The Failure of Risk Assessment

Prepared By: Robert W. Beggs, CISSP CISA Presented To: ISSA Quebec 18 April 2007 Slide 1
© DigitalDefence, Inc. 2007 (www.digitaldefence.ca)

Introduction • Robert Beggs, CISSP, CISA
- 15+ years experience in Information Security - Military, biomedical research, consulting, financial services background

• DigitalDefence
- 9-1-1 for Data Security Incidents - Focus on providing incident management services (prevent, detect, respond) - Professional services, managed services, training - Home of the Canadian Information Security Newsletter
Slide 2
© DigitalDefence, Inc. 2007 (www.digitaldefence.ca)

Why Do Risk Management ?

Slide 3
© DigitalDefence, Inc. 2007 (www.digitaldefence.ca)

2007 (www. Inc.Audits and Controls are Part of Risk Management • Auditing is a good business practice (TRUE) • “Appropriate controls” enhance security and privacy of data and other corporate resources (TRUE) • The part of the auditing process that drives selection of appropriate controls is the risk assessment (TRUE) • Most people have complete a risk assessment of some type (TRUE) • The risk assessment was effective at achieving its goal (?????) Slide 4 © DigitalDefence.ca) .digitaldefence.

It’s designed to stress the network .Sample Risk Assessment Project • Network security testing (“penetration test”) is commonly used as part of the risk assessment process • But.Probe for weak points. vulnerabilities .Leaves the tester with very sensitive data • Have you ever assessed the risks … of assessing the risks? Slide 5 © DigitalDefence. it is a risky project itself! .digitaldefence.ca) . Inc. 2007 (www.

Minimizes interaction with production systems Slide 6 © DigitalDefence.Identifies and quantifies vulnerabilities .Enormous cool factor – it’s just like a hacker! .May include some elements of a vulnerability assessment … or not • Most vendors deliver a “vulnerability assessment” .ca) .digitaldefence.The Failure of Network Security Testing • Most clients ask for a “penetration test” . 2007 (www. Inc.

learning Slide 7 © DigitalDefence.Reasons for the Failure … • Not sure what “testing” really means • Testing has nothing to do with business strategy or goals • Assets are not defined. Inc.ca) . 2007 (www.digitaldefence. inventoried • Threats not understood • Relationship of assets to business not clear (no BIA) • Testing is not managed as end-to-end project • Don’t close the loop! • No sharing of information.

ca) .Summary … • Security testing of applications. or effectively applying. Inc.digitaldefence.The separation of technology from business .Not understanding. the testing process • In short – no risk assessment Slide 8 © DigitalDefence. systems and networks can be considered a failure in 50 – 70% of all cases • Failures are not a result of technical incompetence • Failures are a result of: . 2007 (www.

2007 (www. organized. Inc.ca) .A Quick Word on the Threat … • Computer crime is profitable. favours skilled attackers • Targeted attacks: specific tools against specific organizations • Insider threat • Business competitors • Mobile device attacks • 61.digitaldefence.000+ cops in Canada – 245 specialize in cybercrime • Most organizations are unprepared Slide 9 © DigitalDefence.

no. Inc. 53-60. pp. December 1981. 12.digitaldefence." IEEE Spectrum. (from Morgan.) Slide 10 © DigitalDefence. M. vol. "Choosing and Managing Technology-Induced Risk. 2007 (www.Risk – “Classical Assessment” Optimal risk as determined by minimum sum of cost of risk abatement and expected losses from risk. 18.ca) . Granger.

digitaldefence.Risk •Risk = the possibility of suffering an event that leads to harm or danger •Personal •Emotional Slide 11 © DigitalDefence. 2007 (www. Inc.ca) .

2007 (www. Inc.digitaldefence.ca) . We All See Risk Differently … Slide 12 © DigitalDefence.In Short.

Inc. 2007 (www.digitaldefence.The Risk Management Process Definition of assets Threat assessment Risk assessment Recommendations / Controls Slide 13 © DigitalDefence.ca) .

2007 (www.cse-cst.ca/tutorials/english/section2/m2/images/mod2_2_4.Risk Management Process http://www.gc.ca) Slide 14 .digitaldefence.htm © DigitalDefence. Inc.

FRAP Slide 15 © DigitalDefence. Inc. TRA -OCTAVE. 2007 (www.ca) .digitaldefence. OCTAVE-S -NIST SP800-30 •Qualitative -Microsoft Security Assessment Tool -Facilitated Risk Assessment Process.Risk Management Methodologies •Quantitative -Threat Risk Assessment.

ca) . 2007 (www. things that can be counted • Goal: independently objective numeric values for estimates of impact. bottom line Slide 16 © DigitalDefence.Quantitative Risk Assessments • Deals with quanta – numbers. safeguard effectiveness and cost.digitaldefence. Inc. threat frequency. and probability • Powerful aid to decision making • Uses independent and objective metrics • Can be directly linked to budgetary dollars.

ca) .digitaldefence.Threat Risk Assessment. 2007 (www. TRA: Step 1 Slide 17 © DigitalDefence. Inc.

rcmpgrc.digitaldefence. Inc.ca/tsb/pubs/it_sec/g2001_e.pdf © DigitalDefence. TRA.ca) Slide 18 .Threat Risk Assessment. Step 2 • More details from: http://www.gc. 2007 (www.

A Quantitative TRA is Painful! •Requires knowledge. risk management skills •Time x Effort = Cost •Not really as “precise” as numbers indicate -What is the value of an asset? -What is the frequency for an event? •Numbers can be misused by management Slide 19 © DigitalDefence.digitaldefence.ca) . Inc. 2007 (www.

ca) .1 “The use of a standard TRA process provides a common yardstick regardless of how a department or an organizational unit implements security” Slide 20 © DigitalDefence.TRAs + Citizenship and Immigration . Inc.digitaldefence. 2007 (www.

ca) .TRAs + Citizenship and Immigration . Inc.2 Slide 21 © DigitalDefence. 2007 (www.digitaldefence.

Inc.ca/domino/reports.TRAs in the Federal Government • 12 % of departments had not yet identified their critical systems • 16 % of departments did not have an IT security policy • For those departments that did have one.digitaldefence.oag-bvg.html Slide 22 © DigitalDefence.gc.ca) .nsf/html/20050201ce. 33 % indicated that it had not been formally approved by management • 35 % of departments did not have a policy requiring threat and risk assessments http://www. 2007 (www.

g.: low. 2007 (www. can involve non-technical and non-security staff • Fast + easy = “cost effective” (cheap!) Slide 23 © DigitalDefence. Inc. high) • Fast • Easy.ca) . medium.Qualitative Risk Assessments • Provides for expert opinions and “gut feelings” • Individuals use risk scales to assign grades to events (e.digitaldefence.

NET 2. requires MS .Microsoft Security Assessment Tool • Directed questionnaire • Create a business profile • Answer a series of questions regarding risks.6 MB.0 Slide 24 © DigitalDefence. complete report.digitaldefence.ca) . and a summary report (if you allowed anonymous upload of your own data) • Free download • 4. controls • Creates summary report. Inc. 2007 (www.

Inc. let’s see it in action … DEMO Slide 25 © DigitalDefence.Microsoft Security Assessment Tool • Now.digitaldefence.ca) . 2007 (www.

knowledge • Controls are identified • Selection and implementation of controls driven by business requirements Slide 26 © DigitalDefence.ca) . FRAP • Team-based approach. 2007 (www.digitaldefence. Inc. includes business managers and support groups • Team brainstorms threats.Facilitated Risk Assessment Process. vulnerabilities and resultant negative impacts • Impacts are directly tied to business operations • Threats and risks are prioritized based on team’s experience.

ca) . avoids “group think” • Determine Impact and Likelihood • Plot values.FRAP • Create a team • Brainstorm vulnerabilities and risks .Everyone writes them down on a piece of paper.digitaldefence. Inc. 2007 (www. calculate an estimated “Residue of Exposure” (impact x likelihood) • Use Residue of Exposure to prioritize risks • DEMO Slide 27 © DigitalDefence.

Results are directly tied to business strategy. Inc. don’t have to take a lot of time away from work • Easy to understand • Inexpensive • Management is integral to the process . more likely to buy-in to recommendations Slide 28 © DigitalDefence.ca) . 2007 (www.digitaldefence.Advantages of Qualitative Assessment • Fast.If management is involved. goals • Increased “sale-ability” .

2007 (www.Disadvantages of Qualitative Processes •Subjective •No monetary basis for the value of information assets •No basis for cost/benefit analysis of risk mitigation measures •Provides no means for objectively tracking risk management performance Slide 29 © DigitalDefence.digitaldefence. Inc.ca) .

ca) . Manage Them • Ignore the risk altogether • Accept the risk. but do nothing (“it’s the cost of doing business”) • Accept.digitaldefence. Inc. 2007 (www.After Identifying Risks. implement controls to minimize to acceptable level for your business (residual risk) • Transfer the risk (insurance) Slide 30 © DigitalDefence.

Wireless .1 • Understand the threat . wireless WAN.Where does “the network” begin or end? Is there a perimeter? .g.Internal attackers are frequently ignored .Introduction of new technologies – VoIP.: peer-to-peer) Slide 31 © DigitalDefence.digitaldefence. new software (e.Applying Risk Management to Security Testing . 2007 (www.Mobile devices – how to manage appropriate use .Extensive focus on “external” threats. Inc. particularly organized crime and automated attacks .ca) .

or device – secure the data .2 • Adopt a data-centric security model . during processing.ca) .Don’t secure the technology. Inc.Up-to-date .Business Impact Assessment Slide 32 © DigitalDefence. focus on protecting data at rest.Applying Risk Management to Security Testing .digitaldefence. and transmission … not the “network” • Identify and inventory assets that require protection .Living document • Tie assets to business .Where is the data – map the data flow to fully identify what must be tested. 2007 (www.

share the learning internally Slide 33 © DigitalDefence. Inc. 2007 (www.Applying Risk Management to Security Testing .3 • Conduct risk assessment using quantitative or qualitative process • Validate risk assessment with appropriate security testing • Manage the results of the security testing (as discrete event.ca) . or as part of overall risk management process) • Learn from the process.digitaldefence.

Inc.to • Free monthly meetings. technical defences • Dan Kaminsky.sector. portal site • SecTor (November.digitaldefence.ca • Technical attacks.References • Toronto Area Security Klatch. Ira Winkler … Slide 34 © DigitalDefence.task.ca) . Johnny Long. TASK • www. 2007) • www. 2007 (www.

cert.asp?printable=True) Slide 35 © DigitalDefence.rcmp-grc.ca/pubs_pol/dcgpubs/RiskManagement/guidePR_e. Canada.pdf) • Microsoft Security Assessment Tool (https://www.org/octave/) • RCMP.securityguidance.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30. OCTAVE (http://www. Inc.ca) .pdf) • Treasury Board Secretariat. Guide to Threat and Risk Assessment.References • CERT. Security Risk Management Guide (http://www. G2-001 (http://www. 2007 (www.tbssct.mspx) • NIST.com/) • Microsoft. Integrated Risk Management Implementation Guide (http://www.microsoft.nist.ca/tsb/pubs/it_sec/g2-001_e. SP800-30: Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems (http://csrc.com/technet/security/guidance/complianceandpoli cies/secrisk/default.digitaldefence.gc.

2007 (www.ca) .digitaldefence. Inc.Contact Slide 36 © DigitalDefence.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful