Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Submitted by:
Submitted to:
Prince Arshdeep Singh
Dr. Pushpinder Gill
Wander
152/15
B.Com LL.B (Hons.)
Section C
PREFACE
The topic for my presentation is ‘Right to Private Defence.’ I am very thankful to my Criminal
Law Professor Dr. Pushpinder Gill for providing me with an opportunity to prepare my project
on such an intriguing topic. I humbly believe the right to private defence is one of the most
important rights that are available to the citizens of our country, under the Indian Penal Code,
1860, for the simple reason that the law enforcement authorities cannot be expected to be
omnipresent. The beauty of these rights is that the right to private defence is not available
exclusively to a person for the protection of his own body or property, but it can be exercised
for protection of body and property of other people as well. The law does not expect a man to
be a coward and run away when his life or someone else’s life is in peril. I thoroughly enjoyed
the preparation of this project. For the preparation, I consulted various books and accessed
various legal websites. The same have been mentioned in the respective footnotes.
I would like to take this opportunity to extend my hearties thanks to Dr. Pushpinder Gill,
without whose guidance this project could not have been completed. A special mention to my
colleagues is also a must, as they were available for help at all times whenever I required.
In the preparation of this project, some errors, might have crept in, either unknowingly or due
to my lack of knowledge. Apologies are sought for the same.
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Contents
Preface........................................................................................................................................ 1
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................... 4
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 7
Trespass of Land............................................................................................................... 11
98. Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind, etc. ................... 12
100. When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death..................... 16
101. When such right extends to causing any harm other than death .................................. 20
102. Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of the body. ............ 20
103. When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death. .................... 21
104. When such right extends to causing any harm other than death. ................................. 22
105. Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of property. ............ 24
106. Right of private defence against deadly assault when there is risk of harm to innocent
.............................................................................................................................................. 25
Person — .............................................................................................................................. 25
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Recent Case Laws .................................................................................................................... 26
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 30
bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 32
Webliography........................................................................................................................... 32
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
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11. Jograj Mahto AIR 1940 Pat. 696. 14
(1924) 25 Cr LJ 670.
19. Nand Lal Kishore Case 19
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Public Prosecuter vs 1973 CriLJ 1238
23. 15
Suryanarayan
1973 Cr LJ 1686
State of Orissa v. Rabindranath
28. (Orissa) (FB) 12
Dalai & Another
30. State v. Sidhnath Rai And Ors. AIR 1959 All 233. 24
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INTRODUCTION
The state has the duty to protect its citizens and their property from harm. However,
circumstances may arise when the aid of state machinery is not available and there is imminent
danger to a person or his property. In such situations, a person is allowed to use force to ward-
off the immediate threat to his or someone else’s person or property. This is the right of private
defence. The people are endowed with this right so that they can defend themselves and their
property and not hesitate due to fear of prosecution. 1 The right, in some circumstances even
extends to causing death of the person who poses such a threat. But such a right is subject to
some restrictions and not available in all circumstances. Obviously, he is expected to use force
that is just required to counter the danger or until the state comes to his rescue. An unrestricted
right to defend will inevitably result into ‘might is right’ rule and thereby will create serious
law and order problems. It, thus, intends to discourage cowardice and meek submission to
aggression but at the same time does not encourage private warfare. 2
The right of private defence serves a social purpose. It not only restrains bad characters, but
also encourages the right spirit in a free citizen. A citizen, as a general rule, is neither expected
to run away for safety when he is faced with a grave and imminent danger to his person or
property as a result of unlawful aggression, nor is he expected, by use of force, to right the
wrongs done to him or punish the wrongdoer for commission of the offences. 3
150 years ago, during colonialism, an enthusiastic Macaulay proposed a right of private defence
in his draft code with the ambitious project of encouraging a ‘manly spirit’ among the ‘natives’.
The ideal Indian would stand his ground in the face of danger and not hesitate to defend his
own body or property or that of another. He would respond with defensive force to prevent
certain crimes, even to the extent of causing death. As a general idea, the right of private
defence permits individuals to use defensive force which otherwise be illegal, to fend off
attacks threatening certain important interests. Like the defence of necessity, the right of private
defence authorizes individuals to take the law into their own hands. 4
Mayne says:
1
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/right-private-defence/ accessed on 19-10-2017 at 13:49
2
Pillai, PSA; “Criminal Law”; 10th Edition; Reprint 2011 at p.197
3
Ibid.
4
https://www.academia.edu/1437252/_Private_Defence_in_Collection_of_Essays_marking_the_150th_Anniver
sary_of_the_Indian_Penal_Code_Ashgate_2011 accessed on 19-10-2017 at 14:03
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Society undertakes to protect person and property of individuals.
Where the aid of society is obtainable, it must be resorted to;
Where the aid of society is not obtainable; the person must do everything on its own;
Violence must be proportional to injury-It must not be employed for malicious or
injurious feelings.
It is also to be noted that there is a difference between right to private defence and right to self-
defence. Self-defence is limited in nature. It can only be exercised for protection from danger
of one’s own self. In case of private defence, the right extends to protection of one’s own self
and to someone else’s life as well.
Jeremy Bentham, an English Legal Luminary, once opined, “This right of defence is absolutely
necessary. The vigilance of the Magistrates can never make up for vigilance of each individual
on his own behalf. The fear of the law can never restrain bad men so effectually as the fear of
the sum total to individual resistance. 5
The Right to private defence of a citizen, where one can practically take law in his own hands
to defend his own person and property or that of others, is clearly defined in Section 96 to
Section 106 of the Indian Penal Code, under the Sub head, ‘Of the Right of private Defence’
of Chapter IV ‘General Exceptions.’ These are ostensibly based on the idea that the right of
self-preservation is the basic human instinct.
In case of Barisa Mundi v. State 6, it was held that these provisions are complete in themselves
and no reliance on the principles for governing the right of Self-Defence in Common Law can
be placed for their interpretation.
The provisions contained in these sections give authority to a man to use necessary force
against an assailant or wrong-doer for the purpose of protecting one’s own body and property
as also another’s body and property when immediate aid from the state machinery is not readily
available and in so doing he is not answerable in law for his deeds.
5
www.e-lawresources.co.uk/Public-and-private-defences.php., accessed on 19-10-17, at 14:25
6
AIR 1959 Pat 22, (1959) CrLJ 71 (DB) (Pat)
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OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE
96. Things Done in Private Defence-Nothing is an Offence which is done in the exercise of
the right of private defence.
ANALYSIS OF SECTION 96
This Section lays down the general rule on the right of private defence.
Right of private defence cannot be said to be an offence in return. The right of self-defence
under Section 96 is not absolute but is clearly qualified by Section 99 which says that the right
in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary for the purpose of defence.
It is well settled that in a free fight, no right of private defence is available to either party and
each individual is responsible for his own acts. While it is true that law does not expect from
the person, whose life is placed in danger, to weigh, with nice precision, the extent and the
degrees of the force which he employs in his defence, it also does not countenance that the
person claiming such a right should resort to force which is out of all proportion to the injuries
received or threatened and far in excess of the requirement of the case. The onus of proving the
right of private defence is upon the person who wants to plead it. But an accused may be
acquitted on the plea of the right of private defence even though he has not specifically pleaded
it. 7
In case of Laxman v. State of Orissa 8, it was held that the right to private defence is available
only to one who is immediately confronted with the immediate necessity of an impending
danger, not of his own creation.
Thus, the danger must not be of one’s own creation and must require immediate necessity of
use of force. The case which makes the provision clear is Jai Dev v. State of Punjab 9, the
accused bought a land in a village but since they were outsiders, they were treated as strangers
by the villagers. When the accused, who were armed, were ploughing the field, the villagers
came armed in large numbers to take possession of the field. The accused, in self defence
caused harm and shot one dead. Subsequently the villagers started fleeing which when the right
of private defence ended but the accused still shot two of them. The Supreme Court held that
the accused were liable for murder.
7
http://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/l470-Private-Defence.html accessed on 19-10-17 at 16:55
8
1988 Cr LJ 188 SC
9
AIR 1963 SC 612.
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Right of Private Defence not available to aggressors
A person who is an aggressor and seeks an attack on himself by his own aggressive attack
cannot rely upon the right of private defence. 10 In case of Kishan v. State of Madhya Pradesh 11,
the appellant along with other co-accused went to the house of the deceased with the intention
of causing physical harm to him. They pulled the deceased out of his house and subjected him
to punching and kicking. The deceased managed to escape from their grip, and caught hold of
a khutai and struck three blows on the head of the accused. The appellant snatched the khutai
from the hands of the deceased and gave two or three blows on his head causing profuse
bleeding inside his brain, which proved fatal and the man died. It was held that the accused
were aggressors and hence they could not claim the right to private defence. The accused was
held liable under S.300(3) of the IPC for murder.
97. Right of private defence of the body and of property. —Every person has a right, subject
to the restrictions contained in section 99, to defend—
First. —His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the
human body;
Secondly. —The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person,
against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or
criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal
trespass.
ANALYSIS OF SECTION 97
i. Private Defence of body (Body may be one own self’s or someone else’s);
ii. Property, movable or immovable, (whether him self’s or of any other person)
The right to private defence of property is applicable in the cases where the offence against
property falls under the definition of (a) theft; (b) robbery; (c) mischief; or (d) criminal trespass,
or an attempt to commit any of these.
10
Misra, S.N; Indian Penal Code; 20th Edition, 2016 at p.239
11
AIR 1974 SC 244.
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commit the offence, though the offence may not have been committed. The right comes to an
end as soon as the threat of assault has ceased and the apprehension of danger has been
removed. The continuance of the right to private defence depends upon the nature of the offence
in question. In case of theft, the right of private defence continues till the offender has affected
his retreat with the property; in case of robbery, as long as the offender causes or attempts to
cause death to any person; or hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of any such offence continues
in the commission of such offence; in case of house-breaking by night, so long as the house-
breaking continues. 12
Burden of Proof
Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, requires that when a person is accused of any
offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
the ‘General Exceptions’ or special exception or proviso contained in or proviso contained in
any part of the IPC is on him and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.
This presumption is rebuttable. It, thus, puts the burden of proving the existence of
circumstances which would bring the act of the accused alleged to be an offence within the
exercise of right of private defence is on him and the court shall presume the absence of such
circumstances. 13
In case of Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration 14, it was held that in usual circumstances the
accused must plead the right of private defence. But even if an accused does not plead the same,
it is open to the court to consider the plea of private defence, if it arises from the materials on
record.
Further, in Salim Zia v. State of U.P. 15, it was held that the burden on an accused person to
establish the plea of self defence is not as onerous as the one which lies on the prosecution.
While, the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused need
not establish the plea to the hilt and may discharge his onus by establishing a mere
preponderance of probability either by laying basis for that plea in the cross-examination of the
prosecution witness, or by adducing defence evidence.
Trespass of Land
12
Gaur, KD; Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, 6th Edition; at p.171
13
Supra, note 2 at p.210
14
AIR 1968 SC 702
15
(1979) 1 Cri. L.J. 323
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In case of Hukam Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 16, it was held that the owner of the land has
the right to use necessary force if the trespasser fails to remove the trespass.
However, if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land, the owner has no right to
dispossess the trespasser by force, and in such a case, unless he is evicted by law, he is entitled
to defend his possession even against the true owner. 17
The Supreme Court held in Puran Singh v. State of Punjab 18, that in order to claim the right of
private defence, the trespasser must be in actual possession of the property over a sufficiently
long period of time; the possession must be to the knowledge, either express or implied of the
owner, or without any attempt at concealment and which contains an element of animus
possidendi; the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete
and final and must be acquiesced in by the owner and in case of cultivable land, whether or
not, after taking possession, the trespasser had any crop. The nature of possession of the
trespasser is a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of the case.
In Madra 19, it was held that an illegal seizure of Cattle with a view to impound them is theft
and the persons attempting to resist the seizure by force, act in the exercise of the right of
private defence of property and are as such entitled to the defence under this section.
A Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa v. Rabindranath Dalai & Another 20
summarized the legal position with respect to defence of person and property thus: “In a
civilized society the defence of person and property of every member thereof is the
responsibility of the State. Consequently, there is a duty cast on every person faced with
apprehension of imminent danger of his person or property to seek the aid of the machinery
provided by the State but if immediately such aid is not available, he has the right of private
defence.
98. Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind, etc.—When an act,
which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason of the youth, the want
of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind or the intoxication of the person doing
16
AIR 1961 SC 1541
17
Supa, note 12
18
AIR 1975 SC 1674
19
AIR 1946 Nag. 326
20
1973 Crl LJ 1686 (Orissa) (FB)
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that act, or by reason of any misconception on the part of that person, every person has the
same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.
ANALYSIS OF SECTION 98
Section 98, specifically provides that the right of private defence extend to acts which would
be offences, but for the fact that they are acts of youth, persons of unsound mind, acts of
intoxicated persons and acts done under misconception. It ensures that a person does not lose
his right of private defence merely because legally the other party is not competent to commit
any offence. 21
The principle underlying Section 98 is that the right of private defence does not depend upon
the actual criminality of the aggressor but on the wrongful character of the act attempted. If an
act is otherwise an offence, the right of private defence arises against the author of the Act,
even though he is not punishable by reason of his personal incapacity to commit a crime or
because he acts without the necessary mens rea. 22
Section 98 is based on the fact that the right of private defence arises from the human instinct
of self-preservation and not from any supposed criminality of the person who poses danger to
body and property. 23
99. Acts against which there is no right of private defence.—There is no right of private
defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of
grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under
colour of his office, though that act, may not be strictly justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the
apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of
a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that direction may not
be strictly justifiable by law. There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time
to have recourse to protection of the public authorities.
Extent to which the right may be exercised. —The right of private defence in no case extends
to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.
21
http://lawtimesjournal.in/private-defence/#_ftn1 accessed on 21-10-17 at 00:38
22
Supra, note 10 at p.248
23
Supra, note 2 at p.208
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Explanation 1.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done,
or attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows or has reason to believe,
that the person doing the act is such public servant.
Explanation 2.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done,
or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant, unless he knows, or has reason
to believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states
the authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such
authority, if demanded.
ANALYSIS OF SECTION 99
Section 99 lays down the restrictions on the right of private defence. These restrictions are:
1. Acts of public servants
2. Time to have recourse to authorities
3. Right does not extend to causing more harm than necessary.
Acts of the Public Servant
The word Public Servant is defined under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, which
comprises of twelve sub heads. The definition is so comprehensive that it covers almost every
person beginning from the members of the jury to the arbitrator to the person who is appointed
to maintain the public accounts. Furthermore, the Explanation I to Section 21 provides that the
persons who are concerned with the tasks mentioned in the twelve sub heads are public servants
only, regardless of the fact that whether they are appointed by the government or not.
Clause (1) and Clause (2) of the Act provides immunity to the actions of the Public servants
which are either done by them, or; directed to be done by them; in the colour of their office.
The Act so done may not be strictly justifiable by law. It appears that the clause regarding
justification is essentially to cure procedural impropriety. In case of Jograj Mahto 24, it was
held that the word ‘strictly’ has been inserted in the legislature to serve a definitive purpose,
namely, that the section was not intended to apply to cases where the Act was wholly
unjustified.
However, in the execution of such Act, there must not be a reasonable apprehension of death
or grievous hurt in the mind of the person against whom the Act is being executed.
24
AIR 1940 Pat. 696.
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Also, the clauses have to be read with Explanation I and II which state that the person executing
the Act must be so dressed that the person against whom the act is to be executed is able to
identify him as the public servant.
The Supreme Court in case of State of U.P. v. Niyamat 25, reiterating the observations of Mayne
held that restriction on the right of private defence rests on the probability that the acts of public
servants are lawful in which case resistance necessarily amounts to unlawful, partly on the
theory that resistance is unnecessary, since the law will set right what has been wrongly done
in its name, and on the ground that it is good for the society that a public servant should be
protected in the execution of his duty even when he is in error.
In case of Kanwar Singh 26, a raiding party organised by the officials of the MC to round up
stray cattle within the limits of the Corporation was attacked when it had rounded up some
cattle and was leading them to the cattle pound. It was held that the act of the raiding party
fully justifiable by law and the accused had no right of private defence.
The right of private defence against a public servant is applicable in case only if there is
reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. In case of Mga Nan Da 27, an Excise
inspector pursued an armed smuggler and on getting nearer to him ordered him to stop and
fired his revolver twice to frighten him, whereupon the smuggler drew a sword and cut the
inspector on the thigh. It was held that the smuggler had reasonable ground for believing that
the inspector intended to cause death or grievous hurt and did not exceed the right of private
defence.
In case of Public Prosecuter vs Suryanarayan 28, on search by customs officers certain goods
were found to have been smuggled from Yemen into Indian Territory. In course of search the
smugglers attacked the officers and injured them. They argued that the officers had no power
to search as there was no notification declaring Yemen a foreign territory under Section 5 of
the Indian Tariff Act. It was held, that the officers had acted in good faith and that the accused
had no right of private defence.
25
AIR 1987 SC 1652
26
(1965) II Cri, L.J. 1 (S.C)
27
AIR 1920 U.B. 35.
28
1973 CriLJ 1238
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Section 99 further stipulates that there is no right of private defences in cases in which there is
time to have recourse to the protection of the Public Authorities.
The restriction is based on the fact that the right of private defence is given to a person to repel
an imminent danger to his body and property when the state help is not available to him.
Obviously, the necessity of self help disappears when he has ample opportunity to have
recourse to state authorities. 29
The question whether a person had, in a given case, time to have recourse to the protection of
the public authorities depends upon four facts :
Excess harm is not justified, this is so because the right given is defensive and not offensive in
nature. The quantum of harm that can actually be inflicted varies from case to case and no
definitive standard can be set up for the same.
One landmark case in this regard is Mohinderpal Jolly v. State of Punjab 31. There was dispute
between workers and management on the demand of wages. The workers threw brick bats at
management. The factory owner fired a shot at the workers on account of which one of the
workers died. It was held by the Court that the management inflicted more harm than necessary.
The Shots could have been fired in the Air, rather than directly on the workers. Thus, the
management was not allowed the plea of private defence.
100. When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death.—The right of
private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding
section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence
which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated,
namely:—
29
Supra, note 2 at p.220
30
Supra, note 10 at p.252
31
AIR 1979 SC 571
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First. —Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise
be the consequence of such assault
Secondly. —Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will
otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
Section 100 authorises and justifies the taking away of life of a person in the exercise of the
right of self-defence, if four cardinal conditions exist:
(1)The Accused must be free from fault in bringing the encounter; (2) there must be present an
impending peril to life or great bodily harm, either real or apparent as to create honest belief of
an existing necessity; (3) there must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by retreat; and
(4) there must have been a necessity for taking life. 32
Clause First and Secondly authorises the man to inflict death upon a person in case there is a
reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt to his own body by the Acts of the other
person. However, such apprehension must be reasonable and not an imaginary or concocted
one. In case of Puran Singh v. State of Punjab 33, it was held that it is not necessary that the
actual injury should be caused by the aggressor or the victim before the right of self-defence
32
Supra, note 2 at p.225
33
Supra, note 18
17 | P a g e
can be availed of. Whether there was reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt, would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
In Amjad Khan v. State 34, a communal riot broke out between the Sindhi refugees and the local
Muslims. Several Muslims shops had been broken and looted and many were killed. The mob
started hitting on the door of the accused with lathis and the women and children fled to the
accused for protection. The Accused, the Apex Court held, was justified in firing two shots
which resulted in death as the threat was implicit in the conduct of the mob and the accused
had a right of private defence.
In Bhagwan Swaroop v. State of Madhya Pradesh 35 this court had held that It was established
on the record that Ramswaroop was being given lathi blows by the complainant party and it
was at that time that gun-shot was fired by Bhagwan Swaroop to save his father from further
blows. A lathi is capable of causing a simple as well as a fatal injury. Whether in fact the
injuries actually caused were simple or grievous is of no consequence. It is the scenario of a
father being given lathi blows which has to be kept in mind and we are of the view that in such
a situation a son could reasonably apprehend danger to the life of his father and his firing a
gun-shot at that point of time in defence of his father is justified.
Clauses thirdly and fourthly of Section 100 provide that the right of private defence of body
extends to causing death in cases of assault with intention of committing rape or unnatural lust.
Section 375 provide the definition of ‘rape’ and 377 provides for ‘unnatural lust’.
In Yeshwant Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh 36, the minor daughter of the accused had gone to
the toilet. The deceased caught her and had sexual intercourse with her. The accused seeing
this, hit the deceased with a spade. The deceased fell and hit himself. He died due to liver
injury. The prosecution contended that there was consent for intercourse. But the court held
that since the girl was minor the question of consent does not arise and act of decease amounted
to rape and hence father was entitled the right of private defence under section 100.
Kidnapping or Abducting
34
AIR 1952 SC 165
35
(1992) 2 SCC 406.
36
AIR 1992 SC 1683.
18 | P a g e
A, B and C, who were armed, were escorting two ladies out of a village at the request of the
ladies. X, Y and Z, attempted to kidnap one of the ladies. While doing so X levelled a loaded
revolver against B and thereupon X was stabbed to death by B. Here B would be entitled to
claim the right of private defence of body under this Section because there was reasonable
apprehension of death by reason of an assault with an intention to kidnap one of the ladies. 37
The word ‘abduction’ in clause 5 of this section has been interpreted to mean abduction
simpliciter and not abduction as an offence under Section 364, 365, 366 and 367. 38
In Nand Lal Kishore Case 39, Accused who were Sikhs, abducted a Muslim married woman
and converted her to Sikhism. Nearly a year after the abduction, the relatives of the woman’s
husband came and demanded her return from the accused. The latter refused to comply and the
woman herself expressly stated her unwillingness to rejoin her Muslim husband. Thereupon
the husband’s relatives attempted to take her away by force. The accused resisted the attempt
and in so doing one of them inflicted a blow on the head of the woman’s assailants, which
resulted in the latter’s death. It was held that the right of the accused to defend the woman
against her assailants extended under this section to the causing of death and they had,
therefore, committed no offence.
In case of Razu v. Emperor 40, it was held that this right is further qualified that such wrongful
confinement must be under circumstances, which cause reasonable apprehension that the
person will not be able to have recourse to the public authorities for his release. A person
wrongfully arrested and being taken to the police station for handing him over to the police
cannot be said to have a reasonable apprehension that he will not be able to have recourse to
the public authorities.
In case of Abdul Habib v. State 41, In order to apply clause 6, there must be proof of the
following : (i) there must be an assault; (ii) assault must be intention of wrongful confinement;
(iii) such an assault should cause reasonable apprehension that he will not be able to approach
37
Supra, note 10 at p.265
38
Ibid.
39
(1924) 25 Cr LJ 670.
40
AIR 1946 Sind 17.
41
(1974) Cr LJ 248 All.
19 | P a g e
authorities; (iv) all the three must co-exist; (v) act must fall under restriction mentioned in
Section 99.
Throwing of Acid
By Criminal Law Amendment, which came into force on 3-02-2013, a Seventh clause, whereby
an act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt made for the same which may cause a
reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt has been made an additional ground for causing death
in self-defence.
101. When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.—If the offence be not
of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section, the right of private defence
of the body does not extend to the voluntary causing of death to the assailant, but does extend,
under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing to the assailant of any
harm other than death.
102. Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of the body.—The right
of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to
the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not
42
AIR 1980 SC 660.
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have been committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body
continues.
103. When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death. —The right of
private defence of property extends, under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the
voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the wrong-doer, if the offence, the
committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right, be
an offence of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely: —
First. —Robbery;
Secondly. —House-breaking by night;
43
Supra, note 1 accessed on 22-10-17 at 20:33
44
2007 Cri LJ 874 (S.C.)
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Thirdly. —Mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel, which building, tent or
vessel is used as a human dwelling, or as a place for the custody of property;
Fourthly. —Theft, mischief, or house-trespass, under such circumstances as may reasonably
cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence, if such right of private
defence is not exercised.
104. When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.—If the offence, the
committing of which, or the attempting to commit which occasions the exercise of the right of
private defence, be theft, mischief, or criminal trespass, not of any of the descriptions
enumerated in the last preceding section, that right does not extend to the voluntary causing
45
AIR 2002 SC 520
46
1983 Cri LJ 826 (SC)
47
(1925) 6 Lah. 463.
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of death, but does extend, subject to the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary
causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death.
48
Gaur, H.S; Indian Penal Code; 11th Edition; Vol. 1 at p.953.
49
AIR 1973 SC 665.
50
AIR 1934 All. 829.
51
Basu, N.D; Indian Penal Code; 9th Edition; Vol. 1 at p.335
52
Supra, note 48 at p.957.
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105. Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of property. —The right
of private defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the
property commences.
The right of private defence of property against theft continues till the offender has effected his
retreat with the property or either the assistance of the public authorities is obtained, or the
property has been recovered.
The right of private defence of property against robbery continues as long as the offender
causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or as long as the
fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant personal restraint continues.
The right of private defence of property against criminal trespass or mischief continues as long
as the offender continues in the commission of criminal trespass or mischief.
The right of private defence of property against house-breaking by night continues as long as
the house-trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking continues.
53
Ibid.
54
AIR 1959 All 233.
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In case of Jarha v. Surit Ram 55, it was held that theft is a continuing wrong and a thief is a
thief, no matter when he has committed the theft. If, therefore, a person sees a thief with his
stolen watch six months after the theft, the person has the same right against him, as if he had
only a moment before his watch was stolen.
In Rakhia v. Emperor 56, it was laid down that if the thief runs away after throwing the stolen
property on the ground the right of private defence ceases, and the owner is not justified in
continuing the chase and assaulting him.
106. Right of private defence against deadly assault when there is risk of harm to innocent
Person —
If in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which reasonably causes the
apprehension of death, the defender be so situated that he cannot effectually exercise that right
without risk of harm to an innocent person, his right of private defence extends to the running
of that risk.
55
3 NLR 177.
56
AIR 1934 Lah. 595
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RECENT CASE LAWS
The appeal was directed against the Delhi High Court order dated 01.09.2010. The brief
description of facts is provided below:
The appellant and his father were accused of murder of two brothers by the name of
Shyam Sunder and Kishan Lal in office of one Lala Harkishan Dass in 1991. An
altercation took place wherein the appellant-Suresh Singhal and his father-Pritpal
Singhal alongwith one Roshan Lal fired shots at the three brothers, killing two of them
and injuring the third brother-Hans Raj.
The Sessions Court convicted the appellant for the murder of Shyam Sunder under
Sections 302 and 304 read with Section 34 of IPC for the murder of Kishan Lal. His
co-appellant-Pritpal Singhal who died on 28.03.2007, during the pendency of the suit
was also convicted under Section 307 read with Section 34 of IPC for attempting the
murder of Hans Raj. The third accused Roshan Lal was acquitted.
The actual shooting was claimed to have been witnessed by Lala Harkishan Dass and
Hans Raj. Lala Harkishan Dass turned hostile. On account of deposition of witnesses,
two separate storylines appeared as to the incident. The first one appeared through the
brother of the deceased Hans Raj. He said as soon as the appellant and his father entered
the office, they started firing on the three brothers. However, a different and more
compelling version of the story surfaced through the deposition of two more witnesses
who said that the deceased and his brothers tried to strangulate the appellant first and
then the shots were fired. the accused then exhorted his fathers to fire at the others.
Findings:
The Apex Court found the second version of the incident more compelling. The counsel
for the appellant pleaded right to private defence. The court also relied on the autopsy
report which suggested that the shot so fired was not a close shot. The Court held that
The shot was in all probability fired when the deceased released the appellant during
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the scuffle, and on seeing him reach for his gun moved away to escape after turning
around.
Having regard to the above, the Court held that the appellant reasonably apprehended
a danger to his life when the deceased and his brothers started strangulating him after
pushing him to the floor. As observed by the Court a mere reasonable apprehension is
enough to put the right of self-defence into operation and it is not necessary that there
should be an actual commission of the offence in order to give rise to the right of private
defence.
The court rejected the argument of the State that since the deceased were unarmed,
there was no need to use the gun, the court held that in case of grave danger to life, it is
not possible to calculate the defence with mathematical articulation.
Held that the appellant exceeded the power given to him by law in order to defend
himself but the exercise of the right was in good faith, in his own defence and without
premeditation. The court held that the when the appellant was being strangulated by the
deceased, he took out the revolver. Seeing this, the deceased ran for his life, at which
point, the shot was fired.
Regarding Kishan Lal’s death, the court held that circumstantial evidence created a
doubt as to whose bullet killed him. The benefit of doubt was given to the appellant.
Hence, this appeal was allowed partly and the Court modified the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court to the extent that the conviction of the appellant –
Suresh Singhal under section 302 IPC for murder of Kishan Lal was set aside and his
conviction under section 304 IPC was maintained. Since the appellant had already
undergone a sentence of 13 ½ years as on date, Court sentenced him under section 304
IPC to the period already undergone.
This appeal is directed against judgment and order dated 30.6.2014 passed by High Court of
Gujarat. A brief description of the facts is provided below:
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The Accused-I P.G Rathod stopped the uncle of the complainant and picked up a quarrel
with him. Meanwhile, Deceased-I, Natha Naghabhai joined the uncle. The accused was
joined by his supporters and Deceased by his family members. The accused was armed
with a revolver, some of his supporters with knife and another group of supporters
including Accused-II, Hemubhai Govindji, were armed with sticks. A free fight ensued,
and several people were injured. Accused-I exhorted his supporters to finish off the
opposite party. Accused-1 Pathubha Govindji himself took out revolver from his pocket
and fired at him. Natha Nagabhai suffered bullet injuries on the stomach and fell down.
Accused/appellant no.2 Hemubha Govindji inflicted injury with sword on the head of
Hamir Nagabhai. Natha Naghabhai, and another, Hamir Nagabhai (Deceased-II)
succumbed to their injuries.
The complaints from parties from both of the sides were registered. In the Sessions
Case No. 85 of 2005 in which the present appellants were accused, the trial court
convicted and sentenced each of the twenty accused under Sections 302, 307, 326, 325,
and 324 all r/w Section 149 IPC, major charge being imprisonment for life u/s 302 and
a fine of 5000/-. The trial Court further convicted accused-1 Pathubha Govindji under
Section 27 of Arms Act, and sentenced him to three years in prison and a fine of 2500/-
In appeal to the High Court, the sentence of accused-I was unaltered but was made
eligible for remission. The sentence of the accused-II was changed to one under Section
304 Part I from Section 307 r/w S.149.
It is to be noted that right from the stage of the trial, the accused-I was pleading right
of private defence and that his act fell within Exception 2 to Section 300. 57
The appeal before the Apex Court was by way of SLP. The only contention raised was
that the courts below have erred in law in not accepting the plea of private defence taken
by appellant no.1. It is argued that the accused/appellant no.1 was assaulted with a knife
and suffered the injury on the vital part, as such he has a right of private defence to save
his person. Further contention being that act of fire falls within exception 2 to Section
300.
Findings:
57
Exception 2.-Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private
defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against
whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm
than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.
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Considering the number of persons involved in the incident court concluded that it is a
case of free fight between two groups of people. It is settled principle of law that in the
cases of free fights accused are to be fastened with individual liability taking into
consideration the specific role assigned to each one of them, and normally right of
private defence is not available in such cases unless circumstances in a given case
warrant so.
Held that a person faced with injury with a deadly weapon to his life cannot be expected
to weigh in balance the precise force needed to avoid danger.
Held normally the right of private defence is not available to either of the parties in
incidents of group fighting, In the case at hand, there was a special circumstance where
the accused no.1 who was given 2cm x 2cm x 1.5cm deep knife blow on his back
(scapular region) has retorted by using licensed firearm, and killed one of his rivals in
the same incident
Held that accused no.1 Pathubha Govindji Rathod who suffered knife injury in the
incident has caused death of one of the deceased by firing several shots thereby
exceeding right of private defence.
The Court allowed the appeal partly and altered the sentence from S.302 r/w S.149 to
Section 304 Part I and altered his punishment to 10 years.
The sentence of Accused-II was unaltered.
This appeal is directed against the order of the High Court dated 24.11.2006. The crux of the
case is provided below:
The Accused no. 1-Arjun, who is the appellant was involved in a land dispute with the
deceased-Jagannath. On 30.07.2002, the accused attacked deceased, his wife and son,
along with Accused no.8, who was brother of the accused no.1. The accused no. 1 had
a large knife and the rest of the party was also armed.
The blows so inflicted by Accused No. 1 resulted in death of the deceased and serious
injuries to his wife.
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A case was filed against accused and his several supporters. A case was also registered
against the prosecution witnesses resulting in their conviction u/s 307 r/w 149 and 324
r/w 149.
The accused took the plea of private defence. It was pointed out that the deceased died
as a result of fight. The son of the deceased had inflicted knife injuries on the accused
and his brother. But the plea was rejected by the trial court as well as the High Court
which led to his conviction u/s 302 for murder of the deceased and u/s 326 for injuring
his wife.
Findings:
The Apex Court held that there was nothing to show that the deceased or his wife or
son attacked the appellant.
The right of private defence is subject to restrictions under Section 99. The injuries
caused under right of private defence should commensurate with the nature and type
of danger that the accused was facing.
There is nothing to explain as to how the wife of deceased was injured when the
accused was exercising right to private defence. There was nothing to explain the
presence of large knife with accused.
Though the accused sustained some minor injuries, it cannot go on to justify the death
of the deceased. Hence, the plea of private defence was rejected.
It was held that the death was not caused by pre-planned actions, but in the heat of the
moment and hence the conviction u/s 302 r/w 149 was altered to u/s 304 Part I of the
IPC.
CONCLUSION
In general, private defence is an excuse for any crime against the person or property. It also
applies to the defence of a stranger, and may be used not only against culpable but against
innocent aggressors. The defence is allowed only when it is immediately necessary-against
threatened violence. A person who acts under a mistaken belief in the need for defence is
protected, except that the mistake must be reasonable. The force employed in exercise of right
to private defence shall commensurate with the degree of threat that the person was facing. In
other words, the force must not only be necessary but reasonable as well. There is no duty to
retreat, as such, but even a defender must wherever possible make plain his desire to withdraw
from the combat. Thus, we can say that right of private defence is a very useful weapon that is
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available to the citizens, provided that it is used within the prescribed restrictions and not more
than that.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
WEBLIOGRAPHY
https://www.lawctopus.com
https://www.academia.edu
http://lawtimesjournal.in
www.e-lawresources.co.uk
http://www.legalserviceindia.com
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in
http://www.advocatekhoj.in
scconline.com
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