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GARCIA v.

DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
699 SCRA 352

FACTS:

Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His
infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that
left respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid
he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her
that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she
confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to
full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence
against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders
(TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of
violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based


classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal
protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an
absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and
men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the
policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the
biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and
women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental
objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women.
The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor
of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve
such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial
scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal
protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corporation Vs. Lorenia P. De Guzman
Gr. No. 208261, December 8, 2014

FACTS:

De Guzman was hired as an Evaluation Specialist and assigned her to the Property and
Procurement Department. De Guzman accomplished a Personal History Statement
(PHS) which requires an attestation from the employee that the information stated
therein are true and correct to the best of her knowledge and belief. She indicated the she
had no relatives currently employed with PAGCOR and did not disclose that she has a
sister named Adelina P. See. In 2008, she updated her PHS reiterating her statement that
she had no relatives working in PAGCOR but this time listed Adelina as on of her siblings.

It was later found out that De Guzman had a nephew named Gerwin P. See, her sister’s
son, who worked in PAGCOR from July 26, 2001 until his resignation on September 22,
2005. Upon discovery of alleged deceit, Atty. Albert Sordan, the PAGCORs Corporate
Investigation Unit sent a notice to De Guzman of her deception or fraud in securing
employees appointment or promotion and directed her to show cause why she should not
be subjected to any disciplinary action. PAGCOR, issued a Memorandum wherein De
Guzman was found administratively liable for the charges filed against her. De Guzman
appealed her dismissal before the CSC. PAGCOR opposed the appeal.

CSC ruled in favor of De Guzman and dismissed the administrative disciplinary case
against her without prejudice to its re-filling. PAGCOR appealed to the CA and the CA
Affirmed the CSC ruling. The CA agreed with the CSC’s findings that De Guzman was
deprived of her due process as the Formal Charge and the Assailed Memorandum against
her were not issued PAGCOR but merely by its employees without any authorization.
Hence, the dismissal of the case without prejudice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the CSC’s ruling that she was deprived of her
right to due process.

HELD:

The petition is bereft with merit.

An appeal is not a matter of right but mere a statutory privilege and as such may only be
availed in the manner provided by the law and the rules. Thus a party who seeks to
exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules, otherwise the
privilege is lost. An appeal must be perfected within the reglementary period provided by
law.

In this case at bar, it is undisputed that PAGCOR was the one that appointed De Guzman
to her position. Adhering to the well-settled principle that the power to remove or to
discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested, on;y
PAGCOR has the power to discipline or remove De Guzman for any transgressions she
may have committed. However, in this instance, the formal charge as well as the Assailed
Memorandum sis not come from PAGCOR but merely from Atty. Sordan. Records are
bereft of any showing that the latter were authorized by PAGCOR thru its board of
directors to issue the aforesaid documents. As such, the formal charge was done in
violation of her right to due process, warranting the dismissal of the instant
administrative disciplinary case against her, without prejudice to its re-filling.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.