AC No. 4017. September 29, 1999 failed the standards of his noble profession.
As we have stated in Resurrecion
GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC.,
complainant, vs. ATTY. PRIMO R. NALDOZA, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own.—“x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of]
the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The
standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court
in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that
which courts assume in trying criminal cases.” Administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The burden of proof for
these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt
is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly
preponderant evidence” is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution
will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and
circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.
Same; Same; Evidence; A finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.—It should
be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily
result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In
the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability against the respondent
will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before
this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the
administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and
civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the
disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.
Same; Same; Same; Lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.— Juxtaposed to the
complainant’s evidence, the bare denials of respondent cannot overturn the
IBP’s findings that he has indeed presented a false receipt to conceal his
misappropriation of his client’s money. We agree with the IBP that “it is
unbelievable that the complainant in the person of Rogelio Gatchalian, being
a layman as he is without any knowledge in the procedure of filing a case
before the Supreme Court, could spuriously weave such documents which are
denied by the respondent.” In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly
v. Sayson: “[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity
in a manner beyond reproach.”
Same; Same; Same; The Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a
lawyer for not remitting to his client the amount he had received pursuant to
an execution.—Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he
demanded money from his client for a bogus reason, misappropriated the
same, and then issued a fake receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag v. Lumaya,
the Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to
his client the amount he had received pursuant to an execution, viz.: “[E]ven
as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former client, the
records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of
P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of the canons
of professional responsibility.”
Same; Same; Same; Same.—In Obia v. Catimbang, we meted out the
same penalty to a lawyer who had misappropriated the money entrusted to
him: “The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney. These acts are noted with
disapproval by the Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Such misconduct
discredits the legal profession.” Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not
only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a
reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to
falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he
does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Malpractice and Gross
Misconduct in Office.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Nelson C. Epino for complainant.
Primo R. Naldoza for and in his own behalf.
PER CURIAM:
On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions TalentsPool, Inc., filed before this
Court a Petition for disbarment against Attorney Primo R. Naldoza. The
precursor of this Petition was the action of respondent, as counsel for
complainant, appealing a Decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA). In relation to the appeal, complainant asserts that respondent
should be disbarred for the following acts:
1.Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and
executory
2.Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five US
dollars (US$2,555) from complainant, allegedly for “cash bond” in
the appealed cas
3.Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act.1
In his Answer,2 respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an
appeal. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainant who insisted
on appealing the case in order to delay the execution of the POEA Decision.3He
also controverts complainant’s allegation that he asked for a cash bond and
that he issued the fake receipt.
In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, this Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The pertinent portions of the Complaint were summarized by the IBP in
this wise:
“Under its petition, complainant alleges that the respondent was given the
task to defend the interest of the complainant corporation in POEA Case No.
8888-06-468, entitled Olano, et al.
versus Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., et al.; that when the said
case was resolved in favor of the complainant therein on October 5, 1992, the
respondent Atty. Naldoza knowing fully well that the said decision had already
become final and unappealable[,] through malpractice in [an] apparent desire
to collect or to ‘bleed’ his client of several thousand pesos of attorney’s fees,
convinced the complainant to appeal the case before the Supreme Court.
Thus, on December 14, 1992, the respondent filed with the Supreme Court a
Petition for Review which was docketed as G.R. No. 107984 and that two (2)
days thereafter misrepresented to the complainant corporation that the
complainant ha[d] to pay, which it did, [a] ‘Cash Bond’ in UNITED STATES
DOLLAR amounting to TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S.
$2,555.00) to the Supreme Court in order that the said appealed case could
be heard or acted upon by the Supreme Court. The said amount was given to
the respondent.
“x x x [S]ubsequently the complainant corporation came to know that the
fees to be paid to the Supreme Court consist[ed] only of nominal filing and
docket fees for such kind of appeal but in order to cover up respondent’s
misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza presented complainant a fake xerox copy of
an alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00.
“Subsequent verification from the Supreme Court made by the complainant
corporation revealed that the said receipt issued by the treasurer’s office of
the Supreme Court x x x [was] spurious, meaning a fake receipt. The said
verification revealed that what was only paid by the respondent to the
Supreme Court was the amount of P622.00 as shown by the enumerated legal
fees of the Supreme Court Docket-Receiving Section showing the handwritten
name of the respondent for purpose of showing that the said computation
was requested by and addressed to the respondent.”5 (citations omitted)
Meanwhile, a criminal case6 for estafa based on the same facts was filed
against herein respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared
civilly liable in the amount of US $2,555.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion
to Dismiss on July 22, 1996, on the ground that he had already been acquitted
in the criminal case for estafa. Complainant opposed the Motion.7
On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP Board of Governors’
Resolution, which approved the investigating commissioner’s report8 and
recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year. In his Report, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel Jose justified
his recommendation in this manner:
“x x x [R]espondent fails to rebut the position of the complainant that the
signature [on the receipt for the amount of $2,555.00] was his. Hence,
respondent anchors his position on a mere denial that it is not his signature.
Likewise, the respondent denies the check voucher dated December 15, 1992,
and the encircled signature of the respondent, which x x x according to him
is falsified and irregular. No evidence, however, was presented by the
respondent that his signature therein was falsified and irregular. [As to the
altered Supreme Court Official Receipt, the respondent denied] that he ha[d]
anything to do with it because it was the complainant who signed the Petition
for Review and tried to explain that his name appear[ed] to be the payee
because he [was] the counsel of record of the petitioner. But while it is true
that the affiant in the said Petition for Review [was] Mr. Rogelio C. Gatchalian,
president of the complainant company, the respondent does not deny that he
signed the said petition as counsel of the petitioner corporation and that he
was actually the one who prepared the same and the notary public before
whom the affiant subscribed and [swore] as the one who ‘caused the
preparation’ of the said petition.
“The legal form (Exh. “C”) of the legal fees for the Petition for Review re G.R.
107984 was denied by the respondent because according to him he was never
given a chance to cross-examine the person who issued the [certification] x x
x. However, respondent does not deny that he is the person referred to by
the handwritten name P.R. Naldoza who paid the legal fees of P622.00.
“In addition to the said respondent’s Formal Offer of Evidence, he
submitted to this Commission as his most important piece of evidence the
Decision of acquittal in Criminal Case No. 93-8748 entitled ‘People of the
Philippines versus Primo R. Naldoza,’ the copy of which Decision is appended
to his Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss dated July 22, 1996 praying for
the dismissal of the present administrative case in view of his being
exonerated in the said criminal case based on the same facts and
evidence.”9(citations omitted)
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondent’s contention that his acquittal
in the companion criminal case should result in the dismissal of this
administrative complaint. The commissioner emphasized that the criminal
case for estafa10 was completely different from the proceedings before him;
acquittal in the former did not exonerate respondent in the latter.11 He further
noted that the RTC Decision itself hinted at the administrative liability of
respondent, since it found him civilly liable to herein complainant for $2,555.1
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be
sanctioned. However, the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the
gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
At the outset, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss should be denied. In that Motion, he maintains that he should be
cleared of administrative liability, because he has been acquitted of estafa
which involved the same facts. He argues that the issue involved there was
“the very same issue litigated in this case,”13 and that his exoneration “was a
result of a full blown trial on the merits of this case.”14
In a similar case, we have said:
“x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar
to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of
x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in
an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal
cases.”
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. 16 They
are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; 17in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, “clearly preponderant evidence” is all that is
required.18Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings.19
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative
case.20 Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability
against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in
the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer.21The basic
premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to
remember the Court’s ruling in In re Almacen,22 which we quote:
“x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but
are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
[They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their]
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who
by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. x x x” (emphasis ours)
We shall now discuss seriatim the specific charges against respondent.
 First. Complainant alleges that respondent appealed the POEA Decision,
despite knowing that it had already become final and executory. The IBP
investigating commissioner had no explicit finding on this point. Rogelio C.
Gatchalian testified that during the pendency of the appeal, his company had
received from the POEA a Writ of Execution which led him to the conclusion
that “they [had] lost the case before the Supreme Court.”23 This, however,
does not substantiate the charge.
Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal.
Neither has there been any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the
ground that the POEA Decision had become final and executory. Worse, there
has been no evidence that respondent knew that the case was unappealable.
Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was
dismissed for petitioner’s failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible
duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand on.
Second. Be that as it may, we agree with the IBP that respondent obtained
from complainant the amount of $2,555, on the false representation that it
was needed for the appeal before this Court. According to Gatchalian,
respondent explained that the amount would “cover all the expenses to be
incurred in the Petition for Review with the Supreme Court and which amount
also will answer for the payment as sort of deposit so that if our case is lost,
the money will be given or paid to the complainant in that case so that our
deposit with the bank would not be garnished.” 25 Corroborating Gatchalian's
testimony, Edna Deles declared that respondent received the amount on the
representation that it “would be paid to the Supreme Court in connection with
the Olano case.”26
The defense of denial proffered by respondent is not convincing. Quite
the contrary, when he paid P10,000 and issued a check to complainant as his
“moral obligation,” he indirectly admitted the charge. Normally, this is not the
actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another.
This is an admission of misconduct.27 In his Answer submitted to this Court,
he declared:
“(8) That I have no knowledge, information or belief as to truthfulness of the
allegation of the Petitioner, on his allegation no. 8 and no. 9, the truth being
that in all the cases and assignments made by the Petitioner to me, I was
made to report to him personally and to his Board of Directors the progress
of the cases both orally and in writing. I even [went] to the extent of paying
him P10,000.00 as my moral obligation only to find after accounting that he
still owes me P180,000.00 as attorney’s fee [to] which I am entitled under
rule 130 of the rules of court sec. 24, and under sec. 37 of the above cited
rules, I have the right to apply the funds received from Gatchalian in
satisfaction of my claim for Professional Services, otherwise known as
Attorney’s Lien, as shown in my Service Billings and Statement of
Accounts.”28 (emphasis ours)
Contrary to respondent’s claim, the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his
attorney’s lien. He demanded the money from his client on the pretext that it
was needed for the Petition before the Supreme Court, but he actually
converted it to his personal gain. This act clearly constitutes
malpractice.29 The claim that respondent merely applied his lien over the
funds of his client is just an afterthought, the accounting being made after the
fact. It is settled that the conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him is
a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in
the legal profession.30
Third. In an effort to conceal his misappropriation of the money entrusted
to him, respondent gave complainant a photocopy of a receipt purportedly
showing that the Supreme Court had received the sum of $2,555 from him.
Again, the testimonies of Gatchalian31 and Deles32 were equally clear on this
point. After respondent had presented the false receipt, Gatchalian learned
that no such payment was made. Ms. Araceli Bayuga of the Supreme Court
Cash Collection and Disbursement Division issued a certification that
respondent had paid the amount of P622 only, not $2,555. In fact, the records
of the said case33 contain no indication at all that the Court has required the
payment of the latter sum, or that it has been paid at all.
Juxtaposed to the complainant’s evidence, the bare denials of respondent
cannot overturn the IBP’s findings that he has indeed presented a false receipt
to conceal his misappropriation of his client’s money. We agree with the IBP
that “it is unbelievable that the complainant in the person of Rogelio
Gatchalian, being a layman as he is without any knowledge in the procedure
of filing a case before the Supreme Court, could spuriously weave such
documents which are denied by the respondent.”34
In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly failed the standards of
his noble profession. As we have stated in Resurrecion v. Sayson:35
“[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings
with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach.”
Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded money from
his client for a bogus reason, misappropriated the same, and then issued a
fake receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag v. Lumaya,36 the Court ordered the
indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the amount he instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. (In re: Al
had received pursuant to an execution, viz.: Argosino, 270 SCRA 26 [1997])

“[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former A lawyer violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as his oath
client, the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the as an attorney, when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting to him
amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of all her money, and later refused to return the same despite demand.
the canons of professional responsibility.” (Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 [1998])

In Obia v. Catimbang,37 we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer who had
misappropriated the money entrusted to him:
“The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney. These acts are noted with disapproval by
the Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law. Such misconduct discredits the legal
profession.”

Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the
money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part
with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this
Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being
a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the

Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and
to inform all courts of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quis
umbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ.,concur.

Respondent lawyer disbarred.

Notes.—The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained

the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing, and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. (Alawi vs. Alauya, 268 SCRA
628 [1997])

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the
strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are
 Adm. Case No. 3249. November 29, 1989.*
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURENCE D.
CORDOVA, respondent.
Attorneys; Disbarment and Suspension; Requirement of good moral
character persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good
standing; Case at bar.—After a review of the record, we agree with the
findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that the most recent
reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be
real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of
the respondent carried out in public and necessarily adversely reflecting upon
him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant
for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is
possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and
dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary,
that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar
in good standing.
Same; Same; Same; Respondent Cordova maintained for about 2 years
an adulterous relationship with a married woman, not his wife; He flaunted
his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage.—In the instant case,
respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous
relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general
public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he,
rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of
“reform”, respondent took up again with another woman not his wife,
cohabiting with her, and bringing along his young daughter to live with them.
Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of
marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the
community at large.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Immorality.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr.
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her
husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a
member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline
(“Commission”), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to
submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant
complied and submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised
and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband
charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was
declared in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen
(15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to submit before
the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the
telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting of the 16 December 1988
hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The
hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times—
first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings
never took place as complainant failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never
moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices of the hearings
scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the
Commission that she and her husband had already “reconciled”. In an order
dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties (respondent and
complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and explanation of the
telegraphic message and required them to file a formal motion to dismiss the
complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded and
nothing was heard from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the
Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report
reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts
of immorality in the uture will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him
to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and
out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived
somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his
family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur
with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her
own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and
Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent
Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the
name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which
to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same
time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an
apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from
Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or
cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family.
In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila
necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent
Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant’s) children in their
conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress,
one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along
with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complainant,
compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter
by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their
children.
Notwithstanding respondent’s promises to reform, he continued to live
with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support
to his legitimate family.
Finally, the Commission received a telegram message apparently from
complainant, stating that complainant and respon dent had been reconciled
with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP
Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between complainant
and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe
away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in
public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar
and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership
in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character.
That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a
continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States,
held that “the continued possession x x x of a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law x x x
and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do
not specify that as a ground for disbarment.”2 It is important to note that the
lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good
moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of
an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member
of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which
makes “a mockery of the inviolable social institution or
marriage.”3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed and won
the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited with
him and bore him a son. Because respondent’s conduct in Mortel was
particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his own
son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage
he had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena,4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a
member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly
disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the
complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a
number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2)
years an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full
view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate
family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After
a brief period of “reform” respondent took up again with another woman not
his wife, cohabiting with her, and bringing along his young daughter to live
with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental
institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter
and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court. The Court
will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof
satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to
provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the
immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño
-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., On leave.
 Respondent suspended from the practice of law indefinitely.

Note.—Failure of a lawyer to live up to the high standards of the law

profession his name in Roll of Attorneys be stricken out. (Diaz vs. Gerong, 141
SCRA 46.)
 A.C. No. 6593. February 4, 2010.*
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANGEL E.
GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, respondents.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Disbarment; Laws dealing with double
jeopardy or with procedure—such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of
affidavits of desistance by the complainant—do not apply in the determination
of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.—Laws
dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure—such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or
the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant—do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the
Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves
service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for
the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like
criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not
a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her
own; effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and
to retain membership in the legal profession; Admission to the bar does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any
question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he
became a lawyer.—From this perspective, it is not important that the acts
complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the
practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, 398 SCRA 658 (2003)
the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question
concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became
a lawyer. Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption
that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be
refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission
to the Bar.
Same; Same; Same; The disciplinary authority of the Court over the
members of the Bar recognized to be merely incidental to the Court’s exclusive
power to admit applicants to the practice of law.— Article VIII Section 5(5) of
the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the
members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court’s exclusive power to
admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this
constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which
expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to
take before admission to the practice of law.
Same; Same; Same; Immoral conduct involves acts that are wilful,
flagrant or shameless and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community.—Immoral conduct
involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or
when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community’s sense of decency. We make these distinctions as the
supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral,
not simply immoral, conduct.
Same; Same; Same; Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard
of legal proficiency but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.—The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to
the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the
ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are
at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation.
Needless to state, those whose conduct—both public and private—fail this
scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly
penalized.
Same; Same; Same; Purposes of the Requirement of Good Moral
Character.—Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds
to objective reality. To have good moral character, a person must have the
personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a
good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the
estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is
known. The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes,
namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers;
(3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves. Each purpose is as important as the other.
Same; Same; Same; Court finds Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as her behaviour demeaned
the dignity of and discredited the legal profession.—We find that Atty. Valencia
violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession.
She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality. In Barrientos v. Daarol, 218 SCRA 30 (1993), we held
that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia
failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and
after she became a member of the legal profession.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Z.P. Reyes Law Office for complainant.
E.C. Tutaan Law Office for respondents.
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit1 and a supplemental
affidavit2 for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty.
Garrido) and Atty. Romana P. Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross
immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our
marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila
which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6)
children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza,
Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed
Garrido;
3. x x x x
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one
of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later
part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the
former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere
joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that
sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the
Robinson’s Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman
and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia
and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x
5. x x x x
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure
the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the
said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and
Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime
on 1978.
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined
Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give
us our needed financial support to the prejudice of our children who
stopped schooling because of financial constraints.
xxxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as
alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out
of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch
reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x”
In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea’s charges and
imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal
wife, as he was already married to Constancia David ( Constancia) when he
married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia
parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and
understood his “bad boy” image before she married him in 1962. As he and
Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido
met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided
his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial
difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give
financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six
(6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college
except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course. 4 Atty.
Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced
her profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he
became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage
contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his
children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress
of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty.
Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to
the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia
claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and
Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea
kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this
silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house
for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper
party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were
favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had
no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings6 in
view of the criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them,
and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to
nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
denied this motion for lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the complaints after the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty.
Garrido and Maelotisea “an absolute nullity.” Since Maelotisea was never the
legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality
to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they
had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido
was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before
his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied
this motion.9
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she
filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly
relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.10 The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion.11
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
(Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and
Recommendation for the respondents’ disbarment.12 The Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved
and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No.
XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:
“x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited
conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar,
Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However,
the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit of the complaint.”
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated
January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition
for review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any
gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the
offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian
considerations to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life,
and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life
notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A.
Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline,
filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the
penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is
very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility
for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of
nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other
administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
 The Court’s Ruling
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the
IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its
recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure—such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription
of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant—do not
apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar.13 We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason
to depart from this ruling.14 First, admission to the practice of law is a
component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public.15 The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice
law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State
may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a
disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the
charge is wholly his or her own;16 effectively, his or her participation is that of
a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral
acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the
qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of
law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession.
From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were
committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we
explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,17 the possession of good moral character is
both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission
to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the
bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint,
into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent
before he became a lawyer.18 Admission to the practice only creates the
rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become
a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary
even after admission to the Bar.19
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the
disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely
incidental to the Court’s exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of
law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or
violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of
desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a
complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits
of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are
now available for the Court’s examination and consideration, and their merits
are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea
filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had
submitted, but solely because of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern
for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty.
Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community.20 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. 21 We make
these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct
requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.22
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers
who contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple
marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that
the respondent’s pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of
marriage and family—institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing
of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and
well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward
respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant
while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the
respondent’s act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by
the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,25 where
the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of
his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable
lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular,
he made a mockery of marriage—a sacred institution that demands respect
and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the
admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct
that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or
unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law
studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships
with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study
of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are
not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in
truth he was already married to Constancia.26 This was a misrepresentation
given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea
notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open
admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia
while his two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration
the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took
as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with
Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia
who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty.
Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering
that his marriage with Maelotisea was not “valid.”
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty.
Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union
entered into while another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously
cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were
both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a
period of more than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea.
Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not
an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This
was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past
actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present
complaint was filed against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal
profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s
oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the
time of his admission to the Bar.27 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s
oath,28 Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,29 and Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,30 all of which commonly require him to
obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of
bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with
Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his
petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he “shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct”; Canon 7 of the
same Code, which demands that “[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession”; Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that, “[a] lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation
and that he would set a good example in promoting obedience to the
Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater
to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal
profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of
convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims
and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted
relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the
standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals
and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 31 Lawyers
are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also
of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.32 Lawyers are at all
times subject to the watchful public eye and community
approbation.33Needless to state, those whose conduct—both public and
private—fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, accordingly penalized.34
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that
Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances for
gross immorality:
“x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March
27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford them exemption from
sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to
admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct
was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life.
Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not
relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of
the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that
respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of
them as members of the Bar.”35
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to
objective reality.36 To have good moral character, a person must have the
personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a
good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the
estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is
known.37 The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes,
namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers;
(3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.38 Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer,
Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to
Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty.
Garrido’s admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him
proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for
about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she
married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second
marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she
lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person
possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by
another with respect to the latter’s family problems, would not aggravate the
situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice,
thereby effectively alienating the other person’s feelings and affection from
his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with
Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from
a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required
her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a married man, in fact a
twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should
have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her
liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away
from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse
than this, because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido
even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This
scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s expressed belief that Atty.
Garrido’s second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to
marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and
was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s
marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this
expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong,
not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired before the
declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s second marriage, we can only call
this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino
tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty.
Valencia’s claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed
her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the
celebration of their marriage in Hongkong39 leads us to the opposite
conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of
avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that
Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using
the surname of her “husband.” Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind
that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with
his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did
not mind at all “sharing” her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a
clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia’s perverse sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty.
Valencia’s actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to
approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances,
was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also
unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty.
Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship
with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already
mentioned, Atty. Valencia’s conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting
to the point of shocking the community’s sense of decency; while she
professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build
a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing
her husband with the woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and
discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to
adhere unwaver ingly to the highest standards of morality. 40 In Barrientos v.
Daarol,41 we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was
admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a
privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar
can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer’s lack of
the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this
privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this
reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are
aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and
only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.42
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the
present case is one of them. The records show the parties’ pattern of grave
and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional
fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties
imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido’s plea for compassion and his
act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot
grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules
of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under
other circumstances are commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencia’s behavior over a long period of time
unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which
we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal
profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice
into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but
a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed
into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for
gross immorality, violation of the Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law
for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty.
Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido
and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J), Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura,
Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama,
Jr. and Perez, JJ., concur.
 A.C. No. 6313. September 7, 2006.*
CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DIOSDADO M.
RONGCAL, respondent.
Attorneys; Good moral character is a continuing condition in the
privilege of law practice; One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar
is that an applicant must possess good moral character, which requirement
persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.—
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing
condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the
loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. As officers of the
court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also
be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community. The Court has held that to
justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to
be reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act
that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.
Same; Disbarment; While it has been held in disbarment cases that the
mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient
to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with
respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.—While it is has been held
in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such
illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgrace-ful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and
the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
Same; Same; By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of
immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.—By his
own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is
whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring com-
plainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to
satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the
affirmative, we find otherwise.
Attorney-Client Relationship; It was not unlawful for respondent to
assist his client in entering into settlement with Aquino after explaining all
available options to her, since the law encourages amicable settlement of
disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.—It was not unlawful for
respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after
explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable
settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might
otherwise be filed in court. Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for
sure that Aquino is the father of complainant’s daughter as paternity remains
to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a
settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she
experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to
whether respondent also acted as Aquino’s counsel in the settlement of the
case. Again, we only have complainant’s bare allegations that cannot be
considered evidence. Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the
absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.
Evidence; The Court cannot and should not rule on mere conjec-tures.—
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain
a finding in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not
rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the
parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions
through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the
evidence, a more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose
favor the substantial evidence level tilts.
Administrative Law; Suffice it to state that an administrative case
against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or criminal
action—hence it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private
grievance.—Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a lawyer
is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action. It is an
investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal
profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to
protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and
women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. As such, it involves
no private interest and affords no redress for private grievance. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyer’s
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.
Same; Attorneys; Respondent’s express of remorse over his in-
discretion and the fact of ending the brief illicit relationship with complainant,
the Court takes such signs as not a character of such severe depravity and
thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor .—We note that
from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed
remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship
years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of such severe
depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor.
Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of
P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome
of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of
the client.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Arias Law Office for complainant.
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not
tawdry, from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for.
Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of
disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those
cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.1
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed
by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal
(respondent). A classic case of “he said, she said,” the parties’ conflicting
versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented.
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December
2000 when she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino
(“Aquino”), the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her
former class mate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to
respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a
demand letter2 in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance
of the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus no less than
P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her
congenital heart ailment.
At around this point, by complainant’s own admission, she and respondent
started having a sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events
began after respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the
demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving
her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances towards
complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the
promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as
counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino. Complainant
acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by
respondent’s claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage
had already been annulled.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an
Affidavit of Disclaimer3 (“Affidavit”) categorically stating that even as Aquino
was denoted as the father in the birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in
truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the contents of the
Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the document
meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree to
give her daughter medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly
assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case
against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public document.
Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document
“without even taking a glance at it.”5
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that
Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated
checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning
them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check6 in the amount
of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon
thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her
that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political
campaign as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member
of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that in spite of their sexual relationship and the
fact that respondent kept part of the money intended for her daughter, he
still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the
case against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino,
Jr. (“Atty. Tolentino”).
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal
case for child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal
case was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue
of a compromise agreement.7 It was only when said cases were filed that she
finally understood the import of the Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he
personally prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which
obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her
problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had
already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his
sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him
as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial
need at that time, respondent was able to appropriate for himself money that
rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent’s
aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as
the Code of Professional Responsibility (“Code”), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule
1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.8 Hence, she filed the instant
complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him,
complainant needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned action for
support. Complainant’s former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales,
who was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits
sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the
child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He
learned that because of Aquino’s infidelity, his relationship with his wife was
strained so that in order to settle things the spouses were willing to give
complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect
that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice.
He then advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical
mindset. He also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case.
After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-ofcourt
settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount,
negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino
allegedly offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within four
months.
Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to rediscount the checks at
an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was
P188,000.00. Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily
signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to
by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document and strongly
refutes her allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and
that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the
actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college graduate
and a former bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise
vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement proceeds. When
complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the
sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could
keep the remaining P38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint.
Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorney’s fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with
complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty
promises. According to him, it was more of a “chemistry of (sic) two
consensual (sic) adults,”11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies
that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already annulled.
Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that
complainant very well knew he was married when they commenced what was
to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met through
his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of
hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his residence where she was
actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently, complainant called his residence
several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to
respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he
was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of
the Association of Barangay Council (“ABC”) and as such was an ex
officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for
the position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his
locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital
status especially that she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from
his house and even actively helped him in his campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino
was being worked out, complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City
because a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months
passed and the promised job never came so that she had to return to Lubao,
Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was about to be
exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance
and urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While
respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her “to look for the right
man”12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also
informed her that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one
who prepared and notarized the Affi-davit. He, however, referred her to Atty.
Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with
complainant, but still he agreed to give her monthly financial assistance of
P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to meet and have
communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003,
complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June when her
alleged fiancé from the United States would have arrived. Respondent agreed.
In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for the last time, which
he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of
respondent. She told him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari
store she was putting up and she wanted him to relay the message to
respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared
complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court
should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was being
blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she
filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (“IBP”) for investigation, report and recommendation.13 After the
parties submitted their respective position papers and supporting documents,
the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommenda-
tion14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties’ conflicting factual
versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of
complainant and concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code,
reporting in this wise, to wit:
“Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is
wanting in good moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation
as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges
which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities
of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and
the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the
passage of time have been compendiously described as MORAL CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to
entice complainant to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,]
respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house and gave
P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand
letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because
of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and
emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including
suspension and disbarment. x x x”15
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the
amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a
Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and “considering
Respondent’s obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and
the financial and emotional problem of his client and attempting to mislead
the Commission,”17respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for
one (1) year with a stern warning that a repe tition of similar acts will merit
severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to
complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for
Clarificatory Questioning18(“Motion”) dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a
Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March
2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving
a more detailed account of the events that transpired between him and
complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and
manipulative woman who depends on men for financial support and who
would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that the IBP based its
Resolution solely on complainant’s bare allegations that she failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for
clarificatory questioning in order to determine who between them is telling
the truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the
ground that it has no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already
been endorsed to the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from
what the IBP has recommended.
 On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an
extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act
is not “so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree” 20 in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing
condition for the enjoy ment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the
loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. 21 As officers of
the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community.22 The Court has held that
to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to
be reprehensible to a high degree.24 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act
that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual
relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it is not so with respect to
betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation
of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to
consider is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in
luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in
order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the
affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant’s allegations that she succumbed to respondent’s sexual
advances due to his promises of financial security and because of her need
for legal assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to
conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with her.
Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and
discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into
sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially
when there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical
disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her
part.29 Respondent’s numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not
necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves that he
courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the
finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her
P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her financial
dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for
financial support.
Neither does complainant’s allegation that respondent lied to her about his
marital status inspire belief. We find credence in respondent’s assertion that
it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She
herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former
classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She
admitted that she knew his residence phone number and that she had called
him there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who
even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously, she never refuted
respondent’s allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on several
occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his
campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of
his marital status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino,
who was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just
plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had known for
only a short time without verifying his background, if it were true that she
preferred “to change [her] life for the better,”30 as alleged in her complaint.
We believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established
by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.31 We are left
with the most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an
illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans any misrepresentation or
deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal
skills and moral control over her to force her to sign the clearly
disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without explaining to
her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise
acted as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant’s assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial
support from Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart
ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent
who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of
her child by signing without even reading a docu ment she knew was related
to the support case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short
sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it
before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to
her the contents of the Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She
alleged that respondent even urged her “to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino
will not give the money for Alexandra’s medical and educational support if she
will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer.”32 If her own allegation is to be
believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino
for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution
of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on whether to
sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or
that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and
simple sentences that are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable
conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion
whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing
the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the
Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a
settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law
encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of
disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover, there is no
showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainant’s
daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and
intelligently agreed to a settle ment with Aquino, she cannot later blame her
counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is bereft
of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino’s counsel in the
settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainant’s bare allegations
that cannot be considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not
enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the
presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.35
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the
money given by Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole
amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount of
P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his
fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply
ordered respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We
feel a discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually
gave in settlement of complainant’s claim for support. The parties are in
agreement that complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However,
complainant insists that she should have received more as there were two
postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned over
to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more than
P150,000.00—but only P38,000.00 more—and complainant said he could have
it and he assumed it was for his attorney’s fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there
existed two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount of
P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement for attorney’s fees to
justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on
record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant
for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where
respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he cannot recall
what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as
she did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of
money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to
sustain a finding in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should
not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of
the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions
through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the
evidence, a more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose
favor the substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand
the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainant’s prayer for respondent to be
made liable for the cost of her child’s DNA test absent proof that he
misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant’s claim for moral damages and
attorney’s fees. Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a lawyer
is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action. 36 It is an
investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal
profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to
protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest ad ministration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and
women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 37 As such, it
involves no private interest and affords no redress for private grievance.38 The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyer’s
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.39
Respondent’s misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases
where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground
of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous
marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his paramour,41 cohabited
with a married woman,42 lured an innocent woman into marriage,43 or was
found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from
the foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing
disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would
accomplish the end desired.45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo, respondent was found
to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He
therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous
nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and
desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended
him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47where respondent
judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive
evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his
conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency
of the case.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the
IBP for further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as
an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Moralesand Velasco, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal meted with P15,000.00 fine for immorality,
with stern warning against repetition of similar acts.
Notes.—Possession of a good moral character is not only prerequisite to
the admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of
law—a lawyer’s admission to the practice merely creates a rebuttable
presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer. ( Heck vs.
Santos, 423 SCRA 329 [2004])
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal but is rather an investigation by the court in the conduct of its officers.
(Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma, 438 SCRA 306 [2004])

We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had
expressed remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit
relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of
such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances
in his favor.48 Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that
a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the
outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of
funds of the client.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal

GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
 Adm. Case No. 3319. June 8, 2000.*
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Disbarment; Practice of law is a
privilege; Requisites for admission to the practice of law.—The practice of law
is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of
the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege
that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer
violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission
to the practice of law are: (a) he must be a citizen of the Philippines; (b) a
resident thereof; (c) at least twenty-one (21) years of age; (d) a person of
good moral character; (e) he must show that no charges against him involving
moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court; (f) possess the required
educational qualifications; and (g) pass the bar examinations.
Same; Same; Same; Possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice.—Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to
admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character.
More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as
a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise,
the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.
Same; Same; Same; Lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened
with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution.—Simple as the facts of the case may
sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple,
they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today
is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a
higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal
affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that
perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising
situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out
more about Carlos Ui’s personal background prior to her intimate involvement
with him.
Same; Same; Same; To warrant disciplinary action, conduct must be
“grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree .—All
these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that
her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent
believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover,
for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly
immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards.—We have held that “a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.”
Respondent’s act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and
proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral
standard of the legal profession. Complainant’s bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her
case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. This, herein complainant
miserably failed to do.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Meer, Meer & Meer for complainant.
Roco, Bunag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza for respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris
Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui,
husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our
Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City1 and as a result of their marital union,
they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all
surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out
that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in
1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street,
Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of
the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent.
Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June
1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon,
respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged,
however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant
believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out
well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship
between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in
December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child.
Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and
pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui
but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came
to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his
company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed
on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more
particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s
husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent averred that she met Carlos
Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the
knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in
Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during
one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and
they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985.3 Upon their return to Manila,
respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his
children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui
wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second
marriage before they would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Hono-lulu, Hawaii and
she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice
and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988,
respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted
that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery
of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii
sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2)
children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the
law firm5 she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be
the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui
has been communicating with her.
It is respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit
because they were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent
discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him.
Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that
he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was
respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother,
Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her
par ents’ funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages
in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant
for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment
case against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that
respondent knew perfectly well that Car-los Ui was married to complainant
and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui,
and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2)
children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar,
complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the
crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal,
docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainant’s evidence had prima facie established the existence of the “illicit
relationship” between the respondents allegedly discovered by the
complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that
respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of
1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
 It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the “relationship” of
respondents started and was discovered by com-plainant sometime in 1987
when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street,
Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued
to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later
1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the
relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by
complainant’s evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie
establish the “fact of respondent’s cohabitation in the concept of husband and
wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is
necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense
charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a
conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the
complainant’s evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and
Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support
of their respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant
complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for
the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to
the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos
Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant
filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein
she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for
submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She
alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar,
respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on
October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her
averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage11 duly certified by the State
Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department
of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui
and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October
22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant,
the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress
upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock.12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a
violation of Articles 18313 and 18414 of the Revised Penal Code, and also
contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false
allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document
are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her
unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),15 respondent
averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate
because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed
such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of
the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the
lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner
for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent
averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i)Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the
requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal
profession; and
(ii)Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent
conducted herself in an immoral manner.17
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was
the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos
Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no
reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that
of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open
in his courtship.18
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it
was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage
certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered.
Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it
appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987,
because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before
complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier
marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was
Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for
changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and
complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on
this matter.
Respondent posits that complainant’s evidence, consisting of the pictures
of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of
a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a
picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another
picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house
and the garage,19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They
have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a
photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented
during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint
filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the
Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any
immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine,
respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good
faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or
shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos
Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true
civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she
prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that
respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married
man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that
respondent’s mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and
her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where
Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager.23 It was thus highly improbable that
respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been
informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant
likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the
Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an
intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant’s Memorandum,24respondent stated that
complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her
disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of
complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact
of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew
Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made
known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline
submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by
Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does
not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human
experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents
himself to be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another
woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single
women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true
civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She
broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March
of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and
respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was
allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on
the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim
that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than
condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having
a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
x x x”
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
“A,” and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality
against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is
REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified
Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will
merit a more severe penalty.”
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right
to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar
examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of
due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics.
The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude,
are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.25 (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to
the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the
loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held—
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the
continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining
membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated
when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117
Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for “grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.” A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is “grossly immoral conduct” or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the
bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as “that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the community.” (7 C.J.S. 959).26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she
met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love
with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave
birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos
Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of
respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on
how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before.
This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are
burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to
believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a
compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in
finding out more about Carlos Ui’s personal background prior to her intimate
involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused
respondent’s suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with
Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent
admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy,
China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if
Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage
in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a
circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondent’s
allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent
was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains
that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent
believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.27 Moreover,
for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly
immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to const tute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.28
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her
Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certifi cate, with an altered or
intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.

We have held that “a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards.”29 Respondent’s act of immediately
distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies
just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
Complainant’s bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
Bellosillo (Actg. C.J., Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena,
JJ., concur.
Complaint dismissed, but respondent reprimanded for altering date on
marriage certificate and with warning against repetition of similar offense.
Note.—The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who
possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who
are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. (In Re:
Al Argosino, 270 SCRA 26 [1997])

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by

respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of
respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate
which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage
ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her
marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the
case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is
contrary to human experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an

attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal
knowledge of the facts and circum stances contained therein. In attaching
such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith
of respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest

standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing
less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as
officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris

L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.