1. Objective. Objectives of the Galvanic operation were the at­ tack and occupation of the Japanese held islands of Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama, in order to deny these atolls to the Japanese and provide bases The major effort was directed for future operations of our own forces. against the island of Tarawa where a Jap airfield was located. 2. Air Force mission.1 The primary mission of the Seventh Air Force was to prevent use oi the airfields at Makin, Tarawa, Mili,Nauru, Jaluit, and Maloelap by Japanese air units prior to and during the oper­ ation.

Task Group 57.2 formed.

a. To insure maximum coordination with other participating units, designated air units of the Seventh Air Force were assigned to CTF 57, under command of COMAIRCENPAC* for operational control, and designated as Task Group 57.2. As commander, TG 57.2, the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, also commanded all land-based aircraft strike units participating in Galvanic. b. Although the land-based strike units were under operational control of the Navy, their successful participation was largely due to the planning, preparation, training, security precautions, and logistic support of the Seventh Air Force and its associated agencies. 4. Unusual problems presented. The Galvanic operation was diffi­ cult in that the entire Seventh Air Force, less certain defensive units for Oahu, was committed. Over-all plans for committment and general operations of the campaign could not be made by the Seventh Air Force staff. Therefore itwas necessary to be prepared to carry out all types of missions on extremely short notice. Support of the task group units in their forward areas required much ingenuity and specially form­ ed provisional organizations. Because of lack of adequate maintenance and supply facilities in these forward areas, detailed plans were made to meet all conceivable emergencies. Facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot, the Air Force Service Command, and mainland supply agencies were utilized to the maximum. B. ACTIVITIES OF A-l. The primary responsibility of A-l was to pro­ vide the staff and personnel necessary to support air units assigned to CTF 57 for operational control.


of provisional units.

a. The staff for CTG 57,2 was formed by selecting key person­ nel from the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrons of the Seventh Air


The Adjutant General, A-l, Force and VII Air Force Service Command, A-2, and A-3 made up the Air Force Commander's staff; the A-4 section operated under control of the Service Commander. b. Part of the service organization of the VII Air Force Service Command had to be changed from a permanently based defensive force, organized under a manning table, to a group of highly mobile units suitable for island operations in the Ellice and Gilbert Islands, The number of tactical organizations, ranging from one to three squad­ rons, that could be based on any given island determined the size of these units.

(i) On 12 August

1943, the Ist Provisional Air Service Support Squadron was formed to occupy Baker Island in the Phoenix Island group. This composite unit, set up on a manning table basis, consisted of 20 officers and 200 enlisted men selected from the various Air Force arms and services.

(2) The 2d Air Service Support Squadron was formed 21 September 1943, to occupy the Makin, Betio, and
Apamama atolls in the Gilbert Island group. This unit of 42 officers and 745 enlisted men was con­ stituted early to insure proper ground and amphibi­ ous training, as it was to follow the assault forces.

(3) The 3d Provisional Air Service Support Squadron, formed 26 September 1943 to occupy Funafuti, Nukufetau, and Nanomea atolls in the Ellice Island
group, had a strength of 43 officers and 747 en­ listed men*

(4) The Advance Headquarters

of the Seventh Air Force and the VII Air Force Service Command was consti­ tuted 21 October 1948, as indicated in paragraph B 1 a, and comprised approximately 48 officers and 140 enlisted men.

(5) Provisional Signal Air Warning units were drawn
from the Fighter Command and attached to each "ASSRCN" in numbers necessary to perform their mission. On completion of the Galvanic operation there were 28 Signal Air Warning officers and 319 enlisted men in the forward area.

(6) The 804th Engineer Battalion Aviation was contin­ uously employed during the Galvanic operation un­
til completion of the Makin airstrip.

(7) Signal construction

14 officers and


237 enlisted men, were furnished from the 443 d Signal Construction Battalion.

(8) The 809-th Medical Air Evacuation

Transport Squadron, statiored at Hickam Field and Canton Island, evacu­ ated sick and wounded*


Total troops employed



EM 3425 2697 6122

Service Total C. ACTIVITIES OF A-2. 1•
organization at ADVON. Functi ona l

627 154

An advance party from A-2, Seventh Air Force, arrived at Funafuti on 16 October 1943 wiih the responsibility of coordinating with the VII Air Force Service Command the construction of the advanced headquarters of the Seventh Air Force (ADVON). By 13 November 1943 all ADVON A-2 personnel (9 officers and 13 enlisted men) had arrived and the section was prepared to perform its functions. b. There were also 3 officers and 5 enlisted men in the Photo Interpretation Detachment which was controlled by A-2, and a Technical Crash Intelligence Team, consisting of one officer and one enlisted man, previously secured from Washington. This was the only Technical Crash Intelligence Team from the Central Pacific present immediately after Makin and Tarawa were occupied. Personnel from the Public Relations Section and the Combat and Documentary Photographic Unit, operating under A-2 control, completed the A-2 group; 2.
Intelligence planning.

a. All possible intelligence of the enemy and his capabilities was obtained and evaluated in preparation for tiie Galvanic operation. Liaison officers were sent to the South and Southwest Pacific for a period of three months to collect and return pertinent information. Much information was obtained from JICPOA. Other current intelligence was obtained from adjacent and higher commands in this and other areas. Considerable information had been obtained from long range combat and photographic missions flown at irregular intervals by the Seventh Air Force from December 1942 through October 1943, A Photo Interpretation Unit had been procured from Washington, b.
Special reports

on the Gilberts were prepared.



material and target charts of enemy objectives were prepared in advan oe by JICPOA, 64th Topographical Engineers, Objective Data Section of the Seventh Air Force, the Photo Interpretation Detachment, and A-2 of the Bomber Command, and reproduced in quantity* Terrain, weather, flying conditions to be expected, characteristics of the Pacific theater, distances, geological construction of its islands, and many oilier important items of intelligence were disseminated to combat crews. Immediately upon arrival at ADVQN a safe-hand intel­ ligence pouch service between ADVON and A-2, Rear Echelon, was es­ tablished, resulting in rapid dissemination of mission reports, photo­ graphs, and similar intelligence material.

3. Combat intelligence.

The A-2 section at ADVON maintained a War Room and fur­ Commanding General with intelligence necessary for plan­ nished the ning, and decisions as strike commander* In addition to intelligence obtained from photographs furnished by Commander, Task Group 57.3 (Search and Reconnaissance Group), considerable photo intelligence was obtained from strike aircraft of the Seventh Air Force of idiich approximately one- third were equipped with cameras* Briefing and target charts with up-to-date information of what remained to be destroyed on each particular target were furnished participating units for planning and executing missions. b* All preliminary and flash radio intelligence reports were submitted direct to COMAIRCEtJPAC (information strike commander) by island air commanders* As the camp of the Bomber Command was adjacent to the Air Force and the Force Flagship of COMAIRCBNPAC was based in the harbor at Funafuti, communications between these -three agencies were ordinarily satisfactory* Ho separate net was available to the Bomber Command and all radio communications were handled by joint communication centers; the flow of intelligence was often hin­ dered to a considerable degree by excessive traffic on available circuits*
Briefing and interrogation of our combat crews were done by Army Air Force squadron intelligence officers* The weather initially was furnished in brief reports from Navy sources to island air commanders* These forecasts were unsatisfactory and later Seventh Air Force personnel were procured to furnish this information*



Training in the use of additional navigational aids and the use of air pilot guides over long over-water flights was an abso­ lute necessity for combat crews with little experience other than that obtained in over- land flying in the Ttoited States* A supply of navigation maps and charts was procured from the Maps and accurate Charts Division, Washington, D* C*


b» Particular stress was placed on training in recognition Although sorely handicapped by lack of aircraft and surface vessels. of equipment, all personnel received adequate training. c. Combat intelligence officers were given additional train­ ing during the period that units were in training in Hawaii to include the lessons learned by the intelligence officers in the South and South­ west Pacific, of ASSRONS (Air Service Support were thoroughly trained prior to their departure from Hawaii. In addition to special lectures given these personnel, they were furnished a guide which outlined in detail their functions of furnishing current intelligence of the enemy to their commanders, supervision and execution of counter-intelligence measures, and obtaining adequate publicity for the personnel and accom* plishments of their units.

Squadrons) utilized in the Galvanic operations


Intelligence personnel



a. Planning of the Galvanic operation was done by Joint Army
Intelligence information was fairly complete
and Navy Staff personnel. on the enemy situation, showing that a number of airfields were avail­
able to the enemy in the Gilbert and Marshall groups which could cause considerable difficulty to our forces in accomplishing their mission. Striking units in sufficient strength to deny the use of these airfields to the enemy was of primary importance to success of the operation. In planning the operational role of the Seventh Air Force, based on its assigned mission of neutralization of enemy airfields within supporting range, two important factors entered the picture: First, the size of force available for such an operation and its capabilities; second, the force necessary to adequately defend Oahu during this operation. The entire planning of Galvanic had to be aggressive, bold, thorough, and based on the shortest possible time schedule. It was necessary to strike the enemy with all force available, coordinating the action of all units concerned for maximum concentration. b. Most difficult operational problem solved was the tremendous distance to enemy bases which required pinpoint navigation and offered few, if any, intermediate check points. Length of flights varied from 926 to 2,408 nautical. miles. 2.

a. The task force under the command of Major General Willis H. Hale, organized and constituted to accomplish this mission, consisted of the following units.


Headquarters Seventh Air Force, ADVON Headquarters VII Bomber Command, ADVON Headquarters 11th Bomb Group 42d Bcmb Squadron (H) 431st Bomb Squadron (H) 98th Bomb Squadron (H) 26th Bomb Squadron (H)
Headquarters 30th Bomb Group
27th Bomb Squadron (H)
38th Bomb Squadron (H)
392 dBomb Squadron (H)
531st Fighter Bomber Squadron 46th Fighter Squadron 45th Fighter Squadron

b. Iftider operational control of COMAIRCSNPAC, the Command­ ing General, Seventh Air Force, was designated Commander, Task Group 57.2, with above units as a striking force. c. C-47 and LB-30 type aircraft of the 19th Troop Carrier Squadron were utilized for air transportation of personnel and emer­ gency supplies. d. One heavy bomber squadron, four medium bomber squadrons, and seven fighter squadrons were retained in the Hawaiian Area for its defense. 3. Advanced Headquarters and operation bases.

a. Major General Willis H» Hale, Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, and staff arrived on Funafuti Island on 6 November 1943 and immediately set up advanced headquarters. Allunits participating in the operation were in place and ready to operate on schedule. b. Our operating bases

were located on the following islands Advanced Headquarters and the 42d and 431st Heavy Bomber Squadrons, 27th and 38th Heavy Bomber Squadrons.

Funafuti Funafuti

2) Nanomea Nanomea 3)
Canton Canton

4) llukufetau llukufetau 5)
Baker Baker


Heavy Bomber Squadrons. 26th and 392 d

98th Heavy Bomber Squadron. 45th Fighter Squadron and staging point for heavy bombardment aircraft based on Canton. of


These bases, with the exception of Canton, consisted


small runways approximately nut groves. 4. Training, varying problems.

6,000 feet in length, carved out of coco­
groups presented widely

Training of bombardment

a. The 11th Bomb Group had previously distinguished itself in combat in the Solomons area. Upon return to Hawaii, with the ex­ ception of a few cadre personnel, it was completely reconstituted with new personnel and airplanes. New crews had to be thoroughly trained by the Seventh Bomber Command, their instruction including the Seventh Air Force Gunnery School and additional training in navigation, bomb­ ing, and long over-water flights. b. The 30th Bomb Group which arrived on Oahu 11 October 1943 had less than six weeks in which to complete its training before leav­ This group initially, however, consisted of ing for the forward area* much more experienced crews than the rehabilitated 11th Bomb Group so that although their training period was short the combat crews were well trained for the operation. E. ACTIVITIES OF THE A-4. 1.

Joint staff arrangement.

a* The Commanding General, VII Air Force Service Command was not provided with a separate staff, but utilized the Seventh Air Force staff jointly with the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, This arrangement made the A-4 responsible for the preparation of supply plans, orders to execute the plans, and supervision over the execution of orders for both the tactical and service commands. Special staff sections of the Seventh Air Force were utilized by both commanders in the same man­ ner as the A-4. In effect, ths special staff supply sections actually executed that portion of the supply plan which was fixed as the respon­ sibility of the Seventh Air Force.

(ADVOtf) of A-4 was established at Funa­ b» A futi, operating as a joint A-4 for Headquarters Seventh Air Force and Headquarters VII Air Force Service Command, The ADVON made all neces­ sary arrangements, and prepared orders to make adjustments in the supply, evacuation, and maintenance establishments in the forward area to fur­ nish adequate air service support to meet changes in tactical disposi­ tions directed by COWAIRCENPAC. The rear echelon A-4 mounted all troops, equipment, and supplies for the forward area and advised ADVON A-4 of their routing, time of departure, vessel, and tire of arrival, then disengaged from further responsibility. Upon receipt of this information ADVON A-4 assumed responsibility for supervising the placing of troops, equipment, and supplies on positions. Close contact was maintained be­ rear 3chelon A-4 and ADVON A-4 throu^i weekly summary reports. tween





of supplies and equipment.

a. Upon receipt of information concerning Galvanic, an estimate of the situation concerning equipment and supplies was made, and requisitions covering the required maintenance supplies for 90 days, and ASSROM organizational equipment to support the Air Force Upon completion of this estimate, it was ascertained were prepared. (1) Equipment in possession of the 17th Base Headquarters that: and Air Base Squadron was of the wrong type, and inadequate to equip the ASSRONS, and (2) USAFICPA stocks were inadequate to supply both the Air Force and Garrison Force requirements. Certain items were available, but the time element precluded processing the Air Force requisitions through USAFIGPA supply depots. b. Because of this situation, all Air Force requisitions on requirements for the Galvanic operation were forwarded through Headquarters Army Air Forces to Headquarters Army Service Forces and Headquarters Air Service Command to be filled and deadlined in San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 1 October 1943. In view of the in­ dividual characteristics of each supply arm and service, the magni­ tude and unusual nature of the requisitions, and the fact that items requisitioned were not included in the General Schedule of Supplies, supply representatives from the Air Depot, Ordnance, and Signal Corps were sent to Washington to expedite shipment, make spot decisions, and coordinate the shipment of the supplies and equipment requisi­ tioned. c. Headquarters Army Service Forces, Headquarters Air Service Command, and the San Francisco Port of Embarkation made special efforts to effect delivery of the supplies and equipment at the Port of Honolulu by the deadline date. As an operational pro­ ject, Army Service Forces had assigned this shipment a project num­ ber, Honolulu port authorities expedited the movement of this material to Hickam Field, where it was broken down, re-boxed into organization equipment and maintenance supply packups, and marked by Seventh Air Force supply services, in accordance with instructions issued by the A-4.

Allocation of supplies and equipment.

a. Based on recommendations of observers who had been sent to the South and Southwest Pacific Areas for the specific purpose of observing air service operations and constant study of the type of air service unit and supplies and equipment required for atoll war­ fare, tentative Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment had been prepared for an ASSRON prior to assignment of Galvanic, In planning for Galvanic, correlation of the ASSRON with the garrison force (GARFOR), and information that adequate air transport service would be unavailable initially made several changes in the ASSRON organization, and consequently the ASSRON T/E, necessary. Other


minor changes necessitated continuous revision of the with the changing orgarization of the ASSRDI.


to keep pace

b. On Army Service Forces information that certain supplies and equipment would be unavailable before the deadline date, or were not available at all, USAFICPA depots supplied such articles as were available in their stock; these items to be returned to USAFICPA stocks on receipt of the Air Force shipmmt from Array Service Forces, In many cases the Navy or the Marines had equipment available which we were short, or which was superior in design to our own. Full cooperation was obtained from these services in exchange of equipment. 4. Location of supply, evacuation, and maintenance establishments.

Based on a recornaissance of the Ellice Islands and study of available information on the Gilbert Islands, locations of supply, evacuation, and maintenance establishments we re determined, consider­ ation being given to: (1) Disposition of tactical units, (2) Avail­ ability and disposition of service installations of the Navy and Marines, (3) Anchorage and unloading facilities, (4) Size of the island and airdrome, and availability of suitable area, and (5) Centralized loca­ tion to facilitate service to the outer area. b. To avoid initial congestion in unloading ships at destina­ tion, supplies, troops, and construction supplies for installation of maintenance establishments were echeloned by priority in movement to

c. A forward supply reserve of 30 days Class IV (E) supplies for all Air Force aircraft was established in a supply barge afloat at Funafuti, This reserve, under the control of the ADVON A-4, Head­ quarters VII Air Force Service Command, was utilized in the ElliceGilbert area as emergency supply. 5.

of organizations

and supplies.

To expedite movement, equipment and supplies were preloadEd on spotted freight cars and held awaiting call of the port regulating officer. Each car was carefully tallied to expedite checking at the pier. Ifctit Liaison Officers were assigned to coordinate movement of their organization to the port and supervise loading aboard ship.

b. An Air Force Cargo Booking Agency was established under the A-4 to book all supporting supplies not moved by COMFIFTRPHIBFOR with the GARFOR and AS3RON to Ihe destination. This agency in turn booked its cargo with the Army Port and Service Command, which issued instruc­ tions for movements of cargo to the port when bottoms were made available Organization movements were handled directly by tiie A-4 *
Tonnage requirements

for water movement

of organizations


- 107

supplies were made known to the Navy Joint Shipping Control through TJSAFICPA. Daily conferences with the Joint Shipping Control were held to secure allocation of bottoms for movement. Due to shortage of bottoms, priorities had to be established to insure that the organizations and supplies which were of the greatest importance to guarantee the success of the operational plan were placed on posi­ tion in time to accomplish their mission. This shortage of bottoms caused air echelons of tactical units to operate from airdromes in the Ellice Islands without effective support from ground echelons and air service units for a short period of time.



of airdromes.

a. Based on information available from A-2, the Air Bagi­ neer under supervision of the A-4, prepared plans for the construc­ tion of the air strip at Makin. These plans included taxiways, re­ vetments and hardstandings. The BO4th Aviation Efagineer Battalion Upon com­ was assigned to GARFOR at Makin for this construction. pletion of the air strip the Aviation Engineer Battalion was with­ drawn, to Oahu for rehabilitation. b. Assembled bulk fuel systems were furnished where re­ quired. These systems consisted of the Army Air Force bulk fuel system (canvas Mareng cell, portable pipeline and dispensing system) 1,000 barrel prefabricated steel and the Navy bulk fuel system (10 5,000 gallon tanks revetted above ground, portable pipeline, 4 ready banks, and dispensing system). systems were installed at Both Filling was accomplished from a Makin Island and interconnected. single submarine pipeline tied into a tanker anchorage 2,000 yards offshore, or from a barrel dumping stand which was actually a suc­ tion assembly to fillthe bulk storage or gasoline trucks from the drummed gasoline reserve in an emergency.



c. Air Force technical, administrative, supply, mess, and latrine construction at advanced bases was planned by the Air Engi­ neer under the supervision of A-4, the work being done by ground force engineers furnished to the Fakin CtARFOR. Construction require­ ments were set up by type unit in order to keep pace with tactical decisions effecting changes in dispositions of tactical units. Plans included blueprints of buildings required arid complete bills of mater­ ial for each type building. All construction was of the prefabricated type, designed to be torn down and moved to a new base when required. Full use was made of mainland prefabricated buildings, such as Quonset Huts and the Army Air Forces tropical type. The requirements were bound into book form and published as "Seventh Air Force Construction Requirements at Advanced Bases." d. Public utilities were planned jointly with GARFOR and ASSRON at the bases concerned. In most cases joint use of utilities was limited, as it was necessary for the AS3RON to remain independent


of GARFOR due to the probability -that it would be leap-frogged new base.


7. Mobility,, In order to effect a rapid landing and set up air service as rapidly as possible, a major effort was extended to provide To effect this, ASSROMS with the greatest degree of mobility possible. equipment and shops were procured or manufactured locally. motorized 8. Bombs and ammunition.

a. Seventh Air Force requirements for bombs and ammunition at advanced bases were planned by the Air Force Ordnance Officer under supervision of the A-4. Types of bombs and ammunition ratios recommend­ ed by VII Bomber Command and VII Fighter Command were given high consid­ eration in computing requirements. These requirements were submitted through channels to CCMAIRPAC to COMSERVFOR who was charged witii placing the bombs and ammunition on position. Bombs and ammunition approved by COMAIRPAC to accompany assault and GARFOR to positions were supplied by the Seventh Air Force and moved to position by COMFIFTHPHIBFOR. Support shipments were moved to position by COMSERVFOR. b. Full cooperation was obtained with the Navy and Marines in had the

utilizing types of bombs and ammunition which were common to all ser­ vices. A single agency, Army, Uavy, or Marine, was designated to supply
bombs and ammunition for the base where i2ie service concerned greatest concentration of tactical and service units. 9.
sanitation, and evacuation

of casualties*

a. ASSSON dispensaries were provided with a flight surgeon in charge, who was charged with assisting tactical unit flight surgeons in removal of casualties from aircraft, or in case of an emergency landing, with removal of casualties. Evacuation was direct from squadron aid stations and ASSRON dispensary to the base hospital. Upon arrival of Medical Air Evacuation Squadrons and assignment of 5 C-54 type aircraft to the Air Transport Command for primary use by the Seventh Air Force, the medical air evacuation system was placed in operation. Casualties were evacuated from the Gilbert area by Navy PB2Y type ambulance plane to Funafuti where the medical air evacuation collecting station was located and from there to the Hawaiian Area by C-54 air craft

b. ASSRON flight surgeons were charged with sanitation of the Air Force area on the bases. Provision was made to meet the unusual sanitary, insect, rodent, and disease conditions encountered in Pacific atolls by sending the necessary supplies and equipment. Extreme empha­ sis was placed on keeping latrine and refuse pits above the water line of the extremely low islands. 10.
Assignment of supply, technical

and labor troops. were required to

Troops of all supply arms and services



operate the General Air Force Assembly and Intransit Depot set up to facilitate staging and preparations for Galvanic. The Seventh Air Force had no complement of labor troops, so supply troous were with­ drawn from the Air Base Detachments in "the Hawaiian Area, whose re­ quirements fluctuated dependent upon the rate of flow of supplies As the dead­ from the intransit depot, to operate this installation. line loading date approached, the overload placed on the Air Force supply services by eighteen hour a day operation of the intransit depot caused an acute labor situation* This labor shortage was re­ lieved by disbanding the Air Base Security Battalions which were considered as a nonessential unit, and forming aviation squadrons to supply labor to meet the deadline date.

b. Sufficient aircraft repair personnel in the mechanical classifications were not available to effect the desired distribution to ASSRONS. Because this shortage might seriously effect the ASSROIT ability to produce effective aircraft repair service, it was neces­ sary to place these troopjs in ASSRCTIS located where the major repair effort would be required. 11.
Salvage of unserviceable supplies and equipment.

a. The unavoidable probability that supplies and equipment would continually be damaged and lost in the difficult amphibious operations required that every man be imbued with a personal interest in property responsibility. During the formation of ASSRCNS, supply officers were continuously reminded of the importance of supply dis­ cipline. All supply directives repeatedly emphasized the importance of supply discipline to the proper implementation of the supply plan. Both ASSRON and tactical units were very conscious of wastage before their departure from Oahu. b. Repairable and serviceable parts were salvaged from dam­ aged aircraft and other major items of equipment. Exchange of a re­ pairable or non-serviceable part for a serviceable part was directed as standing procedure for all supply arms except in emergencies. Parts not repairable by A3SRONS were returned to Oahu. 12. Captured supplies and equipment. Captured supplies and equipment which were of value for study were forwarded to Oahu. All airborne equipment was turned over to the Air Depot for careful analy sis and report. -A large quantity of enemy bombs was captured, and are now under study to determine the possibility of their use against the enemy. All captured bulk supplies were utilized in the forward area. A considerable amount of enemy av^as, low in octane rating but suitable for use as motor fuel, is available in the forward area obviating the necessity of making motor fuel shipments from Oahu. Captured enemy oil is utilized for road stabilization. 13.
New types

of equipment

and modification of standard



Standard types of equipment were constantly studied to determine modi­ fications required to better equipment for field conditions. Modifi­ cations known to be required were made prior to departure of units from Oahu. Other modifications were made in the field as necessity was de­ termined. New types of equipment were service tested in the field. Administrative order. Administrative orders covering all ad­ ministrative instructions and the supply plan applicable to Air Force units were prepared* Supplementary administrative instructions were covered in the Base Development Plan for the island concerned. F. ACTIVITIES OF THE HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT.

During the preparation for and 1. Engineering Department. throughout the actual campaign, this department modified aircraft, trained and supplied engineering personnel for the ASSRONS, and aug­ mented and supplied engineering personnel and equipment.

a. Aircraft were modified to meet special requirements of Some of the situation or better adapt -them for intended operations. these changes were standard modifications, others were original develop­ ments •

(1) Heavy bombers

50 modifications were made on each plane, initial combat and replacement, as listed on Inclosure No. 2. Rate of processing was 2-£ planes per day. 23 modifications were made on each plane, as listed on Inclosure No. 3, Rate of processing was 3 planes per day.

(2) Medium bombers

(3) Fighters

38 P-39Q1 and P-39Q5 aircraft were modified to facilitate launching from a carrier. Other changes to these planes and 12 P-40's are listEd on Inclosure No. 4. Ed« 13 A-24's were assembled No modifications were made. and test-


(4) Fighter-bombers

b. The Signal Section trained and furnished 1 officer, 1 warr­ ant officer, and 20 enlisted men; assembled and packed Signal Corps equipment and supplies for T/E plus 90-day maintenance level, totaling over 800 packing cases; and fabricated the following special equipment:

(1) 2 Invasion type combination Early-Warning and GCI
radars (Navy' SC-2 installed in AA



(2) 2 VHF sets (SCR-522 with aircraft generator) installed
in Radio Command Cars.


(3) 4 combination air-borne radio and radar test benches •

c. 5 officers and 251 enlisted men were furnished for 3 and special repair trucks were manufactured for use by the

ASSRONS. d. 3 officers and 150 enlisted men were furnished for air­ craft maintenance and repair work at the 422 dSub-Depot which was Through its operation, many airplanes of all established at Canton. types were quickly returned to combat; emergency repairs were made on others enabling them to return to the Control Depot for completion of repairs. c. Approximately 180 enlisted men, the majority from Air Force squadrons, were trained in specialized work and returned to their units, 49 Navy personnel were given training, mainly in sheet metal fabrication pertinent to aircraft modification.
ed bases

f • Civilian mechanics and supervisors were sent to advance­ on call for third and fourth echelon work.

2. Supply Department. The supply department of the Hawaiian Depot took a continuous part in all phases of the Galvanic oper­ Air ation from the inception of the earliest preparations up to and in­ cluding re-supply and procurement in the operation of the establish­ ed bases and base detachments. The following summary highlights the coordinating functions of the supply department in the combined operations of the several departments of the Hawaiian Air Depot with the Seventh Air Force and the Air Force Service Command. a. In the initial planning stages of the ASSRDNS involved, supply department selected from its personnel 7 officers suffi­ the ciently experienced to serve efficiently as Supply Officers in "the First, Second, and Third Base ASSRCNS and their detachments. During preparation of the Table of Equipment for the ASSEDNS, the entire resources of the supply department organization were devoted to ana­ lytical and fimdamental research work for the determination of oper­ ational excellence of the t/e Equipment. As the T/E was prepared locally and modifications were necessary as preparation of the T/S progressed, the supply department organization and personnel were made available day and ni^ht for complete cooperation with the Com­ manding Officer and the Supply and Engineering Officers of each ASSRCN. All decisions with respect to changes in the T/E were coordi­ nated with A-4 of the Seventh Air Force. b. The t/e necessary for the operational success of Galvanic having been determined, the supply department be^an the immediate issue and procurement planning for the many items of supply and equipment tab ulated therein. Having been advised that the Galvanic operation would


Include a definite number or quantity of tactical squadrons of certain types, the Depot Supply Officer coordinated the t/e v s and computed the amount of equipment and supplies required for the operation, for both tactical and service squadrons. All balances of Air Corps supply stock availability and obligated for the Galvanic involved were checked for operation* Emergency requisitions were instituted for those items not on hand* Balances on hand and available for issue accounted for about 84% of the Air Corps items required by the final approved t/E's for the ASSRONS and tactical squadrons. About 1,888 items, or approximately 16$ of the required items, had to be requisitioned from the mainland. Every priority procurement means was used to carry on procurement oper­ ations in accordance with the addition or deletion of articles of equip­
ment as caused by modifications to equipment. By constant initiation and close follow-up of emergency radios and requisitions over 500 items of equipment and supply were secured from the mainland to fillshortages resulting from such modifications*

(1) To maintain extreme secrecy throughout preparation for this operation, the plans and ultimate purpose of these
involved detailed supply activities were divulged to only -three individuals, the Depot Supply Officer, the Property Control Officer of the Supply Department, and the Chief Clerk of the Property Control Branch of the Supply Department* Because it was necessary to make a deadline of 8 days from tbe starting time of prepar­ ation of balance check and procurement requirements, tills portion of -the supply departments work was most difficult. The supply department organisation of the Hawaiian Air De­ pot geared itself into a day and night working program for most of its personnel over the month of October, 1943* Deadline set for the de­ livery of requisitioned equipment and supplies at the Port of Embarka­ tion on the mainland was 15 September 1943, with arrival at Honolulu set at 1 October 1943* As these Air Corps items arrived at the Port of Honolulu, they were received by the Steamship Dock Section of the Ship­ ping and Receiving Branch of the Supply Department, and transportation by trailer, truck, and railroad flat car was arranged to dear all cargo from the docks* The deadline dates for completion of packing and crat­ ing of all items were set for eaoh ASSRQN. Coordinating the hand­ ling of this equipment and supplies received from the mainland with the program of packing and crating of Air Corps equipment and supply on hand as required by the for Galvanic, presented no little difficulty. Most of these supplies from the mainland were received in one huge influx at the Honolulu docks. Storage space was, as always, a pertinent factor, making dispersion througiout the island of Oahu a necessity. This dis­ persion was so planned as to coordinate with requirements for packing and crating to make deadline dates for the Galvanic operation.




In -the classification

and preparation of equipment and sup


plies for movement, a system was magu rated and followed involving preparation of Shipping Tickets (AAF Form #104) for eaoh using ser­ vice and organization (ie; Signal Ist Base ASSRCN) listing all items of it's equipment and supplies, followed by issue and packing or crating in accordance with these shipping tickets* Preparation of these forms required 9,844 pages of Shipping Tickets (AAF Form #104) upon which were typed 87,031 items for issue, packing and crating, and took 1600 man hours*


(1) Many difficulties were encountered

during the issue, packing, and crating, since these oper­ ations were being carried out while the shipping tiokets were still in process of typing* For example, supply for the ASSBDNS was prepared for a period of ninety days and issue, packing, and crating were made up in 3 30-day increments. Considerable re-planning and much additional work was occasioned when destination or consignee point of one of these increments was changed after tfie supply department had completed fully one-half of the shipping tickets involved, both as to typing and issue and packing* Also, the tactical squad­ rons' positions were moved from time to time throughout the preparation so that by -the time the supply department was ready to prepare certain materiel for shipment the bases and their number had actually changed, resulting in the necessity of compiling the equipment and supplies going out into a different collection of supplies because of the change in tactical organization*


Speoial precautions

were taken to insure that no time

would be wasted in segregating materiel upon arrival at destination Materiel was marked for each section of each ASSROT for each oper­
ation as follows

Engineering Section Supply Section Transportation Section Defense and Operations Weather Section Medical Section.


tickets were cross referenced in their marking to the which supplies were packed, and further cross referenced boxes in to the sections for which they were made* The boxes were each mark­ ed in code for the section to which they belonged in eaoh ASSRON. Copies of idie shipping tickets applicable were not only affixed to the outside of the boxes but were placed inside the boxes along with the materiel listed thereon*

All shipping


As part of the training program for the enlisted personnel of the ASSBONS the complete facilities of the Supply School were made available to the commanding officer of each ASSRCN. Many enlisted men designated as supply personnel attended the regular classes carried on concurrently at the Supply School. The following outline of the con­ centrated course in supply procedure for enlisted personnel illustrates the thorough fundamental training given these men before their departure* CURRICULUM OF STUDY IN SUPPLY PROCEDURE I* Orientation • II Review of Organisation of Amy Air Forces lII* Sohelons of Maintenance, Supply , and Recla­ mation (Stress laid on Echelons of Technical



IV* Army Air Force Classification of Material

(T*o* 00-36-A-l)

V. Status of Army Air Force Equipment and Supplies VI. Army Air Force Stock List (T.O. 00-35A-6) VII* General Provisions for Storage of AAF Equipment and Supplies (AAF Regulation 65-19) Regulations VIII. IX. Army Air Force Vouchers X. Army Air Force Supply Forms. In addition to the Supply School classes throughout October, the supply personnel of the ASSRCNS were given practical, demonstrations and exhi­ Property Control bits by the Hawaiian Air Depot supply organization. personnel and Warehouse Branch personnel of the supply department Unit worked with the ASSRON supply enlisted personnel on practical solutions of detailed problems.
g. Ifhen the equipment and supplies required for the Galvanic operation were boxed and crated, the shipping organization of tiie sup­ ply department was held in readiness to move equipment and supplies to the port of embarkation upon call* Calls for delivery to piers for vessel loading came at all hours of the day and night, necessitating immediate organization of personnel and automotive equipment for load­ ing and transporting equipment and supplies to the port designated. Many nights, long hours of overtime were completed to meet the vessel sailing deadline* Inasmuch as the depot supply of automotive vehicles for heavy transportation is barely adequate for normal transportation requirement, a considerable strain was put upon the use of this equip­ ment* Dispersion of these vehicles, especially throughout the day when they were dispatched on sundry routine tasks, created many problems in securing immediate servioe for loading to meet sailing time.

h. The following pertinent statistics summarize the work done in preparing and moving equipment and supplies into the port of embarka­ tion for Galvanic operations


(1) 10,000 boxes of supplies were moved. (2)
6,000 drums of aviaticn gasoline were moved to Baker*

Total weigit of general equipment and supplies
moved for shipment to Baker: General Vehicles and Gasoline Total

1,884,672 pounds 185,400 2,070,072 pounds


(4) Weight for Galvanic operation in Norember 1943:

Vehicles Total
through 15 January 1944:

1,363,136 pounds B 1,058,410 2,421,546 pounds

(5) Weight for Galvanic operation 1 December 1943
General Vehicles Total

351,900 pounds 476,300 828,200 pound 8 3,599,708 pound 8 1,720,110 5,319,818 pounds

" "

(6) Total General
Grand Total

Total Vehicles

(7) Summary and Grand Total Weights:
Baker November Dec 1 Jan 15


2,070,072 pounds 2,421,546 828,200 5,319,818 pounds (*)


(*) Approximately 9,850 measurement


i. Ihe supply department gave immediate attention night and day to the earliest possible shipment of re-supply items *hich were ordered from the Depot Supply Officer on priority and routine requisitions, both on standard Air Corps forma and by radio from the several bases and base detachments in the Galvanic area of operations. Of the total requisition items thus received, for re­ supply by the supply department, 89$ were supplied by immediate


shipment to the destination* j. Lathes, shapera, grinders, milling machines, and similar equipment were furnished by the supply department to provide for third and minor fourth echelon maintenance at the advance depot* Inspection, Property Control , and Warehouse Branch personnel of long experience in handling such organisational and operational details were also dispatch­ ed to assist in putting the advance depot in proper shape to receive and set up the equipment.

G. ACTIVITIES OP IHE COMMUNICATION SECTION, 1. Planning for Joint Communications Centers » A committee was formed under the direction of the Communications Office, CinCPOA, to establish a Joint Communication System by which all communications would operate utilizing a minimum amount of equipment, number of per­ sonnel, and number of frequencies* A representative of the Seventh Air Force Signal Office was a member of this committee which drew up a policy to govern communications for the Galvanic action* Although there was not complete agreement in all matters, a compromise was made and the policy was published by CinCPOA. Based upon this policy letter (Inclosure No* 1) a communications plan was prepared with the assist­ ance of all the communications officers of the Seventh Air Force, VII Fighter Command, and the VII Bomber Command* This communications plan was published with CinCPAC operations order number 1-43, and provided for Joint Communications Centers to be established at Canton, Baker, Funafuti* Nukufetau, and Nanomea. These centers were to be manned by Army* Navy, and Marine Corps personnel, utilizing equipment already at those bases. Additional equipment was to be supplied by the Navy for Baker, and by the Army for Canton* 2* Functional organization at ADVON.

To provide personnel and equipment to carry out the Army El]ice Islands, the Third ASSBON was formed, with a communications section of 152 officers and men to be divided between the bases of Nanomea* Funafuti* and Nukufetau* Baker communication system was already organized with Army Air Force personnel of the First ASSRCN* A section of the Seventh Air Force already at Canton operating a Canton to Hickam circuit was combined with Army and Navy units al­ ready at that base to form a Joint Communications Center* Air circuits were set up to handle communications between these bases for all tacti­ cal units* The major air tactical net included Funafuti* Baker, Canton, and Tarawa. The Ellice air tactical net linked Funafuti, Nanomea, and Nukufetau. A radar telling circuit was established between all bases but was used very rarely* The Gilbert air tactical net was set up at Apamama, Tarawa, and Makin after capture of -those three bases* Primary responsibility for the establishment of the bases at Tarawa and Apamama rested with the Navy; at Makin with the Army. Secondary responsibility for air circuits at Apamama and for internal telephone trimking communi­

Air Force job in the


cations between the airfields at Tarawa was assumed by the Seventh Air Force. Air Warning and Fighter Direction for Canton, Baker, and Hakin was also the responsibility of the Seventh Air Force, The operation of the SCR- 588 at Funafuti again was under the jurisdic­ tion of the Seventh Air Force. Bomber strike and air search and re­ connaissance stations were set up at the Joint Centers at each base. Radio aids to navigation such as radio ranges and low frequency homing transmitters were installed by the AACS. Radar and YG beacons were installed by the Navy.

b. Headquarters of the Seventh Air Force and the head­ quarters of the VII Bomber Command were established adjacent to each other at Funafuti and were served by the Funafuti Joint Communica­ tions Center and were linked to the center by teletype. A single switchboard consisting of two TC-2O*s was installed to handle both headquarters telephone systems, with a field wire end cable link installed between the USS Curtis and the switchboard providing con­ tact with COMAIRC13?PAC. To coordinate the telephone system on the island of Funafuti, the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, was charged with the responsibility of coordinating the various services. At Nanomea and Nukufetau, the wire sections of the ASSRON detachments installed field cable and field wire for radio key lines and for trunk telephone circuits between headquarters on the island. The internal communications systems at Baker and Canton were already However, additional teletype circuits were added at established. Canton to expedite the delivery of messages to tactical organisations.
c. The operation of communications from November 13 to December 6 through Joint Communications Centers was not entirely This may be attributed to the fact that the idea was satisfactory. new, construction of Joint Centers was continuing throughout the action, and personnel were not accustomed to the new system of com­ munications. There were many delays in the transmission of oper­ Aggressive corrective action was taken by communi­ ational messages* cations officers of the Seventh Air Force to speed traffic in this Through these efforts time delays decreased communications system* continually but never reached a condition considered satisfactory* d. A small signal section was established at Funafuti for the supply and repair of radio and radar equipment. The Sub-Depot repair and supply depot for work which at Canton provided an advance could not be handled by the small section at Funafuti* The operation of this section was hampered by delay in constructing a suitable building for housing the repair equipment. Radio aids to navigation were also provided. A radio range was established at Funafuti, but operated intermittently to a range of about 200 miles due to technical and physical difficulties. The homer which was established at Funafuti was not satisfactory due to transmitter and antenna difficulties. These difficulties were


remedied but not in time to be of maximum use for the Galvanic action. A radio range was established at Nanomea on the 4th of December. A radio homer was operating at Baker • Radio range and radio homer wore both available at Canton. These last ranges and homers worked very satisfactorily throughout the action. YG equipment was installed at Nanomea. YH homing equipment was installed at Funafuti, Baker, and Canton. The AACS established circuits between Canton, Funafuti, Nanomea, and Baker. Ihe station at Nukufetau was not available for this action* Ihe vital communications circuits for "ttie Gilbert group were installed by December 6. f• Air Warning and Fighter Direction was provided at Canton utilizing one SCR-270, one SCR-271, and one SCR-588 with VHF communi­ cation equipment and VHF homer. At Baker an SC-2 was mounted in a searchlight trailer to provide Fighter Direction and one SCR-270-D was provided for Air Warning. V#F communication equipment and homer were provided for Fighter Direction communications. These VHF communica­ admirably and operated in an excellent manner. tions worked On Novem­ ber 30 the 45th Fighter Squadron moved from Baker to Nanomea and it was necessary for the Seventh Air Force to establish VHF homer and VHF equipment at Nanomea for this squadron, since the Argus unit at this base was not equipped for VHF operation. At Makin two SC-2's with associated VHF equipment went in with the attacking troops and one was operative 20 November. One SCR-270-D was operative 28 November and reporting to Ihe SC-2. Ihe complete VHF SCS-3 system, the second SCR­ 270-D, and the Air Defense Command Post were operative at a later date. H. LESSONS LEADED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. 1. Personnel. Air Service Support Squadrons were not furnished sufficient labor troops to perform nan-technical duties, resulting in highly trained technical personnel being employed as laborers on docks and barges, ration details and sanitary details during initial phase of operations. Labor troops are being assigned to ASSRCNS, to be released when no longer required. 2.


a. As ADVON moves forward, the A-2 section, ADVON, with its entire physical equipment, should be set up and ready to operate on arrival of A-2 personnel, to eliminate difficulties of setting up camp and carrying on intelligence operations simultaneously. Action is be­ ing taken to insure that, if at all possible, complete duplicate A-2 physical equipment is forwarded in advance to each new ADVON head­ quarters. b. It is essential that an estimate of the enemy air order (1) of battle be furnished to lower units for the following reasons: loading may be prescribed (if estimates indicate So that proper bcmb strong concentration of enemy aircraft on the ground at a particular


target, specific types of bombs and fuses are required); (2) Number and types of enemy aircraft expected at each specific target deter­ mines the size and type of formation that our commander will pres­ cribe, the altitude of attack, and the tactics utilized; (3) So that crews will be particularly alert when, new types of enemy aircraft are expected over a particular target; and (4) Reliable estimates of enemy air order of battle at the specific and alternate targets build up morale of combat crews*

(1) It was impossible at ADVON to furnish lower units
with this information on the enemy air order of battle because of two factors: (1) Failure on the part of COMAIRCENPAC » after repeated requests, to furnish information necessary to make a fairly re­ liable estimate as to the enemy air order of battle; and (2) poor facilities for rapid dissemination of known information. Proper security measures can be taken to permit furnishing the enemy air order of battle by radio at least to group commanders. c. Number of photo interpretation officers was insufficient to adequately furnish flash photo intelligence* Action is being taken to furnish VII Bomber Command with a team of photo interpretors in addition to placing on detached service with each photo laboratory unit at least one photo interpretation officer* d* Routine air transport service is not always satisfactory for delivery of photos and routine intelligence reports* It is plann­ ed that the Bomber Command, Fighter Command, and groups be furnished appropriate liaison aircraft* An urgent need existed for a radio intelligence unit in the* ADVON area similar to (but on a smaller scale) the one at Pearl Harbor; since the unit at Pearl Harbor, which covers land, sea, and air, cannot furnish desired intelligence information as timely and as completely as a unit at ADVON concentrating only on intelligence essential for decision by the strike commander of land based aircraft* A unit of this type has since been allocated to this theater*

3. Planning and operations


An advance detail should precede the main unit and estab­ the necessary operating agencies and construct the unit camp site* lish Air echelons reached their operating bases in advance of their ground echelons which necessitated the use of combat crews to set up the camp* Corrective action will be taken in future movements. b* Due to the extremely long flying distances to the targets, a definite policy regarding the total number of missions to be flown by each combat crew is essential. Rest periods after a certain number


of missions 4.

is also necessary.


policy has been placed in effect.

Service units and supply.

a. ASSRON detachments are not required at each base and are not properly organized to provide an effective degree of air service. One or two tactical squadrons operating from an airdrome are self suf­ ficient providing there is an ASSRON in the area to provide third eche­ lon repair &ud supply service on call or requisition. Future ASSRONS dispatched to the forward area will be complete units, assigned an air service area in which they will be responsible for all air service. This method of operation introduces the following additional require­

(1) Tactical units should be provided with reefers, mobile Air Force repair units, and additional power

and water distillation units to increase their selfsufficiency when operating on a base away from an Tactical units based on island airdromes ASSRCN inhere there is no ASSRON will be made as self-suf­ ficient as possible by issuing each unit this Class IV equipment. Tactical units will request supplies and repair service direct from the ASSRON charged with air service in the area.


(2) ASSRCNS should be assigned transport aircraft to
effect priority deliveries of supplies and repair personnel to airdromes within the ASSRCN service area, to facilitate immediate temporary repairs on economically repairable aircraft so that such planes can be flown to the main base for completion of re­ pairs. ASSRONS are being assigned transport aircraft for this purpose. b. The method of marking supply shipments for the forward area and identification at destination was excellent; the advance copies of shipping tickets effectively facilitating the identifi­ cation of a box in which a specific item of supply was located* Recommended that this method be continued. c. Initial maintenance stocks should be shipped in 30-day , increments until ihe supply is built up to the authorized level, to alleviate the initial congestion upon landing, reduce initial ship­ ping requirements, facilitate rapid and orderly establishment of sup­ ply dumps, and release units from loading details for the establish­ ment of camps, maintenance, and supply installations. This change has been made. d. The rapid and unpredictable tactical development in the Central Pacific Area requires maximum mobility in the movement of


aircraft spares (Class IV (E)) to meet changes in dispositions of tactioal aircraft. When these supplies are land-based, it is prac­ tically impossible to effect movement to a new position in time to be of value to the tactical units before the next move* These main­ tenance supplies should be kept afloat in barges as much as possible, with a working level of 10 to 30 -days supply for all aircraft based in the ASS RON service area land based in the ASSRON supply, and a 60-day level maintained in the barges* Instructions have been issued to maintain 10-days Class IV (£) supplies ashore and 60- days afloat for all aircraft within the forward area. Hie barge supply will make issues to all ASSRONS in the forward area*

(1) Although the barge supply system was not establish­

ed in sufficient time and was inadequately equipped to be of effective value in Galvanic, it was ascer­ tained that to properly implement the barge supply system, the following features are necessary: (1) One barge for each type of bombardment aircraft and one barge for all types of figiter aircraft oper­ ating in the area; (2) Barges to be equipped with anohor and hoisting gear, ventilation, watertight bulkhead doors, adequate hoisting gear for cargo loading and discharge, proper bins of the wood type, sufficient installed power for lighting and power equipment, watertight hatches similar to a ship hatch, and proper sanitary and office arrangements; (3) Barges organised to effect proper storage, shipping and receiving, issue and stock control; (4) When barges are not tied up to piers, harbor boats (LCMt s) must be permanently assigned to each barge; and (5) Personnel not subject to recall by a parent unit from which they are on detached ser­ vice must be assigned to man the barges. Necessary action has been taken to equip and modify barges now on procurement in accordance with these require­ ments


If the ASSRON is too closely correlated to the 6AKFOR, it becomes impractical to leapfrog the ASSRON to a new base without reduc ing the service ability of either the ASSRON or GARFOR. ttie ASSRON should be made as independent of the GARFOR as possible in order to preserve its mobility without sacrificing its efficiency* Plans are being made to make the ASSRON as independent of the GARFOR as possible in order to guarantee this mobility*
f • Where a base is strictly temporary for air operations, and is not to be extensively developed, construction for air units should be limited to strictly essential construction only* The origi­ nal Air Foroe construction policy is being revised to eliminate non­ essential construction and revise priorities*


g. To provide proper air service upon the initial landing of tactical aircraft on a new strip, facilities for aviation gasoline and oil, third echelon aircraft repair, and bomb and ammunition supply should be installed concurrently with the construction of the air strip, The aviation engineer battalion should remain at the airdrome until all aviation facilities have been completed. Premature removal of the 804th Engineer Battalion from Makin Island delayed the construction Aviation of the above facilities* Recommendation has been made that the aviation engineer battalions not be relieved from an advanced base until released by the Air Force Commander.

h. On islands where sufficient land mass exists, the Air Ser­ vice Center can be more effectively employed than ASSRONS. Plans are being formulated to replace ASSRONS with Air Service Centers as the Central Pacific offensive moves into islands where sufficient land mass exists to facilitate their employment* i. To supervise the execution of air service plans in the for­ ward areas an advanced echelon of the Air Service Command headquarters should be established in a central location in the forward area. With­ out an adequate staff arrangement within the forward area, the Air Ser­ vice Commander is placed in the position of trying to execute his re­ sponsibility without the means to exercise his authority* Plans for the organization and operation of an advanced echelon will be placed in effect when completed. 5. Hawaiian Air Depot.

Organizations were over- equipped with heavy machinery. Recommendations for future operations have been forwarded to the VII Air Force Service Command.



soon enough for the preparation of facilities.
future operations

and engineer troops were not made available Recommendations for have been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command.

c. A small number of repair troops should have been trained and available for the commencement of operations. Recommendations for future operations have been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command. d. Mobile repair shops, such as the Depot manufactured sheettruck, furnish ample facilities for third echelon maintenance; metal however, a greater supply of raw material, particularly sheet aluminum and bar stock, should accompany the vehicles. Recommendation for future operations has been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command. c. Field repairs should be definitely limited to third echelon; repairable items should be forwarded more quickly to the repair base. Recommendation for corrective action to be taken in future operations has been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command.


f • Automatic supply of Technical Data for the advanced bases from the mainland was too slow to arrive on schedule for use in the Galvanic operation, for which itwas intended. Requisitions were en­ tered at once by the Air Depot Supply Department for emergency handling from the mainland to this Depot followed by immediate shipment to the bases involved*


g. The first reports from the advance bases indicated it was to pack all AAF material with only one classification in a box, as due to lack of storage space, material is often stored in the original boxes; making no segregation of classes possible without un­ packing the boxes. Allfuture packing, therefore, kept AAF classifi­ cation material separate, even though such a method required additional packages*

h. It was necessary to include many additional items of mater­ ial over and above the original estimate, because of subsequent losses through accidents, theft, and ordinary deterioration caused by inade­ The automatic quate storage facilities at the disposal of the ASSRDNS* supply increased to cover these abnormal supply conditions. i. In many cases planned manufacturing operations such as the generation of oxygen breathing gas could not be depended upon, due to failure of equipment to function on occasion. The reserve supply of material thus affected was increased.
j. The quantities and variety of Aircraft Spares and Supplies in Prepared Combat Tables from the mainland were not sufficient listed in this theater, proving short in variety as well as in quantity of many items* New and improved tables which were built up by the supply department based on experience reported in this theater are now being used.

k* Full company and E's are essential for tactical combat operations, with all teams self-sufficient in every detail possible* All communications teams were dependent upon the ASSRON headquarters for and administration and mess* Companies are now being sent with full E*s, the standard set-up being a Signal Headquarters (with a Major as Signal Officer, one Lieutenant as assistant, and three clerks) and two companies: one Aircraft Warning Company, formed under and E 11-400, and a Signal Communications Company, formed under and E 11-500* The total number of officers and men is 337 for future assignments*





1* Personnel should be trained, as nearly as possible, in all jobs of the Joint Communication Center to provide flexibility* When­ ever possible all Seventh Air Force personnel are given diversified training so that they may filldifferent positions if required*
procedure is necessary for the Joint Com­ m* A standardized munication Centers, to eliminate differences in procedure and terminology



The Joint Communication and speed up the message handling process* Center personnel from all services should be trained together before they land on an enemy beach* A suggested Standard Operating Procedure has been prepared and included in the Advanced Base Officer's Guide as suggested means of standardization*

n. Pre-fabricated equipment for the Joint Communications suoh as operating tables and radio receiver position^ should be made in the rear area* Plans are being prepared for the Joint Com­ munications Center building and the furniture for it is being built*

o. Certain radio circuits which the Joint Communications Center cannot provide are necessary for internal communications within the Seventh Air Force. A radio circuit from ADVON Headquarters, Seventh Air Force, to its rear echelon has been installed, and a functional VII Bomber Command circuit was installed recently and is now being tested*
p. All radio equipment should be set up and operated prior to shipping to an advanced base, as many radio sets are damaged in shipment from the mainland* All radio equipment, no matter how well packed, is now opened, set up and operated, then carefully repacked and in some cases covered with water-proof paper and then double packed* This double packing, in addition to better protection, also gives additional lumber that is always needed after landing*

Radio equipment

assigned to a net must have sufficient

equipment would not tune to assigned frequencies* now set up and operated before leaving this area* in use have extended frequency coverage*

frequency coverage to accommodate all frequencies which may be assigned to that net* During Galvanic operation it was found, too late* that
Alltransmitters are

All transmitters now

r. AACS radio circuits, ranges, homing beacons* control tower equipment and personnel are needed early in the operation* These fa­ cilities were not planned to be installed until D plus 15 and D plus 20, as they were not believed necessary until then* This plan was correoted by sending in mobile radio transmitter and radio receiving stations, portable radio ranges and temporary radio homers* This equipment is be­ ing improved for future operations.
s. To provide for quick and dependable switchboard installa­ tion, one (1) TC-4 and one (1) TC-12 should be installed in a K-19 trailer. This was done at Funafuti, using two TC-20»s in a K-19 trail­ er, with great success. This was not done at Makin and resulted in slow installation of telephone switchboards. Trailers are being built for future operations* t* Radar efficiency is greatly reduced by tall palm trees in the vicinity, making 100 foot towers a necessity to get radar antennas above the palm trees, as well as to inorease the range.


v. Sufficient spare parts must be readily available for all signal equipment • including an abundance of spare parts for units where trouble is known to occur. This applies mainly to electric power plant equipment and to special radar installations* v. A large bulldozer should be available to ASSRON com­ munications section upon landing to assist in full revetment of all equipment* A bulldozer has been assigned from the Engineers to the communications section for the initial installation of radar, radio, and telephone equipment. w. Deviations between Army and Navy cryptographic practices when working on joint systems tended to give away the organisation enciphering the message. CinCPAC in collaboration with the Seventh Air Force, drafted a letter for submission of the differences to the Combined Communications Committee in order that the deviations might be overcome*

x« Both officers and enlisted men should be trained in the operation of the ECM, and officers should be trained in all crypto­ graphic devioes* Thorough instruction is now being given to all cryptographic personnel*
y. Navy personnel are not always familiar with the Army that are available in the Joint Communication Centers, which in many unnecessary "services The Cryptographic Security results at ADVON Seventh Air Force, has sent a letter to the Joint Officer Communications Centers on checking Army system and Army indicators before sending "services*" in addition, all new cryptograph officers are instructed to keep Navy personnel conscious of the presence of Army systems in the Joint Communications Centers* systems



Cfticpac File




CONFIDSITIAL From: To: Sub j s ect Commander In Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas • PACIFIC FLEET and PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS, Communications Policies for Joint Operations Pacific Areas. in the Central


(a) Joint Action of the Army and the Uavy, 1935. (b) CinCPOA File Pac-01-Ye Iy4lß Ser. 02258 of 21 Sept. 1943.

(c) CinCPOA File Pac-J4-Es

L/tlB Ser.

02248 of 20 Sept. 1943.

The following principles shall be observed in the formulation of communications plans for, and the conduct of communications at newly established Central Pacific island bases, plus CANTON, BAKER, FUNAFUTI, NUKUFETAU, NANOMEA, and others whioh may later be designated.

(a) Hie Commanding Officer of each base shall establish a

joint communication center which shall conduct all communications for all services (Army, Navy or Marine Corps) operating at such base. He will be assisted by <a base communication officer from the Army, Navy or Marine Corps, vftiose selection will be dictated by the situation existing at the base* Selection of each base communication officer shall be approved by CinCPOA after consultation with the interested Services. The base communication officer will be responsible to the com­ manding officer of the base for the operation of the joint communication center through which all communi­ cations from the facilities necessarily separated may be channeled to responsible commanders*

(b) The base communication officer shall have as assistants communication officers of the various services involved
who will be responsible for advising him on the conduct of and requirements for communications for their ser­ * vices.

(c) Normally, all operational dispatches

between island bases and external commanders or higher echelons will be transmitted via operational or tactical circuits


Incl. No. 1 to SECTION XXIII


or authorized by CinCPOA.

(d) In accordance

with a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to avoid duplication of circuits and facili ties, fixed circuits shall be established only as authorized by CinCPOA. This principle applies only to long range circuits employing frequencies below 20 mcs. Internal tactical circuits required by as­ sault or defense forces, tactical circuits required for air-amphibious operations, and circuits employ­ ing low power on frequercies above 20 mcs, are ex­ cluded from the provision.


Circuits or facilities, when authorized in ac­ cordance with (d) above, which ere peculiar to the needs of one service usually shall be pro­ vided and operated by that service.
having paramount interest shall provide and operate such circuit or facility.

(2) Ttfhere circuits are employed jointly the service

(c) Ihe respective services

shall provide the material necessary to meet their own internal communication telephone, telegraph, and teletypewriter require­ ments* All wire communications at the base shall be coordinated by the Senior Signal Officer to avoid duplication or confusion, and will be install­ ed and maintained under his supervision* Visual and harbor control communications under the joint communication center shall be in­ stalled and operated by the Navy.
shall, upon installa­ tion of aircraft operating facilities, pres­ cribe the approach and recognition procedure to be employed by aircraft.

(f) (1)

(2) The base air commander

(s) Communications

for the Filter Warning Services are under the of the local air commander and with base joint communications er.

Director and Air operational control shall be coordinated by the base command­


An airways communication service way be established by the Navy, or Army Airways Commurication Service as required at island bases in ihe Central Pacific Area as part of the joint communication center to provide any or all of the following services:


(1) Point to point circuits for aircraft movements
and other messages service.

relating to the airways

(2) Air-ground communication for
on non-combat missions*

itinerant, trans­ port, and combat aircraft moving between bases

(3) Airdrome local air traffic control* (4) Seadrome
traffic control*

(5) Radio Aids to aerial navigation.
(6) Instrument
landing systems

as required.

Tiiless absolutely essential these services shall not be duplicated and will be utilized by both Amy and Navy aircraft insofar as may be practicable*

(i) Permanent equipment, once provided, shall normally
remain in place regardless of changes in command Every effort shall be made between the services* to avoid duplication of personnel, equipments, and circuits* 2.


Communications plans for island bases shall be form ulated in accordance with Chapter XI, Subsection V of reference (a)* Communication facilities shall be planned in the order of establishment as required by the operation plans*



3* The following rules governing the expression of time of origin, and time in message texts, shall be observed*

(a) The time of origin will be expressed as six figures, followed by a zone suffix letter, the first pair of
digits denoting the date, the second pair hours, the third pair minutes except that the first two digits denoting the date may be omitted ifnot required* Time of origin will be expressed in teims of G*C*T* (G.M*T*) unless considerations of security expediency require otherwise.


(b) All times in the text of messages

will be expressed with a zone suffix letter except that in the text of messages involving a large number of times, a covering expression such as "all times zone Baker"


may be used instead of appending letter to each.

zone suffix

(c) When referenoe is made to a message by its time of

origin, the method of expression of that time of origin will be preserved in its original form. The year may be added if necessary. month



"Your 161412Z DEC 42."

(d) A major task force commander may prescribe a partic­
ular zone time to be used in message texts for his force regardless of the fact that more than one time zcne may be involved in the area of operations of his force.
Cryptographic aids to be employed at advanced base shall 4* be determined by each service to meet its needs, within the limitations to be prescribed by CinCPOA. No. E.C.M. (SIGABA) shall be landed at any base until approved by CinCPOA* Commanders of all services shall be kept apprised of the class (category) of cryptographic aids held by island bases.


(a) All services should maintain adequate levels of
equipment and personnel initially in the Hawaiian
Area, readily available for immediate


wherever they may be required, as directed by para­ graph 6 of enclosure (A) to reference (c). Upon the replacement of mobile equipment by permanent base equipment material replaced shall be made available for reassignment by the material pool or depot of the appropriate service o


(b) Each, service shall be responsible for the supply
of spare parts aid replacements of its own types of equipment regardless of the use to which it is put. 6. All base communication services shall be directly under the operational control of the local Officer in Tactical Command*





LIST II P, SP, MC, HTS, XI, 2, 3, 4, 5, V, Z.
873, 3V, 11. 23, KS3, 4,
NAll54, NBIB, 49, NDll-15,


Special: C.G. Centpao C.G. Sowespac
C»6* Sopac
C.G. Samoan Def. For* C.G. 7th A. F. C.G. sth A. F.
C.G* Army Air Forcea
C.G. 11th A. F. C.G. 4th A. F.

P. V. Mercer,

Flag Secretary.


B-24 Modifications

1. Remove lagging from winterized engines 8 July 43).
2. Install 3«

(T*o. 02-1-44, dated


fire extinguishing system to engines (Mod, No. 53).

Comply with T.O* 01-5-65, dated 5 October 43 (gas vent line when needed).

4. Install tail wheel (Mod. No. 13A). 5.

Install waist gun crash belts.
Install top hatch deflector (Mod. No* 42)*

driftmeter next to navigator's cable (Mod* No* 42)*

7. Relocate

8. Install scanning windows in nose. 9. Relocate navigator to flight deck (Mod. No. 42)* 10. Relocate radio compass indicator L«H. front corner of navigator's table (Mod* No 0 42)* 11. Make one additional droppable bomb bay tank installation (as per drawing No. 44D417). 12. Install navigator's instruments on flight deck (Mod. No. 42)*

13. Install bottom hatch deflector (Mod. No. 36). 14. Modify life raft release mechanism

(Mod. No. 37A).

15. Install SCR-522 antenna mast (Mod. No. 52). 16. Install handrail alongside ball turret* 17. Install heavy duty elevation stowing cable in nose turret. 18.

Install reinforcements

to bomb bay door tracks (U.R. 43-249).

Install supports for pitot tubes (discontinued due to redesign)* Install astral compass dome stowage (Mod* No. 42). Install fuel transfer hand pump system (Mod. No. 17).

20. 21*

22. Relocation of camera vacuum valve (Mod. No. 47).

1 Incl. No* 2 to


23. Modify wiring in bombardier *e panel with rheostat switoh (Mod. No. 5). 24. Install new azimuth lock on nose turret. 25. Install camera mount (Mod. No* 36).

and dimming

26. Install cal. .30 guns in nose side windows and stop* 27. Install stowing containers for cal* .30 ammunition*

28. Install relief tube in nose section (Mod* No. 42). 29. Install ammunition roller guides for waist

30. Bistall modified A-2 bomb releases and synchronise control box with racks (11-5-46, dated 28 November 43 and T*o. 11-5-23, dated 2 March 43). 31. Install upper turret Pelorus pointer and calibrate turret* 32. Install cover for ball turret.

33. Install metal cover in Astral dome (Mod* No. 42).

Install suspension cables for waist gun ammunition chutes. Install shoulder harness

for pilot and co-pilot*


Install sun deflector top turret sight (T.O. 11-35-14, dated 14 September 42)*

37. Safety pitot static selector in off position and check for lines being open (Mod. No* 42). 38. Relocate oxygen bottles over bomb bay (to provide additional stowage space). 39.

Modify emergency hydraulic pump handle (U.R. AD APO 953


Install SCR 521 (Mod. No. 42).

41. Install galley kit. Type C-2 aft of 42.

rie£it waist


Remove tail turret and install twin 50*8 (Mod. No. 31A).

43. Replace Carburetor jets (Install No. 700-3 B jets as per ASC Radio No. 1298, dated 8 Dec 43). 44* Modify Propeller Feathering Switohes

(UR HAD 44-28).


45. Install blister window for Pilot and Co-pilot and widen the open­ ing and equip for emergency release (Mod. No. 69). 46. Install quick release


47. Relocate pilot's seat lock handle (to opposite side of seat)* 48. Install wind deflector for lower ball turret. 49. Install deflector and braces for nose turret when needed*

50. Remove relief tube near bomb bay door handle and reinstall in back of pilot* s seat near right front leg of navigator •* table (Mod. No. 42).


B-25 Modifications

1. 75mm gun firing switch installed an the pilots wheel. 2. Remove miscellaneous airplane*
de-icer lines and equipment -throughout the

3. Remove all lines to rear fuselage heater. 4. Install twin bottle C0 2 engine fire extinguisher

system (Mod,


5. Remove canvas

cover from battery.

6. Install the N6A gunsight in front of the pilot in place of the
N3B sight (Mod. No. 59, part B).
7. Replace stocking boots that cover the nose wheel strut and elbows with boots that cover the shock strut only (Mod. No. 60, part B). 8. Install safety wire on mounting bolts for upper turret. 9. Install turret stop for protection of tail from own fire when
10 • Comply with T.O. 01-60G-63, and install tf6A gunsight. 11. Install oil tank sump bottom self sealing, part No. 82-47083, for left side and part No. 82-47083-1, for the right side (Shortage of parts). 12. Cover wing openings into Navigators compartment in the airplane that did not come so equipped (Mod* No* 60, part A). 13. Install SCR-522 and frequency crystals

(T.O. 08-10-105)*

14. Comply with T*o* 01-600*45, and install buffer plates on nose wheel door and nose as per drawings Nos. AP0953AD44D438, -443, and -458. 15. Modify fuselage hood at hinge point (UR APO 959 43-481)* 16. Install G.S.A.P. camera gun and mount in nose. 17. Install K-21 or K-25 camera mount (Proposed Modification)* 18. Comply with NAA Modification Center Report No. A-18, Structure Reinforcement plus additional APO 953 reinforcement (Mod. No. 65).


Incl. No. 3 to SECTION XXIII

19. Move Waist gun to middle of window, and install spoiler in front of waist gun window. Install N6A sight (Mod. No. 64 )? 20* Beaded trailing wire antennae APO 43-387).
from reel to transmitter


21. Install "Push to Talk11 switches 22* Install extended blast tubes.

on waist and tail guns (Proposed

23. Strengthen bulkhead blast plate for package guns (Same as Item



Fighter Aircraft


1* Launching, tow-holdback, installation, P-39 series aircraft (NAF). 2. Supercharging of V-1710-81 engine ignition systems and P-398-5-BE series aircraft (Mod. No. 63) • in P-39Q-1-BE

3. Supercharging of ignition systems of V-1710-73 and -85 engines Installed in P-40K-1 and P-40N-SCU aircraft (Mod. No. 62).


Incl. No. 4 to SECTION XXIII






-' : -¦¦¦ :






A. PREPARATION This command assisted the troops in the preparation for Galvanic operation with every means at their disposal. 1« Supplies furnished. The packing and crating section furnished prefabricated boxes and crates, dimension lumber for palletizing and all dunnage, strapping materials, tool stencils, brushes and other equipment for cargo crating* 2. Equipment furnished. Ihe transportation division furnished all available low-bed and flat-bed trucks to assist in the movement of the organizational equipment to the staging area and to the piers. The fol­ equipment was also furnished for use at the Navy docks: 4 3-ton lowing lift trucks, 4 hi-lifts, and 4 jitneys. 3. Personnel furnished. Ihis command provided personnel for the technical supervision of cargo crating, Port troops for loading person­ nel and equipment aboard transports, and Military Police to convoy Army and Marine troops from staging areas to piers, direct traffic and main­ tain security guards prior to and during loading. An officer from this command with previous task force experience also furnished advice and assistance in loading the transports and cargo vessels. B. SUPPORT.
1, Company D, 376th Port Battalion consisting of 4 officers and 220 enlisted men was assigned to the 7th Garrison Force which had th* mission of defending the island after the assault troops left.



2* The staging and billeting section furnished the requisite bil­ lets for the entire garrison force prior to its departure from Oahu.












A. ASSIGNMENT OF MISSION. 1. Objective. On 4 August 1943, the Commanding General, USAFICPA, notified the Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division, that his divi­ sion was to participate in the Galvanic operation. Details were not then available, but the general directive authorized direct contact with the Navy, as this operation was to be an amphibious action in the Gilbert Islands. Within 48 hours, the planning section of CinCPOA, represented by Colonel Mandell and Colonel Ferrin, informed the Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division, that the Divisions objective was to be the Island of Nauru, with the target date tentatively about 15 November. It was planned to employ 9 BLT's, with an impressive number of Naval vessels supporting the action. All information in their hands was made available to the 27th Infantry Division* This information as to the enemy, terrain, and logistical data, however, was inadequate for the detailed preparation of an operational plan. Further details were to be transmitted to the division as they became available* 2. Chain of command. During the months of August and September, Headquarters for the Central Pacific Force, Fifth Amphibious Force, and Fifth Amphibious Corps, were in the process of organization. Channels of command were non-existent, and direct contact was maintained by the 27th Infantry Division with all these Naval echelons. This situation caused considerable confusion as to the delivery of orders but did bring about a close association between all the staffs concerned. B. TPAINING PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF MISSION.

1. Staff Amphibious School. The 27th Division had been conducting preliminary amphibious training over a period of approximately c ight months prior to assignment to the Galvanic operation. In December, 1942, two officers were detailed to attend an amphibious school conducted by the Marines at San Diego. On the return of these officers to the divi­ sion, a school on amphibious operations was inaugurated. This school was conducted during the period 7 April 1943 12 May 1943, and was attended by regimental and battalion commanders, their executive officers, S-2 f s, S-3*s, S-4's, and other officers and key non-commissioned officers of artillery battalions and separate units. This school accomplished its purpose in that it properly indoctrinated the organizations as to the requirements of amphibious operations.



2. BLT amphibious training Schofield Barracks. During the period 2 May 1943 24 July 1943 each BLT was assembled at Schofield Barracks for one weeks training. Here instruction was given in the use of ropes for guide-lines and the tying of knots, cargo-net climbing and descending, boat team drill, handling supplies from a platform (including the lower­ ing and stowing in mock-up boats), debarking and deployment from mock-up boats, passage through wire entanglements and other obstacles. BLT




commanders and their staffs prepared boat assignment tables, boat diagrams, shore party organization, landing diagrams, debarkation and approach schedules. In addition, officer schools were ccnduct­ ed by the BLT commander to complete the indoctrination in amphibious training.
During the week follow­ 3. BLT amphibious training Waianae. ing the training at Schofield Barracks each BLT received one week f s training at the Waianae Amphibious Training Center. Here a pier was used to simulate a transport with the necessary booms and nets and a specially constructed barge was anchored off shore to give personnel the experience of embarking and debarking from a listing vessel. Winch operators were also trained with the existing equipment. Dur­ ing the training period at TiTaianae, each BLT received instruction in the embarkation and debarkation of troops, equipment, and supplies. Three landing exercises were conducted as follows:


a. A daylight landing "where the mechanics of debarkation, operation of the shore party, and handling of supplies were stressed. b. c. A night landing involving the same problems.

A dawn landing covering all phases of the landing oper­ clearing the beach, reorganization, advance to the objective, operation of shore party, handling of supplies and The final exercise was made as realistic as possible with equipment. the use of simulated strafing and bombing by planes, bangalore tor­ pedos, barbed wire obstacles, smoke, and explosives.
ation, debarkation,

4. Physical ccnditioning. During the period from the Ist of January to the end of July, special attention was given to physical conditioning. Vehicles were used only when necessary for the trans­ portation of troops* Every individual not required to participate in strenuous training was required to run a mile a day as a step toward proper conditioning. C. TRAINING AFTER ASSIGNMENT OF MISSION.

1. Subjects to be stressed. It was most apparent that prior to employment in amphibious action, the division required further train­ ing and equipment. A complete study of the equipment required to accomplish the assigned mission was initiated. Efforts to obtain definite information as to the personnel and cargo transports to be assigned were continued. Training was commenced, stressing rifle marksmanship, battle conditioning, and small unit training, vihile efforts were being made to obtain sufficient ships for the final phases of amphibious training in ship-to-shore movement. 2. Training camps. At the time the division was assigned to the Galvanic operation, three RCT training camps were made available


to the division. These camps made training aids available so that the units could complete basic training, known-distance firing, battle courses, specialists l training and team work in the employment of oom­ bined arms. In addition, each BLT was given one week of amphibious training at the VTaimanalo center; this training was similar to that conducted at Waianae. The 165th RCT conducted ship-to-shore exercises during the period 3 October 22 October, employing the 20th Transport Division. Shore Fire Control Parties were trained by the Division Artillery for the purpose of directing Naval gunfire after arrival on the beach.


3. Transport Quartermaster School. A school was conducted for Transport Quartermasters, commencing on 17 September and continuing until the troops embarked for the Galvanic operation. Under supervision of Lieutenant Colonel Ferris, G-4, 27th Infantry Division, the course stressed the following:

a. Familiarity with APA's and AKA's by visiting Pearl Harbor,
the ships and observing the loading of ships.
Study of stowage plans used in the Attu operation.

c. Preparation of stowage plans, using the concepts prepared
by G-4 and based on tentative operational plans.
This school was of immense value. Itnot only trained transport quarter masters for the assault troops for the Makin operation, but also made possible the detail of officers in Vnis capacity for ships transporting the defense battalion* D' PIANNIFG. As previously stated, the original objective assigned the 27th Division was the Island of Nauru. On 2 October, this objective was changed to Makin Atoll. Because of this change, the planning phase by the 27th Division was divided into two parts. 1.


Intelligence. In obtaining information on Nauru, every effort was made to preserve security. All available information on Nauru was obtained from the planning section of CinCPOA* Aerial photo­ graphs, objective reports, photo interpretation reports and studies were obtained from the Seventh Air Force. A feigned interest in guano and phosphate was successful in locating three information sources, namely, National Geographic Magazine, December, 1921; Ocean and Nauru Islands by Ellis; the Year Book of the South Pacific, 1942. A study of this data made possible a good informational foundation of Nauru prior to the establishment of Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Corps and Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Force.


A request was made to Admiral Nimitz to obtain the aid


of an inhabitant of Nauru with the result that Mr, Bott, an employee of the British Phosphate Company, arrived on Oahu about 18 August. He brought with him printed data on Nauru, pictures (both still and moving), and a large scale company map of the plateau on the island. This data, plus other ver­ bal information, proved extremely valuable, Mr. Bott remained with the division for approximately 3 weeks* During this period, his time was employ­ ed as follows:

(a) Discussion of the characteristics
relief map of Nauru. craft on Nauru.

of Nauru,

(b) Advice to PRISIC in their construction of

(c) Study of possible use of types of landing (d) Advice to G-2 during his preparation of a
terrain study of Nauru.

(c) A thorough reconnaissance

of Oahu with G-2 in quest of examples of reefs, cliffs, and vegetation with such characteristics as those found on Nauru.

(f) Correction of Engineer topographical map (2) By the middle of August, PRISIC had prepared a
relief model of Nauru from the information they had at hand but the scale was too small to give more than a general impression of the island, A second model was requested on a scale of 5,000, exaggerated 2-g- times vertically. This relief map, though not accurate in detail, was declared amazingly true -when seen by Mr, Bott, A third relief map of the same scale was Ihen prepared under Mr, Bott*s supervision. It was planned to make sufficient copies of this re­ lief map so that every troop ship in the oper­ ation would have one available during the voyage.


(3) The large scale map of ihe plateau area, furnish­ ed by Mr. Bott, was used in the preparation of a 1/20,000 topographical map by the 64th Engineer Topographical Company. This map, as originally
prepared, was unsatisfactory due to the method of 20,000 map was over-printing grid lines. Ihe l/


later corrected and satisfactory maps are now

(4) About the middle of September, a submarine reconnais

sanoe of all GalTanic objectives was ordered by the Navy* Captain Donald Neuman, an assistant G-2, 27th Infantry Division, was designated to accompany this reconnaissance* Since Nauru was removed from the objectives for Galvanic, this reconnaissance list of of the Gilbert Islands was accomplished and valuable pictures of Makin secured.

(5) In addition to Mr. Bott, the following listed men and officers of the Australian Forces assisted in
the preparation of information on Nauru:
Captain William Brom, Engineer, A.I.F. Lieutenant Norman H* Cooke, Engineer, A.I.F. Warrant Officer Frank L. Mcßae, A.I.F* Sergeant Winston X* Tingman, R.A.A.F.

These men arrived on Oahu at about the time the objective was changed and caused some embarrassment as no one was available to supervise them in their mission of producing more information on Nauru* These men were thoroughly familiar with reef, beach, and cliff conditions with which Mr* Bott had no intimate knowledge* They were most conscientious in their efforts and corrected and added to the data They also thoroughly which we had already obtained* analyzed and corrected the 1/20,000 engineer map prior to its final printing* Their efforts have made available an extremely complete data file on the Island of Nauru* b» Tentative plan for attack* Due to the increasing infor­ mation concerning the physical characteristics of the island, it was possible to prepare a tentative plan of attack, employing 2 regiments in the assault, with 1 regiment (less 1 battalion) in floating reserve* Due to the prevailing winds, reef conditions, width of beach, cliff conditions, and location of the phosphate pits, the plan called for an attack on the northwest portion of the island* This plan was never crystallised due to the ever-changing assignment of vessels and the ultimate change in objective*
Logistical plans* In adapting the division for amphibious it was necessary to obtain considerable logistical support* Additional medical assistance was needed as well as combat engineers for shore party employment* A large amount of non-TBA equipment was also necessary.



(1) Non-TBA Engineer Equipment required. (a) Barco hammers. (b) Additional explosives. (c) Water evaporators.

(d) 3 H-10 and 1 H-20 bridge and pneumatic equip­
ment (which was contemplated for jetty and floating stage across the reef).

(c) 29 bulldozers with blades, including 2 D-7's
and 4 R-4's for each shore party company to handle supplies ashore.

(f) 6,000 pallets for ship-to-shore movement of supplies, and miscellaneous additional equip­

(2) Ordnance*


During the period from 8 August to 30 August, a complete physical inspection of all ordnance in the division was made and deficiencies noted were reported in a detailed letter to CPA with a request for replacement of defective items. This included: Replacement of 60mm and 81mm mortars found defective. Replacement of 1918, 155mm Howitzer with new Ml Howitzer. 585 trucks (to make up shortages). 7 Athey trailers. Replacement of lj*ton dumps for dumps




(b) Permission

was asked from CPA to alter Ordnance Company to permit inclusion of the follow­ ing elements: Ammunition men to operate a supply point. Specialists for tank maintenance, (AA) armament, and director equipment. An increased small arms section, artillery section, instrument section, and service section, to make the organization compar­ able to a medium maintenance company, normally a corps establishment.


(c) 50 LVT*s and as many DUKWs as could be obtained
Late in October, infor­ were also requested. mation was received that the LVT 2 f s which had been requested, would be available for employ­ This equipment actually ment in the attack. arrived and was delivered to the 27th Infantry Division on 30 October. A provisional organiza­ tion, composed of members of the 193 dTank Bat­ talion had previously been organised to operate these vehicles* This detachment, under command of Major Inskeep, performed an outstanding piece of work in the servicing prior to combat and operation during combat*

(3) Signal.

(a) A request for signal/ items, including portable

radios for communication from company to platoon, 1 280 radar, 1 274 radar, K5l and K52 (truck and trailer) and SCR 299 radios as well as radios for tanks and ship-to-shore communication*


(b) The CPA Signal Officer offered the use of detach­ ments* 75th Signal Company, which had participat­
ed in the operation at Attu and had recently arrived here*

(4) Filler personnel.

At the time information was receiv­ ed that the 27th Infantry Division was to participate In Galvanic, the division was under strength over 1,000 men* G-l, CPA, made plans for the reduction of this deficiency by the assignment of troops from other combat divisions in the area* Due to the limitations on personnel caused by the size and number of trans­ ports available, it was at all times apparent that a full table of organizational strength could not be employed* The Division Commander requested that he be allowed to remain under strength* This request was approved*

(6) Graves registration* The attachment of quartermaster graves registration troops was requested but not pro­ vided by higher headquarters due to their unavailability. A graves registration section, consisting of 1 officer
and 2 enlisted men from the 27th Quartermaster Company, augmented by 5 enlisted men from participating units was organized for the operation* This section was trained under the direction of the Division Quartermaster and functioned adequately during combat in the disposition of American dead. However it was insufficient to cope


with the problems of hostile dead. An assistant G-4 of the division was given the responsibility of the burial of enemy dead -which he accomplished by the employmait of the 165 th Infantry Band in conjunction with native labor detail of approximately 50 men.

(6) A bakery unit was requested but refused. (7) Mail* It was apparent that in the event the oper­
ation progressed as planned and the troops were with­ drawn from their objective immediately after its capture that delivery of mail to the participating troops would be impractical* On the other hand, prompt delivery of mail to troops remaining on the island was an essential morale factor© It was there­ fore necessary to determine the exact units that were to remain on the island before definite arrangements could be made© When the island had been captured and air evacuation of wounded commenced, the division G-l requested that mail be forwarded by plane at once. Through his efforts, arrangements were made with USAFICPA for prompt mail delivery. The operation of the mail service when once begun was conducted in a most superior manner. All Christmas packages were delivered to the troops on the island prior to Christ­ mas and with the return of the remaining combat troops to Oahu deliveries were stopped in time to prevent the unnecessary voyage to Makin and return* The men were outstandingly impressed by the fact that they had re­ ceived their Christmas packages and the fact that the delivery of mail for them to Makin had been terminated so that upon their arrival at Oahu, their current mail was awaiting them* This matter of mail delivery can­ not be over-emphasized.

(8) QM Supplies and equipment requested and obtained.

(a) 30 days

maintenance from which the 27th Infantry Division on its own initiative deleted a number of such non-essential items as stationery and protective clothing*

(b) Requested 2 machettes

per squad (obtained 600).

(c) 12 days* combination "C", "D", and "X" ration*, (d) 30 days'
M fl ration, B salt tablets, cigarettes pipe tobacco* and p

(c) One additional canteen

and cover per individual.


(f) Eh trenching tools for all personnel* (g) 1 set of HBT's for each man in place of one set
of cotton khaki clothing.

(h) 2 5-gallon water containers (9) Medical.

per individual*

(a) During "the month of August, the Division Surgeon
and the G-4 visited the Surgeon CPA, CinCPAC, and the Naval Surgeon, PH, obtaining information regarding expected casualties in the type of operation contemplated*

(b) Numerous

conferences were held with General King, CPA Surgeon, regarding the supporting hospital­ ization units for "the task force but General King was unable to supply the Field Hospital inhich we requested. However, he did furnish the following assistance:

Medical officers to fillvacancies

existing in the 27th Infantry Division. Additional medical officers necessary for 2 portable surgical teams* 66 trained medical EM for the portable surgical teams, to be replaced from personnel of the division from the best of limited service people of any branch. The division therefore actually had to furnish its own enlisted per­ sonnel for an additional Clearing Company and 2 Surgical Teams*

(10) Regulating Point.

In the last week of September, it became evident that a regulating point would have to be established for the assembly of supplies which were required for loading on shipboard. The assistant G-4 made arrangements with higher authority to use certain portions of Fort Kamehameha for such a regulating point and operating procedure was drawn up accordingly, ttie division special staff was instructed to ship materiel to the regulating point for palletizing. The division experienced considerable difficulty in obtain­ ing necessary equipment for the palletizing operation and for handling pallets*

2. Ob j ti ; Makin ec ve The change in target was confirmed the first week in October. Although the objective had been changed to Makin Atoll, all the planning during the previous two months had not been wasted*



Valuable staff contacts had been established, the training preparations remained unchanged* and supply requirements (including reequipping) were changed only by reduction in the number of items required.

(1) 3y 1 October, several officers of the Australian

who had intimate knowledge of Male in, had arrived at Fifth Amphibious Force Headquarters* Lieutenant Commander Heyen, of the Royal Australian Navy, remained with the Fifth Amphibious Force Head­ quarters during the entire operation and was con­ stantly available to the division for information.

(2) On 15 October, Private Fred C. Narruhn, Ist Fiji
Infantry, a native of Makin, reported to the divi­ sion for duty and was assigned to the G-2 section. By this time. Battalion Commanding Officers of the 165 th Infantry, 105th Field Artillery, and 193 d Tank Battalion had been informed of the mission assigned to the division and were familiar with the tentative ground force plans for the operation. Since Narruhn had played as a child over all parts of Butaritari Island, he was well informed as to the conditions of the reefs, taro pits, swamps, and lakes even to a greater extent than the Englishmen who had lived there* Thus he was of greatest value to the commanders who were to be in immediate charge of the BLTf s.


(3) The submarine which had been dispatched to reoon­
noiter the Galvanic objectives was informed of the change from Nauru to Makin and was able to obtain panoramic pictures of the west and south shores of Butaritari Island as well as some previously unknown hydrographic information. Every effort was made to obtain all observations made by the submarine offi­ cers as well as by Captain Neuman, Headquarters, 27th Infantry Division, iflio had accompanied the ex­ pedition*

(*) Excellent air photographs were available, including
air observer's reports nhich, together with the in­ terpretations of the photographs, were invaluable in the preparation of the plan of attack*

(6) A team of 10 Nisei (American soldiers of Japanese ancestry) was received from the mainland approxi­ mately 4 weeks prior to departure* Due to the tacti­
cal plan, it was necessary
initially to divide the


group into several teams so as to accompany each land­ ing unit* Plan 8 were made by which Ihe section was re united in division headquarters as soon as practicable after arrival ashore*


Maps of Makin


Atoll were prepared on a scale of with sufficient sets for issue to all head­ and all officers and platoon sergeants*

(V) During the month of October, a great amount of infor­ mation data was received from the Fifth Amphibious Corps, Fifth Amphibious Force, JICPOA, and Head­ quarters, Central Pacific Area. Regimental and Bat­ talion Commanders received single copies of all avail­
able data. The general distribution of this informa­ tion was finally made as follows:

(a) Maps, Makin Atoll,


indicated above*

(b) Aerial


Butaritari and Kuma Islands

all officers*

(c) Intelligence snnex and terrain studies
organizations officers* aquade

all every squad and all to include


- to

(d) Information folder, Gilbert Islands

- one


(c) Aerial mosaics, stereo pairs

- one

talion and higher headquarters organization*

set per bat­ and each separate and higher

(f) Submarine panoramic strips

- battalion

and one per LVT driver.


(8) Due to the flatness

of Butaritari Island, large handdrawn maps showing terrain features cf the island and anticipated enemy installations were substituted for relief maps* These maps were drawn to a scale of approximately and were distributed to each troop ship.



Plan of attack*

(1) Based on enemy information and terrain study, a plan was prepared whereby the task force (less one BLT

(reinforced) was to land on the western shore of Butaritari Island beginning at nH"-hour, which was
to be set according to tidal conditions and time


required for preliminary naval, and air bombardment, 1 BLT, reinforced, was Initially held as a floating reserve with the intention of landing on the lagoon side of Butaritari Island in the center of the organ­ ised Jap positions at "If-hour, which hour was to be determined dependent upon the success of the initial landing.

(2) In order to insure the success heavy naval gunfire bombardment ment were employed. The naval fully prepared by the Division

of landing troops, and aerial bombard­ gunfire plan was care­

Artillery Commander

in conjunction with the appropriate staff officers of the Fifth Amphibious Force and Fifth Amphibious Corps* The air strikes were coordinated with the bombardment and the approach of the initial waves of the landing forces.

(S) An officer of the Division General Staff was given
the assignment of coordinating the preparation of the Air Plan with Fifth Amphibious Force and Fifth Amphibious Corps* At the time this assignment was given, the Air Officer of Force had already prepared a draft of a plan which had not been approved by the Corps Commander. A plan was finally worked out nhich proved satisfactory to all units and was issued e by tii Fifth Amphibious Force. The principal pro­ blems which had to be solved were:

(a) Targets to be hit on "D"-l strike and MD"-day

(b) Type of bombs which would be most effective against the Japanese installations* (c) Safety factor*
(d) Planes to be available for direct support of the
ground forces and for reconnaissance.

The Fifth Amphibious Force had the additional problem of lack of information as to the name and number of aircraft carriers vhich would be available for the operation. This so retarded the preparation of de­ tailed plans for the execution of the air support that the final plans of the carrier task force com­ manders were not received until the day of sailing.

(4) Air-ground liaison parties, furnished by the Fifth
Amphibious Corps, were assigned

to the division just


prior to the last training cruise and too late for combined training, Ihese parties were immediately assigned to and lived with the units with which they were to operate, so that close personal contact might be obtained. The greatest difficulty in the employ­ ment of these air-ground liaison groups was due to the lack of any combined training with the carrier groups which were eventually assigned to support the operation.

(5) Initial information indicated that the communications
personnel for the support aircraft commander ashore would be furnished by the Fifth Amphibious Force, It was not until just prior to the operation "that this decision, was changed and itbecame neces3ery to organ­ ize and train the communications group from personnel in the division. This was finally accomplished through the assistance of the Division Signal Officer, Force Air Communications Officer, and the Garrison Force Sig­ nal Officer. In spite of their hasty organization, the communications functioned very satisfactorily during the operation.

c. Logistical, plan. TAlhen the initial logistical planning was changed to conform to the new directives the greater part of the pallet­ izing had been completed. The assignment of Transport Division No. 20, for employment in practice cruise, made possible the actual assignment of troops to ships in conformity to the then tentative plans for attack. During the period 9 October 17 October, the 27th Infantry Division Task Force participated in a practice cruise for training in ship-to­ Immediately following the return of the task force from shore movement. its training cruise, the ships were reloaded for the actual expedition. By 30 October, all equipment and personnel had been loaded on Transport Division No, 20, and during the first week of November, rehearsals for the actual operation were conducted at Maui and Kahoolawe, The task force returned to Pesrl Harbor and for several days devoted their time to rehabilitating equipment and correcting faults noted in "the rehearsals. On 10 November ths task force departed Pearl Harbor on its historic mission.





In the lowest echelons (rifle companies, platoons, and squads and tank platoons and individual tanks) there was no communication agency available to link the components of the infantry-tank team* This dis­ crepancy is being made the subject of intensive study and test by this division. 2. The waterproof containers provided for communication equipment were not entirely effective. Further experimentation is being done by


signal agencies equipment*

in an effort to provide better protection for this

3. Promiscuous firing by "trigger happy" individuals is a serious danger to our own troops. Strict discipline for offenders is necessary but prior training should eliminate a large percentage of this.
4. Full advantage in the employment of tanks was not obtained due to lack of training in conjunction with small infantry units* This training is being stressed in preparation for future operations* 5. It is believed that the lightly armored LVT is the vehicle that will insure landings being successful against the heavy opposition that can be expected in future operations* 6. Shore Fire Control Parties and Air-Ground Liaison Parties must train with the units which they will support in the operation* 7* Observers should be attached to the organisations of the task force so that full use may be made of their professional qualifications by the commanders concerned*







Task Force Headquarters. In support of this operation the Headquarters acted as an agency for coordination of Canton Task Foroe Galvanio tactical units stationed here. Assistance rendered these units was essentially in matters of supply, maintenance, quarters and communications •



Air Base facilities.

a* Two squadrons of B-24s conducted strike and search missions from this base in preparation for Galvanic* Search missions were con­ ducted daily and a total of sixteen strikes were made*

b. One Navy reconnaissance squadron conducted photographic missions over the Gilbert-Marshall area in order to provide the task forces with the latest photographic intelligence* Complete facilities were established here for reproduction and distribution of prints* One medical air evacuation squadron brought patients to this base for hospital isation or evacuation to Oahu depending upon the type of casualty* B* LESSONS LEAMED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKBE. Many times radiograms were reoeived which referred to orders which had not yet arrived. This resulted in many questions and answers which placed an unnecessary load upon the communication facilities* The commanders concerned have been notified of this in an attempt to avoid a recurrence in future oper at ions.







1. Organization, This task fore© was formed by direction of the Commanding General, USAFICPA, on 11 August 1943 with the mission of occupying Baker Island, establishing thereon an air base with suitable facilities for the operation of fighter and bomber aircraft and defend­ ing the island and all of its installations against attack by land, sea or air. The task force nhich consisted of a headquarters, an engineer aviaticn battalion, a provisional antiaircraft artillery battalion, a provisional ASSRON, a fighter squadron, and the necessary service de­ tachments l aided on 1 September 1943 with full equipment and supplies sufficient to operate and maintain the base for 90 days.
2. Construction. The engineer aviation battalion assisted by other task force units immediately cans true ted a Mars ton-mat runway 150* x 5500*, and twenty six hardstandings to accomodate fully loaded B-24 f s with ample taxiways and turning areas. The field was ready for fighter operations on 8 September 1943 and the entire base was ready to support the Galvanic operation by 12 September 1943. B. SUPPORT OF OPERATION. £uring the ninety day period following estab­ lishment of the base Army and Navy aircraft conducting heavy bombardment

strikes, and photographic, reconnaissance, search and transport missions were serviced at this base using nearly 400,000 gallons of fuel and 4,000 gallons of lubricant. Three thousand officers and men of the air crews were fed, quartered and in sane cases clothed. Casualties were expedi­ tiously handled by the medical section, the more seriously wounded being kept here until definite improvement was noted.


Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful