Academic Freedom

ARTICLE
By Ester A. Garcia, Ph.D.
President and Chief Academic Officer

Academic Freedom and Academic Responsibility

IN THE PHILIPPINES, ACADEMIC FREEDOM is enshrined in the Constitution. The

1987 Constitution states that “academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of
higher learning.” This was reiterated in the law creating the Commission on Higher
Education, R.A. 7722, which states that “The State shall likewise ensure and protect
academic freedom and shall promote its exercise and observance…” Furthermore, the
same law states that “Nothing in this Act shall be construed as limiting the academic
freedom of universities and colleges.” In the University of the East, respect for academic
freedom is enunciated in its mission statement and elaborated upon in the Faculty
Manual.

The history of academic freedom has rather ancient origins, but for our purposes in this
paper we will start with the academic freedom definition set forth by the American
Association of University Professors in 1940 and the definition of institutional academic
freedom by Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court. Most of the
Philippine jurisprudence on the matter has upheld these two definitions. The first
focuses mainly on the teacher and includes the following:

A. “The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in publication of the results
subject to the adequate performance of his other academic duties, but research for
pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the
institution.”

B. “The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he
should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no
relation to his subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other
aims should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.”
C. “The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and
an officer of an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen he should
be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the
community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and educational officer,
he should remember that the public may judge his institution and his profession by his
utterances. Hence, he should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate
restraint, should show respect for the opinion of others, and should make every effort to
indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.”

The second definition emphasizes institutional academic freedom, which means that a
university can “determine for itself on academic grounds: (1) who will teach; (2) what
may be taught; (3) how it should be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.”

The topic of academic freedom and the corresponding Philippine jurisprudence had
been thoroughly discussed in this University by eminent scholars and jurists such as
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Professor Onofre D. Corpuz, Fr. Rolando De La Rosa and
Dean Pacifico A. Agabin. Their papers were published in the UE Research Bulletin, Vol.
2, 2000.

The main focus of this paper will be on academic responsibility and faculty ethics and
will be based mainly on a paper I presented several years ago during a conference on
Academic Freedom and Academic Responsibility. A former law faculty member of UE,
Prof. Delfin Ll. Batacan, published an article on a similar topic in the UE Law Journal,
Vol. 14, Nos. 1-4, 1971.

Academic freedom is not a basic human right. It is a freedom that is bestowed upon the
academe by the larger community in the belief that society, in the long run, would
benefit from a free and disinterested search for truth in the university and freedom to
pass on the truth so uncovered to future generations. In enjoying this freedom, the
academic community takes on the concomitant responsibility to ensure that it meets the
expectations of society. While the academic community asks for protection from outside
interference, it cannot allow its members to hinder the university from carrying out its
mission effectively to its students and the larger community.

A faculty member has specific responsibilities to the students, his professional

colleagues and the institution where he is employed. The following lists some of the
duties and responsibilities of a faculty member in relation to these groups and the
community at large.
• Teachers have the freedom to teach as they see fit and to rate their students
accordingly. However, they have to make sure that the legitimate pedagogical goals of
the course are met. The students should be informed of the course content, the
evaluation criteria and the grading system. A syllabus given at the start of the term
should contain all, if not most, of the information required. Teachers should teach their
courses properly. If the course requires 54 hours, the teachers should provide 54 hours
of quality teaching. There is no excuse for absenteeism and tardiness. A teacher should
go to class prepared consistent with the standards of the discipline. Moreover, he
should teach the students all the topics that the course calls for instead of offering an
abbreviated version of the course, thus shortchanging the student who is paying his
salary. A faculty member should evaluate the work of his students promptly and
conscientiously. In giving grades, he must be fair and use only academic criteria for
evaluating his students.

• A teacher’s special relationship with his students should be respected at all times,
never exploited for private gain. Because of his influential role in the classroom, he
should not take advantage of his position by repeatedly introducing topics that are
outside the scope of the course and not within his professional competence. As the
students’ intellectual guide, a professor must serve as an example of utmost integrity,
impeccable scholarship and high standard of professionalism.

• Inasmuch as academic freedom grants the faculty member the right to pursue
research in any topic or field, then he should be a true and competent researcher by
developing and maintaining his expertise. He should be continually updated with the
developments in the field. He has to exercise that competence through public lectures,
discussions and publications whereby he will be appraised as a professional.

• Related to the previous item is the responsibility to maintain an impeccable integrity in

all his scholarly activities. Spurred by the need to publish as a requirement for tenure or
promotion and other incentives, some academicians commit outright intellectual fraud. A
professor must acknowledge his academic debts by citing his sources. If he is working
with his colleagues or students in his research projects, their contribution should be
properly acknowledged. He must not falsify data or selectively report data with deceitful
intent. Neither should he misappropriate the ideas of others.

• As a member of a self-governing academic community, a professor must observe at all

times civility, courtesy, objectivity and fair play in dealing with his colleagues. This does
not mean muting criticisms and disagreements, for it is the duty of a scholar to criticize
or dissent and to call for revisions where, in his honest opinion, such are called for.
Many among us, however, are not known for our objectivity. We give and take criticisms
very personally and sometimes our peer review process is a failure. I know of at least
one case where faculty members in a department, in trying to protect their turf, gang up
on new applicants who may in fact be better than them, to ensure that the applicants
are not appointed.

• Faculty members have the responsibility to participate in the governance of the

university. It is the faculty’s responsibility to participate intelligently and with sobriety in
discussions relating to university policies and academic programs. Once a consensus is
reached, all should follow said decision while reserving the right to criticize it and seek
revisions to it.

• If a faculty member is connected with business and professional interests outside the
university, he should ensure that such activities do not conflict with his responsibilities to
the university, which should have first priority. Because of the need for further
professional advancement or to meet some pressing financial needs, a sweeping
prohibition for such outside activities would not be advisable. But they certainly should
not be pursued to the extent of jeopardizing the interest of the university. Moreover, the
Commission on Higher Education permits such activities within prescribed limits.

In calling for academic freedom, faculty members are essentially asking society, which
pays for the upkeep of academic institutions, to trust their judgment. In return, faculty
members must convince society that they are worthy of that trust. The faculty’s visible
and scrupulous efforts to live up to their responsibilities and duties as outlined above
would be the clearest statement from the faculty that, indeed, they are worthy of that
trust.
Case 1
NON VS. DAMES [185 SCRA 523; G.R. NO. 89317; 20 MAY 1990]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet,

Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year
1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the
preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the
pleadings.

Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the
school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse
its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that
petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent
college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester
of school year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny
admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to
require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose
activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students,
therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and
discipline.

Issue: Whether or Not the students’ right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.

Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by
the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction.
However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of
Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in
class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others.
Case 2
Ateneo de Manila University vs Judge Ignacio Capulong
222 SCRA 644 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Academic Freedom – Power of
School to Dismiss Erring Students

On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila

Legis conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died as
a result thereof and one was hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution
dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found seven students
guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then president
of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the expulsion of the seven students.
However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the
students’ petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse
its decision and reinstate the said students.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order
dismissing such students pursuant to its rules.

HELD: Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students
and therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do not deserve to claim
such a venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute longer for they may
forseeably cast a malevolent influence on students currently enrolled as well as those
who come after them. This is academic freedom on the part of the school which
includes:

a. freedom to determine who may teach;

b. freedom to determine what may be taught;
c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;
d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Case 1
Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION
106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959

FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their
schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the
conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called
for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary
of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied.

2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO
No. 8.

3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional

DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to
determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the
complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly
devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any
religious ceremony.

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony
must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a
follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and
misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given
to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot
mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws,
rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute
on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or
refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted.
Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they
chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public
education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more.
According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to
comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend
public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol
of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and
national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession
of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for;
that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to
promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance
of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not
violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion;
that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and
school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to
attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag
ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school
they were attending.
Case 2
Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition
against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized
by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as
authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the
benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the
respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the
purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the
government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance,
thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and
State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its
influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the
aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations.’
Case 3
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals : The Power of the State to Review and Classify
(Censor) Religious Television Shows

In Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, several pre-taped episodes
of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC)
were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for
Moving Pictures and Television (now Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s
controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC
ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV
programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA
ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV
program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of
“Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against
another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and
contrary to good customs.”

Petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court. The issues resolved were: (1) Does
respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?; and (2) Assuming
it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited
the airing of petitioner’s religious program?

The ruling of the Court and the separate opinions

Justice Puno, with whom Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Francisco and Torres
fully concurred, wrote the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice Narvasa concurred in the
result. Justice Panganiban filed a separate concurring opinion, joining the majority in
upholding the review power of the respondent Board, but limiting the grant of the
petition only because the respondent Board failed to justify its conclusion, using the
proper standards, that the subject tapes offended another religion.
Justice Padilla wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. He joined the majority in
granting the petition and lifting the ban against the showing of petitioner’s TV programs,
but dissented from the majority’s holding that upheld respondent Board’s power to
censor petitioner’s religious TV programs. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza wrote a
separate opinion, holding Sec. 3(b) of P.D. No. 1986, which gives to the Board limited
time for review, to be valid, while finding Sec. 3(c), under which the Board acted in this
case in censoring petitioner's materials, to be, on its face and as applied,
unconstitutional.

Justice Melo filed his concurring and dissenting opinion, also agreeing with the grant of
the petition and the lifting of the ban against the showing of the subject TV programs,
but disagreeing with the upholding of the respondent Board's power to review
petitioner’s religious TV programs. Justice Vitug wrote a separate opinion dismissing the
petition and sustaining altogether both the respondent Board's review and classification
power and its action in X-rating the subject TV programs. Finally, Justice Kapunan, with
whom Justice Hermosisima joined, wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion,
concurring in reversing the action of the respondent Board, but disagreeing with the
majority in sustaining the review power of the respondent Board. [NOTE: Justice
Bellosillo was on leave.]
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

Case 1
Chavez Vs Gonzales
G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice;
and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.

Facts : Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes
where the parties to the conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004
elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Ignacio
Bunye (Bunye) held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before
the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations between a
woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo
but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been "spliced" to make it
appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano. On 11 June 2005, the NTC
issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes
is a "cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations" issued to them.5 On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the
broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP), to dispel fears
of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing
commitment to press freedom

Issue : WON the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005
constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression

Held : When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only
four categories of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security. All other
expression is not subject to prior restrain Expression not subject to prior restraint is
protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior restraint on
protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression
means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship Prior restraint on
expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the
expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based restraint. If the prior
restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral
even if it burdens expression The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is
a content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes.
The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful
misrepresentation," and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the
restraint is content-based The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression
because it does not fall under any of the four existing categories of unprotected
expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a
political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly
improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting
in the last presidential elections. The content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the
sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a
protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. Public discussion on the
credibility of the electoral process is one of the highest political expressions of any
electorate, and thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever there is a hierarchy of
protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank. The rule,
which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on
protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional.
Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not,
endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by
respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and
publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State. The alleged violation
of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on the
airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the enactment of
any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of expression. The
only exceptions to this rule are the four recognized categories of unprotected
expression. However, the content of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these
categories of unprotected expression.
Case 2
GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]
Facts:
The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.The
main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, - proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of
the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of
the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present
Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as
nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each
province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, - calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution,
the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative
district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of
November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, -proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be
amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to
become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting
their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June
17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the
Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for
approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14,
1967.

Issue:
Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the
Constitution.

Held:
In as much as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act
4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two
(2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied,
without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may
not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity
of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the
reasons are obvious:
(1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and
(2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar
as the public is concerned.

"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof."

Article XV of the Constitution provides:

. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the

Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may
propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of
the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification.

From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long
as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats
as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the
Convention.