August 10, 2005 directing him to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt

of court for continuously filing pleadings which cast aspersions and serious accusations that
Republic of the Philippines tend to malign the integrity not only of the Court officials including that of the Chief Justice but
Supreme Court also of the entire Court despite the Resolution dated February 28, 2005.
Manila
In his Compliance, Mr. Dequia alleges that there is nothing contumacious in the a) Urgent
FIRST DIVISION Motion to be Furnished Certified Copy of the Resolution dated February 28, 2005 From Whence
the Minute Resolution (of even dated) was alleged to have Been Quoted; b) Omnibus Motion
NESTOR ERNESTO P. v. JUDGE ROLANDO V. dated April 12, 2005; and c) the Third Manifestation and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion To Be
RAMIREZ, , Furnished Certified Copy of the Resolution dated February 6, 2002 from whence the minute
resolution was quoted.
MTCC, Cadiz
Clerk of Court, Mr. Dequia argues that: in the aforesaid pleadings, he was merely pointing out the serious
errors and falsehoods that characterized the issuance of the minute resolutions and even
Promulgated: invoked jurisprudential principles; he had never cast aspersions and serious accusations that
MTCC, Cadiz City tend to malign the integrity of the Chief Justice and the Court; if ever there is such a serious
accusation, it is not intended against the Court nor to the Chief Justice but against the erring
September 27, 2006 Court officials issuing minute resolutions based on untruthful facts, for and in behalf of the
Respondents. Court in a desperate move to shield the respondent judge from the consequences of his
misdeeds and other undoings while at the same time, harass complainant from pursuing his
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1657 quest for justice; the enumerated pleadings, are valid responsive pleadings addressed to the
DEQUIA, Court will all respect and candor, for the judicious resolutions of the issues therein raised which
the Court had even failed to resolved judiciously up to this point of time; moreover, to expunge
September 27, 2006 the enumerated responsive pleadings from the records of OCA IPI No. 99-681-MTJ, will
Respondents. perpetuate the frauds and deceits, and prevent the truth to be ventilated; and considering the
quantum of documentary evidences adduced by him during the administrative proceedings of
OCA IPI No. 99-681-MTJ, that are more than sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondents,
x------------------------------------------------x had the case (OCA IPI No. 99-681-MTJ) been actually deliberated upon by the Justices of the
First Division, Supreme Court, as was made to appear in the minute resolution of February 6,
2002.

RESOLUTION Further, Mr. Dequia avers that the February 28, 2005 Resolution contained serious falsehoods,
particularly in paragraph 6 of page 2 thereof, which stated that in the August 29, 2001, the case
was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator which in turn was raffled to DCA Elepao.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: He maintains that said resolution refers to another matter.

After the issuance of the Resolution dated February 6, 2002 dismissing Mr. Nestor Ernesto P.
Dequias complaint against the respondents, he filed numerous pleadings containing innuendos
that tend to malign the integrity not only of the Division Clerks of Court, Deputy Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, the Associate Justices and the Chief Justice but also of the
entire Court. This prompted the Court to clarify all his misconceptions that a syndicate is
operating in the Court and had a hand in the dismissal of his complaint against the respondents
in the Resolution dated February 28, 2005. In the said Resolution, the Court, inter alia, ordered
that henceforth, all pleadings which reiterate the same issues will no longer be entertained and
shall be expunged from the records. Despite such Resolution, Mr. Dequia continued to file
pleadings which reiterate his misconceptions. Thus, the Court issued the Resolution dated
Mr. Dequia also alleges that the matters as stated in paragraph 7, page 2 of the subject
Resolution dated February 28, 2005 is wrong and utterly misleading. He asserts that the subject
administrative complaint being referred to, that he earlier filed against the same respondent
Judge Rolando V. Ramirez and co-respondent Clerk of Court Sandra M. Ledesma before the
OCA, Supreme Court, is different and distinct from that of the Administrative Complaint in OCA
IPI No. 99-681-MTJ, which disappeared from the files of the Court Management Office, Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA). For which, complainant prays for an administrative
investigation. In that administrative complaint, the same respondent Judge Rolando V. Ramirez
and co-respondent Clerk of Court Sandra M. Ledesma were accused for the loss and/or
Pilferage of vital documents submitted to the trial court by the spouses defendants Anastacio
and Angelina Villanueva for their defense in Civil Case No. 796, Sixth Judicial Region, Cadiz City,
for alleged EJECTMENT WITH DAMAGES, where respondent Judge Rolando V. Ramirez acts as
the Presiding Judge, and co-respondent Sandra M. Ledesma as the Clerk of Court. SO ORDERED.

The Court shall delve first on the alleged falsehoods, wrong and misleading statements in the
February 28, 2005 Resolution.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Contrary to the allegation of Mr. Dequia, there is no falsehood in the February 28, 2005 Associate Justice
Resolution. The records show, specifically, page 214, Rollo that in an internal Resolution dated WE CONCUR:
August 29, 2001, the case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation which case was raffled to the Office of DCA Zenaida N. Elepao as
stated in the Resolution of February 28, 2005.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Neither does the Resolution of February 28, 2005 contain wrong and misleading statements as Chief Justice
to his plaint of the alleged disappearance of the records of another administrative complaint Chairperson
against the same respondents regarding loss and pilfered vital records of Civil Case No. 796
before the sala of respondent judge in the Office of the Court Administrator. The records show
that this has been addressed by the then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo as shown by
his Memorandum dated March 10, 2000 including therein the aforesaid complaint dated CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
October 14, 1998 of Mr. Dequia. Thus, then Court Administrator Benipayo sent a letter dated Associate Justice
March 23, 2000 to Mr. Dequia stating that an agenda report had already been prepared for the ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
consideration of the Court. Associate Justice

As to the show cause Resolution.

As borne by the records of the case, the Court had been very lenient and accommodating to
Mr. Dequia. His numerous pleadings containing unfair accusations against Court officials, MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
biased and prejudged statements and misconceptions, all casting doubts on the integrity of said Associate Justice
officials and the entire Court, were simply noted without action on the ground that the
administrative complaint against the respondents had been dismissed in the Resolution dated
February 6, 2002. However, Mr. Dequia went overboard. Inspite of the Resolution of February
28, 2005 which stressed the point that the Court is a court of justice, to the extent of explaining
in detail how the Court operates through the different offices particularly, the offices of the
Division Clerks and the Court Administrator, Mr. Dequia remains unperturbed in his continuous
filing of numerous pleadings, reiterating his allegation that the dismissal of his complaint
against the respondents was brought about by a syndicate that connive to coddle the
respondents. This frame of mind of Mr. Dequia is evident even in the present Compliance.

The Court finds the explanation of Mr. Dequia untenable and finds his persistence in filing
pleadings after the Courts Resolution dated February 28, 2005 to be contumacious. Certainly,
the Court will not allow Itself to be pestered with pleadings that reiterate the same issues and
misconceptions which the Court had already dealt with.

The precious time and resources of the Court have been consumed unnecessarily and which
could have been used to attend to more pressing matters before the Court.

WHEREFORE, Mr. Nestor Ernesto P. Dequia is found GUILTY of Indirect Contempt of Court and
FINED the amount of P20,000.00 payable within 30 days from finality of herein Resolution.
 currency; twelve (12) managers checks from different banks amounting to P280, 615.36; six (6)
EN BANC postal money orders amounting to P1,150; one (1) check dividend from the Supreme Court
Savings and Loan Association amounting to P160; forty-six (46) salary checks and seventeen
OFFICE OF THE COURT (17) checks representing rice allowances of court personnel amounting to a total of
ADMINISTRATOR, A.M. No. P-01-1499 P174,019.50. The inventory of cash and cash items totaled P829,282.02. The next day, Atty.
Complainant, Aldevera deposited the checks found in the vault in the account for the Fiduciary Fund.
Present:
After making a preliminary finding, the team took custody of the records of the Clerk of Court.
PANGANIBAN, C.J., They returned to Manila to further determine the exact status of the accountabilities of
PUNO, respondent Clerk of Court.
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, The Partial Report dated July 18, 2000 of the Financial Audit Team covered only the Judiciary
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, Development Fund, Clerk of Court General Fund, Sheriffs General Fund and Sheriffs Trust Fund.
CARPIO, It was reported that there was a shortage in the Sheriffs General Fund and Sheriffs Trust Fund
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, in the amount of P2,959.21 and P229,283.85, respectively. While there was over-remittance in
- versus - CORONA, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Clerk of Court General Fund (CoCGF) in the amount
CARPIO MORALES, of P71,053.34 and P133,603.90, respectively. Over-remittance in the JDF was attributed to
CALLEJO, SR., improper recording of collections. While over-remittance in the CoCGF, was attributed to non-
AZCUNA, issuance of the corresponding receipt upon the transfer of forfeited bonds from the Fiduciary
ATTY. MARILOU DUREZA-ALDEVERA TINGA, Fund to the CoCGF.
Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City, CHICO-NAZARIO,
and TERESITA M. ELEGINO, CASH CANCIO-GARCIA, and In a Resolution[1] dated October 24, 2000, the Court resolved to:
CLERK III, same Court, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Respondents. xxx
Promulgated:
(b) SUSPEND Ms. Teresita Elegino from office pending resolution on this audit report;
September 26, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x (c) DIRECT Atty. Marilou D. Aldevera and Ms. Teresita Elegino to: (c-1) explain why no
administrative sanction shall be imposed upon them based on the result of the audit findings
and (c-2) restitute the shortages for Sheriff General Fund and Sheriff Trust Fund amounting to
DECISION P2,959.21 and P229,283.85, respectively; x x x

PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case against respondents Clerk of Court Marilou Dureza-Aldevera and
Cash Clerk Teresita M. Elegino for the cash shortages and infractions discovered in the Office
of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Davao City during an audit conducted in April
2000 and February 2001.
Due to reports of fiscal irregularities being committed in the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Davao City, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo directed Verina
F. Yap, Head of the Fiscal Monitoring Division of the Court Management Office, Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), to form a team and conduct a surprise audit of the accountabilities
of respondent Atty. Marilou D. Aldevera, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City.
(d) DIRECT the Fiscal Management and Budget Office, this Court, and the Financial
Management Office, OCA, to WITHHOLD the salaries, allowances and other benefits of Atty.
Aldevera and Ms. Elegino to cover possible shortages that may be found after the audit of the
Fiduciary Fund account; and
(e) DIRECT Atty. Aldevera to explain why she signed the Daily Time Record of Ms.
Elegino without reflecting her absence on 18 April 2000.
On January 12, 2001, respondent Elegino filed a Manifestation[2] informing the Court that she
had restituted the shortage of P229,283.85 in the Sheriffs Trust Fund, which was supported by
two deposit slips.[3] She, however, did not file an Explanation in compliance with the Court
Resolution of October 24, 2000.

On April 5, 2000, the audit team went to Davao City and proceeded to the Office of the Clerk On the other hand, Atty. Aldevera filed an Explanation[4] dated January 15, 2001. She informed
of Court. They made a cash count of the contents of the vault and found P373,337.16 in the Court that respondent Elegino had fully restituted the shortages in the Sheriffs General
Fund and the Sheriffs Trust Fund. She also appended thereto her letter dated November 22,
2000 directing Elegino to immediately restitute the shortage of P229,283.85 in the Sheriffs
Trust Fund. She explained that all the anomalies had been committed by Elegino without her
knowledge, participation or connivance. She pointed out that Elegino executed an
Undertaking[5] stating that Elegino assume[s] full money accountability for all shortages in the
collections that may be found by the auditing team during the audit.
Atty. Aldevera stated that long before she assumed the position of Clerk of Court in 1989,
Elegino had already been performing the duties of a cash clerk/cashier under her (Aldeveras)
predecessors. Elegino performed the task of handling, depositing, recording of cash and check
deposits. She was the exclusive custodian of all records and documents pertaining to the cash,
money and other payments handled by the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Atty. Aldevera claimed that she exercised due diligence in supervising and monitoring Elegino
in the handling of the court accounts and transactions. She also systematized the filing system
of deposits and withdrawal slips on a monthly basis. Because of the volume of the transactions,
she assigned four persons to assist Elegino.
Atty. Aldevera contended that the modus operandi employed by Elegino was such that a
cursory and normal monitoring and checking of the transactions would not result in its
discovery, but could only be found out in a regular audit. Even the assignment of other
personnel did not uncover the irregularities, especially in the Fiduciary Fund.
Atty. Aldevera stated that after the audit on April 6, 2000, she relieved Elegino and assigned
Laarni G. Mascardo as the Acting Cash Clerk. Her persistent efforts to protect the interest of
the government enabled her to secure an admission from Elegino of her accountability.
Through her efforts, cash and checks amounting to P679,928.68 had been recovered. To further
protect the interest of the government, Atty. Aldevera claimed that she was able to secure from
the Elegino spouses a transfer certificate of title and a special power of attorney to mortgage
their property and to use the amount loaned to restitute any shortages.
Atty. Aldevera maintained that the irregularities committed by Elegino should be blamed on
Elegino alone. She argued that in the absence of any evidence of her own personal wrongdoing,
participation or knowledge of Eleginos irregular acts, she should be spared from any
administrative sanction for acts which she did not commit. She contended that although she
was the head of office who had supervision and control of her cash clerk, it would defy logic
and fair play if she is made to answer for the latters acts or misdeeds, the same having been
astutely hidden from her and where such misdeed would not, by due diligence, be discovered
were it not for the work of the Audit Team.
Finally, Atty. Aldevera stated that Elegino was present on April 18, 2000, but that she was
verifying/locating her records. Her physical absence may have given the auditors the
misimpression that she was absent that day.
In February 2001, the same audit team returned to the RTC, Davao City for the purpose of
determining the state of the Fiduciary Fund. After the second audit, a Final Report dated August
17, 2001 was submitted to the Court by then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao.
It was reported that from the period covering June 1989 to April 5, 2000, the collections in the
Fiduciary Fund supposed to be deposited in the depository bank totaled P24,777,871.92.
However, the balance reflected in the bank account for Fiduciary Fund as of April 5, 2000 was
only P15,349,393.17. Hence, there was a shortage of P9,428,478.75. In view of the partial
restitution made by respondent Elegino in the amount of P455,505.68, the shortage was
lessened to P8,972,923.07.
The second audit found that the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City, under the
supervision of Atty. Aldevera as Clerk of Court, committed the following infractions:
1. Allowing the encashment of checks (such as salary checks, checks issued by the
Supreme Court Savings and Loan Association (SCSLA) representing dividends and Rice
Allowance checks) from funds collected as Legal Fees, in violation of Sec. 67 of P.D. 1445;
2. Failure to present upon demand the full amount of the Fiduciary Fund which gives
rise to the presumption that malversation was done resulting in the shortage of NINE MILLION
FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT PESOS and
75/100 (P9,428,478.75), defined and penalized under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code;
3. Failure to present upon demand the full amount of the Sheriffs General Fund which
gives rise to the presumption that malversation was done resulting in the shortage of TWO
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY NINE PESOS and TWENTY ONE CENTAVOS (P2,959.21), also
penalized under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code;
4. Failure to present upon demand the full amount of the Sheriffs Trust Fund which
gives rise to the presumption that malversation was done resulting in the shortage of TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS and EIGHTY FIVE
CENTAVOS (P229,283.85) also penalized under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code;
5. Over-remittance of the Judiciary Development Fund in the amount of SEVENTY ONE
THOUSAND FIFTY THREE PESOS and THIRTY FOUR CENTAVOS (P71,053.34), which can only be
caused by improper book handling;
6. Over-remittance of Clerk of Court General Fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THREE and NINETY CENTAVOS (P133,603.90) which
can only be caused by improper book handling;
7. Failure to issue Official Receipts for collections for the Fiduciary Fund in Special Case
No. 3762-93 amounting to P2,389,767.67 and Civil Case No. 21,811-93 amounting to
P642,200.00 in violation of Sec. 61 and 113, Art. VI, Auditing and Accounting Manual;
8. Failure to submit the Monthly Report of Collections, Deposits and Withdrawals for
Fiduciary Fund as reflected in the Subsidiary Ledger of the Revenue Division, Accounting
Division for the months of June to December 1989; January to December 1990; January to
December 1991; May to December 1994; January to December 1995; January to April 1996;
November to December 1996; February 1997; April to August 1997; October to December
1997; January 1998; March to December 1998 and January to December 1999, in violation of
Circular No. 32-93; and
9. Failure to deposit the daily collections with the authorized depository bank in
violation of Administrative Circular No. 31-90 dated 15 October 1990.[6]
Imputed to Atty. Aldevera are the following specific violations:
1. Failure to sign the certification in the cash books that the entries therein are true
and correct. At the end of each month, she should have signed the certification but the records
show that there was not a single certification signed by her in the cash book. Had she done this
regularly she could have monitored the everyday transaction in her office. It appears that she
left all the work to Ms. Elegino;
2. There were checks of judges and court personnel encashed from the collections
which are still in their possession, some of which were duly signed and endorsed by Atty.
Aldevera for deposit but were never done, causing the checks to become stale, thus depriving
the RTC of funds, the interest of which should have accrued to the JDF;
3. Atty. Aldevera is aware that Cash Clerk Elegino is engaged in the business of lending
money to the court personnel and some other people, but she condoned such activities. She
should have not authorized Ms. Elegino to engage in such business considering the nature [of]
her work in the court. Atty. Aldevera should have made the necessary measures to safeguard
their collections;
4. Atty. Aldevera does not regularly submit Monthly Reports of Collections, Deposits
and Withdrawals for the Fiduciary Fund which resulted in the large amount of shortages;
5. Atty. Aldevera claims that she allowed Ms. Elegino to handle the cash collections
because she was already performing this task when she assumed office. This, however, is not
reason enough for her to continue the set-up in her office.[7]
In an en banc Resolution dated August 21, 2001, the Court resolved to:
xxx
(b) RE-DOCKET this matter as A.M. No. P-01-1499 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty.
Marilou Aldevera, Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City);
(c) DIRECT Ms. Teresita M. Elegino x x x to submit her explanation as required in the resolution
dated 24 October 2000;
(d) REFER this matter to ACA Antonio H. Dujua for investigation report and recommendation
thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt of the explanation of Ms. Elegino;
(e) place Atty. Aldevera under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION effective immediately and while this
matter is under investigation;
(f) DIRECT the Executive Judge of RTC Davao City to DESIGNATE Branch Clerk of Court Rosemarie
Cabaguio as Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court thereat, vice Atty. Aldevera;
(g) ISSUE a Hold Departure Order against Atty. Aldevera and Ms. Elegino x x x;
(h) DIRECT Atty. Aldevera to RESTITUTE the amount of Eight Million Nine Hundred Seventy Two
Thousand and Nine Hundred Twenty Three Pesos and Seven Centavos ( P8,972,923.07).
In a Resolution dated October 16, 2001, the Court noted the Manifestation and Urgent
Omnibus Motion of respondent Atty. Aldevera for the inclusion of Teresita M. Elegino as
respondent; for the expeditious investigation, report and recommendation on the case; to
request the Court to fix the period for Elegino to submit her Explanation; to release salaries,
benefits and allowances withheld; to lift Hold Departure Order; and to reconsider and set aside
the order to restitute the amount of P8,972,923.07.
Assistant Court Administrator Antonio Dujua set the case for hearing in Manila at 1:30 p.m. of
November 19 to 20, 2001. Respondent Elegino sent a letter[8] and a telegram[9] to Atty. Dujua
explaining that her failure to appear at the investigation was due to financial constraints since
her salary and other benefits have been withheld upon her preventive suspension. In lieu of
her appearance, Elegino submitted an affidavit dated November 16, 2001, wherein she stated,
thus:
1. That I have been the Cash Clerk of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Davao
City since 1994;
2. That in April 2000, an audit of the Books of Accounts of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City
was conducted by the Audit Team headed by (Ms.) Verina Yap, who found that the alleged sum
of P8,972,923.07 of the office is unaccounted for;
3. That the records, deposit slips, passbook, withdrawal slips, receipts/payment/release
vouchers and other documents were made available to, and taken possession of by the audit
team but I have not participated in the reconciliation of accounts and thus dispute the accuracy
of the alleged shortage findings of the audit team;
4. That from a list which I was shown recently, and solely from my recollection, it appears that
certain funds are still held by the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City, when in truth
and in fact some of the said funds or amounts have already been paid to, released in favor of,
withdrawn by the depositing parties or individuals BUT were still included as alleged shortage
or unaccountable funds of the Office;
5. That as Cash Clerk, I am not the only personnel who issues receipts for funds paid to the
office as the signatures in the Official Receipts will show and neither am I the only one handling
cash transactions. For the funds duly turned over to me, I have also issued the corresponding
acknowledgment receipts for them and were duly remitted to the office or deposited with our
depository bank, I thus deny incurring any shortage in the performance of my duty as Cash Clerk
of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City.[10]
In a Resolution dated December 11, 2001, the Court directed respondents Atty. Aldevera and
Elegino to comment on the Final Report dated August 17, 2001 within 15 days from notice, and
directed Assistant Court Administrator Antonio H. Dujua to suspend the proceedings of the case
until after the Comments have been filed.
In her Comment dated February 5, 2002, Atty. Aldevera answered the issues raised in the Final
Report, thus:
1. As regards her failure to sign the certification in the Cash Books as to the entries
therein, Atty. Aldevera stated that this was the practice of her three predecessors, and she did
not know that it was obligatory for her to sign the same. Although she attended seminars and
lectures conducted by the Court, she does not remember of any reminder that Clerks of Court
had to sign the Cash Books at the end of the month. She asked the Court to take notice of the
Cash Books of her predecessors, former Clerks of Court Mapayo, Europa and Velasco,
particularly their unsigned reports.
2. As regards her failure to deposit the checks of judges and court personnel encashed
from the collections, Atty. Aldevera put the blame on Elegino who was supposed to have
deposited the checks.
3. As regards the charge that she was aware of Eleginos money-lending activities, Atty.
Aldevera admitted that even before she assumed office as Clerk of Court or during the tenure
of her three predecessors, Elegino, who was then the cashier, was already engaged in money-
lending to court personnel. Atty. Aldevera alleged that upon her assumption of office and for
the next 11 years thereafter, she had no knowledge of any shortages incurred by Elegino;
otherwise, she would have stopped her money-lending activities. When she asked Elegino
where she was getting the money that she was lending, Elegino replied that she was being
financed by her mother-in-law. Atty. Aldevera asserted that she had to believe Elegino because
she did not have any basis at that time to suspect her of any wrongdoing.
4. Atty. Aldevera denied the charge that there was no regular submission of monthly
reports of collections, deposits and withdrawals for the fiduciary fund which resulted in large
amount of shortages. She claimed that she saw to it that the monthly reports were religiously
prepared, and that there were times when she personally typed the monthly reports so that
they could be mailed without delay. During the times that she discovered that Elegino failed to
mail a monthly report, she personally attended to its mailing. However, Atty. Aldevera disclosed
that while retrieving documents for the auditors during the April 2000 audit, she discovered
that there were some monthly reports inside the filing cabinets of Elegino which were not yet
signed by her (Aldevera). When she confronted Elegino about the shortages and her failure to
present the monthly reports for signature, Elegino only cried.
5. Atty. Aldevera denied the charge that she failed to diligently monitor Eleginos work
as cashier. She stated that when she noticed the increased volume of work in the cash section,
she assigned Mascardo, Salazar and Tongco to help Elegino. At that time, she had no knowledge
of any wrongdoings or shortages of Elegino.
While admitting that she is primarily liable for any loss, shortage or destruction concerning
court funds, revenues, records and properties, Atty. Aldevera submits that this general rule
admits of exceptions such as when a subordinate employee of the accountable officer has
expressly admitted his/her commission of the anomaly all by himself/herself as shown by
Eleginos Undertaking dated April 18, 2000.
Atty. Aldeveras Comment contains a Further Statement of Facts alleging, thus:
(1) There was no periodic audit of her books of accounts since her assumption as Clerk of Court
in 1989.
(2) She made several oral requests from time to time to Ms. Verina Yap, a staff member of the
Financial Audit Section, OCA, to conduct an audit of their Cash Books.
(3) After the discovery of the April 2000 audit, she immediately took the following interim
remedial measures:
(a) She immediately relieved Elegino as cash clerk;
(b) Through her personal persistent effort, Elegino made an immediate partial restitution of
P455,505.68;
(c) She succeeded in obtaining from Elegino the Transfer Certificate of Title of their house and
lot and a special power of attorney to mortgage the same and to apply the proceeds to her
shortages;
(d) On July 10, 2000, she reiterated her request to the Land Bank, Davao Branch, for a printout
of the deposits and withdrawals made by her office;
(e) On July 21, 2000, she requested the Philippine National Bank, Davao Branch, for the
printouts of their transactions from October 1991 to January 13, 1993;
(f) On October 10, 2000, she requested authority from the Court Administrator to execute a
Memorandum of Agreement with Land Bank of the Philippines, Davao Branch, for free pick up
service of deposits;
(g) On March 21, 2001, she received a letter from the City Auditor in answer to her request for
copies of disbursement vouchers. The City Auditor stated that the 1989 vouchers had already
been disposed, and as for the transactions from 1990 to 1995, she (Atty. Aldevera) was
requested to secure the voucher and check numbers from the City Accountant in order to
facilitate the retrieval of the vouchers;
(h) She succeeded in retrieving several folders of disposed/archived cases from various
branches of the RTC, Davao City, to verify whether cash bonds posted by litigants were still
unwithdrawn as indicated in the cash books and she discovered that many of them had already
been withdrawn.
On March 5, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the Comment of Atty. Aldevera to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a Resolution dated May 7, 2002, the Court noted the Memorandum dated March 2002 of
then Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock in compliance with the resolution of
March 5, 2002, and required respondents Atty. Aldevera and Elegino to manifest within 10 days
from notice if they were willing to submit the case based on the pleadings on record.
On May 27, 2002, Atty. Aldevera filed a Manifestation stating that she was willing to submit the
case based on the pleadings on the record. However, on June 21, 2002, the Court received from
Atty. Aldevera a Manifestation and Motion requesting for a full-blown investigation of the case.
On August 20, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the case to one of the consultants in the OCA
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, a consultant in the OCA, was designated to investigate the
case. He set the case for hearing at the OCA, Manila on September 25 to 27, 2002. In the hearing
scheduled on September 25, 2002, only respondent Atty. Aldevera appeared with her counsel.
Respondent Elegino did not appear and it was not certain whether she had been served with
notice since the return card of the registered mail was never received. Thus, Justice Quimbo
reset the hearing to December 9 to 11, 2002 at the Regional Trial Court in Davao City to
accommodate respondent Elegino who could not appear in Manila due to financial constraints.
On October 24, 2002, Justice Quimbo received from respondent Elegino a Manifestation and
Submission of Document(s) as Respondents Exhibits[11] dated October 8, 2002. Respondent
Elegino manifested, thus:
(1) She did not receive the notice for the hearing in September, 2002 on time;
(2) On November 16, 2001, she submitted an affidavit[12] in lieu of her appearance
before Assistant Court Administrator Antonio Dujua;
(3) Cash collection and issuance of receipts are not solely undertaken by her and all the
funds turned over to her and those directly collected by her have been deposited in the bank;
(4) Under this backdrop and confident that she may only be required to account for the
funds actually collected and held by her, and upon the behest and explanation of Atty. Aldevera
that it was part of the audit process, she (Elegino) signed the Undertaking prepared by Atty.
Aldevera.
Further, respondent Elegino annexed to the pleading a photocopy of her letter[13] dated
October 16, 2001 addressed to Atty. Aldevera in response to the latters letters demanding
restitution and payment of the reported missing funds. In the letter, respondent Elegino stated
that she was sorry for not complying with the letters of Atty. Aldevera since she disputed the
accuracy of the audit and that she was not solely responsible for handling collections. Hence,
she could not be solely responsible for any shortages. She also stated therein that she signed
the Undertaking upon the behest of Atty. Aldevera as her superior since she was made to
understand that it was a usual part of an audit. She added that she agreed to have her residence
mortgaged by Atty. Aldevera because she only wanted to help in resolving the matter, but not
as an admission of liabilities.
In the hearing conducted on December 9 to 11, 2002, only Atty. Aldevera appeared with her
counsel. Respondent Elegino did not appear. However, the process server informed the
Investigating/Hearing Officer, Justice Quimbo, that he delivered the notice for respondent
Elegino to the latters niece.
Atty. James Navarrete, appearing for the Office of the Court Administrator, offered the oral
testimony of Audit Team Leader Verina Yap. According to the Report of Justice Quimbo, the
testimony of Verina Yap established the following facts:
1. Respondent Atty. Marilou Dureza-Aldevera was appointed Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio
Sheriff, RTC, Davao City on August 1, 1989 (Exhibit C), but assumed office only on August 8,
1989 (Exhibit D) although she had been discharging the functions as such in an acting capacity
since April 25, 1989. Respondent Ms. Teresita Elegino, on the other hand, was appointed Cash
Clerk III on May 17, 1989 (Exhibit E) and assumed her duties as such on May 23, 1989 (Exhibit
F). In her application (Exhibit G), Ms. Elegino stated that since she was promoted to the position
of Staff Assistant III in 1983, she had been concurrently holding the position and performing
the job of a Cashier and other matters related to the functions of the Clerk of Court as
accountable officer. Ms. Yap further declared that according to Civil Service Form 1 (Position
Description) (Exhibit H) the Clerk of Court has the following duties:
Under the general supervision of the Supreme Court through the Executive Judge/Presiding
Judge, he is the administrative officer of the court and as such, exercises general supervision
and control over all divisions, sections, and units in the Office of the Clerk of Court; coordinates
their activities for effectiveness and efficiency; manages the court records and physical facilities
of the Court; provides information services to the public and other government agencies;
assists the trial court in the latters relationship with other public and private agencies including
bar associations; takes charge of court writs and processes; prepares ceases for raffle; keeps
book; accountable for money and property deposits of the Court; studies and recommends to
the judge ways and means to improve both adjudicative and administrative support; performs
special functions as ex-oficio provincial/city sheriff; implements all orders and policies of the
Court in connection wit the speedy administration of justice; and does related work. (Emphasis
ours)
2. Upon instructions of then Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, Ms. Yap
and two companions x x x proceeded to Davao City and made a surprise audit of the accounts
of respondent Atty. Aldevera. Upon arrival at the office of the Clerk of Court in the afternoon
of April 5, 2000, the audit team made a count of the cash in the possession of respondents. The
vault wherein the cash and cash items were kept was opened only upon the arrival of Ms.
Elegino because, according to Aldevera, the former was the only one who had the combination.
Found inside the vault were a total of P373,337.16 in currency of different denominations
(Exhibit I). This total was acknowledged by respondent Atty. Aldevera (Exhbiti I-1). Other cash
items were listed in Exhibit J (three pages) which respondent Aldevera acknowledged (Exhbit J-
1). All these cash items which amounted to a grand total of P829,280.02 were returned to the
vault and were deposited the next day with the Land Bank (Davao Branch) by respondent Atty.
Aldevera (Exhibits K, K-1, L and L-1).
3. Ms. Yap declared that the respondent Clerk of Court did not certify as correct the
entries in the cash book for the Fiduciary Fund (Exhibit M which consists of 392 pages); that
said respondent did not deposit the collections in the Fiduciary Fund daily thereby invariably
leaving a balance exceeding P500.00 at the end of each day. This could be seen from the totals
at the end of each month. As an example, Ms. Yap pointed to page 61 of the cashbook (Exhibit
M-1) where it appears that although the total collections amounted to P102,000.00, the
amount deposited was only P55,000.00. This is repeated in pages 62, 64, 67 x x x ([numbering
50 pages in all] (Exhibits M-2 etc.); that there was a gap in the FF cashbook found on page 62
of the same (Exhibit M-2; M-2-A). Ms. Yap further identified the booklet of official receipts
(Exhibit N) serially numbered from 019501 to 019550; that ORs Nos. 019540 to 019549 (Exhibits
N-1 to N-10) were not listed in the cashbook for the FF. However, OR No. 019542 (Exhibit N-3)
and 019547 (N-8) which appear to have been cancelled were not taken up during the audit. The
audit team prepared a columnar pad listing down the ORs issued by the respondents. The same
was marked as Exhibit O and a folder containing the list of ORs (Exhibit P) was also identified.
She declared that the items in the list which appear to have been crossed out refer to the
deposits that have already been withdrawn by the litigants who deposited them.
4. The witness further declared that certain deposits did not correspond to any Official
Receipt although they appear to have been withdrawn by the depositors. One such deposit slip
is dated 25 April 1994 (Exhibit Q) and another dated 6 May 1994 (Exhibit R); that withdrawals
were made on 2 June 1994 (Exhibit S); 13 January 1995 (Exhibit S-1); 13 January 1995 (Exhibit
S-2); 12 April 1995 (Exhibit S-3); 24 April 1995 (Exhibit S-4) and 1 September 1999 (Exhibit S-5).
Ms. Laarni Mascardo, the Acting Cash Clerk IV of the RTC, Davao City, prepared a summary of
the said deposits and withdrawals. The same is contained in a sheet of yellow pad paper (Exhibit
T) which she signed (Exhibit T-1) showing a total of P2,474,000 deposited on 25 April 1994 and
6 May 1994 and ten withdrawals made on different dates but also amounting to P2,474,000.
The deposit of P642,200.00 made by Atty. Manuel Quinones on behalf of the spouses Pedrito
and Lourdes Fernandez (Exhibit V) was acknowledged by the respondents in a private receipt
(Exhibit U).
5. Ms. Yap brought to the hearing photocopies of seven pages of the subsidiary ledger
kept by the Supreme Court which were duly certified by the custodian of the same. The pages
were marked as Exhibits W, W-1 to W-6, inclusive. An examination of the same will reveal that
respondent Atty. Aldevera did not religiously submit a report every month as required by the
Supreme Court under Circular No. 32-93. In Exhibit W-2, it appears that there were no reports
submitted for the months of June, July and August, 1992. In Exhibit W-3, it appears that there
was no report for the month of September 1993. For 1996, there were reports only for the
months of April, May, June, July, August and October and for the year 1997, the only reports
are for January, March and September.
6. Ms. Yap also identified the Summary of Reconciliation (Exhibit Y), to which was
attached 13 pages of the annual reconciliation of the accounts for the years 1989 to 2000,
inclusive. As it appears in Exhibit Y, the total collections for the FF for the said years amounted
to P73,644,153.33 (Exhibit Y-2) while the withdrawals amounted to P48,957,443.85 (Exhibit Y-
1) thereby leaving a balance of P24,686,709.48 (Exhibit Y-3). However, in making the final
report, the audit team deducted the amounts of P20,100.30 as unaccounted withdrawal and
the amount of P35,531.07 as over withdrawal thus the total withdrawals should only be
P48,901,812.48 thus leaving a balance of P24,777,871.92 [this should be P24,742,340.85]. This
latter amount should have been intact in the custody of the respondents. But the remaining
balance of the FF account with the Land Bank Davao (Recto) City Branch was only
P15,496,282.87 as shown in the certification (Exhibit CC) issued by the said bank. This,
according to Ms. Yap, indicated a shortage of P9,428,478.75 [this should be P9,246,057.98]
(Exhibit FF, Memorandum of Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao). The
aforementioned final report concedes that a partial restitution in the amount of P455,505.68
was made thus leaving a net shortage of P8,972,923.07 [this should be P8,790,552.30]
7. Ms. Yap also identified a folder titled Statement of Unwithdrawn Fiduciary Fund
prepared by the respondents (Exhibit DD) which states that the total unwithdrawn FF is
P26,388,884.46 (Exhibit DD-1). The same Statement of Unwithdrawn FF as prepared by the
audit team was identified and marked as Exhibit EE. In the latter, the total unwithdrawn funds
amounted to P24,686,709.48 (Exhibit EE-1).
8. Ms. Yap testified that there are seven (7) different funds handled by the Clerk of
Court. They are (1) Clerk of Court General Fund (CoCGF); (2) Sheriffs General Fund (SGF); (3)
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF); (4) Fiduciary Fund (FF); (5) Sheriffs Trust Fund (STF); (6)
Victims Compensation Fund (VCF); (7) Legal Research Fund (LRF). Of these funds, the Supreme
Court is more concerned with the first five mentioned above. As to the sources of each, the
CoCGF, the JDF and the SGF are the fees provided in Rule 141 of the Rules of Court and other
sources that may accrue to these accounts as provided in En Banc Resolution No. 99-8-01-SC.
The FF comes from cash bonds, rental deposits and money consigned to the court while the STF
comes from deposits for redemption, deposits for publication and proceeds from auction sales.
Collections pertaining to the CoCGF and the SGF are remitted to the National Treasurer.
Collections pertaining to the JDF are remitted to the Supreme Court. The FF and the SGF remain
in the place where the court sits. These funds have to be returned to those who deposited them
once the purpose for which they were deposited no longer exists. The fund may be withdrawn
only upon the joint signatures of the Executive Judge and the Clerk of Court.
9. Official Receipts to be used for collections accruing to the first five funds mentioned
above, are supplied by the Supreme Court. For the collection of the VCF, official receipts must
be secured from the Department of Justice. Receipts for the Legal Research Fund can be had
from the UP Law Center and for cadastral fees, the official receipts can be secured from the
Land Registration Administration. The Court requires that receipts for collections must be
separate for each fund. Thus a booklet of ORs may be used only for CoCGF; another booklet for
the FF and so forth. This is provided in OCA Circular No. 22-94. These collections must be
recorded in separate cashbooks. The reason for this requirement, according to Ms. Yap is
because not all collections pertain to the Court. The CoCGF is remitted to the National Treasurer
as is the SGF while the JDF is remitted to the Supreme Court. The Sheriffs Trust Fund and the
Fiduciary Fund are kept with the depository bank and may be withdrawn only by the Executive
Judge and the Clerk of Court together. The reason for this is because these funds are only held
in trust for certain depositors who may claim them later.
10. Ms. Yap further declared that respondents failed to comply with Circular No. 50-95
because they failed to deposit all collections pertaining to the FF within twenty four (24) hours.
Respondents also failed to comply with Section 111 of the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual which required that collections be deposited with the depository bank daily if
the distance to the bank is less than 15 kilometers or the travel time is less than 1 day, whenever
the collections exceed P500.00.
11. Ms. Yap stated that an examination of the FF cashbook submitted by respondent
Atty. Aldevera revealed that she did not certify as true and correct, at the end of every month,
the entries therein. She also found out that respondents did not deposit all their collections for
the FF leaving always a balance exceeding P500.00.
12. On February 4, 2001, the audit team was directed to return to Davao to conduct
spot audits of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities x x x and the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
in order to finalize the audit of the latter. From the documents given to them and their
reconciliation of the FF, the team found out that there was a shortage of Nine Million Four
Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Eight Pesos and Seventy-Five Centavos
(P9,428,478.75) [this should be Nine Million Two Hundred Forty-Six Thousand Fifty-Seven Pesos
and Ninety-Eight Centavos (P9,246,057.98]).[14]
On cross-examination, Ms. Yap conceded that in 1997, Atty. Aldevera had verbally requested
Mrs. Antonina Soria, then the Chief of the Fiscal Monitoring Division, for an audit of her
accounts. However, due to lack of personnel, no audit could be done. An audit of her accounts
was only conducted on April 5, 2000 upon the order of then Court Administrator Alfredo
Benipayo.[15]
Finally, Ms. Yap declared that she gave Atty. Aldevera a year to find proof showing that there
were withdrawn fiduciary funds which were not included in the summary because there were
no documents to support them. Unfortunately, Atty. Aldevera was unable to further reduce the
amount of the unwithdrawn fiduciary funds. Although she had been suspended from office,
Atty. Aldevera could have asked the Courts permission to go over the records of her office to
see if there were withdrawn funds which were not carried in the audit.[16]
After the testimony of Ms. Yap, complainant made a formal offer of evidence in writing.
Thereafter, Atty. Aldevera testified in her defense. On direct examination, she ratified the
Explanation (Exhibit GG) and Comment (Exhibit HH) she had submitted earlier.
The Report of Investigating Officer, Justice Quimbo, summarized the testimony of Atty.
Aldevera, thus:
Respondent Aldevera declared that she had occupied the position of Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao
City, since May 1989 until 1 October [2001] when she was placed under preventive suspension.
She admitted that she knew Teresita Elegino who was then the cash clerk in said office; that
even before respondent Clerk of Court assumed office, Ms. Elegino was already performing the
functions of a cashier since 1983 or earlier under Atty. Ray Uson Velasco, then Clerk of Court.
She was handling the cash transactions of the office, depositing the collections with the
depository bank as well as keeping the documents pertaining to these transactions. She had
been performing these functions during the tenure of Atty. Aldeveras predecessors.
Reiterating what she had earlier stated in her two pleadings (Exhibits GG and HH), respondent
Aldevera declared that she had initiated reforms in her office by creating separate files for
deposit and withdrawal slips in the different funds handled by her office. Immediately after the
preliminary findings of the auditors regarding the existence of shortages, she relieved Ms.
Elegino and assigned Ms. Laarni Mercado to act as cashier. x x x She denied the statement of
Ms. Yap that the cash items found by the team during the cash count on 5 April 2000 were
returned to her. She denied any physical return of these items to her but declared that it was
Ms. Elegino who returned them to the vault.
She averred that she had reluctantly signed the cash count sheet (Exhibit I). She reasoned that
since she had nothing to do with the amounts found in the vault, Ms. Elegino should
acknowledge the same, but respondent alleged that she was informed by Ms. Yap that because
she was the accountable officer, she had to acknowledge the said cash items.
As regards her failure to certify to the correctness of the cashbook entries, respondenet
Aldevera reiterated her explanation that she did not feel compelled to do so because her
predecessors, Judge Virginia Europa, Judge Hilario Mapayo and Ray Uson Velasco also did not
certify said entries during their time. She had just followed their example. She presented sixty-
nine (69) entries of cashbooks (Exhibit 2) made during the time of her predecessors which the
latter failed to certify. She took exception to the testimony of Ms. Yap that not all the collections
were being deposited everyday because the cashbook showed big balances after the deposits.
Atty. Aldevera declared that her instruction to Ms. Elegino was to deposit the collections
everyday and she signed deposit slips prepared by said cash clerk. She admitted that she relied
on Ms. Elegino and did not bother to find out whether the deposits were actually made because
she really did not have any other time due to time constraints to go over the official receipts
and verify the collections of Elegino. She stated, however, that once in a while she checked on
the deposits made by the cash clerk but it was humanly impossible to go over the receipts to
verify the collections for the day specially that there were seven booklets being used for the
different funds.
She further averred that it was her intention to have all transactions entered in the cashbooks
and that is the reason she assigned other employees to give support to Ms. Elegino. She denied
knowledge of the several collections which were not supported by official receipts. She claimed
that her standing instruction to Ms. Elegino was always to issue an official receipt for every
amount she received. She claimed having learned of the instances mentioned by Ms. Yap where
no ORs were issued for such big amounts as P1,000,000.00 and P1,474,000.00 deposited in
Special Proceeding No. 3762-93 nor the deposit of P642,200.00 in Civil Case No. 21,[8]11-93.
She denied having failed to submit a monthly report required by the Court but admitted that
her salary was withheld for said failure.
Respondent Atty. Aldevera justified her encashment of checks issued by the Court to
employees saying that she had asked Ms. Soria, an official of the Court Administrators Office,
and the latter had told her that she may do so provided the checks are not postdated.
As regards the shortage mentioned in the final report (Exhibit FF) of the auditors[,] [s]he
maintained that she did not participate in the reconciliation of the items, hence she is not
bound by the audit report. She argued that had she been given more time and access to the
records in her office after she was preventively suspended, she could have reduced further the
shortage as found by the auditors.
Finally, respondent Aldevera reiterated the steps she had taken after the audit to secure from
the offices proof of withdrawals, etc.[17]
On cross-examination, Atty. Aldevera admitted that she knew that Elegino was engaged in
money-lending even before she took over as Clerk of Court. She did not believe that there was
any conflict in the duties of the cash clerk and her business. Atty. Aldevera saw it as Eleginos
way of earning additional income for her family. It never occurred to her to relieve Ms. Elegino
as cash clerk for her money-lending activity because Ms. Elegino told her that her business was
being financed by her mother-in-law and Elegino was also making a lot of money from her farm
in Malita.[18]
Moreover, she admitted that she was aware that salary checks of court employees were being
encashed by Elegino. Although she could see from the Fiduciary Fund cash book (Exhibit M)
that not all the collections were being deposited by Elegino, she, however, declared that she
did not see any irregularity in keeping a substantial amount of cash in the office because the
amount was entered in the cash book, which meant that the money was there and that was
the procedure being practiced. Atty. Aldevera admitted that she knew the rule that all monies
in excess of P500 should be deposited. When she confronted Elegino regarding the matter,
Elegino told her that the balance could not be deposited at the end of the month, but would be
carried to the following month.[19]
She immediately relieved Elegino of her duties as cash clerk on April 6, 2000 upon her discovery
that Elegino was keeping a big amount of cash in the vault which should not have been the
case, and upon seeing the many checks kept in the vault contrary to her instructions to deposit
them.[20]
Confronted with her statement that she made innovations such as creating folders for the
deposit and withdrawal slips for every fund and asked why she did not, from 1989 up to 2000,
bother to make sure that Elegino was following her instructions, Atty. Aldevera answered that
she saw that the folders were intact and there were a lot of documents placed in there, so she
presumed that her instructions were being followed. However, she discovered that there was
only substantial compliance by Elegino in keeping all documents properly, but she did not
bother to go over each and every folder supposed to contain those documents.[21]
On re-direct examination, Atty. Aldevera declared that the summary (Exhibit M-1) pertained to
June 1989 when she was only acting as Clerk of Court barely two months. As far as she could
remember, during the early years of her tenure, local auditors examined her accounts and if
they saw any irregularity in the failure of Elegino to deposit all the collections everyday, these
auditors would have called her attention. Moreover, it was the procedure being followed by
her predecessors.[22]
After her testimony, Atty. Aldevera made a formal offer of her evidence, which was admitted
by the Hearing Officer.
On rebuttal, Ms. Verina Yap declared that the audit team had considered the ORs in Exhibit 10
in favor or respondents. She insisted that the discovered over remittance in the General Fund
may have come from forfeited bonds which were transferred without the corresponding ORs.
She stated that not all transfers were included in Exhibit 10.[23]
On sur-rebuttal, Atty. Aldevera declared that all forfeited bonds were transferred to the
General Fund and later to the JDF through ORs correspondingly issued and that she saw to it
that this was done. She insisted that there never was a transfer made without the
corresponding official receipt.[24]
Thereafter, the Hearing Officer, Justice Quimbo, gave both parties 30 days to file their
respective memorandum.
In his Report, Justice Quimbo averred that the records presented by the complainant, which
were taken from respondents files, clearly proved the shortages in the Sheriffs General Fund
and the Sheriffs Trust Fund in the amount of P2,959.21 and P229,283.85, respectively (which
shortages were restituted by respondent Elegino), and the shortage of P8,972,923.07 [this
should be P8,790,552.30], in the Fiduciary Fund.
Justice Quimbo stated that there was no direct evidence linking Atty. Aldevera to any
misappropriation of public funds. In fact, Elegino executed an Undertaking wherein she
declared that she assumes full responsibility for any shortages which the audit may discover.
The document, however, was never identified nor offered in evidence for respondent Atty.
Aldevera. Morever, in a subsequent Manifestation, Elegino repudiated the Undertaking and
claimed that she signed the document because Atty. Aldevera told her that it was a normal
audit procedure. She also denied that she had given the title to her property to Atty. Aldevera
as an admission of any liability.
According to Justice Quimbo, the testimony of Atty. Aldevera merely repeated what she had
stated in her Explanation and in her Comment and dwelt on the reforms she instituted and the
efforts she exerted after the discovery of the shortages, which cannot exonerate her. She never
questioned the accuracy of the findings in the financial audit, which is an admission of the cash
shortages in her office. She, however, blamed co-respondent Elegino for the shortages.
Justice Quimbo did not give credence to Atty. Aldeveras assertion that she could not be faulted
for the shortages. He cited the evaluation of then Deputy Court Administrator Christopher Lock
in his Memorandum dated March 19, 2002, thus:
The principal argument of Atty. Aldevera is that long before she was appointed Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Ms. Elegino has been the cash clerk of the said office.
She claims that there was no reason for her to believe that there was something amiss in the
handling of the court collections. This is not entirely true.
On page 3 of the Comment, Atty. Aldevera stated that she discovered incomplete entries in the
cash books of Ms. Elegino, but her solution to this problem was to designate additional
personnel to assist Ms. Elegino. Atty. Aldevera should have assumed greater responsibility in
the financial transactions of her office, by handling personally the transactions or by at least
replacing Ms. Elegino. Atty. Aldeveras incompetence is exacerbated by the fact that she knew
that Ms. Elegino was engaged in money-lending activities (Comment, pp. 10-11). The mere fact
that Ms. Elegino was engaged in this business should have alerted Atty. Aldevera to take the
necessary precaution of replacing her or to be meticulous in inspecting the cash books, official
receipts, deposit slips and the bank books of her office. If only Atty. Aldevera inspected these
books and documents she could have discovered that the monthly deposits of her Office were
way below the monthly collections (see Partial Report dated July 18, 2000, pp. 6-8). This is the
reason why her claim that she verified the deposits/posting and cash positions and monitored
the handling of cash of Ms. Elegino (Comment, p. 7) cannot be given credence.
The other defenses raised by Atty. Aldevera, far from exonerating her, merely underscores her
incompetence. On the charge that she failed to certify the entries in the cash books, she
contends that from the time she assumed the position of Clerk of Court nobody called her
attention that she had to certify the said entries (Comment, p. 2). It seems that Atty. Aldevera
is not even aware of her duties as Clerk of Court, and worse, she lacks the dedication to know
her job.
Another indicia of her incompetence is her answer to the charge of failure to deposit checks of
Judges and court personnel encashed from their office collections. Just like before, she claims
that she relied on Ms. Eleginos verbal assurances that the deposit slips truly reflected the
collections of the day. It clearly appears that Atty. Aldevera did not even know that the mere
encashment of private checks using the collections of the court is in itself already a violation of
Sec. 105 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (see also Report on the Financial
Audit in RTC, General Santos City and the RTC and MTC of Polomok, South Cotabato; A.M. No.
96-1-25-RTC; April 18, 1997). Added to this, is the fact that when the audit team examined the
contents of the vault, it contained stale checks of court employees duly endorsed by Atty.
Aldevera (see Partial Report, p. 11).
Atty. Aldevera is likewise offering the excuse that her volume of work made it impossible for
her to monitor the work of Ms. Elegino. This deserves scant consideration since the task of
monitoring the cash flow of her office is not as difficult as she wants to make it appear. The
only things she has to do each day is to compute the total collections based on the cash book
or the official receipts and compare this with the cash on hand. If these tally, then she should
prepare the deposit slip and if it is no longer possible to deposit the money in the bank, to keep
the same in the vault. On the following day, she should see to it that the money is deposited
and that the deposit slip is properly validated by the bank. In sum, the task of monitoring the
cash flow of the office involves simple mathematical computations. That she did not follow this
procedure is evidenced by the fact that on April 5, 2000 the audit team discovered that the cash
on hand was P829,282.02 representing collections for the past several months (Partial Report,
pp. 1-3). Besides the accumulation of the said amount is a violation of Sec. 111 of the
Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, which requires that a collection of P500 or more
should be deposited daily.
Atty. Aldevera likewise passes the blame on Ms. Elegino for her failure to submit to this Court
their monthly reports claiming that Ms. Elegino failed to mail the same. If this is true, she should
have seen to it that those reports were, although late, immediately mailed to this Court. Here
we can see again that Atty. Aldevera had personal knowledge of the shortcomings of Ms.
Elegino and yet her only reaction was merely warn the latter. Atty. Aldevera even added that
during the audit, she found several unsigned monthly reports in the filing cabinet of Ms.
Elegino. This only goes to show that there were months that Atty. Aldevera did not sign any
report and yet she did not even notice it nor did she call Ms. Eleginos attention.
The last portion of her Comment deserves scant consideration as these were measures taken
by Atty. Aldevera after the audit. For obvious reasons these can in no way exonerate her.
In sum, Atty. Aldevera failed to present a satisfactory explanation regarding the cash shortages
in her office.
According to Justice Quimbo, the evidence presented during the hearings justified the
conclusions of then Deputy Court Administrator Christopher Lock who evaluated the pleadings
of respondents.
Justice Quimbo stated that unlike Atty. Aldevera, Elegino contested the accuracy of the findings
of the audit in her Affidavit, but she did not offer any evidence to prove that it was not accurate.
Hence, in the absence of countervailing evidence, the findings of the auditors have high
probative value. Justice Quimbo held respondents Atty. Aldevera and Elegino liable for the
massive defalcation of funds of the RTC, Davao City, and recommended their dismissal from
service.
The Court agrees with Justice Quimbo that Atty. Aldevera, as the Clerk of Court of RTC, Davao
City, is accountable for the shortage of P8,972,923.07 [this should be P8,790,552.30] in the
Fiduciary Fund because she is the designated custodian of the Courts funds. Section B, Chapter
1 of the 1991 Manual for Clerks of Court and the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court state:
The Clerk of Court has general administrative supervision over all the personnel of the Court.
As regards the Courts funds and revenues, records, properties and premises, said officer is the
custodian. Thus, the Clerk of Court is generally also the treasurer, accountant, guard and
physical plant manger thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
In addition, the duties of a Clerk of Court as Cashier and Disbursement Officer contained in the
1991 Manual for Clerks of Court[25] are as follows:

1. Collects and receives, by himself or thru a duly appointed cashier, all monies in
payment of all legal fees.
2. Receives, by himself or thru a duly appointed cashier, deposits, fines and dues.
3. Controls the disbursements of funds appropriated by the provincial and city
governments as aid to the Court.
4. Disburses funds quarterly allocated by the Supreme Court to the branches upon
the direction and approval of the Executive Judge.
From the above duties, it is clear that the Clerk of Court is primarily accountable for all funds
that are collected for the court whether personally received by him or by a duly appointed
cashier who is under his supervision and control.
As the custodian of the Courts funds, revenues, records, properties and premises, the Clerk of
Court is liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and
properties.[26] Hence, Atty. Aldevera cannot pass the blame for the shortages incurred to
Elegino who performed the task of handling, depositing, and recording of cash and check
deposits. As Clerk of Court, Atty. Aldevera has general supervision over all personnel of her
court. It was incumbent upon her to ensure that Ms. Elegino was performing her duties and
responsibilities in accordance with the circulars on deposits and collections[27] so that all court
funds are properly accounted for.
The 1991 Manual for Clerks of Court[28] and the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court[29]
both provide that [a] Clerk of Court found short of money accountabilities may be dismissed
from the service.
The penalty of dismissal for cash shortage incurred by the Office of the Clerk of Court was
imposed in Office of the Court Administrator v. Clerk of Court Ermelina C. Bernardino, et al.[30]
The Court therein ruled:
Respondent Banting, even assuming arguendo that he did not take part in any irregularity, was
grossly negligent when he did not properly oversee the collection, reporting and remitting of
court funds. Consequently, his failure to remit his collections amounting to P1,242,117.38
constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. By his failure to properly
remit the cash collections that are public funds, he transgressed the trust reposed in him as
cashier and disbursement officer of the Court. This Court imposes the supreme penalty of
dismissal.
xxx
Particularly referring to Clerks of Court, and as the custodians of the courts funds, revenues,
records, properties and premises, they perform very delicate functions and are liable for any
loss, shortage, destruction or impairment thereof. For those who have fallen short of their
accountabilities, we have not hesitated to impose the ultimate penalty. This Court had never
and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public
accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice
system.[31]
Similarly, the failure of Atty. Aldevera to account for the shortage of P8,790,552.30 in the
Fiduciary Fund constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. Each
offense is punished with dismissal even for the first violation of the offense under Section 22
(a) (b) and (c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292[32] and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Further, the shortage in the Fiduciary Fund incurred by Atty. Aldevera can also be attributed to
respondent Elegino as Cash Clerk III of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City.[33]
The Court notes that despite proper notice, respondent Elegino failed to file a Comment on the
Final Report and to appear during the hearing of this case, which was held in Davao City to
accommodate her. She merely submitted an Affidavit and a Manifestation and Submission of
Document(s) as Respondents Exhibits. However, even if she failed to refute the charges against
her during the hearing, she can still be held administratively liable. Where the opportunity to
be heard has been accorded, there is no denial of due process.[34] If it is not availed of, it is
deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.[35]
The testimonies of Atty. Aldevera and Ms. Verina Yap, as well as the records show that
respondent Elegino failed to properly carry out her duties as cash clerk which resulted in the
shortage of P8,790,552.30 in the Fiduciary Fund. Hence, respondent Elegino is found guilty of
gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Further, the Investigating Officer found and the records showed that Atty. Aldevera violated
provisions of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual and Court Circulars pertaining
to collections and deposits and the issuance of official receipts.
Section 111 of the Government Auditing Rules and Regulations requires collecting officers to
deposit their collections daily when the distance to the depository bank is less than 15
kilometers or the travel time is less than one day daily whenever the accumulated collections
amount to P500 or more. Atty. Aldevera admitted that she was aware of this rule. Nevertheless,
she and respondent Elegino violated the rule considering that in the audit of April 5, 2000, the
auditors found the amount of P373,337.16 in currency and P455,944.86 in other cash items in
the vault of the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Moreover, Circular No. 50-95[36] requires that [a]ll collections from bailbonds, rental deposits
and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within twenty-four (24) hours by the Clerk of
Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the Philippines. The records
reveal that this was not done. Audit Team Leader Verina F. Yap testified that respondents failed
to deposit collections pertaining to the Fiduciary Fund within 24 hours. Atty. Aldevera herself
admitted that she discovered deposit slips already signed by her, but which were not delivered
to the depository bank by Elegino. The Investigating Officer opined that this happened because
Atty. Aldevera was remiss in monitoring the activities of Elegino.
A.M. No. 95-4-143-RTC (Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial audit of RTC-Br. 4, Panablo,
Davao Del Norte),[37] promulgated on March 13, 1998, held:
The Clerk of Court may not keep funds in his custody as the same should be deposited
immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his
court is located should there be no branch of the LBP in the locality. Thus, the failure of Atty.
Genete to remit the funds to the Municipal Treasurer of Panabo, Davao, constitutes gross
neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Further, Circular No. 32-93,[38] requires all Clerks of Court/Accountable Officers to submit to
this Court a monthly report of collections for all funds not later than the 10th day of each
succeeding month. For the RTC Fiduciary Fund, the monthly report should include the [o]riginal
copy of report of deposits and withdrawals and validated duplicate copy of official receipts and
deposit slips; and in cases of withdrawals, a copy of the order of the Court duly authenticated
with Courts seal and a copy of the acknowledgement receipt.
According to the records of the Accounting Division of the Office of the Court Administrator,
Atty. Aldevera did not send the required reports of deposits and withdrawals for the months of
June to December, 1989; January to December, 1990; January to December 1991; May to
December, 1994; January to December, 1995; January to April, 1996; November to December,
1996; February, 1997; April to August, 1997; October to December, 1977; January 1998; March
to December, 1998; and January to December 1999. Such failure was confirmed by Atty.
Aldevera in her Comment wherein she disclosed that while retrieving documents for the
auditors during the April 2000 audit, she discovered that there were some monthly reports
inside the filing cabinets of Elegino which were not yet signed by her, showing that she was
remiss in complying with Circular No. 32-93.
The record also reveals that the Office of the Clerk of Court failed to issue official receipts for
collections for the Fiduciary Fund in Special Case No. 3762-93 amounting to P2,474,000 and in
Civil Case No. 21,811-93 amounting to P642,200,00 in violation of Sec. 61 and 113, Article VI of
the Auditing and Accounting Manual.
The safeguarding of funds and collections, submission to this Court of a monthly report of
collections for all funds, the proper issuance of official receipts for collections are essential to
an orderly administration of justice. Hence, respondents failure to comply with the
aforementioned Court Circulars and other relevant rules designed to promote full
accountability for public funds constitutes gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct.
Some recent development in this case are the following:
On August 14, 2006, the Court adopted a Resolution stating:
The Court Resolved to NOTE the Memorandum dated June 15, 2006 field by the Office of the
Court Administrator relative to the letter dated May 2, 2006 of Atty. Nenita C. Chua,
representative of Pryce Corporation, requesting for the release of the amount of P3,353,357.84
consigned with the RTC, Davao City, which amount was among those collected by Atty. Marilou
Dureza-Aldevera, Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City, who was placed under suspension as a result
of the financial audit conducted on her books of account.
Subsequently, on August 23, 2006, respondent Atty. Aldevera filed a Manifestation, thus:
xxx
1. She was in receipt of AUGUST 14, 2006 of the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated
June 27, 2006, which is quoted hereunder:
The Court Resolved to NOTE the Memorandum dated June 15, 2006 filed by the Office of the
Court Administrator relative to the letter dated May 2, 2006 of Atty. Nenita C. Chua,
representative of Pryce Corporation, requesting for the release of the amount of P3,353,357.84
consigned with the RTC, Davao City, which amount was among those collected by Atty. Marilou
Dureza-Aldevera, Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City, who was placed under suspension as a result
of the financial audit conducted on her books of account.
2. The consignation of the amount of P3,353,357.84 was made by Pryce Corporation,
through its lawyer, the late Atty. Manuel Jesus Escudero on January 18, 1995 under Managers
BPI Managers CHECK No. 461779 dated January 9, 1995;
3. Official Receipt No. 4018399 dated January 18, 1995 was accordingly issued in their
favor. Certified photocopy of said Official Receipt is hereto attached as ANNEX 1;
4. Said BPI Managers CHECK NO. 461779 dated January 9. 1995 was deposited on
January 19, 1995 with the fiduciary development fund account No. 0161-1521-485 of the
Regional Trial Court, Davao City. Certified photocopy of said Deposit Slip duly validated by the
bank is hereto attached as ANNEX 2;
5. -- In relation to the letter of Pryce Corporation through their counsel, Atty. Nenita
C. Chua dated March 2, 2006 for the withdrawal of the said amount, the Clerk of Court V,
Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City, Atty. Edipolo P. Sarabia,
Jr., sent a letter dated April 24, 2006 to hon. Renato A. Fuentes, Executive Judge, rtc, Davao
City, informing the latter that the said amount of P3,353,357.84 is still intact and remain
unwithdrawn from the depository bank, Land Bank of the Philippines, but required Pryce
Corporation to present and surrender the original copy of the Official Receipt, as an accounting
procedure and for audit purposes. Certified photocopy of the letter is hereto attached ad
ANNEX 3;
6. Per information from the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City, Pryce Corporation
however, failed to present the requirements, hence, was not able to withdraw said deposit.
 [13] Id. at 390.
On September 5, 2006, the Court NOTED the Manifestation. [14] Report of Justice Romulo S. Quimbo (Ret.), pp. 18-24.
[15] Id. at 24-25.
WHEREFORE, the Court rules as follows: [16] Id. at 26.
[17] Id. at 27-30.
1. Respondents Clerk of Court Marilou Dureza-Aldevera and Cash Clerk Teresita M. [18] Id. at 30.
Elegino, RTC, Davao City are hereby found GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave [19] Id. at 32.
misconduct. Atty. Marilou Dureza-Aldevera and Ms. Teresita M. Elegino are hereby DISMISSED [20] Id. at 31.
from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with [21] Ibid.
prejudice to re-employment in any government office, including government-owned and [22] Id at 32-33.
controlled corporations. [23] Id. at 34.
[24] Ibid.
2. Atty. Marilou Dureza-Aldevera and Teresita M. Elegino are ordered to jointly and [25] The Manual applicable before the preventive suspension of Atty. Aldevera.
severally RESTITUTE, within thirty (30) days from notice, the amount of EIGHT MILLION SEVEN [26] Office of the Court Administrator v. Bawalan, A.M. No. P-93-945, March 24, 1994, 231 SCRA
HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO PESOS and THIRTY CENTAVOS 408,411.
(P8,790,552.30) representing their shortage in the Fiduciary Fund. [27] Office of the Court Administrator v. Bernardino, A.M. No. P-97-1258, January 31, 2005, 450
SCRA 88, 116-117.
3. The Employees Leave Division, Office of the Administrative Services, OCA is DIRECTED [28] Paragraph 4, Section H, Chapter 1.
to compute the balance of the earned leave credits of Atty. Marilou Dureza-Aldevera and [29] Chapter IX, D(4).
Teresita M. Elegino and forward the same to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office, [30] Supra, note 27.
OCA, which shall compute its monetary value. The amount, as well as other benefits they may [31] Id. at 117, 119-120.
be entitled to, and the withheld salaries and allowances of respondents shall be applied as part [32] The Administrative Code of 1987.
of the restitution of the shortage. [33] Supra, note 27, at 118.
[34] Ibid.
4. Finally, OCA is further DIRECTED to study the possibility of the filing of criminal [35] Ibid.
complaints against respondents and other persons in light of the facts of this case. [36] Circular No. 50-95 took effect on November 1, 1995.
[37] 287 SCRA 510, 529.
SO ORDERED. [38] Promulgated on July 9, 1993.

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

[1] Rollo, p. 182.

[2] Id. at 184.
[3] Id. at 185-186.
[4] Id. at 189.
[5] Id. at 159.
[6] Id. at 438-439.
[7] Id. at 439-440.
[8] Id. at 346.
[9] Id. at 354.
[10] Id. at 349.
[11] Id. at 387.
[12] Id. at 349.
 full payment of a P50,000 bond. Accordingly, Atty. Maria Zoraida Zabat Tuazon (Atty. Tuazon),
the Branch Clerk of Court, issued the corresponding writs of execution.

EN BANC On 15 July 2002, respondent telephoned Jennifer Baldueza (Baldueza), the Marketing Officer
of SGIC, and informed her that the trial court issued a writ of execution for P50,000 against
OFFICE OF THE COURT A.M. No. P-02-1665 SGIC. Respondent allegedly said that he could conceal the writ of execution if SGIC would give
ADMINISTRATOR, him P25,000. Baldueza replied that SGIC did not have that much money.
Complainant, Present:
On 12 August 2002, respondent again telephoned Baldueza to ask if SGIC already had the
PANGANIBAN, C.J., money, otherwise he would enforce the writ of execution. Respondent told Baldueza that he
PUNO, would be at the SGIC office on 21 August 2002 at 2:30 p.m. to pick up from Baldueza the P4,000
QUISUMBING, and he would get the balance some other time.
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, On 20 August 2002, Baldueza and SGIC Clerk Maria Victoria D. Lim (Lim) went to the Anti-
CARPIO, Organized Crime Unit of the Office for Business Concerns, PNP Criminal Investigation and
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Detection Group (CIDG-AOCBCD) and lodged a complaint against respondent. The Chief of the
CORONA, Intelligence Branch of the CIDG-AOCBCD prepared two P1,000 bills for powder dusting mixed
CARPIO MORALES, with four undusted P500 bills for use in the entrapment operation. Lim was assigned to give
CALLEJO, SR., the money to respondent.
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, On 21 August 2002, at around 9:00 a.m., joint elements of CIDG-AOCBCD-Intelligence Branch
GARCIA, and and AFP-ACTAF led by PS1 Arnold Palomo (PS1 Palomo) and D/Sgt. Noel C. Camada were
VELASCO, JR., JJ. dispatched to conduct the entrapment operation in Room 306, Aurelio Building, 9th Avenue,
EDWIN N. LATAYAN, Grace Park, Kalookan City. Upon arrival of the team, PS1 Palomo coordinated with the
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial employees of the insurance company while the rest of the team positioned themselves in
Court, Branch 107, Quezon Promulgated: strategic places within the vicinity and waited for respondent.
City,
Respondent. September 13, 2006 At around 3:00 p.m., respondent arrived and talked directly to Lim in a room with its door left
open. A few seconds later, Lim handed over the marked money to respondent. The police
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x operatives approached respondent and, then and there, placed him under arrest. When asked
for the marked money, respondent reached for his right back pocket, took the marked money
and surrendered the amount of P4,000 which included the powder-dusted P1,000-bills.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Respondent Edwin N. Latayan (respondent) is the Sheriff of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC-Branch 107) while Judge Rosalina L. Pison (Judge Pison) is that courts
presiding judge. On 13 May 2002, Judge Pison ordered the issuance of a writ of execution
against Summit Guaranty and Insurance Company, Inc. (SGIC) in Criminal Case No. 01-
103713[1] for the full payment of a P30,000 bond. On 2 July 2002, Judge Pison ordered the
issuance of another writ of execution against SGIC in Criminal Case No. 01-105257[2] for the
Respondent was detained and charged in an Information for robbery-extortion. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. C-66090 (2002). The recommended bail was P100,000 and
respondent was eventually released on bail.
During the last week of August 2002, Judge Pison noticed that respondent had not been
reporting for work. Judge Pisons clerk of court informed her that respondent was caught in an
entrapment operation in Kalookan City and was detained. Later, on a Saturday, Judge Pison
received a telephone call in her house from respondent. When Judge Pison asked respondent
about the entrapment, respondent allegedly admitted he was involved in an entrapment in
Kalookan City and was detained. Judge Pison told respondent to see her at her office on
Monday but respondent failed to do
so. Thus, Judge Pison requested her clerk of court to tell respondent to tender his
resignation.[3]
Meanwhile, in a letter dated 27 August 2002, Judge Pison wrote the Court Administrator
recommending that respondent be suspended from the service. In her letter dated 10
September 2002, Judge Pison attached a certified true copy of the Information and requested
the detail of respondent at the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC).
On 31 August 2002, respondent submitted his letter of resignation but on 2 September 2002,
Judge Pison received a letter from respondent withdrawing this letter of resignation.
Acting on the letter of Judge Pison, the Court issued a Resolution dated 16 December 2002
docketing the case as a regular administrative matter and directing respondent to comment on
the documents relative to the robbery and extortion charges against him. The Court suspended
respondent pending the final outcome of the criminal case against him considering that the
evidence against him was prima facie strong.
In his Comment dated 8 April 2003, respondent denies that he demanded money from SGIC in
exchange for the non-service of the writ of execution. Respondent claims that the P4,000 he
received on 21 August 2002 was part of the initial payment of P6,000 for collection pursuant to
the order of Judge Pison. He further claims he called Baldueza of SGIC to remind her that SGICs
pending obligation was due. Respondent prays for the dismissal of this administrative case.[4]
On 29 April 2003, Judge Pison wrote a letter to the Court Administrator requesting that,
whatever might be the outcome of the criminal case, respondent should not be detailed
anymore in her sala as she could not allow respondent to work in her court because respondent
admitted to her the entrapment.
In the Resolution dated 13 August 2003, the Court resolved to refer this case to Executive Judge
Natividad A. Giron-Dizon (Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon) of the RTC-Quezon City for
investigation, report and recommendation. At the initial investigation, Judge Pison, Baldueza,
Lim and respondent appeared. As prayed for, they were given 15 days within which to submit
their respective affidavits and counter-affidavits. Judge Pison, Baldueza
and respondent submitted their respective affidavits.
On 22 January 2004, Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon submitted her report finding respondent
guilty of dishonesty in the performance of his duties. She recommended that respondent be
dismissed from the service with perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government
service.
Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon noted that if respondents contention that he was just collecting
SGICs obligation on forfeited bonds were true, he should have issued the corresponding receipt
immediately after receiving the money. According to Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon,
execution of forfeited bonds is paid directly to the OCC which issues clearances. It is not the
practice of the sheriff to enforce a writ on forfeited bonds. The bonding company settles its
obligation with the OCC and the court does not allow staggered payments on forfeited bonds.
Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon stated that respondent had no authority to collect partial
payment since respondent was not an accountable officer.
Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon further noted that if respondent really believed he was
innocent, he should have immediately called the branch clerk of Judge Pison during the
entrapment instead of allowing himself to be detained and charged.
On 1 March 2004, the Court referred this case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The OCA adopted the findings and recommendation of Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon and
stated that persons involved in the dispensation of justice must live up to the strictest standards
of integrity, probity, uprightness, honesty and diligence in the public service. Sheriffs, as
frontline representatives of the justice system, should be imbued with a sense of
professionalism in the performance of their duties. Thus, the OCA found respondent guilty of
dishonesty and recommended his dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in
the government service.
We find the reports and recommendations of Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon and the OCA
well-taken.
Respondent admitted having received the P4,000 allegedly as partial payment of the SGIC
obligation, but claimed he was surprised when PNP-CIDG operatives accosted and
apprehended him. Respondent denied extorting money from SGIC or violating his duties as
sheriff. He admitted calling SGIC on 21 August 2003 to remind them of the courts order
directing SGIC to pay, in staggered basis. He then went to the SGIC office to receive the P4,000.
As he further admitted in his Affidavit, respondent informed Judge Pison on 24 August 2002 of
his plight and relayed to her the circumstances pertaining to his arrest.[5]
It took respondent some time to inform his superiors of his whereabouts. As correctly pointed
out by Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon, if respondent believed himself to be innocent, he could
have called his superiors or Judge Pison for assistance.[6] Under a situation where respondents
honesty, credibility and integrity are at stake, respondent should have exerted his best effort
to prove his innocence. As it stands, respondent simply allowed himself to be arrested and
detained.
As pointed out by Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon, it is not the practice of a sheriff to enforce
the writ on forfeited bonds. The bonding company simply settles its obligation with the Office
of the Clerk of Court. Moreover, courts do not allow staggered payments on forfeited bonds
and respondent had no authority to collect partial payment because he is not an accountable
officer.[7] Even if respondent had such an authority, still he did not issue a receipt immediately
after receiving the money.
In the implementation of a writ of execution, only the payment of sheriffs fees may be received
by sheriffs. Sheriffs are not allowed to receive voluntary payments from parties in the course
of the performance of their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interest of the service
because even assuming arguendo such payments were indeed given and received in good faith,
this fact alone would not dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble
purposes. Corollary, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-
litigant without observing the proper steps; otherwise, it would amount to extortion.[8]
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
High standards are expected of sheriffs, who play an important role in the administration of Associate Justice Associate Justice
justice.[9] At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are
indispensably in close contact with litigants. Hence, their conduct should be geared towards
maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court.[10] The Court condemns and would never
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration
of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
people in the judiciary.[11] Associate Justice Associate Justice

Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
dishonesty is a grave offense which carries with it the penalty of dismissal, even if committed
for the first time. Under Section 58 of the same rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it the
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
from re-employment in the government service. Associate Justice Associate Justice

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Edwin N. Latayan, Sheriff IV of Branch 107 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, GUILTY of DISHONESTY. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent from
the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in the government service. CANCIO C. GARCIA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents records with this Court.

SO ORDERED.
[1] Entitled People of the Philippines v. Patrick Mangit-es y Nget-Teg.
[2] Entitled People of the Philippines v. Ric Sigen y Daes, et al.
[3] Rollo, pp. 50-51, Affidavit, pp. 2-3.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN [4] Rollo, p. 26.
Chief Justice [5] Id. at 65-67.
[6] Report and Recommendation, p. 6.
[7] Id.
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING [8] Tan v. Peredes, A.M. No. P-04-1789 and A.M. No. RTJ-04-1841, 22 July 2005, 464 SCRA 47;
Associate Justice Associate Justice Rizal
Commercial Banking Corp. v. Quilantang, 413 Phil. 13 (2001).
[9] Ignacio v. Payumo, A.M. No. P-00-1396, 24 October 2000, 344 SCRA 169.
[10] Canlas v. Balasbas, A.M. No. P-99-1317, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 41.
CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ [11] Madrid v. Quebral, A.M. Nos. P-03-1744 and P-03-1745, 7 October 2003, 413 SCRA 1.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA- MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION
RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED A.M. No. P-05-1949
IN THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT [Formerly A.M. No. 04-9-255-MCTC]
TRIAL COURT, RAGAY-DEL
GALLEGO, CAMARINES SUR
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 27, 2006
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
Tinga, J.:
This disposes of the administrative case against Darius Ramon C. Abengoza (Abengoza), Officer-
in-Charge (OIC)/Acting Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ragay-del
Gallego, Camarines Sur.
It appears that Abengoza was designated as OIC/Acting Clerk of Court in a memorandum dated
May 6, 2002 of Hon. Manuel E. Contreras (Judge Contreras), Acting Presiding Judge of the said
court, due to the indefinite leave of absence of Clerk of Court II, Ricardo Roehl P. Ocfemia
(Ocfemia).[1] On October 17, 2002, however, Judge Contreras relieved Abengoza of his
designation due to the latters failure to make the necessary remittances of his cash collections
and to submit the required financial reports on time. Subsequently, Judge Contreras requested
that a financial and judicial audit of his court be immediately conducted.[2]
It was discovered during the financial audit that collections on the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF), Clerk of Court General Fund, and Fiduciary Fund for the months of August to October 16,
2002 with an aggregate amount of P62,934.80 were not reported and remitted on time to their
corresponding depository accounts, and salary checks of employees amounting to P19,095.00
were encashed from court collections in violation of existing Supreme Court administrative
circulars. As a result, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Abengoza
be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 and disqualified from being an accountable officer of any
first and second level court.[3]
The matter was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, for investigation, report and recommendation. Accordingly, Executive Judge
Cecilia R. Borja-Soler (Judge Borja-Soler) conducted an investigation and submitted a Report[4]
dated December 23, 2005.
The Report reveals that Abengoza admitted his lapses but attributed them to his lack of training
for the designated post. According to Abengoza, he tried his best to diligently perform his duties
as OIC/Acting Clerk of Court apart from his regular duties as Clerk II.[5] He divulged that he
committed an error when he deposited the amount of P19,095.00 to the JDF when it was
supposed to have been deposited to the Fiduciary Fund. From then on, he opted to keep the
cash collections inside Ocfemias drawer, hoping that the latter would soon resume his regular
work.[6]
Avengoza also admitted having allowed the encashment of the salary checks of his officemates
from the courts cash collection but claimed that the practice was done in good faith.[7]
In view of Avengozas admission of his mistakes and plea for the Courts understanding, Judge
Borja-Soler recommends that he be fined the amount of P3,000.00 and disqualified from being
an accountable officer of any first and second level court.[8]
We are in accord with the findings and recommendation of Judge Borja-Soler.
Clerks of court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt and sound
administration of justice. Their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders,
processes and concerns. They perform a delicate function as designated custodians of the
courts funds, revenues, records, properties and premises. As such, they generally are also the
treasurer, accountant, guard and physical plant manager thereof. They are liable for any loss,
shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property.[9]
It is the duty of clerks of court to perform their responsibilities faithfully, so that they can fully
comply with the circulars on deposits of collections. They are reminded to deposit immediately,
with authorized government depositaries, the various funds they have collected because they
are not authorized to keep those funds in their custody. The unwarranted failure to fulfill these
responsibilities deserves administrative sanction and not even the full payment of the
collection shortages will exempt the accountable officer from liability.[10]
Abengozas practice of keeping the courts cash collections inside Ocfemias drawer was
imprudent and foolhardy. His action was in complete violation of Administrative Circular No. 3-
2000 dated June 15, 2000 which commands that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited
immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an authorized
government depository bank. The procedural guidelines of this circular provide:
II. Procedural Guidelines WHEREFORE, Darius Ramon C. Abengoza is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of P3,000.00 payable
A. Judiciary Development Fund to this Court within five (5) days from notice hereof. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED from being an
xxxx accountable officer of any first and second level court.
3. Systems and Procedures.
xxxx SO ORDERED.
c. In the RTC, MeTC, MTCC, MTC, MCTC, SDC and SCC. The daily collections for the Fund in these
courts shall be deposited everyday with the nearest LBP branch for the account of the Judiciary DANTE O. TINGA
Development Fund, Supreme Court, Manila SAVINGS ACCOUNT NO. 0591-0116-34 or if Associate Justice
depositing daily is not possible, deposits for the Fund shall be at the end of every month,
provided, however, that whenever collections for the Fund reach P500.00, the same shall be WE CONCUR:
deposited immediately even before the period above-indicated.
xxxx LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Collections shall not be used for encashment of personal checks, salary checks, etc. x x x Associate Justice
xxxx Chairperson
B. General Fund (GF)
(1.) Duty of the Clerks of Court, Officer-in-Charge or Accountable Officers.The Clerks of Court, ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Officers-in-Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court, or their accountable duly authorized Associate Justice Associate Justice
representatives designated by them in writing, who must be accountable officers, shall receive
the General Fund collections, issue the proper receipt therefor, maintain a separate cash book PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
properly marked CASH BOOK FOR CLERK OF COURTS GENERAL FUND AND SHERIFFS GENERAL Associate Justice
FUND, deposit such collections in the manner herein prescribed, and render the proper
Monthly Report of Collections and Deposits for said Fund. [1]Rollo, p. 51.

xxxx [2]Id. at 52.

Further, Abengozas act of allowing the encashment of salary checks from the courts collections [3]Id. at pp. 1-3; Memorandum dated September 10, 2004.
directly contravenes the same circular.
[4]Id. at 51-55.
The excuse of lack of prior training and orientation in administering fiduciary fund collections
and eventual restitution and deposit of these collections on October 24, 2002 do not absolve [5]Id. at 52-53.
Abengoza from liability.
[6]Id.
In Re: Gener C. Endona,[11] the clerk of court was fined the amount of P2,000.00 for belatedly
depositing the courts collections. The Court held that strict observance of the rules and [7]Id.
regulations regarding the remittance of these funds is necessary to safeguard them against the
possibility of loss or misuse and to ensure that the government is not deprived of its interest [8]Id. at 55.
earnings.[12] In Re: Financial Audit of Accounts of Clerk of Court Pacita T. Sendin,[13] on the
other hand, the Court imposed a higher fine of P5,000.00 on the clerk of court because of the [9]Misajon v. Feranil, A.M. No. P-02-1565, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1408, A.M. No. P-04-1900, October
shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the years of delay she incurred before actual 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 315, 327-328.
remittance.
[10]Id. at 328.
Given that the delay in depositing the cash collections in this case was less than three (3)
months only and the fact that this is Abengozas first infraction, we are inclined to adopt Judge [11]A.M. No. 94-12-111-MeTC, February 13, 1995, 241 SCRA 237.
Borja-Solers recommendation.
[12]Id. at 239.

[13]424 Phil. 406 (2002).

 That when we informed one of her colleagues about what she had done to us, he said that she
Republic of the Philippines had been doing this for quite a long time;
Supreme Court
Manila That we executed this affidavit to inform the authorities concerned of the facts above stated
and for whatever legal purpose it may serve us best.[3]
FIRST DIVISION
The complaint was originally filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. In his 1st
FELOMINO D. MENDOZA, JR. A.M. NO. P-05-2034 Indorsement dated March 25, 2004, Deputy Ombudsman Antonio E. Valenzuela forwarded the
and FELO JANE M. MARGATE, (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1930-P) records of the case to then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. for appropriate
Complainants, action.[4] On May 21, 2004 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed respondent to
Present: file her Comment to the Complaint.[5]

PANGANIBAN, C.J. In her Comment[6], respondent denied the charges imputed by complainants against her,
(Chairperson) contending as follows:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, xxxx
CALLEJO, SR., and a. It is not true that I received from the complainants the amount of P200.00 because what
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. they actually gave me and which I actually received from them was only the amount of P25.00;

ANNALEE C. NAVARRO, b. As requested by them, I issued a receipt for the Joint Affidavit P24.00 for the JDF and P1.00
Utility Worker, Municipal Trial for the GF receipt or a total of P25.00, because I learned that this rate or fee for preparation of
Court, Asuncion, Davao del Norte, Promulgated: affidavits prevailing in the municipality;
Respondent. September 11, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x c. I immediately prepared the affidavits requested by the complainants in the sincere belief
that I was helping them, hence, instead of filing a case against me, complainants should be
thankful that I immediately accommodated their request for preparation of affidavits prevailing
RESOLUTION in the municipality;

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Complaint[1] with an attached Joint Affidavit[2] executed by Felomino D.
Mendoza, Jr. and Felo Jane M. Margate charging Annalee C. Navarro, Utility Worker, Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Asuncion, Davao del Norte with Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service.
The allegations of complainants, as contained in their Joint Affidavit, are as follows:
That on September 09, 2003, a certain Analie Navarro, regular Utility Worker assigned at
Municipal Trial Court of the Local Government Unit of Asuncion, Davao del Norte, collected
from us the amount of two hundred pesos (P200.00) as payment for Joint Affidavit and Affidavit
of Support for our mother, Virginia D. Mendoza who had been confined at Alegre Medical Clinic,
Kapalong, Davao del Norte;
That when we asked the official receipt for the said sworn statements, she furnished us the
receipt for Joint Affidavit bearing number 17232702 in the amount of twenty four pesos
(P24.00); and Affidavit of Support bearing number 17232652 in the amount of one peso (P1.00);
3. That I understand that preparation of affidavits is the practice in all courts throughout the
country in municipalities where there are no law offices or no notaries public, like in Asuncion,
Davao del Norte;
4. That in all candor, I prepared the affidavits knowing that there is nothing wrong with it, as it
is being done by employees in other courts, as well as to supplement the very low income which
I am receiving from the court as a Utility Worker in the Municipal Trial Court of Asuncion, Davao
del Norte;
5. That I am the only breadwinner of the family with five (5) children and my husband is not
gainfully employed;
6. That after having been operated for Breast Cancer and underwent Chemotherapy I have
been on continuous medication since then up to the present; copies of my medical records are
hereto attached;
7. That I request this Honorable Office to dismiss the complaint against me as I believe that I
have not done anything wrong. However, if this Honorable Office would consider wrong and as
an offense the preparation of the affidavits and my charging of fees, then I respectfully plead
to this Honorable Court to be lenient to me and be compassionate to my plight and to my
family, especially that this is my first offense as an employee of the Municipal Trial Court of
Asuncion, Davao del Norte.[7]
Upon recommendation of the OCA,[8] the Court, in separate Resolutions, dated July 11, 2005,
re-docketed the complaint as a regular administrative matter and referred the same to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tagum, Davao del Norte for investigation,
report and recommendation.[9]
After conducting an investigation, Executive Judge Oscar G. Tirol submitted his Investigation
Report, Evaluation and Recommendation dated November 11, 2005 with the following findings:
Respondent is the Utility Worker of the Municipal Trial Court of Asuncion, Davao del Norte,
then presided over by now RTC Judge Justino G. Aventurado. She is married and has five
children. She did not finish first year college and on November 1999 underwent mastectomy of
her left breast.
xxxx
On September 9, 2003, the mother of complainants got admitted for asthma at the Alegre
Medical Clinic in Kapalong, Davao del Norte. She was required, for Philhealth benefits purposes,
to secure two affidavits: affidavit of lost birth certificate, and affidavit of two disinterested
persons.
Since Felomino was at work on September 9, 2003, he directed Felojane to secure the affidavits
required from the municipal [trial] court, there being no notary in Asuncion (TSN, p. 2)
On her way to court in the morning of September 9, Felojane obtained P200.00 from Felomino
[for] the documents needed (TSN, p. 2 to 3).
At 11:00 A.M. when she arrived in court, three employees were present at the staff room, one
of them the respondent seated at one of the tables. She approached respondent and inquired
where she could secure the required affidavits and respondent replied she could prepare them
(TSN, p. 3). Respondent, in reply to Felojanes question of how much the two affidavits would
cost, said that at P100.00 per affidavit, the total cost would be P200.00 (TSN, p. 4).
Felojane made no attempt to haggle on the cost mentioned. Respondent directed her to gave
[sic] the names of the two disinterested persons. Two persons at the ground floor of the
building whom Felojane knew agreed to sign the affidavit and their names were what she gave
to respondent who then prepared the two affidavits (TSN. p. 8). It was already lunchtime when
respondent finished typing the two affidavits, so after Felojane got the signatures of the two
disinterested persons, she was told by respondent to whom she gave P200.00, to leave the
affidavits and be back at 2:00 P.M. since Judge Aventurado at that time would be back from
MTC Kapalong (where he was also assigned as acting judge) for the notarization required (TSN,
p. 4).
At 2:00 P.M., Felojane received the two affidavits which now appeared to be notarized by Judge
Aventurado. Respondent also handed to her two official receipts which she did not bother to
look at. Felojane did not ask for any change, believing the change [sic] was really P200.00 (TSN,
p. 5 and 6).
When Felomino got hold of the receipts given to Felojane, he felt aggrieved seeing that the
amounts therein reflected totaled only P25.00 when what respondent in fact received was
P200.00. He also felt mad considering that he and respondent were even neighbors in the same
building (TSN, p. 7).
A week after the transaction, Felomino met respondent and confronted her about her
overcharging. Respondent replied that they used [the] rest of the money for pasahe and for
snacks. This angered Felomino even more and was advised by the municipal administrator to
sue respondent at the Ombudsman (TSN, p. 7).
xxxx
The respondent admitted preparing the two affidavits for Felojane Margate towards noon of
September 9, 2003 since earlier that morning, the acting branch clerk of court Edgar Torres told
Felomino who needed the affidavits to approach respondent for their preparation (TSN, p. 9).
xxxx
The respondent also admitted that she actually received the amount of P200.00 from Felojane
Margate x x x.
xxxx
While respondent admittedly prepared the two affidavits that complainants needed, she did
not go as far as notarizing them. The affidavits (no copy of which were submitted by
complainants to the undersigned investigator) were notarized by Judge Aventurado himself
when he returned to court in the afternoon of that day.
Respondent has been candid enough, and appeared contrite, when she admitted to the
undersigned that she received P200.00, but issued receipts for P25.00 only, thus wittingly
failing to return the balance of P175.00 to complainants. And while complainants did not at
once demand return of the excess of P175.00, this circumstances [sic] does not make the
scheme any less sordid for a court employee as respondent is.[10]
xxxx
Judge Tirol found respondent guilty of dishonesty. However, on the basis of the amount of
money which respondent misappropriated, the investigating judge concluded that the offense
may be considered as simple misconduct. Accordingly, he recommended a penalty of
suspension for two months.[11]
In a Resolution dated February 27, 2006, the Court referred the investigation, report, evaluation
and recommendation of Judge Tirol to the OCA for its own evaluation, report and
recommendation.[12]
In its Memorandum of May 8, 2006, the OCA adopted the findings and recommendation of
Judge Tirol.[13]
The Court sustains the conclusion of the OCA and the investigating judge that respondent is
guilty of simple misconduct but modifies the recommended penalty.
Respondent admitted before the investigating judge that she prepared two affidavits for the
complainants; that she received the amount of P200.00 from complainant Felo Jane but only
issued two receipts in the amounts of P24.00 and P1.00; that she did not return Felo Janes
change of P175.00; and that she misappropriated a portion of the said change.
Under the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, the following are the functions of a Utility
Worker:
2.2.7. Utility Worker
2.2.7.1. acts as courier of the Court
2.2.7.2. maintains and keeps custody of a record book on matters dispatched
by him;
2.2.7.3. monitors messages received and/or delivers mail matter to court
employees;
2.2.7.4. sews originals of records, pleadings/ documents as directed by the
Branch Clerk of Court, docket clerk and-clerk-in-charge in the strict order of dates in which
received and in the correct expediente, seeing to it that they are sewn straight, and that no
letterings or parts thereof are stitched;
2.2.7.5 maintains cleanliness in and around the court premises; and
2.2.7.6. performs such other functions as may be assigned by the Presiding
Judge and/ or Branch Clerk of Court.[14]
There is nothing in the above-enumerated functions that authorizes a utility worker of the court
to perform clerical tasks such as the preparation of an affidavit.
Respondent declared before Judge Tirol that it was Judge Aventurado, then presiding judge of
MTC, Asuncion, Davao del Norte, who encouraged her to learn to prepare affidavits in order
for her to earn additional income and that it was the acting branch clerk of court who referred
complainant Felomino to her. It is true that Sub-section 2.2.7.6 allows a utility worker to
perform such other functions as may be assigned by the Presiding Judge and/or Branch Clerk
of Court. However, the Court cannot give credence to respondents self-serving claims because
these are mere allegations unsupported by convincing and credible proof.
Even granting, for the sake of argument, that respondent was indeed authorized by the
presiding judge or the branch clerk of court to prepare affidavits requested from their office,
she is not excused from asking P200.00 from complainants and thereafter issuing a receipt for
the amount of P25.00 only without returning the change of P175.00.
The Court has consistently held that persons involved in the administration of justice ought to
live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service.[15] The conduct
required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be
beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.[16] This Court
cannot countenance any act or omission by all those involved in the administration of justice,
where such act or omission would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the
faith of the people in the judiciary.[17]
In the present case, respondents improper conduct subjected the courts image to distrust. For
this, the Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more
particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer.[18] Respondent may not be held
guilty of dishonesty because she issued receipts which accurately reflect the amount that
should have been charged for the affidavits she prepared. She is only guilty of simple
misconduct for her failure to return the change of complainant Felo Jane and of subsequently
appropriating the same for her personal use.
Section 52(B)(2) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classifies
simple misconduct as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month and one day
to six months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.
However, in Balajadia v. Gatchalian[19], a court stenographer found guilty of simple misconduct
was fined in the amount of P3,000.00 after the court took into consideration the fact that it
was her first administrative offense. In addition, the Court in previous cases, found it proper to
mitigate the administrative penalties imposed upon erring judicial officers and employees for
humanitarian reasons coupled with other extenuating circumstances.[20] The court has also
ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed
by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe.[21] It is not only for the laws
concern for the workingman; there is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings
untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage earners.
Thus, for humanitarian reasons, considering that respondent has five children and a husband
who is not gainfully employed; that she is on continuous medication after having undergone
operation and chemotherapy for breast cancer; that it appears on the records at hand that this
is respondents first offense; that she admitted her transgression during the investigation and
that she appears contrite, as observed by the Investigating Judge, the Court finds it fit to impose
the penalty of fine in the amount of P2,000.00.
The Court takes note of the following testimony of respondent during her investigation:
Q Mrs. Margate, during her examination, said that you charged her P200.00 for the two
affidavits when she asked you how much the affidavits would cost. Is this true?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is it also true when she said that she handed to you the P200.00 after both affidavits were
typed already?
A Yes, sir.
Q She said you issued two (2) receipts one for P24.00 and the other for P1.00. What can you
say about this?
A That is right, sir. The P24.00 covered by O.R. 17232702 was for the JDF and the P1.00 covered
by O.R. 17232652 was for the general fund.
Q How come you did not give the change of P175.00 when what you officially received was only
P25.00?
A When Judge Aventurado arrived, sir, I handed to him the P200.00. He instructed me to issue
a receipt for one affidavit in the amount of P25.00. And this P25.00 is covered by both receipts
when you total the P24.00 and the P1.00.
Q Did you not ask the judge for the change of P175.00 to be returned to complainants?
A I did not do that anymore, sir because it has been customary for us in that court to charge
P100.00 for every affidavit that we prepare.
Q When you say us, who are you referring to?
A Except for the process server, sir, who is always out of the office, all of us who are in that
office charge P100.00 for every affidavit we prepare.
Q Coming to this transaction, what happened to the P175.00 that was the excess after the
charges for the affidavits?
A Judge Aventurado kept the P100.00 and he handed to me the P75.00 because he pity me
because I always need medicine for my breast cancer.[22]
The Court cannot simply brush aside respondents abovementioned allegations of wrongdoing
in the court where she serves, especially with respect to her claim that Judge Aventurado
pocketed half of the amount paid by complainant Felo Jane for the affidavits which respondent
prepared.
The Court also takes note of the findings of the Investigating Judge that what has been
notarized by Judge Aventurado are an affidavit of lost birth certificate and an affidavit of two
disinterested persons, both of which are sought to be secured for the purpose of enabling the
mother of the complainants to avail of PHILHEALTH benefits. These are private documents
which bear no direct relation with the exercise of Judge Aventurados official functions and
duties.
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 1-90, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court
judges are empowered to perform the functions of notaries public ex-officio, subject to certain
qualifications. The text of said Circular reads:
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to
perform the functions of notaries public ex-officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications on the scope
of this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex-officio in the notarization of documents
connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties [Borre v. Moya, Adm.
Matter No. 1765-CFI, October 17, 1980, 100 SCRA 314; Penera v. Dalocanog, Adm. Matter No.
2113-MJ, April 22, 1981, 104 SCRA 193.] They may not, as notaries public ex-officio, undertake
the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of
conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges. The
1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities
in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from
engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which
have neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to
municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries
public ex-officio, perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided
that: (1) all notarial fees be charged for the account of the Government and turned over to the
municipal treasurer (Lapea, Jr. v. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA
572); and, (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any
lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit.
In the present case, respondent alleged in her Comment that there are no law offices or
notaries public in Asuncion, Davao del Norte. The records are bereft of any evidence to prove
this allegation. Even if this allegation were true, which would have given Judge Aventurado the
authority to notarize the subject affidavits, it would appear that there is still a possible violation
of the above-quoted Circular because only a portion of the fees collected from and paid by Felo
Jane was charged for the account of the government.
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Such power of supervision carries with it
the authority to order the conduct of investigation and impose sanction upon court officers and
employees found to have committed an administrative offense. In consonance with this power,
the Court directs the OCA to conduct an investigation to determine the possible liability of
Judge Aventurado in the notarization of the abovementioned affidavits and his alleged
appropriation for personal use of part of the sum paid for such affidavits; as well as on the
possible liability of other personnel of the MTC, Asuncion, Davao del Norte in preparing
affidavits not germane to their official functions and duties.
WHEREFORE, respondent Annalee C. Navarro is found GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT. She is [14] Volume I, pp. 206-207.
FINED in the amount of P2,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or [15] Office of the Court Administrator v. Duque, A.M. No. P-05-1958, February 7, 2005, 450
similar act of misconduct would be dealt with more severely. SCRA 527, 533.
[16] Id.
The Court Administrator is DIRECTED to conduct an investigation on the possible culpability of [17] Id.
Judge Justino G. Aventurado and personnel in the collection of excessive fees for affidavits [18] Mioso v. Pamulag, A.M. No. P-05-2067, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 407, 418.
prepared while he was the presiding Judge of MTC, Asuncion, Davao del Norte; and to initiate [19] A.M. No. P-02-1658, October 21, 2004, 441 SCRA 82, 87.
the proper charges against the Judge and the MTC personnel, if warranted, under a separate [20] In Re: Delayed Remittance of Collections of Teresita Lydia R. Odtuhan, OIC, RTC, Br. 117,
docket number. Pasay City, 445 Phil. 220, 226-227 (2003); Tan v. Paredes, A.M. No. P-04-1789 and A.M. No. RTJ-
04-1841, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 47, 58-59.
SO ORDERED. [21] Re: Habitual Absenteeism of Mr. Fernando P. Pascual, A.M. No. 2005-16-SC, September
22, 2005, 470 SCRA 569, 573.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [22] TSN, September 13, 2005, rollo, pp. 60-62.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

[1] Rollo, p. 6.
[2] Id. at 5.
[3] Id.
[4] Id. at 1.
[5] Id. at 9.
[6] Id. at 10.
[7] Id. at 10-11.
[8] Id. at 14-16.
[9] Id. at 17 and 18.
[10] Id. at 21-24.
[11] Id. at 25.
[12] Id. at 85.
[13] Id. at 86-89.
SECOND DIVISION
MARIO S. ROMERO, A.M. No. P-05-2041
Complainant, (formerly OCA IPI No. 99-667-P)
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
AUGUSTO R. SISON,
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Promulgated:
Court, Branch 44, Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro,
Respondent. September 15, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
Complainant, Mario S. Romero, publisher of Island Observer, a weekly newspaper with general
circulation in Occidental and Oriental Mindoro, Marinduque, Palawan and Metro Manila, in a
sworn affidavit-complaint[1] dated May 4, 1999 and filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), charges the herein respondent, Augusto R. Sison, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, with violation of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) 1079[2] and Supreme Court Circular No. 63-96.[3]
In his affidavit-complaint, Romero claimed that legal and judicial notices in the RTC, Branch 44,
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, which were intended for publication after raffle, were being
distributed by the respondent to different newspapers without the benefit of raffle. He cited
two instances wherein he received from the respondent two legal notices for publication which
he returned for lack of raffle. The notices adverted to were: 1) Notice for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage filed by the Philippine National Bank against the spouses Virgilio del
Rosario and Norma del Rosario in Petition No. F-217; and 2) Notice for the Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage filed by the Philippine Postal Savings Bank against the Alpha King
Transit in Petition No. F-218. Complainant avers that the respondent's request for publication
of the aforesaid two notices was evidently done to appease or to stop him (complainant) from
insisting that raffle be held first before court notices could be published in a qualified
newspaper of general circulation, as mandated by law.
Via a 1st Indorsement[4] dated July 7, 1999, then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo
referred the aforesaid affidavit-complaint to the respondent for comment, which affidavit in
effect charges him with serious misconduct and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 (Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). Copy of the indorsement
was furnished the complainant.
In his comment[5] dated August 2, 1999, the respondent sheriff denied the accusations against
him. He claimed that contrary to complainants allegations, raffle was undertaken prior to the
publication of the notices of extrajudicial foreclosure in Petition Nos. F-217 and F-218. He
attached to his comment documents purporting to be minutes of the raffle of the aforesaid
petitions.
On August 22, 1999, the OCA received a letter from the complainant reiterating his charges
against the respondent for violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 63-96 and P.D. 1079, instead
of R.A. No. 6713.
In a reply[6] thereto, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo explained that complainants
charges had been duly considered, but that neither of said charges is included in those
constituting administrative offenses committed by government employees under Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 (Revised Administrative Code of 1987) nor under R.A. No. 6713 (Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). In the same reply,
however, Court Administrator Benipayo observed that complainants charges, taken together
with the other allegations found in his affidavit-complaint, may be considered as properly
falling within the coverage of Grave/Serious Misconduct and/or Violation of R.A. No. 6713.
In a Resolution[7] dated March 24, 2003, the Court referred the case to the OCA for
investigation, report and recommendation by any of its consultants.
True enough, the OCA assigned the matter for the purpose to retired Justice Narciso T. Atienza.
The OCA, in its Memorandum dated May 24, 2004, summarizes the findings of Justice Atienza
as reflected in the latters Report, as follows:
FINDING OF THE INVESTIGATOR:
The Investigating Justice found respondent Augusto R. Sison guilty of violating Supreme Court
Circular No. 63-96 in relation to P.D. 1079 and recommended that he be penalized to pay a fine
of P10,000.00. The Investigating Justice likewise recommended that Judge Inocencio M.
Jaurique, presiding judge of RTC, Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, be directed to
follow the aforesaid circular.
Complainant submits that judicial and legal notices in RTC, Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro are being distributed by respondent Sheriff for publication to different newspapers
without having been raffled. To support his allegation, complainant submitted the following
documentary evidence:
1. Letter dated 2 March 1999 addressed to the Editor of the Island Observer which
complainant received on 4 March 1999. In said letter, respondent Augusto R. Sison, Sheriff IV
of Branch 44, RTC, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro requested the Editor of the Island Observer
to publish, once a week, for three (3) consecutive weeks, the Notice for Extra-Judicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage by Philippine National Bank against Spouses Virgilio and Norma del
Rosario.
2. Letter of complainant to Mr. Augusto R. Sison dated 4 March 1999 returning the
Notice for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage mentioned in the preceding paragraph on the
ground that it was not raffled.
3. Undated letter of Augusto R. Sison addressed to the Editor of the Island Observer.
In this letter, respondent Augusto R. Sison, requested the Editor of the Island Observer to
publish once a week, for three (3) consecutive weeks, the Notice for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure
of Mortgage in the case of Philippine Postal Savings Bank against Alpha King Transit.
4. Letter of complainant to Augusto R. Sison dated 13 March 1999 returning the Notice
for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage by the Philippine Postal Savings Bank against Alpha
King Transit on the ground that it was not raffled.
Respondent Sheriff Sison denies the allegation of Mr. Romero that publications are caused
without the benefit of raffle. According to him, raffles were conducted as shown in the minutes
of raffle dated 11 March 1999 in Petition No. F-217 in the foreclosure of PNB vs. Sps. Virgilio
and Norma del Rosario and in the minutes of raffle dated 23 March 1999 in Petition F-218 in
the foreclosure proceedings of Philippine Postal Savings Bank vs. Alpha King Transit.
Respondent likewise denies the allegation of complainant Romero that the legal notices for
publication were sent to the latter in order to appease him. He claims that he could not have
sent the notice for publication to the Island Observer because the latter is not accredited to
publish legal notices in Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. Respondent rested his case after the
admission of the following documentary evidence:
(1) Exhibit 1, Minute of the raffle of Petition No. 218;
Exhibit 1-a signature of Judge Jaurigue and Exhibit 1-b signature of Cirilo Q. Tejoso, Jr.;
(2) Exhibit 2, Minute of raffle of Petition No. 217;
Exhibit 2-a, signature of Judge Jaurigue and Exhibit 2-b signature of Cirilo Q. Tejoso, Jr.;
(3) Exhibit 3, Certification issued by Atty. Cirilo Q. Tejoso to the effect that petitions F-
217 and F-218 were raffled;
(4) Exhibit 4, Receipt issued by the Island Observer to respondent Sison as proof that
the P16,000.00 was received by the Island Observer, and Exhibit 4-a, signature of Cirilo Q.
Tejoso, Jr.;
(5) Exhibit 5, Postal Money Order Remitters Receipt dated September 4, 2000; Exhibit
5-a, signature of Cirilo Q. Tejoso; and
(6) Exhibit 6, Certification issued by Judge Inocencio M. Jaurigue to the effect that the
Island Observer is not duly accredited in Branch 44, RTC, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro;
Exhibit 6-a, signature of Judge Jaurigue; and Exhibit 6-b, signature of Cirilo Q. Tejoso.
The investigation revealed that there was no raffle conducted prior to the sending to the Island
Observer of the notice for publication of Petition Nos. F-217 and F-218. The minutes of the
raffle submitted by respondent Sheriff did not prove that the petitions were raffled before they
were sent to the editor of the Island Observer for publication. On the contrary, these were
incontrovertible evidence that the petitions were raffled only after they were returned to the
respondent by the complainant because of the latters refusal to participate in the violation of
the Decree and the Supreme Court Circular. It may be noted that Petition No. F-217 was
returned by the complainant by mail on 4 March 1999 and it was raffled on 17 March 1999 as
shown in Exhibit 2 while Petition No. F-218 was returned by the complainant on 13 March 1999
and it was raffled on 23 March 1999 as shown in Exhibit 1.
In a letter dated 10 January 2001, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo directed
respondent Sheriff Sison to submit certified true copies of the minutes of all raffles conducted
for the distribution of all legal notices for publication. Records show that respondent did not
answer the letter which could only be interpreted to mean that he could not produce the
minutes because no raffle was ever conducted in RTC, Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro.
When asked during the investigation why he did not respond to the letter of the Court
Administrator, respondent alleged that he did not know the records of raffles because their
court had been transferring from one place to another and sometimes records are lost.
The investigation likewise established that respondent was lying when he testified earlier that
their courts judicial and legal notices are raffled before these are distributed to different
newspaper for publication. When asked to give the procedure on how judicial and legal notices
are raffled, respondent admitted that these were not raffled but were distributed to different
newspapers for publication by drawing of lots because there are only few newspaper joining.
Investigating Justice also reported that respondent suddenly developed amnesia when Exhibit
A and G were shown to him, thusly:
Q: Do you remember having sent to Mr. Romero the case of PNB vs. Virgilio and Norma del
Rosario for publication in the Island Observer. (referring to Exhibit A)
A This is a xerox copy.
Q Yes, but the signature, find out?
A I am doubtful about this.
Q You mean to say you cannot remember this letter, will you please read the contents of the
letter?
A This is 1999 sir, I could no longer remember.
Q And how about this letter, do you remember having sent this to the Editor of the Island
Observer? (referring to Exhibit G).
A No date sir, I could no longer remember.

Q How about this signature appearing here on top of the typewritten name, Augusto Sison?
A I dont know sir.
Q Do you remember having received letters from Mr. Romero in connection with these two (2)
cases for publication, the Postal Savings Bank and the PNB, rejecting them according to him
they were not raffled?
A I could no longer remember.
Respondent testified that he could not remember whether he sent the notice for judicial
foreclosure filed by PNB against Sps. Virgilio and Norma del Rosario and the notice for extra-
judicial foreclosure filed by Philippine Postal Savings Bank against Alpha King Transit to the
editor of the Island Observer. He maintains that the newspaper is not accredited to publish
judicial notices in Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
These assertions of respondent Sheriff was belied by the letter that he himself sent to the editor
of the Island Observer, requesting the latter for the name and complete address of its
authorized representative who will represent their company in raffles to be conducted relative
to foreclosures. If the Island Observer is not an accredited newspaper in RTC, Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, respondent would not have asked the editor of the Island Observer to give
him the name and complete address of its authorized representative.
Another evidence that belied the allegation of respondent Sheriff that the Island Observer is
not an accredited newspaper in RTC, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, is the letter dated 21
June 2002 which states that respondent personally talked to the wife of Mr. Romero about the
payment for the publication.
It is worth mentioning that in the Villaluz and Tria foreclosures, complainant on 13 August 2000
sent a letter to respondent demanding the remittance of the amount of P6,883.80 representing
the balance of payment that the latter collected from the Rural Bank of Rubang, Occidental
Mindoro without authority. In his letter of demand, complainant stated that the cost of the
publication was P22,883.30 but what respondent remitted to the Island Observer on 17
September 1998 was only P16,000.00. In view of the letter of demand, respondent on 4
September 2000, paid the balance of P6,883.30 in Postal Money Orders. From 17 September
1998 up to 4 September 2000, respondent was in possession of the P6,883.30 which was part
of the payment for the publications of the Notices for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Rural Bank
of Rubang against Villaluz and Tria in 1998. The allegation of respondent that the Manager of
the Rural Bank gave him the money and that he purchased money order is incredible. The
payment for the publication of the notices of the Villaluz and Tria extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgages was collected by the respondent without the knowledge and consent of the
complainant. The cost of the publication, as stated earlier, was P22,883.30 but respondent kept
in his possession the amount of P6,883.30 from 1998 until he received the letter of demand
dated 12 August 2000 from the complainant.
Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., now a member of this Court, concurred with
the findings of the Investigating Justice and accordingly recommends the following:
1. That respondent Augusto R. Sison, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos for violation of Supreme
Court Circular No. 63-96 in relation to PD No. 1079; and
2. That Judge Inocencio M. Jaurique, RTC, Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro be
REMINDED to strictly comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 63-96 in relation to P.D. No. 1079
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
After going over the record of this case, we agree with the factual findings of Justice Atienza
and are convinced, along with the OCA, that the respondent sheriff indeed deserves to be
administratively sanctioned.
Administrative Order No. 3, dated October 19, 1984, provides for the procedures to be followed
in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, as follows:
1. All application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135, as amended by Act
4118, and Act 1508, as amended, shall be filed with the Executive Judge, through the Clerk of
Court who is also the Ex-Oficio Sheriff;
2. Upon receipt of an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, it shall be the duty
of the Office of the Sheriff to:
a) receive and docket said application and to stamp the same with the corresponding file
number and date of filing;
b) collect the filing fees therefor and issue the corresponding official receipt;
c) examine, in case of real estate mortgage foreclosure, whether the applicant has complied
with all the requirements before the public auction is conducted under its direction or under
the direction of a notary public, pursuant to Sec. 4, of Act 3135, as amended;
d) sign and issue certificate of sale, subject to the approval of the Executive Judge, or in his
absence the Vice-Executive Judge; and
e) turn over, after the certificate of sale has been issued to the highest bidder, the complete
folder to the Records Section, Office of the Clerk of Court, while awaiting any redemption within
a period of one (1) year from date of registration of the certificate of sale with the Register of
Deeds concerned, after which the records shall be archived.
3. The notices of auction sale in extra-judicial foreclosure for publication shall be published in
a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1709, dated
January 26, 1977, and non-compliance therewith shall constitute a violation of Section 6
thereof;

4. The Executive Judge shall assign with the assistance of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff,
the cases by raffle among the deputy sheriffs, under whose direction the auction sale shall be
made. Raffling shall be strictly enforced in order to avoid unequal distribution of cases and
fraternization between the sheriff and the applicant-mortgagee, such as banking institutions,
financing companies, and others.
The respondent, as sheriff, ought to know the procedures attendant to the application for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, considering that, more often than not, foreclosure sales
are conducted by sheriffs as duly authorized representatives of the RTC Clerks of Court who are
also the ex-officio sheriffs. There is nothing in Administrative Order No. 3 authorizing the
respondent, or for that matter, any sheriff, to conduct the raffle to choose which of the
newspapers or periodicals is qualified to publish court notices, nor to decide that the
distribution of the notices for publication be made by the drawing of lots.
Quite the contrary, Section 2 of P.D. 1079 categorically requires the executive judges to
personally distribute judicial notices to qualified newspapers for publication, which distribution
should be done by raffle, thus:
SECTION 2. The executive judge of the court of first instance shall designate a regular working
day and a definite time each week during which the said judicial notices or advertisements shall
be distributed personally by him for publication to qualified newspapers or periodicals as
defined in the preceding section, which distribution shall be done by raffle: Provided, That
should the circumstances require that another day be set for the purpose, he shall notify in
writing the editors and publishers concerned at least three (3) days in advance of the
designated date: Provided, further, that the distribution of the said notices by raffle shall be
dispensed with in case only one newspaper or periodical is in operation in a particular province
or city. (Emphases supplied.)
The record shows that during the investigation of this case, the respondent sheriff admitted
that no raffle ever took place before the notices for publication in Petition Nos. F-217 and F-
218 were distributed, the same having been made only through drawing of lots because,
according to him, only few newspapers joined in the raffle. Obviously, the respondents decision
to distribute court notices for publication thru drawing of lots was made without any
authorization from the executive judge who is personally in charge thereof. For sure, no proof
to the contrary was presented by the respondent. Respondent does not only exceed his
authority but his act even constitutes misconduct which destroys the image of the Judiciary.
Respondent ought not forget that as sheriff, he plays an important role in the administration of
justice. And as agent of the law, high standards of propriety are expected of him. Being an
officer of the court and an agent of the law, respondent must discharge his duties with great
care and diligence. It is well to remind all persons serving the government through its judicial
arm that the conduct and behavior of every person connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, is laden with a heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety
and decorum but above all, be beyond suspicion.[8]
From the respondents admission that he was the one in charge of the distribution of court
notices for publication thru raffle, it would appear that the executive judge, Judge Inocencio M.
Jaurique of the RTC, Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, had been evading a judicial
duty mandated by this Court in Supreme Court Circular No. 63-96, directing all executive judges
to comply strictly with the said Circular and P.D. 1079.
WHEREFORE, Sheriff Augusto R. Sison, Sheriff IV, of the RTC, Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos with a stern
WARNING that any repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
While we are inclined to remind Executive Judge Inocencio M. Jaurique to comply strictly with
Supreme Court Circular No. 63-96 in relation to P.D. 1079, for apparent evasion of a positive
duty, the OCAs recommendation for the purpose has indubitably become moot and academic,
it appearing that Judge Jaurique had already retired (optional) from the service on January 31,
2005.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-6.
[2] Revising and Consolidating All Laws and Decrees Regulating Publication of Judicial Notices,
Advertisements for Public Biddings, Notices of Auction Sales and other Similar Notices.
[3] Strict Compliance of P.D. 1079.
[4] Id. at 19.
[5] Id. at 20-22.
[6] Id. at 24.
[7] Id. at 27.
[8] Anonymous Complaint Against Pershing T. Yared, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Canlaon City, A.M. No. P-05-2015, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 347, citing Llamado v. Ravelo, Jr.,
345 Phil. 843, 853 [1997]; Magat v. Pimentel, 399 Phil. 728, 736 [2000]; Bornasal, Jr. v. Montes,
345 Phil. 401, 406 [1997]; Chupungco v. Cabusao, Jr., A.M. No. P-03-1758, December 10, 2003,
417 SCRA 365, 369.
 office. After having punched his own card, Mr. Morales handed the time card of Ms. Razon to
Mr. Joel M. Magtuloy who was then near the bundy clock and was about to punch his own time
FIRST DIVISION card. Mr. Magtuloy bared that Mr. Morales told him that Ms. Razon was on official business.
Thus, upon seeing that there was already an entry, he punched Ms. Razons time card both for
IN RE: IRREGULARITIES IN THE USE OF LOGBOOK AND DAILY TIME RECORDS BY CLERK OF COURT the log-out entry at 12:00 and log-in entry at 12:06.
RAQUEL D.J. RAZON, CASH CLERK JOEL M. MAGTULOY and UTILITY WORKER TIBURCIO O.
MORALES, ALL OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT-OCC, GUAGUA, PAMPANGA. To protect the integrity of the bundy clock system, Judge Maxino caused the removal of the
bundy clock which was located inside the MTC-OCC premises and had it delivered to the RTC-
A.M. No. P-06-2243 OCC office for safekeeping. All personnel of the MTC-OCC, MTC-Branch 4 and MTC-Branch 2
(Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-74-MTC) were then required to use the bundy clock located in the RTC, Branch 51 area.

Present: In her comment[2] dated 20 November 2004, Clerk of Court Raquel D.J. Razon admitted her
transgression and sought this Courts acceptance of her apology with a promise not to repeat
PANGANIBAN, C.J., the act complained of. She averred that she instructed Mr. Tiburcio Morales, to punch in and
YNARES-SANTIAGO, out her DTR on 7 September 2004 considering that she was on official business at the Supreme
MARTINEZ, Court. She added that she was unable to secure a travel authority from Presiding Judge Jesussa
CALLEJO, SR., Mylene C. Suba-Isip who was the one who instructed her to secure needed office forms from
CHICO-NAZARIO, the Employees Welfare Compensation. She likewise averred that she went to (1) the Philippine
Judicial Academy (PHILJA) to clarify the mechanics of the new Revised Rule 141 of the Rules of
Promulgated: Court regarding the collection of PMC General Trust Fund, as evidenced by a certification[3]
dated 17 November 2004 issued by Mr. Policarpio G. Felicidario, Jr., SC Chief Judicial Staff
September 26, 2006 Officer and Chief of the Financial Management Office PHILJA; (2) the Leave Section Office of
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x the Court Administrator to submit their bundy cards; and (3) the Supreme Court Savings and
Loans Association (SCSLA) to submit the loan applications of Messrs. Joel Magtuloy and
Salvador Isip. She stressed that she had the impression that since she was in the Supreme Court,
RESOLUTION she was on official travel. She alleged that she was not yet accustomed in using the use of bundy
cards, thus, she saw no harm when she instructed Utility Worker Tiburcio Morales to punch her
time card at the bundy clock.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In his Letter-Comment[4] dated 22 November 2004, Mr. Joel M. Magtuloy, Cash Clerk II of the
This case stemmed from the incident Report dated 25 October 2004 of Executive Judge Pamela same court, narrated that on 7 September 2004, when he was about to punch in his bundy
Ann A. Maxino of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Guagua, Pampanga, Re: Spot Check on the Use of card, Mr. Tiburcio Morales approached him and handed to him the bundy card of Ms. Razon
Logbook and Daily Time Cards at the Office of the Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court (MTC), with the request to log it because he was near the bundy clock. He disclosed that Mr. Morales
Guagua, Pampanga, on 7 September 2004. informed him that he (Mr. Morales) was instructed by Ms. Razon to register her bundy card for
her because she was at the Supreme Court on official business. Having seen that there was
In the Incident Report,[1] Judge Maxino observed that court employees logged-in in the already an entry in the morning in the bundy card proving that Ms. Razon had, indeed, reported
morning but most of them failed to log-out in the morning and log-in again in the afternoon in for work, Mr. Magtuloy registered the bundy card of the latter, particularly for the entries of
as much as they do not indicate their times of departure in the morning and arrival in the her time out at 12:00 noon and time in at 12:06. He, however, clarified the he did it without
afternoon. She discovered Clerk of Court Raquel D.J. Razon, although had a logged-out entry of malice and with the impression that it would not do him any harm if he would grant his
12:00 in the morning and logged-in entry of 12:06 in the afternoon of 7 September 2004 in her colleagues request and accede to his superiors instruction although the instruction was not
Daily Time Record (DTR), was not physically present in the office since she, according to her directly given to him. He alleged that since the use of the bundy clock was still new to them,
staff, was at the Supreme Court. they were neither aware nor acquainted with its attendant prohibitions.

This discovery prompted Judge Maxino to conduct an investigation to determine how the In his Comment/Explanation[5] dated 19 November 2004, Mr. Tiburcio O. Morales, explained
incident came about. Initial investigation, per testimony of Mr. Tiburcio O. Morales, Utility that he merely complied with the instruction of Ms. Razon to punch in her bundy card for her
Worker of Guagua, Pampanga, revealed that Ms. Razon registered her time card in the morning. because, as a subordinate employee, he considered her as his immediate superior believing in
Before leaving, she instructed Mr. Morales to punch in her time card while she was out of the good faith that her instruction was in line with her functions as Clerk of Court. He averred that
he had no intention of violating any rules and/or regulations set forth by the Supreme Court. In
seeking this Courts compassion and forgiveness, he cited his 35 years of unblemished service
as Utility Worker, his being the only breadwinner in the family, and that this was his first
infraction. He also promised not to commit the same mistake again.
In a letter[6] dated 25 January 2005, Executive Judge Pamela Ann Maxino bared that she had
already lost her trust and confidence on Clerk of Court Raquel D.J. Razon, the person who
should be protecting the integrity of the bundy clock system. She likewise said that having four
(4) bundy clocks in Guagua, Pampanga, was not ideal, and recommended the return of two to
the Supreme Court for distribution to other courts without one. According to her, the two (2)
remaining bundy clocks should be installed side by side at the second floor lobby of the Mang
Andres P. Goseco Hall, Guagua, Pampanga, to serve all RTC and MTC employees. She also
requested that they be provided with a security guard who would (1) secure and protect the
courts premises, (2) act as security officer during court sessions, and (3) monitor the use of
bundy cards by employees.
On 14 October 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its report and
recommended the following:
1. the instant case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2. Clerk of Court Raquel D. J. Razon be REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of a similar offense shall warrant a more severe penalty;
3. Cash Clerk Joel M. Magtuloy and Utility Worker Tiburcio O. Morales be ADMONSHED but
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of a similar offense shall warrant a more severe
penalty;
4. The letter dated 25 January 2005 of Executive Judge Pamela Ann MAxino, RTC, Guagua,
Pampanga, be REFERRED to the Office of the Administrative Services-Supreme Court for
COMMENT within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.[7]
On 6 March 2006, we required the parties to manifest within ten days from notice if they are
willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed. We also referred the
letter dated 25 January 2005 of Executive Judge Pamela Ann Maxino to the Office of the
Administrative Services for comment.[8]
On 12 May 2006, Raquel D.J. Razon, Joel L. Magtuloy and Tiburcio O. Morales, submitted their
joint manifestation[9] stating they were submitting the case for resolution based on the
pleadings filed.
On 27 June 2006, Executive Judge Pamela Ann Maxino manifested[10] that she is likewise
submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
The Court, after examining the records of the case, upholds the findings of the OCA, except for
the penalty imposed.
It is clear from the records that on 7 September 2004, respondent Razon directed Mr. Tiburcio
O. Morales to punch out and in her DTR. She admitted in her comment that:
a) On September 07, 2004, the undersigned reported for work at about 7:28 A.M. , and
logged in her bundy card;
b) At about 9:30 in the morning of the same day she left for an official business to Manila
particularly at the Honorable Supreme Court. But before leaving she instructed the court Utility
Worker, Mr. Tiburcio Morales, to punch in and out her Daily Time Record;
c) The instruction was made to avoid getting absent though she is at the time personally and
physically out on official business and unable to secure any travel authority from Honorable
Presiding Judge Jesusa Mylene C. Suba-Isip who tasked her to go to the Employees Welfare
Compensation to secure the needed office Form;[11] (Emphasis supplied.)
Mr. Tiburcio Morales also admitted that though she was instructed by Ms. Razon to punch in
her card, it was Joel Magtuloy who punched it, thus:
Judge Maxino: x x x I will repeat the question. Did you, Mr. Morales personally or in any manner
participate in the punching out and punching in of the card of Mrs. Razon?
Mr. Morales: I was instructed by Mrs. Razon regarding the card but I was not actually the one
who punched the card, it was Joel, maam.
Judge Maxino: When you say Joel, who is that Joel?
Mr. Morales: He is my officemate, maam.
Judge Maxino: What is his family name?
Mr. Morales: Joel Magtuloy, maam.
Judge Maxino: What exactly were the words of Mrs. Razon this morning?
Mr. Morales: He stated this in and out yung sa akin bago siya umalis (before she left), maam.
Judge Maxino: To whom was she talking to?
Mr. Morales: She was talking to me maam.
Judge Maxino: So she was giving you instructions?
Mr. Morales: Yes, maam.

Judge Maxino: When she gave you instructions, was she instructing you only?
Mr. Morales: Yes maam.[12]
We find respondents actuations violative of OCA Circular No. 7-2003,[13] which, in part, reads:
In the submission of Certificates of Service and Daily Time Records (DTRs)/Bundy Cards by
Judges and court personnel, the following guidelines shall be observed:
1. After the end of each month, every official and employee of each court shall accomplish the
Daily Time Record (Civil Service Form No. 48)/Bundy Card, indicating therein truthfully and
accurately the time of arrival in and departure from the office x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
As may be gleaned from above, every official must truthfully and accurately enter his/her time
of arrival and departure in office. The entry must reflect the employees true and actual arrival
and departure in office. Thus, respondent Razon violated this Circular when she instructed Mr.
Morales to log-out and log-in her time card to make it appear that she was in the office, when
the truth is, she was in another place. Respondent Razons instruction to Morales to make it
appear that she was religiously reporting for work during said period is an act of falsification, a
gross and blatant act of dishonesty. Not only does it reveal her deplorable lack of candor, it
disturbingly shows her disregard of office rules. Her duties and responsibilities required her
presence at her workplace, not outside. What makes her violation more disappointing is that
being the Administrative Head of the office, she should be the first advocate of fealty to
established rules and regulations.
Respondent Razons defense that she considered herself to be in office as she was on official
business in the Supreme Court, is without merit. As correctly observed[14] by the OCA, she
should have left the entries in her 7 September 2004 time card vacant and attach the travel
authority issued by the Presiding Judge of MTC-OCC and certification issued by the Supreme
Court attesting to her presence thereat. As admitted by respondent Razon, she was not able to
do both.
Mr. Morales and Mr. Magtuloy are equally liable, the former for accommodating Mrs. Razon,
and the latter for actually punching following the request of Mr. Morales to log-in and log-out
the card of Mrs. Razon. Respondents Razon, Morales and Magtuloy should have known that
punching of ones daily time record is a personal act of the holder as mandated by the word
every in the above quoted Circular. It should not be delegated to anyone else.
Respondent Razon, as Branch Clerk of Court of a court of justice, must bear in mind that the
office she holds and the duties, as well as the responsibilities appurtenant thereto, require from
its holder competence, honesty, and integrity; that, in relation to the judge, she occupies a
position of confidence which should not be betrayed; and that the prestige of the office goes
the corresponding responsibility to safeguard the integrity of the court and its proceedings, to
earn respect therefore, to maintain the authenticity and correctness of court records, and to
uphold the confidence of the public in the administration of justice.[15] Respondent has failed
to measure up to the standards exacted by her position. She has not been true to these lofty
ideals so essential for the proper and effective administration of justice.
The Court had repeatedly held that everyone in the judiciary, from the presiding judge to the
clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility as to let them free of any suspicion that may taint the judiciary.[16]
Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times
the highest sense of honesty and integrity for no less than the Constitution mandates the
principle that a public office is a public trust and all public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency.[17] As the administration of justice is a sacred task, the persons involved in it
ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty and integrity.[18] Their conduct, at all
times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be
above suspicion. Thus, every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty.[19]
Anent the imposable penalty, it must be stressed that falsification of daily time records
amounts to dishonesty. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in government service.[20]
Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary.[21] This Court has
defined dishonesty as the (d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.[22]
However, in several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors.[23] Factors such as the respondents length of
service in the judiciary, the respondents acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling
of remorse, and family circumstances, among others things, have had varying significance in
the Courts determination of the imposable penalty.[24]
In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales,[25] the branch clerk of court who was found guilty of dishonesty
in not reflecting the correct time in his DTR was merely imposed a penalty of P5,000.00. In this
case, respondent did not indicate his absences on May 10 and 13, 1996, although he was at
Katarungan Village interfering with the construction of the Sports Complex thereat and at the
DENR-NCR, pursuing his personal business. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Saa,[26] the
clerk of court of the MCTC of Camarines Norte who made it appear in his DTR that she was
present in office on 5 June 1997 and 6 June 1997, when all the while he was attending hearings
of his own case in Quezon City was fined P5,000.00.
As to Raquel Razon, we note that she readily acknowledged her offense, offered her sincere
apologies and promised not to do it again. Also, we perused her records and noted that this is
her second administrative case in her 27 years in government service. She was previously
charged with discourtesy, insubordination and violation of office regulation and procedure in
A.M. No. P-97-89, but the same was dismissed on 10 October 1989. With the foregoing
pronouncements, we deem it proper to impose a fine of P2,000.00 on respondent Razon, [14] Rollo, p. 82; OCA Report, p. 4.
considering that she made it appear that she was present in office on 7 September 2004 . [15] Rudas v. Acedo, 317 Phil. 283, 292 (1995).
[16] Dipolog v. Montealto, A.M. No. P-04-190, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 465, 476.
As to respondent Joel M. Magtuloy and Tiburcio Morales, the instant case being their first [17] Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution.
administrative offense in their 9 years and 37 years, respectively, in government service, a stern [18] Hernandez v. Borja, 312 Phil. 199, 204 (1995).
warning will suffice. [19] Basco v. Gregorio, 315 Phil. 681, 688 (1995).
[20] Office of the Court Administrator v. Magno, 419 Phil. 593, 602 (2001); Sec. 22(a), Rule XIV
WHEREFORE, respondents Raquel D.J. Razon, Tiburcio O. Morales and Joel M. Magtuloy are of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 ( Administrative Code
found GUILTY of falsification of official document and dishonesty, with the following penalties: of 1987), as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999 (a).
[21] Cabanatan v. Molina, 421 Phil. 664, 674 (2001); Lacurom v. Magbanua, 443 Phil. 711, 718
1. Raquel D.J. Razon is FINED P2,000.00 and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the (2003), citing Pizarro v. Villegas, 398 Phil. 837, 838 (2000).
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely; [22] Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Sec. I & Angelita C.
Esmerio, Clerk III, Off. Clerk of Court, A. M. No. 2001-7-SC & No. 2001-8-SC, 22 July 2005, 464
2. Tiburcio O. Morales and Joel M. Magtuloy are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition SCRA 1.
of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction from the Court. [23] In Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Sec.I & Angelita C.
Esmerio, Clerk III, Off. Clerk of Court, id. In this case, Elizabeth Ting was found guilty of
SO ORDERED. dishonesty but was meted only the penalty of six months after considering the following
circumstances: her continued long years of service in the judiciary amounting to 21 years, her
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO acknowledgment of her infractions and feelings of remorse, the importance and complexity of
Associate Justice the nature of her duties ( i.e. the preparation of the drafts of the Minutes of the Agenda), the
fact that she stays well beyond office hours in order to finish her duties and her Performance
WE CONCUR Rating has always been Very Satisfactory and her total score of 42 points is the highest among
the employees of the Third Division of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice In Geocadin v. Hon. Remigio Pea (195 Phil. 344 [1981]), a judge found guilty of knowingly
Chairperson rendering manifestly unjust orders, partiality, and drunkenness. The Supreme Court agreed
that respondent committed acts unbefitting an occupant of a judicial office but in view of his
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ serious illness which prevented him from presenting evidence other than his comment/answer
Associate Justice Associate Justice to the complaint, the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor and the investigators
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. recommendation of benignity, respondent judge was merely reprimanded and made to suffer
Associate Justice the forfeiture of 3 months of his salary, to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits he
may be entitled to under existing laws.

[1] Rollo, pp. 4-5. In In re: Delayed Remittance of Collections of Teresita Lydia Odtuhan (445 Phil. 220 [2003]), a
[2] Id. at 30-32. court legal researcher of RTC Pasay City was found guilty of serious misconduct in office for
[3] Id. at 72. failing to remit a P12,705 fund collection to the proper custodian until after a lapse of about
[4] Id. at 35-36. three years and only after several demands or directives from the clerks of court and from the
[5] Id. at 37-38. OCA. For humanitarian reasons, the Court found dismissal from the service to be too harsh
[6] Id. at 39-40. considering that Odtuhan subsequently remitted the entire amount and she was afflicted with
[7] Id. at 83. ovarian cancer, and imposed upon her a FINE of P10,000, with a stern warning that a repetition
[8] Id. at 85. of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
[9] Id. at 87.
[10] Id. at 95. In Sarenas-Ochagabia v. Atty. Balmes Ocampos (A.C. No. 4401, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 286),
[11] Id. at 30. a lawyer failed to file an appelants brief, and the necessary Manifestation and Motion with the
[12] Id. at. 17-18, TSN dated 7 September 2004, pp. 5-6. Court of Appeals. The Court noted that for the said offense, it had imposed penalties ranging
[13] Re: Certificates of Service and Daily Time Records (DTRs)/Bundy Cards of Judges and from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension and, in aggravated cases, disbarment. Owing to
Personnel of the Lower Courts.
his advanced age, the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for 3 months with a warning
that a repetition thereof will be dealt with more severely.

In Re: Misappropriation of the Judiciary Fund Collections by Ms. Juliet C. Banag (A.M. No. P-02-
1641, 20 January 2004, 420 SCRA 150) the clerk of Court of MTC Plaridel, Bulacan was found to
be in delay in the remittance of her cash collections in hundred of thousands of pesos
constituting gross neglect of duty under the Civil Service Law and the Omnibus Rules
implementing it. However, in determining the applicable penalty in this case, the Court took
into consideration the lack of bad faith and the fact that she fully remitted all her collections
and that she has no outstanding accountabilities. Because of these attendant circumstances,
and for humanitarian considerations, the Court merely imposed a fine of P20,000.00 and a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

In Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties For Habitual Tardiness Committed During the First
and Second Semesters of 2002 by the Following Employees of this Court: Gerardo H. Alumbro,
et al. (A.M. No. 00-06-09-SC, 16 March 2004, 425 SCRA 508), Susan Belando, Human Resource
Management Assistant of the Employees Welfare and Benefit Division, Office of the Court
Administrator was found to be habitually tardy for the third time. A strict application of the
rules would have justified her dismissal from the service. Instead, for humanitarian reasons,
she was meted the penalty of only suspension for thirty (30) days with a warning that she will
be dismissed from the service if she will commit the same offense in the future. She then
incurred habitual tardiness for the fourth time. However, again, for humanitarian reasons, the
Court found a suspension for three (3) months without pay to be appropriate.

Renato Labay, Utility Worker II, Medical and Dental Services and Albert Semilla, Clerk III,
Office of the Chief Attorney this Court, were found to be habitually tardy for the second time
and were suspended and warned. In the instant case, they committed tardiness for the third
time and, therefore, they should be dismissed from the service. Again, for humanitarian
reasons and as recommended by Atty. Candelaria, the Court meted instead a penalty of
suspension for ten (10) days without pay, with a warning that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
[24] Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the First Semester of 2005, A.M. No. 2005-
25-SC, 6 July 2006.
[25] 396 Phil. 150, 165-166, (2000).
[26] 457 Phil. 25 (2003).
THIRD DIVISION On motion of the accused, Judge Laureano T. Alzate of Branch 25 of the Koronadal City RTC to
which the cases were raffled, quashed the criminal complaints on the ground of, inter alia,
ALEGRIA P. BELTRAN, absence of preliminary investigation.[2]
Petitioner,
Hence, spawned the filing of a November 10, 2004 letter-complaint of Alegria P. Beltran
- versus - (complainant),[3] wife of the accused, charging respondent with Gross Ignorance of the Law
and Abuse of Authority, which letter-complaint was received by the Office of the Chief Justice
JUDGE OSCAR E. DINOPOL, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal City, on November 17, 2004. A verified complaint essentially reiterating the charges in the said
South Cotabato. letter-complaint was subsequently filed by complainant on June 14, 2005.[4]
Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2020 Complainant charges that with respondents acceptance of the criminal complaints lodged by
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI the police, despite the absence of a preliminary investigation, he us[ed] his position to sow
05-2230-RTJ] terror and injustice, . . . violat[ed] mens constitutional rights and distorted [the] interpretation
of the law and/[or] the rules.[5]
Present:
To the complaint, complainant attached photocopies of respondents orders and other
QUISUMBING, Chairperson, documents material to her complaint.
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, In his Comment[6] of January 26, 2005, respondent proffers the following explanation:
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. When he assumed his duties as Executive Judge, the Office of the City Prosecutor had only
one prosecutor, Prosecutor Elfredo Sales, who had no assistant. Prosecutor Sales suffered a
Promulgated: stroke, however, and had not fully recovered.
September 20, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - x While Prosecutor Ringcar Pinote was designated as Acting City Prosecutor on May 18, 2004,
he too suffers from a heart ailment and often fails to attend court hearings and rarely
conducts preliminary investigations. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rene Barrion was
DECISION designated to assist Prosecutor Pinote, but cases were not assigned or indorsed to him. After
several communications with the Department of Justice and the Regional State Prosecutor
requesting the designation of an active Acting City Prosecutor, Memo Order No. 2004-18 was
CARPIO MORALES, J.: issued directing Prosecutor Pinote to attend to all cases, but the latter did not heed the
same.[7]
On the basis of two criminal complaints against Manuel Beltran, a retired Assistant Provincial
Assessor of South Cotabato, one for Falsification of Public Documents (Criminal Case No. Respondent further proffers that given the length of time that there was no prosecutor in the
5876), and the other for Attempted Murder (Criminal Case No. 5877), filed by the local police Koronadal City RTC, he and Judge Alzate, Presiding Judge of another branch of the court,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Koronadal City, South Cotabato, Executive Judge agreed, on the basis of the Philippine National Polices written request, to accept cases directly
Oscar E. Dinopol (respondent) issued two (2) similarly worded Orders[1] finding probable filed by the police on condition that after the arrest of the accused but before arraignment,
cause to hale the accused into court and the cases would be remanded to the Prosecutors Office for further preliminary
investigation.[8]
consequently ordering the issuance of warrants for his arrest. Thus each order read:
Respondent furthermore explains that the Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
After reading the Criminal Complaint including the Affidavit of the complainant, the Court is in Cities (MTCC), Koronadal City holds sessions only once a week and has instructions to his
satisfied and finds probable cause. There being a need, however, to place the accused in Clerk of Court not to accept cases for preliminary investigation, there being a designated
custody of the law in order not to frustrate justice, let a warrant be issued for the arrest of the City/Acting City Prosecutor to conduct the same;[9] and that he exercised good faith with the
accused. principal motive of filling a gap to make the flow and services of the enforcement and
prosecution agencies continuous, for the promotion of an orderly administration of
justice.[10]

Acting on the complaint, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) has come up with the
following:
EVALUATION: Pars. (a), Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days
from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already
been arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section
7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must
be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or
information.
While the judge of the Regional Trial Court determines the existence of probable cause on the
basis of evidence on record, and may consequently issue warrants of arrest, the same cannot
be done without the required preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the complaint or
information. Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. Preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.
Except as provided in section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be
conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to
the fine.
Viewed from the above-quoted provision of the Rule, direct filing of complaints or
information is not allowed.
Who are authorized to conduct preliminary investigation? Section 2, Rule 112 provides:
Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.
The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial [or] City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Judges of the Regional Trial Courts are not among those officers authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation. Hence, in the absence of a designated provincial or city prosecutor
in RTC, Koronadal City, preliminary investigation may be conducted by the MTCC, Koronadal
City Acting Presiding Judge. It should be stressed herein that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is not a judicial but an executive prerogative. For which reason, considering that
there is a city prosecutor assigned in Koronadal City, preliminary investigation shall first be
conducted by the city prosecutor before the filing of a proper complaint or information.[11]
(Underscoring in the original; Emphasis supplied).
The OCA thus recommends that respondent be fined the amount of P20,000.00, with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely, and that he be
directed to refrain from allowing the filing of criminal complaints or informations which have
not been subjected to preliminary investigations and ordering the issuance of warrants of
arrest on the basis thereof.[12]
The evaluation and recommendation of the OCA are well-taken.
Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates who are
authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. RTC judges, who were under the 1964 Rules
of Court authorized to conduct preliminary investigations, have been expressly excluded
under said section of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[13]
Preliminary investigation of criminal cases is intended to protect the accused from the
inconvenience, expense, and burden of defending himself in a formal trial until the
reasonable probability of his guilt has first been ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by
a competent officer. It also protects the State from having to conduct useless and expensive
trials.[14]
If, as respondent tries to justify his questioned act, the city prosecutor had been sickly,
respondent could have endorsed the criminal complaint to the Presiding Judge of the MTCC,
Koronadal City. The alleged instruction of the MTCC judge not to accept cases for preliminary
investigation did not justify respondents violation of the Rules. Neither did the alleged failure
of the designated Acting City Prosecutor to attend to all criminal cases in the city. Under those
circumstances, respondent was not without any remedy.
Parenthetically, why would, by respondents own claim, allow the filing in the RTC of criminal
cases which have not been subjected to preliminary investigations and, after issuing the
warrants of arrest, remand [the cases] to the Prosecutors Office for further preliminary
investigation? A case of putting the cart before the horse!
It bears stressing that a judge must be faithful to and proficient in the law. He must maintain
professional competence which is a mark of a good judge.[15] Basic legal procedures must be
at the palm of his hands.[16] When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to
simply apply it. Anything less erodes the confidence of the public in the courts and it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[17]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal
City, South Cotabato is, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority, ORDERED to
pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos with WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. He is further ORDERED to refrain from
allowing the filing before the Regional Trial Court of criminal complaints which have not been
subjected to preliminary investigation.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
(No Part)
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
(No Part)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 14-15.

[2] Id. at 113-119; Annex E.
[3] Id. at 10-12.
[4] Id. at 71.
[5] Id at 10.
[6] Id. at 6-8.
[7] Id. at 6-7.
[8] Id. at 7.
[9] Id. at 7-8.
[10] Id. at 8.
[11] Id. at 3-4.
[12] Id. at 4-5.
[13] Vide IV Herrera, Remedial Law, 2001 ed., p. 225; II Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium,
8th ed., 2000, p. 315.
[14] Salta v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-41395 and L-42973, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 228, 234.
[15] Nedia v. Lavia, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1957, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 10, 18.
[16] Pesayco v. Layague, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 450, 459.
[17] Caas v. Castigador, G.R. No. 139844, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 425,440.
 Tuqueros clearance was held in abeyance meantime, resulting in the delay in the release of
his retirement benefits.[3]
THIRD DIVISION
A final submission of compliance was made on 18 October 2005 and both Atty. Tuquero and
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF A.M. P-06-2124 Mr. Manguera requested that the remaining unaccounted amount be divided equally
THE FINANCIAL AUDIT [Formerly AM No. 05-12-747-RTC] CONDUCTED IN THE RTC- between them and the same to be deducted from their respective money value of leave
Tarlac City, Present: credits.[4] Moreover, Mr. Manguera intimated that while he may have incurred delay in the
deposit of court collections, he has not taken a single centavo from the courts money. He
QUISUMBING, J., likewise claimed that the filing and keeping of the records were also not properly maintained
Chairperson, because of the lack of available storage space. This deficiency, he asserted, has contributed to
CARPIO, the loss of some documents.[5]
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and After considering the documents presented, the established accountability was reduced to
VELASCO, JR., JJ. P573, 047.04, the composition of which is as follows:[6]

Promulgated: Particulars Amount

Unauthorized withdrawals P235,500.00*
September 20, 2006 Interest transferred to RTC-Paniqui 24,705.25**
Balance of Beginning Inventory 146,124.36***
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x Unidentified Withdrawals 169,750.00****
Overwithdrawal of interest 467.43*****
Over deposit 3,500.00******
RESOLUTION TOTAL 573,047.04

Tinga, J.:
This involves a financial audit by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City.
The audit of the books of accounts of Atty. Roberto Q. Tuquero, Clerk of Court of RTC, Tarlac
City, disclosed that-
1) Official receipts with serial numbers 8984951-8984976 remain unaccounted; and
2) Reconciliation of the fiduciary fund disclosed an unaccounted amount of P6, 953,
714.77.[1]
Several violations were likewise committed with regard to the implementation of court
circulars on the timely deposit of court collections (18 to 23 November 2003 JDF collections
amounting to P167,835.91 were deposited on 1 December 2003) as well as on the use of the
court collections to encash personal checks.[2]
Clerk of Court, Atty. Tuquero disputed the findings and instead ascribed liability to Mr.
Honorato Q. Manguera, the cash clerk. However, due to the principle of command
responsibility, and being the one primarily accountable, Atty. Tuquero was required to submit
the necessary documents to justify the unaccounted amount of P6,953,714.77. Atty.
*Withdrawals which have no supporting documents, i.e. acknowledgment receipt and court
order
**Interest for cash bond deposited with RTC-Tarlac City but withdrawn together with the
principal amount in violation of SC Circular No. 50-95
***Beginning inventory which appeared in the SL of Accounting but without details. Allegedly
deposited with the Provincial Treasurers Office (PTO) but the accountable officer was not able
to present the official receipts issued by the PTO as proof of deposit.
****Withdrawals appearing in the passbook but could not be identified for lack of necessary
documents.
*****Interest on fiduciary fund deposits which were withdrawn without deducting the
withholding tax
******Deposits exceeded the collections
Yet, Atty. Tuquero and Mr. Manguera could no longer account for the missing official receipts.
On 22 November 2005, the OCA submitted to the Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., a Report
on the status of the Financial Audit conducted in the RTC of Tarlac City. The OCA found that
Atty. Tuquero failed to perform his duties and functions as accountable officer specially his
duty to monitor the financial transactions in the court. It also found that Mr. Manguera failed
to deposit court collections on time and used court collections to encash personal checks.[7]
In our Resolution dated 30 January 2006, we adopted the OCAs recommendation, quoted as
follows:

1. The shortage amounting to FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY NINE PESOS & 61/100 (P572,579.61) be divided equally between Atty. Roberto Q.
Tuquero and Mr. Honorato Q. Manguera and the same be allowed to deducted from the
money value of their respective leave credits;
2. The said amount (P572,579.61) be deposited in the Fiduciary Fund Account of RTC-Tarlac
City (LBP SA#0071-0925-42) subject to refund to Atty. Roberto Q. Tuquero and Mr. Honorato
Q. Manguera upon submission of the required documents;
3. Atty. Roberto Q. Tuquero be DIRECTED to deposit the amount of P467.43 (amount of
interest overwithdrawn) to the Fiduciary Fund Account maintained by the Regional Trial Court
of Tarlac City;
4. Atty. Shalane GO-Palomar be DIRECTED to assist Atty. Roberto Q. Tuquero and Mr.
Honorato Q. Manguera in complying with the unsubmitted documents; and
5. This report be docketed as a regular administrative complaint against Roberto Q. Tuquero
and Mr. Honorato Q. Manguera and they be fined in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) each, in the case of Atty. Tuquero, for his failure to perform his duties and
functions as accountable officer specially his failure to monitor the financial transactions in
the court and, that of Mr. Honorato Q. Manguera, for his failure to deposit court collections
on time and for using of court collections in encashing personal checks.[8]
The evidence shows that Atty. Tuquero and Mr. Manguera incurred a total shortage of Five
Hundred Seventy Two Thousand Five Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos and Sixty-One Centavos
(P572,579.61).
Even if said amount was restituted, nonetheless, its non-remittance on time deprived the
Court of the interest that may be earned if the amounts were deposited in a bank as
prudently required. Pertinently, Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Duty of the Clerks of Court, Officers-in-Charge or accountable officers.
The Clerks of Court, Officers-in-Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Courts, or their
accountable duly authorized representatives designated by them in writing, who must be
accountable officers, shall receive the Judiciary Development Fund collections, issue the
proper receipt therefore, maintain a separate cash book properly marked CASH BOOK FOR
JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND, deposit such collections in the manner herein prescribed,
and render the proper Monthly Report of Collections for said fund.
xxx xxx xxx
3. Systems and Procedures:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) In the RTC, SDC, MeTC, MCTC and SCC. The daily collections for the Fund in these courts
shall be deposited everyday with the local or nearest LBP branch for the account of the
Judiciary Development Fund, Supreme Court, Manila SAVINGS ACCOUNT NO. 0591-0116-34;
or if depositing daily is not possible, deposits for the Fund shall be at the end of every month,
provided, however, that whenever the collections for the Fund shall reach P500.00, the same
shall be deposited immediately even before the days above-indicated:
xxx xxx xxx
Collections shall not be used for encashments of personal checks, salary checks, etc. Only
Cash, Cashiers Check and Managers Check are acceptable payments. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Correlatively, Circular No. 50-95[9] mandates that all collections from bailbonds, rental
deposits and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within twenty four (24) hours by
the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof.
As clerk of court and cash clerk respectively, Atty. Tuquero and Mr. Manguera are
accountable officers entrusted with great responsibility of collecting money belonging to the
funds of the court. Both have been remiss in their duty to remit the collections within a
prescribed period and are liable for keeping funds in their custodyTuquero as the one
responsible for monitoring the courts financial transactions and Manguera as the one in
whom the such functions are reposed. Atty. Tuquero and Mr. Manguera violated the trust
reposed in them as disbursement officers of the judiciary. Thus, they should be held liable for
the shortages mentioned above. Moreover, as held in Re: Financial Audit of Accounts of Clerk
of Court Pacita T. Sendin,[10] shortages in the amount to be remitted as well as the delay in
the actual remittance constitute neglect of duty for which the responsible officers shall be
administratively liable.[11].
Clerks of courts should be reminded that they are the chief administrative officers of their
respective courts. They are judicial officers entrusted to perform delicate functions with
regard to the collection of fees and are expected to correctly and effectively implement
regulations such that even undue delay in the remittances of amounts collected by them at
the very least constitutes misfeasance. Being the custodian of the courts funds, revenues,
records, the Clerk of Court is likewise liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment
of said funds and property. [12]
In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit of RTC-Br. 4, Panabo, Davao Del Norte,[13]
we held that failure of the Clerk of Court to remit the court funds collected to the Municipal
Treasurer constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. Under Rule IV, Section 52-A of the Civil Service Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, these are grave offenses punishable by dismissal
even committed for the first time.
However, considering that Atty. Tuquero had retired from the service, we find the Court
Administrators recommended penalty of P5,000.00 fine on both Atty. Tuquero and Mr. [7]Id. at 1
Manguera in order.
[8]Id. at 1-2.
WHEREFORE, retired Clerk of Court Roberto Q. Tuquero and Honorato Q. Manguera are
FINED in the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and are ordered to jointly and [9]Dated 11 October 1995.
equally restitute the shortage in the collections in the total amount of P572,579.61.
[10]Re: Financial Audit of Accounts of Clerk of Court Pacita T. Sendin, 424 Phil. 406 (2002).
The Financial Management Office is directed to deduct equally from Roberto Q. Tuquero and
Honorato Q. Mangueras money value of their leave credits the sum of Five Hundred Seventy [11]Re: Financial Audit of Accounts of Clerk of Court Pacita T. Sendin, 424 Phil. 406, 410
Two Thousand Five Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos and Sixty-One Centavos (P572,579.61). (2002).

SO ORDERED. [12]Re: Initial Report on the Financial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan,
Bulacan, A.M. No. 01-11-291-MTC, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 486, 494.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice [13]A.M. No. 95-4-143-RTC, 13 March 1998, 287 SCRA 510.

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

[1]Rollo, p. 3.

[2]Id. at 3.

[3]Atty. Tuquero retired on November 2003.

[4]Rollo, p. 4.

[5]Id. at 5.

[6]Id. at 4.
 The Facts

EN BANC Complainant alleges that on 12 July 1983, she was introduced by her cousin, Pablo Adrimisin,
to respondent. She needed the help of a lawyer in having her son-in-law, Alfredo Monterde
(Monterde), who was charged with the crime of qualified theft, released from the Caloocan
LETICIA ADRIMISIN, City Jail. Complainant claims that respondent advised her to file a bail bond. Complainant
Complainant, informed respondent that her only money was P500. Complainant contends that respondent
A.C. No. 2591 received the money, issued a receipt[2] and promised that Monterde would be released from
jail the following day.
Present:
Complainant also alleges that respondent failed to keep his promise in having Monterde
PANGANIBAN, C.J., released. Complainant went to respondents office several times but it seemed that
PUNO, respondent was avoiding her. Monterde was later released upon settlement of the case with
QUISUMBING, his employer. Complainant claims that she demanded for the return of the P500 but
YNARES-SANTIAGO, respondent failed to return this amount.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO, Respondent did not file any comment or answer. He only appeared in the investigative
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, hearings conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Respondent, in his testimony,
CORONA, claims he was not hired by complainant as legal counsel. Respondent alleges complainant
CARPIO MORALES, only asked his help to secure a bail bond.[3] Respondent admits he received P500 for the bail
CALLEJO, SR., bond and called up Carlos Alberto (Alberto), an insurance agent.[4] Respondent claims he
AZCUNA, gave the P500 to Alberto. However, the amount was not sufficient to pay for the bond.[5]
TINGA, Respondent denies that he promised to have Monterde released immediately.[6] Respondent
CHICO-NAZARIO, claims he advised complainant to get back her money directly from Alberto.[7]
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. Alberto, the insurance agent, was presented during the hearing. He testified that on 20 July
1983, respondent came to him to secure a bail bond for qualified theft.[8] Alberto showed a
copy of the personal bail bond dated 20 July 1983, issued by Philippine Phoenix Surety &
ATTY. ROLANDO S. JAVIER, Promulgated: Insurance, Inc. (Philippine Phoenix Surety) with a premium of P940 and costs of documentary
Respondent. September 8, 2006 stamps, notarial fees and clearances at P279 for a total of P1,219.[9] Alberto claimed he
issued a genuine bond but it was not filed in court because complainant failed to pay the
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x balance.[10] He also testified that Pablo Adrimisin asked for the refund of the P500 but the
amount could not be refunded due to expenses already incurred and forfeiture of the
DECISION remainder in favor of Albertos office.[11]

CARPIO, J.: The bail bond which was marked as Exhibit 1 contained a stamped Limitation of Liability
clause. The clause states Authorized limit of the bond shall not exceed P20,000 and it is not
The Case valid for theft and robbery cases.[12] The portion Not valid for theft and robbery cases was
deleted with a marking pen but this cancellation was not signed or initialed. Alberto was
On 12 September 1983, Leticia Adrimisin (complainant) filed a complaint-affidavit[1] with the asked why the cancellation was unsigned. Alberto replied that he had no knowledge on who
Ministry of Justice seeking the disbarment of Atty. Rolando S. Javier (respondent) for deceit made the stamp or the cancellation.[13] When asked if it is the policy of Philippine Phoenix
and misrepresentation. Surety not to post personal bail bond with respect to theft and robbery cases, Alberto
answered in the affirmative.[14]

Alberto also clarified that he is not connected with Philippine Phoenix Surety but he is an
employee of the House of Bonds, which is the general agent of the former.[15]

Mr. Alfredo Brigoli (Brigoli), General Manager of the House of Bonds, was also presented as
one of respondents witnesses. Brigoli explained that he gives Alberto 5 sets of pre-signed bail
bond forms.[16] However, in theft, robbery and drug cases, Alberto is required to seek his
approval before the bond is issued.
Brigoli testified that it was Albertos daughter who called him up for approval to issue a bond
for qualified theft.[17] He informed Albertos daughter to bring the original bond and its
duplicate copies to his office in Intramuros for his signature, but the same was not done.[18]
Due to the lack of his signature, Brigoli claimed that the bond has not been approved. [19]
Brigoli also testified that since the bond was not forwarded to his office, the same was not
recorded and the payment was not remitted.
The OSGs Report and Recommendation
The OSGs Investigating Solicitor Antonio G. Castro heard the case and submitted a Report and
Recommendation (Report). The OSG recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for not less than one year. The Report reads:
The charge of deceit and misrepresentation against respondent has been sufficiently
established. Respondent himself admits that he received from complainant the sum of
P500.00 for the bail bond of complainants son-in-law Alfredo Monterde; that he failed to
secure Monterdes release from jail; and that he did not return the sum of P500.00 to
complainant (pp. 9-20, tsn, March 14, 1985).
xxxx
Respondents defense that he actually secured a bail bond for Monterde is a mere
afterthought. Firstly, complainant confided to him that she had no more money except
P500.00. He would not, therefore, secure a bail bond with higher premium than P500.00.
Secondly, while he declared that the records of Monterdes case in the Regional Trial Court in
Caloocan City, Branch XXV, sala of Judge Oscar Herrera showed that the recommended bail
was P8,000.00 (pp. 8-9, tsn, March 14, 1985), the personal bail bond, marked as Exhibit 1,
which was allegedly prepared, was for P9,400.00 (Exh. 1, p. 7, Folder of Exhs.).
Thirdly, respondents witness, Alfredo Brigoli, the general manager of the AAF House of Bonds,
admitted that Exhibit 1 was not finally approved. On cross-examination, he declared:
Q Have you signed that as finally approved?
A No, sir. When they called up asking for my signature on the deleted portion of the bond,
Mr. Alberto never came to my office.
Q In other words that bond has not been finally approved.
A Not finally approved because there is no signature yet.
(p. 20, tsn, Sept. 30, 1985).
As held by this Honorable Court in Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859, 868-869 (1963), The
respondents misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds
for disbarment. And in Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439, 445 (1967), it also held that, Indeed, it
is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform
themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality.
Specifically, for deceit and misrepresentation, respondent may be suspended or disbarred (In
re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25 [1920]).[20]
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 16 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code). The Code mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.[21] Consequently, a
lawyer should account for the money received from a client.[22] The Code also enjoins a
lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,[23] and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Respondent himself admitted the receipt of P500 from complainant as payment for the bail
bond as shown in his testimony and in Exhibit A. By his receipt of the amount, respondent
agreed to take up complainants cause and owed fidelity to complainant and her cause, even if
complainant never paid any fee. Lawyering is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration.[24]
Respondent claims that on 12 July 1983, he called up Alberto for the issuance of the bail bond
but it took 8 days before the bail bond was prepared. In failing to immediately secure the bail
bond, respondent clearly neglected to exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree
of care and skill required by the circumstances.
There were also irregularities in the personal bail bond. Firstly, it was issued on 20 July 1983
but notarized sometime in 1984 as seen in the Notarial Certificate. The Court therefore agrees
with OSGs finding that respondents defense that he secured a bail bond was a mere
afterthought. Furthermore, complainant filed her complaint on 12 September 1983, which
means that the bond was notarized only after the complaint was filed. Secondly, the bail bond
was not valid for theft and robbery cases. Although there was a cancellation of such phrase
through marking pen, the same was not countersigned, and hence the cancellation was void.
Thirdly, the payment for the bond was not recorded and neither was it remitted to the issuer
of the bond. This means that the bond was a mere piece of paper without any value for it
failed to serve its purpose.
Complainant demanded for the return of the P500 but respondent kept on insisting that
complainant seek refund from Alberto. Respondent has the duty to account for the money
entrusted to him by complainant. In Parias v. Paguinto,[25] we held that a lawyer shall
account for all money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for
a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must
immediately be returned to the client on demand. In the present case, money for the
payment of the bonds premium was not used for the purpose intended. Hence, respondent
must return the amount to complainant upon demand.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-4.
A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives [2] Rollo, p. 5 and Exhibit A, exhibits for complainant and respondent, p. 1.
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the [3] TSN, 8 April 1985, p. 11.
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of [4] Id. at 12-13.
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves [5] Id. at 25.
punishment.[26] [6] Id. at 28-29.
[7] Id. at 34.
This is not the first time respondent is found to have unlawfully withheld and misappropriated [8] TSN, 15 August 1985, p. 25.
money. In Igual v. Javier,[27] the Court held that respondent had unjustifiably refused to [9] Id. at 10-13.
return Iguals money upon demand and his absence of integrity was highlighted by his half- [10] Id. at 16.
baked excuses, hoary pretenses and blatant lies in his testimony before the IBP Committee on [11] Id. at 29.
Bar Discipline. The Court suspended Javier from the practice of law for a period of one month [12] Exhibit 1, exhibits for complainant and respondent, p. 7.
and ordered him to restitute the amount of P7,000 to Igual. In that case, we reminded [13] TSN, supra note 8, at 46-47.
respondent that he was expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of [14] Id. at 48.
Professional Responsibility for the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly [15] Id. at 41-43.
fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [28] [16] TSN, 30 September 1985, pp. 7-8.
[17] Id. at 10.
We reiterate this reminder. Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross [18] Id.
violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal [19] Id. at 20.
profession.[29] Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended from [20] Rollo, pp. 21-25.
the practice of law.[30] [21] Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 16.
[22] Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 16.01.
Wherefore, we SUSPEND Atty. Rolando S. Javier from the practice of law for six months [23] Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 18.03.
effective upon finality of this Decision. We ORDER respondent to restitute complainant Leticia [24] Burbe v. Magulta, 432 Phil. 840, 850 (2002).
Adrimisin the Five Hundred Pesos (P500) with legal interest computed from 12 September [25] A.C. No. 6297, 13 July 2004, 434 SCRA 179, 183.
1983 until full payment. Respondent shall submit to the Court proof of restitution within ten [26] R. Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics 242 (2002 ed.)
(10) days from payment. [27] 324 Phil. 698, 709 (1996).
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to [28] Id.
respondents personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court [29] Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, 412 Phil. 419, 424 (2001).
Administrator shall furnish copies to all courts of the land for their information and guidance. [30] Espiritu v. Ulep, A.C. No. 5808, 4 May 2005, 458 SCRA 1, 9.

So Ordered.

Antonio T. Carpio
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
 each candidate for Senator in the election held on May 8, 1995. And with respect to the
SECOND DIVISION Statement of Votes per Municipality, they were required to certify that each entry made is
true and correct.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., A.C. No. 4517
Complainant, xxx xxx xxx
Present:
11. It would appear, however, that the Statement of Votes per Municipality (annex B)
PUNO, J., Chairperson, prepared and certified to be true and correct by herein respondents was actually a fraudulent
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, statement which had been altered and which contain false and untrue entries. By comparing
CORONA, the said statements with the Municipal/City Certificates of Canvass of some of the
AZCUNA and municipalities and component cities for the Province of Isabela, it is clearly apparent that in
GARCIA, JJ. nine (9) municipalities and one (1) city of the said province, the votes of candidates Enrile,
Honasan and Mitra were padded and increased by some 27,755, 10,000 and 7,000,
ATTYS. VITALIANO C. FABROS respectively.
and PACIFICO S. PAAS,
Respondents. Promulgated: xxx xxx xxx

September 11, 2006 13. The anomalous, irregular and illegal padding of the votes in the Provincial
Certificate of Canvass for the Province of Isabela cannot be attributed [to] mere computation
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x or recording error, but was ostensibly the result of a premeditated scheme knowingly
implemented by herein respondents.

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
A complaint for disbarment was filed against Attys. Vitaliano C. Fabros and Pacifico S. Paas by
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. for unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in
relation to the discharge of their duties as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the
provincial board of canvassers, Province of Isabela (PBC-Isabela) in the 1995 elections.
Complainant alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
8. Among the duties of the [PBC-Isabela] was to canvass the results of the elections
from the various municipalities and component cities of the Province of Isabela and submit
the Provincial Certificate of Canvass to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). This
Provincial Certificate of Canvass was to be submitted to the COMELEC together with its
supporting Statement
14. The respondents, chairman and vice chairman of the [PBC-Isabela], willfully,
feloniously, unethically and in wanton and reckless regard of the duties and responsibilities
reposed upon them by virtue of their official positions, signed the Provincial Certificate of
Canvass (annex A) and the Statement of Votes per Municipality (annex B) for the Province of
Isabela, well aware that the same contained false statements which has altered the results of
the senatorial elections in said province. Their submission of these falsified documents to the
COMELEC is an act constituting a gross violation of the Omnibus Election Code and existing
penal laws, and a serious breach of public trust and of their oaths as duly licensed members of
the Philippine Bar.
15. For under section 27 of R.A. 6646 it is provided that any member of the board of
canvasser who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any
election shall be guilty of [an] election offense.
16. And, under provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. xxx xxx xxx.[1] (Emphasis ours)

of Votes per Municipality for the Province of Isabela, and as required by law, these
documents were prepared under the control and supervision of the [PBC-Isabela] of which
herein respondents are officials.
9. In fact, with respect to the Provincial Certificate of Canvass of Isabela,
respondents were required to certify under oath that they duly canvassed the votes cast for
In his comment, respondent Fabros reproduced the counter-affidavit he filed with the
COMELEC-Manila since the issues raised in the complaint were identical to those brought
before the Commission. He denied committing any act which violated his oath as a lawyer.
Specifically, he stated that: (1) he neither consented nor allowed any member of PBC-Isabela
to increase the votes of Senators Enrile, Honasan and Mitra; (2) the canvassing was done in
public view; (3) he faithfully read the votes as reflected in the municipal/city certificates of
canvass, repeating the same twice or thrice and (4) the canvassing proceeded in an orderly
manner after counsels and watchers were given the chance to examine the certificates of
canvass.[2]
Aside from substantially echoing the statements of Fabros, respondent Paas alleged that he
was in no position to manipulate the figures since Fabros did the reading throughout the
canvass, while he attended to maintaining the integrity of the envelopes containing the
statement of votes. Both attributed to human fatigue or simple negligence any error in the
figures since the board and its staff allegedly worked continuously to finish the canvassing
within 72 hours as directed.[3] Paas claimed that if there were figures in the certificates of
canvass which did not match the statement of votes prepared by the PBC, he honestly
believed that this was due to human fatigue.[4] He alleged that, if at all, he could only be
faulted for failing to see for himself if the reading by Fabros of the number of votes and the
tabulation thereof faithfully reflected the figures in the PBCs copy of the election returns.
Both respondents do not, however, deny that they authenticated the provincial certificate of
canvass and signed the statement of votes as true and correct. Their only excuse for any
discrepancy was their alleged reliance on the documents prepared by the secretary of PBC-
Isabela, Olympia Marquez.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner George Briones heard
the case on January 20, 1997.[5] By agreement of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner
ordered the parties to submit simultaneous verified position papers with the affidavits of
their witnesses.[6] On June 21, 2003, the IBP board of governors issued a resolution adopting
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondents were found
guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and were penalized
with a fine of P10,000 each, with a warning that a violation on similar grounds will be dealt
with more severely.
Based on the evidence presented, we find respondents guilty of misconduct. The records
reflect, and respondents admit, the discrepancy between the questioned certificate of
canvass and the statement of votes of the Province of Isabela in the 1995 elections. While
there was no question that the municipal/city certificates of canvass were not tampered with,
the tabulation of the figures on the statement of votes was anomalous. For this, respondents
were responsible.[7]
As chairman and vice-chairman of PBC-Isabela, respectively, respondents were mandated to
receive the municipal/city certificates of canvass, and to canvass them for the votes of the
members of the Senate,
among others.[8] They were also required to determine the provisional total votes of each
candidate as of each adjournment. On final adjournment, they were tasked to prepare a
statement of votes with a certification of the same as official.[9] In addition, they prepared
the provincial certificate of canvass (in which the padded figures were discovered) with the
certification under oath as public officers that the entries were true and correct.[10]
More than simply affixing their signatures for the purpose of identifying the documents,
respondents signed the documents certifying (and vouching) for the correctness and accuracy
of their contents. Even if they allegedly had no participation in the misdeed, they nevertheless
remained responsible for it as officials of PBC-Isabela. Respondents must bear the
consequences of any misstatement or falsehood arising from such certification.[11] They
cannot evade responsibility by pointing to other persons who supposedly prepared the
documents in question.[12] They had the opportunity to check, as they should have checked,
the accuracy of the figures they were certifying to.[13] By certifying to false figures, they
committed misconduct subject to disciplinary action.[14] In fact, by invoking the defenses of
honest mistake, oversight due to fatigue, even simple negligence, respondents virtually
admitted the existence of the discrepancies in the number of votes reflected in the
questioned documents.[15]
As public officers, respondents failed to live up to the high degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill required of them.[16] As lawyers, they were found to
have engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.[17] They also violated
their oath as officers of the court
to foist no falsehood on anyone. Furthermore, by express provision of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the avoidance of such conduct is demanded of them as lawyers in
the government service:
CANON 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks.
As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under an even greater obligation to
observe the basic tenets of the legal profession because public office is a public trust.[18]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Atty. Vitaliano C. Fabros and Atty. Pacifico S. Paas
GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on them a FINE in the amount of P10,000 each, with a
WARNING that the commission in the future of a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and entered in the records of respondents.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

[1] Complaint, rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 2-5.

[2] Compliance, id., Vol. 1, pp. 30-31; Counter Affidavit, id., Vol. 1, pp. 32-33.
[3] Counter Affidavit, id., Vol. 1, p. 32.
[4] Id., p. 33.
[5] IBP-CBD Order, id., Vol. 2, p. 4.
[6] At that time, a COMELEC investigation (E.O. Case No. 95-408) was also pending against
respondents along with other election officials for violation of Sec. 27(b), RA 6646. IBP-CBD
TSN, pp. 12-13, id., Vol. 3.
[7] Id., p. 22.
[8] Position Paper, id., Vol. 2, pp. 12-13. See COMELEC Resolution No. 2756 (January 17,
1997).
[9] Position Paper, id., Vol. 2, p. 13. See Sec. 23 (f)(g), COMELEC Resolution No. 2756.
[10] Position Paper, id., Vol. 2, p. 13. See Sec. 42, COMELEC Resolution No. 2756.
[11] Report and Recommendation, id., Vol. 3.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Pimentel v. COMELEC, 382 Phil. 75, 90 (2000).
[16] Sec. 4(b), Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, RA
6713.
[17] Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
[18] Pimentel, Sr. v. Llorente, A.C. No. 4680, 29 August 2000, 339 SCRA 154.

FIRST DIVISION
RAMON C. GONZALEZ, A.C. No. 5321
Complainant,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, CJ, Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Atty. ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, Promulgated:
Respondent. September 27, 2006
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
Disbarment cases are sui generis. Being neither criminal nor civil in nature, these are not
intended to inflict penal or civil sanctions. The main question to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
The Case and the Facts
This case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed by Ramon C. Gonzalez with the Office of
the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court. The Complaint was subsequently referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[2]
Complainant charged Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz with grave misconduct, abuse of authority, and
acts unbecoming a lawyer. The antecedents were summarized by the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) as follows:
x x x [C]omplainant alleges that on 11 August 2000, while he was driving along the South
Superhighway upon entering the Sucat Toll Gate heading towards Makati, respondent, who
was driving a Nissan Infiniti suddenly cut across his path while overtaking him and almost hit
his car had he not been able to evade it. According to complainant, he chased respondents
car and when he was side by side with respondents car, he angrily confronted respondent and
then drove on. Complainant claims that respondent then chased him and shot him twice but
fortunately missed him by a few inches[,] but broken glass coming from the shattered window
allegedly hit him and slightly wounded his right arm and stomach. Complainant adds that
respondent allegedly tried to escape but he was able to chase him and block his way at the
Nichols Toll Gate where the PNCC guards responded to his call for assistance. According to
complainant, respondent attempted to escape and avoid the PNCC guards by proclaiming
boisterously that he is a lawyer and a customs official but complainant was able to block his
way again and their vehicles collided in the process. Complainant claims that he requested
the PNCC guards to confiscate respondents firearm and accompany them to the nearest
police station. At the time of the arrest, respondent allegedly opened the back door of his car
and pretended to have accidentally dropped so much money which distracted the policemen
from further searching the car.
At the police station, respondent allegedly identified himself and his lady companion, a
certain Ferlita Semeniano, and [said] that he was the Deputy Customs Collector assigned at
Batangas City. Complainant claims that respondent yielded one (1) Super .38 cal. Springfield
Automatic Pistol, SN NMII 3138, one (1) magazine with seven (7) live ammos and three (3)
spent (empty) shells. Complainant adds that respondent presented only an unsigned
Memorandum Receipt (MR) of the firearm without any Mission Order or Permit to Carry.
Complainant claims that respondent allegedly kept calling persons to help him and a
fabricated Mission Order was brought and presented by another person more than eight
hours after the shooting incident and apprehension.
Complainant alleges that the Nissan Infiniti used by respondent is allegedly a luxury vehicle
which was not covered by any document whatsoever and it was not verified whether stolen
or smuggled.
Complainant finally alleges that the PNP Crime Laboratory examined his car and they
recovered one slug in between the wall of the left rear door while the other bullet went
through the right front seat and exited at the left rear door of complainants car and that cases
of Frustrated Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearms were already filed at the Paraaque
City Prosecutors Office.
xxxxxxxxx
In his Comment dated 04 January 2001, respondent claims that the present administrative
case is unfounded and unwarranted and was allegedly filed in bad faith, with malice and ill
motive and allegedly has no other purpose but to harass, vex, humiliate and dishonor him. In
support thereof, respondent points to the fact that complainant filed substantially identical
complaint affidavits with the same identical alleged cause of action as that of the present
administrative case at [various] judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative tribunals and
accused him of forum-shopping.
Respondent denied the narration of facts stated in complainants Complaint-Affidavit as self-
serving, a misrepresentation of facts and obviously tainted. Respondent claims that he was
not the aggressor during the incident and that he did not provoke complainant. Respondent
claims that he justly acted in self-defense and defense of a stranger under the true actuality
of facts and circumstances the[n] prevailing.
Respondent also claims that the acts complained of in the present case were not connected
with the practice of the legal profession and the fact that he was a lawyer is merely
coincidental, immaterial and irrelevant.
xxxxxxxxx
In connection with the cases filed by the parties against each other, respondent submitted
the xxx Resolutions/Decisions issued in said cases to show that the charges filed against him
by the complainant were dismissed while the criminal cases he filed against the latter [were]
filed in court.
xxxxxxxxx
Finally, it is the submission of the respondent that since the alleged acts complained of are
not within the sphere of his professional duties as a lawyer, but rather are acts done in his
non-professional or private capacity, the same, cannot allegedly be the subject of an
administrative complaint for disbarment.[3]
Report and Recommendation
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
In his Report,[4] IBP Investigating Commissioner Rafael Antonio M. Santos said that the
dismissal of the criminal and other administrative charges filed by complainant indicated that
respondents version of the incident was given credence by the investigating officials and
agencies of the various other tribunals in which these charges were filed. Consequently, since
no sufficient evidence warranted the imposition of further disciplinary sanctions on
respondent, the investigating commissioner recommended the dismissal of the administrative
case.
In Resolution No. XVI-2005-29 dated March 12, 2005, the board of governors of the IBP
adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Santos.
On July 8, 2005, the Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this
Court for final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. On August
4, 2005, complainant asked this Court to set aside Resolution No. XVI-2005-29 of the IBP
board of governors. Upon orders of this Court,[5] respondent filed on August 22, 2005, his
Comment on complainants plea.
The Courts Ruling
The Court disagrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
At the outset, we stress that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent did not
erase the occurrence of the shooting incident, which he himself does not deny. Moreover, this
incident has been established by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, he must face the
consequences of his actions.
The first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides as follows:
CANON 1. - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.[6]
Furthermore, respondent bound himself to obey the laws in his attorneys oath,[7] which
underscores the role of lawyers as officers of our legal system. A lawyers brash transgression
of any, especially a penal, law is repulsive and reprehensible and cannot be countenanced by
this Court.[8]
Admitting that he fired shots in the direction of complainant while they were speeding along
South Luzon Expressway,[9] respondent justifies his actions by claiming self-defense and
defense of a stranger. During the traffic altercation, complainant allegedly exchanged angry
words with respondent and, from an open car window, even threw a handful of coins at the
latter.[10] Respondent further avers that, from his higher vantage point, he saw complainant
draw a pistol.[11] The former contends that when he fired the shots, he had no intention of
hitting complainant but merely wanted to scare him away.
Reviewing the factual circumstances, we are convinced that the defenses proffered are mere
afterthoughts. Based on the physical and documentary evidence, complainants version of the
incident is more credible.
First, the allegation of respondent that complainant hit him with coins is highly improbable. At
that time, both vehicles were speeding along the highway. Since the PNP Crime Laboratory
Report[12] showed that the bullets fired by respondent had come from the right side, his
vehicle must have been to the right of complainants. If we were to accept this version, the
coins hurled by complainant had to pass through his cars right window and then through the
left window of respondents admittedly taller sports utility vehicle (SUV). Given their relative
positions, it is highly incredible that the coins could have hit respondent and his companion.
Second, assuming that respondent and his companion were indeed hit by coins, this alleged
fact was not a sufficient unlawful aggression that would justify shooting at complainant.
As a lawyer, respondent should know that the following three requisites must concur to
justify self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming
self-defense.[13] On the other hand, in defense of a stranger, the first two requisites must
also be present together with the element that the person defending was not induced by
revenge, resentment or other evil motive.[14]
Of these requisites, unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding both self-
defense and defense of a stranger; the fundamental raison detre of these defenses is the
necessity to prevent or repel an aggression.[15] The alleged throwing of coins by complainant
cannot be considered a sufficient unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression presupposes
actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent threat to life and limb.[16] There was no aggression
to prevent or repel. Absent this imminent threat, respondent had no legal reason to shoot in
the direction of complainant.
Third, for lack of supporting evidence, neither can merit be accorded to respondents claim of
imminent threat after allegedly seeing complainant draw a pistol. The Joint Affidavit[17] of
PNCC Officers Florencio Celada y Seso, Jr. and Mario Puso y Visaya mentioned no firearm
found in the possession of complainant. Except for the bare and belated allegations of
respondent, there was no showing that complainants alleged possession of the pistol had
been reported to the PNCC officers or later to the police headquarters. Thus, without proof of
the existence of the firearm, respondent has not convincingly shown any legal justification for
his act of firing at complainant.[18]
Fourth, right after the shooting incident, respondent fled the scene. He stopped only when
PNCC officers blocked his vehicle in response to complainants call for assistance. If
respondent was only protecting himself and his companion, then his righteous indignation
should have propelled him to report immediately his version of the incident to the PNCC
officers.
Disbarment Proceedings
Sui Generis
Respondent maintains that the dismissal of the cases filed by complainant against him in the
various tribunals and agencies proves that the present case for disbarment is unfounded.
We do not agree.
Well-established is the rule that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. These cases are distinct from and proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.[19]
In Re Almacen,[20] the Court discoursed on this point thus:
x x x [D]isciplinary proceedings [against lawyers] are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, x x x [they do] not involve x x x a trial of an action or a suit, but [are] rather
investigation[s] by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x.[21]
Respondents administrative liability stands on grounds different from those in the other cases
previously filed against him; thus, the dismissal of these latter cases does not necessarily
result in administrative exculpation. Settled is the rule that, being based on a different
quantum of proof, the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
does not necessarily foreclose the finding of guilt in an administrative proceeding.[22]
Misconduct Committed
in a Private Capacity
Untenable is respondents argument that the acts complained of cannot be the subject of a
complaint for disbarment, because they were done in his private capacity.
Whether in their professional or in their private capacity, lawyers may be disbarred or
suspended for misconduct. This penalty is a consequence of acts showing their unworthiness
as officers of the courts; as well as their lack of moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor.[23] When the misconduct committed outside of their professional dealings is so
gross as to show them to be morally unfit for the office and the privileges conferred upon
them by their license and the law, they may be suspended or disbarred.[24]
In Cordon v. Balicanta,[25] this Court explained the rationale for this holding as follows:
x x x. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal,
those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in
their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. Thus, the requirement of good moral character
is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of
legal learning. Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain one's good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the
absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his client's property, reputation, his life, his all.[26]
The vengeful and violent behavior exhibited by respondent in what should have been a simple
traffic altercation reveals his conceit and delusions of self-importance. By firing his gun openly
in a congested highway and exposing complainant and the general public to danger, he
showed his utter lack of a sense of responsibility, as well as of respect for law and order.
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents gross misconduct. In line
with Lao v. Medel,[27] Co v. Bernardino,[28] and Saburnido v. Madroo,[29] suspension from
the practice of law for one year is appropriate in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is hereby
SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson, First Division
 [22] Pablejan v. Calleja, A.M. No. P-06-2102, January 24, 2006; Office of the Court
W E C O N C U R: Administrator v. Caete, 441 SCRA 512, 520, November 10, 2004.
[23] Calub v. Suller, 380 Phil. 532, January 28, 2000; Saburnido v. Madroo, 418 Phil. 241,
September 26, 2001; Lao v. Medel, 453 Phil. 115, July 1, 2003.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [24] Soriano v. Dizon, AC No. 6792, January 25, 2006; Quingwa v. Puno, 125 Phil. 831,
Associate Justice Associate Justice February 28, 1967.
[25] 439 Phil. 95, October 4, 2002.
[26] Id. at. 115-116.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO [27] Supra.
Associate Justice Associate Justice [28] 349 Phil.16, January 28, 1998.
[29] Supra.

[1] Dated August 21, 2000; rollo, pp. 1-2.

[2] Resolution dated February 12, 2001; rollo, p. 45.
[3] November 5, 2004 Report of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, pp. 4-13.
[4] Id.
[5] September 21, 2005 Resolution of the Third Division.
[6] Emphasis ours.
[7] I, (name), of (address), do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to
its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false, or
unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any mans cause for money
or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself
this obligation voluntarily, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God. (Emphasis supplied)
[8] Gonzaga v. Realubin, 312 Phil. 381, March 14, 1995; Bautista v. Gonzales, 182 SCRA 151,
February 12, 1990.
[9] Respondents Sworn Statement dated September 3, 2000, p. 2; rollo, p. 65.
[10] Id. at 1; rollo, p. 64.
[11] Id. at 2; rollo, p. 65.
[12] Rollo, p. 59.
[13] Revised Penal Code, Article 11(1).
[14] Id., Art. 11(3).
[15] Rimano v. People, 416 SCRA 569, November 27, 2003; People v. Gonza, 415 SCRA 507,
November 11, 2003; People v. Caratao, 451 Phil. 588, June 10, 2003.
[16] People v. Escarlos, 410 SCRA 463, September 10, 2003; People v. Caratao, supra.
[17] Rollo, p. 76.
[18] See People v. Diego, 424 Phil. 743, January 17, 2002.
[19] Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, 374 Phil. 1, September 29, 1999.
[20] 31 SCRA 562, February 18, 1970; see also Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v.
Naldoza, supra.
[21] Id. at 600-601, per Castro, J.
 Complainant further accuses respondent of falsifying court records. Complainant alleges that
THIRD DIVISION respondent, in collusion with the court stenographer, altered the transcript of proceedings
taken on 25 June 1998 by deleting what exactly transpired during the hearing. Complainant
avers that during the hearing, respondent suspended the cross-examination then being
conducted by complainant on Biasura, only to be postponed later but on condition that
ORLANDO ANGELO A. SANTOS, A.C. No. 5395 complainant would be allowed to continue his unfinished cross-examination. However, the
Complainant, transcript instead stated that the hearing of 25 June 1998 was merely reset to 5 August,
Present: omitting mention of the stipulation that complainant would be allowed to resume his cross-
examination.
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson, At the next scheduled hearing on 5 August 1998, complainant failed to appear and instead
- versus - CARPIO, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that a criminal complaint based on violation of R.A.
CARPIO-MORALES, and No. 6713 was then pending before the Sandiganbayan. In an Order[3] dated 27 August 1998,
TINGA, respondent denied the motion to dismiss. However, the same order also stated that
VELASCO, JJ. complainant had already waived his right to further cross-examine Biasura. This order is being
cited by complainant to bolster his claim that respondent committed the falsification earlier
ATTY. MA. VIVIANE CACHO-CALICDAN, adverted to.
Respondent. Promulgated:
Complainant moved for reconsideration of the Order of 27 August 1998, contending that he
September 19, 2006 never manifested that he was waiving his right to further cross-examine Biasura and that the
order denied him of his constitutional right to confront his accuser. In his motion for
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x reconsideration, complainant expressed his desire to continue with the cross-examination on
certain material points, to wit: (1) Biasuras testimony on the circumstances when the alleged
RESOLUTION demands were made; (2) Biasuras claim that he was granted/awarded by the DENR Regional
Office No. 1 an approved survey plan of Lot No. 20206, San Fabian Cadastre; (3) Biasuras claim
Tinga, J.: that complainant blatantly refused to give copies of a Decision dated 21 April 1993 and a
report related thereto; and (4) glaring inconsistencies in Biasuras accounts during the direct
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed by Orlando Angelo A. examination and those made in his Complaint-Affidavit and Reply/Comment.[4]
Santos (complainant) on 28 December 2000 for disbarment against Atty. Ma. Viviane Cacho-
Calicdan (respondent). In an Order[5] dated 24 September 1998, respondent granted complainants motion. He was
however advised to limit his cross-examination to the facts stated by Biasura. In the same
Estifanio Biasura (Biasura) filed criminal and administrative cases against complainant, a Land order, respondent nonetheless found it necessary to stress the following points:
Management Officer IV of the Regional Office No. 1 of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). Said cases were assigned to respondent, a Graft Investigation (a) That herein respondent (complainant) already subjected complainant (Biasura) to
Officer II of the Office of the Ombudsman, who acted as the hearing officer in the cross-examination with respect to point (1) of his Motion for Reconsideration.
administrative case against complainant. Complainant was eventually found guilty by the (b) Points (2) and (3) are not covered by complainants direct examination.
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon on 5 October 2000 of violating Section 7, par. (d) (c) Point (4). The inconsistencies, if ever there is (sic), between the testimony of
in relation to Section 3, par. (d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713[2] and meted a penalty of six complainant during the direct examination and his complaint affidavit and Reply-Comment in
(6) months suspension without pay. the criminal complaint as already explained, during the last hearing is not within the scope of
the administrative hearing. The direct examination of the complainant, as the transcript
In his Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleges several irregularities against respondent showed, only covered the allegations with respect to herein respondent Santos, that he made
committed in the course of the hearing of his complaint. Complainant claims that while he solicitations from the complainant in the form of money and piece of land in exchange for a
was in the process of conducting his cross-examination on Biasura during the formal favorable decision and when respondents demand was not fully given, the Decision dated
investigation of the administrative complaint, respondent uttered to complainant, You April 21, 1993 in favor of complainant was subsequently reversed.[6]
concentrate in proving your innocence. The utterance allegedly manifested respondents
partiality to Biasura.
Complainant takes issue with the foregoing conclusions of respondent. In particular, he
argues that points (2) and (3) were actually covered by the direct examination according to
the transcript of stenographic notes.
In addition, complainant avers that on the day of the hearing on his motion for
reconsideration, respondent did not take action on the motion and instead left the office
early. Complaint further asserts that the 24 September 1998 order was issued despite
knowledge of the existence of the motion for respondent to inhibit from the case.[7]
Mention must be made that on 30 September 1998, complainant filed a motion for
respondent to inhibit herself from conducting the administrative proceedings. The motion
was granted and the case was re-assigned to Graft Investigation Officer Joaquin F. Salazar
(Salazar).
In her Comment,[8] respondent submits that the statements she allegedly uttered neither
convey bias or partiality to Biasura. She asserts that in the course of complainants cross-
examination, the questions propounded by the latter dealt with the alleged activities of
Biasura which were not at issue in the case and were moreover not testified to during the
direct examination.[9]
On the issue of falsification, respondent insists there was no false declaration or falsification
committed. She explains that the proposal to set aside the hearing adverted to by
complainant was made off-record; hence, it was not incorporated in the transcript of
stenographic notes.
Respondent denies having belatedly acted on complainants motion for reconsideration. She
contends that as of the date of the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, she has yet to
receive a copy of the motion from the Records Division and the other parties have yet to file
their respective comments.
At this point, it is noteworthy to mention that prior to the filing of the present disbarment
complaint, complainant lodged a complaint before the Civil Service Commission on 19 July
1999 charging respondent, together with her stenographer, Joel Barja Ativo, and Salazar for
falsification of records and grave misconduct. The complaint was referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In a Fact-Finding Report[10] dated 31 August 1999, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
dismissed the case for lack of merit. Dealing extensively with the issues raised by
complainant, the Report advanced the following observations:
The alleged alterations in the transcripts are likewise unfounded, since they are plain and
simple typographical errors which would only highlight the real issues in this case which is the
act of soliciting money in exchange for a favorable decision. Evidently, this was done by
herein-complainant in his naked attempt to evade the real issues against him and to delay the
administration of justice. Moreover, all the points raised by the complainant are entirely
baseless and tainted with malice. The records and the actions of respondent hearing officer
are regular and in accordance with established rules of procedure. It appears from the
evaluation of the undersigned that this complaint was designed to harass herein respondents
in order to derail the proceedings against him and this proves to be beneficial to his interest
and advantage. As it is, complainant is up [sic] to set a dangerous trend that whoever hearing
officer that will not take his side will end up a victim of a complaint before any other forum.
Lastly, the entire proceedings were all set aside by the new hearing officer and an entirely
new proceeding is now on-going.
In view of the foregoing, there was no falsification that we can speak of and neither are
respondents liable for Grave Misconduct as the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law or flagrant disregard of established rules are not manifested.[11]
The Report was approved by then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto on 1 October 1999.
The complaint in the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation. In its Order dated 7 March 2002, three areas of concern were identified to be
the subject of the administrative complaint, namely: (1) Order of 24 September 1998, (2)
utterances made by respondent during the hearings, and (3) alleged intervention of
respondent in the preparation of the transcript of stenographic notes of the 25 June 1998
hearing.[12] Thereafter, the IBP, in its Investigation Report[13] dated 28 February 2003,
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. The IBP ruled, thus:
A careful scrutiny of the assailed Order dated September 24, 1998 contains guidelines issued
by Respondent Calicdan, consistent with her functions as Hearing Officer/Ombudsman
Investigator. In issuing the same, Respondent Calicdan acted without malice and criminal
intent. Good faith is evident on her part, considering that the subject Order was mainly for
the orderly conduct of the administrative case she was presiding over.
The Fact-Finding Report dated August 31, 1999 of the Ombudsman in the administrative
complaint filed by Complainant Santos against Respondent Calicdan, on the very same
matters subject of this disbarment case, is comprehensive, and clearly point to the innocence
of Respondent Calicdan with respect to the charge for falsification.[14]
Upon review of the records, the Court is in full accord with the findings and conclusion of the
IBP.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended from practice for any deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, violation of the lawyers oath, willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or willful and unauthorized appearance for a party to a case, as specified in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A deceitful act, in particular, constitutes a violation of Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Nonetheless, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.[15] In disbarment
proceedings, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and
satisfactory proof, the burden of which rests upon the complainant.[16] Only a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar will warrant disbarment.[17]
In the instant case, complainant failed to substantiate his charges of falsification, to establish
the basis of respondents disbarment. He claimed that during the hearing on 25 June 1998,
respondent merely suspended the cross-examination being conducted by the former on
Biasura. Complainant accused respondent of altering the transcript of proceedings by making
it appear that the hearing was reset to 5 August and complainant was required to submit his
position paper.[18] The complainant, in questioning the veracity of the transcript of the
proceedings, failed to present evidence that the said transcript has been altered. Against his
bare allegations, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed prevails.
Otherwise stated, it is presumed that a public official properly and regularly discharges his
duties, or performs act required by law; in accordance with the law and the authority
conferred on him; and that he will not do any act contrary to his official duty or omit to do
anything which such duty may require.[19] Accordingly, we uphold the assailed transcript of
proceedings as the faithful and accurate recording of all matters that transpired during the 25
June 1998 hearing.
The alleged omissions in the said transcript were reflected in the 27 August 1998 Order, the
integrity of which complainant also assails in his Complaint-Affidavit. It appears that the IBP
did not dwell on the 27 August 1998 Order, focusing instead on the validity of the 24
September 1998 Order. This notwithstanding, we can conclude with comfort that no
irregularity attaches to the 27 August 1998 Order, as well. The statement therein that
complainant had waived his right to further cross-examine Biasura and that the parties were
to submit their respective position papers does not contradict the transcript which, absent
any evidence disputing its veracity, stands as the official record of what had transpired during
the hearing.
Even assuming that there is a grain of truth in complainants allegations regarding the
transcript of the hearing and the 27 August 1998 Order, it should be noted that the alleged
irregularities ultimately did not work to complainants prejudice. This was because in the 24
September 1998 Order, respondent affirmed the right of the complainant to continue his
cross-examination of Biasura, the very right which complainant purports to have been
infringed upon by reason of the transcript and the 27 August 1998 Order.
We now turn to the remaining issues as identified by the IBP in its March 2002 Order whether
the alleged utterances by respondent to complainant warrant administrative sanction against
her, and whether any irregularity attaches to the 24 September 1998 Order.
Complainant has accused respondent of unduly favoring Biasura when the latter made the
following remark: You concentrate in proving your innocence. There is no evidence on record
that respondent unduly favored Biasura. Respondent, in her Comment, averred that the
aforesaid statements, if ever uttered, neither convey bias nor partiality. She explained that
the cross-examination questions propounded by him did not deal with the issue in the said
case, as they did not address the matter subject of Biasuras testimony on direct examination.
It bears noting that complainant, a layman, was not assisted by a lawyer during the
proceedings before the Deputy Ombudsman. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that
complainant is not versed with rules of procedure. It could be said that respondent was
merely guiding complainant on how to pose the proper questions, in no way exhibiting bias
against his cause. In fact, in the Order[20] of 24 September 1998, respondent reminded
complainant to limit his cross-examination only to the facts testified to by Biasura.
Finally, we see no taint of irregularity in the Order of 24 September 1998. It should be recalled
that almost all of complainants questions in the cross-examination before the Ombudsman
were objected to by the counsel for the opposing party; thus, respondent deemed it fair to
give leeway to complainant by proposing to suspend the proceedings. The Order of 24
September 1998 did allow complainant to continue his cross-examination of Biasura, but
advised him to limit his cross-examination to the facts testified to by Biasura. The four points
stressed by respondent in the 24 September 1998 Order are merely reflective of this concern.
We agree with the IBP that the questioned order only manifests
respondents good faith in the performance of her duties as a hearing officer. The assailed
guidelines were precisely issued to ensure the orderly conduct of the proceedings.
We agree with the finding of the Ombudsman, shared by the IBP, that bad faith and malice
had attended the filing of the present complaint. In view of his suspicion of bias on the part of
respondent, the filing of the motion to inhibit would have sufficed. And yet, despite
respondents inhibiting herself from further conducting the administrative proceedings against
him, complainant still proceeded to file an administrative case before the Civil Service
Commission against respondent and, subsequently, the disbarment complaint before this
Court.
Based on the foregoing, complainant failed to establish by substantial evidence that
respondent committed the imputed acts to justify administrative sanction.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: [11]Id. at 283.

[12]Id. at 408.

[13]Id. at 485-488.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice [14]Id. at 487.
Chairperson
[15]Ramos v. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210, 9 December 2004, 445 SCRA 529; Santiago v. Rafanan, A.
C. No. 6252, 5 October 2004, 440 SCRA 91.

[16]Berbano v. Barcelona, A.C. No. 6084, 3 September 2003, 410 SCRA 258, 264, citing
Concepcion v. Fandio, Jr., 334 SCRA 136, 142 (2000).

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES [17]Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, 22 September 2004, 438 SCRA 582, 590.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
[18]Rollo, pp. 5-6.

[19]Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law VI, 1999 ed., citing 31 C.J.S. 798.

[20]Supra note 4.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

[1]Rollo, pp. 5-7.

[2]Entitled An Act Establishing a Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Officials and
Employees.

[3]Rollo, pp. 8-9.

[4]Id. at 36.

[5]Id. at 41-42.

[6]Id. at 41.

[7]Id. at 230-231.

[8]Id. at 52-56.

[9]Id. at 54.

[10]Id. at 277-285.

THIRD DIVISION
SIMON D. PAZ, A.C. No. 6125
Complainant,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ATTY. PEPITO A. SANCHEZ, Promulgated:
Respondent. September 19, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Simon D. Paz (complainant) against Atty. Pepito A.
Sanchez (respondent) for representing conflicting interests and violation of the lawyers oath.
The Facts
In his complaint dated 23 July 2003, complainant stated that sometime in 1995, complainant
and his partners, Alfredo Uyecio and Petronila Catap, engaged the services of respondent to
assist them purchase, as well as document the purchase, of several parcels of land from
tenant-farmers in Pampanga. Respondent was also tasked to defend complainants claim on
the properties against the claim of a certain George Lizares (Lizares).
The complaint arose because respondent, allegedly after the termination of his services in
May 2000, filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Board (DARAB case)
in behalf of one Isidro Dizon (Dizon) for annulment of Transfer Certificate Title No. 420127-R
(TCT No. 420127-R) in the name of complainant and his partners.[1] Complainant explained
that Dizons property, covered by Emancipation Patent No. 00708554/Transfer Certificate Title
No. 25214 (TCT No. 25214), was among those properties purchased by complainant with
respondents assistance. Complainant alleged that respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests when he represented Dizon in a case involving the same properties and
transactions in which he previously acted as complainants counsel. Complainant added that
respondent filed the DARAB case with malicious machination because respondent used
complainants old address to serve the complaint and summons, enabling respondent to
obtain a judgment by default in Dizons favor.
Complainant also stated that on 23 June 2003, respondent, despite knowledge of
complainants pending petition for review of judgment in the DARAB case, filed a civil case
(RTC case) against complainant and Sycamore Venture Corporation[2] (Sycamore) before the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, for annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 483629-R (TCT No. 483629-R).[3] Complainant pointed out that respondent should be
punished for forum shopping and preparing a false certification of non-forum shopping
because respondent failed to disclose complainants pending petition before the DARAB.
Complainant also charged respondent with violation of the lawyers oath because, with malice
and full knowledge of the real facts, respondent filed groundless and false suits against
complainant, his partners and Sycamore.
In his comment dated 2 October 2003, respondent stated that he has been representing the
tenant-farmers, including Dizon, in their cases before the DARAB and the courts since 1978.
Respondent also represented the tenant-farmers against the claims of Lizares, who filed cases
for the cancellation of their emancipation patents.
Respondent confirmed that in 1995, complainant and his partners expressed interest in
acquiring Dizons property. Respondent also explained that complainant and his partners, as
buyers of the tenant-farmers properties, were impleaded as defendants in the Lizares cases.
Respondent came to represent complainant and his partners because they did not get a
lawyer of their own and allowed respondent to represent them too.[4]
On the DARAB case, respondent clarified that the complaint[5] was filed on 15 May 1997 and
not, as complainant claimed, after respondents services was terminated in May 2000.
Respondent declared that he was compelled to file the case because he felt responsible for
the cancellation of TCT No. 25214. Respondent explained that he lent Dizons title to
complainant and his partners enabling them to transfer the title in their names. Denying that
there was malicious machination in the filing of the DARAB case, respondent stated that the
address he placed was the address of complainant in 1997. The 20 August 2002 DARAB
decision[6] specifically stated that a copy of the complaint, summons and notices were duly
served and received by complainant and his partners. However, complainant and his partners
ignored the complaint, summons and notices, which led to the issuance of a judgment in
Dizons favor. Moreover, there was entry of judgment[7] on 21 November 2002 and the writ
of execution[8] was issued on 10 December 2002.
On the RTC case, respondent explained that he was compelled to file the case when he
discovered that TCT No. 420127-R, in the name of complainant and his partners, was
transferred in the name of Sycamore. Respondent pointed out that unless TCT No. 483629-R
is nullified, the Register of Deeds cannot execute the DARAB decision. Respondent denied
that he violated the prohibition on forum shopping.[9] Respondent also maintained that the
cases he filed were justifiable, tenable and meritorious.
In a Resolution dated 12 November 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) set the case for mandatory
conference on 4 March 2004. Both parties appeared and were given ten days to submit their
position papers. Both parties complied.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2005-78 dated 12 March 2005
adopting, with modification,[10] Commissioner San Juans Report and Recommendation
finding respondent guilty of violating the prohibition against representing conflicting
interests. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition on respondent of a
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law with a warning that a similar offense
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the case to the Court as provided under Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B[11] of the Rules of Court.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds insufficient evidence to hold respondent liable for forum shopping and for
filing groundless suits. However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of the
prohibition on representing conflicting interests.
On Respondents Violation of the Rules
on Non-Forum Shopping
Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits, either simultaneously or
successively, involving the same parties to secure a favorable judgment.[12] Forum shopping
exists if the actions raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues.[13] The mere
filing of several
cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum shopping.[14]
The Court notes that the certification against forum shopping did not form part of the records
of the case. However, a comparison of the two cases reveal that there was no forum
shopping. Although both cases are related because Dizons property is involved, the reliefs
prayed for are different. In the DARAB case, Dizon prayed for the cancellation of TCT No.
420127-R in the name of complainant and his partners. In the RTC case, Dizons widow prayed
for the cancellation of TCT No. 483629-R in the name of Sycamore. Respondent cannot be
held liable for forum shopping.
On Respondents Violation of the Lawyers Oath
Lawyers take an oath that they will not wittingly or willingly promote any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same. The Court notes that the cases are still
pending before the DARAB and the RTC. The Court, therefore, does not have any basis for
ruling if there was a violation of the oath.
On Respondents Violation of the Prohibition against
Representing Conflicting Interests
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full
disclosure of the facts. Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf
of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to
oppose.[15] The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a
situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action.[16]
By respondents own admission, when he filed the DARAB case on Dizons behalf against
complainant, both complainant and Dizon were respondents clients at that time. Respondent
was representing complainant in the cases against Lizares where respondent was duty-bound
to defend complainants title over the properties against the claims of Lizares. While it is not
clear from the records that the Lizares cases included Dizons property, it is undisputed that
respondent acted as complainants counsel in the Lizares cases. At the same time, respondent
was also representing Dizon before the DARAB for cancellation of lis pendens[17] involving
Dizons property, which cancellation was needed for complainant to purchase the Dizon
property. In filing the second DARAB case on Dizons behalf, respondent was duty-bound to
assail complainants title over Dizons property, which complainant had purchased from Dizon.
Respondent was clearly in a conflict of interest situation.
The Court notes that respondent did not specifically deny that he represented conflicting
interests. Respondent merely offered to justify his actuations by stating that he felt it was his
duty and responsibility to file the case because he felt responsible for the cancellation of TCT
No. 25214 and its subsequent transfer in complainants name.[18] Respondent stated that he
will forever be bothered by his conscience if he did not file the case.[19] However, good faith
and honest intentions do not excuse the violation of this prohibition.[20] In representing both
complainant and Dizon, respondents duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his clients was
placed under a cloud of doubt. Respondent should have inhibited himself from representing
Dizon against complainant in the DARAB and RTC cases to avoid conflict of interest.
In Maturan v. Gonzales, the Court said:
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his clients case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well
as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No
opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the clients secrets. A lawyer must have
the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer [2] Complainant is the President of Sycamore Venture Corporation.
by the loss thereof.[21] [3] Docketed as Civil Case No. 12722 entitled Natividad Carreon Vda. de Dizon vs. Simon Paz,
Atty. Enrique M. Basa, Sycamore Venture Corporation, Register of Deeds of Pampanga and
Provincial Assessors of Pampanga for Declaration of Nullity of TCT No. 483629-R, Canceled
On the Appropriate Penalty Against Respondent Entry No. 7268 in TCT No. 420127-R and Damages with prayer for Injunction/Temporary
Restraining Order filed on 23 June 2003.
In cases involving representation of conflicting interests, the Court has imposed on the erring [4] Rollo, p. 45.
lawyer either a reprimand,[22] or a suspension from the practice of law from six months[23] [5] Id. at 22.
to two years.[24] [6] Id. at 69-73.
[7] Id. at 74.
In this case, we deem it proper to suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year [8] Id. at 75.
as recommended by the IBP. [9] Id. at 80-84.
[10] Commissioner San Juan recommended a penalty of three years suspension from the
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Pepito A. Sanchez GUILTY of violating Rule practice of law.
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court SUSPENDS respondent from the [11] Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
practice of law
for ONE YEAR and WARNS respondent that the commission of a similar act in the future will SEC. 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.
merit a more severe penalty. xxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
[12] NBI-Microsoft Corporation v. Hwang, G.R. No. 147043, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 428.
SO ORDERED. [13] International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 510 (1995).
[14] Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 322 Phil. 709 (1996).
ANTONIO T. CARPIO [15] Canon of Professional Ethics, Canon 6.
Associate Justice [16] Quiambao v. Bamba, A.C. No. 6708, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 1.
WE CONCUR: [17] Docketed as DARAB Case No. 5190-P97 entitled Isidro Dizon vs. Register of Deeds
Pampanga for Cancellation of Lis Pendens filed on 26 February 1997.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING [18] Rollo, p. 47.
Associate Justice [19] Id. at 48.
Chairperson [20] Nakpil v. Valdes, 350 Phil. 412 (1998).
[21] 350 Phil. 882, 887 (1998).
[22] Gamilla v. Mario, Jr., 447 Phil. 419 (2003).
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA [23] See Abragan v. Rodriguez, 429 Phil. 607 (2002); Artezuela v. Maderazo, 431 Phil. 135
Associate Justice Associate Justice (2002); De Guzman v. De Dios, 403 Phil. 222 (2001).
[24] See Maturan v. Gonzales, supra note 21; Vda. de Alisbo v. Jalandoni, Sr., A.C. No. 1311,
18 July 1991, 199 SCRA 321; Natan v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640 (1952);
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

[1] Docketed as DARAB Case No. 5230-P97 entitled Isidro Dizon vs. Petronila Catap, Alfredo
Uyecio and Simon Paz for Annulment of TCT No. 420127-R with Damages filed on 15 May
1997.
 in writing and file the appropriate pleading.[3] Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no
such pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments.
SECOND DIVISION
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.[4] The complaint, which charged Atty.
RENATO M. MALIGAYA, A.C. No. 6198 Doronilla with misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in]
Complainant, obstruction of justice,[5] was referred to a commissioner[6] for investigation. Complainant
Present: swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement
to withdraw his lawsuits.[7] Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to
PUNO, J., Chairperson, present evidence and explain his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, agreement.[8] Later he explained
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and in his memorandum that his main concern was to settle the case amicably among comrades in
GARCIA, JJ. arms without going to trial[9] and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath.[10] He pointed out, in addition, that
ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., his false statement (or, as he put it, his alleged acts of falsity) had no effect on the
Respondent. Promulgated: continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.[11]

September 15, 2006 In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and
recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[12] and recommending that
he be suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a period of three
RESOLUTION months.[13] This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August
30, 2003.[14]

CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate Generals Service is before us on a charge
of unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil
Case No. Q-99-38778.[1]
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M.
Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several
military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February
19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court,
participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with
truth and honor.[15] The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled
to speak the truth and to act honestly should not become a common reality.[16] To this end,
Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya]
filed before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the case
against him, he will
also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he is now
receiving pension.[2] (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a
number of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits,
Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he
violated the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, of
which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyers duty
to never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of
fact or law.[17]
Atty. Doronillas unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to
acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this
administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done
nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even after
having admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth
exist. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an
ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been
meant for the information of Judge Daway but only as a sort of question to complainant
regarding a pending proposal to settle the case.[18]
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness,[19]
cannot absolve him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to
obfuscate plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his
favor, though, a
presumption of good faith[20] which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered
excuse as an indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was
to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial,[21] perhaps it is
not unreasonable to assume that what he really meant to say was that he had intended the
misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But
even if that had been so, it would have been no justification for speaking falsely in court.
There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way,
makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not
true. A lawyers duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and
honor[22] forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit
of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case
amicably, we must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.
Atty. Doronillas offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
which in part declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice x x x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the
practice of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBPs recommendation for Atty.
Doronillas suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this
administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronillas liability as a member of the legal
profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper
for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of
legal ethics and the lawyers oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate
Generals Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well
follow as a consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be
reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going
beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBPs
recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBPs recommendation on the duration of Atty.
Doronillas suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability
somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the
investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daways courtroom. Second,
the absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.[23] And finally, since this is Atty. Doronillas first offense, he is entitled to some
measure of forbearance.[24]
Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells
us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time
away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten
notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
TWO MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate
Generals Service.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
Q: What do you mean when you say (sic) there was an agreement?
A: It was only a question propounded to the plaintiff on the premise that there was a pending
proposal to agree on those withdrawal (sic). To withdraw the case before the separation
[1] The case, entitled Renato M. Maligaya v. Octavio S. Dauz, et al., was filed and heard in board and the case before Judge Daway (sic). TSN, July 11, 2002, pp. 106-107.
Branch 90, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. [19] The contention if taken literally was preposterous, for he had quite obviously been
[2] Rollo, p. 8 (Aside from this damage suit, complainant filed other cases against the military addressing Judge Daway when he said there was an agreement, and that assertion could not
officers. The military, on the other hand, had instituted an administrative case against have been construed as other than a statement of fact.
complainant prior to his retirement. The case was dismissed when he retired from the service [20] Cuaresma v. Daquis, No. L-35113, 25 March 1975, 63 SCRA 257, 260.
in 1999. Id., p. 186). [21] Supra note 9.
[3] Id., p. 9. [22] Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (d); Pangan v. Ramos, A.C. No. 1053, 7 September 1979,
[4] Docketed as CBD Case No. 02-955. 93 SCRA 87, 89.
[5] Rollo, p. 3. [23] Cailing v. Espinosa, 103 Phil. 1165 (1958).
[6] Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro. [24] See e.g., Whitson v. Atienza, A.C. No. 5535, 28 August 2003, 410 SCRA 10; Alcantara v.
[7] TSN, July 11, 2002, pp. 28, 35, 60, & 78. Atty. Pefianco, 441 Phil. 514 (2002); Fernandez v. Atty. Novero, Jr., 441 Phil. 506 (2002).
[8] ATTY. Doronilla:
Actually there is no agreement but there was a proposal to dismiss and to withdraw all the
cases. There was no agreement. TSN July 11, 2002, p. 105;

COMM. NAVARRO:
An answer. His question was, was there an agreement in the cases pending before Judge
Daway and he answered, there was no agreement.
ATTY. DORONILLA:
There was no agreement. Id., p. 106;

ATTY. DORONILLA:
Q: Is it true that in the hearing of July 11, 2002 on page 105 you said actually that there was
no agreement but there was proposal to dismiss and to withdraw all the cases?
A: There was no agreement. TSN, December 10, 2002, p. 43;

COMM. NAVARRO:
Has there been an agreement?
ATTY. DORONILLA:
There was no agreement as I said in an agreement there must be two parties to have it
consummated (sic). Our part is already done Id., p. 52.
[9] Rollo, p. 217.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. p. 218.
[12] Infra.
[13] Report and Recommendation, p. 6.
[14] Per Resolution No. XVI-2003-37.
[15] Sabayle v. Tandayag, A.C. No. 140-J, 8 March 1988, 158 SCRA 497, 506.
[16] Id.
[17] Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20.
[18] Q: What made you make a manifestation saying (sic) that there was an agreement?
A: That manifestation is a sort of question to the plaintiff. It is not giving information to the
court. TSN July 11, 2002, p. 102
 At around this point, by complainants own admission, she and respondent started having a
THIRD DIVISION sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started
calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly
started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making sexual
CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG A.C. No. 6313 advances towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the
Complainant, promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the
prospective claim for support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed
Present: to these advances, assured by respondents claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his
own marriage had already been annulled.
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson, On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of
CARPIO, Disclaimer[3] (Affidavit) categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in
CARPIO MORALES, the birth certificate[4] of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not
TINGA, and allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her
VELASCO, JR. that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. to give her daughter medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly assured
RONGCAL, complainant that despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the
Respondent. Promulgated: future because the Affidavit is not a public document. Because she completely trusted him at
September 7, 2006 this point, she signed the document without even taking a glance at it.[5]

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from
the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a
lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great
caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.[1]
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P.
Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of he said,
she said, the parties conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter
presented.
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she
was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino (Aquino), the biological father of
her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary
referred her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a
demand letter[2] in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the
monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical
operation their daughter would need for her congenital heart ailment.
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him
P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical
expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his
personal check[6] in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of
P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed
her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as
he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of
Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent
kept part of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a
job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty.
Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. (Atty. Tolentino).
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child
abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil
case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement.[7] It was only
when said cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally
prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her
disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated by
his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her
into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in
him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that
time, respondent was able to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her
daughter. She argues that respondents aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath
as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), particularly Rule 1.01,
Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.[8] Hence, she filed the instant complaint[9]
dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a
lawyer who would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainants former high
school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official, referred
her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for
the child.[10] Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned
that because of Aquinos infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order
to settle things the spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would
execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised
her to study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her
the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate
for an out-of-court settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the
amount, negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly
offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant
disagreed. Aquino then proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a
total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that
respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to
sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what the
Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft
before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college graduate and a
former bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise vehemently denies
pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the
Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told
respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the
complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorneys fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant.
He, however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it
was more of a chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults,[11] complainant then being in
her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already
annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant
very well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital
liaison. He points out that, first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend
and former high school classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his
residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently, complainant called his
residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to
respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong
Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Council (ABC) and as such was an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua,
Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known
in his locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital status
especially that she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even
actively helped him in his campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked
out, complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised
her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job never came so
that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was
about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and
urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her
pleas, he also advised her to look for the right man[12] and to stop depending on him for
financial assistance. He also informed her that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he
was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty.
Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he
agreed to give her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then,
they have ceased to meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone.
In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June when her alleged fianc
from the United States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked
for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped
communicating to her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told
him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted
him to relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him a
prepared complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should
the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent
ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[13] After the parties submitted their respective
position papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his
Report and Recommendation[14] dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties
conflicting factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of
complainant and concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise,
to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good
moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and
renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer,
are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which
throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described as MORAL CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant
to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling
complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for
the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular
calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and
emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x[15]
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within
two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and
Recommendation in a Resolution[16] dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondents obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial
and emotional problem of his client and attempting to mislead the Commission,[17]
respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for one (1) year with a stern warning
that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to return
P58,000.00 to complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Questioning[18] (Motion) dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand
Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He
reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that
transpired between him and complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd
and manipulative woman who depends on men for financial support and who would stop at
nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on
complainants bare allegations that she failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence, he
posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order to determine who
between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution[19] dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has
no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme
Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has
recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair
with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree[20] in
order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good
moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege.[21] As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community.[22] The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral.[23] A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[24] It is
a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community.[25]
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior,[26] it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.[27] Even if
not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations
outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by
our laws.[28]
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of
the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by his
alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire
financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in
the affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainants allegations that she succumbed to respondents sexual advances due to his
promises of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case
against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into
having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient
age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual
congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no showing
that she is suffering from any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness
and/or helplessness on her part.[29] Respondents numerous visits and regular calls to
complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves that he
courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of
immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not
induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if
not badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainants allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status
inspire belief. We find credence in respondents assertion that it was impossible for her not to
have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced by her
friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent.
She admitted that she knew his residence phone number and that she had called him there.
She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board
Member in 2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondents allegations that she had met and
talked to his wife on several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him
in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital
status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married
man, it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with
respondent whom she had known for only a short time without verifying his background, if it
were true that she preferred to change [her] life for the better,[30] as alleged in her
complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by
clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.[31] We are left with the most
logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship
with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral
control over her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her
read it and without explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she
alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainants assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from
Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom
how she could abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple of months
and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she
knew was related to the support case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short
sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she
signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of
the Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her
to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandras medical and
educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer.[32] If her own
allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with
Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the
Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on whether to sign the same.
Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or that she knows and understands
English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are understandable even to
a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without
any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a
document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with
Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable
settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in
court.[33] Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of
complainants daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and
intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when
she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to whether
respondent also acted as Aquinos counsel in the settlement of the case. Again, we only have
complainants bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence.[34] Suspicion, no matter
how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the
presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his
oath.[35]
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by
Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her
his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in
violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to
return the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of
complainants claim for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the
amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have received more as
there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned
over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00
but only P38,000.00 more and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for
his attorneys fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two
postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand,
respondent admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence
of an agreement for attorneys fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the same.
Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of
complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent
belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but
he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did not want to travel all the way to
Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in
favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The
IBP relied only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need to subject
the veracity of the assertions through the question and answer modality. With the
inconclusive state of the evidence, a more
in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the
substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for
further reception of evidence solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainants prayer for respondent to be made liable for the
cost of her childs DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked
for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainants claim for moral damages and attorneys fees. Suffice
it to state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a
civil or a criminal action.[36] It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to
remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to
protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.[37] As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private SO ORDERED.
grievance.[38] The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
lawyers alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the DANTE O. TINGA
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.[39] Associate Justice

Respondents misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court
meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the WE CONCUR:
respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,[40] abandoned his family to cohabit with his
paramour,[41] cohabited with a married woman,[42] lured an innocent woman into LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
marriage,[43] or was found to be a womanizer.[44] The instant case can be easily Associate Justice
differentiated from the foregoing cases. Chairperson
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.[45] In Zaguirre v. Associate Justice Associate Justice
Castillo,[46] respondent was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
was married. He therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous Associate Justice
nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire.
Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely.
However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,[47] where respondent judge consorted with a woman [1]Buado v. Layag, A.C. No. 5182, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 159; Berbano v. Barcelona, A.C.
not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined No. 6084, September 3, 2003, 410 SCRA 258.
P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during the
pendency of the case. [2]Rollo, p. 5; The demand letter is dated 5 January 2000 but both parties admit that the same
should read 5 January 2001.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse
over his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take [3]Id. at 6.
these as signs that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as
mitigating circumstances in his favor.[48] Considering further that this is his first offense, we [4]Id. at 40-41.
believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the
outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the [5]Id. at 2.
client.
[6]Id. at 7.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality
and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or [7]Id. at 51-52.
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
[8]The Complainant charges respondent of violating the following rules of the Code of
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further Conduct of Professional Responsibility:
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
Decision. Canon 1, Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Canon 1, Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Canon 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL [27]Id. at 461.
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
[28]Id. at 461-462.
Canon 16, Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client. [29]The operative circumstances in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, 15 September
2004, 438 SCRA 306, are markedly different from those obtaining in the present case.
Canon 16, Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
[30]Rollo, p. 2.
[9]Rollo, pp. 1-7.
[31]Concepcion v. Atty. Fandio, Jr., 389 Phil. 474 (2000).
[10]Id. at 12.
[32]Rollo, p. 34.
[11]Id. at 14.
[33]De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 168, 173 (1996).
[12]Id.
[34]See Rodriguez v. Valencia and Rodriguez, 81 Phil. 787 (1948).
[13]Id. at 25.
[35]In re De Guzman, 154 Phil. 127, 133 (1974).
[14]Id. at 77-83.
[36]In re Almacen, No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 600.
[15]Id. at 81-83.
[37]Roldan v. Panganiban, A.C. No. 4552, 14 December 2004, 446 SCRA 249; Rivera v. Atty.
[16]Id. at 76. Corral, 433 Phil. 331 (2002) ; In re Almacen, supra.

[17]Id. [38]De Ere v. Rubi, 378 Phil. 377 (1999).

[18]Id. at 99-130. [39]Tajan v. Cusi, Jr., 156 Phil. 128, 134 (1974).

[19]IBP Resolution dated 27 April 2006 filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 June [40]Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, 376 Phil. 336 (1999); Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313 (1957).
2006.
[41]Obusan v. Obusan, Jr., 213 Phil. 437 (1984); Toledo v. Toledo, 117 SCRA 768 (1963).
[20]Rollo, p. 56.
[42]Royong v. Oblena, supra note 21.
[21]Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865 (1963).
[43]Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, supra note 29; Cabrera v. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256 (1960).
[22]Tolosa v. Cargo, A.C. No. 2385, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 21, 26.
[44]Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, 22 September 2004, 438 SCRA 582.
[23]Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr., 342 Phil. 408, 412 (1997).
[45]In re Almacen, supra.
[24]Id. [46]A.C. No. 4921, 6 March 2003, 398 SCRA 658.

[25]Id. [47]423 Phil. 522 (2001).

[26]See Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, 388 Phil. 691 (2000); See also Concerned Employee v. Mayor, [48]See Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia, 451 Phil. 420 (2003).
A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 448, 457.

FIRST DIVISION
ROBERTO POON, A.C. No. 6549
Complainant,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
ATTY. JANETTE BASSIG-CHUA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 22, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Roberto Poon (Roberto) was the defendant in a case entitled Metro Central Mercantile
Corporation (MCMC) v. Robert Poon, for unlawful detainer and docketed as Civil Case No.
174709 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila, Branch 23, presided by Judge
Tingaraan U. Guiling. Atty. Janette Bassig-Chua (respondent), on the other hand, was the
counsel of the plaintiff, MCMC.
In a sworn complaint[1] dated July 23, 2004, Roberto charged respondent with grave
professional misconduct for deliberately failing to furnish his (Roberto) counsel, Atty. Antonio
R. Tupaz (Atty. Tupaz) of the pleadings and motions she filed in Civil Case No. 174709. Roberto
prays that respondent be disbarred for grave professional misconduct and for the total
disregard of his right to due process.
Roberto alleged that when respondent filed a Complaint[2] in behalf of her client, the same
was deficient because it did not contain any Annex B. Thus, Atty. Tupaz, filed a Motion to
Complete the Complaint.[3] Respondent filed an Opposition[4] stating that the annexes were
complete and that the Annex B referred to was a statement of account which had already
been furnished to him before the filing of the complaint. Copy of said Opposition was served
by respondent to Atty. Tupaz.
On March 18, 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Render Judgment[5] contending that
Roberto failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. Copy thereof was sent only
to Roberto. On April 2, 2002, the MTC treated said motion as one to declare Roberto in
default and directed respondent to show proof of service thereof to the latter. Indicated in
the said order were the address of both Roberto and his counsel, Atty. Tupaz.[6] In her
Compliance dated April 10, 2003, respondent informed the MTC that the Motion to Render
Judgment was personally served to Roberto. Again, copy of said compliance was furnished
only to the latter but not to Atty. Tupaz.[7]
On April 15, 2003, the MTC granted the Motion to Render Judgment[8] and subsequently
rendered a judgment[9] in favor of MCMC on July 1, 2003. The MTC served copy of the said
decision and April 15, 2003 order only to Roberto and not to Atty. Tupaz.
On September 23, 2003, Roberto filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction[10] with Branch
33 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, but was denied for lack of merit on December
4, 2003.[11] Pending the resolution of Robertos motion for reconsideration, respondent filed
a motion for execution dated January 19, 2004 of the MTC decision. The same was granted by
the MTC which issued a writ of execution directing Roberto to vacate the leased premises
within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
Atty. Tupaz filed a Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Order of Execution,[12] to
which respondent filed an Opposition.[13] Roberto claimed that for the fourth time,
respondent did not furnish Atty. Tupaz with a copy of the said Opposition. The MTC denied
the Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Order of Execution, hence, Roberto was
ousted from the leased premises.
In sum, Roberto maintained that respondent failed to live up to a lawyers duty to uphold the
rights of the parties in a case, even that of the adverse party. Roberto asserts that respondent
violated his right to due process by repeatedly and deliberately failing to furnish his counsel of
the following pleadings: (1) Plaintiffs (Respondent) Motion to Render Judgment; (2)
Compliance; (3) Motion for Execution; and (4) Opposition to the Very Urgent Manifestation
and Motion to Recall Order of Execution.
Respondent argued that she did not commit any professional misconduct in not furnishing
Robertos counsel of the abovementioned pleadings. She averred that when she filed the
Motion to Render Judgment on March 21, 2003, there was no legal basis to know that
Roberto was represented by Atty. Tupaz because she received the Motion to Complete
Complaint filed by the latter only on March 24, 2003, and prior to this, there was no formal
appearance filed by the latter. Likewise, she claimed that Atty. Tupaz never appeared in the
MTC case to represent the complainant.
Respondent added that she sent her Opposition to the Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion
to Recall Order of Execution to Roberto because Atty. Tupaz again failed to indicate in the
Notice of Hearing of said motion, the date and time of the setting of the hearing.
On October 4, 2005, Lydia A. Navarro, Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three months. Commissioner Navarro found that
respondent admitted that she failed to furnish Atty. Tupaz with the pleadings she filed.
In a Resolution dated March 20, 2006,[14] the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the recommendation of Commissioner Navarro.
The only issue for resolution is whether respondent should be held administratively liable for
failure to furnish Atty. Tupaz of the pleadings she filed.
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that service is the act of providing a
party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel,
service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the
party himself is ordered by the court. Moreover, an attorney is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client.[15]
In the instant case, there is no doubt that Atty. Tupaz is the counsel of record of Roberto.
After respondent filed a Complaint on February 17, 2003 against Roberto, Atty. Tupaz filed on
behalf of the latter a Motion to Complete the Complaint. Respondent filed an Opposition
dated March 24, 2003 and furnished both Atty. Tupaz and Roberto a copy of the same.
However, subsequent pleadings such as the Compliance; the Motion for Execution; and the
Opposition to the Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Order of Execution, were
furnished only to Roberto and not to Atty. Tupaz.
Respondent admitted not serving a copy of the Motion to Render Judgment to Atty. Tupaz
because she received the Motion to Complete the Complaint only on March 24, 2003 after
she had already filed the Motion to Render Judgment on March 21, 2003. However, except
for her bare allegations,[16] she presented no proof to substantiate her claim as to her date
of receipt of said motion. Moreover, an entry of appearance is not necessary for Atty. Tupaz
to be recognized as counsel of Roberto. The fact that he filed a pleading in behalf of the latter
is sufficient notice to respondent that he is the counsel of record of Roberto and that copy of
the pleadings should be served to him and not to the latter.
Anent her Compliance to the MTCs order dated April 2, 2002, respondent cannot claim that
Roberto is not represented by Atty. Tupaz considering that the April 2, 2002 order clearly
reflected that the MTC sent a copy thereof not only to Roberto but also to his counsel, Atty.
Tupaz.[17]
The same is true with respect to respondents Motion for Execution dated January 19, 2004
and February 19, 2004 Opposition to Atty. Tupazs Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion to
Recall Order of Execution. This is because at the time she filed the motion for execution, she
already received on September 22, 2003 the petition for certiorari filed by Atty. Tupaz with
the RTC. More so as regards the Opposition of respondent considering that she stubbornly
failed to furnish Atty. Tupaz with a copy thereof although it was very clear that it was the
latter counsel who signed the motion she was opposing.
It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all notices should be sent to the
partys lawyer at his given address.[18] The purpose of the rule is obviously to maintain a
uniform procedure calculated to place in competent hands the orderly prosecution of a partys
case.[19] In J.M. Javier Logging Corporation v. Mardo,[20] we held, thus:
This rule is not a mere technicality, but one founded on considerations of fair play. A party
engages an attorney of record precisely because it does not feel competent to deal with the
intricacies of law and procedure. Furthermore, as the party directly served would have to
communicate with its attorney and turn over to him the notice received, the net result would
be to noticeably shorten the usable period for taking the proper steps required to protect the
partys interests.
In sum, we find that respondent should be reprimanded for failing to comply with the rules.
Under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
Nevertheless, the penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law is too harsh
and not commensurate to the infraction of respondent vis--vis the damage caused to
Roberto. The latter was declared in default because he did not file an answer within the
reglementary period. His motion to complete the complaint was correctly treated as a mere
scrap of paper for non-compliance with Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Neither can
Roberto be considered to have been denied due process considering that he was able to
elevate the case to the RTC. Indeed, due process is merely an opportunity to be heard which
in this case was amply afforded to him.
WHEREFORE, for failure to observe Section 2, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court,
respondent Atty. Janette Bassig-Chua is found GUILTY of simple misconduct and is hereby
REPRIMANDED and sternLY warnED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 1-5.

[2] Id. at 7-10.
[3] Id. at 12-13.
[4] Id. at 14-15.
[5] Id. at 16-17.
[6] Id. at 18.
[7] Id. at 19-20.
[8] Id. at 2.
[9] Id. at 126-127.
[10] Id. at 23-44.
[11] Id. at 45-47.
[12] Id. at 53-56.
[13] Id. at 59-64.
[14] Id. at 238.
[15] Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 21.
[16] Rollo, p. 70.
[17] Id. at 18.
[18] Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 454 Phil. 338,358 (2003).
[19] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 213 Phil.
362, 368 (1984).
[20] 133 Phil. 766, 769 (1968).
FIRST DIVISION
(Sgd.) JOCELYN [A.] SAQUING (Sgd.) PAULINO MORA

JOCELYN A. SAQUING, A.C. No. 6678 (Sgd.) MANUELA ASPA MORA

Complainant,
Present: SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), ____________________________

- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez, SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 8th day of July, 2004 at Tuguegarao.
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ. (Sgd.) ATTY. NOEL A. MORA[3]
ATTY. NOEL A. MORA,
Respondent. Promulgated: After payment of the remaining balance, respondent prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale of a
Portion of Unregistered Land,[4] but complainant refused to affix her signature on the deed
October 9, 2006 because it was stated therein that the land was unregistered, contrary to the representations
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x of the spouses and the respondent.[5]

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Complainant Jocelyn A. Saquing seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Noel A. Mora for
grave misconduct for allegedly conspiring with spouses Paulino and Manuela Mora in inducing
her to buy an unregistered parcel of land, and for performing a notarial act without a
commission, he being a lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO).
Complainant alleged that in June 2004, she bought from the spouses Mora 7,828 square
meter parcel of allegedly registered land located at Sitio Paquiel, Camasi, Peablanca, Cagayan,
for P782,800.00.[1] On July 8, 2004, she paid the amount of P550,000.00 to the spouses Mora
at the house of the respondent, who prepared a handwritten acknowledgment receipt, which
reads:[2]
ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT
This is to acknowledge receipt the amount of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P550,000.00) from MS. JOCELYN [A.] SAQUING as partial payment of the Lot 108-3, PSU-(2f)
02-165983 Amd3 with an area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Eight (7,828) square
meters located at Camasi, Peablanca, Cagayan.
The balance in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
PESOS (P232,800.00) shall be paid within the period of three (3) months.
Executed this 8th day of July, 2004 at Tuguegarao City.
When the spouses Mora refused to return the contract price, complainant filed a complaint
for estafa against them at the City Prosecutors Office, Tuguegarao City, and an administrative
case for disbarment against the respondent at the Office of the Bar Confidant.[6]
Respondent denied conspiring with spouses Mora regarding the sale of the land. He alleged
that before he prepared the acknowledgment receipt, the parties had already agreed on the
terms of the contract; thus, there was no need for him to convince complainant to buy the
land. He admitted that he asked the parties to subscribe the acknowledgment receipt and
swear before him but claimed that he did it only for complainants protection in case any
problem would arise. He denied giving any assurance that the land was registered. In fact, he
explained to her the status of the case with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and that the spouses were facilitating the titling of the property in their
names.[7]
Complainant filed a Reply[8] to respondents comment, after which the case was referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[9] In
its Resolution No. XVII-2006-238, dated April 27, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors approved
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, Lolita A. Quisumbing,
finding respondent guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for notarizing the Acknowledgment Receipt without notarial commission and
recommending that he be reprimanded with warning that repetition of the same act will be
dealt with more severely.[10]
This resolution is now before us for review.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this Court will
exercise its disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case by clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence.[11] Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.[12]
Complainants evidence consists mainly of her Affidavit-Complaint, Acknowledgment Receipt,
Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Unregistered Land and her testimony before the
Commission attesting to the truth of the allegations in her affidavit.
We agree with the Investigating Commissioner that while the evidence of complainant is
sufficient to support the charge that respondent notarized the Acknowledgment Receipt
without a notarial commission, the same however is insufficient to prove that respondent
conspired with spouses Mora in inducing her to purchase the land. Thus,
Other than complainants bare allegation, there is no extant proof adequately showing that
respondent told her that the property was registered land. Instead, we find sufficient
evidence to support the finding that there was no connivance and that complainant was
aware that the property was still to be titled:
1. The Acknowledgment Receipt describes the property as Lot 108-3, PSU (2f) 02-
165983 xxx and not by TCT or OCT Number.
2. The Acknowledgment Receipt provides that the balance shall be paid within a
period of three (3) months. Thus, complainant had sufficient time to demand or verify if the
property was registered with the Registry of Deeds. But instead of doing so, she made further
payments on 16 August 2004 and 8 September 2004.
3. Complainant was present when the property was being surveyed for the purpose
of segregating the lot to be adjudicated to her. The status of the property was further
explained to her by Engr. Camb[r]i during the segregation survey of the property she bought.
4. The Lot Descriptions attached to the Survey Plan prepared by Engr. Cambri
specifically states that Lot No. 15 was complainants.
5. The property was adjudicated to the spouses Mora by the DENR in the Order
dated 5 October 2001 which already became final and executory. In a way, the title of
spouses of the lot was confirmed and in the process of making it perfect through the approval
of the subdivision plan and the appropriate public land application. This was explained by
respondent to complainant since he is the lawyer of the spouses in the DENR case.[13]
Anent the charge of notarizing a document without a notarial commission, we agree that such
an act violates Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In Nunga v. Viray,[14] the Court held that:
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time
when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of
the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes,
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These
violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
For such misconduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers with suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as
such, and even disbarment.[15]
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar
must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear
cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of
the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where
any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine would accomplish the
end desired.[16]
In Joson v. Baltazar,[17] the Court suspended a lawyer for three months for unauthorized
notarization of a deed of sale. Considering, however, that in the instant case, it was only an
Acknowledgment Receipt that was notarized; that it was done to protect the complainant;
that it was the first offense of the respondent; and the heavy workload of the respondent as
Public Attorney, we find the recommended penalty of reprimand sufficient under the present
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Resolution No. XVII-2006-238, dated April 27, 2006, of
the IBP Board of Governors which adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing, finding respondent Atty. Noel A. Mora
GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for notarizing
an acknowledgment receipt without a notarial commission and recommending that he be
REPRIMANDED with warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely,
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 2.
[2] Id.
[3] Id. at 10.
[4] Id. at 11.
[5] Id. at 3.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 45-47.
[8] Id. at 86-91.
[9] Id. at 92.
[10] Id. Notice of Resolution, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Board of Governors.
[11] Arienda v. Aguila, A.C. No. 5637, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 282, 287.
[12] Tabang v. Gacott, A.C. No. 6490, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 307, 312.
[13] Report of Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing, pp. 4-5.
[14] 366 Phil. 155, 161 (1999).
[15] Zoreta v. Simpliciano, A.C. No. 6492, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 1, 10.
[16] Suzuki v. Tiamson, A.C. No. 6542, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 129, 140.
[17] A.C. No. 575, February 14, 1991, 194 SCRA 114.
 The material averments of the Complaint are as follows:
EN BANC
On April 7, 1999, Plus Builders Inc. filed before the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) of
DAR, DARAB CASE NOS. R-402-027-99 up to R-402-031-99, inclusive, against Leopoldo De
PLUS BUILDERS, INC. A.C. No. 7056 Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido De Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs of
and EDGARDO C. Faustino Siongco; Serafin Santarin, Benigno Alvarez and Maria Esguerra, et al; hereinafter
GARCIA, Present: called [tenants/farmers] x x x.
Complainants,
PANGANIBAN, CJ, On November 15, 1999, the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a consolidated
PUNO, Decision in favor of petitioner/complainant [Plus Builders, Inc.], and against
QUISUMBING, [tenants/farmers]. x x x.
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, [Tenants/farmers] filed several verified pleadings as part of the records of DARAB cases
- versus - CARPIO, above-mentioned alleging under oath that they were MAGSASAKANG NAMUMUWISAN or
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, mere tenants of subject properties, acknowledging the rights of the registered owners at that
CORONA, time, even before the ownership and title were transferred to Petitioner/ Complainant Plus
CARPIO MORALES, Builders, Inc. x x x.
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA, On Dec[ember] 17, 1999, counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time was Atty. Damian
TINGA, S. J. Vellaseca, filed a pro-forma Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation x x x. As a
CHICO -NAZARIO, result, PARAD did not give due course to the same x x x.
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ On March 27, 2000, another counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, by the name of Atty. Willy G.
Atty. ANASTACIO E. Roxas, who represented himself as counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, filed a manifestation
REVILLA, JR., Promulgated: stating that he is representing TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they were bona fide
Respondent. Septiembre 13, 2006 members of the [Kalayaan Development Cooperative] (KDC). Thereafter, he filed a Notice of
x- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x Appeal on March 27, 2000 stating that they received the Decision on March 14, 2000 and
alleged that the Decision is against the law and jurisprudence x x x.
DECISION
On May 31, 2001, Respondent Anastacio Revilla Jr., knowing that there was a monetary
PANGANIBAN, CJ: judgment by way of Disturbance Compensation granted to Tenants/Farmers, x x x filed a
Motion for Leave of Court to Allow Correction of Caption and Amendment of Judgment
By their oath and under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers must uphold truth (referring to the Decision of PARAD of Cavite dated November 15, 1999 x x x) with a prayer x x
and justice above everything else, even above their own and their clients interests. They must x to include the name of the KALAYAAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION representing the
be willing and able to stand for their convictions against all odds; to carry on in spite of following respondents herein above stated in the caption of [the] pleading. Also, a Contract of
seemingly insurmountable opposition; and to be beacons for the weak, the oppressed and Retainership dated April 4, 2001 was attached to the Motion x x x to make x x x KDC
the marginalized. For failing miserably to live by this oath and Code, respondent must be represented by Respondent, [the] retained x x x counsel on record x x x.
sanctioned.
After realizing that his motion failed to give him beneficial monetary gain from the PARAD
The Case and the Facts judgment, a Petition for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and to Quash Alias Writ of Execution with Demolition plus Damages dated
This administrative case originated from a Verified Petition for Disbarment[1] filed by Plus July 18, 2001 was filed by Respondent x x x before the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City,
Builders Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). notwithstanding the fact that this instant case was appealed by another lawyer (Atty. Willy
Complainants charged Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. with committing a willful and intentional Roxas). x x x.
falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of On the basis of this Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order by the DARAB Central Office,
a judgment; and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. Quezon City, was issued on July 25, 2001 and an extension of or another Temporary
Restraining Order was issued dated August 24, 2001, as a result of the active participation of
Respondent x x x.
Emboldened by the two (2) TROs coming from DARAB Central Office, Respondent x x x filed an
Indirect Contempt case dated August 28, 2001 against Plus Builders Inc. and their Board of
Directors, Edgardo Garcia and [its] counsel Atty. Leopoldo S. Gonzalez before the same Office.
x x x.
Sensing a series of orders against herein Petitioners and considering, further, that the DARAB
Central Office refused to hear arguments from Petitioners on the two (2) questionable TROs,
Petitioners decided to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for
Certiorari. A Decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals on [December] 20, 2001 stating
that:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders issued by the DARAB are hereby
declared NULL AND VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. Consequently, this
Court sees no impediment for the IMPLEMENTATION of the 15 November 1999 Decision of
the provincial adjudicator.
SO ORDERED.
This incident was further elevated to the Supreme Court by Respondent x x x through a
Petition, but said Petition was dismissed with finality x x x.
Enraged by his defeat, Respondent x x x filed a verified Action to Quiet Title before the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite praying for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), among
others, to deliberately and maliciously stop the enforcement of the Decisions of the higher
courts to implement the PARAD Decision dated November 15, 1999. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent signed his pleading under a group of non-lawyers joining him in the practice of
law as [KDC] LEGAL SERVICES, LAW OFFICERS AND ASSOCIATES which included KDC as law
partners in violation of the Rules on the practice of law with non-lawyers. As a matter of fact,
under the Retainership Contract submitted by Respondent before the PARAD of Cavite, it was
specifically mentioned that legal fees were to be collected as counsel on record for the
cooperative and respondent. Therefore, this contract was effectively used [for] unlawful
solicitation of clients in the practice of law with non-lawyers, being the cooperative (KDC) to
become counsel on record [sic] x x x.
On March 6, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite quashed the earlier issued TRO and
dismissed the case on the ground of res judicata because the Court of Appeals ruled that, x x x
the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator of DAR dated November 15, 1999 has already become
final x x x and that, prescription does not run against registered land. x x x.[2]
In his Answer[3] dated March 29, 2004, respondent denied the charges against him. He
averred that by filing the action to quiet title in Civil Case No. 2763-03, he had merely wanted
to protect the rights and interests of his clients. According to him, they sincerely and honestly
believed that their possession of the litigated land had already ripened into ownership. He
explained thus:
Notwithstanding the claim of said farmers of tenancy relationship with [the] previous owner
in the decisions of PARA[D], Court of Appeals and Supreme Court in the DISTURBANCE
COMPENSATION CASES, (DARAB CASE NO. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-
028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402-030-99; R-402-031-99) the said farmers, are not precluded, by
any law or jurisprudence, from entertaining in good faith an opinion or belief that they could
legally be considered as owners of the subject-property precisely because of the undisputed
fact that they have been in possession thereof in an open, continuous, public, uninterrupted
possession for more than fifty (50) years. x x x.
It was on the basis of [a] sincere and honest belief and opinion o[f] acquiring ownership of the
land through prescription that the said farmers had decided to pursue and file the Action to
Quiet Title in Civil Case No. 2763-03, before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
It should be stressed that the decisions of the PARA[D], Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court in DARAB CASE No. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-
029-99; R-402-030-99; R-402-031-99, [i]ndisputably refer only to the fixing of disturbance
compensations. They did not in any way, involve [the] question of ownership of the subject
property, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 2763-03, (Action to Quiet Title), filed
before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.
xxxxxxxxx
As new counsel of the said farmers x x x, respondent has the complete discretion [of] what
legal strategy or cause of action to undertake on their behalf and the complainant and their
counsel have no business or right to interfere with or dictate [upon] the respondent on how
to protect the rights and interests of said farmers under the applicable law and jurisprudence.
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent respectfully submits that he has not committed any illegal, unlawful, unjust,
wrongful or immoral acts towards the complainant. Respondent, in good faith filed the
aforesaid cases (Action to Quiet Title, RTC, Imus, Cavite, Branch 20; and Petition for Issuance
of Preliminary Injunction and TRO, and Complaint before the Ombudsman), as a lawyer sworn
to uphold justice and the law who was the bounden duty to exert utmost efforts to defend his
client and protect his right, no matter how guilty or evil he appears to be, especially if they
are poor and uneducated like the said farmers.[4]
In a Reply[5] dated April 12, 2004, complainants emphasized that the nature of the possession
of the subject land by respondents clients had already been settled in the case for disturbance
compensation. Complainants maintained that the PARAD Decision, which was sustained by
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, clearly stated that these clients were mere
tenants of the land. Thus, adverse possession could not be claimed by respondent in good
faith, especially when he had previously acknowledged the rights of complainants as
landowners.
On August 4, 2004, both parties appeared at a hearing scheduled by Edmund T. Espina,
commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD). During the hearing, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD
In his April 30, 2005 Report,[6] Investigating Commissioner Espina found respondent guilty of
violating the attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.[7] Allegedly,
respondent had maliciously concealed the defeat of his clients in the case before the PARAD
of Cavite and the higher courts,[8] in order to secure a temporary restraining order from the
RTC of Imus, Cavite. As a result, he was able to delay the execution of the provincial
adjudicators Decision dated November 15, 1999.
Moreover, Commissioner Espina opined that the charge that respondent had been engaged in
the unlawful practice of law was neither satisfactorily explained nor specifically denied by the
latter. The failure of respondent to do so led to the presumption that the allegation was true.
Thus, his suspension from the practice of law for two years was recommended by the
investigating commissioner. In Resolution No. XVII-2005-172,[9] the board of governors of the
IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of IBP Commissioner Espina.
The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final
action,[10] pursuant to Rule 139-B Section 12(b).
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP board of governors.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They
act as vanguards of our legal system,[11] protecting and upholding truth and the rule of
law.[12] They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the courts.
Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting
to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice.[13]
Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.[14]
Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the essence of membership in the legal
profession.[15] Thus, while lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their client, they must never
abuse their right of recourse to the courts by arguing a case that has repeatedly been
rejected. Neither should they use their knowledge of the law as an instrument to harass a
party or to misuse judicial processes. These acts constitute serious transgression of their
professional oath.[16]
In the present case, respondent claims good faith in pursuing the cause of his clients. The
records show, however, that his course of legal action was obviously a stratagem. It was
meant to delay unduly the execution of the provincial adjudicators Decision dated November
15, 1999.
It must be noted that when the Court of Appeals and this Court upheld that Decision,
respondent resorted to a different forum to pursue his clients lost cause. In the disturbance
compensation case, he represented his clients as tenants and acknowledged that
complainants were the owners of the subject land. In the action to quiet title, however, he
conveniently repudiated his previous admission by falsely alleging that his clients were
adverse possessors claiming bona fide ownership. Consequently, he was able to obtain a
temporary restraining order preventing the execution of the provincial adjudicators Decision.
Clearly, he was shielding his clients from the Order of execution. Contrary to his later claim of
ownership of the land, he cannot feign ignorance of his previous admission of a tenancy
relationship existing between his clients and complainants, as correctly observed by IBP
Commissioner Espina.
The propensity of respondent for doublespeak was also revealed in his declaration that his
clients were pauper litigants. His prayer for an exemption to pay court fees, on the ground
that they did not have sufficient income,[17] was granted by the trial court. Earlier, however,
he admitted that they had engaged the services of his legal office for a fee of P20,000, in
addition to P2,500 per appearance in court. Also, in the action to quiet title, he even alleged
that they were willing to post a bond to answer for damages, in the event that the court ruled
in favor of the defendants. These facts contravene his claim that his clients could not afford to
pay the appropriate court fees.
In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law.
This obligation, however, must never be at the expense of truth and justice,[18] as explained
in Choa v. Chiongson:[19]
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must
give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with
the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath
he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will
conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it
must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled
by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.[20]
 Chief Justice
Moreover, we agree with the finding of IBP Commissioner Espina that the silence or failure of
respondent to challenge the [1] Dated February 13, 2004; rollo, pp. 1-20.
allegation that he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law may be [2] Id. at 1-10.
deemed an admission of the truth of the accusation. We note that complainants successfully [3] Id. at 195-204.
substantiated their claim that respondent, who held himself out as a law partner of the KDC [4] Id. at 197-202.
Legal Services, Law Offices and Associates, was rendering legal services together with persons [5] Id. at 207-217.
not licensed to practice law. His silence on this accusation is deemed an admission, especially [6] Id. at 374-401.
because he had every chance to deny it.[21] [7] Specifically, the following Rules were violated:
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide thus: proceeding or delay any mans cause.
Rule 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. the ends of justice.
Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task misuse court processes.
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. Rule 9.02 A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with a person
not licensed to practice law.
The significance of this professional norm was emphasized in Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,[22] [8] Id. at 395.
which we quote: [9] Dated December 17, 2005; id. at 372.
[10] The Supreme Court noted the Resolution of the board of governors of the IBP on March
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of 7, 2006.
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be [11] Ting-Dumali v. Torres, 427 SCRA 108, April 14, 2004; Radjaie v. Alovera, 337 SCRA 244,
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive August 4, 2000.
right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he [12] Ziga v. Arejola, 443 SCRA 435, November 23, 2004; Berbano v. Barcelona, 410 SCRA 258,
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to September 3, 2003; Radjaie v. Alovera, supra; Busios v. Ricafort, 347 Phil. 687, December 22,
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of 1997.
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It [13] Canon 10.01.
devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the [14] Canon 10.03.
profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, [15] Manila Pilots Association v. Philippine Ports Authority, 357 Phil. 703, October 1, 1998;
or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. Sebastian v. Calis, 372 Phil. 673, September 9, 1999; Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, 391 SCRA 415,
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman November 12, 2002.
in the unauthorized practice of law.[23] [16] Re: Administrative Case No. 44 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Tagbilaran City,
Against Atty. Samuel C. Occea, 383 SCRA 636, July 3, 2002.
Respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of law [17] Order dated February 10, 2003; rollo, p. 281.
and justice. In line with jurisprudence, he is held liable for gross misconduct and is suspended [18] Foronda v. Guerrero, 436 SCRA 9, August 10, 2004; People v. Almendras, 449 Phil. 587,
from the practice of law. [24] April 24, 2003.
[19] 329 Phil. 270, August 9, 1996.
WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and is [20] Id. at 275-276, per Davide Jr., J.
SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. [21] Tan v. Dela Cruz, Jr., 439 SCRA 555, September 30, 2004; Grefaldeo v. Lacson, 355 Phil.
He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. 266, August 3, 1998.
[22] 434 SCRA 288, July 14, 2004.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on [23] Id. at 296, per Davide Jr., CJ.
the IBP, as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their [24] Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Flores, 350 Phil. 889, March 12, 1998; Villaflor v.
information and guidance. Sarita, 367 Phil. 399, June 10, 1999; Rural Bank of Silay v. Pilla, 350 SCRA 138, January 24,
2001; Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Romero v. Reyes Jr., 461 SCRA 1, June 23, 2005.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal strike is dismissed for lack of
THIRD DIVISION merit.

Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are hereby declared guilty of
RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN BACULBAS, Unfair Labor Practice for union busting and that the dismissal of the nine (9) complainants are
Complainants, declared illegal. All the respondents in NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98 for illegal dismissal are
- versus - directed to reinstate all the complainants to their former position with full backwages from
date of dismissal until actual reinstatement computed as follows:
ATTY. JOSE A. SUING,
Respondent. xxxx

A.C. No. 7062 3. CRISANTO CONOS

[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355] Backwages:

Present: Basic Wage:

2/21/98 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos.
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30 = P104, 504.40
CARPIO, 10/31/99 - 10/31/00 = 12 mos.
CARPIO MORALES, P223.50 x 26 days x 12 = 69, 732.00
TINGA, and 11/01/00 - 8/30/01 = 10 mos.
VELASCO, JR., JJ. P250.00 x 26 days x 10 = 65,000.00
P239,236.40
Promulgated:
13th Month Pay:
September 26, 2006 1/12 of P239,236.40 = 19,936.36
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x SILP
2/16/98 - 12/31/98 = 10.33 mos.
DECISION P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12 = 852.22
1/1/99 - 12/31/99 = 12mos.
P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12 = 1,117.50
CARPIO MORALES, J.: 1/1/00 - 10/30/01 = 20 mos.
Complainants, via a complaint[1] filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12 = 2,083.33
sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing (respondent) on the grounds of deceit, 4,053.05
malpractice, violation of Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.[2]
P263,225.81
xxxx
Herein complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-0403180-98,
Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. 7. RONALD SAMBAJON
Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil, for Unfair Labor Practice (same as Conos) 263,225.81
(ULP) and Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for the therein respondents. 8.FREDELYN BACULBAS
Said case was consolidated with NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98, Microplast Incorporated v. (same as Conos) 263,225.81
Vilma Ardan, et al., for Illegal Strike. 9. RENEIRO SAMBAJON (same as Conos) 263,225.81
Total Backwages P2,370,674.38
By Decision of August 29, 2001,[3] Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal
Strike case, and declared the employer-clients of respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the above-mentioned backwages including
Arbiter disposed: the various monetary claims stated in the Manifestation dated August 24, 1998 except
payment of overtime pay and to pay 10% attorneys fees of all sums owing to complainants.[4]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 2,
2003 a Writ of Execution.[5]
In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February 27,
2004 purportedly signed and sworn to by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal
Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were concerned, by Order dated March
9, 2004. [6]
Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents
or having received the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative complaint
at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil,
frustrated the implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter
the spurious documents.
In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against
respondent, together with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutors Office
of Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No. 04-5203.[7]
In his Report and Recommendation[8] dated September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador
B. Hababag, who conducted an investigation of the administrative complaint at bar,
recommended that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded
therefor with warning, in light of his following discussion:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged
manipulation of four alleged RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who
subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and falsified.
A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby becomes an
Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in
the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on the one hand, the right of a
litigant to seek redress against a member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him damaged,
either through malice or negligence, while in the performance of his duties as his counsel,
and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and preserve his good name
and reputation, we have again gone over and considered [the] aspects of the case.
All the cases protesting and contesting the genuineness, veracity and due execution of the
questioned RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall,
Appeal and Falsification are PENDING resolution in their respective venues. Arbiter Ariel
Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to know the identities of the herein complainants is not
impleaded by the complainants when it was his solemn duty and obligation to ascertain true
and real identities of person executing Release Waiver with Quitclaim.
The old adage that in the performance of an official duty there is that presumption of
regularity unless proven otherwise, such was proven in the January 28, 2005 clarificatory
questioning . . . :
xxxx
. . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or not respondent actually committed the
despicable act would seem to be fairly debatable under the circumstances.[9] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted
the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag.
After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the
Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP[10] transmitted additional records including a Motion to
Amend the Resolution No. XVII-2005-226[11] filed by respondent.
One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon (Sambajon), by Petition[12] filed before the OBC,
assailed the IBP Board Resolution. The Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period to
assail the IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel received the Resolution on
February 27, 2006, he only learned of it when he visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who
could not reach him, he (Sambajon) having transferred from one residence to another.
Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the 3-day delay in filing the
present petition, in the interest of justice, this Court gives his petition due course.
In respondents Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, he does not deny that those
whom he met face to face before Commissioner Hababag were not the same persons whom
he saw before Labor Arbiter Santos on February 27, 2004. [13] He hastens to add though that
he was not familiar with the complainants as they were not attending the hearings before
Arbiter Santos.[14] Complainants[15] and their former counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan[16]
claim otherwise, however. And the Minutes[17] of the proceedings before the National
Conciliation Mediation Board in a related case, NCMB-NCR-NS-02-081-98, Re: Microplast, Inc.,
Labor Dispute, which minutes bear respondents and complainants signatures, belie
respondents claim that he had not met complainants before.
Respondent, who declared that he went to the Office of the Labor Arbiter on February 27,
2004 on the request of his clients who told him that on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants
w[ould] be at the office of Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims and waivers,
heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of ascertaining the identity of the parties who
executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. But respondent himself had the same
responsibility. He was under obligation to protect his clients interest, especially given the
amount allegedly given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents. His
answers to the clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not, however, show that
he discharged such obligation.
COMM. HABABAG: COMM. HABABAG:

But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask.. that the money of your client would go to So, you just followed the instruction of your client to be present at Arbiter Cadiente Santos
the deserving employee? office because there would be signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release, it that clear?

ATTY. SUING: ATTY. SUING:

I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there was already as you call it before a Yes, Your Honor.
precedent in February of 1998 when my client directly made settlement to the nine or eight
of the seventeen original complainants, Your Honor, and I did not participate. Hindi po ako COMM. HABABAG:
nakialam don sa kanilang usapan because it is my belief that the best way, Your Honor, to
have a dispute settled between the parties is that we let them do the discussion, well let [You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is the money intended for the payment of
them do the settlement because sometimes you know, Your Honor, sad to say, when lawyers these workers?
are involved in a matters [sic] of settlement the dispute does not terminate as in this case,
Your Honor. ATTY. SUING:

xxxx I did not ask.

COMM. HABABAG: COMM. HABABAG:

Yes. What made you appear on said date and time before Arbiter Santos? You did not asked [sic] your client who will prepare the documents?

ATTY. SUING: ATTY. SUING:

I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter Santos, number one, to witness the As far as the documents are concerned, Your Honor.
signing of the documents of Quitclaim and Waiver; number 2, so that according to them
someone as a lawyer will represent them in that proceedings. COMM. HABABAG:

COMM. HABABAG: The Quitclaim Receipt and Release?

My query, did it not surprise you that no money was given to you and yet there would be a ATTY. SUING:
signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me before February of 1998.
ATTY. SUING:
COMM. HABABAG:
I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and there were no complaints, Your Honor.
When you say they whom are you referring to?
COMM. HABABAG:
ATTY. SUING:
Just because it happened before you did not bother to see to it that there is a voucher so you
just rely on your precedent, is that what you mean? Im referring to my client, Your Honor.

ATTY. SUING: COMM. HABABAG:

Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the parties who are talking and it is my client They asked me attorney can you please prepare us a document of Quitclaim and Waiver or
who knows them better than I do, Your Honor. give us a simple [sic] of Quitclaim and Waiver. I do recall that I made one but this document,
Your Honor, is only a single document where all the signatories named are present because
my purpose there really, Your Honor, is that so that each of them will be there together and
they will identify themselves, see each other para ho siguradong sila-sila yong magkakasama
at magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the signing took place in February of 2004 it was made
for any [sic] individual, Your Honor, no longer the document that I prepared when all of the
seven will be signing in one document.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic] made the changes?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time when I was there, there are already
people there, the seven complainants plus another woman.[18] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
To be sure, respondents client Manuel Rodil did not request him to go to the Office of Labor
Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims. That he was requested to go there could only mean that he would exert vigilance
to protect his clients interest. This he conceded when he acknowledged the purpose of his
presence at the Office of Labor Arbiter Santos, thus:
ATTY. SUING:
To go there, Your Honor, and represent them and see that these document[s] are properly
signed and that these people are properly identified and verified them in front of Arbiter Ariel
Cadiente Santos.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of complainants entered into a
compromise agreement with his clients in which he did not participate and from which no
problem arose did not excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of going to the
Labor Arbiters office that [the complainants] are properly identified . . . in front of [the]
Arbiter.
Besides, by respondents own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on
the true identity of those who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims.[20] That should
have alerted him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients interest.
But he was not and he did not.
Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite
of negligence. A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice
expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by
the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is
eternal diligence to the cause of the client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that
extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection
use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is ordinary diligence
(diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. x x x[21] (Italics in
the original; underscoring supplied)
And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of his client Manuel
Rodil when the latter testified before Commissioner Manuel Hababag:
COMM. HABABAG:
May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba sinong may gawa nitong
Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Sila po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant o sinong nag-abot sa iyo nitong Receipt
Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Si Atty. Suing po.
ATTY. SUING:
In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga dokumentong ito or what?
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na English. Ito bang Release
Waiver and Quitclaim sino ang may gawa nito, sino ang nagmakinilya nito?
MR. RODIL:
Kami yata ang gumawa niyan.
 COMM. HABABAG:
COMM. HABABAG: Huwag kang tatawa. Im reminding you serious tayo dito.
Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino sa inyong mga officer, tauhan o abogado ang
gumawa nito? MR. RODIL:

MR. RODIL: Opo serious po.

Matagal na ho yan eh.
COMM. HABABAG:
xxxx
Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera?
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong. Sino ang naghatid nito kay Ariel Cadiente Santos para MR. RODIL:
pirmahan ni Ariel Cadiente Santos? Opo.

MR. RODIL: COMM. HABABAG:

Si attorney po.
Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang tinutukoy mo?
ATTY. SUING:
Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner is asking kung sino ang nagdala ng MR. RODIL:
mga dokumento? Atty. Suing po.

MR. RODIL: COMM. HABABAG:

Yong mga tao. Okay.

xxxx ATTY. SUING:

Your Honor,
COMM. HABABAG:
Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino mo inabot ang bayad sa nakalagay dito COMM. HABABAG:
sa Release waiver and Quitclaim? Pabayaan mo muna. Ill come to that. Magkano kung iyong natatandaan ang perang inabot kay
Atty. Suing?
MR. RODIL:
Kay attorney po. MR. RODIL:
Yan ang hindi ko matandaan.

COMM. HABABAG: x x x x[22] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong attorney?
Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions in
ATTY. SUING: an apparent attempt not to incriminate him (respondent). His client contradicted respondents
Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang tanong. claim that the Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was not the one
presented at the Arbiters Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not involved in
releasing to the complainants the money for and in consideration of the execution of the
COMM. HABABAG: documents.
Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong hindi ang abogado mo.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He
MR. RODIL: is an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or
Opo. impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct.[23] While the Commission on
Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial
proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.[24] lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.[25] the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for proceeding or delay any mans cause.
his attempts to delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, Rule 1.04 A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
this Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was enough to give admit of a fair settlement.
him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession. CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice.
case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that CANON 12. A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN
respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order. THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Rule 12.06 A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross impersonate another.
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months, with [3] Rollo, pp. 8-20.
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. [4] Rollo, pp. 17, 19-20.
[5] Id. at 21-23.
[6] Rollo, p. 102. The Order reads:
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of Finding the Motion To Dismiss filed by respondents to be sufficient in form and substance, the
the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country. same is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, in view of the above, let this case be, as it is hereby considered DISMISSED in
SO ORDERED. sofar [sic] as the seven complainants namely Crisanto Conos, Alex Patola, Dionisio Patola,
Noel Saletaria, Ron[al]d Sambajon, Fredelyn Baculbas and Reinerio [sic] Sambajon are
concerned.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES [7] Rollo, p. 5.
Associate Justice [8] Id. at 323-329.
[9] Id. at 326-328.
[10] Id. at 330.
WE CONCUR: [11] Id. at 331-336.
[12] Id. at 343-366.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING [13] TSN, January 21, 2005, rollo, pp.225-228.
Associate Justice COMM. HABABAG:
Chairperson You said you were present when they signed this Release Waiver and Quitclaim before
Cadiente Santos, is that correct?
ANTONIO T. CARPIO ATTY. SUING:
Associate Justice Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
DANTE O. TINGA As an officer of the court I ask you [a ] point.
Associate Justice ATTY. SUING:
Yes.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. COMM. HABABAG:
Associate Justice Did you personally see these Ronald Sambajon, Fredilyn Baculbas, Crisanto Conos and
[Reinerio] Sambajon, signed freely th[ese] Release Waiver and Quitclaim[s] on February 27,
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-7. 2004 before Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos?
[2] CANON I - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND ATTY. SUING:
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Yes, Your Honor, I saw persons.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. COMM. HABABAG:
No, specific ako. Sila ba talaga ang nakita mong humarap, itong apat na nabanggit ko na [24] Agpalo, Legal Ethics (1997 Ed), 416.
pangalan, sila ba talaga? [25] A.C. No. 6589, December 19, 2005, 478 SCRA 443.
ATTY. SUING:
I did not know these people, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
Hindi. Ibig sabihin sabi mo andoon ka nong magpirma nito?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
Katunayan narinig mo pina[n]umpa sila ni Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos?
ATTY. SUING:
Ang tanong ko ngayon at this point in time sila ba talaga yong nakita mo itong apat (4) na ito
mga complainants na ito noong 2004 last February 27. Sila ba talaga yong humarap doon o
yong ibang tao?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not see these people, Your Honor, because in the first place I do not know them. As I said
it is not true, Your Honor
COMM. HABABAG:
Hindi, wag na tayong lumayo. Ang tanong ko lang naman ay itong apat (4). Samakatuwid
maliwanag tayo dito?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
When in time na itong apat (4) na complainants na ito ay hindi ito ang humarap doon kay
Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, I will also say that for the first time I saw these people here. I never saw
them before Arbiter Santos before even when the case was filed, Your Honor. And contrary to
what they are saying these people that they appeared there they did not appear, Your Honor,
it was only this fellow who appeared together with his wife.
Vide TSN, January 31, 2005, rollo, pp. 270-280.
[14] Vide Respondents Counter-Affidavit filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor, rollo,
pp. 34-35, and his Answer filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline, rollo, pp. 47-52.
[15] Vide TSN, January 21, 2005, TSN, rollo, pp. 192-193.
[16] Vide TSN, January 31, 2005, rollo, pp. 306-307. Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan (also spelled
Capocquian in some parts of the records) was the counsel of the complainants in the
consolidated labor cases and a former partner of complainants present counsel, Atty. Mory
Nueva.
[17] Vide Minutes of the NCMB in NS-02-081-98 on March 2, 9, 19, and 20, 1998, rollo, pp. 39-
42.
[18] TSN, January 28, 2005, rollo, pp. 259-270.
[19] Id. at 212.
[20] TSN, January 28, 2005, rollo, p. 254.
[21] Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 5687, February 3, 2005, 450 SCRA 406, 412.
[22] TSN, January 21, 2005, rollo, pp. 195-204.
[23] Agpalo, Comments On The Code Of Professional Responsibility And The Code Of Judicial
Conduct (2004), 408.
 Hilario G. Davide Jr. For this infraction, the Court indefinitely suspended Atty. Sorreda as a
member of the Bar and prohibited him from engaging in the practice of law unless the Court
Republic of the Philippines orders otherwise.
Supreme Court
Manila In a subsequent letter of February 4, 2006, Atty. Sorreda continued with his old obnoxious
ways and, in a virtual repeat of what he said previously but with more venom this time, Atty.
Sorreda embarked on another assault against the dignity of the Court, adding that he has not
EN BANC the slightest intention of apologizing for his misdeeds either now or in the future. Worse still,
he even dared the Court to up the penalty of suspension to disbarment.

RE: LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA. In the expectation that Atty. Sorreda would mend his ways if given another chance, the Court
merely imposed a strong warning. Accompanying the warning, however, was the caveat that
any further derogatory remark from him, be it embodied in a letter or pleading, shall warrant
A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC an even more severe sanction, of which there is none other than disbarment.

Present: In his present MANIFESTATION AND MOTION under date of July 18, 2006, Atty. Sorreda has
raised a step further the level of his obstinacy and defiance. In a clearly insulting tone
PANGANIBAN, C.J., reflecting a remorseless and boorish person, he states that he has from the start defied the
PUNO, suspension order meted him by the Court and has continued with his professional practice as
QUISUMBING, a lawyer both in the lower courts and before this Tribunal.
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, The Courts patience has been stretched to the limit by Atty. Sorredas arrogance and
CARPIO, disrespect. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of justice respect. By
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, taking the lawyers oath, they become guardians of the law and an indispensable instrument in
CORONA, the orderly and impartial administration of justice. Deliberately veering away from the path
CARPIO-MORALES, which a lawyer ought to follow as called for by his oath and his profession cannot be tolerated
CALLEJO, SR., by this Court as the disciplining authority. So it must be here. Atty. Sorreda has proven himself
AZCUNA, to be incorrigible. By his demeanor, as demonstrated by his penchant for addressing malicious
TINGA, letters and pleadings to this Court, Atty. Sorreda is unworthy to continue as an officer of the
CHICO-NAZARIO, court.
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. WHEREFORE, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda is DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let his name be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
Promulgated:
This resolution shall take effect immediately. Let copies thereof furnished the Bar Confidant,
September 11, 2006 to be appended to Atty. Sorredas personal record; the National Office and the Quezon City
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Chapter of the IBP; the Philippine Judges Association; and all the courts of the land for their
information and guidance.
RESOLUTION
SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
In an en banc Resolution dated July 22, 2005 in A.M. No. 05-3-304-SC, the Court adjudged Chief Justice
Atty. Noel S. Sorreda guilty of contempt of court and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for maliciously attacking the Court and its members for the manner they
resolved several cases mentioned in his letter of February 21, 2005 to then Chief Justice
 3. Mr. Edilberto A. Davis, Deputy Judicial Reform Program Administrator, PMO 10, 12, and 11
times tardy for the months of July, August, and December, respectively.
EN BANC
4. Ms. Maria Noemi B. Adriano, Development Management Officer V, PMO 10 times late for
each month of August and October and 12 times in November;
RE: SUPREME COURT EMPLOYEES A.M. No. 2006-11-SC
INCURRING HABITUAL TARDINESS 5. Mr. Zosimo D. Labro, Jr., Administrative Officer II, Property Division, OCA 10 times late for
IN THE 2ND SEMESTER OF 2005, each month of September and November and 11 times in December;
Present:
6. Ms. Zienna Punsalan-Duldulao, Court Stenographer IV, OCA 10 times late for each month of
Panganiban, C.J., August and November;
Puno,
Quisumbing, 7. Ms. Emelda M. Benologa, Printing Machine Operator IV, Printing Services 10 times late for
Ynares-Santiago, each month of August and November;
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, 8. Ms. Susana M. Luber, Statistician III, Statistical Report Division CMO 10 times late in July
Austria-Martinez, and 11 times in October;
Corona,
Carpio-Morales, 9. Mr. Gerardo D. Pinca, Accounting Clerk II, Philippine Judicial Academy 13 times tardy in
Callejo, Sr., August and 10 times in October;
Azcuna,
Tinga, 10. Ms. Maria Nia A. Rayco, Clerk IV, Personnel Division, OAS, OCA 10 times late for each
Chico-Nazario, month of August and November.
Garcia, and
Velasco, Jr., JJ. 11. Atty. Winston R. Baniel, Court Attorney VI, Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc 12, 10, 11,
and 12 times late for the months of July, August, September, and October, respectively;
Promulgated:
12. Atty. Belen C. Gatdula, Court Attorney II, CMO 10 and 11 times tardy for the months of
September 13, 2006 August and November, respectively;
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
13. Ms. Maria Melissa R. Dimson, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Office of the Chancellor,
DECISION Philja- 10 times late for each month of July and August and 11 times in September;

In compliance with the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) directive dated March 13, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: to explain why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against them for their
infraction, said employees submitted the following comments/explanations:

For consideration is the following list of Supreme Court employees who were found habitually
tardy[1] for the second semester of 2005, namely:
1. Mr. Fernando P. Pascual, Utility Worker II, Records Division, OCA 11 times late for each
month of July, August, and October.
2 Ms. Louella G. Cadiz, Human Resource Management Aide, Employee Training &
Development Division, OAS 13 and 10 times tardy for the months of July and September,
respectively;
FERNANDO P. PASCUAL who was previously severely reprimanded for habitual tardiness in
the first semester of 2005,[2] and fined P2,000.00 for habitual absenteeism for the same
semester,[3] alleged that his tardiness was caused by congested traffic conditions; and that
he sleeps late in the evening because he sells balut to augment his income. He, however,
explained that despite the circumstances, he sees to it that he reports for work daily, albeit,
tardily. He prayed for a tempered penalty because he is the only breadwinner of his family
and that he has been in the government service for more than 27 years.
LOUELLA G. CADIZ who was sternly warned in a Resolution dated August 8, 2000[4] for
incurring tardiness in 1999, explained that she had health problems which affected her
physical condition and which resulted in her tardiness.
EDILBERTO A. DAVIS admitted that he incurred 10 and 12 times tardiness in the months of
July and August 2005, respectively, but he claimed that he was only tardy eight times in
December 2005. He claimed that in the said months, he worked late in the office, sometimes
going home as late as 11:00 in the evening. He averred that the long hours of work coupled
with the late arrivals at home made it difficult for him to wake up early in the morning.
MARIA NOEMI B. ADRIANO declared that she is not guilty of habitual tardiness as their offices
daily attendance sheet shows otherwise. She contended that while she was late 10 times in
October 2005, she was only tardy nine times for each month of August and November, 2005.
She submitted a copy of their offices daily attendance sheets for the said months.
ZOSIMO D. LABRO, JR. claimed that he was only nine times late in September and seven times
late for November 2005. He submitted photocopies of their offices Report of Absences and
Tardiness (RAT) for the said months to prove his allegations.
ZIENNA PUNSALAN-DULDULAO stated that in August 2005, she was in her 5th to 8th weeks of
pregnancy. She experienced morning sickness, vomiting and dizziness which made it
impossible for her to go to office early. In November 2005, she had a threatened abortion but
she opted not to file a leave of absence and continued reporting for work.
EMELDA M. BENOLOGA alleged that she was only nine times late in August 2005. On August
23, 2005, she informed Mr. Frederick Aguilar of the OAS regarding her defective ID. The
following day, her ID still failed to register in the Chronolog Time Recorder Machine (CTRM),
thus, she registered her arrival in the RAT in their office which was 8:05 a.m. Thereafter, she
surrendered her ID to Mr. Aguilar and when she redeemed it later, she tested the same in the
CTRM. It allegedly functioned and registered the time of 10:16 a.m. as her time-in which was
subsequently considered by the Leave Division as her time of arrival thus disregarding her
recorded time of arrival in their offices RAT. As to her tardiness in November 2005, Benologa
explained that she took care of her father who suffered a heart attack.
SUSANA M. LUBER explained that during the said periods, she was involved in the
implementation of the CAMIS Project of the Supreme Court and was required to stay longer in
office causing her to go home late. She promised not to commit the offense again and vowed
to continue performing her duties and responsibilities effectively and efficiently.
GERARDO D. PINCA stated that he is suffering from intractable insomnia which requires
regular medicine intake. He is under regular medication but the illness chronically recurs.
MARIA NIA A. RAYCO declared that her mother passed away in July 2005 and depression
caused by the loss makes it difficult for her to sleep at night causing her to be tardy for work
several times.
ATTY. WINSTON R. BANIEL averred that starting May 2005 when his wife delivered their
fourth child, he was saddled with domestic problems. His wife became diabetic while he had
chronic back pain. They had no maid to assist in taking care of their four children, three of
whom are of school ages. He admitted that the same are not justifications to exonerate him
but he nonetheless asked for temperance considering that it was his first offense in his 15
years of service in the Court.
ATTY. BELEN C. GATDULA said that her tardiness during the months of August and November
2005 was due to the recurring sickness of her mother who needed constant medical
attention.
ATTY. MARIA MELISSA R. DIMSON said that because of her numerous assignments in the
Philippine Judicial Academy, she became sickly and had difficulty getting up early. She
submitted that she had no valid excuses for her tardiness but appealed for the Courts
indulgence.
The OAS recommended that Pascual be suspended for five (5) days with a final warning that a
repetition of his infraction will be dealt with more severely; Cadiz be reprimanded with a
warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely; while the
remaining employees, being first-time offenders be sternly warned and further cautioned that
a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
Respondents manifested their willingness to submit the instant administrative case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.
The Court adopts the findings of the OAS, except as to the recommended penalty on Pascual,
Cadiz, Davis, Adriano and Labor, Jr.
No less than the Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust.[5] Inherent in this
mandate is the observance and efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours
to serve the public,[6] if only to expiate the Government, and ultimately, the people who
shoulder the cost of maintaining the Judiciary.[7] Thus, to inspire public interest for the justice
system, court officials and employees are at all times behooved to strictly observe official
time. As punctuality is a virtue, absenteeism and tardiness are impermissible.[8] We cannot
countenance such infraction as it seriously compromises efficiency and hampers public
service.[9]
Indeed, the law requires that all officers and employees of all departments and agencies,
except those covered by special laws, to render not less than eight hours of work a day for
five days a week or a total of 40 hours a week, exclusive of time for lunch. As a general rule,
such hours shall be from eight oclock in the morning to five oclock in the afternoon on all
days, except Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays.[10]
Except for the claims of respondents Davis, Labro, Jr., Adriano and Benologa, all the reasons
given by the other respondents for their tardiness fall under the following categories: illness,
moral obligation to family and relatives, performance of household chores, traffic and health
or physical condition.

These justifications are neither novel nor persuasive and hardly evokes sympathy. Moral
obligations, performance of household chores, traffic problems, health conditions, domestic
and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse habitual tardiness.[11] If at all,
they would mitigate, but not exempt them from the infraction.
As regards Labro, Jr., the records belie his claim that he did not incur habitual tardiness
because he was in fact tardy 11 times in September; 10 times in November and 9 times in
December including the days he claims he was on a half day leave of absence.
The same goes for the defense of Adriano. Her DTRs obtained from the Leave Division of the
OAS for the month of August disclose that she was late on the following dates, to wit: August
1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 24, 26 and 30, 2005. She was not tardy on August 15, 2005, however,
the OAS deemed her late on August 26, 2005 when she registered 12:05 p.m. on the CTRM for
which she did not apply for a half-day leave of absence. Her DTR for November 2005 reveals
that she was tardy 12 times, three of which she claimed as half-day leaves of absence. The
OAS, however, did not receive any applications for leave covering the mentioned dates.
Benologa claims that she was tardy 9 and not 10 times in August 2005 considering that her
actual time of arrival on August 24, 2005 was 8:05 a.m. as reflected in her RAT after the CTRM
allegedly failed to register her bar-coded ID. However, the Leave Division of the OAS
considered the 10:16 a.m. entry in the CTRM as her official time of arrival when she allegedly
tested her ID to see whether it was already functioning. If her explanation was indeed true,
she should have sought the affidavit of OAS Frederick Aguilar to support her claim.
Unfortunately, she neither attached nor submitted a sworn statement along with her
comment/explanation thereto. If there is a discrepancy between the entries appearing in the
RAT and that registered in the CTRM, the latter prevails.
This administrative case is the third incursion for Pascual and the second for Cadiz. Pascual
was severely reprimanded for habitual tardiness[12] and fined P2,000.00 for habitual
absenteeism.[13] Cadiz, on the other hand, was previously sternly warned for being habitually
tardy for three (3) months.[14] The present malfeasance of Pascual and Cadiz warrants stiffer
sanctions pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 63-2001 and Rule IV, Section 52 (C)
paragraph 4 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service which classifies
Tardiness as a light offense with the following penalties:
4. Frequent unauthorized tardiness (Habitual Tardiness)
1st Offense Reprimand
2nd Offense Suspension 1-30 days
3rd Offense Dismissal
Respondents Davis, Labro, Jr. and Adriano were considered first-time offenders by the OAS
although they have been previously warned for failing to register their arrival and/or
departure time in the CTRM in A.M. No. 2005-21-SC.[15] The OAS recommended that their
earlier and present infractions should be treated separately although belonging to the same
class of offenses. According to the OAS, respondents previous breaches of conduct were in
gross violation of A.C. No. 36-2001 requiring all employees to register their daily attendance
in the CTRM while the present charges deal with Habitual Tardiness which is covered by CSC
M.C. No. 14. s. 1999, Supreme Court Adm. Circular No. 1-99,[16] and Supreme Court Adm.
Circular No. 2-99.[17]
However, it must be pointed out that while the previous violations of respondents are distinct
from their present breaches of discipline, nonetheless, they constitute aggravations of the
malaise which the above-enumerated circulars seek to address and obviate. Accordingly, the
imposition of a penalty heavier than the stern warning recommended by the OAS is
warranted in the case of respondents Davis, Labro, Jr. and Adriano.
We are, however, given a certain measure of discretion to temper our judgment with mercy.
Indeed in a number of cases, we refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence
of mitigating factors[18] and, in fact, mitigated the imposable penalty for humanitarian
reasons.[19] We have also considered the length of service in the judiciary; the respondents
acknowledgment of his infractions, his feelings of remorse; and family circumstances, among
others, in determining the proper penalty.[20] We have also ruled that where a penalty less
punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited
by consequences so severe. It is not only because of the laws concern for the workingman.
There is in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and
sorrows on those dependent on wage earners.[21]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing:
a. FERNANDO P. PASCUAL is SUSPENDED for Ten (10) Days with a FINAL WARNING that a
repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely;
b. LOUELLA G. CADIZ is SUSPENDED for Five (5) Days and sternly warned that a repetition of
the same offense will be dealt with more severely;
c. EDILBERTO A. DAVIS, MARIA NOEMI B. ADRIANO and ZOSIMO D. LABRO, Jr. are SEVERELY
REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more
severely;
d. Attys. WINSTON R. BANIEL, BELEN C. GATDULA and MARIA MELISSA R. DIMSON, ZIENNA
PUNSALAN-DULDULAO, EMELDA M. BENOLOGA, SUSANA M. LUBRE, GERARDO D. PINCA and
MARIA NIA A. RAYCO are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same offense shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
[1] Habitual Tardiness is defined under CSC MC No. 14, s. 1991 thus: [A]n officer or employee
of the Civil Service shall be considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the
number of minutes ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at
least two (2) consecutive months during the year. . .
[2] Re: Habitual Tardiness Committed During the First Semester (January to June) of 2005,
A.M. No. 2005-25-SC, July 6, 2005.
[3] Re: Habitual Absenteeism of Mr. Fernando P. Pascual, A.M. No. 2005-16-SC, September
22, 2005, 470 SCRA 569.
[4] Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties to Employees Committing Habitual Tardiness,
A.M. No. 00-6-09-SC, August 8, 2000.
[5] CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 1.
[6] Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties for Habitual Tardiness Committed During the
First and Second Semester o f 2003, A.M. No. 00-06-09-SC, March 16, 2004, 425 SCRA 508,
517 (2004).
[7] Re: Habitual Tardiness of Ms. Cecilia L. Asilo, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Pasig City,
Branch 151, A.M. No. 05-9-555-RTC, October 14, 2005, 473 SCRA 14, 15.
[8] Re: Habitual Tardiness Incurred by Gideon M. Alibang For the 1st Semester of 2003, 432
SCRA 53, 56 (2004).
[9] Re: Habitual Tardiness of Mrs. Natividad M. Calingao, Clerk III, RTC, Branch 255, Las Pinas
City, A.M. No. P-05-2080, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 88, 91.
[10] Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Ms. Rowena Marinduque, Casual Utility Worker II,
Assigned At Philja Development Center, Tagaytay City, A.M. No. 2004-35-SC, January 23,
2006, 479 SCRA 343, 348.
[11] Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties for Habitual Tardiness Committed During the
Second Semester of 2004, A.M. No. 00-6-09-SC, July 27, 2005, 464 SCRA 155, 162-163.
[12] Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness In The First Semester of 2005, A.M. No. 2005-
25-SC, July 6, 2006.
[13] Re: Habitual Absenteeism of Mr. Fernando P. Pascual, A.M. No. 2005-16-SC, September
22, 2005, 470 SCRA 569, 573.
[14] Supra note 4.
[15] Re: Failure of Various Employees to Register their Time of Arrival and/or Departure from
Office in the CTRM, September 20, 2005.
[16] Enhancing the Dignity of Courts as Temples of Justice and Promoting Respect for their
Officials and Employees.
[17] Strict Observance of Working Hours and Disciplinary Action for Absenteeism and
Tardiness.
[18] Concerned Employees v. Valentin, A.M. No. 2005-01-SC, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 307,
311-312.
[19] Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties for Habitual Tardiness Committed During the
First and Second Semester o f 2003, A.M. No. 00-06-09-SC, March 16, 2004, 425 SCRA 508,
517, 518 (2004).
[20] Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Secretary I, and
Angelita C. Esmerio, Clerk III, Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, A.M. No.
2001-7-SC and No. 2001-8-SC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 1, 17-19.
[21] Re: Habitual Absenteeism of Mr. Fernando P. Pascual, supra note 3 at 573.
 made by the Association. According to complainant, the following amounts have been
EN BANC misappropriated:

RE: RIVARAS COMPOUND A.M. No. 2006-18-SC 1. Unremitted monthly amortizations P 8,287.55
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 2. Penalties for delinquent payments 24,641.50
Represented by its President, Present: 3. Documentary stamps 226,095.48
MR. JESUS L. LLANTADA 4. Membership fees 67,500.00
Complainant, PANGANIBAN, C.J., 5. Subdivision survey fees 208,000.00
PUNO, 6. Equity Payments 372,235.93
QUISUMBING, P906,760.46[3]
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, Moreover, complainant avers that respondent Cervantes, during his incumbency, never
- versus - CARPIO, caused a full audit of the Associations books nor made the same available to its members in
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, violation of the Associations by-laws. He also did not submit any of the books, records, and
CORONA, financial statements to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Under
CARPIO MORALES, respondent Cervantess leadership, the Association did not even conduct regular monthly and
CALLEJO, SR., annual meetings.[4] Further, complainant accuses him of withholding from member-
MR. FRANCIS A. CERVANTES, AZCUNA, homeowners Award Certificates for lots awarded to them.[5]
Respondent. TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, Complainant also alleges that at the moment respondent Cervantes is not even a member in
GARCIA, and good standing of the Association as he refuses to pay his Association dues among others and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. does not attend the monthly meetings.[6]

Promulgated:
September 5, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
RESOLUTION
Tinga, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by the Rivaras Compound Homeowners Association
(the Association), through its President, Mr. Jesus L. Llantada,[1] against respondent Francis
H. Cervantes (Cervantes), Records Officer I, Records Division, Office of Administrative Services
(OAS), Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty and Breach
of Trust.
Complainant Llantada, in the sixty-four (64) page Complaint,[2] states that Rivara Compound
at Santan St., Fortune, Marikina City is under the Community Mortgage Program (CMP)
wherein monthly amortizations are collected by the Association from the member-
homeowners to be remitted and paid to the CMP-Social Housing Finance Corporation.
Complainant claims that while respondent Cervantes served as President of the Association,
he conspired with its Treasurer not to remit and thereafter misappropriate the collections
Complainant states that he and the other member-homeowners already made several
demands on respondent Cervantes for the return of the misappropriated amounts to no avail.
Instead, respondent Cervantes allegedly responded with a threat that he will file a case of
harassment against complainant and the other member-homeowners if they continue
demanding reimbursement. This he stated with the reminder that he is [s]omebody working
in the Supreme Court, he could send anyone to jail if he wants. In fact, complainant adds,
respondent Cervantes was elected President of the Association because he had made the
misrepresentation in 1999 that he is a lawyer working with the Supreme Court. [7]
Complainant prays for (1) the dismissal of respondent Cervantes from service for the above-
stated charges; (2) the return of the allegedly misappropriated amounts; and (3) the turn-over
of all the financial records, documents and properties of the Association allegedly still in
respondent Cervantess possession to the Associations Treasurer.[8]
Respondent Cervantes in his Comment[9] dated 8 May 2006, vehemently denies the
allegations against him. He seeks the dismissal of the instant complaint for being unfounded,
fallacious, and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court as the allegations do not involve his official
functions.[10]
Complainant in his Reply[11] informs the Court that a criminal case for estafa has been filed
against respondent Cervantes before the Office of the Prosecutor of Marikina City. He also
mentions the padlocking or closing without a court order of the house of a certain Arlene
Perillo (Perillo) on 5 May 2006, which case is the central subject of the Supplemental
Complaint[12] in which complainant alleges that respondent Cervantess basis of his claim
over Perillos property was made in violation of the Marikina Settlement Code of 2001.[13] In
the Supplemental Complaint, complainant also avers that respondent Cervantes made
overconfident comments that the administrative charges against him are already dismissed
because the investigating officers of the case, namely, Atty. Edwin Andrada and Atty. Marissa
Villarama, are respectively his kumpadre and patroness.
In his Rejoinder[14] dated 9 June 2006, respondent Cervantes asserts that in truth Perillo
mortgaged her property to him and as she failed to settle her obligations, he was constrained
to file a case for estafa against her before the local barangay.[15] Respondent Cervantes
reiterates his previous submission that the allegations made against him are mere
fabrications and prays for the dismissal of the complaints filed against him.
In her Memorandum[16] dated 15 August 2006, Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of
Court and Chief Administrative Officer, found that the acts of dishonesty and grave
misconduct leveled against respondent Cervantes, done as they were in his capacity as
President of the Association, are in no way related to his official functions as employee of the
Court. While the acts may make out a criminal case for estafa under the Revised Penal Code,
such acts generally cannot ripen to administrative offenses until respondent Cervantes is
adjudged criminally guilty thereof.
The other allegations of the complaint, however, were considered for further investigation.
Llantada and another witness, Aquiliza Gutierrez, a resident of the subdivision and Acting
Vice-President of the Association, testified to support the allegations.
Atty. Candelaria found the allegation that respondent Cervantes has misrepresented himself
as a lawyer working with the Court to be wanting in probative value. On the other hand, the
allegation that respondent Cervantes heralded his connections with Atty. Andrada and Atty.
Villarama was established by substantial evidence. Atty. Candelaria reported in part as
follows:
The allegation is worthy of belief. This Office could not ponder why the complainant was able
to get the names of Atty. Andrada and Atty. Villarama in particular, in the same manner, that
his membership in the SC Choir came to the knowledge of Mr. Llantada, Ms. Gutierrez and
other residents of Rivara Compound, and its relation to the case at bar.
It is not amiss to state that Atty. Villarama has not in any manner took (sic) part in any stage
of the investigation of the instant complaint, in the same way that Atty. Andradas being under
the CID, this Office, would impinge on the outcome of the investigation of the case. The
overriding fact is that the names and the other information would not have come to the
knowledge of the complainant as well as his witness, had the same not actually been uttered
by Mr. Cervantes. To this Office, the latters claim that it was impossible for one to utter the
full names of their connections in a mundane sort of gathering is not unlikely to happen. On
the contrary, to this Office, the uttering of at least the complete name or names of certain
personalities just like what Mr. Cervantes did although he denied the same, is to make other
people aware of who those people are, their connections with them, and in particular, what
can those people do by virtue of their positions or place in the society. At any rate, what were
actually alleged as their names were ATTY. EDWIN ANDRADA and []ATTY. MARISSA
VILLARAMA (sic). In the case of Atty. Villarama, it was not the latters full name that was
uttered since it was Marissa while her real first name is Ma. Luisa although she is known to
some as Marissa.[17]
Atty. Candelaria made the following recommendations, to wit:
1. the Complaint, insofar as the civil and criminal aspects attributed to the acts of Mr. Francis
H. Cervantes in his then capacity as President of the Rivaras Compound Homeowners
Association and all matters raised in connection therein, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
without prejudice to the re-filing of the appropriate administrative charge based on the
judgment in the Criminal Case for Estafa; and,
2. for having been found guilty of Simple Misconduct, this being his first offense and
considering his length of service and very satisfactory performances in his job, as well as
humanitarian consideration, Mr. Francis H. Cervantes be imposed the penalty of REPRIMAND
with a warning that a violation of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.[18]
Simple misconduct is punishable by one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of
suspension for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. But, considering that
respondent Cervantes has been employed by the Court since 1997 and has been receiving
very satisfactory performance ratings, Atty. Candelaria lowered the penalty and believed that
the penalty of reprimand is in order.[19]
Except for the penalty, the recommendation of Atty. Candelaria is well-taken.
The Court cannot take cognizance of a number of the allegations leveled against respondent
Cervantes being of the nature that should properly be threshed out in a court or agency
clothed with jurisdiction. Besides, the propriety of the imposition of administrative sanctions
would depend on the outcome of the case or cases, if any is filed. At the moment, it is
premature to determine whether respondent Cervantes should be held administratively liable
for the alleged dishonesty and grave misconduct.
However, we believe as we agree with the recommendation of the OAS, that respondent
Cervantes should be reproved for publicizing his connections with the alleged investigating
officers of the instant case and for trumpeting the power that he purportedly wields as an
employee of the Court. The Court cannot overstress the need for circumspect and proper
behavior on the part of the court employees.[20] It is well to recall our ruling in Re:
Disciplinary Action Against Antonio Lamano, Jr. of the Judgment Division, Supreme Court,[21]
to wit:
Government officials and employees, more specifically those employed in the Judiciary, are
bound by the highest standards of propriety and decorum to maintain the peoples respect
and faith in the Judiciary. Such dictates apply not only between the said personnel and the
public but among co-workers as well. Any transgression or deviation from the established
norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct. Any scandalous behavior or
any act that may erode the peoples high esteem for the Judiciary is considered an act DANTE O. TINGA
unbecoming an employee of the Judiciary.[22] Associate Justice

By reason of the nature and function of the Supreme Court, officials and employees of the WE CONCUR:
highest court of the land must live up to the strictest standards of honesty, uprightness and
integrity in the public service. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the highest Justice to the
lowest personnel. Court employees are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
name and integrity of the court of justice.[23] Chief Justice

Respondent Cervantes failed to meet this exacting standard. His actuation, although made in
a private gathering, has stained the image of his public office. Like any member of the
Judiciary, respondent is expected to be a model of fairness and honesty not only in all his
official conduct but also in his personal actuations, including business and commercial REYNATO S. PUNO
transactions. Any conduct that would be a bane to the public trust and confidence reposed on Associate Justice
the Judiciary shall not be countenanced.[24]
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

Indeed, the Court finds respondent Cervantes guilty of simple misconduct. Misconduct is
defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of
justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAG0
generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, Associate Justice
obstinate or intentional purpose.[25]
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Section 52 B (2) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service[26] imposes Associate Justice
the penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first
offense of simple misconduct. A second offense is punishable by dismissal. For displaying
conduct that casts a blight on the image of the judiciary, we deem that the penalty of
suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day without pay would be a sufficient penalty for
respondent Cervantes offense. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WHEREFORE, respondent Francis H. Cervantes, Records Officer I, Records Division, Office of
Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator is hereby SUSPENDED without pay MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day. He is further WARNED that Associate Justice

the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely by
this Court. RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
 [12]Id. at 143-146.

[13]Id. at 143-144.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice [14]Id. at 35-42.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA [15]Id. at 35-36, 38.

Associate Justice
[16]Id. at 1-9.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO [17]Id. at 6.

Associate Justice
[18]Id. at 8-9.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice [19]Id. at 8.

[20]See Administrative Complaint for Non-payment of Debt against Nahren Hernaez, 443 Phil.
697, 704 (2003); In Re: Complaint for Failure to Pay Just Debts Against Esther T. Andres, A.M.
No. 2004-40-SC, 1 March 2005, 452 SCRA 654, 663.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice [21]377 Phil. 364 (1999).

[22]Id. at 367.

[1]Pursuant to the Associations Board Resolution No. 020, Series of 2006, Mr. Llantada has
been duly authorized to file the instant administrative complaint.
[2]Rollo, pp. 191-254.
[3]Id. at 1, 231, 234, 235, 236, 240.
[23]Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Sec. I & Angelita C.
Esmerio, Clerk III, Off. Clerk of Court, A.M. No. 2001-7-SC & No. 2001-8-SC, 22 July 2005, 464
SCRA 1, 15.
[24]In Re: Complaint for Failure to Pay Just Debts against Esther T. Andres, A.M. No. 2004-40-
SC, 1 March 2005, 452 SCRA 654. 663-664.

[4]Id. at 244. [25]Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-01-1660, 25 August
2005, 468 SCRA 21, 35.
[5]Id. at 244-245.
[26]Resolution No. 991936, which repealed or modified accordingly Rule XVI of the Omnibus
[6]Id. at 246. Rules Implementing Book V of Administrative Code of 1987.

[7]Id. at 245.

[8]Id. at 2, 250.

[9]Id. at 167-172.

[10]Id. at 172.

[11]Id. at 52-60.
THIRD DIVISION presiding judge of MTCC-Branch 1.[3] Complainant alleged that it was only in the first week of
November 2003 that respondent judge returned the records of the case.
ROMEO R. SANCHEZ, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1570
Complainant, Complainant opined that respondent judge delayed the disposition of the election case and
Present: the return of the records because respondent judge is a personal and very close friend of
protestee, Tomas Menor, Jr. (Menor).
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO, In his Comment dated 15 July 2004, respondent judge admitted that the case was deemed
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, submitted for decision on 30 April 2003 but denied that there was undue delay in the
TINGA, and disposition of the election case. Respondent judge cited his numerous court assignments and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. heavy caseload as the cause of the delay.[4] Respondent judge also mentioned complainants
letter-complaint to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (letter)[5] and the motion for inhibition
(motion)[6] as additional reasons for the delay.
JUDGE QUINTIN B. ALAAN,
Acting Presiding Judge, Municipal Respondent judge further stated that he suffered a mild stroke on 31 March 2003 and was
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Promulgated: confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital until 7 April 2003. Respondent judge reported back to
Surigao City, work in the last week of April 2003 and sought immediate relief from hearing the cases
Respondent. September 5, 2006 pending before MTCC-Branch 1, which included the election case.

x-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Respondent judge explained that he had already prepared the draft decision as early as the
last week of June 2003 but was not able to finalize the decision because of the revocation of
his designation as acting presiding judge. Respondent judge believed that his authority to
RESOLUTION hear and decide the cases pending before MTCC-Branch 1 had ceased.

On the records of the election case, respondent judge explained that he returned the records
CARPIO, J.: to the Clerk of Court in July 2003. But the records were given back to respondent judge in the
second week of October 2003 because of a standing agreement with newly designated Acting
Presiding Judge Leonora R. Edera (Judge Edera) that respondent judge would prepare the
The Case drafts of the cases submitted for decision during his term as acting presiding judge, subject to
the scrutiny and approval of Judge Edera.[7] Respondent judge claimed that he finished the
draft decision in the first week of November 2003 and returned the records.
This is an administrative complaint against Acting Presiding Judge Quintin B. Alaan
(respondent judge) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Surigao City, Branch 1 (MTCC- Respondent judge also denied that Menor was his friend and claimed that he met Menor only
Branch 1), for dereliction of duty and inefficiency. once, at the wedding of his stenographers daughter.

The Facts The Report of the Office of the Court Administrator

In a verified letter-complaint dated 11 March 2004, Romeo R. Sanchez (complainant) alleged
that respondent judge failed to render a decision in Election Case No. 02-5888 (election case)
entitled Romeo R. Sanchez v. Tomas Menor, Jr. for judicial recount of votes.[1] Complainant
explained that the last pleading[2] was filed on 30 April 2003 but up to the filing of the letter-
complaint, respondent judge had not rendered a decision.
Complainant also questioned respondent judges possession of the records of the election
case despite the revocation on 2 July 2003 of respondent judges designation as acting
In its Report dated 2 November 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
respondent judge liable for gross inefficiency for failure to decide the election case within the
required period. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that respondent judge be fined P11,000.
In a Resolution dated 13 December 2004, the Court resolved to re-docket the case as a
regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest if they were willing to
submit the case for decision based on the pleadings filed. In a letter dated 23 February 2005,
complainant manifested affirmatively. Respondent judge failed to file a manifestation and the
Court, in a Resolution dated 1 August 2005, deemed respondent judge to have waived the
filing of his manifestation.
The Ruling of the Court
On Respondent Judges Violation of
Administrative Circular No. 5-98
Judges must maintain professional competence by being knowledgeable and obedient to the
rules and circulars issued by the Supreme Court.[8] Administrative Circular No. 5-98[9]
provides that cases already submitted for decision before an Acting Judge, at the time of the
assumption of the newly designated Acting Presiding Judge, shall be decided by the Acting
Judge.
In this case, the election case was already submitted for decision before the revocation of
respondent judges designation, and the appointment of Judge Edera as acting presiding judge
of MTCC-Branch 1. Therefore, respondent judge was duty-bound to decide the election case.
There was no need for the agreement with Judge Edera that respondent judge would only
draft the decision subject to the scrutiny and approval of Judge Edera. Consequently,
respondent judges possession of the records of the case was justified because respondent
judge was mandated by the circular to decide the election case.
On Respondent Judges Gross Inefficiency
A petition or protest contesting the election of a barangay officer should be decided by the
municipal or metropolitan trial court within fifteen days from its filing.[10] Courts are
mandated to give preference to election contests over all other cases, except petitions for
habeas corpus, and judges are enjoined to hear and decide election contests without
delay.[11] In this case, since the election protest was filed on 18 July 2002, respondent judge
should have rendered a decision on 2 August 2002 or fifteen days from the filing of the
election protest.
In Bolalin v. Occiano, the Court said:
The period provided by law must be observed faithfully because an election case involves
public interest. Time is of the essence in its disposition since the uncertainty as to who is the
real choice of the people for the position must soonest be dispelled. It is neither fair nor just
that one whose right to the office is in doubt should remain in that office for an uncertain
period. It must be noted that the term of office of barangay officials is only three years, hence
the need for the resolution of the controversy in the shortest possible time.[12]
Complainants motion and letter should not have prevented respondent judge from deciding
the election case. The letter and motion were filed more than eleven months and fourteen
months, respectively, after respondent judge should have decided the case. The revocation of
respondent judges designation as acting presiding judge of MTCC-Branch 1 does not excuse
the delay as the revocation came exactly eleven months from the time the case should have
been decided. Respondent judge had more than reasonable time to decide the election case.
Because of the delay in the disposition of the election case, the Court finds respondent judge
liable for gross inefficiency and for violation of Rule 3.05[13] of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent judge had a mild stroke on 31 March 2003 or almost eight months after he
should have decided the election case. Respondent judges mild stroke does not exonerate
him. However, respondent judges additional court assignment serves to mitigate his
liability.[14] The Court, mindful of the judges heavy caseload, allows judges to request for a
reasonable extension of time to resolve cases.[15] While respondent judge did not request for
an extension of time to decide the election case, the Court recognizes his additional
assignment as acting presiding judge of MTCC-Branch 1.
On the Appropriate Penalty Against
Respondent Judge
Gross inefficiency and violation of Supreme Court circulars are less serious charges punishable
with (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for a period of not less than
one month but not more than three months; or (b) fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.[16]
Considering that respondent judge had compulsorily retired on 31 October 2004 and that this
is respondent judges third offense,[17] a fine of P11,000 as recommended by the OCA is
proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Quintin B. Alaan GUILTY of gross inefficiency
and of violation of Administrative Circular No. 5-98. The Court FINES him P11,000 to be
deducted from the P20,000 withheld from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
[1] The election case was filed on 18 July 2002.
[2] Memorandum of Protestee.
[3] Administrative Order No. 94-2003 dated 2 July 2003 revoked respondent judges
designation as acting presiding judge of MTCC-Branch 1.
[4] Aside from respondent judges official station at the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Alegria-
Tubod, Surigao del Norte, respondent judge was also regularly assigned at the MTCC-Branch
1, Surigao City and at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mainit, Surigao del Norte.
Respondent judge also attended to cases at the MTC of Anao-aon and MTC of Sison, both in
Surigao del Norte, where the presiding judges have inhibited themselves from hearing some
cases.
[5] Dated 12 July 2003.
[6] Complainant filed on 17 October 2003 a Motion for the Inhibition of the Former Honorable
Presiding Judge Designate and to have the Records of the Case Immediately Returned to the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 1 so that the same may be Decided with Absolute
Dispatch. The motion was denied by Judge Edera on 15 January 2004.
[7] 2nd Indorsement dated 15 July 2004, p. 1.
[8] Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.01.
[9] Dated 18 February 1998.
[10] Omnibus Election Code, Section 252.
[11] Id., Section 258.
[12] 334 Phil. 178, 182 (1997).
[13] Rule 3.05―A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods.
[14] See Perez v. Andaya, 349 Phil. 714 (1998).
[15] Report of Justice Felipe B. Kalalo, 346 Phil. 742 (1997).
[16] Rules of Court, Sections 9 and 11(B), Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
effective 1 October 2001.
[17] In Caeda v. Alaan [425 Phil. 20 (2002)], respondent judge was found liable for violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and was fined P5,000 with a warning that the commission of a
similar offense will merit a more severe penalty.