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1. HENRY HILTON vs. GUSTAVE BERTIN GUYOT, ET AL., 159 US 113, June 3, 1895

Brief Fact Summary

Hilton (Plaintiff) and Libbey (Plaintiff) appealed from a federal district court holding that a French court judgment against them for
amounts allegedly owed to a French firm was enforceable without retrial on the merits.

Synopsis of Rule of Law

No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived.

Hilton (Plaintiff) and Libbey (Plaintiff), New York citizens trading in Paris, were sued in France by Guyot (Defendant), the administrator of
a French firm, for sums allegedly owed to that firm. The Plaintiffs appeared and litigated the merits in the French proceeding. The
French court rendered a judgment against them that was affirmed by a higher court and became final. Defendant then sought to
enforce that judgment in federal district court in New York. That court held the judgment enforceable without retrial on the merits. The
Plaintiffs then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Issue: Do laws have any effect, of their own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived?

(Gray, J.) No. No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. No
sovereign is bound, unless by special compact, to execute within his dominions a judgment rendered by the tribunals of another state,
and if execution be sought by suit upon the judgment or otherwise, the tribunal in which the suit is brought, or from which execution is
sought, is, on principle, at liberty to examine into the merits of such judgment, and to give effect to it or not, as may be found just and
equitable. However, the general comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among most civilized states, by
which the final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally carried into execution, under certain regulations
and restrictions, which differ in different countries. Additionally, judgments rendered in France, or in any foreign country, by the laws of
which our own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this
country, but are prima facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiffs’ claim. Reversed.

Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, 297 SCRA 469, G.R. No. 122191, October 8, 1998

Locus Actus

On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
.In 1990, while she and some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to rape her in a hotel room.
Fortunately, a room boy heard her cry for help and two of her Arab co-workers were arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia
Airlines re-assigned her to work in their Manilao ffice. While working in Manila, Saudia Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia
Airlines officer in Saudi.She did but to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and eventually
sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim customs by partying with males. The Prince of
Makkah got wind of her conviction and the Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her and sent
her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for damages under Article19
and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because
the applicable law should be the law of Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under the premises.

ISSUE: WON Saudi Airlines’ contention' was tenable?

Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the latter filed a motion to dismisswith petition for other reliefs. The
asking for other reliefs effectively asked the court to make adetermination of Saudi
a Airlines’s rights hence a submission to the court’s jurisdiction.

Secondly , the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the complaint ofMorada, she is bringing the suit for
damages under the provisions of our Civil Law and not of the ArabianLaw.Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC because
under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may elect whether to file an action in personam (case at bar) in the place where she resides or
where thedefendant resides. Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case here because if she’ll file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be
very disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign element involved, is the so called “locus actus” or
where an act has been done. In the case at bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was summoned by her superior to go
to Saudi Arabia to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she was going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she
wasdefrauded into appearing before a court trial which led to her wrongful conviction. The act of defrauding,which is tortuous, was
committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation, misery, and suffering. Andapplying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds
that the Philippines could be said as a situs ofthe tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).

APPELLATE COURT, 176 SCRA 331, G.R. No. 72494, August 11, 1989

In 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd., (Eastern) a company incorporated in Singapore applied w/, & was granted by the
Singapore branch of HSBC an overdraft facility in the max amount of Singapore $200,000 (w/c amount was subsequently increased to
Singapore $375,000) w/ interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility. As a
security for the repayment by Eastern of sums advanced by HSBC to it through the aforesaid overdraft facility, in 1982, Jack Sherman,
Dodato Reloj, and a Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom were directors of Eastern at such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in
favor of HSBC whereby Sherman, Reloj and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by Eastern to HSBC
under the aforestated overdraft facility.

The Joint and Several Guarantee provides that: “This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be
construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that
the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee.”

Eastern failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment of the obligation from Sherman & Reloj, conformably w/ the
provisions of the Joint and Several Guarantee. Inasmuch as Sherman & Reloj still failed to pay, HSBC filed a complaint for collection of a
sum of money against them. Sherman & Reloj filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint, and (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendants.

ISSUE: W/N Philippine courts should have jurisdiction over the suit?

YES. While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and that the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a choice-
of-forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates that the stipulation that "this guarantee and all rights, obligations & liabilities
arising hereunder shall be construed & determined under & may be enforced in accordance w/ the laws of the Republic of Singapore.
We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee" be liberally
construed. One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of
some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the
jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Indeed,
as pointed-out by HSBC at the outset, the instant case presents a very odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone would be
disinclined to litigate before a foreign tribunal, w/ more reason as a defendant. However, in this case, Sherman & Reloj are Philippine
residents (a fact which was not disputed by them) who would rather face a complaint against them before a foreign court and in the
process incur considerable expenses, not to mention inconvenience, than to have a Philippine court try and resolve the case. Their
stance is hardly comprehensible, unless their ultimate intent is to evade, or at least delay, the payment of a just obligation.

The defense of Sherman & Reloj that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not
even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the
other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass Sherman & Reloj.

The parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the
clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a
State to exercise authority over persons and things w/in its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume
jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign military units stationed
in or marching through State territory w/ the permission of the latter's authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept
of sovereignty, is exclusive w/in and throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees
fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them.

4. IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased, MORA ADONG vs. CHEONG SENG GEE, 43 Phil. 43, G.R. No. 18081, March
3, 1922
5. CAYETANO LIM and MARCIANO LIM vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, 36 Phil. 472, G.R. No. L-11759, March 16, 1917
November 23, 2007

Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the
infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend
professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access
Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the
detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the
project manger in the contract.

Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR

Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had
expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.

Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has
no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan
following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because
nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle
of lex loci solutionis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages involving
contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus,
“the state of the most significant relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.

HELD: NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition
and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will determine
the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does notautomatically give a state constitutional
authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex foriwill often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not
always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a
transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.

In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its
power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the
subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation.In
assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the
court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of
an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the
matter submitted to it because no lawgrants it the power to adjudicate the claims.

In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject
controversy for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by
the RTC of Lipa City.What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis
and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of
lex contractus or lex loci contractusmeans the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed.” It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by
them either expressly or implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply to a
dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case
involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile,
place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties.This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the
choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as
the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict
between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation
requiring theapplication of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for
the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there
are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume
jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over
the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is
derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign
sovereign law short of treaties or other formalagreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for
a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be
entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the
sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.

103493, June 19, 1997

Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment
Corp (PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent Daic, assumed
Ducat’s obligation under an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien by which it sold to petitioner
Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment
of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc.
Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered
to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered by the note became due and demandable. Accordingly,
private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance and for
damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of
stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint “For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of
Preliminary Attachment” against private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their
respective counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private respondents committed
fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more than its true value.
Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2)
forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducat’s MTD, stating that “the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the
forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non conveniens,” even as it noted that
Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S. court?
HELD:CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati
NO. While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is because in this jurisdiction, with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, §50 provides:
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for
declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the
trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented
thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in
this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata.
Second. Nor is the trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens:
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a
case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense.

Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after
“vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances” require the court’s desistance.

153, G.R. No. 154830, June 8, 2007

Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the RTC of Makati City, a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment
against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G.
McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).

Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-
mix concrete and concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company established by PIL to own and hold the stocks of its operating
company in the Philippines; PCPI is the company established by PIL to undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates
and quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald is the Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL; and, Klepzig is the President
and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI; Todaro has been the managing director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company
engaged in pre-mixed concrete and concrete aggregate production; he resigned from Betonval in February 1996; in May 1996, PIL
contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with their intention to establish a ready-mix concrete
plant and other related operations in the Philippines; Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL
and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to three
months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company decide to invest
in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its undertaking to
employ Todaro on a permanent basis. Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as
the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. RTC dismissed the MTD which was affirmed by the CA.

W/N the RTC should have dismissed the case on the basis of forum non conveniens due to a presence of a foreign element

NO. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case
and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
this Court held that "xxx [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following
requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in
a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision."
The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain
from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court’s desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense.

Note: the case was also being dismissed on the ground that there was no cause of action but SC held that there was cause of action, to
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that
a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. And it was also argued in this case that jurisdiction is with
the NLRC and not with the RTC. SC held it was with RTC, SC has consistently held that where no employer-employee relationship exists
between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any
collective bargaining agreement, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction.

• In 1978 plaintiff Menandro B. Laureano applied for employment with the defendant company Singapore Airlines Ltd.
• On January 20, 1979, plaintiff commenced working for the defendant after accepting a contract of employment for an original
period of two (2) year.
• On July 21, 1979, dependant ordered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979
to January 20, 1984.
• In 1982, defendant, hit by recession, decided to terminate its excess personnel including the plaintiff.
• On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982 and he will be paid three (3)
month-salary in lieu of three-month notice. Due to the request of plaintiff, private respondent gave two (2) months notice and
one (1) month salary.
• On June 29, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter which was later withdrawn.
• On February 11, 1987, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court over the matter, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss,
which was later denied by the court.
• On April 10, 1991, trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the private respondent to pay him his unearned
compensation, consequential, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
• On October 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals set aside and reversed the decision of the trial court.

1. Whether the Singapore Law was applicable to the case at hand
2. Whether the Philippine court had jurisdiction over the case

1. The court cannot determination the applicability of Singapore Laws due to the defendant’s failure
to show which specific laws of Singapore that apply to the case at hand; thus, Philippine law
should be applied.

2. Respondent Court of Appeals had acquired jurisdiction when the defendant filed its appeal before
the said court; hence, the former was correct it barred the latter from raising the issue of

Hence, the court dismissed the petition, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals.

October 6, 2000


The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela,
to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, an official pilot of Venezuela, was
designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. The Philippine Roxas
experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel. The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch
officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and
verified that it was in the centre of the channel. The Philippine Roxas ran around in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and
egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wild valley Shipping Company, Ltd.,
was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Subsequently, Wild valley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine
Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00plus attorney's fees, costs, and
expenses of litigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar?

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory:

(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal
of his office.

The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a
document in a foreign country. With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a
duly authenticated copy of the statute. At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower

A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and
legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue.

A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas
occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela. We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must
be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed
to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as Processual Presumption.
11. AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father and legal guardian, Augusto Benedicto Santos vs. NORTHWEST ORIENT
AIRLINES and COURT OF APPEALS, 210 SCRA 256, G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992

326 US 310, December 3, 1945

Augusto Benedicto Santos III is a minor represented by his dad. In October 1986, he bought a round trip ticket from Northwest Orient
Airlines (NOA) in San Francisco. His flight would be from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back to San Francisco. His scheduled flight
was in December. A day before his departure he checked with NOA and NOA said he made no reservation and that he bought no ticket.
The next year, due to the incident, he sued NOA for damages. He sued NOA in Manila. NOA argued that Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Article 28(1) of theWarsaw Convention, which provides that complaints against international
carriers can only be instituted in:

1. the court of the domicile of the carrier (NOA’s domicile is in the USA);

2. the court of its principal place of business (which is San Francisco, USA);

3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had been made (ticket was purchased in San Francisco
so that’s where the contract was made);

4. the court of the place of destination (Santos bought a round trip ticket which final destination is San Francisco).

The lower court ruled in favor of NOA. Santos III averred that Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case and he questioned the
constitutionality of Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter to conduct judicial review.

HELD: No.The Supreme Court ruled that they cannot rule over the matter for the SC is bound by the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention which was ratified by the Senate. Until & unless there would be amendment to the Warsaw Convention, the only remedy for
Santos III is to sue in any of the place indicated in the Convention such as in San Francisco, USA.
The SC cannot rule upon the constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention.In the first place, it is a treaty which was a joint
act by the legislative and the executive.The presumption is that it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it
was adopted and given the force of law in this country. In this case, Santos was not able to offer any compelling argument to overcome
the presumption.

13. EL BANCO ESPA-OL-FILIPINO vs. VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, 37 Phil. 921, G.R.
No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

Constitutional Law| Procedural Due Process| Presumption of Regularity

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged his parcels of real property to El Banco Espanol-Filipino as security for his debt to
the bank.

Engracio however failed to settle his payments. Furthermore, he returned to China, his native country and never returned to the
Philippines until his death in 1910. The bank proceeded to foreclose the mortgage. As Engracio was a nonresident, it was necessary for
the bank to give notice by publication their summons and complaints by virtue of the order of the court directed to the defendant’s last
place of residence in the city of Amoy, China.

In 1908, the court ordered the sale of the property. After 7 years, Vicente Palanca emerged, as the administrator of the estate of
Engracio Palanca and petitioned to nullify the decision of the court in 1908 on the ground that they have not received a notice of letter
from the court that resulted to their default.

ISSUE: Whether the proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.

HELD: SC ruled in favor of El Banco Espanol.

Yes. Due process is satisfied in the following conditions, namely;

1. There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
In the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that there is a presumption “that official duty has been regularly performed” and a
presumption “that the ordinary course of business has been followed.”

The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the court made its decree with the knowledge that the requirements of law
had been complied with appear to be amply sufficient to support the conclusion that the notice was sent by the clerk as required by the
14. WILLIAM F. GEMPERLE vs. HELEN SCHENKER and PAUL SCHENKER as her husband, 19 SCRA 45, G.R. No. L-18164, January 23, 1967


Appeal, taken by plaintiff, William F. Gemperle, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing this case for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of defendant Paul Schenker and for want of cause of action against his wife and co-defendant, Helen
Schenker, said Paul Schenker "being in no position to be joined with her as party defendant, because he is beyond the reach of the
magistracy of the Philippine courts."

The record shows that sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker hereinafter referred to as Schenker acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact,
Helen Schenker hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Schenker filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a complaint which was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-2796 thereof against herein plaintiff William F. Gemperle, for the enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription
to the shares of stock of the Philippine-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued
original capital stock of said corporation and the increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages. Alleging that, in connection
with said complaint, Mrs. Schenker had caused to be published some allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent,
irrelevant and immaterial to said case No. Q-2796, aside from being false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit of
Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his "honesty, integrity and reputation" and of bringing him "into public hatred, discredit,
disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman", Gemperle commenced the present action against the Schenkers for the recovery
of P300,000 as damages, P30,000 as attorney's fees, and costs, in addition to praying for a judgment ordering Mrs. Schenker "to retract
in writing the said defamatory expressions". In due course, thereafter, the lower court rendered the decision above referred to. A
reconsideration thereof having been denied, Gemperle interposed the present appeal.
Summons was personally served to Helen Schenker but not to Paul Schenker. Helen then filed an answer with a counterclaim, but Paul
Schenker filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person since admittedly, he is a Swiss
citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, and has not been actually served with summons in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Paul Schenker.

RULING: Yes, although as a rule, when the defendant is a non-resident and in an accion in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant can be acquired only through voluntary appearance or personal service of summons. But this case is an exception to the said
rule. The Supreme ratiocinated:

“We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to him upon
Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband aforementioned civil
case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her behest, in her aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs.
Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in
suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar, which is consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.”

Briefly, in an accion in personam where the defendant is a non-resident, substituted service of summons does not apply. However, by
way of exception, substituted service of summons may be effected, if the following requisites are present:

1. The summons is served to the spouse of the defendant

2.The spouse must be residing in the Philippines
3. The spouse is appointed as attorney-in-fact of the spouse defendant in a previous case involving the non-resident spouse.

October 19, 2007

Personal Action – Real Action – Extraterritorial Service

Cynthia Logarta and Teresa Tormis were the daughters of Luis Regner in his first marriage with Anicita Regner. Victoria Regner is the
second wife of Luis.

In 1999, Victoria alleged that Cynthia and Teresa with the help of another sibling defrauded Luis, who was then very ill and was unable to
write, into placing his thumbmark into a Deed of Donation. In said Deed, Luis purportedly donated a Proprietary Ownership Certificate
pertaining to membership shares in the Cebu Country Club. Victoria alleged that said Deed is void because the placing of thumbmark by
Luis was done without the latter’s free will and voluntariness considering his physical state; that it was done without Luis’s lawyer; that
the ratification made by Luis before he died is likewise void because of similar circumstances.

In the same year, Victoria filed a complaint to annul said deed with the RTC of Cebu. The sheriff could not deliver the summonses against
Cynthia and Teresa because apparently, although they are Filipinos, they are not residing here; they are residing in California. It was only
in the year 2000 that one of the summonses was served to one of the sisters, Teresa, when she came back to the Philippines.

Teresa immediately filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Victoria failed to prosecute her case for an unreasonable length of time.
Naturally, Victoria opposed the MTD. Teresa, in her rejoinder, alleged that the case should be dismissed because Cynthia, who is an
indispensable party, was not issued any summons, hence, since an indispensable party is not served with summons, without her who
has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter there can be no proper determination of the case. The trial court ruled in favor
of Teresa; this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of Victoria’s complaint is correct.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the arguments presented by Teresa. The Supreme Court also emphasized:
There are generally two types of actions: actions in rem and actions in personam. An action in personam is an action against a person on
the basis of his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person.
The certificate, subject of the donation, is a personal property. The action filed by Victoria is therefore a personal action. So in order for
the court to acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, summons must be served upon them. Further, the certificate is indivisible,
Cynthia’s and Teresa’s interests thereto can only be determined if both are summoned in court.

In personal actions, if the respondents are residents of the Philippines, they may be served summons in the following order:
1. Personal Service;
2. If (1) is not possible, Substituted Service;
3. If respondent can’t be found because he is abroad but still a resident of the Philippines, by publication with leave of court.
In personal actions still, if the respondents are non-residents, they may be served summons in the following manner:
1. Personal service through the Philippine embassy;
2. By publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or
3. in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

The above must be with leave of court.

In the case at bar, Cynthia was never served any summons in any of the manners authorized by the Rules of Court. The summons served
to Teresa cannot bind Cynthia. It is incumbent upon Victoria to compel the court to authorize the extraterritorial service of summons
against Cynthia. Her failure to do so for a long period of time constitutes a failure to prosecute on her part.

Ingeniurgesellschaft mbh and HEERS & BROCKSTEDT GMBH & CO., 435 SCRA 246, G.R. No. 159586, July 26, 2004

17. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY vs. HARRY J. TOMPKINS, 304 US 64, April 25, 1938

S.A., and THE VESSEL M/V "ESTELLA", G.R. Nos. 90306-06, July 30, 1990


20. In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased, A.W. FLUEMER vs. ANNIE COUSHING HIX, 54 Phil. 610, G.R. No. L-32636,
March 17, 1930

MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, 106 Phil. 997, G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960

their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii vs. HON. SANTIAGO
JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the ESTATE OF FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, through its court appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, namely:
Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005

23. SYLVESTER PENNOYER vs. MARCUS NEFF, 95 US 714, May 13, 1878


25. R. F. SHAFFER, et al. vs. ARNOLD HEITNER, 433 US 186, June 24, 1977

26. IDONAH SLADE PERKINS vs. MAMERTO ROXAS, ET AL., 72 Phil. 514, G.R. No. 47517, June 27, 1941