting his title as against either of the exercise his right of subrogation in accordance with article 1067, above quoted. lawph!1.net
vendees mentioned in the documents of sale dated February 27, 1907, to which we have just
referred. (Code Civ. Pro., sec. 333, No. 1.) Bigelow on Estoppel (p. 607) says: The interest which Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana purchased from Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa on
February 27, 1907, for the sum of P4,500, he afterwards transferred to Alejandro Montelibano y
. . . it is now a well-established principle that where the true owner of property, for however short Ramos for the sum of P10,000. In rendering judgment, the trial court decreed that the plaintiff,
a time, holds out another, or, with knowledge of his own right, allows another to appear as the Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa, should pay the latter sum for the privilege of exercising the right of
owner of or as having full power of disposition over the property, the same being in the latter's subrogation. This was error. Article 1067 of the Civil Code provides that the co-heir may exercise
actual possession, and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner, this right of subrogation upon the payment to the purchaser of another heir's interest, "el precio de
they will be protected. la compra" (the purchase price). Obviously, if the interest had not been resold, the plaintiff, Rosendo
Hernaez y Espinosa, would have had to pay only the price for which Uy-Cana acquired it. The
On August 19, 1912, Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana sold his interest in the estate to Alejandro
purpose of the article cannot be evaded by a reconveyance of the interest to a third person at a
Montelibano y Ramos. By this transfer, the latter stood owner of all the interest of Domingo Hernaez
higher price. Subsequent purchasers of the interest acquire it burdened with the right of
y Espinosa in the estate of Pedro Hernaez, and five-eighteenths of his interest in the estate of Juana
subrogation of co-heirs at the price for which the heir who sold it parted with it.
Espinosa as against Vicente Hernaez y Espinosa.
It is urged that the prices in some of the deeds of sale by which Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos
It is admitted that Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa, another son of the deceased spouses administrator
purchased the interest of various heirs in the estates are fictitious. This is a question of fact upon
of the estates, was notified of Montelibano's purchases on January 8, 1913, when he received notice
which both parties adduced evidence, and we concur in the opinion of the trial court that there is
of Montelibano's motion, entered in the administration proceedings, asking that he (Montelibano)
no basis to the charge. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court is modified by
be substituted as assignee of the interests of various heirs of the estate which he had acquired by
substituting, as the price of subrogation of the interest originally purchased by Jose Montelibano
purchase. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa entered into a contract of
Uy-Cana, the sum of P4,500, as set out in Exhibit 7, for the sum of P10,000, the consideration
sale with Vicente Hernaez y Tuason, whereby the latter purported to convey all the interest, which
expressed in Exhibit 10. As modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs. So
he had acquired from his father, in the estate of the deceased spouses, Pedro Hernaez and Juana
ordered.
Espinosa. It will be remembered that he purchased his father's share of the estate on November 6,
1901; that he is estopped from asserting title to any interest in his grandfather's estate and in five-
eighteenths of his grandmother's estate. Rosendo Hernandez y Espinosa purchased with full
knowledge of these facts. He, therefore, acquired thirteen-eighteenths of the interest of Domingo
Hernaez y Espinosa in the estate of the latter's mother nothing more. lawph!l.net
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR – TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP AND TITLE sue in trespass for damages or for the recovery of the property, provided he has not lost his
– JUDICIAL SALES right to do so by his own conduct. Upon this point, the rule is stated in 16 Cyc., 764, thus:
"When a person having title to or an interest in property knowingly stands by and suffers it to
G.R. No. L-10599 December 24, 1915 be sold under judgment or decree, without asserting his title or right or making it known to
the bidders, he cannot afterward set up his claim." (Citing a long array of cases from Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, South Carolina, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
VICENTA JALBUENA, plaintiff-appellant,
Conklin vs. Wehrman, 38 Fed., 874.)"
vs.
SALVADOR LIZARRAGA, et al., defendants-appellees.
Bigelow on Estoppel says: "... it is now a well-established principle that where the true owner
of property, for however short a time, holds out another, or, with knowledge of his own right,
TRENT, J.:
allows another to appear, as the owner of or as having full power of disposition over the
property, the same being in the latter's actual possession, and innocent third parties are thus
On May 22, 1903, Salvador Lizarraga, as judgment creditor, caused the sheriff of the Province led into dealing with some [such] apparent owner, they will be protected." (Quoted with
of Iloilo to levy upon an old sugar-mill as the property of Ildefonso Doronila, the judgment approval in the case of Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 32 Phil. Rep., 214.)
debtor and husband of the plaintiff. At the time of the levy Doronila stated to the sheriff that
the mill belonged to him. The sale took place about the last of July, 1913. The purchaser at this
The foregoing quotations from Cyc. and Bigelow are in harmony with No. 1 of section 333 of
public sale sold the mill to Lopez. The present action was instituted on November 26, 1913, by
the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein it is provided that — "Whenever a party has, by his own
the plaintiff for the purpose of recovering the mill of its value upon the ground that the same
declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular
was her exclusive property and that her husband had no interest therein. From a judgment
thing true, and to act upon such belief, he can not, in any litigation arising out of such
dismissing the cause after a hearing on the merits, the plaintiff appealed.
declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it."
The plaintiff knew that the old sugar-mill had been levied upon at the time the levy was made
The phrase "stood by" does not import an actual presence, but implies knowledge under such
and also knew that it would be sold as the property of her husband. Notwithstanding these
circumstances as to render it the duty of the possessor to communicate it. The herein plaintiff
facts, she stood by and permitted the sale to go forward without making the slightest protest
had, as we have indicated, full knowledge of the fact that the property was going to be sold to
or claim until the property had passed into the hands of Lopez. Upon these facts the trial court
pay the debts of her husband. She did not communicate her claim to the purchaser, and it is
held that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting her claim of ownership against the
now too late to assert such a claim.itc-a1f
defendants, or either of them. This holding is assigned as an error, and in support of this alleged
error the plaintiff cites and relies upon the doctrine enunciated by this court in the case of
Waite vs. Peterson (8 Phil. Rep., 449); Lopez vs. Alvarez (9 Phil. Rep., 28); Uy Piaoco vs. Osmeña For the foregoing reason, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
(9 Phil. Rep., 299); Ariston vs. Cea (13 Phil. Rep., 109); and Bonzon vs. Standard Oil Co. and appellant. So ordered.
Osorio (27 Phil. Rep., 141).lawphil.net

An examination of the above cited cases will show that they do not support the plaintiff's
contention. In the first case the interested party made a demand upon the sheriff for the return
of the property levied upon. The second case had to do with the question of preferred
creditors. In the third case there was also a claim made upon the sheriff for the return of the
property soon after it was attached. In the fourth case there was likewise a claim made upon
the sheriff for the release of the property before it was sold under execution. In the last case
the court used the following language: "In this jurisdiction, under the general principle that
one person may not enrich himself at the expense of another, a judgment creditor would not
be permitted to retain the purchase price of land sold as the property of a judgment debtor
after it has been made to appear that the judgment debtor had no title to the land and that
the purchaser had failed to secure title thereto, and we find no difficulty, therefore, in
accepting a liberal construction of the statute which arrives at the same equitable result." This
is a correct statement of the law; but it has nothing to do with the question of estopped.

An execution is an order to the sheriff to attach and sell the property of the judgment debtor.
If he sells the property of another person, he exceeds his authority and the true owner may
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR –DELIVERY OF THING SOLD – KINDS OF It is understood that the timber is to be round and that allowance will be made in
DELIVERY – REAL OR PHYSICAL measurement of same for the bark, which is to be removed.

G.R. No. L-4175 March 26, 1908 B.W.C.

A.W. BEAN, administrator of the estate of George Case, deceased, plaintiff-appellee, Exhibit B is as follows:
vs.
THE B.W. CADWALLADER COMPANY, defendant-appellant. MANILA. P.I., January 3, 1905.

JOHNSON, J.: THE B.W. CADWALLADER CO., Manila, P.I.

On the 4th day of June, 1906, the plaintiff brought an action in the Court of First Instance of DEAR SIRS: I propose to furnish you the following native timber at the prices and under the
the city of Manila to recover of the defendant the following sums: conditions herein expressed, viz:

(a) The sum of P7,356.80, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, from the Calantas, at twenty-five (25) cents per English cubic foot, all forestry charges to be paid by
6th day of December, 1905, being the balance due for timber sold and delivered by the plaintiff me.
to the defendant, under and pursuant to the contract set out in Exhibit A of the complaint.
Calantas, short and crooked, at ten (10) cents per English cubic foot, all forestry charges to
(b) The sum of P2,782.75, the balance due for timber sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the be paid by you.
defendant, under and pursuant to the agreement set out in Exhibit B of the complaint.
Ipil, at sixty (60) cents per English cubic foot, all forestry charges to be paid by me.
(c) The sum of P810, the actual damage suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the violation of
said agreements (a) and (b), and for such other damages as the proof at the trial may show the
Ipil, short pieces, at fifteen (15) cents per English cubic foot, all forestry charges to be paid
plaintiff had suffered, etc.
by you.

Said Exhibit A is as follows:


Mangachupay, No. 1, at twenty-five (25) cents per English cubic foot, all forestry charges to
be paid by me.
MANILA, September 6, 1905.
These prices are in the Philippine currency and include delivery alongside ship or barge at
Mr. GEORGE CASE, Manila, P.I. Basilan, I to furnish the necessary men to load same, and you to furnish steam gear to assist
in loading; the cargo to be mixed and consisting of approximately fifteen thousand cubic
DEAR SIR: We wish to confirm our acceptance of your verbal offer to furnish us a cargo of feet. Delivery to be made within three months from this date.
ipil and molave (the molave to consist of 10 logs, more or less), said cargo to comprise from
eight thousand to ten thousand cubic feet, English measurement, and the same to be Very respectfully,
delivered alongside our vessel at Basilan, for the sum of sixty cents (60 cents), Philippine
currency, per English cubic foot. It is understood that we are to pay the forestry dues at
GEORGE CASE.
Manila, the same to be charged against you, and it is also understood that delivery is to be
made within three months from date of this letter, you notify us by telegraph when delivery
can be made. MANILA, P.I., January 3, 1905.

Very respectfully, MR. GEORGE CASE, Manila, P.I.

THE B.W. CADWALLADER CO., DEAR SIR: We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of even date proposing to furnish
us calantas, ipil, and mangachupay, and state that we hereby accept the prices and
conditions therein mentioned.
By B.W. CADWALLADER, President.
Very respectfully, The plaintiff also alleged and attempted to prove that he did, in pursuance of the terms of the
contract represented by Exhibit B, within three months from the said 3d day of January, 1906,
THE B.W. CADWALLADER CO., deliver at the port of Basilan, P.I., 15,131 English cubic feet of mangachupay and calantas, and
did notify the defendant of such delivery; that the value of said timber so delivered at the price
agreed upon in said contract as represented by Exhibit B was P3,782.75; that on the 6th day of
By B.W. CADWALLADER, President.
February, 1906, the defendant paid to the plaintiff, to apply on said account, the sum of
P1,000, and that there is still due and owing to the plaintiff by the defendant the sum of
On February 6, 1906, the defendant and appellant wrote the following letter to George Case: P2,782.75, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the 3d day of April, 1906.

MANILA, February 6, 1906. The plaintiff further alleges that, by reason of the violation on the part of the defendant of said
contracts as represented by Exhibits A and B, he, the said plaintiff, was obliged to borrow
MR. GEO. CASE, Manila. money from third persons and incur expenses in travelling, amounting to the sum of P810, and
that, by reason of the violation of the said contracts on the part of the defendant, this sum was
DEAR SIR: Conforming our conversation of this morning, we will make you a further advance due and payable as damages by the defendant to the plaintiff.
of P1,000 for the logs at your cuttings on Basilan islands, Approximating 30,000 English cubic
feet, more or less. It is understood that this timber is not otherwise encumbered, and that On the 16th day of July, 1906, the defendant answered the complaint of the plaintiff and
this payment of P2,500 on December 29, 1905, shall draw interest at the rate of 10 per cent admitted the execution and delivery of the said contracts, but alleged that the plaintiff had
per annum, each from date of payment, until sufficient timber has been delivered to us make certain misrepresentations concerning the character of the costs of the Island of Basilan;
under our contract to cover the amount. that the plaintiff had represented that the harbor of said Island of Basilan, where said logs
were to be delivered, was a safe harbor, and that it was easily practicable for a vessel to come
It is further understood that these two payment are part payments on the entire 30,000 alongside the land, whereas, in fact, said harbor was unsafe, and that it was impossible for the
English cubic feet, more or less, and that the timber shall be held subject to our order. defendant to enter said harbor with the boats and to load said logs.

If this is satisfactory to you, please confirm the same. The defendant further alleged that the plaintiff had not, as a matter of fact, delivered to it the
logs or timber, nor any part of the same, as represented by said contracts, and asked for a
Yours, faithfully, judgment against the plaintiff for the sum of P3,500, the money paid by the defendant to the
plaintiff, and interest on the sum of P2,500 from the 29th of December, 1905, and interest on
P1,000 from the 6th of February, 1906, at the rate of 10 per cent.
THE B.W. CADWALLADER CO.,

The cause was duly tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, and on the 27th
By B.W. CADWALLADER, President.
day of June, 1907, the court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant for the sum of P10,033.39, with interest at 6 per cent from the 3rd day of April,
MANILA, P.I., February 6, 1906. 1906, and costs.

I hereby confirm acceptance of the above. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court made the
following findings of fact:
GEO. CASE.
First. That on September 6, 1906 [1905], the plaintiff and the defendants erred into a written
The plaintiff alleged and undertook to prove that, in accordance with the said agreement as contract (Exhibit A), by virtue of which the former bound himself to furnish and sell to the
represented by Exhibit A, he did, within three months from said 6th day of September, 1905, latter a cargo of pieces of native wood, about eight to ten thousand (8,000 to 10,000) cubic
deliver at the port of Basilan, P.I., a cargo of native logs, consisting of 16,428 English cubic feet feet, for the sum of sixty (60) cents, Philippine currency, per English cubic foot, and also
of ipil, and duly notified the defendant by telegram of such delivery; that the value of said logs bound himself to deliver said pieces of wood to the defendants alongside the latter's ship at
so delivered at the price stipulated was P9,856.50; that on the 29th day of December, 1905, Basilan, which delivery was to be effected within three months from the date of the
the defendant paid to the plaintiff the sum of P2,500 to apply on the said account, and that contract, and the same plaintiff was to wire the defendants regarding the date on which the
there was still due from the defendant to the plaintiff, upon said contract as represented by above delivery could be made.
Exhibit A, the sum of P7,356.80, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the 6th day of
December, 1905.
Second. That on January 3 of the following year, 1906, the plaintiff and the defendant Sixth. That the lighter Primera, towed by the S.S. Robert K, having arrived, on January 22,
entered into another contract, by which the former bound to himself to deliver and sell to 1906, at the point of the eastern shore of Basilan where the cargo of lumber prepared by
the defendants another cargo of native lumber consisting of calantas, ipil, and the plaintiff was to be shipped, it happened that, after the said lighter had been placed in
mangachupay, at the various prices mentioned in the same contract (Exhibit B), for a cubic the proper position for loading, and when a portion of the lumber was put on rafts (balsas)
foot, and agreeing also to deliver it to the defendants alongside the latter's vessel at Basilan, in order to be delivered alongside the said lighter Primera, the latter grounded on the beach
within the period of three months from the said date. on account of the breaking of the anchor chain, the said lighter thereby becoming useless
for the shipment of the lumber.
Third. That, for the fulfillment of the first contract, the plaintiff cut a great quantity of
lumber, sufficient for the purpose, and placed the same on the near the beach at Punta Seventh. That new steps were taken by the plaintiff, together with the defendants, about
Matanal, Island of Basilan, where his cuttings were established, and had the lumber ready the beginning of February, 1906, in order to make arrangements with the Atlantic, Gulf and
for delivery to the defendants within the period fixed in the above-mentioned Exhibit A; that Pacific Company of this city for the transportation of said lumber from Basilan to Manila,
on November 17 of the same year, 1905 — that is, two months and eleven days after the when the logs covered by the second contract were cut and ready at Basilan, and the Atlantic
date of the contract, and therefore within the fixed term of three months — he informed Gulf furnished the lighter Juanita, towed also by the same S.S. Robert K. That the lighter,
the defendants by a telegram (Exhibit 2), that the said cargo of lumber could be shipped on after having appeared first on March 23 at the place for the shipment of the lumber, without
about December 6, a date within the period agreed to, and added that good and strong making any attempt at loading, on account of the unsettled condition of the sea, did attempt
halyards were required; that some pieces weighed eight tons; and he asked the said to effect the shipment during the early part of the following month of April, by anchoring
defendants to wire him immediately the probable date on which their steamer would leave near the place where the logs were placed on rafts ready for delivery; but on placing the
Manila for his port and the probable date her arrival in Basilan. To this communication the gang planks necessary for loading, the anchor chain was broken at the moment when
defendants replied by telegrams also, on the same date, stating that they could not fix the operations began, which resulted in the suspension of the shipment, and the return of the
probable date of the departure of the steamer until after the 24th, and asked the plaintiff lumber to its original place on shore. The lighter Juanita, towed by the S.S. Robert K. left the
whether he was able to make contracts for transportation at Basilan, and at what rate. The place, and since that date no action has been taken or efforts made by the defendants for
plaintiff replied to this cable on the following day, the 18th, stating that he was unable to the purpose of taking away the two cargoes of lumber, purchased from the plaintiff, who
obtain the transportation there, and again requested the defendants to wire the probable had already received from the defendants P2,500 on December 29, 1905, and a further
date on which their steamer would arrive at Basilan. P1,000 on February 6, 1906, as an advance payment on the mentioned cargoes, and had
bound himself to pay the same defendants interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum of
Fourth. That the defendants advised the plaintiff in Basilan, by telegram on December 8, the above amounts.
that the ship Lilly-bonne was dismasted, that they had no means of transportation, and that
they wished him to telegraph them the quantity of lumber ready for shipment, and to inform From this judgment the defendant appealed and made a number of assignments of error,
them if he could obtain transportation from there. The said plaintiff, after giving in his reply which are more specifically included within the following:
the particulars relating to the quantity and prices of lumber referred to by the defendants
in their previous telegram, reported on the 18th of the same month that, as stated by the First. The defendant has never received or accepted the timber which is the object of the
captain of the S.S. Robert K, the defendants might contract for transportation with the contracts.
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., that they might leave the lighter Quince (Jan) at the starting
point with a motor engine, which was very necessary, and pointed out, moreover, in the
Second. If the defendant has defaulted in receiving the property, the law has provided
same telegram, that the defendants were very late in furnishing the transportation. The
remedies and the plaintiff must pursue those remedies or fail.
defendants, on the 20th of the same month of December, wired to the plaintiff again, stating
that the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. could not supply them with transportation, and that
there was at the time no others available way to secure it. (Exhibit B 1.) Third. There has been no default upon the part of the defendant.

Fifth. That the plaintiff, having come to Manila on or about Christmas day of the same year, Fourth. The plaintiff has never had said timber ready for delivery at ship's side.
interviewed Mr. B.W. Cadwallader, the agent of the defendant company, for the purpose of
getting a boat for Basilan in order to take away the lumber there ready for shipment, and, Fifth. The conditions at Punta Matanal are such that the plaintiff can not make delivery at ship's
after an inquiry made by him at the office of the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company, it was side, and the default is therefore on the part of the plaintiff and not on the part of the
agreed by the defendants and the said Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company, that the lighter defendant.
Primera, towed by the S.S. Robert K., would be sent there for the transportation of the
lumber. Under the first above-noted assignment of error the defendant and appellant argues that the
contract between the parties was a contract de compraventa under the Civil Code, or an
executory contract under the common law, and cites various provisions of the Civil Code as
well as of the Commercial Code for the purpose of showing that, under a contract of this kind, Actual manual delivery of an article sold is not essential to the passing of the title thereto (art
an absolute and manual delivery of the property sold is necessary before the contract becomes 1450, Civil Code) unless made so by the terms of the contract or by an understanding of the
an executed one upon which an action can be based. It will be remembered that, under the parties. The parties to the contract may agree when and on what conditions the property in
terms of the contract, the logs in question were only to be delivered by the plaintiff "alongside the subject of the contract was passed to the prospective owner. (Andrews vs. Durant, 11 N.Y.,
our (defendant's) vessel at Basilan, within three months from the date of this letter" 42.) In the present case the parties agreed that the delivery of the logs should be made
(September 6, 1905). There is nothing in the contract which in any way required the plaintiff alongside a vessel of the defendant. That was done by the plaintiff. The vessel of the defendant
to do more than to place said logs alongside a vessel to be sent to the point of delivery by the was sent to the point of delivery and the said defendant attempted to load on said vessel the
defendant. To the above contention of the defendant and appellant the plaintiff and appellee logs delivered along its side by the plaintiff. It is a rule well established that a mere contract
contends that the following propositions are clearly established by the testimony: for the sale of goods, where nothing remains to be done by the seller before making delivery,
transfers the right of property, although the price has not been paid, nor the thing sold actually
(a) That the plaintiff cut the logs required by the contract. delivered to the purchaser. (Olyphant vs. Baker, 5 Denio, N.Y., 379; art. 1450, Civil Code.)

(b) That plaintiff transported said logs to the beach. Suppose, for example, that after the vessel of the defendant had arrived at the point where
the logs were delivered along its side, and the logs had actually been delivered at the side, as
is claimed by the plaintiff in the present case, the plaintiff had thereafter sold the said logs to
(c) That plaintiff had said logs measured by the representative of the Forestry Bureau of
third persons. Could the defendant have maintained replevin for the same? If the title had not
Government of the Philippine Islands.
passed, he could not. If it had, he could. If the title had not passed at that moment the plaintiff
might have sold said logs to a third person in the very presence of the defendant, even after
(d) That plaintiff placed said logs in rafts to be floated alongside a vessel to be sent to the point defendant's vessel had arrived to take the logs away. If the title had not passed, the plaintiff
of delivery by the defendant. would thus have subjected himself to an action for damages upon his contract upon a failure
to perform it. We are of the opinion, however, that, if the plaintiff had sold said logs to a third
(e) That plaintiff did actually place the said logs along-side the vessel known as the Juanita in person after the arrival of the vessel of the defendant, the defendant, the defendant, the
the month of April, 1906. defendant might have claimed and recovered said logs upon the theory that have properly said
to another purchaser of said logs: "These logs are mine; they have been delivered to me under
(f) That the crew of the Juanita did in fact actually proceed to place said logs on board said a contract; everything has been done under said contract which the circumstances will permit
vessel, but failed because the anchor chain was not strong enough to sustain a 1 ½ ton skid, of for the passing of the title of the same to me, and whoever buys said logs buys something
which the crew were trying to pull in place. which has not only been previously bought by me but which has been set apart for me ands
placed at my disposal by the most unequivocal acts, and I am, therefore, vested with the title
The plaintiff and appellee insists that he had done all that was required of him by the contract. to the same which I have a right to maintain and enforce." And we believe that the law would
have sustained the defendant in this contention. (Whitcomb vs. Whitney, 24 Mich., 485; Hatch
vs. Oil Company, 100 U.S., 124 art. 339, Code of Commerce; Noyes vs. Marlott, 156 Fed. Rep.,
The evidence shows that at least on one occasion, if not more, the plaintiff had about eighty
753.)
men at the point of delivery of said logs, for the purpose of assisting the defendant and
appellant in loading said logs.
The evidence shows that, when the Juanita arrived at the point of delivery, the parties in
charge of said boat placed or attempted to place skids on said boat for the purpose of loading
The evidence shows beyond peradventure of doubt that at the time the said Juanita, the vessel
the logs. Certainly they believed that the logs had been delivered, or else why would they have
of the defendant, was at Basilan, some of the logs were placed alongside of the vessel, in
actually made preparation for the loading of the same? The logs were fully at the disposal of
accordance with the terms of the contract. It is denied that all of the logs to be furnished by
the defendant, and the latter thereby became liable for the price of the same under the
the plaintiff under the terms of the contract were placed in rafts in the water at or near the
contract. (Art. 339, Code of Commerce; Noyes vs. Marlott, 156 Fed. Rep., 753.
point of delivery. Certainty the plaintiff can not be required to show that he placed each log
alongside the vessel, after he has shown that he had all the logs rafted in the water at the point
of delivery and had placed some of them alongside the vessel in accordance with the terms of It was held in the case of Nicholas vs. Morse (100 Mass., 523) that in an action for goods sold
the contract. He could not be required to place others alongside the vessel until after the first and delivered, if the plaintiff proves delivery at the place agreed and that there remained
had been loaded. (Whitcomb vs. Whitney, 24 Mich., 485.) The fact is not disputed that the nothing further for him to do, he need not show actual acceptance by the defendant. The mere
plaintiff duly notified the defendant, within the period prescribed in the contract, that the said fact that the defendant, by reason of the improper equipment of the vessel, was unable to
logs were ready for delivery. take said logs aboard such vessel, can not relieve the latter from responsibility under the
contract. No burden rested upon the plaintiff to furnish proper equipment for the vessel of the
defendant with which to put on board said logs. That was the responsibility of the defendant.
The responsibility of the plaintiff ceased when he placed the logs alongside the vessel of the P10,033.39, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 3rd day of April, 1906,
defendant. and costs. So ordered.

Under the second above assignment of error the defendant and appellant claims that the
plaintiff, in bringing the form of action which was brought in this case, did not pursue the
proper remedy afforded him by the law, and cites articles 325, 332, and 339 of the Commercial
Code in support of this view. To this contention of the defendant and appellant the plaintiff
replies that he is entitled to recover under the contract price by virtue of article 1451 of the
Civil Code, insisting that the delivery of the logs in question had actually been made, and cites
a letter of the defendant and appellant directed to the plaintiff, dated the 6th day of February,
1906, in which the defendant after referring to the advancements which he had made, said
that "it was further understood ... that the logs should be held subject to our (defendant's)
order." This letter of the defendant would seem to clearly indicate that the latter, at least,
believed that the title to said logs had passed.

With reference to the third and fourth above-noted assignments of error, it would seem that
we have said all that is necessary upon that question under the first above-noted assignment
of error.

With reference to the fifth above-noted assignment of error, there is considerable conflict
among the witnesses with reference to the conditions at the point where the logs were to be
delivered. The witnesses for the defendant state that it was impossible to load logs at said
point, while witnesses for the plaintiff assert that during several months of the year, at least it
was perfectly possible and feasible to load logs on boats such as were furnished by the
defendant at the place designated for the delivery of the said logs. It will be noted, from
reading the testimony of the witnesses for the defendant, that many of them had no
experience whatever concerning the general conditions of the sea in and about the point
where the said logs were to be delivered, except on the particular occasions when they were
there with boats of the defendant to receive the delivery of said logs; whereas, upon the
contrary, the plaintiff presented some four or five witnesses, the experience of whom had
covered several years, and who all testified that during several months of the year especially
during the months of December, January, and February, it was perfectly feasible and
practicable by means of proper apparatus, to take on board cargo at the point where the logs
were to be delivered. And it must not be forgotten that, under the terms of the contract, the
defendant undertook to receive and put on board its vessel the logs in question at a time
beyond the time provided for by the terms of the contract. Our conclusion is that a large
preponderance of the evidence shows that it was perfectly feasible of the defendant, with
proper apparatus, to take on board the logs in question at the point of delivery. We presume
that at almost every point upon the coast of the Philippine Archipelago there are days when
conditions are such as to prevent the loading of cargo upon vessels. This is true even in the Bay
of Manila. However, it would not be just to conclude that, because on certain days it is
impossible to load and unload ships might be loaded and unloaded in said bay had made
misrepresentations, because of the fact that on a particular day ships could not be loaded or
unloaded by reason of the conditions of the sea resulting from wind or storm.

We are of the opinion, and so hold, under all of the facts, that the plaintiff is entitled to a
confirmation of the judgment of the lower court. It is therefore, hereby ordered that a
judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR –DELIVERY OF THING SOLD – KINDS OF the warehouse at No. 119, Muelle de la Industria. The bank's representative immediately went
DELIVERY – REAL OR PHYSICAL to this warehouse and upon arrival there found some 3,200 piculs of sugar, of which he took
immediate possession, closing the warehouse with the bank's padlocks. It is admitted that the
G.R. No. L-10658 February 14, 1918 sugar seized by the bank in the Muelle de la Industria warehouse is the same sugar which the
plaintiff firm delivered to Chua Teng Chong. On the date on which the bank took possession of
the sugar the promissory note executed March 17, 1914, had fallen due and was unpaid.
OCEJO, PEREZ & CO., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION, defendant-appellant. In the written contract by which the plaintiff firm undertook to sell the sugar in question to
FRANCISCO CHUA SECO, as assignee, intervener-appellant. Chua Teng Chong nothing was said concerning the time and place for payment. The court
below found that the delivery of the sugar by plaintiff to Chua Teng Chong was made upon the
mutual understanding that the price was to be paid in cash "upon the completion of delivery."
FISHER, J.:
The plaintiff firm proved that in sales of this kind it is the custom among merchants in Manila
for the seller to deliver the merchandise into the warehouse of the buyer, for inspection and
On the 7th day of March, 1914, Chua Teng Chong of Manila, executed and delivered to the verification of weights, and that as soon as this operation is completed, the price is payable on
International Banking Corporation, hereinafter referred to as "the bank," a promissory note, demand. After Chua Teng Chong had refused to pay the bill for the price of the sugar which
payable one month after date, for the sum of P20,000. Attached to this note was another the plaintiff firm presented to him, the day after its delivery, an attempt was made by the
private document, signed by Chua Teng Chong, in which it was stated that he had deposited plaintiff to recover possession of the sugar, and to that end, on April 24, 1914, the plaintiff
with the bank, as security for the said note, 5,000 piculs of sugar, which in said document were made a demand on the bank for the delivery of the sugar, to which demand the bank refused
said to be stored in a warehouse situated at No 1008, Calle Toneleros, Binondo, Manila. It to accede. On April 24, 1914, the buyer Chua Teng Chong was judicially declared to be
appears from the evidence, assuming that the sugar was in the warehouse on that date, that insolvent, and Francisco Chua Seco was appointed as assignee of the insolvency. On the same
the bank did not take possession of it when the document was executed and delivered, and date, and a few minutes after the insolvency proceedings were commenced, the plaintiff
that Chua Teng Chong continued to retain the sugar in his possession and control. The bank partnership filed a complaint, upon which this action was commenced, naming the bank as
made no effort to exercise any active ownership over said merchandise until the 16th of April, defendant, alleging that said defendant was unlawfully holding some 4,711 piloness of sugar,
when it discovered that the amount of sugar stored in the said warehouse was much less than the property of the plaintiff firm, which the bank had received from Chua Teng Chong, and
the 5,000 piculs mentioned in the contract. The agreement between the bank and Chua Teng prayed for the judgment for the possession of said sugar. A few days after, the plaintiff firm
Chong with respect to the alleged pledge of the sugar was never recorded in a public took advantage of those provisions of the procedural law which permit a plaintiff to replevin
instrument. It does not appear from the evidence that the promissory note represents money personal property. Subsequently, by agreement of the parties, the sugar was sold and the
delivered by the bank on the date of its execution, although it is stated therein that it was proceeds of the sale deposited in the bank, subject to the order of the court upon the final
executed for value received. disposition of the case. After the answer of the defendant bank was filed, a complaint in
intervention was filed by Chua Seco, in which he asserts a preferential right to the sugar, or to
On the 24th day of March, 1914, the plaintiff partnership Ocejo, Perez and Co., entered into the proceeds of its sale, upon the ground that the delivery of the sugar by plaintiff, by virtue
contract with Chua Teng Chong for the sale to him of a lot of sugar. It was agreed that delivery of which it passed into the possession and control of Chua Teng Chong, had the effect of
should be made in the month of April, the sugar to be weighed in the buyer's warehouse. It transmitting the title of the pledge asserted by the bank was null and void. Upon these
appears that this sugar was brought to Manila by a steamer in the month of April, and 5,000 allegations the interveners contends that the sugar is the property of the insolvent estate
piculs were delivered by plaintiff to Chua Teng Chong. The delivery was completed April 16, represented by him. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and from this
1914, and the sugar was stored in the buyer's warehouse situated at No. 119, Muelle de la decision appeals have been taken by the bank and by the intervener.
Industria. On April 17, 1914, plaintiff partnership presented, for collection, its account for the
purchase price of the sugar, but the buyer refused to make payment, and put up to the present Upon these facts the following questions arise:
time the sellers have been unable to collect the purchase price of the merchandise in question.
(a) Did title to the sugar pass to the buyer upon its delivery to him?
On the same date as that on which the 5,000 piculs of sugar were delivered into the warehouse
on Muelle de la Industria, the bank sent an employee to inspect the sugar described in the
(b) Assuming to pay that the title passed to the buyer, did his failure to pay the purchase price
pledge agreement, and which, as therein stated, should have been stored in the Calle
authorize the seller to rescind the sale?
Toneleros warehouse. The bank's representative then discovered that the amount of sugar in
that warehouse did not exceed 1,800 piculs, whereas the amount which should have been
there, according to the contract, was 5,000 piculs. Upon making this discovery, the bank's (c) Was the commencement of a replevin suit by the seller equivalent to the rescission of the
representative, accompanied by a lawyer, went immediately to see Chua Teng Chong, and the sale?
latter informed him that the rest of the sugar covered by the pledge agreement was stored in
(d) Can the pledge of the sugar to the bank be sustained upon the evidence as to the The seller calls this transaction a cash sale, but, strictly speaking, it is not cash sale. It is not like
circumstances under which it obtained physical possession thereof? a sale made in a retail store, in which delivery and payment are to be made simultaneously. Of
course, when no term for payment is stipulated the seller is not bound to deliver the thing sold
Clearly, there can be no doubt that from March 24, 1914, on which date the parties agreed in until the buyer has paid him the price; but if, notwithstanding this right, delivery is
regard to the quantity of the sugar which the seller was to deliver and the price which the consummated without requiring payment to be made in advance or simultaneously, in fact he
buyer was to pay, the contract was perfected. (Civil Code, art. 1450.) It is also clear that the grants a term of credit to the buyer, however short and indeterminate it my be, and waives his
obligation of the seller to make delivery of the thing sold was not subject to the condition that right to insist upon payment in advance or simultaneously with delivery, but in lieu thereof he
the buyer was to pay the price before delivery. The witness Pomar, called on behalf of the becomes entitled to payment upon demand therefor made upon the buyer. As is correctly
seller, testified that the price was to be paid after the completion of delivery. (Stenographic stated in Williston on Sales:
notes, p. 4.)
Confusion especially may be caused by use of the words 'cash sale' or 'terms cash' by
The sugar was delivered to the buyer March 16, 1914. The seller delivered it into the buyer's business men. In business dealings these words are frequently used when in reality a short
warehouse, leaving it entirely subject to his control. Article 1462 of the Civil Code provides that period of credit is contemplated. In such a case it is clear there is no cash sale in the legal
the thing sold is deemed to be delivered "when it passes into the possession and control of the sense; for, under the circumstances suggested, it is not contemplated that the buyer shall
buyer." It is difficult to see how the seller could have divested himself more completely of the refrain from dealing with the goods or even from reselling them, and if such is the
possession of the sugar, or how he could have placed it more completely under the control of contemplation of the parties, it is impossible to say that the property was not to pass until
the buyer. the price was paid. (Williston, Sales par. 343.)

On the day following the delivery of the sugar the seller presented his bill to the buyer, but the It is contended that there was an express agreement in this case that the passage of the title
latter failed and refused to make payment. We agree with the seller's contention that he was should be subject to the payment of the price, as a condition precedent. As was stated by
entitled to demand payment of the sugar at any time after the delivery. No term having been Justice Mapa, the author of the decision in the case of De la Rama vs. Sanchez, (10 Phil. Rep.,
stipulated within which the payment should be made, payment was demandable at the time 432):
and place of the delivery of the thing sold. (Civil Code, art. 1500.) The seller did not avail himself
of his right to demand payment as soon as the right to such payment arose, but as no term for The fact that the price of the property has not yet been paid in full is not, nor can it be, an
payment was stipulated, he was entitled, to require payment to be made at any time after obstacle to the acquisition of the ownership thereof by the plaintiff, because as such a
delivery, and it was the duty of the buyer to pay the price immediately upon demand. But the condition was not stipulated in the contract, the latter immediately produced its natural
seller not only argues that he was entitled to demand payment at any time after delivery, but effects in law, the principal and most important of which being the conveyance of the
contends further that until such payment was in fact made, title to the sugar did not pass to ownership by means of the delivery of the thing old to the purchaser, without prejudice, of
the buyer. We cannot agree with this contention. the course, to the right of the vendor to claim payment of any sum still due.

As Manresa says (vol. 10 p. 120), tradition is a true mode of acquiring ownership "which effects The same fundamental doctrine was stated by Chief Justice Arellano in the case of Gonzalez
the passage of title and the birth of the right in rem. Therefore, the delivery of the thing . . . vs. Rojas (16 Phil. Rep., 51):
signifies that title has passed from the seller to the buyer."
. . . ownership of things is not transferred by contract merely but by delivery. Contracts only
If we were to sustain the seller's contention, the consequences to the business community constitute titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery or
would, in our judgment, be most deplorable. If the seller may make delivery of the thing sold tradition is the method of accomplishing the same, the title and the method of acquiring it
and clothe the buyer with all the appearances of ownership but without the passage of title being different in our law."
until the purchase price is actually paid, it occurs to us to inquire how long this anomalous
state of affairs may be permitted to continue? It is the buyer's duty, upon the assumed facts In the case of Kuenzle and Sheriff vs. Watson and Co. (13 Phil. Rep., 26), the court sustained
to pay the price on demand, but the seller is not bound to present his account immediately. In the validity of a sale of personal property subject to the stipulation that title should not pass
the present case the buyer was not called upon to make payment until the following day. If until the payment of the purchase price. On the other hand, when there has been no such
the seller had allowed three, four, or five days to go by before presenting his account for express agreement and the thing sold has been delivered, title passes from the moment the
payment, would it be permitted him still to contend that title had passed? If the title did not thing sold is placed in the "possession and control of the buyer."
pass, any sale which might in the meantime be made by the buyer, would be void, ass it is
evident that no one can transfer a greater interest than that which he possesses. With even
Having concluded that the effect of the delivery was to transmit the title of the sugar to the
greater reason, the destruction of the thing in the possession of the buyer, before demand
buyer, we will now consider the legal effect of the failure on the part of the buyer to pay the
upon him for payment, would relieve him from the obligation to pay — the thing perishes for
price on demand.
its owner. (Tan Leonco vs. Go Inqui, 8 Phil. Rep., 531.)
Article 1506 of the Civil Code provides that the contract of sale may be rescinded for the same February 5, 1916, this court held that when the contract of pledge is not recorded in a public
causes as all other obligations, in addition to the special causes enumerated in the preceding instrument, it is void as against third persons; that the seller of the thing pledged, seeking to
articles. It is also observed that the article does not distinguish the consummated sale from the recover the purchase price thereof, is a third person within the meaning of the article cited;
merely perfected sale, and we do not believe that there is any reason for making this and that the fact that the person claiming as pledgee has taken actual physical possession of
distinction. Article 1124 of the Civil Code establishes the principle that all reciprocal obligations the thing sold will not prevent the pledge form being declared void as against the seller. The
are rescindible in the event that one of the parties bound should fail to perform that which is court held that the principle established by article 1865 of the Civil Code is not adjective in its
incumbent upon him. In the contract of the sale the obligation to pay the price is correlative character, but that "It prescribes a condition without which the contract of pledge cannot
to the obligation to deliver the thing sold. Nonperformance by one of the parties authorizes adversely affect third persons." Applying the doctrine of the decision cited, it is evident that
the other to exercise the right, conferred upon him by the law, to elect to demand the the pledge aserted by the International Bank is inefficacious.
performance of the obligation or its rescission (Mateos vs. Lopez, 6 Phil. Rep., 206), together
with damages in either event. But the right to rescind the sale for nonperformance on the part In the brief filed on behalf of the bank it is argued that in no case may a revindicatory action
of the buyer is not absolute. The law subordinates it to the rights of third persons to whom be maintained when the plaintiff attempts to exercise the right to rescind the sale for
bad faith is not imputable (Civil Code, arts. 1124 and 1295), and the defendant bank seeks to nonpayment of the purchase price and that therefore a replevin suit will not lie. But as it is
invoke in its defense this principle, alleging that the sugar in question was pledge to it, after its held that the bank has no interest in this matter, as its alleged contract of pledge is utterly
delivery to the buyer and before the latter was placed in default with respect to the payment unavailing, it is evident that the question of procedure does not affect it. It appears that by
of the price. reason of the insolvency of the buyer Chua Teng Chong an insolvency proceeding was
commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction and in that proceeding Francisco Chua Seco
We believe that this connection of the defendant bank cannot be sustained. In the first place, was appointed assignee of the property of the insolvent. As such assignee Chua Seco filed a
even giving all possible effect to the contract evidenced by the private document exhibited by complaint in intervention in this suit, in which he contends that by reason of its sale and
the bank (Exhibit No. 1), it is evident that the sugar therein mentioned is not the same as that delivery by plaintiff to the insolvent, title to the sugar passed to the latter and that the pledge
here in dispute. By this document, which bears date March 4, 1919, an attempt was made to set up by the bank is void as to third persons. Standing in the place of the insolvent buyer, the
pledge the lot of sugar deposited in warehouse No. 1008, Calle Toneleros, Manila. The sugar assignee asks that he be recognized in his representative capacity as the owner of the sugar in
in dispute has never been in that warehouse, as the seller delivered it into the bodega at No. question. The voluntary intervention of the assignee of the insolvent buyer cures the defect of
119, Muelle de la Industria. The sugar here in question could not be possibly have been the nonjoiner of the latter as a party defendant, and all parties in interest have been heard in this
subject matter of the contract of pledge which the parties undertook to create by the private proceeding.
document dated March 7, 1914, inasmuch as it was not at the time the property of the
defendant, and this constitutes an indispensable requisite for the creation of a pledge. (Civil The judgment of the court below awards the plaintiff the product of the sale of the sugar, it
Code, art. 1857.) It does not appear from the record that any effort was made to pledge the having been so disposed of by agreement by the parties during the pendency of the suit. The
sugar which is the subject matter of this case. It is true that it appears that in the afternoon of intervener excepted to the decision and joined in the bank's appeal. In his brief in this court
the day the sugar was delivered, the buyer gave the bank's representative the keys of the the intervener raises a question as to the sufficiency of the complaint to support the decision
warehouse on the Muelle de la Industria in which the sugar was stored, but it also appears of the court below, adopting the argument of the bank upon this point. That is, assuming that
from the testimony of the bank's witness, Grey, to whom the keys of the warehouse were by reason of the nonpayment of the purchase price, the seller is entitled to elect to rescind the
delivered, that this was not done because of an agreement concerning the pledge of the sugar sale, is the rescission effected ipso facto by such election, or is it necessary for him to bring an
now in dispute. Grey testified that on the afternoon of April 16, 1914, he ascertained, after an action of rescission? The action of replevin, the intervener contends, is based (Code of Civil
inspection of the warehouse on Calle Toneleros, that the sugar therein stored was not stated Procedure, sec. 263) upon the assumption that the plaintiff at the time of bringing the action
in the document of pledge; that upon observing this storage he asked the debtor to account is either the owner of the thing which is the subject matter of the suit or entitled to its
for it, whereupon at No. 119, Muelle de la Industria;" that upon receiving this reply the witness possession. But the question presented is whether, in cases in which title has passed by
went to the warehouse at No. 119, Muelle de la Industria, demanded the keys from the person delivery and in which the buyer has failed to pay the purchased price on demand, title is
in charge, and then closed the warehouse with the bank's own padlocks. From these revested in the seller by the mere fact that he has mentally determined to elect to rescind? In
statements it appears that no attempt was made to enter into any agreement for the pledge its brief the plaintiff partnership contends for the affirmative, saying that the acts of the seller
of the sugar here in question. The bank took possession of that sugar under the erroneous — the filing of its complaint — imply that it has made the election. But the intervener, adopting
belief, based upon the false statement of Chua Teng Chong, that it was a part of the lot the argument of the bank, contends that the party to whom article 1124 of the Civil Code
mentioned in the private document dated March 7, 1914. But even if it were assumed that on grants the right to rescind "must apply to the court for a decree for the rescission of the
the afternoon of April 16, 1914, an attempt was made to pledge the sugar and that delivery contract. . . ." (Scaevola, vol. 19, p. 673); and this conclusion is supported by the last paragraph
was made in accordance with the agreement, the pledge so established would be void as of the article cited. Of course, if the action of the court is necessary in order to effectuate the
against third persons. Article 1865 of the Civil Code provides that a pledge is without effect as rescission of the sale, such rescission does not follow ipso jure by reason of nonpayment and
against third persons "if the certainty of the date does not appear by public instrument." In the the determination of the seller to elect to rescind. Consequently, the action of replevin cannot
case of Tec Bi and Co. vs. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, 16 Off. Gaz., 908 decided be maintained. The right to rescind a sale, established by article 1506, in no wise differs from
that which is established, in general terms, with respect to reciprocal obligations, by article
1124 in "true event that one of the obligors fails to perform the obligation incumbent upon
him." But the right so conferred is not an absolute one. The same article provides that "the
court shall decree the rescission demanded, unless there are causes which justify him in
allowing a term."

Therefore, it is the judgment of the court and not the mere will of the plaintiff which produces
the rescission of the sale. This being so, the action of replevin will no lie upon the theory that
the rescission has already taken place and that the seller has recovered title to the thing sold.

If the buyer himself had intervened, instead of the assignee in the bankruptcy suit, we might
perhaps have said that all the parties in interest having been heard, we would overlook the
matter of procedure and proceed to adjudicate the rights of the parties upon the evidence
submitted. But as the buyer has been declared insolvent, it is clear that his creditors have an
interest in this question, and that if this interest is discussed in the bankruptcy proceedings,
they will have an opportunity to be heard. In the present condition of the case, the only thing
we can do is to decide that the title to the sugar having been commenced against him before
the declaration of insolvency, the assignee, standing in the shoes of the buyer, has a better
right to its possession or to the product of its sale during the pendency of this action. We
cannot apply section 126 of the Civil Code Procedure, because one of the material averments
of the complaint is that Chua Teng Chong unlawfully took possession of the sugar. The
evidence shows, on the contrary, that it was delivered to him by plaintiff. Strictly speaking the
mission of the court ends at this point, but following the practice adopted in other cases, for
the purposes of avoiding an unnecessary multiplicity of suits, and bearing in mind the fact that
the assignee of the bankruptcy is a party to this proceedings, we deem it advisable to indicate
that we are of the opinion that the rights of the seller are protected by section 48 of Act No.
1956, inasmuch as the sugar in question had not passed by an "irrevocable title" when the
buyer was declared insolvent. Attention is also invited to the decision of the court overruling
the motion for a rehearing in the case of Tec Bi & Co. vs. Chartered Bank of India, Australia &
China, cited above.1

The decision of the court below is therefore reversed, and it is decided that the assignee of the
bankruptcy of Chua Teng Chong is entitled to the product of the sale of the sugar here in
question, to wit, P10,826.76, together with the interest accruing thereon, reserving
proceedings. So ordered.
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR –DELIVERY OF THING SOLD – KINDS OF These assignments of error raise but two questions: First, in which of the two sales was title to
DELIVERY – CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY – SYMBOLIC the house in dispute transferred? And second, whether or not it was an error to declare the
defendants owners of said house, the latter not having expressly prayed in their answer for
G.R. No. 18341 September 18, 1922 such declaration. The other errors assigned are but a consequence of these two points.

GENEROSA AVILES and her husband RUFINO VILLAFUERTE, plaintiffs-appellants, As to the first question, we have, by virtue of the stipulation and the documents presented,
vs. the following facts, which must be considered proven:
SEGUNDA ARCEGA and FORTUNATO DE LEON, defendants-appellees.
The house in question belonged originally to the spouses Venancio Alcantara and Vicenta
ROMUALDEZ, J.: Capulong. On the 10th of October, 1917, these spouses sold this house in a public document
to Generosa Aviles, the herein plaintiff, it having been stipulated, in the document executed
for the purpose, that "during four months from the 10th of October, 1917, the vendors would
The plaintiffs bring this action to recover title to a house of mixed materials erected on a
continue in possession of the house" (to use the language of the stipulation of facts). We
leasehold land of the Nagtahan estate, more particularly described in the complaint. While
italicize the words would continue, which show that the vendors were in possession of the
the plaintiffs claim the ownership of said house, the defendants assert title in themselves.
house before, and that at time of, its conveyance, and continued thereafter in said possession.
It is, further, to be noted that the plaintiff never had possession of the house, as stated at the
At the trial of the case, the parties entered into the following stipulation of facts: end of the second paragraph of the stipulation of facts, which says "the plaintiff Generosa
Aviles never having taken possession thereof." From this it appears that the purchaser never
1. That the house in dispute in this case was on October 10, 1917, sold by the spouses took possession of the house either at the execution of the deed of sale, or at any other time.
Venancio Alcantara and Vicenta Capulong to the plaintiff Generosa Aviles, as evidenced by It thus being admitted by the appellants that the purchaser Generosa Aviles, one of the
the document marked with the letter A, and acknowledged on the 8th day of November of plaintiff, never had possession of this house, it cannot be presumed that she took possession
the same year, 1917, before the notary public Jose Galang Serano, for the sum of P497, it thereof at the expiration of the four months following the sale, as stipulated by the parties.
having been stipulated that during four months from the 10th of October, 1917, the vendors Such positive fact having been expressly admitted, there can be no presumption to the
would continue in possession of the house, the expenses for repairs, land and other tax to contrary.
be for their account, as well as the payment of the rent for the lot on which it is erected.
On the 13th of March, 1918, the same spouses Venancio Alcantara and Vicenta Capulong (who
2. That in a document dated March 13, 1918, and acknowledged on the following day before are presumed to have been in possession of the house until then, inasmuch as it is positively
Ariston Rivera, notary public, the same property was sold by the same spouses Venancio know that they were uninterruptedly prior to the first sale, during the time the sale was in
Alcantara and Vicente Capulong for P500 to the spouses Fortunato de Leon and Segunda force and until at least four months thereafter, and it is a fact that the purchaser Aviles never
Arcega, who took possession of the property, as the stated in the third paragraph of the had possession of the house), in a public document sold the same house to the spouses
complaint, the plaintiff Generosa Aviles never having taken possession thereof. Fortunato de Leon and Segunda Arcega, the herein defendants, who then and there took
possession of said house.
Under the foregoing facts the case is submitted to the consideration of the court for the
determination of the question law as to which of the two purchasers acquired title to the None of the two sales appears to have been registered; therefore the question at issue is,
property. which of these purchasers was the first to take possession (art. 1473, Civil Code).

In view of these stipulated facts the trial court rendered judgement declaring the defendants We have already seen that the first purchaser, the plaintiff, never took possession of the
to be the owner of the house and absolving them from the complaint with costs. From this house, while the second purchasers, the defendant spouses, did. Under the Civil Code, the
judgement the plaintiffs appeal, alleging that the trial court erred (a) in not rendering conclusion is inevitable that the titles to the house was transmitted not to the plaintiff but to
judgement in their favor; (b) in not giving preference to the sale made to them of the house in the defendants.
question; (c) in not declaring them owners of said house; (d) in not sentencing the defendants
to deliver the same plaintiffs; (e) in not sentencing the defendants to pay damages; ( f ) in We are of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot invoked symbolic delivery by the execution of
declaring the latter owners of the house when they did not make a prayer to that effect; (g) in the public document of sale, inasmuch as there was not, nor could there have been, such
drawing from the facts stipulated a conclusion inconsistent therewith; and (h) in not granting delivery, the same being prevented by the express stipulation contained in the deed of sale,
a new trial. to the effect that the vendors did not part with the possession of the house but would continue
therein for four months. Article 1462 of the Civil Code says:
If the sale should be made by means of a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be The instant case is one of those above mentioned by the eminent commentator Mr. Manresa.
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the subject-matter of the contract unless the To use the phraseology of the above quoted passage, a certain date was fixed (namely, at the
contrary appears or may be clearly inferred from such instrument. end of four months, because id certum est quod certum reddi potest), when the purchaser
should take possession of the thing.
At the time, therefore, of the execution of the deed in favor of the plaintiff, the first purchaser,
there was no symbolic delivery because there was an express stipulation to the contrary. It Neither can it be said that the house must be presumed to have been delivered to the first
cannot be said that after the lapse of the four months following, during which the vendors purchaser after the lapse of the four months aforesaid, for such a presumption is overthrown
were to continue in possession of the house, according to the stipulation, any symbolic delivery by the fact stipulated by the parties that this first purchaser never took possession of the
subsisted. Nothing can subsist that did not exist before. house.

It cannot be said that symbolic delivery spontaneously took place after the lapse of the four We entertain no doubt, either under the facts or under the law of the case, as to the right of
months stipulated, for there is no law providing that it should take place after the execution the defendants to the house in question, with absolute exclusion of the plaintiffs.
of the document where there is a stipulation to the contrary.
Turning to the second point which is of a procedural nature, we hold that the trial court did
The law does not say that such a symbolic delivery is suspended when at the execution of the not commit any error in declaring the defendants owners of the house in question. It is true
document a stipulation to the contrary is made. What the law simply says is that no such that the answer does not expressly pray for such as affirmative relief. But both parties
symbolic tradition can take place, — can exist — when there is a stipulation to the contrary. expressly and solemnly stipulated that they submitted the case to the trial court for the
determination of the question as to which of the two purchasers acquired title to the house,
As we understand the law, there is symbolic delivery when the sale is made in a public when in the stipulation of facts, they said the following to the court:
document, and nothing appears therein to the contrary either expressly or impliedly; and no
such symbolic delivery can be held to take place when, as in the instant case, there is in the Under the foregoing facts, the case is submitted to the consideration of the court for the
document a stipulation to the contrary. determination of the question of law as to which of the two purchasers acquired title to the
property.
We do not hesitate to term symbolic such delivery of the thing as is supposed to be made
by the execution of the document, as provided in article 1462, although in that case it must This statement made to the court below by both parties is tantamount to an amendment of
be considered to take place partly by operation of law. This kind of tradition finds its the prayer of the answer, and to a waiver by the party plaintiff of the right to question such a
precedent in law 8, title and Partida aforecited, which provides that "when one grants defect, if it is at all, of the prayer of the answer.
another any property or thing, the latter acquires possession thereof, if the grantor delivers
to him the letters whereby the same is made, or makes a new one and hands it to him, The question having thus been raised, and both parties having requested the lower court to
although he is not given physical possession of the thing." determine which of the two litigating parties acquired the house in question, the lower court
did but fulfill its duty in determining the question presented and declaring upon the facts and
It must be noted that this manner of delivering the thing through the execution of a public the law of the case, that the defendants, and not the plaintiffs, are the owners of the house in
document is common to personal as well as real property, for the Code does not distinguish, dispute.
and besides, taking this rule in connection with the following article, 1463, a conclusion to
this effect seems to be clearly justifiable. As above stated, the other assignments of error are but a corollary of the two points already
decided.
This kind of tradition, however, is, as to its efficaciousness, subject to the terms of the
document, for if it appears therein, or can be inferred therefrom, that it was not the The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.
intention of the parties to make delivery, no tradition can be deemed to have taken place.
Such would be the case, for instance, where a certain date is fixed when the purchaser
Separate Opinions
should take possession of the thing, or where in the case of a sale by installments, it is
stipulated that until payment of the last installment is made, the title to the property should
not be deemed to have been transmitted, or where the vendor reserves the right to use and ARAULLO, C.J., dissenting:
enjoy the property until the gathering of the pending crops. (10 Manresa, Codigo Civil, p.
129.) Under the facts stated in the majority opinion, this case presents a double sale of a house of
mixed materials. The first was made to the plaintiffs on October 10, 1917, with a stipulation
that during the four months following said date the vendors should continue in possession of
the house for the reasons therein stated. The second was made on March 13, 1918, to the obligation effective, whereas that of the resolutory resolves the obligation — makes it entirely
defendants who took possession of the property, which is one month after the expiration of ineffective.
the term stipulated in the first one. Both sales appear in a public document. None of the
documents was registered in the registry of property. The symbolic tradition, which is effected by the execution of the public document, was
suspended for four months by virtue of the stipulation. It cannot be said that it did not exist
To which of the two purchasers was the title to the property in question transferred? because suspension presupposes the existence of that which is suspended. The four months
elapsed, the condition was fulfilled. It seems clear to us that symbolic tradition, which was
Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides: temporarily suspended, recovered its efficaciousness, as a necessary consequence of the
execution of the public document. To hold otherwise is to give the stipulation a meaning
contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties.
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith if it
should be personal property. The doctrine we maintain finds support in the very opinion of the authoritative commentator
of the Civil Code, Mr. Manresa.
Should it be real property, it shall belong to the purchaser who first recorded it in the registry
of deeds. This kind of tradition, however, is, as to its efficaciousness, subject to the terms of the
document, for if it appears therein, or can be inferred therefrom that it was not the intention
of the parties to make delivery, no tradition can be deemed to have taken place. Such would
Should it not be recorded, the property shall belong to the person who first took possession
be the case, for instance, where a certain date is fixed when the purchaser should take
of it in good faith, or, in default of possession, to the person who present the oldest title,
possession of the thing, or where in the case of a sale by installments, it is stipulated that
provided there is good faith.
until payment of the last installment is made, the title to the property should not be deemed
to have been transmitted, or where the vendor reserves the right to use and enjoy the
Applying this provision to the instant case, there is no doubt that the ownership was property until the gathering of the pending crops. (10 Manresa, Codigo Civil, p. 129.)
transferred to the purchaser who first gained possession in good faith. But who was the first
to gain possession? The defendants, according to the opinion of the majority. But with all the
Manresa does not say that, at the expiration of the term fixed, or upon the payment of the last
respect due to the authoritative opinion of the majority, the undersigned think that it was the
installment, in the examples given by him, the public document ceases to produce legal effect
plaintiffs.
— the symbolic tradition. Neither can it be said in the case at bar that the lapse of the term
stipulated renders the document ineffective in so far as the effecting of tradition by its
Article 1462 of the Civil Code provides: execution is concerned, because this would amount to annulling an obligation by the
fulfillment of a suspensive condition.
The thing sold shall be deemed delivered when the vendee is placed in the control and
possession thereof. For the foregoing the undersigned dissent from the opinion of the majority.

If the sale should be made by means of a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the subject-matter of the contract unless the
contrary appears or may be clearly inferred from such instrument.

The majority opinion says: "At the time, therefore, of the execution of the deed in favor of the
plaintiff, the first purchaser, there was no symbolic delivery because there was an express
stipulation to the contrary. It cannot be said that after the lapse of the four months following,
during which the vendors were to continue in possession of the house, according to the
stipulation, any symbolic delivery subsisted. Nothing can subsist that did not exist before."

This reasoning, in our opinion, is applicable only where the stipulation inserted in the public
documents involves a resolutory condition. But to our mind the stipulation under
consideration constitutes a suspensive condition. The essential difference in law between
these two kinds of condition is that the fulfillment of the suspensive condition makes the
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR –DELIVERY OF THING SOLD – KINDS OF The RTC ruled that the execution of the deed of absolute sale did not result in constructive
DELIVERY – CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY – SYMBOLIC delivery of the machinery and equipment. It found that at the time of the sale, petitioner did
not have control over the machinery and equipment and, thus, could not have transferred
G.R. No. 167195 May 8, 2009 ownership by constructive delivery. The RTC ruled that petitioner is liable for breach of
contract and should pay for the actual damages suffered by respondent.
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, Petitioner, On petitioner’s appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
vs.
T.J. ENTERPRISES, Respondent. Hence this petition.

DECISION Before this Court, petitioner raises issues by attributing the following errors to the Court of
Appeals, to wit:
TINGA, J.:
I.
This is a Rule 45 petition1 which seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision 2 and
resolution3 affirming the RTC’s decision4 holding petitioner liable for actual damages for breach The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that petitioner had complied with its obligation to
of contract. make delivery of the properties subject of the contract of sale.

Petitioner Asset Privatization Trust5 (petitioner) was a government entity created for the II.
purpose to conserve, to provisionally manage and to dispose assets of government
The Court of Appeals erred in not considering that the sale was on an "as-is-where-is" basis
institutions.6 Petitioner had acquired from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
wherein the properties were sold in the condition and in the place where they were located.
assets consisting of machinery and refrigeration equipment which were then stored at Golden
City compound, Pasay City. The compound was then leased to and in the physical possession III.
of Creative Lines, Inc., (Creative Lines). These assets were being sold on an as-is-where-is basis.
The Court of Appeals erred in not considering that respondent’s acceptance of petitioner’s
On 7 November 1990, petitioner and respondent entered into an absolute deed of sale over disclaimer of warranty forecloses respondent’s legal basis to enforce any right arising from the
certain machinery and refrigeration equipment identified as Lots Nos. 2, 3 and 5. Respondent contract.
paid the full amount of ₱84,000.00 as evidenced by petitioner’s Receipt No. 12844. After two
(2) days, respondent demanded the delivery of the machinery it had purchased. Sometime in IV.
March 1991, petitioner issued Gate Pass No. 4955. Respondent was able to pull out from the
compound the properties designated as Lots Nos. 3 and 5. However, during the hauling of Lot The reason for the failure to make actual delivery of the properties was not attributable to the
No. 2 consisting of sixteen (16) items, only nine (9) items were pulled out by respondent. The fault and was beyond the control of petitioner. The claim for damages against petitioner is
seven (7) items that were left behind consisted of the following: (1) one (1) Reefer Unit 1; (2) therefore bereft of legal basis.8
one (1) Reefer Unit 2; (3) one (1) Reefer Unit 3; (4) one (1) unit blast freezer with all accessories;
The first issue hinges on the determination of whether there was a constructive delivery of the
(5) one (1) unit chest freezer; (6) one (1) unit room air-conditioner; and (7) one (1) unit air
machinery and equipment upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale between petitioner
compressor. Creative Lines’ employees prevented respondent from hauling the remaining
and respondent.
machinery and equipment.
The ownership of a thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
Respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner and
constructive delivery thereof.9 The thing sold shall be understood as delivered when it is placed
Creative Lines.7 During the pendency of the case, respondent was able to pull out the
in the control and possession of the vendee.10
remaining machinery and equipment. However, upon inspection it was discovered that the
machinery and equipment were damaged and had missing parts. As a general rule, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the
Petitioner argued that upon the execution of the deed of sale it had complied with its
deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. And with regard to movable
obligation to deliver the object of the sale since there was no stipulation to the contrary. It
property, its delivery may also be made by the delivery of the keys of the place or depository
further argued that being a sale on an as-is-where-is basis, it was the duty of respondent to
where it is stored or kept.11 In order for the execution of a public instrument to effect tradition,
take possession of the property. Petitioner claimed that there was already a constructive
the purchaser must be placed in control of the thing sold.12
delivery of the machinery and equipment.
However, the execution of a public instrument only gives rise to a prima facie presumption of
delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected because of a legal
impediment.13 It is necessary that the vendor shall have control over the thing sold that, at the debtors to fulfill their obligation in a normal manner, and; (d) the obligor must have been free
moment of sale, its material delivery could have been made.14 Thus, a person who does not from any participation in the aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor. 20
have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive possession by the
execution and delivery of a public instrument.15 A fortuitous event may either be an act of God, or natural occurrences such as floods or
typhoons, or an act of man such as riots, strikes or wars.21 However, when the loss is found to
In this case, there was no constructive delivery of the machinery and equipment upon the be partly the result of a person’s participation–whether by active intervention, neglect or
execution of the deed of absolute sale or upon the issuance of the gate pass since it was not failure to act—the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to
petitioner but Creative Lines which had actual possession of the property. The presumption of a fortuitous event.22
constructive delivery is not applicable as it has to yield to the reality that the purchaser was
not placed in possession and control of the property. We quote with approval the following findings of the Court of Appeals, to wit:

On the second issue, petitioner posits that the sale being in an as-is-where-is basis, respondent We find that Creative Lines’ refusal to surrender the property to the vendee does not
agreed to take possession of the things sold in the condition where they are found and from constitute force majeure which exculpates APT from the payment of damages. This event
the place cannot be considered unavoidable or unforeseen. APT knew for a fact that the properties to
be sold were housed in the premises leased by Creative Lines. It should have made
where they are located. The phrase as-is where-is basis pertains solely to the physical condition arrangements with Creative Lines beforehand for the smooth and orderly removal of the
of the thing sold, not to its legal situation.16 It is merely descriptive of the state of the thing equipment. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act
sold. Thus, the as-is where-is basis merely describes the actual state and location of the must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to
machinery and equipment sold by petitioner to respondent. The depiction does not alter be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the
petitioner’s responsibility to deliver the property to respondent.1awphi1.zw+ cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man,
whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is
Anent the third issue, petitioner maintains that the presence of the disclaimer of warranty in thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. 23
the deed of absolute sale absolves it from all warranties, implied or otherwise. The position is
untenable. Moreover, Art. 1504 of the Civil Code provides that where actual delivery has been delayed
through the fault of either the buyer or seller the goods are at the risk of the party in fault. The
The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well as warrant the thing risk of loss or deterioration of the goods sold does not pass to the buyer until there is actual
which is the object of the sale.17 Ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from or constructive delivery thereof. As previously discussed, there was no actual or constructive
the moment it its delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in delivery of the machinery and equipment. Thus, the risk of loss or deterioration of property is
any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor borne by petitioner. Thus, it should be liable for the damages that may arise from the
to the vendee.18 A perusal of the deed of absolute sale shows that both the vendor and the delay.1avvphi1
vendee represented and warranted to each other that each had all the requisite power and
authority to enter into the deed of absolute sale and that they shall perform each of their Assuming arguendo that Creative Lines’ refusal to allow the hauling of the machinery and
respective obligations under the deed of absolute in accordance with the terms thereof. 19 As equipment is a fortuitous event, petitioner will still be liable for damages. This Court agrees
previously shown, there was no actual or constructive delivery of the things sold. Thus, with the appellate court’s findings on the matter of damages, thus:
petitioner has not performed its obligation to transfer ownership and possession of the things
sold to respondent. Article 1170 of the Civil Code states: "Those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof
As to the last issue, petitioner claims that its failure to make actual delivery was beyond its are liable for damages." In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor
control. It posits that the refusal of Creative Lines to allow the hauling of the machinery and who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences
equipment was unforeseen and constituted a fortuitous event. of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.24 The trial court correctly awarded actual
The matter of fortuitous events is governed by Art. 1174 of the Civil Code which provides that damages as pleaded and proven during trial.25
except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation,
or when the nature of the obligation requires assumption of risk, no person shall be WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 August
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were 2004. Cost against petitioner.
inevitable. The elements of a fortuitous event are: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence, must have been independent of human will; (b) the event that SO ORDERED.
constituted the caso fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable,
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must have been such as to render it impossible for the
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR –DELIVERY OF THING SOLD – KINDS OF It appears that as Malabanan was not able to repay Floro's advances, the latter, by a document
DELIVERY – CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY – TRADITIO LONGA MANU dated August 4, 1954, sold 11,047 pieces of steel mattings to Eulalio Legaspi for the sum of
P24,803.40.
G.R. No. L-15155 December 29, 1960
Seventeen days later, on August 21, 1954, Malabanan filed in the Court of First Instance of
BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, petitioner-appellant, Manila a petition for voluntary insolvency, attaching thereto a Schedule of Accounts, in which
vs. the Board was listed as one of the creditors for P10,874.46, and Exequiel Floro for P24,220.50,
EXEQUIEL FLORO, ET AL., oppositors-appellees. the origin of the obligations being described as "Manila Royalty" and "Salvaging Operations",
respectively. Also attached was an Inventory of Properties, listing certain items of personal
property allegedly aggregating P33,707.00 in value. In this list were included 11,167 pieces of
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
steel mattings with an alleged estimated value of P33,501.00.
From the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated August 10, 1955, denying its
Soon after, the Board, claiming to be the owner of the listed steel matting, filed a petition to
petition to exclude certain pieces of steel matting from the assets of the insolvent M. P.
exclude them from the inventory; and to make the insolvent account for a further 1,940 pieces
Malabanan, the Board of Liquidators appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter certified the
of steel matting, the difference between the number stated in the insolvent's recovery report
case to this Court on the ground that only questions of law are involved.
of July 26, 1954 and that stated in the inventory. Exequiel Floro opposed the Board's petition
and claimed that the steel matting listed had become the property of Eulalio Legaspi by virtue
The Board of Liquidators (hereinafter referred to as the Board) is an agency of the Government of a deed of sale in his favor, executed by Floro pursuant to the latter's contract with
created under Executive Order No. 372 (November 24, 1950), and, pursuant to Executive Order Malabanan on March 31, 1954. The court below, after reception of evidence as to the
No. 377 (December 1, 1950), took over the functions of the defunct Surplus Property genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale to Legaspi, as well as of the contract
Liquidating Committee. between Malabanan and Floro, denied the Board's petition, declaring that Malabanan had
acquired ownership over the steel mattings under his contract with the Board; that Exequiel
On June 14, 1952 Melecio Malabanan entered into an agreement with the Board for the Floro was properly authorized to dispose of the steel mattings under Floro's contract with
salvage of surplus properties sunk in territorial waters off the provinces of Mindoro, La Union, Malabanan; and that the sale to Eulalio Legaspi was valid and not contrary to the Insolvency
and Batangas (Exhibit "A"). By its terms, Malabanan was to commence operations within 30 Law.
days from execution of said contract, which was to be effective for a period of one (1) year
from the start of operations, extendible for a total period of not more than six (6) months. On In this appeal, the Board contends that Malabanan did not acquire ownership over the steel
June 10, 1953, Malabanan requested for an extension of one (1) year for the salvage in waters mattings due to his failure to comply with the terms of the contract, allegedly constituting
of Mindoro and Batangas; and the Board extended the contract up to November 30, 1953. On conditions precedent for the transfer of title, namely: payment of the price; audit and check
November 18, 1953, Malabanan requested a second extension of one more year for the waters as to the nature, quantity and value of properties salvaged; weighing of the salvaged
of Occidental Mindoro, and Board again extended the contract up to August 31, 1954. properties to be conducted jointly by representatives of the Board and of Malabanan;
Malabanan submitted a recovery report dated July 26, 1954, wherein it is stated that he had determination of the site for storage; audit and verification of the recovery reports by
recovered a total of 13,107 pieces of steel mattings, as follows: government auditors; and firing of performance bond.

1. December, 1953-April 30, 1954 2,5552 We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the contract (Exhibit "A") between Malabanan and
2. May 1, 1954-June 30, 1954 10,552 the Board had effect of vesting Malabanan with title to, or ownership of the steel mattings in
question as soon as they were brought up from the bottom of the sea. This is shown by
13,107 (pieces) pertinent provisions of the contract as follows:

10. For and in consideration of the assignment by the BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS to the
Four months previously, Malabanan had entered into an agreement with Exequiel Floro, dated
CONTRACTOR (Malabanan) of all right, title and interest in and to all surplus properties
March 31, 1954 (Exhibit 1, Floro), in which, among other things, it was agreed that Floro would
salvaged by the CONTRACTOR under this contract, the CONTRACTOR shall pay to the
advance to Malabanan certain sums of money, not to exceed P25,000.00, repayment, thereof
Government Ninety Pesos (P90.00) per long ton(2,240 lbs.) of surplus properties recovered.
being secured by quantities of steel mattings which Malabanan would consign to Floro; that
said advances were to paid within a certain period, and upon default at the expiration thereof,
Floro was, authorized to sell whatever steel mattings were in his possession under said 11. Payment of the agreed price shall be made monthly during the first ten (10) days of every
contract, in amount sufficient to satisfy the advances. Pursuant thereto, Floro claims to have month on the basis of recovery reports of sunken surplus properties salvaged during the
made total advances to the sum of P24,224.50.
preceding month, duly verified and audited by the authorized representative of the BOARD The lapse of the bond did not extinguish the contract between Malabanan and the Board. The
OF LIQUIDATORS. requirement that a bond be posted was already complied with when Malabanan filed the bond
dated June 10, 1952. A bond merely stands as guaranty for a principal obligation which exist
That Malabanan was required under the contract to post a bond of P10,000.00 to guarantee independently of said bond, the latter being an accessory contract (Valencia vs. RFC & C.A.,
compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract; that the operation for salvage were 103 Phil., 444). Significantly, its purpose, as per the terms of the contract, was "to guarantee
entirely at Malabanan's expense and risks; that gold, silver, copper, coins, currency, jewelry, his (Malabanan's) faithful compliance with the terms and conditions herein" and, for violation
precious stones, etc. were excepted from the contract, and were instead required to be turned of the contract, the Board may declare "the bond forfeited" (par. 13). Being for its benefit, the
over to the Board for disposition; that the expenses for storage, including guard service, were Board could legally waive the bond requirement (Valencia vs. RFC, et al., supra.), and it did so
for Malabanan's account — all these circumstances indicated that ownership of the goods when, the bond already having expired, it extended the contract not only once, but twice. In
passed to Malabanan as soon as they were recovered or salvaged (i.e., as soon as the salvor none of the resolutions extending contract (Annexes "C" & "E", pp. 108-112, Record on Appeal)
had gained effective possession of the goods), and not only after payment of the stipulated was there a requirement that the bond be renewed, in the face of the first indorsement by the
price. . Executive Officer recommending that Malabanan's request for a second extension be granted
"provided the bond be originally posted should continue."
While there can be reservation of title in the seller until full payment of the price (Article 1478,
N.C.C.), or, until fulfillment of a condition (Article 1505, N.C.C.); and while execution of a public There is no merit to the suggestion that there being a novation, Article 1299 of the Civil Code
instrument amounts to delivery only when from the deed the contrary does not appear or should govern. Novation is never presumed, it being required that the intent to novate be
cannot clearly be inferred (Article 1498, supra), there is nothing in the said contract which may expressed clearly and unequivocally, or that the terms of the new agreement be incompatible
be deemed a reservation of title, or from which it may clearly be inferred that delivery was not with the old contract (Article 1292, N.C.C.; Martinez vs. Cavives, 25 Phil. 581; Tiu Siuce vs.
intended. Habaña, 45 Phil. 707; Pablo vs. Sapungan, 71 Phil. 145; Young vs. Villa, 93 Phil., 21; 49 Off. Gaz.,
[5] 1818.) Here there was neither express novation nor incompatibility from which it could be
implied. Moreover, a mere extension of the term (period) for payment or performance is not
The contention that there was no delivery is incorrect. While there was no physical tradition,
novation (Inchausti vs. Yulo, 34 Phil. 978; Zapanta vs. De Rotaeche, 21 Phil. 154; Pablo vs.
there was one by agreement (traditio longa manu) in conformity with Article 1499 of the Civil
Sapungan, Supra); and, while the extension covered only some of the areas originally agreed
Code.lawphil.net
upon, this change did not alter the essence of the contract (cf. Ramos vs. Gibbon, 67 Phil., 371;
Bank of P.I. vs. Herridge, 47 Phil., 57).
Art. 1499 — The delivery of movable property may likewise be made by the mere consent
or agreement of the contracting parties, if the thing sold cannot be transferred to the
It is next contended that the sale by Floro to Legaspi on August 4, 1954 (within 30 days prior
possession of the vendee at the time of the sale. . . .
to petition for insolvency) was void as a fraudulent transfer under Section 70 of the Insolvency
Law. The court below held that the sale to Legaspi was valid and not violative of Section 70;
As observed earlier, there is nothing in the terms of the public instrument in question from but there having been no proceedings to determine whether the sale was fraudulent, we think
which an intent to withhold delivery or transfer of title may be inferred. it was premature for the court below to decide this point, especially because under section 36,
No. 8. of the Insolvency Act, all proceedings to set aside fraudulent transfers should be brought
The Board also contends that as no renewal of the bond required was filed for the extension and prosecuted by the assignee, who can legally represent all the creditors of the insolvent
of the contract, it ceased to have any force and effect; and, as the steel mattings were (Maceda, et al., vs. Hernandez, et al., 70 Phil., 261). To allow a single creditor to bring such a
recovered during the extended period of the contract, Malabanan did not acquire any rights proceeding would invite a multiplicity of suits, since the resolution of his case would not bind
thereto. The pertinent portion of the contract provides: the other creditors, who may refile the same claim independently, with diverse proofs, and
possibly give rise to contradictory rulings by the courts.
12. Jointly with the execution of this contract, the CONTRACTOR shall file a bond in the
amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS to guarantee his faithful compliance with The order appealed from is hereby affirmed in so far as it declares the disputed goods to be
the terms and conditions herein; Provided, that this contract shall not be considered to have the property of the insolvent; but without prejudice to the right of the assignee in insolvency
been executed notwithstanding the signing hereof by the parties until said bond shall have to take whatever action may be proper to attack the alleged fraudulent transfer of the steel
been properly filed. matting to Eulalio Legaspi, and to make the proper parties account for the difference between
the number of pieces of steel matting stated in the insolvent's recovery report, Annex "B"
Malabanan filed a bond dated June 10, 1952, effective for one (1) year, or up to June 10, 1953. (13,107), and that stated in his inventory (11,167). Costs against appellant.
The principal contract, executed on June 14, 1952, was first extended to November 30, 1953,
and finally, to August 31, 1954. As can be seen, there was no longer any bond from June 11,
1953 to August 31, 1954.
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR –DELIVERY OF THING SOLD – KINDS OF Counsel for the defendant Raymundo de la Cruz admitted paragraphs 1 and 6 of the complaint,
DELIVERY – CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY – TRADITIO CONSTITUTOM POSSESSORIUM and denied generally and specifically the other paragraphs thereof. In special defense he
alleged that the camarin described in subparagraph (a) , paragraph 2 of the complaint, was of
G.R. No. L-13125 February 11, 1919 the exclusive ownership of the defendant Raymundo de la Cruz. He therefore asked that his
client be absolved from the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiff.
ROSALIO BAUTISTA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Upon the hearing of the case and the introduction of the evidence by the parties, the court
FRANCISCO SIOSON, ET AL., defendants. decided the suit in the manner aforesaid.
RAYMUNDO DE LA CRUZ, appellant.
It now behooves us to determine who is the owner of the camarin of strong materials with an
TORRES, J.: iron roof, to which reference is made in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 of the complaint:
Whether it belongs to Rosalio Bautista, in whose favor its ownership became consolidated by
the lapse of the term of two years without its having been repurchased by the vendors; or to
This appeal through bill of exceptions was filed by counsel for the defendant Raymundo de la
Raymundo de la Cruz, to whom Francisco Sioson likewise sold the said camarin on August 5,
Cruz from the judgment of December 29, 1916, whereby the judge of the Court of First
1914, one year and eleven months after the sale of this building to the plaintiff Bautista,
Instance of Rizal held (1) that Rosalio Bautista, the plaintiff, was by merger the owner of the
effected on September 4, 1912.
properties described in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 of the complaint; (2) ordered
Raymundo de la Cruz to deliver to the plaintiff Bautista the camarin or warehouse, built of
strong materials, described in the subparagraph (a) above mentioned; (3) ordered Francisco In order that the issue raised in this suit may be properly decided we shall herein make a
Sioson to pay to said plaintiff Bautista the sum of P200, the amount of the rent due; (4) statement of the contracts executed by and between the litigants.
absolved Francisco Santos Paulino from the compliant, as the evidence did not show that he
had taken possession of the house described in said subparagraph (b); and, finally (5) ordered On September 4, 1912, the defendant Francisco Sioson and his wife Lorenza de la Cruz, through
each of the defendants Francisco Sioson and Raymundo de la Cruz to pay one-half of the costs. a notarial instrument, sold to the plaintiff Rosalio Bautista the camarin in question, besides
The appellant moved for a new trial, which motion being denied, he entered an exception, some other property, under the right of repurchase. It was stipulated that if within two years
and, upon filing the proper bill of exceptions, the same was approved and forwarded, together from the date of the contract the vendors or their successors in interest should not repurchase
with a transcript of all the evidence to the office of the clerk of this court. said properties for the sum of P400, the price of the sale, such sale should become absolute
and thenceforth the ownership in the properties sold should be consolidated, the execution
On June 30, 1916, counsel for the plaintiff filed complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, of another instrument being unnecessary. (Exhibit A, p. 10.)
in which he alleged that on September 4, 1912, by virtue of a contract of sale executed on
September 4, 1912, between the plaintiff Rosalio Bautista and the spouses Francisco Sioson On the same date, September 4, 1912, Rosalio Bautista, through a notarial instrument, leased
and Lorenza de la Cruz, for the sale of a camarin or warehouse of strong materials with an iron the properties sold to him to the vendors Francisco Sioson and Lorenza de la Cruz, for the price
roof and a house of mixed materials with a nipa roof — both buildings constructed on lots of P100 per annum, for the period of two years counted from the date of the instrument.
situated in the town of Malabon, Rizal, and belonging to the chaplaincy known by the name of (Exhibit D, p. 15.)
Concepcion — said buildings were delivered to him on the date of the contract, which was
drawn up before a notary, under the condition that the vendors might repurchase them within On June 12, 1913, Lorenza de la Cruz died (Sten. notes, p. 29) and on August 5, 1914, Francisco
the term of two years, counted from the date of the contract; that immediately after the sale Sioson executed before a notary a document by which he sold under right of repurchase to the
of the plaintiff leased the purchased buildings to said vendor spouses, who had not paid the defendant Raymundo de la Cruz, the camarin in question. It was stipulated in this instrument
price of the lease, nor repurchased said buildings, notwithstanding that the term of the that if within six months, counted from the 1st of August, 1914, the vendor Francisco Sioson
contract had elapsed with the result that the other defendant Raymundo de la Cruz was then should return to the purchase Raymundo de la Cruz the sum of P422, the price of the purchase,
(at the time of the filing of the complaint) in material possession of said camarin under title of then the purchaser Raymundo de la Cruz would be obliged to execute in favor of said vendor
owner, and Francisco Santos Paulino was in possession of the house, also under a like title. Francisco Sioson an instrument of resale, but that if within the period mentioned he should
Therefore he prayed the court to hold that the plaintiff's ownership in said buildings was not make the redemption stipulated, said sale should become absolute, the execution of
consolidated, to order the defendants to deliver them to the plaintiff, and to order Francisco another instrument being unnecessary. (Exhibit 1, p. 17.)
Sioson to pay to the plaintiff the price of the lease and to pay the costs.
From the instrument referred to in the preceding paragraphs it is concluded that the original
The defendants Francisco Sioson and Francisco Santos Paulino did not put in an appearance to owner of the buildings in dispute, Francisco Sioson, and his wife, Lorenza de la Cruz, sold, on
answer the complaint, notwithstanding that they were duly summoned. They were therefore September 4, 1912, the house and the camarin to the plaintiff Rosalio Bautista for P400, under
declared in default. agreement of their resale within the term of two years counted from said date; and that, on
the same date, by means of a constitutum possessorium agreement, and in another new of the two purchasers first took possession of the camarin sold, and also whether the material
notarial instrument, the purchaser Bautista leased the properties sold to the vendors Francisco possession of the tenant is of a precarious nature, enjoyed in the same and representation of
Sioson and Lorenza de la Cruz at an annual rent of P100, for a period of two years counted the owner Bautista.
from the date above mentioned.
Article 1462 of the Civil Code reads:
After the lessee, Francisco Sioson, had been in possession of the properties leased for one year
and eleven months, he sold the camarin, one of them, by virtue of a notarial instrument to A thing sold shall be considered as delivered, when it is placed in the hands and possession
Raymundo de la Cruz, under the agreement that if he did not redeem the camarin so sold of the vendee.
within six months from the 1st of August, 1914, and return the sum of P422, such sale under
right of repurchase should become absolute, the execution of another instrument being
When the sale should be made by means of a public instrument, the execution thereof shall
unnecessary.
be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if in said
instrument the contrary does not appear or may be clearly inferred.
As a result of the two said alienation, both set forth in notarial instruments though not
recorded in the registry of property the issue raised and to be decided is, which of the two
From the contest of this article it is deduced that the delivery or tradition of the thing sold may
purchasers, the plaintiff Bautista and the defendant Cruz, is the lawful owner of the camarin
be real or actual, and feigned. The execution of a public instrument constitutes one of the kinds
successively sold to the former and to the latter by the other defendant Francisco Sioson, its
of symbolic tradition, but, in all the different manners by which the thing sold may be
original owner, in accordance with the provisions contained in article 1473 of the Civil Code,
delivered, it is necessary that the record bear proof and that it may be held that such delivery
the last paragraph of which, among other things, prescribed:
or tradition was determined by the will of the parties to deliver and receive, respectively, the
thing that is the subject of the contract.
Should there be no entry, the property shall belong to the person who first took possession
of its in good faith . . .
In the contract of lease (Exhibit D, record, p. 15) the lessor, Rosalio Bautista, states that in his
capacity as owner he leased to the spouses Francisco Sioson and Lorenza de la Cruz, among
In view of the fact that the deed of sale executed by Francisco Sioson, the owner of the other properties, a camarin of strong material with an iron roof, at an annual rent of P100, the
camarin, and his wife, Lorenza de la Cruz, on September 4, 1912, in favor of Rosalio Bautista, lessees binding themselves to report to the lessor any act of disturbance committed by any
was not entered in the registry of property, and of the further fact that, upon the execution of other person, and all defects that might be occasioned to the building. The execution of this
the second sale of the same camarin by the said Sioson, which sale was made after the death instrument of lease shows that the camarin would be continued to be occupied by its previous
of his wife Lorenza by virtue of an instrument dated August 5, 1914, in favor of Raymundo de owner and vendor after it had been delivered, symbolically, by means of the instrument
la Cruz, under agreement of repurchase for the price of P422 the term of two years fixed for executed for the purpose in favor of the purchaser, in order that he might hold it in the capacity
the redemption of the camarin so sold had not yet expired, it may be presumed, in the absence of lessee, it being supposed, by a legal fiction, that the purchaser entered into possession of
of proof to the contrary, that the second purchaser Raymundo de la Cruz, on acquiring the the camarin sold, a form of possession utilized by the purchaser by virtue of the clause known
camarin of its original owner Francisco Sioson, who, according to the written contract, became in law as constitutum possessorium, stipulated between the contracting parties.
a tenant or lessee of the camarin, was not aware of said first sale to Bautista, and believed that
Sioson, who was in possession of the camarin, was still the owner thereof. Therefore, Cruz
So that by the execution of the deed of sale of September 4, 1912, Rosalio Bautista entered
acted in good faith in acquiring it, inasmuch as, through failure to enter the property in the
into the material possession under title of owner, of the camarin sold to him by Francisco
registry, there was no reason why the previous alienation of the camarin should have been
Sioson, and, by virtue of another instrument of lease, of the same date, the purchaser and
known. But be all this as it may, nevertheless, the actual and material possession of the
owner of the camarin conveyed and delivered this building to the lessee in view of said
camarin by Cruz does not constitute a sufficient legal reason for holding the he has a better
contract. Under these perfectly legal suppositions it is unquestionable that the purchaser
right to the building than the first purchaser Rosalio Bautista, although the latter was not in
Rosalio Bautista was the first person who entered into the possession of the camarin as soon
actual, physical, and material of the camarin that he had purchased. This conclusion is derived
as soon as he acquired it by virtue of said sale.
from a strict application of the provisions of said article 1473 of the Civil Code.
The material possession which the other defendant, Raymundo de la Cruz, now enjoys, not
Both alienations, effected successively by Francisco Sioson in favor of Bautista and Cruz, are
only was subsequent by one year and eleven months, but also, on the other hand, is an
recorded in notarial instruments, though they were not entered in the registry of property. To
unlawful possession which was transmitted to him by Francisco Sioson, who held the camarin
determine who is the lawful owner of the camarin sold, if the provisions of said article of the
precariously and in the capacity of tenant, and, consequently, without any right whatever to
Code are to be observed, we have first to determine the contention in regard to which of the
convey to Raymundo de la Cruz the possession under title of owner referred to in article 1473,
two purchasers is in possession thereof, and if, on the execution of the contract of lease by the
aforementioned of the Civil Code.
first purchaser in favor of the vendor himself, the constitutum possessorium agreement is to
be considered to have been stipulated, the conclusion must necessarily be reached as to which
This article says: "If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees. . .;" but it must
be understood that said sale was made by its original owner. In the instant case Francisco
Sioson, on affecting the second sale in favor of Raymundo de la Cruz, was in possession of the
camarin and occupied it, not in the capacity of owner, but in that of lessee or tenant, and
therefore absolutely had no right to dispose of the building in the capacity of owner thereof;
consequently Sioson could not convey to the second purchaser the lawful possession of the
disputed camarin.

After the foregoing elucidation of the main issue submitted to this court for decision, we deem
it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues relative to whether Francisco Sioson could have
sold, only after the death of his wife, the said camarin to Raymundo de la Cruz, and whether
the price of the second sale was part of a larger sum that pertained to the second purchaser,
as proceeds derived from the game of jueteng, inasmuch as, for the reasons above stated, it
has been shown that Raymundo de la Cruz could not have acquired any right in the camarin
involved in this suit; for Francisco Sioson, who sold to Cruz, occupied it as a mere tenant and
not as owner, and, consequently, was unable to transmit to the purchaser any property right
whatever or lawful possession under title of owner.

For all the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from
have been duly refuted, said judgment, being in conformity with the evidence of record, should
be, as it hereby is, affirmed, with the costs against the appellant Raymundo de la Cruz. So
ordered.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Manresa, in his commentaries, on article 1473 of the Civil Code, clearly indicates that
the possession referred to in that article is the real, the physical possession of the property;
and certain it is that to hold that the possession contemplated in this article may be secured
without the performance of some act which will give notice to innocent subsequent
purchasers, or of which subsequent purchasers may inform themselves by due diligence tends
to defeats the just and equitable provisions of the law.
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR –DELIVERY OF THING SOLD – KINDS OF order. Defendant also refused the optional offer of the plaintiff, of waiting for the remainder
DELIVERY – CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY – DELIVERY TO A COMMON CARRIER of the shipment until its arrival, or of accepting the substitution of seventy-one drums of
caustic soda of similar grade from plaintiff's stock. The plaintiff thereupon sold, for the account
G.R. No. 13203 September 18, 1918 of the defendant, eighty drums of caustic soda from which there was realized the sum of
P6,352.89. Deducting this sum from the selling price of P10,063.86, we have the amount
claimed as damages for alleged breach of the contract.
BEHN, MEYER & CO. (LTD.), plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
TEODORO R. YANCO, defendant-appellee. Law. — It is sufficient to note that the specific merchandise was never tendered. The soda
which the plaintiff offered to defendant was not of the "Carabao" brand, and the offer of
drums of soda of another kind was not made within the time that a March shipment, according
MALCOLM, J.:
to another provision the contract, would normally have been available.
The first inquiry to be determined is what was the contract between the parties.
2. PLACE OF DELIVERY.
The memorandum agreement executed by the duly authorized representatives of the parties
Facts. — The contract provided for "c.i.f. Manila, pagadero against delivery of documents."
to this action reads:

Law. — Determination of the place of delivery always resolves itself into a question of act. If
Contract No. 37.
the contract be silent as to the person or mode by which the goods are to be sent, delivery by
the vendor to a common carrier, in the usual and ordinary course of business, transfers the
MANILA, 7 de marzo, de 1916. property to the vendee. A specification in a contact relative to the payment of freight can be
taken to indicate the intention of the parties in regard to the place of delivery. If the buyer is
to pay the freight, it is reasonable to suppose that he does so because the goods become his
Confirmanos haber vendido a Bazar Siglo XX, 80 drums Caustic Soda 76 per cent "Carabao" at the point of shipment. On the other hand, if the seller is to pay the freight, the inference is
brand al precio de Dollar Gold Nine and 75/100 per 100-lbs., c.i.f. Manila, pagadero against equally so strong that the duty of the seller is to have the goods transported to their ultimate
delivery of documents. Embarque March, 1916. destination and that title to property does not pass until the goods have reached their
destination. (See Williston on Sales, PP. 406-408.)

Comprador Bazar Siglo XX


The letters "c.i.f." found in British contracts stand for cost, insurance, and freight. They signify
de Teodoro R. Yangco
that the price fixed covers not only the cost of the goods, but the expense of freight and
J. Siquia
insurance to be paid by the seller. (Ireland vs. Livingston, L. R., 5 H. L., 395.) Our instant
contract, in addition to the letters "c.i.f.," has the word following, "Manila." Under such a
Vendores
contract, an Australian case is authority for the proposition that no inference is permissible
BEHN, MEYER & CO. (Ltd.)
that a seller was bound to deliver at the point of destination. (Bowden vs. Little, 4 Comm.
O. LOMBECK.
[Australia], 1364.)

This contract of sale can be analyzed into three component parts. In mercantile contracts of American origin the letters "F.O.B." standing for the words "Free on
Board," are frequently used. The meaning is that the seller shall bear all expenses until the
1. SUBJECT MATTER AND CONSIDERATION. goods are delivered where they are to be "F.O.B." According as to whether the goods are to
be delivered "F.O.B." at the point of shipment or at the point of destination determines the
Facts. — The contract provided for "80 drums Caustic Soda 76 per cent "Carabao" brand al time when property passes.
precio de Dollar Gold Nine and 75/100 1-lbs."
Both the terms "c.i.f." and "F.O.B." merely make rules of presumption which yield to proof of
Resorting to the circumstances surrounding the agreement are we are permitted to do, in contrary intention. As Benjamin, in his work on Sales, well says: "The question, at last, is one
pursuance of this provision, the merchandise was shipped from New York on the steamship of intent, to be ascertained by a consideration of all the circumstances." For instance, in a case
Chinese Prince. The steamship was detained by the British authorities at Penang, and part of of Philippine origin, appealed to the United States Supreme Court, it was held that the sale was
the cargo, including seventy-one drums of caustic soda, was removed. Defendant refused to complete on shipment, though the contract was for goods, "F.O.B. Manila," the place of
accept delivery of the remaining nine drums of soda on the ground that the goods were in bad
destination the other terms of the contract showing the intention to transfer the property. contemplated by article 1451 of the Civil Code, the vendee can demand fulfillment of the
(United States vs. R. P. Andrews & Co. [1907], 207 U.S., 229.) contract, and this being shown to be impossible, is relieved of his obligation. There thus being
sufficient ground for rescission, the defendant is not liable.
With all due deference to the decision of the High Court of Australia, we believe that the word
Manila in conjunction with the letters "c.i.f." must mean that the contract price, covering costs, The judgment of the trial court ordering that the plaintiff take nothing by its action, without
insurance, and freight, signifies that delivery was to made at Manila. If the plaintiff company special finding as to costs, is affirmed, with the costs of this instance. Against the appellant. So
has seriously thought that the place of delivery was New York and Not Manila, it would not ordered.
have gone to the trouble of making fruitless attempts to substitute goods for the merchandise
named in the contract, but would have permitted the entire loss of the shipment to fall upon
the defendant. Under plaintiffs hypothesis, the defendant would have been the absolute
owner of the specific soda confiscated at Penang and would have been indebted for the
contract price of the same.

This view is corroborated by the facts. The goods were not shipped nor consigned from New
York to plaintiff. The bill of lading was for goods received from Neuss Hesslein & Co. the
documents evidencing said shipment and symbolizing the property were sent by Neuss
Hesslein & Co. to the Bank of the Philippine Islands with a draft upon Behn, Meyer & Co. and
with instructions to deliver the same, and thus transfer the property to Behn, Meyer & Co.
when and if Behn, Meyer & Co. should pay the draft.

The place of delivery was Manila and plaintiff has not legally excused default in delivery of the
specified merchandise at that place.

3. TIME OF DELIVERY.

Facts. — The contract provided for: "Embarque: March 1916," the merchandise was in fact
shipped from New York on the Steamship Chinese Prince on April 12, 1916.

Law. — The previous discussion makes a resolution of this point unprofitable, although the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Norrington vs. Wright (([1885], 115 U.S., 188)
can be read with profit. Appellant's second and third assignments of error could, if necessary,
be admitted, and still could not recover.

THE CONTRACT.

To answer the inquiry with which we begun this decision, the contract between the parties
was for 80 drums of caustic soda, 76 per cent "Carabao" brand, at the price of $9.75 per one
hundred pounds, cost, insurance, and freight included, to be shipped during March, 1916, to
be delivered to Manila and paid for on delivery of the documents.

PERFORMANCE.

In resume, we find that the plaintiff has not proved the performance on its part of the
conditions precedent in the contract. The warranty — the material promise — of the seller to
the buyer has not been complied with. The buyer may therefore rescind the contract of sale
because of a breach in substantial particulars going to the essence of the contract. As
SALES – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR –DELIVERY OF THING SOLD – KINDS OF price and any excess or deficiency beyond this 3 per cent at the market price of the day of
DELIVERY – CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY – DELIVERY TO A COMMON CARRIER arrival at port of discharge, this market price to be fixed by the Executive Committee of the
National Institute of Oilseeds Products. Each shipment to be treated as a separate contract.
[G.R. No. L-8717. November 20, 1956.]
PACKING: In bulk. SHIPMENT: November, 1947, earlier if possible, from Philippine Islands.
GENERAL FOODS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. NATIONAL COCONUT
CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
PRICE: One hundred and sixty-four dollars ($164) per ton of 2,000 pounds, CIF New York.

PAYMENT: Buyers to open immediately by cable in favor of Sellers Irrevocable Letter of


DECISION Credit through the Philippine National Bank for 95 per cent of invoice value based on
shipping weight in exchange for the following documents:
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
1. Provisional Invoice.
Appellant General Foods Corporation is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the
State of Delaware, U. S. A., and licensed to do business in the Philippines; while Appellee 2. Full set of negotiable ocean bills of lading, freight charges fully prepaid and showing the
National Coconut Corporation (otherwise called NACOCO), was, on the date of the transaction material on board.
in question, a corporation created by Commonwealth Act No. 518, but later abolished and
place in liquidation by Executive Order No. 3727 dated November 24, 1950. 3. Weight Certificate confirming quantity shown on invoice and bill of lading.

On September 23, 1947, Appellee sold to Appellant 1,500 (later reduced to 1,000) long tons of 4. Consular invoice or certificate of origin in duplicate.
copra, at $164 (later reduced to $163) per ton of 2,000 pounds, under the following terms and
conditions:
5. Loading survey report and weight certificate of Superintendence Corporation.
“CONTRACT NO. RH-3551
6. Consular form No. 197 (Pure Food & Drug Certificate).
FRANKLIN BAKER DIVISION OF GENERAL FOODS CORPORATION
Balance due to be paid promptly upon ascertainment and based upon outturn weights and
quality at port of discharge.
15th & Bloomfield Streets
WEIGHTS: Net landed weights.
Hoboken, New Jersey
SAMPLING: As per Rule 101 of National Institute of Oilseeds Products.
WE CONFIRM HAVING PURCHASED FOR YOU TODAY from Messrs. National Coconut
Corporation, Manila, Philippine Islands, through Mercantile, Inc., Manila, P. I.
INSURANCE: Buyer to provide valid insurance for Marine and War risks for 110 per cent of
CIF contract value. Seller to allow buyer from the CIF price an amount equivalent to the
COMMODITY: COPRA — Fair Merchantable Quality, Basis current rate of insurance prevailing on the date of shipment, in lieu of sellers covering usual
marine insurance themselves.
6% F. F. A.
CLAUSE PARAMOUNT: This contract is subject to published rules of the National Institute
QUALITY: As per rule 100 of National Institute of of Oilseeds Products adopted and now in force, which are hereby made a part hereof. Any
dispute arising under this contract shall be settled by a Board of Arbitrators selected by
Oilseeds Products. the Chairman of the Foreign Commerce Association of the San Francisco Chamber of
Commerce and to be judged according to the rules of the National Institute of
QUANTITY: Fifteen Hundred (1500) tons of 2,240 pounds each. Seller has the option of Oilseeds Products and the findings of said Board will be final and binding upon all the
delivering 5 per cent more or less of the contracted quantity, such surplus or deficiency to signatories hereto, providing such rules are not in conflict with existing Government
be settled as follows: On the basis of the delivered weight up to 3 per cent at the contract regulations.
The above shipment to be made under Franklin Baker’s license No. 26429. This contract covers In the transaction now in question, despite the quoted price of CIF New York, and the right of
the sale made by the Nacoco thru the Mercantile, Inc. dated September 9, 1947 in the the seller to withdraw 95 per cent of the invoice price from the buyer’s letter of credit upon
Philippines.” (Exhibit “A”). tender of the shipping and other documents required by the contract, the express agreement
that the “Net Landed Weights” were to govern, and the provision that the balance of the price
From November 14 to December 3, 1947, Appellee shipped 1054.6278 short tons of copra to was to be ascertained on the basis of outturn weights and quality of the cargo at the port of
Appellant on board the S. S. “Mindoro”. The weighing of the cargo was done by the Luzon discharge, indicate an intention that the precise amount to be paid by the buyer depended
Brokerage Co., in its capacity as agent of the General Superintendence Co., Ltd., of Geneva, upon the ascertainment of the exact net weight of the cargo at the port of destination. That is
Switzerland, by taking the individual weight of each bag of copra and summing up the total furthermore shown by the provision that the seller could deliver 5 per cent more or less than
gross weight of the shipment, then weighing a certain number of empty bags to determine the the contracted quantity, such surplus or deficiency to be paid “on the basis of the delivered
average tare of the empty bags, which was subtracted from the gross weight of the shipment weight”.
to determine the net weight of the cargo. On the strength of the net weigh thus found,
Appellee prepared and remitted to Appellant the corresponding bills of lading and other In our opinion, the governing rule may be found in the decision of the Supreme Court of New
documents, and withdrew from the latter’s letter of credit 95 per cent of the invoice value of York in the case of Warner, Barnes & Co. vs. Warner Sugar R. Co., 192 NYS 151, cited in
the shipment, or a total of $136,686.95. Appellee’s brief (pp. 16-19.) In said case, the parties had expressly agreed that the payment of
the price was to be according to “landed weights”, and that delivery of the goods shipped from
Upon arrival in New York, the net cargo was reweighed by Appellant and was found to weigh the Philippine Islands to New York was to be in New York ex vessel at wharf; but it was also
only 898.792 short tons. Deducting from the value of the shortage the sum of $8,092.02 agreed that the seller had the right, upon presentation of full shipping documents, including
received by Appellant from the insurer for 58.25 long tons lost or destroyed even before the full insurance, to draw upon the Defendants for 90 per cent of the invoice price, evidencing an
copra was loaded on board the vessel, Appellant demanded from Appellee the refund of the intent to give the buyers dominion over the goods and to place the risk of loss upon them. The
amount of $24,154.59. Sometime after the receipt of Appellant’s demand, the Appellee, reasonable construction given by the Court to this contract was that:
through its officers-in-charge Jose Nieva, Sr., acknowledged in a letter liability for the
deficiency in the outturn weights of the copra and promised payment thereof as soon as funds “though the seller was required to deliver the goods at a customary wharf in New York, and
were available (Exhibit “B”). Then Appellee was, as already stated, abolished and went into the price could not be finally determined until the goods were landed, yet the property in the
liquidation. Appellant submitted its claim to the Board of Liquidators, which refused to pay the goods and the risk of loss was intended to pass when the full shipping documents were
same; wherefore, it filed the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover presented, including an insurance policy. If the goods were totally lost, then by the express
from Defendant-Appellee the amount of $24,154.49 and the 17 per cent exchange tax thereon terms of the contract the buyers were to pay the full amount of invoice and if the goods were
which, under the provisions of Republic Act 529, had to be paid in order to remit said amount partially lost, then it is fairly inferable that, while payment was to be made according to landed
to the United States, plus attorney’s fees and costs. The Court a quo found for the Defendant weights, the seller should not be deprived of the right to show that these landed weights were
and dismissed the complaint; hence, this appeal by Plaintiff. diminished by loss or damage due to the risk of the voyage. Any other construction of the
contract would require the seller to provide insurance for the buyer for a loss which falls not
Plaintiff-Appellant’s theory is that although the sale between the parties quoted a CIF New on the buyer, but on the seller.” (Emphasis supplied.)
York price, the agreement contemplated the payment of the price according to the weight and
quality of the cargo upon arrival in New York, the port of destination, and that therefore, the The same could be said in the instant case. While the risk of loss was apparently placed on the
risk of the shipment was upon the seller. Defendant-Appellee, on the other hand, insists that Appellant after delivery of the cargo to the carrier, it was nevertheless agreed that the
the contract in question was an ordinary C. I. F. agreement wherein delivery to the carrier is payment of the price was to be according to the “net landed weight”. The net landed or
delivery to the buyer, and that the shipment having been delivered to the buyer and the latter outturn weight of the cargo, upon arrival in New York, was 898.692 short tons. Although the
having paid its price, the sale was consummated. evidence shows that the estimated weight of the shipment when it left Manila was 1,054.6278
tons, the Appellee had the burden of proof to show that the shortage in weight upon arrival in
There is no question that under an ordinary C.I.F. agreement, delivery to the buyer is complete New York was due to risks of the voyage and not the natural drying up of the copra while in
upon delivery of the goods to the carrier and tender of the shipping and other documents transit, or to reasonable allowances for errors in the weighing of the gross cargo and the empty
required by the contract and the insurance policy taken in the buyer’s behalf (77 C.J. S. 983; bags in Manila. In the absence of such proof on the part of the shipper-Appellee, we are
46 Am. Jur. 313; II Williston on Sales, 103 — 107). There is equally no question that the parties constrained to hold that the net landed weight of the shipment in New York should control, as
may, by express stipulation or impliedly (by making the buyer’s obligation depend on arrival stipulated in the agreement, and that therefore, the Appellee should be held liable for the
and inspection of the goods), modify a CIF contract and throw the risk upon the seller until amount of $24,154.59 which it had overdrawn from Appellant’s letter of credit.
arrival in the port of destination (77 CJS 983- 984; Williston, supra, 116; also Willits vs.
Abekobei, 189 NYS 525; National Wholesale Grocery Co. vs. Mann. 146 NE 791, Klipstein vs. Appellee contends that as it was only the “balance due to be paid” that was to be ascertained
Dilsizian, 273 F 473). and based “upon outturn weights and quality at port of discharge”, as provided in the contract,
there was no more balance due to be ascertained at the port of discharge because it had
already received full payment of the copra it sent to the Appellant when it withdrew
$136,686.95 from the latter’s letter of credit. The argument is untenable. The provision
regarding the ascertainment of the balance due based upon outturn weight and quality of the
shipment at the port of discharge, should not be construed separately from the stipulation
that the “net landed weight” was to control. The manifest intention of the parties was for the
total price to be finally ascertained only upon determining the net weight and quality of the
goods upon arrival in New York, most likely because the cargo in question, being copra, by
nature dries up and diminishes in weight during the voyage; that no bulk weigher was available
in Manila so that the best that could be done was to get the gross weight of the shipment and
deduct the average tare of the empty bags; and that the buyer in New York had no agent in
Manila to represent it and protect its interest during the weighing of the cargo. The intention
of the parties to be bound by the outturn or net landed weight in New York is clearly shown in
the letter of Appellee’s then officer-in-charge Jose Nieva, Sr., acknowledging liability for the
deficiency in the outturn weight of the copra (Exhibit “B”). Although this letter may not be
considered an admission of liability on the part of Appellee in the absence of a showing that
Nieva was authorized to admit liability for the corporation, it is nevertheless competent
evidence of the intention of the parties, particularly the NACOCO, to be bound by the net
landed weight or outturn weight of the copra at the port of discharge.

With respect to Appellant’s claim for damages equivalent to the 17 per cent excise tax which
it has to pay in order to remit the sum of $24,154.59 to the United States, such excise tax is no
longer imposed in view of the trade (Laurel-Langley) agreement, so that it need not be taken
into account.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the Appellee National Coconut
Corporation is ordered to pay the Appellant General Foods Corporation the equivalent in
Philippine currency of the amount of $24,154.59, with legal interest from the time of the filing
of the complaint. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.