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● Instead, moral distinctions are derived from moral sentiments that are:
○ From self-love (self-interest, feelings) but at the same time, recognizing that
we have a strong “connexion” with society
○ So we are not only limited to our own self-love, but we are
concerned with the feelings and sentiments of others as well
○ This is what Hume calls “fellow feeling”
○ We feel concern for that which appeals to our sympathy
● Because we cannot be indifferent to our own interests, and the interests of others,
utility pleases
○ What is useful for me, and what is useful for everyone else
● This means that public utility is the sole origin of justice
○ Everything which promotes the interest of society must communicate
pleasure, and
○ What is pernicious give uneasiness
● From this, we can conclude that reason cannot be the foundation of morality, because
it does not move us in the way that sympathy can
● This is against moral rationalism
○ Which forwards that moral principles can be known a priori, through reason
alone
○ Hume present a counter argument to moral rationalism
○ Because Hume posits that moral rationalism makes a big jump from a
descriptive is to a prescriptive ought
■ We cannot argue that an argument is valid just because things should be
different from the way they are, or that certain things are to remain the
way that they are, to compare
● Example: I am lying to my mom. My mom will get upset. I ought not
to lie to my mom. There is a big jump because the ought is not derived
from the is but is rather a goal for the thing that is in-between –
upsetting mom
● Now, Kant posits something different. Instead of focusing on sympathy, he instead
focuses on the dictate of reason to move us to do what is moral.