51. Navarro vs.

Villegas
31 SCRA 371

FACTS:
The petitioner has applied for a permit to conduct an assembly in Plaza Miranda during a
weekday. Respondent Mayor has offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative, guided by a lesson
gained from the events of the past few weeks. The Mayor appraised that a public rally at Plaza
Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more
imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as
an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing
such disorders.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent mayor violated Article 131 in not granting the petition to hold an
assembly in Plaza Miranda.

HELD:
Respondent Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public
safety and order; Respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for
peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would
not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has
further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda.

Article 131, RPC:

Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings. – The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who,
without legal ground, shall prohibit or interrupt the holding of a peaceful meeting; or shall
dissolve the same. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who
shall hinder any person from joining any lawful association or from attending any of its
meetings. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall
prohibit or hinder any person from addressing, either alone or together with others, any petition
to the authorities for the correction of abuses or redress of grievances.

52. Primicias vs. Fugoso [80 PHIL 71; L-18000. Jan 27, 1948]
Doctrine: Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression

FACTS:
This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of the
Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to compel
the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16,
1947. The petitioner requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting”. However, the respondent
refused to issue such permit because he found “that there is a reasonable ground to believe,
basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, especially on the part of the
losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly peace and
a disruption of public order.” Respondent based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927
prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any
public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with
other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public
Place.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating freedom
of assembly.

HELD:
The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights
of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not
absolute. They can be regulated under the state’s police power – that they should not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the community or
society. The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City
of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding
of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of
the City of Manila; and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine
or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by
overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second
construction since the first construction is tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the
use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be
validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.
It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places and not for the
assembly itself. The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down.
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free
speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The
fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to
justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

53. People vs. Reyes, et al.

C.A.-G.R. No. 13633-R, July 27, 1955

FACTS:
The Iglesia ni Cristo held a meeting at a public plaza after securing a permit to do so from the
mayor. The meeting started with some singing, after which the minister (Sanidad) of the sect read
from the Bible and then delivered a sermon, in the course of which he attacked the Catholic and
Aglipayan churches, as well as the women of San Esteban, Ilocos Sur. The Chief of Police
ordered his policemen to stop the minister. When the minister refused, the Chief of Police fired
two shots in the air which dispersed the crowd and stopped the meeting.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Chief of Police is liable under Article 132 (Interruption of religious worship)
of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:
The act of the Chief of Police is not a violation of Article 132 (Interruption of religious
worship), but of Article 131 (Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings).

Reyes Book II, page 78:

The Chief of Police who ordered the speaker in a public meeting of the Iglesia ni Cristo, then
attacking the Catholic and Aglipayan churches, to stop and fired two shots in the air which
dispersed the crowd and stopped the meeting, is liable under Article 131.

Article 131, RPC:

Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings. – The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who,
without legal ground, shall prohibit or interrupt the holding of a peaceful meeting, or shall
dissolve the same. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who
shall hinder any person from joining any lawful association or from attending any of its
meetings. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall
prohibit or hinder any person from addressing, either alone or together with others, any petition
to the authorities for the correction of abuses or redress of grievances.

Article 132, RPC:

Interruption of religious worship. – The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall prevent or disturb the
ceremonies or manifestations of any religion. If the crime shall have been committed with
violence or threats, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.

56. People vs. Baes

68 Phil. 203

FACTS:
Baes, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna, charged the accused
with an offense against religion for causing the funeral of a member of the “Church of Christ” to
pass through the churchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church, belonging to said church and
devoted to the religious worship thereof. The parish priest opposed this, but through force and
threats of physical violence by the accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through
the said churchyard.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act complained of is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, thereby violating Article 133 of the RPC.

HELD:
The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of
the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and a
trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively established, the court may
find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under
article 281 of the Revised Penal Code.

Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a
question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholic and not
those of other faithful ones. Laurel dissent: Offense to religious feelings should not be made to
depend upon the more or less broad or narrow conception of any given particular religion, but
should be gauged having in view the nature of the acts committed and after scrutiny of all the
facts and circumstance which should be viewed through the mirror of an unbiased judicial
criterion. Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of the offense would hinge on the subjective
characterization of the act from the point of view of a given religious denomination or sect, and
in such a case, the application of the law would be partial and arbitrary, withal, dangerous,
especially in a country said to be "once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution.”

Article 133, RPC:

Offending the religious feelings. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to
religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony, shall perform acts
notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.

58. People vs. Mandoriao

CA 51 OG 4619

Facts:
The Iglesis ni Cristo held a religious rally at a public place in Baguio. About 200 people attended
the meeting, about 50 of whom were members of the Iglesia ni Cristo but the rest were outsiders
and curious listeners. While Salvio, a minister of Iglesia ni Cristo, was expounding on his topic
to the effect that Christ is not God, but only a man, the crowd became unruly. Some people urged
Mandoriao to go up to the stage and have a debate with Salvio. Mandoriao however, was not able
to speak before the microphone because the wire connecting it was abruptly disconnected.

Issue:
Whether or not the meeting was a religious ceremony.

Held:
The meeting was not a religious ceremony. A religious meeting is an “assemblage of people
meeting for the purpose of performing acts of adoration to the Supreme Being, or to perform
religious services in recognition of God as an object of worship.” The meeting here was not
limited to the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. The supposed prayers and singing of hymns were
merely incidental because the principal object of the rally was to persuade new converts to their
religion. Assuming that the rally was a religious ceremony, the appellant cannot be said to have
performed acts or uttered words offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The act complained of
must be directed against a dogma or ritual, or upon an object of veneration. There was no object
of veneration at the meeting.
Reyes Book II, Page 80:
When the application of the Iglesia ni Cristo was to hold the meeting at a public place and the
permit expressly stated that the purpose was to hold a religious rally, what was held was on that
occasion was not a religious ceremony, even if a minister was then preaching (“that Jesus was
not God but only a man”). The rally was attended by persons who are not members of the sect.

Reyes Book II, Page 81:

Remarks that those who believed that Christ is God are anti-Christ, that all the members of the
Roman Catholic Church are marked by the demon, and that the Pope is the Commander of Satan
are notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.

65. Enrile vs Salazar

186 SCRA 217
June 5, 1990

Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand
R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup
attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in
Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern
Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.

Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an
offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second
clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?

Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot
be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes
were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be
imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000
and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder,
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could
not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to
him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed
in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed
as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed
charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition
for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating
its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction
to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke
that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by
reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the
trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are
entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once
bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with
this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

66. People v Geronimo

100 PHIL 90

Facts:
On June 24, 1954 a Federico Geronimo, et al. were charged with the complex crime of rebellion
with murders, robberies, and kidnapping. These are the ranking officers/ or members of CCP and
Huks. In the information it alleged 5 instances including an ambush on Mrs. Aurora Quezon’s
convoy on April 28, 1949 and ending on February 1954 where Geronimo killed Policarpio Tipay
a Barrio Lieutenant. He pleaded guilty to the accusation and the trial court found him guilty of
the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua. He appealed raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him
is not the complex crime of rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus punishable only by prision
mayor.

ISSUES:

Can rebellion be complexed with murder, robbery or kidnapping?

- No. Even if the crime is not committed in furtherance of rebellion, without political motivation,
the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed in rebellion.
- According to the Hernandez resolution; the complexing of rebellion will lead to undesirable
results.
- It cannot be taken with rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and
intent would be unrelated to each other. He would be held liable for separate crimes, and these
cannot be merged into a juridical whole.
HELD:

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for
the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and
also for the crime of murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the
accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and
to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal
Code) for the rebellion and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of
reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay
the costs.

68. U.S. vs. Abad

1 PHIL 437

Facts:
Maximo Abad was charged with violation of oath of allegiance when he denied to an officer of
the United States Army the existence of certain rifles at the time of his surrender in April 1901
when in fact, he was aware of the existence
and whereabouts of such rifles. Section 14 of Article 292 of the United States Philippine
Commission states that: "Any person who shall have taken any oath before any military officer under
the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands, whether such official so administering the oath
was specially authorized by law so to do or not, in which oath the affiant is substance engaged to
recognize or accept the supreme authority of the United States of America in these Islands or to
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto or to obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated
by its duly constituted authorities and who shall, after the passage of this act, violate the terms and
provisions of such oath or any of such terms or provisions, shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both."

Abad is a former insurgent officer and is entitled to the benefit of theproclamation of amnesty if the
offense is one of those to which the proclamation applies. The denying of the whereabouts of the rifles
can be considered an act of treason, as being an act of adhering to the enemies of the United
States, giving them aid and comfort, the offense in this particular case might, perhaps, be held to be covered
by the amnesty as being, in substance, treason though prosecuted under another name.

Treason is defined in section 1 of Act No. 292 to consist in levying war against the United States or the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within
the Philippine Islands or else here. Sedition is defined in section 5 of the same act as the rising publicly and
tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods certain enumerated objects of a
political character.
Issue:

Whether or not the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance fall under the category of “treason
and sedition.”

Held:
Yes.

Ratio:
The offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, being one of the political offenses defined in Act
No. 292, is included in the general words "treason and sedition," as used in the amnesty proclamation of
July 4, 1902.

The offenses listed in Act No. 292 include: treason, misprision of treason, insurrection, conspiracy to commit
treason or insurrection, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, seditious words and libels, the
formation of secret political societies, and violation of oaths of allegiance. When the framer of
the proclamation used the words "treason and sedition" to describe the purely political offenses covered by
the amnesty, we think it was his intention, without specially enumerating the political offenses defined in
Act No. 292, to include them all under the terms “treason and sedition.”

Ruling:
The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the proclamation of amnesty, and upon filing in
the court the prescribed oath the cause will be returned to the court below with directions that he
be discharged.

73. Espuelas vs People

90 PHIL 524
December 17, 1951

Facts:
On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar
Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at
the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was
merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of
same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other
local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for
their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a
fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of
which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the
situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President
Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with
many Hitlers and Mussolinis.
Issue:

Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the
Government of the Philippines?

Held:

Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to
the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written by the accused,
cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The
infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide
and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating
language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of
free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only
President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the
Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas
people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority
of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On
this score alone the conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir
up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may
seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent
to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other
than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their
minds.