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BLENDING CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL METHOD OF OPERATION AS A FIGHTING CONCEPT FOR BANGLADESH ARMY INTRODUCTION
1. The geo-strategic environment demands that Bangladesh maintains sizeable army for protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, economic constraints prohibit Bangladesh from maintaining an army of reasonable size and also from equipping the existing army with weapons with adequate range and sophistication to carry the battle into enemy territory. To strike a balance between these two opposing factors our present concept of operations envisage a conventional method of operation (CMO) against the potential aggressor for a limited period and then transiting into guerilla warfare. 2. This existing concept is purely defensive in nature that is most likely to be adopted after a prescribed period. Besides, this concept has virtually no specific plan to exploit enemy’s vulnerabilities, which is so essential for success in war. To replace this age-old concept and ‘’postulate a definable, recognizable element of victory’’ the draft operation of war volume one states, “ In future conflicts Bangladesh Army must be prepared to blend conventional and unconventional warfare in the implementation of national strategy”. 1 It also goes on to state that “ unconventional warfare is not regarded as an aftermath of the conventional war, rather should be waged simultaneously with conventional war. In fact, the campaign plan should conceive the operational employment of the unconventional forces as one of its major operations or battle and establish its relationship with other component parts”. 2 3. The existing force structure of the army, para military and auxiliary forces are quite capable of undertaking Unconventional Method of Operation (UCMO) with some restructuring and command and control set up. Some modification to infantry battalions may also be necessary. Raising of special force like para commando elements would strengthen the operational efficiency. The expected shortfall of regular troops for UCMO at the outbreak of hostility would necessitate the preservation of reservist form retired personnel up to a certain age limit. Different options are to be formulated within existing command structure to offset enemy's aggression. Mission oriented training, smooth logistic support and finally economic viability would expedite the blending operation to a success. 4. This blending of CMO and UCMO is not a new concept in Bangladesh Army. People had been thinking over it as they tried to grapple with the problem of fighting hopelessly outnumbered. The concept provided a ray of hope of fighting
Draft Operations of War Volume One p. 2-6 Loc cit
RESTRICTED with numerical disadvantage and still retaining the chances to win. Over the years, the concept crystallized through extensive brainstorming by numerous individuals/groups/ organization/ institutions. The above strategy obviously would call for conducting battles behind the enemy line, that is engaging the enemy right from his preparatory stage and destroying logistic bases. The modern concept of conducting a deep battle will play an important role in shaping the battle in our advantage, so that our ‘ main effort can strike the enemy at our desired time and place. It is assumed that this concept is likely to be considered as the cornerstone of our future doctrine. 5. However, before a concept can mature into a doctrine it involves a tedious process of research, tests, trials and analysis. This research work is one such step in our effort towards crystallization of the future doctrine of war for Bangladesh Army. This paper will discuss a few conceptual and relevant issues including threat analysis. The concept of blending will be then discussed in detail, the main focus of the research being to highlight infrastructural changes for it's implementation. Finally the paper will suggest recommendations to implement this concept.
6. The aim of this paper is to examine the concept of blending conventional and unconventional method of operation in order to suggest measures for implementation of the concept in Bangladesh Army.
DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
7. Conventional Method of Operation (CMO). Operations, which are conducted by conventional forces i.e. Army, Navy and Airforce following established doctrine and principles of war, are termed as CMO. These forces wear uniform during operations and are subjected to Geneva Convention.3 8. Unconventional Method of Operation (UCMO). Operations, which are conducted by forces other than conventional forces, are known as UCMO. These forces normally do not wear uniform during operations, live off the mass population and are not subjected to Geneva Convention. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held/ controlled or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigineous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by external source during all condition of war.4
AHQ Project Study-1998 by HQ 46 Indep Inf Bde Loc cit
the entire population is drawn or involved in the war effort in some form or the other and the nation is unable to defend itself with conventional form of war. The strategy of revolutionary war in Vietnam had its objectives of seizing political power of the state. Total People’s War. The strategy they followed can be summarized as follows: a. political and social to the war effort. 3 RESTRICTED . It was by necessity and choice a protracted war. In operation it totally integrated two principle forms of conflicts. At the same time it constantly mixed all phases of war. Total people’s war means all conventional and unconventional forces of a nation fighting unconventional form of warfare against the enemy. The Chinese and Russians in Second World War fought two wars simultaneously. predominantly indigenous forces. Most of the wars fought by weaker countries against a superior enemy have blended the method of both conventional and unconventional warfare. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 11. In the Vietnam War the Vietminh conducted both conventional and unconventional war simultaneously. armed conflict and political conflict. was the difficulty in distinguishing the phases of war at a particular time. economic. It is conducted to complement. It stressed on gaining and keeping of initiative. or extend conventional military operations or to wear down his resistance. Vietnam. It was a changing war. 12. In other words. Every element of power was coordinated with the others to gain the objectives. This involved not only to the military initiatives but to the political and psychological initiatives as well. It was waged with total unity of effort. 10. General. the Vietnam War and Afghan War are worth mentioning and provide lessons relevant to our requirement. d.RESTRICTED 9. that is. It shows us how a peasant force comprised of common mass were organised to fight a revolutionary war that defeated French and American Forces. It means complete utilization and mobilization of all resources available to a nation. The most important part in Vietnam War. b. In one area it was phase-3 while nearby it was phase 2 and somewhere else it was phase 1 insurgency. It was a total war which mobilised all the people and used every available facet of the power. c. Guerilla Warfare. Military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular. However. support. e.
India may muster a sizeable proportion of mechanised forces and combat helicopters against Bangladesh to rapidly secure the 4 RESTRICTED . “ Never in the history of man’s resistance to a foreign oppressor has there total motivation as was displayed by the people of Bangladesh”. General. However with strong determination the resistance movement turned into a formidable force known as Mujahideen. She possesses the 5th largest army in the world. THREAT PERCEPTIONS 15. Bangladesh is surrounded from all sides by India except for a small portion in the south-east with Myanmar and Bay of Bengal in the south. We all are aware of our liberation war.RESTRICTED 13. Major General D K Palit in his book ‘The Lightning Campaign’ said. it may be assumed that only a part of her forces will be mustered against Bangladesh in the event of a full scale war. During war. Though the war initially started as a resistance movement ultimately it turned into a full-scale war. considering the strained relations that India has with her other powerful neighbours like China and Pakistan. The chances of a limited war between Bangladesh and India always exists. The likely pattern of offensive by our potential aggressor may be envisaged as under: a. which is likely to pose a great threat for it's neighbours. Mujahideen took control of more than 80 percent of the land. During the liberation war of Bangladesh a large number of civilian volunteers joined the regular forces. India has bilateral problems with almost all her neighbours and Bangladesh no exception to it. while Myanmar poses a low threat because of limited common borders of almost inaccessible terrain. culture and overall internal security of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is likely to be subjected to physical threat from India and Myanmar only. Afghanistan. As a result the final offensive could achieve its objectives easily and rapidly. India is a regional super power. 16. It had no experience of fighting a war against the professional army of a super power. These operations helped the allied forces to shape the battlefield to their design. Within next seven years they evicted the super power from Afghan soil causing fourteen thousand killed and sixty thousand wounded. India also poses threat to the economy. After seven years of fighting. the possibilities of a full-scale escalation of war against Bangladesh can not be ruled out. Besides. Bangladesh. His military venture in Sri -Lanka and Maldives bears the testimony of this possibility. 14. However. In the event of a conflict of interest. The war in Afghanistan was another example of peoples’ war against an occupation army. forces were ill armed and disorganised. Considering this geographical reality. Even during the final offensive by the Allied Forces unconventional operations were carried out throughout the length and breadth of the battlefield. The well known Mukti Bahini carried out both conventional and unconventional operations deep inside enemy held territories. India. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan the resistance was weak.
Bangladesh will face difficulty in procuring war materiel from abroad. d. enemy Air force is likely to be employed for providing close support to ground forces and keep the defiles over the rivers under constant surveillance to prevent movement of our forces and logistics support. the chances of irregular border disturbances and low 5 RESTRICTED . isolate and gain positional advantages to capture the defensive positions. Analysis. However. Potential aggressor borders Bangladesh on three sides. Brahmaputra. The aim of manoeuvre would be to engage the entire depth of the defended sector. and can effectively block air and water routes as well. Vietminh had China and Afghans had Pakistan as their sanctuaries for their struggle against USA and the then USSR respectively. c. east and west as situation permits. 17. As such conventional military threat from Myanmar is of less significance. their Armed Forces will encounter certain difficulties to apply rapid manoeuvre concept in our terrain. e. c. The only possibility is through Myanmar. However. d. Meghna and Padma by dominant manoeuvre and then subsequently converge on Dhaka from north. a muchneeded support. with long range weapons while remaining disengaged. The movement of large body of troops through this terrain is a remote possibility. b. The threat will have overwhelming superiority in terms of conventional force ratio as well as resources including long range weapons. Bangladesh will be deprived of sanctuary outside its border. to conduct and continue a war against a superior enemy.RESTRICTED military objectives. across the rivers Jamuna. 18. if diplomatic manoeuvre can be won. enemy Armed Forces are likely to tackle the defences en-route with bypassing manoeuvre and simultaneous development of operations in its flanks and rear areas. Myanmar. Any confrontation with our potential enemy will have the following implications for Bangladesh. The same will also provide them with added advantage during the conduct of manoeuvre and close engagement. While progressing operations towards the defiles. Enemy Armed forces ‘ initial thrusts are likely to be directed to secure defiles. The border between Bangladesh and Myanmar is a rugged hilly terrain. During the entire period of battle. Enemy Armed forces has the capabilities to cause attrition to our forces and combat assets. The threat is likely to dominate air space throughout that will hinder the movement and operations of own conventional forces. which must be kept in mind: a. b.
without it no military can continue the war. Myanmar is likely to undertake offensive by small-scale infiltration through the hilly areas of Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar or across river Naf. Objective and Method of Blending. people are involved at all echelons of the war effort. CONCEPT OF BLENDING 19. It also involves the population right from the beginning in the conduct of war. In modern wars it is the peoples’ support. Their elected leaders decide to go to war if forced upon. a. ‘’ Unconventional war assumes greater importance in defensive operation as it significantly compensates the numerical disadvantage of the defending forces. Blending CMO and UCMO and Clausewitz’ Paradoxical Trinity. b. their national military plays the key role in conducting the war and the population provides both physical and moral support. 20.RESTRICTED intensity conflict on the plea of Rohingya issue can not be ruled out. For the peace time training and coordination a separate chain of command will be maintained in each divisional Area of Responsibility (AOR). the main objective of the blending CMO and UCMO is to compensate the numerical inferiority and lack of modern fighting assets of our conventional forces against our potential adversary.5 Therefore. P. The government decides to wage a war. the outcome of a war depends on the perfect harmony and balance between the people. Method. directs its military to conduct it and provides all necessary resources. The unconventional forces will carryout operations under the over all command of the conventional force commander. This should be more pertinent in those countries whose military has less sophistication. which determines the ultimate outcome of war. Thus the blending of CMO and UCMO validates Clausewitz’ paradoxical trinity for prosecution of war. The USA had to withdraw from Vietnam and Somalia because of its people negative attitude towards the war. 9-27 6 RESTRICTED . The people support government’s decision and provide moral and material assistance to both the government and the military. In war where CMO and UCMO are blended. An amphibious assault against St Martin Island may also be contemplated. The concept envisages blending of CMO and UCMO right from the beginning of hostilities as opposed to the age old concept of transition into UCMO in the last phase of the war. Objective. According to Clausewitz. It makes the theatre/ battlefield cellular by allowing simultaneous engagement of enemy forces throughout the length and breadth of the area of operation ‘’. government and military. 5 Draft GSTP Operation of War Volume one. The military prosecutes the war to achieve the end-state set by government. which he termed as ‘paradoxical trinity’. but morale is high and peoples’ support is the main driving force.
To understand the modern fighting concept certain relevant aspects need to be clarified. All these will pose difficulty for our army to disperse and deploy. recognizable victory for the defender”.RESTRICTED 21. continuous supply of arms and ammunition and maintaining command and control arrangement”.” Own strategic CGs may be identified as “ capital Dhaka. According to Richard E. we are to cause large scale casualty right form beginning. The geographical 22. p. b. The inadequate depth of the country and imbalance in force ratio signifies that a prolonged conventional war against enemy would be a remote possibility. Definition of Victory. one of the foremost military thinkers and writers of recent times. To achieve victory we are to tilt enemy’s CG and protect our own. Simpkin. The defensive strategy must extend beyond simply denying victory to other side. Identify Center of Gravity (CG) of Both Enemy and Own. Relevance of the Concept of Blending Conventional and Unconventional Method of Operation for Our Army. AHQ Project Study-1998 by HQ 46 Indep Inf Bde 7 RESTRICTED . “ the purpose of military operation can not be simply to avert defeat rather it must be to win. Simpkin. While the threat‘s victory is the capture of our capital. Brassey’s London. It may be conducted as under: 6 7 Richard E.7 a. On the other hand. Outcome of Blending CMO and UCMO. 23.6 The definition of victory is derived from the national security strategy. location of Bangladesh clearly dictates that our potential adversary would leave no room outside national border from the beginning of hostilities. But for planners. Blending of CMO and UCMO and Modern Fighting Concept. own victory is likely to be forcing him to pull back immediately. maintaining peoples’ support. the approaches to own formation’s area of responsibility have increased over last few years due to development of communication net work. 1994. However the definition at national level in general term may be ‘ defeat enemy’s aggression’.” popular support and his diplomacy to carry international support for war effort. Similarly the shifting of troops from one sector to other would also be difficult and risky for lack of effective air cover. understood and identified: a. Therefore. we are to conduct operation within own territory. this definition will be further narrowed down and given measurable statistics. both CMO and UCMO have to be blended to neutralise enemy’s CG and protect our own. Considering the definition of victory stated above in case of an aggression by the potential enemy. Blending of CMO and UCMO will allow us to conduct deep operations well inside enemy territory as well as behind enemy lines when he is inside our own territory. This is possible by taking the battle in to enemy’s territory from the outset of hostilities.X. As such. It must instead postulate a definable. Race to the Swift. the threat’s strategic CG s are likely to be. To effectively tilt enemy’s CG.
The targets for deep operation will be selected at Army/Division/Brigade level based on the situation templates. (2) As the enemy enters own territory in considerable depth the unconventional force hit enemy’s high value targets (HVTs) and his flanks by continuously laying ambushes and conducting raids. These operations are also shaping the battlefield to own design. (2) When the battlefield is taken in to their ground. Enemy civil population will find the battle in their own area. All these are conducted under overall operational framework and conventional leadership. This gives us the advantage of having lucrative targets for unconventional operations. As a result at the very outset of the war enemy will be concerned about his rear area security and employ more troops to protect those. people are likely to lose confidence in their armed forces and react adversely. (4) He can not concentrate on the main battle and bring in forces to achieve concentration (5) Simultaneously all echelons of enemy are engaged.RESTRICTED (1) Right from the beginning the battle must be taken to enemy territory to exploit his geo-political vulnerabilities. Whether specially trained conventional force (commando) or unconventional forces are to be tasked will depend on the location of target and capability of the force. (3) Continuous hitting of logistic installations and disruption of lines of communication will force enemy to commit more troops in protecting those. People will question government for the justification of sacrifice. So we are actually in the process of neutralizing enemy’s CG before the main battles are fought. INFRASTRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS : FORCE STRUCTURE AND RELEVANT ISSUES 8 RESTRICTED . b. They will hit high value and strategic targets to play havoc and create chaos within civil population. The net result of blending CMO and UCMO are as under: (1) Large-scale casualties will provoke his population against the government. This will also manifest our preparedness and determination to fight the war. The outcry of the civil population was evident in the newspaper. Indian Peacekeeping Force was forced to withdraw from Sri Lanka because of large-scale casualty. These forces can be special/commando and unconventional forces in civil dress. For example.
From the core concept of the new operational doctrine we find that the unconventional force should comprise of elements from regular force. for it is beyond the scope of this presentation. Bangladesh is a populous nation and there is no dearth of population to form unconventional force if properly trained and motivated. Options for force structuring are discussed in subsequent paragraphs. The economic aspect has been generally highlighted without going into the details of calculations. The main focus has been on the unconventional/ reserve forces who will complement the operations of the regular forces. Composition and Size of Forces. Options. Nobody is ever sure when the next war will take place and whether or not we will have all our existing deficiencies of the conventional forces filled up before it happens. 8 Option-1(Army Co mp one nts 2X Battalions per division (when 3 X Company Ibid 9 RESTRICTED . Composition of unconventional force and its size is the most important aspect of blending conventional with unconventional method of war. Force Structure 25.RESTRICTED General 24. For blending CMO and UCMO not many of changes have been suggested for the regular forces. It leaves us with three options as regards the quantum of regular and paramilitary forces that can be spared for the unconventional effort right from the beginning. second line/paramilitary and trained segment of the population. 26. 8 These options are as follows: Seria Options Army Components BDR 1.
due to paucity of regular forces. The main advantage of this option is that the unconventional force is quite strong.1x platoon per Battalion and Armed police-50% shall be common to all the options shown above. due to existing deficiency of regular troops. Option-2. This is the recommend option if we have to go to war with existing deficiencies. per secto r Option-2(with 1 X Platoon per Infantry Battalion 1 X Company existing deficiency) (when division having existing per deficiency) secto r Option-3(with Each Infantry Battalion provides 2 X Company existing deficiency) organizational framework as under: per 1 X Major secto 2 x Junior Commissioned Officer r 7 X Other Ranks (when division having existing deficiency) Note: Embodied Ansar. In this option. the conventional force is not seriously depleted. However the only weakness or disadvantage is the weakening of the conventional force itself affecting its reserve capability and flexibility. one platoon from each Infantry Battalion and one Company from each BDR Sector will be dedicated for the unconventional forces at the outset. Option-3. The disadvantage of this course is the weakness of the unconventional force and the possibility of their initial inertia to set into motion.RESTRICTED having strength) 2. full division is in full strength) 3. Option-1. b. These elements will be yet quite effective in making the unconventional force fairly strong and balanced producing a positive outcome. Reservist Policy. 27. In this option. At the same time. c. well balanced and has a better command and control right from the beginning. 10 RESTRICTED . in all probability will be offset by the rich dividends that a strong unconventional force will be able to achieve. The main advantage of this option is retention of combat power for the conventional force which will be better prepared to take the initial onslaught. This. Only minimum essential elements are taken from the Army to provide an organizational framework along with Ansar and Armed Police elements which will still make the unconventional force fairly balanced and strong. the emphasis is placed on retaining the combat power of the conventional force. a. This option is based on the assumption that the existing deficiency of the Army has been filled up.
In addition we will have better quality NCOs’ who will form the backbone of the army. they should leave the job with a handsome amount of money i. Reserve policy will be a key factor in the force structure for it will play vital role in creating reserves and forming unconventional force structure/reserve units. This will help to create a large pool of reservist who will form the core of unconventional forces. (2) Society will benefit with the input of increased number of disciplined people. e. We suggest 4/5 years of voluntary service for soldiers. In order to make them self contained in airdefence and anti-tank capability. Three hand launchers instead of one may be allotted to rifle platoon. The voluntary service contract will not have any retirement liability. Modifications in Infantry Battalions. 2-3 lacs taka . The brigade has one para commando battalion and two more para commando battalions need to 11 RESTRICTED . infantry battalions do not have proper reconnaissance assets. c. Bangladesh Army should have a para-commando brigade as its strategic offensive force. need to be self sufficient in respect of reconnaissance. These battalions. These inclusions will be cost effective compared to the costly air defence assets and anti-tank missiles and tanks.RESTRICTED a. This will also have positive economic implications such as: (1) Large number of trained/disciplined soldiers will retire every year. Rest of the soldiers to be in reservist list for next 10 years. (3) Government may be free of pension. d. will be in reserve list till the age of 35. They can help in the socio-economic upliftment of the country. This will help them to pursue a different career later.e. A scout platoon may be added to the organizational set-up of infantry battalions that would help the battalion commander to keep the Named Area of Interest (NAI) in his AOR under constant surveillance. 28. air defence and anti-tank capabilities. accommodation and ration liabilities. At the end of the tenure only selected individual may be promoted/retained as noncommissioned officers (NCO). light air-defence and anti-tank guided weapons may be provided to the infantry battalions. At present. Two shoulder controlled air-defence missiles may be provided to the infantry battalions. All battles will revolve around the infantry battalions. therefore. Reserve pool will be of younger generation. Raising of Para Commando Brigade. As they retire. b. 29. An average soldier retiring at the age of 25. a portion of this may be the forced saving from their pay. It will act as a great incentive to younger generation to join army for five-year contract.
Command and control (C2) of unconventional forces and their operations will be a challenging task for the leadership at all level. In this option. The division commander remains the highest commander to control and coordinate the unconventional operations. orientation. Without proper C2 management. the unconventional forces will conduct operations independently within the allotted AOR. Command Structure 30. plan and conduct unconventional operations maintaining separate chain of command. A suggested chain of command is shown below: DIV ISION COMMANDER FORMATION AREA BRIGADE COMMANDER SECTOR AREA (Two or more Districts) BATTALION COMMANDER ZONE (One District) COMPANY COMMANDER Patrol Base Area Two or More Thanas PLATOON COMMANDER Patrol b. Option -2. the whole thing will become a fruitless exercise. Here we have two options with regard to chain of command. Command and Control. unconventional forces will conduct operation within their respective AOR under the command and control of regular force commanders at all level. This option is better for peacetime coordination. Separate commanders at Sector and below level will be designated to organise. training. The main limitation is with the dual command functions by the military commanders particularly brigade and below who will not be in direct communication and control of the unconventional forces.RESTRICTED be raised. Option-1. The division commander will act as the highest authority to direct and coordinate both conventional and unconventional operations simultaneously within respective formation AOR. This is the option we recommend since there are separate people to command respective 12 RESTRICTED . The Army Commander may use them to engage deep targets' across the international border. a. The major advantage is that the induction of more army elements at a later stage would be smooth they are already in command and oriented with their AOR and situation. In this particular option. planning and setting up organizational framework.
b. c.RESTRICTED troops. Telephone Civil/military exchange. d. however is the lack of coordination between the regular and the irregular forces. These include: a. it is the training for the other elements of the unconventional forces that we are primarily concerned with. Bangladesh Navy and Airforce should include unconventional training for all their personnel during peacetime. While the present practice of training on unconventional war by the conventional forces. This training will be organised both during the peacetime and during the war. Existing Telegraph. 13 RESTRICTED . 33. that is the regular forces must continue with increased importance. All available means of communication will be used for maintaining communication. For peace time the chain of command suggested in the option 1 shall remain in force. Training of Unconventional Forces 32. The main disadvantage. The chain of command is shown below: DIVISION COMMANDER UW FORCE COMD SEC COMD (One or more Dists) ZONE COMD One Dist or No of Thanas PTL BASE COMD Ptl Base Area One Thana or No of Unions Normal Chain of Comd for Conventional Force PL COMD One Unions or No of Villages 31. Communication. They should also organise refresher training annually for duration of two weeks for all their retired personnel below the age of 55. Conventional High Frequency sets(Command net). railway communication. Mobile/Cellular phones etc.
field craft and training on small arms including firing. that is raid. A joint exercise may be conducted every three years. Combat intelligence. Special operations. 35. Formations may organize 'Formation Battle School' to conduct this training. Bangladesh Ansars and Village Defence Party. All reservists. The reservists can be trained as a full-fledged reserve unit in the operational role. Unconventional training should also be organised by each Area Headquarters in their respective districts as soon as the government orders general mobilisation. b. both at home and abroad or taking public or private jobs. sabotage. use of mines and explosives. tank. Compulsory military training may be introduced for all able-bodied male personnel who are seeking higher education after intermediate. Advanced training may be provided to specially selected personnel after basic military training. Basic Military Training. Training on unconventional war shall mainly comprise minor operations. that is Bangladesh Rifles. paramilitary forces and civilian volunteers (BNCC) as a continuous process. This training can be organised annually for a duration of 4 weeks in each district headquarters by each area Headquarters of the Army. small scale attacks. 38. patrolling. a. ambush. Bangladesh National Cadet Corps and Armed Police Battalions of Bangladesh police should train all their personnel on unconventional warfare during the peacetime below the age of 50. Training may be provided to the reservists. Formations may arrange training camps once in every 2 years for all reservists under that formation AOR. paramilitary and selected volunteers will be provided with basic military training for a period of four weeks. hideout. This training should continue throughout the war for all civilian volunteers who would join the unconventional war. All second line forces. The training curriculum may be as follows. Advance Training. Following subjects may be covered in their training: (1) (2) (3) Explosive handling. 14 RESTRICTED . 37. guerrilla warfare. which may last for about four weeks.RESTRICTED 34.hunting. 36. This training can be open to all civilian volunteers as well. Following subjects may be covered: (1) (2) (3) Field craft. Weapon training (handling and firing) Minor tactics.
RESTRICTED 39. This replenishment will be carried out using unspecified and undesignated line of communications through crosscountry and difficult terrain. In extreme emergency. Mines and Explosives. civil administration and bureaucrats may be conducted to bring in cohesiveness. Food. The logistics cells shall arrange replenishment from the central/forward depot which are still unaffected and functional in the area occupied by own force. 41. Ammunition. stocked and maintained in each Army formation area. They would mostly live off the land and use indigenous transportation system. shelter. Economic Aspects 15 RESTRICTED . feasibility of logistic system. civil administration and mass population. and co-ordination with a view to pursuing a common cause during national crisis. ammunition. The exercise may be organised once in every 3 years as mentioned before under the overall supervision of Armed Forces Division. Joint Exercises. Indigenous transportation system. which they would need to implement/undertake in case of actual mobilisation and execution of operations. Sufficient quantity of these weapons and ammunition are to be procured. Joint exercises involving conventional and unconventional forces. areas of co-ordination between armed forces. Unconventional forces should also wherever possible. mines and explosives will be the principal commodities of the unconventional forces. important items may be air dropped to meet urgent demands. Medicare. It will also help the formation commander to prepare a checklist of actions. The unconventional forces shall depend on local resources for their food. Shelter. Mutual understanding. repair and transportation. Logistics Cell. Repair and Transportation. Arms. The logistics staff at the Army Headquarters must work out the overall requirement. There is sufficient stock of small arms mainly rifles available with the Army and the police to arm the unarmed segment of the unconventional force. try to capture arms and ammunition from the enemy. Small arms. 42. The unconventional forces Headquarters at the respective district headquarters shall have its in built logistics cell with required number of men and staff who will be responsible for organizing logistics support for the unconventional forces in coordination with the Army and local authority. Conventional logistics support system which relies on central bases and well established lines of communications will be unable to provide necessary support to the unconventional forces operation behind enemy lines. Logistics Support 40. particularly riverine transportation will be quite effective. Formation logistics staff is to work out requirement for each Thana and make arrangements to place these stocks at the selected bordering Thanas only on declaration of emergency according to the operational plan. Such exercise will help to identify the training requirements. Medicare.
Operating -81% (1) (2) (3) (4) b. a deliberate study on this subject can save lot of money in this aspect. This money can be used to modernise and improve the operational effectiveness of the Army. similarly reduced. Can be reduced. Can be c. anti9 Study Period Conducted by 71 Infantry Brigade 16 RESTRICTED . We have not gone into the details of this but we will highlight a few aspects to suggest that defence budget can be better managed. there are enough possibilities to reduce unnecessary expenditure and save money. b. POL and office 16% MES project/ minor works 18% Miscellaneous 7% 44. We must also think of having defence production infrastructure of our ownmay be in a small scale. Modernisation of army is possible only if operation cost can be reduced. Clothing and Miscellaneous expenditure. Pay and allowances. Suggested reserve policy and detailed study on budgetary issues can reduce the operating cost in following heads: a. Some of their jobs can be taken over by civil contractors. At least we should be able to produce small arms. This is a key element that comes in. when force structure and defence policy is discussed. 45. the army will not have to construct any more SM barrack. d. clothing. One SM barrack costs about 2. This is just one example. For example. We hope that. Some of these can be raised during war. Logistic/Tail Arms Versus Fighting Arms. Less pension liability with five years voluntary service to be introduced.RESTRICTED 43. Food. if bunk system can be introduced in the barracks. We believe that it is very much possible. A study on defence budget shows:9 a. Development/ procurement -19% Pay and allowances 40% Food. This can be substantially reduced. 46.2 crore taka to construct. The present expenditure is 18%. Military Engineering Service (MES). It is time to think the relevance of having heavy tail arms in peacetime. With deliberate and dynamic planning and a commitment in it.
The strategic CG of our potential adversary is likely to be it's continuous peoples support for the war effort. 17 RESTRICTED . Conclusion 47. It was difficult to divide the war into phases. During war we should not fall short of these basic fighting equipment. victory can be achieved by tilting enemy's CG and at the same time protecting that of own. CMO is undertaken by regular force wearing uniform and subjected to Geneva Convention. The concept thus fulfilled the requirement of fighting concept of weaker country of ours to face the superior adversary. They also established a remarkable logistics system and intelligence network to support the unconventional warfare. Large-scale casualty and engagement of enemy key installations. By following the technique of changing war they created fluidity in the battlefield.RESTRICTED tank weapons and their ammunition. Spontaneous participation of common mass was the main strength of Vietminh. UCMO is conducted by forces other than conventional force devoid of uniform and Geneva Convention. Total Peoples’ War involves both conventional and unconventional forces and fight only unconventional method of operation utilizing and mobilising national resources. The forces live off the mass population and conduct clandestine operation. During the final offensive unconventional warfare operated extensively throughout the length and breadth of the battlefield. The Afghans evolved their own technique of fighting and conducted a protracted war against Soviet Army. It involves the population right form the beginning in the conduct of war. The main objective of blending CMO and UCMO is to compensate the numerical superiority and lack of modern fighting asset of our conventional forces against our potential adversary. There are number of examples in the military history where a weaker nation had fought against its adversary blending conventional and unconventional warfare. HVTs within enemy's territory will denude the hostile government's popular support. It envisages that CMO alone can not effectively assail enemy's CG neither it can effectively protect our own CG. Contrary. The unconventional war conducted by the Mukhtibahini shaped the battlefield for Allied offensive. Participation of common mass and national will was the center of gravity during our liberation war. Our CG may be identified as the capital Dhaka and popular support. Similarly Guerilla war is conducted by both military and para military forces in enemy held or controlled area. 48. The Afghan war was another example of people’s war against occupation army. On the other hand it will show success of our people right from beginning and entails confidence in them. Hence blending CMO and UCMO will help us achieving victory by tilting enemy's CG while protecting own CG. Thereby it validates Clausewitz paradoxical trinity for prosecution of war. In Vietnam War the Vietminh blended the conventional and unconventional war from beginning to end. Rather all phases of war were fought simultaneously. As per modern fighting concept. 49.
4/5 years of voluntary service for soldiers are to be introduced and suitable lot to be retained in the army. medicine. Unlike conventional forces. There are two types of chain of command suggested for unconventional forces. The necessity of para commando brigade in unconventional warfare can not be overruled. a coordinated joint exercise comprising conventional.RESTRICTED 50. civil administration and bureaucrats should be planned once in every three years. This organised force structure can easily offer strong resistance against enemy from the outset of hostility. The chain of command is the pre-requisite to make any operation successful. However. shelter and transportation for operating behind enemy line. tank hunting. This operation mainly involves raid. the supply of different commodities should be based at district. Reservist policy is of prime importance in order to maintain large forces and employ them at the time of urgency. hideout and sabotage. All available means of communication are to be integrated while blending CMO and UCMO to achieve a desired goal. Incorporation of scout platoon and changes of weapon and equipment in infantry battalion would facilitate unconventional warfare. The second option provides only limited strength while maintaining reasonable conventional forces. Compulsory basic military training for ablebodied citizen particularly college going students of each district should be organized annually for specific duration. But the overwhelming populous support and their integration can easily form strong unconventional forces. three options are suggested to organize unconventional forces. To make the future operation successful. Training of unconventional forces by regular forces is the key element for organizing a strong force. Similarly second line forces should also train their personnel on unconventional warfare during peacetime. These forces should make all out effort to live on captured items of enemy. The division commander will act as the highest commander to direct and coordinate both conventional and unconventional forces within formation AOR. The third option only provides command setup to organize and train unconventional forces keeping strong regular forces intact. The replenishment should be done through indigenous line of communication like cross country and riverine route. Logistics is the lifeline for maintaining steady fighting capability of unconventional forces. Similarly the unconventional forces also require proper chain of command for smooth conduct of operation. therefore. Our Armed Forces lack the required forces and equipment to meet the challenges of a powerful adversary. The first option demands handsome amount of troops to embody powerful unconventional forces. Rest of them is to be kept in reservist list for 10 years after retirement. ambush. 51. Bangladesh Airforce and Navy should also include unconventional training in their routine training activities for a specific duration including retired personnel. unconventional. In extreme emergency items should be air-dropped for unconventional forces. 18 RESTRICTED . patrol. thanas and unions level by logistic staff. it needs to be raised in our army. Considering the availability of regular troops. 52. one option is to have unconventional forces conducting operation within their respective AOR under the command and control of regular forces commander at all levels. The second option entails unconventional forces operating independently within their allotted AOR under separate leadership. These forces would mainly depend on local resources for food. From the operational point of view the second option appears to be more viable.
58. MES and other construction work would increase budget for operation. Mirpur Cantonment Major November 2001 Distribution : Sponsor Directing Staff Defence Services Command and Staff College Mirpur Cantonment Dhaka S M SALAHUDDIN ISLAM Group Leader 19 RESTRICTED . Only the other important recommendations will be covered here.RESTRICTED Economy is the backbone of proper execution of operation by either conventional or unconventional forces. Compulsory military/training may be introduced for all able-bodied male personnel who are seeking higher education after intermediate both at home and abroad or taking public or private jobs. mines and explosives for the irregular forces to be made available to the Army. This training will be organized annually for a duration of 4 weeks in each district headquarters by each area Headquarters of the Army. The operational budget needs to be maintained at any cost. Provision of small arms. anti-tank ammunition and other war material to maintain fighting efficiency at any cost. 54. We should produce small arms. 53. 55. All the three Services and the paramilitary forces should carry out regular training on unconventional operations for their personnel. They should also organize refresher training on the same annually for their retired personnel. This training may be open to all civilian volunteers as well. 57. Enactment of laws should be made in favour of people's participation in war efforts. The lack of which would slow down the fighting spirit of any fighting formation. Recommendations. Most of the recommendations regarding the options of force and command structure of the unconventional forces are already stated earlier. 56. Training for civilian volunteers to be organised in each district Headquarters with the declaration of emergency till the end of the war under the arrangement of respective Infantry Division. Reduction of budget in pay and allowance.
See References of Vietnam War . John Fullerton. Lieutenant Colonel Alauddin Mohammad Abdul Wadud.1994. 1991. Division Level Study Period conducted by 71 Infantry Brigade Division Level Study Period conducted by 19 Infantry Division. Martin Van Creveld. US Army Command and General Staff Colege. Bangladesh Army Journal. 1991 3. 1992. AHQ Project Study Papers/Div Level Study Papers 10. 22nd Issue. 13th Issue. The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan. 12. Singh. Major General Lachhman. Brassey’s (UK). USA (Retd). Major Md Fayzul. Training Manual 8. Race to the Swift. Brassey’s. London.Lancers Publishers pvt ltd. December 1988. 9. 1993. Fort Leavenworth. Volume One. BP. Journal 6. June 1994. 1983. 5. Bangladesh Army Journal. Dehra Dun : Natraj Publishers. " Bangladesh : A Geo-political Study". 7. Haque. AHQ Project Study –1998 by 46 Independent Infantry Brigade. Lieutenant General Philip B. 2. Davidson. New Delhi. Simpkin. FM 100-5 Operations. Draft GSTP Operation of War. Richard E. Victory in Bangladesh. Military Research Project on Blending Unconventional Warfare by Major Anwarul Momen. Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd. “ Military Theory and Doctrine-An Analysis of Their Relationship”. 11. Hong Kong. Conventional and 13. 4.psc.Thoughts on Twenty First Century Warfare. 20 RESTRICTED . kansas.RESTRICTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Books 1. On Future War.
Major Rajiv Kumar Singh.(Student Officer of 26th Army Staff Course) 15. India Army. (Student Officer of 26th Army Staff Course) 21 RESTRICTED .RESTRICTED Discussions/Other Documents 14. US Army . Major Kane.