Funa v.

Ermita On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was

Power of Appointment [6/9] appointed Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties and

responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.

Facts: Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987

prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of Constitution .

preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial
respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) inquiry are not present in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual
of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA). controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the appointment of

On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and

respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport,

Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). which rendered the present petition moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer

On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is likewise

Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is nothing left to
Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC enjoin.
Undersecretary.

On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, Issue: W/N the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA,

concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to

constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription

the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and

and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment. assistants.

Held:
The petition is meritorious. any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any

franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,

Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled

against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in

or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned the conduct of their office.

citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal

act by public officials. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil

degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as

controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,

would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction including government-owned or controlled corporations and their

over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. But even in cases where subsidiaries.

supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to

resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:

principles to guide the bench, bar, and public. In the present case, the Sec. 7. x x x

mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no

appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the

Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is

deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, all-embracing, the disqualification was held to be absolute, as the holding of

hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during "any other office" is not qualified by the phrase "in the Government" unlike in

said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in Section 13, Article VI prohibiting Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives from holding "any other office or employment in the
Government"; and when compared with other officials and employees such
as members of the armed forces and civil service employees, we concluded
thus:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his
official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil
service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of
the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by
itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold
other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such
is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or
employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this
prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of
Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended
to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the
constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive
and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President
being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article
VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2)
and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of
the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she
was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7,
paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the
primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA
in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties
Union.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma.
Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime
Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting

Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the

for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and person named.

therefore, NULL and VOID.

Funa v. Agra

Note:
Power of Appointment [7/9]
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with
the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M.
When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in
Macapagal Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice
security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie
because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as
Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent
where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman
capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a
of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under
concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the
the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the
constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming
Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while
during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty.
designation is legislative in nature.
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it
Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra
likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office.
renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January
That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is
12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President
merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the
Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor
office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned

that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict

Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile of interest in the conduct of their office.

tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in

Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished his A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article

position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the

Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his
Acting Solicitor General. Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding the two offices
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.

Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his

Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional.
position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered

Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be

13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz: differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or

employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and Constitution has not otherwise so provided.

their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this

Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary

shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the

participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the

in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in government-owned or government
controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent designations were

means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and still subject to the conditions under the latter constitutional provision. In this

administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual regard, the Court aptly pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:

discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of

Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an

the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple appointive official to hold more than one office only if “allowed by law or by

offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all the primary functions of his position.” In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this

appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a government official

without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as

the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically long as there is no incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether

the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v. Green –

deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the veritable whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has

floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of the right to interfere with the other.

officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the Presidents

Funa v. COA
power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet

Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of

Power of Appointment [8/9]
government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled
corporations.
FACTS:

Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar

It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor
as Chairman of the COA.
General, was not covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra,

due to such position being merely vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3,
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth
Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered by the general
year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman
of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008,
Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly
thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in
the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as
COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar,
in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists
that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years
which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such
chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008
when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February
22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to
step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his
word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III
named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This
development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan
and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the
requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least
four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo
namely:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount
public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the
following requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act
obtain in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and
must be the very litis mota of the case
ISSUES:
W/N Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and
after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA
commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the
circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
HELD: The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be

Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that: appointed by the President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another

President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a

seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being

shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served

commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either

vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is

In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or to prevent the president from “dominating” the Commission by allowing him
acting capacity. to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.

Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional

Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has

point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence

(commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any vacancy shall be only

(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such
ab initio. promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the

rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such

The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the

the word “reappointment” as, in context, embracing any and all species of term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not

appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the

plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

without attempted interpretation.

In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office

a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who
made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions. serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as

chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full

appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve

term––from February 2008 to February 2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.

COA commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court.

While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution,

“reappointment,” there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case viz:

can one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of

both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view 1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions,
would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of
would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
rotational system of succession. appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing

authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system

any circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year prescribed by the Constitution.

appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of

the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term 2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion
would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than
breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so
the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid 5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a
down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). temporary or acting capacity.

3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were Betoy v BoA
appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are

barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the

Power of Appointment [9/9]
first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by
the prohibition against reappointment.
FACTS:

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than
On June 8, 2001, RA 9136 (EPIRA) was enacted by Congress with the goal of
seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the
restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the
unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is
National Power Corporation. On February 27, 2002, pursuant to Section 77 of
not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate
the EPIRA, the Secretary of the Department of Energy promulgated the IRR.
period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of

the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided
Section 63 of the EPIRA provides for separation benefits to officials and
further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death,
employees who would be affected by the restructuring of the electric power
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
industry and the privatization of the assets of the NPC. Rule 33 of the IRR
“reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and
provided for the coverage and the guidelines for the separation benefits to
the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman).
be given to the employees affected.
On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different

position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new

Petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with thousands of his co-employees from
appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment
the NPC were then terminated. He then filed a petition questioning his
barred under the Constitution.
termination, and together with it the validity of the EPIRA, in particular Section
34 of EPIRA for being exorbitant display of State Power and was not premised
on the welfare of the people.
ISSUE: Is the universal charge under Section 34 of the EPIRA, a tax or an
exaction in the exercise of the State’s police power?
RULING:
In Gerochi vs. Department of Energy, the Court ruled that the Universal
Charge is not a tax but an exaction in the exercise of the State’s police power.
The Universal Charge is imposed to ensure the viability of the country’s electric
power industry.
Petitioner argues that the imposition of a universal charge to address the
stranded debts and contract made by the government through the NCC-IPP
contracts or Power Utility-IPP contracts or simply the bilateral agreements or
contracts is an added burden to the electricity-consuming public on their
monthly power bills. It would mean that the electricity-consuming public will
suffer in carrying this burden for the errors committed by those in power who
runs the affairs of the State. This is an exorbitant display of State Power at the
expense of its people.
It is basic that the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive
oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves a question of
fact and, thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same.
Barrioquinto v. Fernandez
Executive Clemency [1/6]
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made
during the war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because
Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life
imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the
defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants
amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized
under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the
proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well. However,
Commissioner Fernandez of the 14thAmnesty Commission refused to process
the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to
the crime as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain
Tolentino was the one who committed the crime being charged to them.
ISSUE: Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
HELD: Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes

must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say

take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the President with that “invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of

the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should confession and avoidance.” Although the accused does not confess the

take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty

is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he

offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged,

and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party,

offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the

convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the

does “nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the

suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,” enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to

and it “in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity be “regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to

imposed upon him by the sentence” (art 36, RPC). While amnesty looks the nation,” or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty

backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as

overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the

released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases

committed no offense. coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by

the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is
shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non,

admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, Vera v. People
and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either
Executive Clemency [2/6] Issue:

Should persons invoking the benefit of amnesty first admit having committed
Facts:
the crime of which they were accused?

Vera and 96 others were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with

murder before CFI of Quezon. They invoked the benefits of the Amnesty Held:
Proclamation No. 8 of the President; thus, the case was referred to the 8th

Guerilla Amnesty Commission which tried the case. During the hearing, none Yes. It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness
of the petitioners admitted having committed the crime. Vera was the only for an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty
one who took the witness stand and denied having killed Lozanes. presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains
The Commission said it could not take cognizance of the case because the that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty.
benefits of amnesty could only be invoked by defendants in a criminal case Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it
who, admitting commission of the crime, plead that the said crime was is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The
committed in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance,
against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but
occupation. The Commission ordered that the case be remanded to disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved,
the court of origin for trial. would being the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty

proclamation.
The CA affirmed the decision of the Commission. Vera appealed to the SC,

contending that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation it is Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez and the other cases cited by petitioner were
not necessary for them to admit the commission of the crime charged, citing superseded and deemed overruled by the subsequent cases of People v.
the case of Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, etc.
Llanita, et al. (L-2082, April 26, 1950, 86 Phil. 219) and People v. Guillermo, et al.

(L-2188, May 18, 1950, 86 Phil. 395).