You are on page 1of 16

People V.

Adriano Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both
killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow
Doctrine: One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences the Flora doctrine.
which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.
The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la causa es causa del COMPLEX CRIME PROPER
mal causado’, or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales V. People
FACTS: In March of 2007 in Nueva Ecija, Rolly Adriano, with his three others, overtook a
policecar and Honda CRV. With intent to killd, treachery, and abuse of superior stregth, Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
willfully shot Danilo Cabiedes, the driver of CRV, resulting from his instant death.
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but
The shooting incident caused a bystander, Ofelia Bulanan, to be hit by a stray bullet and only civil liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft,
eventually die. swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the
following persons:
Two policemen was able to trace the car used in the incident and ended up arresting
Adriano. RTC found accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as 1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity
charged, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, and also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of in the same line;
Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulana. 2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which
belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall
CA affrimed the decision of RTC. have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-
ISSUES: (1) WON Adriano is responsible for the death of Bulanan. in-law, if living together.
(2) WON treachery can be appreciated in aberratio ictus?
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable
RULING: (1) YES. Evidently, Adriano’s original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during to strangers participating in the commission of the crime. (emphasis
the commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is supplied)
responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article
4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera citing People v. Ural:
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and
different from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the
for all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen marriage which created such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of
or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
causa es causa del mal causado‘, or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused. Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix [1] of
petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong,
(2) YES. The accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two filed a complaint-affidavit[2] for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese
victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by a stray bullet. The national. Her complaint-affidavit read:
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, mother in the presence of Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our
single, and resident of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later became
12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose and the second wife of my sisters widower William Sato.
state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate 6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed
of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]- the document in the belief that they were in connection with her taxes,
95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1) not knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special
of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex A to form an integral
part hereof. 7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney,
William Sato found buyers for the property and made my niece Wendy
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng
the properties of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public
Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or properties as property Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No.
belonging to the estate but are presently in the possession or control of V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee
other parties. Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public
Toribio D. Labid). x x x
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer
with some of the children of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who 8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the
predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died considerations appearing on the deeds of absolute sale were not the true
in Japan in 1991. and actual considerations received by her father William Sato from the
buyers of her grandmothers properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy paid P7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148
Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior and P7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the
to the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], aforesaid proceeds were turned over to William Sato who undertook to
[s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, make the proper accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita Carungcong
through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature Gonzale[s].
and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby
my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, 9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee
was made her attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces Tsai paid P8,000,000.00 for the property covered by Tax Declaration No.
of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of which is GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to
attached as ANNEX A of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed William Sato.
and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato told her that the
documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, 10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were
my mother was completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has actual knowledge of the true
prior to November, 1992. amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the
signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was already
Gonzale[s]. then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of
attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato,
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document involved
position to oppose or to refuse her fathers orders. only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes
Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay
sold under the power of attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, City, as follows:
which total P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for the same
and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] 1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square
until the latter died on June 8, 1994. meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;

13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an 2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and
accounting and to deliver the proceeds of the sales to me as covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-
Administratrix of my mothers estate, but he refused and failed, and 016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the 3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and
heirs which include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida Carungcong covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-
Sato. x x x[3] 016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;

Wendy Mitsuko Satos supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued 4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less
by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No.
the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix. 7062;
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed
the complaint.[4] On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and
resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other
Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the
Code.[5] Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT]
Quezon City, Branch 87:[6] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for P250,000.00 and [Tax
Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in possession of the
INFORMATION proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and
Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales
Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of deceit, did, then and Contrary to law.[7]
there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES
VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds
of sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato. WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the meritorious, the same is GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby
Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased DISMISSED.
Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
SO ORDERED.[9] (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecution disputed Satos motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,[8] the trial court granted Satos motion and ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case: The prosecutions motion for reconsideration[10] was denied in an order dated June 2,
The Trial Prosecutors contention is that the death of the wife of
the accused severed the relationship of affinity between accused and his Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by
mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals[12] which, however, in a
accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining. decision[13] dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:

A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal [W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of
Code convinces this Court of the correctness of the contention of the Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity between her
[d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does
extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact not bar the application of the exempting circumstance under Article
that accused and Zenaidas mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in- 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law
even beyond the death of Zenaida. We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing in the law and/or existing
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the fact of death
proviso. No criminal, but only civil liability[,] shall result from the of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita and
commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious private respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of
mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and
descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line. that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato
remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the filing of
Code, preserves family harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases the criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already
of theft and malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a created havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato families as
stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather, by a private respondents daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her
son against his mother, no criminal liability is incurred by the accused only aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of
civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. private respondent, William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of
63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473). their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and the mantle of
elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the
exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, in case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while
as son-in-law of Manolita, they being relatives by affinity in the same line the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law
under Article 332(1) of the same Code. We cannot draw the distinction and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaidas mother, Manolita.
that following the death of Zenaida in 1991, private respondent Sato is no
longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former from the For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from
exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1) of the Revised criminal liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports
Penal Code. petitioners claim that Zenaidas death dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and
Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc among the members of the
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332s
rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the provision exempting a family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from
courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only.
application of law where none is indicated. The courts could only
distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the The petition has merit.
lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts
would merely give effect to the lawgivers intent. The solemn power and The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death
power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein. on the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of
the deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction
that penal laws are strictly construed against the State and liberally in EFFECT OF DEATH ON RELATIONSHIP
favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of BY AFFINITY AS ABSOLUTORY CAUSE
the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the
Revised Penal Codes simple language is most favorable to Sato.[14] Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause[16] in the
crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the
The appellate court denied reconsideration.[15] Hence, this petition. offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to
the offended party.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial
court. It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that
rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned therein included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.[17] By
from criminal liability is that the law recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious
between the offender and the offended party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa mischief against his stepson;[18] by the stepmother who commits theft against her
case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Satos wife), died stepson;[19] by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson;[20] by the grandson
on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law, her who steals from his grandfather;[21] by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with
right to the three parcels of land could have arisen only after her mothers death. Since him;[22] and by the son who steals a ring from his mother.[23]
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both
spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or parties is commingled.[28]
a familial relation resulting from marriage.[24] It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in
connection with the institution of marriage and family relations. The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity
If marriage gives rise to ones relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of ones between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after
spouse, does the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or
relationship by affinity? not.[29] Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the
marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage.
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or
in this case. That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the dearth of in-laws, the tie of affinity between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be
jurisprudence and/or commentaries on the matter. In contrast, in the American legal regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.[30]
system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino author observed:
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the
are conflicting views. There are some who believe that relationship by Revised Penal Code.
affinity is not terminated whether there are children or not in the
marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and
view supported by most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if incest.[31] On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the
the spouses have no living issues or children and one of the spouses dies, interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of
the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within
relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution of the marriage which the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more
produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the appropriate.
other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued despite the death of
one of the spouses where there are living issues or children of the Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of relatives by affinity in the same line is
marriage in whose veins the blood of the parties are commingled, since couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the
the relationship of affinity was continued through the medium of the spouse of ones living child and the surviving spouse of ones deceased child (in case of a son-
issue of the marriage (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).[25] in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law)[32] can be drawn from
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates
with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a
relationship of affinity between the parties.[26] Under this view, the relationship by affinity is basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the
simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is State to strengthen the solidarity of the family. [33] Congress has also affirmed as a State and
indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family. [34] In this connection,
for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. [35] The view that
relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouses blood relatives. relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that
created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the
death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. [27] The rationale is that the relationship
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another
resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification. [39]
accused.[36] This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be
presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. [37] The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of
the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.[38] The rule the offense.[40] What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the
applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that offense but the actual facts recited in the Information. [41] In other words, it is the recital of
is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that
adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused. determines the crime being charged in the Information.[42] It is the exclusive province of the
court to say what the crime is or what it is named. [43] The determination by the prosecutor
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not binding
basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by on the court.[44]
providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the
Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged
this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view. not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the (a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time)
affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of ones and induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of (b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her
immediate vindication of grave offense committed against ones relatives under Article 13[5] taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his
of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of
Article 20 also of the same Code.) Manolitas properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Satos inducement and representation, Manolita signed and
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 332 OF thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
THE REVISED PENAL CODE (d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither
delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to (d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the
the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by
the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the offender attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document) statements
civilly liable. other than those in fact made by her. Manolitas acts of signing the SPA and affixing her
thumbmark to that document were the very expression of her specific intention that
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned something be done about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of
therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it her statement on such intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document
applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does which she could not have read) because of Satos representation that the document
pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that
she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the
about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself
conformity to Satos proposal that she execute a document to settle her taxes. of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.

Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita EFFECT OF ABSOLUTORY CAUSE UNDER
granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning, ARTICLE 332 ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY
transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolitas Tagaytay properties when the fact was that FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA
Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief that it THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it DOCUMENTS
contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,
(1) once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa
documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of through falsification of public documents? No.
Absolute Sale and
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and
(2) once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said falsification of public document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of
accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own estafa through falsification of public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v.
personal use and benefit People.[46] It means that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the
falsification of a public document as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.

raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one who However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the
benefited therefrom, was the author thereof. Revised Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption
from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of documents, simply because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple
the Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000. estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
This was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari.
This meant that the amended Information would now state that, while the total amount of The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against
consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only P1,150,000, Sato actually property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all
received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolitas other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause
properties.[45] This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were public documents) were provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration stated in Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of
the deeds. negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In
other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple
not simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the
power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.
indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of
charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public document. crimes where the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting
a complex crime for which there is only one criminal liability.[51] (The complex crime of estafa
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the through falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is different from a
offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more
considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender against crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability.[52] The latter category is
certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and
therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes
presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is (concursus delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and
no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest. requires the imposition of a single penalty:

The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more
scandal.[47] Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply concerns the private crimes, it is only one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed and
relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect between the the two or more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently
offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public termed as component crimes.[53] (emphasis supplied)
document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond
the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when ∞∞∞
the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public
documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed,
from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332. they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the
conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through in the case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the
falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes other, the evil intent of the offender is only one.[54]
separately from each other. While there may be two component crimes (estafa and
falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one and the same
criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.[48] That is the concept of a For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public
complex crime. In other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, document requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean
subject to a single criminal liability. that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered independently of that
for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents are not
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated separate crimes but component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and
(e.g., homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to property), [49] a falsification of public documents.
complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of
diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in itself. [50] Since only a single criminal intent Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex
underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are considered as elements of a crime of estafa through falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be
single crime, the complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as considered separately from the liability for falsification of public document. Such approach
treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. would disregard the nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal
plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under
crime of estafa through falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where Article 48 of the same Code.[58] The falsification of a public, official or commercial document
the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished individually. may be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually
utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated,
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a
DOCUMENTS MAY BE A NECESSARY public, official or commercial document.[59] In other words, the crime of falsification was
MEANS FOR COMMITTING ESTAFA committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa.[60] Actually utilizing the
EVEN UNDER ARTICLE 315 (3[A]) falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. [61] The damage
to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. [62]

The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show
Revised Penal Code are as follows: that the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-
made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document; with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the
consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document; particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the
sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign
the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party. of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for)
the commission of the estafa.

While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had
require that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third
the falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the same time
estafa under that provision. as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would
only have been the simple crime of estafa. [63] On the other hand, absent any inducement
The phrase necessary means does not connote indispensable means for if it did, (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to her
then the offense as a necessary means to commit another would be an indispensable taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for her signature was
element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. [55] In People v. Salvilla,[56] the an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification.[64]
phrase necessary means merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure
the commission of the other.[57] In this case, the crime of falsification of public document, WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007
the SPA, was such a necessary means as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out and the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260
more effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is directed to try
the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons. the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit
Continued Crime/Delito Continuado November 21, 1937, the date of the commission of the theft to the eight cows of Maximiano
Sobrevega charged to the previous information.
People V. Tumlos
The question to be decided in the present appeal is whether or not the conviction of the
The defendant Irineo Tumlos appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First accused for the theft of the eight cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega constitutes a bar
Instance of Iloilo finding him guilty of the crime of theft of large cattle defined and punished to his conviction for the theft of the five cows belonging to Ambrosio Pecasis, which were
in article 310, in relation to article 309, of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to grazing together with the aforesaid eight cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega in the
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from two months and one day of arresto mayor to two same place from which they were stolen at the same time, under the legal procedural
years, four months and one day of prision correccional, with the accessories prescribed by principle of "autrefois convict" or double jeopardy.
law and costs, by virtue of an information reading as follows:
The theft of the thirteen cows committed by the defendant took place at the same time and
The undersigned acting provincial fiscal accuses Irineo Tumlos of the crime of in the same place; consequently, he performed but one act. The fact that eight of said cows
qualified theft committed as follows: pertained to one owner and five to another does not make him criminally liable for two
distinct offenses, for the reason that in such case the act must be divided into two, which act
That on or about November 21, 1937, in the municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, is not susceptible of division.
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, said defendant, wilfully and
without using force upon things or violence or intimidation against person, took, The intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the purpose of appropriating or selling
with intent to gain and without the consent of their owner, five cows valued at P39 the thirteen cows which he found grazing in the same place. As neither the intention nor the
and belonging to Ambrosio Pecasis. criminal act is susceptible of division, the offense arising from the concurrence of its two
constituent elements cannot be divided, it being immaterial that the subject matter of the
An act punishable by law. offense is singular or plural, because whether said subject matter be one or several animate
or inanimate objects, it is but one.
Iloilo, July 11, 1938.
Therefore, as the five cows alleged to be stolen by Irineo Tumlos were integral parts of the
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns as the only error allegedly committed by the thirteen cows which were the subject matter of theft, and as he had already been tried for
lower court in the aforesaid judgment its failure to sustain the defense of "autrefois convict" and convicted of the theft of the other five.
or double jeopardy, interposed by said defendant.
On or about November 21, 1937, eight cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega and five Wherefore, as he had already been put in jeopardy of being convicted of the theft of the five
belonging to his son-in-law, Ambrosio Pecasis, then grazing together in the barrio of Libong- cows in question when he was tried for and convicted of the theft of the eight which
cogon, municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, were taken by the herein defendant without together with the five from an integral part of the thirteen which were the subject matter of
the knowledge or consent of their respective owners. The deputy fiscal of Iloilo filed on July the offense, the conviction of the herein defendant Irineo Tumlos for the said five cows in
11, 1938, an information against the said defendant for the offense of theft of the eight the present case would be the second, in violation of his constitutional right not to be
cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega, which resulted in his being sentenced on July 15, punished twice for the same offense; hence, he is acquitted of the charge, which is
1938, to an indeterminate penalty of from one year, eight months and twenty-one days to dismissed, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
five years, five months and eleven days of prision correccional, with the accessories
prescribed by law and costs. In the information filed in the present case the same defendant
is charged with the theft of five cows belonging to Ambrosio Pecasis, committed on
Santiago V. Garchitorena Issue:

Facts: (a) Whether the petitioner is charged with continued crime (delito continuado) under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code
On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Held:
Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of
the Alien Legalization Program. The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito continuado or
"continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." In fairness to the
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with criminal case on the ground that said case was of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define
intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this and more difficult to apply.
was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona
fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been
discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992. applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the
charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall
Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992. ten days after, the be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal
Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. On November 6, 1992, petitioner crimes punished under special laws.
moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for
inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars. However, on In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single
November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the criminal act that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified
arraignment. under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal
act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law - Executive Order No. 324 dated
More so, the petitioner cannot accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii)
Garchitorena who would her from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
charges against her. It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first
securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First
order which. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is
and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in modified in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
court, with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country. Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos.
18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case
The court issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25,
Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his 1993 is lifted insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is
disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the resolution dated concerned.
March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and
from proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993.
Santiago Paera V. People DECISION:

Facts: Yes, Santiago Paera is guilty of grave threats. The MCTC found the prosecution evidence
sufficient to prove the elements of Grave Threats under Article 282, noting that the Darongs’
Santiago Paera (petitioner) a Punong Barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, persistent water tapping contrary to Paeras directive must have angered Paera, triggering his
allocates limited distribution of communal water from a communal tank to his constituents. criminal behaviour. The MCTC rejected petitioner’s defence of denial as self-serving and
The tank was located at the property of Vicente Darong, the complainant, father of Indalecio uncorroborated.
Darong, a complainant. Despite the petitioners’ scheme, Indalencio continued drawing
water from the tank. On April 7, 1999, Santiago Paera reminded Indalencio of the water The Regional Trial Court affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latter’s findings on petitioner’s
scheme and cut Indalencio’s access. motive. The RTC similarly found unconvincing petitioners denial in light of the ‘”clear, direct
and consistent” testimonies of the Darong`s and other prosecution witnesses.
The following day the petitioner inspected the tank due to his constituents’ complaints of
about the water interruption supply and discovered a tap on the main line and he RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
disconnected it. To stop water from leaking, petitioner borrowed a bolo and made a wooden
plug, this was when Indalecio arrived. What happened next was contested by both parties.. The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the concepts of
continued and complex crimes preclude the adoption of petitioner’s theory.
According to the prosecution, Paera without any warning charged and shouted at Indalecio Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats any person who shall threaten another
“patyon tikaw!” (I will kill you). Indalecio ran for safety and passing along the way Diosetea with the infliction upon the personof the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to
his wife who followed him going to the tank. Diosetea asked the petitioner what’s the a crime. This felony is consummated as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the
matter and instead of replying, petitioner shouted ”wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka patyon person threatened.
tikaw!”, (“I don’t spare anyone, even if you’re a woman, I will kill you!”). diosotea also ran
and sought refuge to a nearby house of her relative. Unable to pursue Diosotea, petitioner Santiago Paera’s threat to kill Indalencio and Diosetia and crack open Vicente’s skull are
turned his back to Indalecio. As he chase Indalecio, he came across Vicente, father of wrongs amounting to homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized in Revised Penal
Indalecio and recognizes him and thrusts his bolo towards him shouting, “bisag gulang ka, Code. The threats were consummated as soon as the Darongs heared Paera said his
buk-on ko imo ulo!” (“even if you’re old I will crack open your skull”). threatening remarks.

According to petitioner, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo. Angrily inquiring The proof of grave threats against Vicente came from the prosecution’s evidence on the
why the petitioner cut his supply of water connection. Forcing the petitioner to take a testimonies of Indalencio and Diosetia and two witnesses who corroborated with them
defensive stance and using a borrowed bolo that makes Indalencio ran away. indisputably shows the threat of Paera on killing Vicente. Vicente’s absence on the stand
does not affect the veracity and strength of the prosecution’s evidence.
Except for the father of Indalecio, Vicente who was seriously ill, the Darong’s testified during
trial. The petitioner was the defense lone witness. There is no justifying circumstances attended on Paera’s commission of grave threats. His
claim of defence of a stranger under rule number 3 of Article 11 of the RPC which negates
ISSUE: the criminal liability of “anyone who acts in defence of his persons or rights of a stranger,
provided that the first and second requisites in the next preceding circumstance are present
Was Santiago Paera guilty of grave threats? and the person defending be not induced by resentment, revenge or any other evil motives”
which requires 1. Unlawful aggression 2. Reasonable necessity of means to avoid or repeal it
and 3. Lack of provocation on the part of the person being attacked. None of this requisites
was obtained.This claim of Paera has no merit on having acted to protect and defend the the facts that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of
water rights of his constituents in the lawful exercise of his office as punong barangay. AAA. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5)
minutes wherein the appellant would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after
The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under Article 11 he has regained his strength, he would again rape AAA. Hence, it can be clearly inferredfrom
paragraph 5 lies upon a proof the offense was committed was the necessary consequence of the foregoing that when the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of office. When Paera barred the sexual assault upon AAA, he was not motivated by a single impulse, but rather by several
Darong’s access to communal water, arguably, he acted in the performance of his duty to criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable. The three
ensure the delivery of basic services. But he excessively exceeded the bounds of his office insertions into AAA were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore,
when he chased the Darong’s with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons for the appellant’s conviction for three counts of rape is proper. People of the Philippines v.
violation on his orders. Manolito Lucena y Velasquez,
The Supreme Court denied the petition of Santiago Paera and affirms the decision of the DOCTRINE OF ABSORPTION
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete, Branch 39 dated November 28, 2008.
People V. Hernandez
People V. Aaron
People v. Aaron (Aaron Case),35 insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of Amado Hernandez and several others were accused of the crime of rebellion with multiple
rape despite the three (3) penetrations because he was motivated by a single criminal intent. murder, arsons and robberies. They were convicted of the crime and sentenced to suffer the
This Court finds this contention fallacious. penalty of life imprisonment.

In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then withdrew ISSUE(S):
it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again Whether or not there is a complex crime of rebellion with murder.
his penis into the victim’s vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the
victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted RULING:
again his penis into the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping motions. From these NO. Under the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons and robberies
sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein for only one count of rape despite the described therein are mere ingredients to the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said
three successful penetrations because there is no indication in the records from which it can defendants as means “necessary” for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion. The
be inferred that the accused decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual crime, therefore, is simple rebellion.
assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was Motion for bail is GRANTED.
committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations occurred during one
continuing act of rape in which the accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal Enrile V. Salazar
People V. Manolito Lucena
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
Rape; one count for each separate act of sexual assault. The appellant, citing People v. arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Aaron, insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3) Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
penetrations because he was motivated by a single criminal intent. However, it appears from Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during Code: simple rebellion.
the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted
Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a
right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and
for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The
1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights. correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be
admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence
Issue: against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second
clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code? The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco
Held: and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners
are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the
two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the pronouncement as to costs.
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for
the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon Enrile V. Amin
the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article Facts:
48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of An information was charged against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile for having committed
the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant. rebellion complexed with murder with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Another
information was subsequently filed with the Regional Trial Court 9of Makati, charging the
former with a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 for willfully and knowingly
obstructing or delaying the apprehension of Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan.

Allegedly, Senator Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Gringo Honasan by giving him
food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house and not doing anything to have
Honasan arrested or apprehended. It was the prosecution’s contention that harboring or
concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while rebellion is based on Revised
Penal Code; thus, the two crimes can be separately punished.

Issue: Can a separate crime of a violation of PD 1829 be charged against the petitioner?

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court used the doctrine that if a person cannot be charged with
the complex crime of rebellion, he can neither be charged separately for two different
offenses, where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of

It was also noted that petitioner was already facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with
Honasan. Being in conspiracy thereof, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is
clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of
rebellion. It cannot be made the basis of a separate charge.

Also, the High Court reiterated that in cases of rebellion, all crimes committed in furtherance
thereof shall be absolved. Hence, the other charge of rebellion complexed with murder
cannot prosper. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are
mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance of rebellion, become
absorbed and it cannot be charged as separate crimes.