Mandanas v. Ochoa, Jr.
of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or
G.R. No. 199802; G.R. No. 208488; July 3, 2018
En Banc, Bersamin, J.
The petitioners hereby challenge the manner in which
the just share in the national taxes of the local government
units (LGUs) has been computed.
This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus assailing the manner the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for FY 2012 computed the IRA for the
LGUs. Certain collections of NIRTs by the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) — specifically: excise taxes, value added taxes (VATs)
and documentary stamp taxes (DSTs) — have not been
included in the base amounts for the computation of the IRA.
The procedural issue is the propriety of the remedy of
mandamus in violation of doctrine of separation of powers.
The substantive issue is whether Section 284 of the
LGC is unconstitutional for being repugnant to Section 6, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution.
Sec. 6, Art. X, 1987 Constitution.
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them.
Sec. 284, Local Government Code. Allotment of Internal
Revenue Taxes.
Local government units shall have a share in the national
internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third
fiscal year preceding the current Gscal year as follows:
• xxx
Sec. 21, National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
Sources of Revenue.
The following taxes, fees and charges are deemed to be
national internal revenue taxes:
a) Income tax;
b) Estate and donor's taxes;
c) Value-added tax;
d) Other percentage taxes;
e) Excise taxes;
f) Documentary stamp taxes; and
g) Such other taxes as are or hereafter may be imposed
and collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Section 286, Local Government Code. Automatic Release
of Shares.
(a) The share of each local government unit shall be released,
without need of any further action, directly to the
provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case
may be, on a quarterly basis within Gve (5) days after the end
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holdback that may be imposed by the National Government for
whatever purpose. x x x
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
Mandamus Improper Remedy
• Mandamus only lies to compel a ministerial act. The
burden of proof is on the mandamus petitioner to
show that he is entitled to the performance of a legal
right, and that the respondent has a corresponding
duty to perform the act.
• Determination of what constitutes the just share of
the LGUs in the national taxes under the 1987
Constitution is an entirely discretionary power. The
discretion of Congress thereon, being exclusive, is not
subject to external direction; otherwise, the delicate
balance underlying our system of government may be
unduly disturbed. (VIOLATION OF DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS)
HOWEVER, the allegations of the petition shows that this is also
a Petition for Certiorari:
• The petition, while dubbed as a petition for
mandamus, is also a petition for certiorari because it
alleges that Congress thereby committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
o That the non-release of some portions of
their IRA balances is due to alleged
congressional indiscretion — the diminution
of the base amount for computing the LGU's
just share. The insertion by Congress of the
words internal revenue in the phrase national
taxes.
• The actual nature of every action is determined by the
allegations in the body of the pleading or the
complaint itself, not by the nomenclature used to
designate the same. Moreover, neither should the
prayer for relief be controlling; hence, the courts may
still grant the proper relief as the facts alleged in the
pleadings and the evidence introduced may warrant
even without a prayer for specific remedy.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
(1) Section 284 of the LGC deviates from the plain
language of Section 6 of Article X of the 1987
Constitution
• The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted
in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than
the term national taxes written in Section 6. Verba
legis non est recedendum (from the words of a statute
there should be no departure).
• According to Garcia v. Executive Secretary, customs
duties is the nomenclature given to taxes imposed on
the importation and exportation of commodities and
merchandise to or from a foreign country. Although
customs duties have either or both the generation of
revenue and the regulation of economic or social
activity as their moving purposes, it is often difficult
to say which of the two is the principal objective in a
 particular instance, for, verily, customs duties, much
like internal revenue taxes, are rarely designed to
achieve only one policy objective.
• Strictly speaking, customs duties are also taxes
because they are exactions whose proceeds become
public funds.
• Further, Section 102 (oo) of R.A. No. 10863 (Customs
Modernization and Tariff Act) expressly includes all
fees and charges imposed under the Act under the
blanket term of taxes.
(2) Congress can validly exclude taxes that will
constitute the base amount for the computation of the
IRA only if a Constitutional provision allows such
exclusion
• Although it has the primary discretion to determine
and fix the just share of the LGUs in the national
taxes, Congress cannot disobey the express mandate
of the Constitution for the just share of the LGUs to
be derived from the national taxes.
• The phrase as determined by law in Section 6 follows
and qualifies the phrase just share, and cannot be
construed as qualifying the succeeding phrase in the
national taxes. The intent of the people in respect of
Section 6 is really that the base for reckoning the just
share of the LGUs should includes all national taxes.
• To read Section 6 differently as requiring that the just
share of LGUs in the national taxes shall be
determined by law is tantamount to the unauthorized
revision of the Constitution.
The national taxes to be included in the base for
computing the just share the LGUs shall henceforth be,
but shall not be limited to, the following:
1. The NIRTs enumerated in Section 21 of the NIRC, as
amended, to be inclusive of the VATs, excise taxes, and
DSTs collected by the BIR and the BOC, and their
deputized agents;
2. Tariff and customs duties collected by the BOC;
3. 50% of the VATs collected in the ARMM, and 30% of all
other national taxes collected in the ARMM; the remaining
50% of the VATs and 70% of the collections of the other
national taxes in the ARMM shall be the exclusive share of
the ARMM pursuant to Section 9 and Section 15 of R.A. No.
9054;
4. 60% of the national taxes collected from the exploitation
and development of the national wealth; the remaining
40% will exclusively accrue to the host LGUs pursuant to
Section 290 of the LGC;
5. 85% of the excise taxes collected from locally
manufactured Virginia and other tobacco products; the
remaining 15% shall accrue to the special purpose funds
pursuant created in R.A. No. 7171 and R.A. No. 7227;
6. The entire 50% of the national taxes collected under
Section 106, Section 108 and Section 116 of the NIRC in
excess of the increase in collections for the immediately
preceding year; and
7. 5% of the franchise taxes in favor of the national
government paid by franchise holders in accordance with
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6631 and Section 8 of R.A. No. 6632.
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Excluded in the base for computing the just share
• Proceeds do not come from a tax, fee or exaction
imposed on the sale and conversion:
o Share of the affected LGUs in the proceeds of
the sale and conversion of the former military
bases pursuant to R.A. No. 7227.
• Conforms to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as money collected on any tax levied for
a special purpose:
o Excise taxes imposed on: (1) locally
manufactured Virginia tobacco products; (2)
the share of the affected LGUs in incremental
revenues from Burley and native tobacco
products; (3) the share of the COA in the
NIRTs; and (4) the share of the host LGUs in
the franchise taxes paid by the Manila Jockey
Club, Inc., and Philippine Racing Club, Inc.
o Same is true for the franchise taxes
o paid under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6631 and
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6632, inasmuch as
certain percentages of the franchise taxes go
to different beneficiaries
• Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution allows
affected LGUs to have an equitable share in the
proceeds of the utilization of the nation's national
wealth "within their respective areas.
o Exclusion of the share of the different LGUs
in the excise taxes imposed on mineral
products pursuant to Section 287 of the NIRC
in relation to Section 290.
• Properly excluded for such taxes are intended to truly
enable a sustainable and feasible autonomous region
as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution.
o NIRTs collected by the provinces and cities
within the ARMM whose portions are
distributed to the ARMM's provincial, city and
regional governments.
PAYMENT OF THE ARREARS OF THE LGUS' JUST SHARE
CANNOT BE GRANTED
• The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence
of the law or executive act prior to the determination
of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that cannot always be erased,
ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void
law or executive act but sustains its effects. It
provides an exception to the general rule that a void
or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF THE LGUS' JUST SHARE IN THE
NATIONAL TAXES
• The 1987 Constitution is forthright and unequivocal in
ordering that the just share of the LGUs in the national
taxes shall be automatically released to them. With
Congress having established the just share through
the LGC, it seems to be beyond debate that the
inclusion of the just share of the LGUs in the annual
GAAs is unnecessary, if not superfluous. Hence, the
just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall be
released to them without need of yearly appropriation.
 • Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
commands that the just share of the LGUs in national
taxes shall be automatically released to them. The
term automatic connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory; and, in the context of
this case, the LGUs are not required to perform any
act or thing in order to receive their just share in the
national taxes.
• This is because Congress not only already determined
the just share through the LGC's fixing the percentage
of the collections of the NIRTs to constitute such fair
share, but also explicitly authorized such just share to
be "automatically released" to the LGUs in the
proportions and regularity set under Section 285 of
the LGC without need of annual appropriation. To
operationalize the automatic release without need of
appropriation, Section 286 of the LGC clearly
provides that the automatic release of the just share
directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
treasurer, as the case may be, shall be "without
need of any further action.”
• As compared to the provisions of the 1987
Constitution on Judiciary, Constitutional Commisions,
Ombudsman, and the Commission on Human rights
which shares to aspects: The first relates to the grant
of fiscal autonomy, and the second concerns the
automatic release of funds. The common denominator
of the provisions is that the automatic release of the
appropriated amounts is predicated on the approval
of the annual appropriations of the offices or
agencies concerned.
DISCUSSION IN THE MAIN DECISION
Local Autonomy
• One of the key features of the 1987 Constitution is its
push towards decentralization of government and
local autonomy.
• Local autonomy has two facets, the administrative
and the fiscal.
o Fiscal autonomy means that local
governments have the power to create their
own sources of revenue in addition to their
equitable share in the national taxes released
by the National Government, as well as the
power to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities.
o Such autonomy is as indispensable to the
viability of the policy of decentralization as
the other.
(A) Basic Principles underlying our System of Local
Government
• Municipal corporations are now commonly known as
local governments. They are the bodies politic
established by law partly as agencies of the State to
assist in the civil governance of the country. Their
chief purpose has been to regulate and administer the
local and internal affairs of the cities, municipalities or
districts.
• Municipal corporations, being the mere creatures of
the State, are subject to the will of Congress, their
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creator. Their continued existence and the grant of
their powers are dependent on the discretion of
Congress.
(a1) Modified Dillons Rule (Merriam v. Moody’s
Executors)
A municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the
following powers and no others:
• (1) those granted in express words;
• (2) those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to
the powers expressly granted;
• (3) those essential to the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient but
indispensible;
• (4) any fair, reasonable, doubt as to the existence of
a power is resolved by the courts against the
corporation against the existence of the powers.
(a2) Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.
• Municipal governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as
the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter.
• Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive
their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It
breathes into them the breath of life, without which
they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As
it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless
there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature might, by a single act, and if we can
suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a
wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
corporations in the State, and the corporation could
not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right
so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned.
They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of
the legislature.
• This basic relationship between the national
legislature and the local government units has not
been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy. True, there are certain notable innovations
in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the
local government units of the power to tax, which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and
large, however, the national legislature is still the
principal of the local government units, which cannot
defy its will or modify or violate it.
(a3) Sec. 5 (a) LGC (Tempered the Application of Dillon’s
Rule)
• Any provision on a power of a local government unit
shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case
of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in
favor of devolution of powers and of the local
government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to
the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor
of the local government unit concerned;

(B) Extent of the Autonomy granted to the LGUs by the
1987 Constitution
• The 1987 Constitution limits Congress' control over
the LGUs by ordaining in Section 25 of its Article II
that: "The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments." The autonomy of the LGUs as thereby
ensured does not contemplate the fragmentation of
the Philippines into a collection of mini-states, or the
creation of imperium in imperio.
• The constitutional mandate to ensure local autonomy
refers to decentralization.
• Decentralization of Power
o Involves the abdication of political power in
favor of the autonomous LGUs as to grant
them the freedom to chart their own
destinies and to shape their futures with
minimum intervention from the central
government.
o This amounts to self-immolation because the
autonomous LGUs thereby become
accountable not to the central authorities but
to their constituencies.
• Decentralization of Administration
o Occurs when the central government
delegates administrative powers to the LGUs
as the means of broadening the base of
governmental powers and of making the
LGUs more responsive and accountable in
the process, and thereby ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and
more effective partners in the pursuit of the
goals of national development and social
progress. This form of decentralization
further relieves the central government of
the burden of managing local affairs so that
it can concentrate on national concerns.
Decentralization of Power in the Philippines
• The decentralization of power has been given to the
regional units (namely, the Autonomous Region for
Muslim Mindanao [ARMM] and the constitutionally-
mandated Cordillera Autonomous Region [CAR]).
• This aims to permit determinate groups with common
traditions and shared social-cultural characteristics to
freely develop their ways of life and heritage, to
exercise their rights, and to be in charge of their own
affairs through the establishment of a special
governance regime for certain member communities
who choose their own authorities from within
themselves, and exercise the jurisdictional authority
legally accorded to them to decide their internal
community affairs.
Decentralization of Administration in the Philippines
• LGUs (i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays) enjoy the decentralization of
administration to make governance at the local levels
more directly responsive and effective.
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• In turn, the economic, political and social
developments of the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and
development.
• It is not unlimited but involves only the powers
enumerated by Section 20, Article X of the 1987
Constitution and by the acts of Congress.
Decentralization under Sec. 3 of the LGC
Based on the delineation of the operative principles of
decentralization under Sec. 3, decentralization can be
considered as the decision by the central government to
empower its subordinates, whether geographically or
functionally constituted, to exercise authority in certain areas.
It involves decision-making by subnational units, and is
typically a delegated power, whereby a larger government
chooses to delegate authority to more local governments. It is
also a process, being the set of policies, electoral or
constitutional reforms that transfer responsibilities, resources
or authority from the higher to the lower levels of government.
It is often viewed as a shift of authority towards local
governments and away from the central government, with total
government authority over society and economy imagined as
fixed.
As a system of transferring authority and power from
the National Government to the LGUs, decentralization
in the Philippines may be categorized into four, namely:
(1) Political decentralization or devolution;
(2) Administrative decentralization or deconcentration;
(3) Fiscal decentralization; and
(4) Policy or decision-making decentralization.
Political decentralization or devolution
• occurs when there is a transfer of powers,
responsibilities, and resources from the central
government to the LGUs for the performance of
certain functions.
• It is a more liberal form of decentralization because
there is an actual transfer of powers and
responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy to
the LGUs in cognizance of their right to self-
government, to make them self-reliant, and to
improve their administrative and technical
capabilities.
• Section 16 to Section 19 of the LGC characterize
political decentralization in the LGC as different LGUs
empowered to address the different needs of their
constituents. In contrast, devolution in favor of the
regional units is more expansive because they are
given the authority to regulate a wider array of
subjects, including personal, family and property
relations.
Administrative decentralization or deconcentration

• involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of

authority and responsibility from the national office to
the regional and local offices.
• Consistent with this concept, the LGC has created the
Local School Boards, the Local Health Boards and the
Local Development Councils, and has transferred
some of the authority from the agencies of the
National Government, like the Department of
Education and the Department of Health, to such
bodies to better cope up with the needs of particular
localities.

Fiscal decentralization

• means that the LGUs have the power to create their

own sources of revenue in addition to their just share
in the national taxes released by the National
Government.
• It includes the power to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities.
• Fiscal decentralization emanates from a specific
constitutional mandate that is expressed in several
provisions of Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
specifically: Section 5; Section 6; and Section 7.
• Fiscal decentralization under the Constitution been
formalized from Section 128 to Section 133 of the
LGC. To implement the LGUs' entitlement to the just
share in the national taxes, Congress has enacted
Section 284 to Section 288 of the LGC. Congress has
further enacted Section 289 to Section 294 of the LGC
to define the share of the LGUs in the national wealth.
• This is limited by Congress in subjecting the LGUs'
power to tax to the guidelines set in Section 130 of
the LGC and to the limitations stated in Section 133
of the LGC. The concept of local fiscal autonomy does
not exclude any manner of intervention by the
National Government in the form of supervision if only
to ensure that the local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with the national goals.

Policy- or decision-making decentralization

• exists if at least one subnational tier of government

has exclusive authority to make decisions on at least
one policy issue.

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Borja vs Comelec

Facts: Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988
for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by
operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was
elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27,
1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought
Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor
for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for
another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but
the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for
mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of
law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that
office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held: No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is
not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor
in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term
but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full
term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased
mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is
more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be
counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the
people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution
reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned
with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by
reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to
unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. (Borja
vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)

Facts: Jose Capco Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros in the 1988 election. On
September 2, 1989 he became mayor, by operation of law upon the death of the
incumbent mayor. He was elected for mayor in the 1992 election and was re-elected in
the 1995 election. He filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor relative to the upcoming
1998 elections. Petitioner who was a candidate for mayor sought the disqualification of
Jose Capco Jr. on the ground of the three-term limit rule under the constitution and local
government code.
Capco got the majority of votes and was proclaimed as mayor of Pateros.

Issue: Whether or not Capco Jr. is eligible to run for mayor.

Ruling: Yes, the three-term limit for elective local official refers to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. In relation to this it is not
enough that a person has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position. Therefore, the succession by
operation of law by Capco does not count as a term in counting the three-term limit rule.

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Carpo, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on
January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became
mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next
two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Carpo filed a certificate of candidacy for
mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja,
Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Carpo’s disqualification on the
theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms
by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
COMELEC ruled in favour of petitioner and declared private respondent Carpo
saying that “In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term
limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no
reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected.” Carpo won the
election case against Borja. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be
considered as having served the term for the purpose of the three-term limit under the
Constitution.

Held: No. The court held that when Carpo occupied the post of the Mayor upon the
incumbent’s death and served for remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as
having served a full term as contemplated under the three term limit. The term he
served must be one for which he was elected. Furthermore, before assuming the
position of Mayor, he served first as a Vice Mayor and the duties and responsibilities of
the two positions are wholly different from each other.
Adormeo vs. Commission on Elections

FACTS: Petition for certiorari on COMELEC ruling that qualifies Ramon Talaga to run
for mayor
• Petitioner (Raymundo Adormeo) and privae respondent (Ramon Talaga) were
the only ones who filed for candidacy for mayor in Lucena city on the elections to
be held on 9 May 2001.
• Talaga served to consecutive terms (1992-1998). He was defeated in the 1998
elections to Bernard Tagarao but he won the recall elections in 12 May 2000 and
served the unexpired term until 30 june 2001.
• Adormeo filed a petition to deny due course and cancel certificate of candidacy to
Talaga for it is violative of Sec 8 Art. X of 1987 Constitution.
o Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected (emphasis mine).
• 20 April 2001 – COMELEC 1st division disqualified Talaga for having served 3
consecutive terms.
• 27 April 2001 – Talaga filed motion for reconsideration stating that he did not
serve 3 consecutive terms of office which must amount to nine consecutive
years.
• 2 May 2001 – Adormeo filed opposition to motion saying serving an unexpired
term counts as serving a full term.
• 9 May 2001 – COMELEC en banc ruled the disqualification must be lifted
because of he was not elected for three terms
o He was only installed as mayor because of the recall elections
o His loss in 1998 did not count in the 3 term rule
o He did not fully serve 3 terms

ISSUES: Whether or not Talaga was disqualified to run for mayor or Lucena city

HELD: NO. Sec. 8 Art X of the 1987 constitution clearly states that a person must have
served three consecutive terms in office. It cited Borja jr vs COMELEC where the Court
ruled that an official must have served and must have been ELECTED for three
consecutive times. The court highlights the last sentence of sec. 8 which states that
voluntary renunciation does not count as interruption. Talaga’s loss in the 1998
elections does not count as voluntary renunciation. He was removed from office
because of an expiring term and an electoral defeat. He did not serve a full ELECTED
term. Wherefore the petition is denied.
Petition:Consolidated petitions for certiorari[1] seeking the reversal of the
resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (�COMELEC� for brevity) in
relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
Ruling: The petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED.
The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on September 24, 2002
enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa
in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is lifted.

FACTS:
G.R. No. 154512

Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated August
14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC) which gave due course to the Recall Resolution
and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.

Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the
Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal
infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall
Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt
the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally
deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral
mandate from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was
exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were
conducted in a manner that violated his and the public�s constitutional right to
information.

G.R. No. 154683

Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673
dated August 21, 2002 insofar as it fixed the recall election on September 7,
2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He prayed that the
COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and that
a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days to
campaign.

In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the COMELEC
from implementing Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the date of the recall
election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the COMELEC to give the
candidates an additional fifteen 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to
campaign.

Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708
giving the candidates an additional 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to
campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to September 24, 2002.

G.R. Nos. 155083-84

Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC�s resolutions dated
September 20, 2002 and September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 declaring
Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They likewise prayed
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of
the winning candidate in the recall election.

Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding
Hagedorn�s qualification to run for mayor in the recall election despite the
constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for
elective local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to desist
from proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall election until further orders
from the Court. Petitioners were required to post a P20,000 bond.

On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached
petition for intervention seeking the same reliefs as those sought by Adovo, Gilo
and Ollave.

In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall
election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained
17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.

Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming
the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office to give effect to the will
of the electorate.

On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates� motion for leave to file a
petition for intervention.

ISSUES: 1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall
election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.

2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the

recall election of Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.

In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in fixing a campaign period of only 10 days has become moot. Our
Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an
additional 15 days for the campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.

HELD:
First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.

Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members
and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. The COMELEC, however,
found that �

�On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of
incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the convening of
the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government
Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA.
Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said notices were attached to the
Petition and marked as Annex �G� of Volumes II and III of the Petition.

Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay

Hall. Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the
following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective officials, print and
broadcast media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional and national
officials, and DILG officials].
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the
competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently
erroneous. hus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall
election on September 24, 2002.

Second Issue: Hagedorn�s qualification to run for mayor

In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002
recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:

1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three

consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;

2. Hagedorn�s continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from

June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen;

3. Hagedorn�s recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made
to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually
the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and

4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to
the right of the electorate to choose their leaders.
Latasa vs. Comelec
Facts: Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor
of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in
the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In
February 2001, he filed his certificate of
candidacy for city mayor for the 2001
elections. He stated therein that he is eligible
therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had
already served for three consecutive terms
as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is
now running for the first time for the position
of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the
said elections, filed before the COMELEC a
petition to deny petitioner's candidacy since
the latter had already been elected and
served for three consecutive terms.
Petitioner countered that this fact does not
bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy
for the 2001 elections since this will be the
first time that he will be running for the post
of city mayor.
The Comelec’s First Division denied
petitioner's certificate of candidacy.
However, his motion for reconsideration was
not acted upon by the Comelec en banc
before election day and he was proclaimed
winner. Only after the proclamation did the
Comelec en banc issue a resolution that
declared him disqualified from running for
mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all
votes cast in his favor should not be
counted.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when
Digos was converted from a municipality to a
city, it attained a different juridical personality
separate from the municipality of Digos. So
when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
city mayor, it should not be construed as
vying for the same local government post.
Issue: Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as
candidate for the position of mayor of the
newly-created City of Digos immediately
after he served for three consecutive terms
as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
Held: As a rule, in a representative
democracy, the people should be allowed
freely to choose those who will govern them.
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an
exception to this rule, in that it limits the
range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not
barred from running again in for same local
government post, unless two conditions
concur: 1.) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms to
the same local government post, and 2.) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate
existence separate and distinct from that of
the municipality. This does not mean,
however, that for the purpose of applying the
subject Constitutional provision, the office of
the municipal mayor would now be construed
as a different local government post as that
of the office of the city mayor. As stated
earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Digos is the same as that of the municipality.
Consequently, the inhabitants of
municipality are the same as those in the city.
These inhabitants are the same group of
voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be
their municipal mayor for three consecutive
terms. These are also the same inhabitants
over whom he held power and authority as
their chief executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically
included an exception to the peoples
freedom to choose those who will govern
them in order to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of
a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow
petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city
mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor
would obviously defeat the very intent of the
framers when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the City of
Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the
same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants
for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This
is the very scenario sought to be avoided by
the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.(Latasa
vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, 10
December 2003)
the Note: It cannot be denied that the Court has
previously held in Mamba-Perez v.
COMELEC that after an elective official has
been proclaimed as winner of the elections,
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass
upon his qualifications. An opposing party's
remedies after proclamation would be to file
a petition for quo warranto within ten days
after the proclamation. Time and again, this
Court has held that rules of procedure are
only tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that when rigid
application of the rules tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, this
Court is empowered to suspend their
operation. We will not hesitate to set aside
technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.