ZENAIDA ORTEGA, represented by Her Attorney-in G.R. No. 161400 Kapitbahayan), a Socialized Housing Project (B.P. Blg.
cialized Housing Project (B.P. Blg. 220) with seventeen
Fact OCTAVIO ALVAREZ and/or ZEMVE ORTEGA
ALVAREZ, Present:
Petitioners,
- versus -
THE QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL
HOUSING AUTHORITY & THE NATIONAL HOME
MORTGAGE CORP.,
Respondents.
xx-----------------------------------------------------------------------------xx
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Zenaida Ortega comes directly to this Court assailing the
validity of Quezon City Ordinance No. SP 1304, Series of 2003, and praying
that the following agencies, National Housing Authority (NHA), Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Bureau of Land Management, National Home Mortgage
Financing Corporation, and Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation, be
restrained from implementing the said ordinance.
Proposed Ordinance No. 2002-07 (PO 2002-07) was filed on January 10,
2002 before the City Council. PO 2002-07 sought to approve the Subdivision
Plan of Samahang Kapitbahayan ng Barangay Vasra (Samahang
(17) lots (Community Mortgage Program) containing [a total] area of Six
Hundred Sixty Seven (667) square meters, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 735, owned by the City Government of Quezon City (Vendor)
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
located at a portion of [an] easement [in] Barangay Vasra, Quezon City,
PUNO, Metro Manila, as applied for by the Samahang Kapitbahayan ng Barangay
PANGANIBAN, Vasra (Vendee) subject to the conditions prescribed under Quezon City
QUISUMBING, Ordinance No. SP-56, S-93 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 220.[1]
YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,Proposed Resolution No. 2003-13 (PR 2003-13) was subsequently filed on
CARPIO, January 20, 2002 to complement PO 2002-07. The proposed resolution
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,sought to authorize Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R. Belmonte to enter into a
CORONA, contract to sell a portion of an easement located at Barangay Vasra, Quezon
CARPIO MORALES, City with the SAMAHANG KAPITBAHAYAN to be represented by its
CALLEJO, SR., President, through the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National
AZCUNA, Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).[2]
TINGA,
NAZARIO, and On August 5, 2003, the Quezon City government enacted Ordinance No.
GARCIA, JJ. SP-1304, Series of 2003 (the ordinance), which is being challenged in the
present petition,[3] reclassifying as residential or converted from its original
Promulgated: classification to residential for distribution or for sale to its informal settlers a
parcel of land which may be considered an accretion/excess lot and
previously conceived and referred to in Proposed Ordinance No. 2002-07
September 2, 2005 and Proposed [Resolution] 2002-13 as portion of [an] easement situated
between Block 14, Psd-39577 of the original subdivision plan and Culiat
Creek, Barangay Vasra, Quezon City.[4]
The provisions of the assailed ordinance read:
SECTION 1. A parcel of land which may be considered an
accretion/excess lot and previously conceived and
referred to in proposed ordinance no. PO 2002-07 and
proposed ordinance no. PO 2002-13 as portion of
easement, situated between Block 14. Psd-39577 of the
original subdivision plan and Culiat Creek, Barangay
Vasra, Quezon City, is hereby classified as residential or
converted from its original classification to residential for
distribution or for sale to its informal settlers.
SECTION 2. This Ordinance shall take effect immediately
upon its approval.[5]
1
Petitioner, who claims to be the rightful owner of the land subject of the
ordinance, alleges that in enacting the ordinance, her various letter-protests
to the City Council against proposed Resolutions No. 2002-13, 2002-07 and
2002-239[6] were not heeded in the City Council, thus violating her
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
Petitioner further claims that the lot referred to in the ordinance overlaps her
properties as their technical descriptions in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
RT-70472 (296026) and N-152137 issued in her name show;[7] and that
assuming that there exists accretion or easement of the Culiat Creek, she,
being the owner of the adjoining land, is the rightful owner thereof following
Articles 457[8] and Article 620[9] of the Civil Code.
Petitioner likewise claims that the intended beneficiaries under the proposed
ordinance and resolution are not informal settlers as required under City
Ordinance No. SP-56, Series of 1993,[10] but lessees of her properties who
had been ordered ejected after she filed several unlawful detainer cases
against them.[11]
By Comment[12] filed on April 14, 2004, the Quezon City Government,
through the Office of the City Attorney, alleges that the present petition is
premature and raises questions of fact which entail reception of evidence;
and that petitioner has not yet established her right of ownership over the
property referred to in the ordinance, whereas its clear right thereover is
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued in its name.[13]
The NHA, by Comment[14] filed on May 17, 2004, prayed for the
dismissal of the petition, pointing out that the petition is actually one for
declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court over which
this Court has no original jurisdiction.
The NHMFC, by Comment[15] filed on June 17, 2004, alleged that it
is not a party to any of the transactions with any of the parties in the present
case. It nevertheless adopted the comment of the Quezon City government
that the petition is premature and alleges facts which still need to be
proven.[16]
The petition must be dismissed.
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality
or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court can thus only review, revise, reverse, modify on appeal or
certiorari final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of, among other things, an ordinance is in
question. Foremost, therefore, is that there must be first a final judgment
rendered by an inferior court[17] before this Court can assume jurisdiction
over a case of this nature.
Verily, this Court does not conduct original and full trial of a main
factual issue like what petitioner is raising in the present petition. [18] It does
not analyze or weigh evidence brought before it at the first instance,
otherwise, it would preempt the primary function of the lower court to try the
case on the merits, receive evidence, and decide the case definitively. [19] Its
jurisdiction in cases which assail the validity of an ordinance is limited to
reviewing or revising final judgments or orders of lower courts and applying
the law based on their findings of facts brought before it.[20]
2
 In another vein, if this petition was to be considered as one for
declaratory relief, as observed by the OSG, it is not embraced within the
original jurisdiction of this Court.[21]Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order
or regulation, ordinance, or any other government
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising
from, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, or to quiet
title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to
consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil
Code may be brought under this Rule.
xxx
Finally, while a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one
for prohibition if it has far reaching implications and raises questions that
need to be resolved,[24] there is no allegation of facts by petitioner tending to
show that she is entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy must thus remain
that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it, except when the redress
sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and
compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling
for the exercise of this Courts primary jurisdiction.[25]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN
DANAO, FERMINA DANAO, LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA DANAO,
the last two are represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA
DANAO ACORDA,
Petitioners,

SEC. 4. Local government ordinances. In any action - versus -

involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the
corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and
government unit involved shall be similarly notified and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND MARIA LIGUTAN,
entitled to be heard. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) Respondents.

Respecting petitioners contention that since the ordinance violates G.R. No. 181303
national laws, the present petition delves on questions of law over which this Present:
Court has original jurisdiction,[22] the same fails.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
As reflected above, petitioners assertion that the invalidity of the
ordinance is premised on her claim that she has a better right to the parcel of Chairperson,
land referred to in the ordinance is a factual issue.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
At all events, even if this petition delves on questions of law, there is
no statutory or jurisprudential basis for according to this Court original and VELASCO, JR.,
exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief which advances only questions of
law.[23] NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.

3

Promulgated:
September 17, 2009
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Orders[1] dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007, and 31 October 2007,
rendered by Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City,
which dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the Complaint of petitioners Carmen
Danao Malana, Leticia Danao, Maria Danao Accorda, Evelyn Danao,
Fermina Danao, and Leonora Danao, against respondents Benigno Tappa,
Jerry Reyna, Saturnino Cambri, Francisco Ligutan and Maria Ligutan, in Civil
Case No. 6868.
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting
of Title, and Damages[2] against respondents on 27 March 2007, docketed
as Civil Case No. 6868. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are
the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-127937[3] situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property).
Petitioners inherited the subject property from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio),
who died intestate.[4] During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed
Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build
on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and
Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that
Anastacio and his heirs might need it.[5]
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members,[6]
continued to occupy the subject property even after her death, already
building their residences thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also
learned that respondents were claiming ownership over the subject property.
Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents
vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners
demand.[7]
Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the
conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject
property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of
ownership.
According to petitioners, respondents documents were highly dubious,
falsified, and incapable of proving the latters claim of ownership over the
subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud upon petitioners title to
the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a
Complaint to remove such cloud from their title.[8] Petitioners additionally
sought in their Complaint an award against respondents for actual damages,
in the amount of P50,000.00, resulting from the latters baseless claim over
the subject property that did not actually belong to them, in violation of Article
19 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.[9] Petitioners likewise prayed for
an award against respondents for exemplary damages, in the amount of
P50,000.00, since the latter had acted in bad faith and resorted to unlawful
means to establish their claim over the subject property. Finally, petitioners
asked to recover from respondents P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, because
the latters refusal to vacate the property constrained petitioners to engage
the services of a lawyer.[10]
Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated
4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No. 7691,[11] amending Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that
the subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners
action to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC
decreed in its 4 May 2007 Order that:
The Court has no jurisdiction over the action, it being a real action involving
a real property with assessed value less than P20,000.00 and hereby
dismisses the same without prejudice.[12]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC
Order dismissing their Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of
action was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely
to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents. Petitioners
Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the
4
Rules of Court[13] states that an action to quiet title falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.[14]
In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value
of real property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of
subject property per Tax Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real
action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.[15]
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which
they prayed that the RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007,
dismissing their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier
argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action
to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also
contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of
action, i.e., quieting of title and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint, citing
Rumarate v. Hernandez.[16] And even if the two causes of action could not
be joined, petitioners maintained that the misjoinder of said causes of action
was not a ground for the dismissal of their Complaint.[17]
The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners
Motion. It clarified that their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of
misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC dissected
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property
or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607
of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an
action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The
second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which
includes an action to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must
be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with
jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the real property
involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all
other places.[18] The dispositive part of the 31 October 2007 Order of the
RTC reads:
This Court maintains that an action to quiet title is a real action. [Herein
petitioners] do not dispute the assessed value of the property at P410.00
under Tax Declaration No. 02-48386. Hence, it has no jurisdiction over the
action.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion is hereby denied.[19]
Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the sole issue of:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE
PETITIONERS MOTU PROPRIO.[20]
Petitioners statement of the issue is misleading. It would seem that they are
only challenging the fact that their Complaint was dismissed by the RTC
motu proprio. Based on the facts and arguments set forth in the instant
Petition, however, the Court determines that the fundamental issue for its
resolution is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court rules in the negative.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under
a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The
relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination
of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the
parties rights or duties thereunder.[21]
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and the second
paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
5
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the
general circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory
relief, to wit:
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.)
As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under
the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the
appropriate RTC.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second
paragraph that:
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or
remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of
the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument,
recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to
quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an
action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in
a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered
similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the
legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.[22]
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the
second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision
must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not
categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It
repeatedly uses the word may that an action for quieting of title may be
brought under [the] Rule on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person
desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief may x x x bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court. The use of the word may in a statute
denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option.[23]
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended, uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title
to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed
P20,000.00, thus:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to,
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.)
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in
Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners
Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has
been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising
thereunder.[24] Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties
under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement
thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or
violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for
declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have
not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and
supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest
6
before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the
commission of wrongs.[25] silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the
court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of same ex mero motu or motu proprio. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction
over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners Complaint, acted in complete
action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or accord with law and jurisprudence, it cannot be said to have done so with
transgressed before the institution of the action.[26] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An act
of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been committed in
In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed after grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or
petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latters The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
express claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title. law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been hostility.[29] No such circumstances exist herein as to justify the issuance of
deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is a writ of certiorari.
the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for
declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The
possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007 and 31 October 2007 of the
the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3, dismissing the Complaint
is a suit that has for its object ones recovery of possession over the real in Civil Case No. 6868, without prejudice, are AFFIRMED. The Regional
property as owner.[27] Trial Court is ordered to REMAND the records of this case to the Municipal
Trial Court or the court of proper jurisdiction for proper disposition. Costs
Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion against the petitioners.
reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of
the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at
P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to SO ORDERED.
recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of ALFREDO O. ESTRERA, G.R. No. 154235-36
discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners Complaint in Civil (in his Official Capacity as the
Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction. Regional Director, Philippine Present:
Postal Corporation,
As for the RTC dismissing petitioners Complaint motu proprio, the following Postal Region 10),
pronouncements of the Court in Laresma v. Abellana[28] proves instructive: Petitioner, PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at CALLEJO, SR., and
the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the HON. LEONARDO DEMECILLO,
consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction and VENUS KAVOORI. Promulgated:
over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court Respondents. August 16, 2006

7
 On March 21, 2001 Regional Office Order No. 01-06 was
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x issued creating an investigation team to look into the said
allegations. x x x

DECISION After investigation, the investigating team submitted the

following recommendation.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: RECOMMENDATIONS:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING FACTS and

This resolves the petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the CIRCUMSTANCES, it is strongly recommended that:
Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 10, 2002
dismissing herein petitioners Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP xxxx
No. 67944[2] and the Resolution[3] of the CA dated June 17, 2002 which xxx
denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in the re-filed Petition
for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69407[4], and found petitioner and POSTMAN VENUS KAVOORI be ADMINISTRATIVELY
his counsel guilty of forum shopping, sentencing each of them to pay a fine charged for DISHONESTY, GROSS VIOLATION OF
of Fifteen Thousand Pesos, failing which, each of them is to suffer REGULATIONS and/or NEGLIGENCE and/or LAXITY IN
imprisonment of three (3) months. THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS

A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the narration of the POSTMAN VENUS KAVOORI be criminally charged for
antecedent facts set forth in the Order[5] of DISHONESTY (infidelity in the custody of official
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City (RTC) dated October 24, documents) and VIOLATIONS of the ANTI-GRAFT LAW
2001 is undisputed; hence, the pertinent portion of said Order is reproduced
hereunder: POSTMAN VENUS KAVOORI be
reassigned/transferred/detailed immediately in a work area
THE ANTECEDENT: Petitioner [herein private not directly handling mails, preferably at the APDM Office
respondent Kavoori] is employed with the Philippine Postal or Administrative and Finance Division, Philippine Postal
Corporation as POSTMAN II and assigned at the Registry Corporation.
Delivery Section of the Cagayan de Oro City Post Office.
On May 5, 2001, Cayetano T. Pacana IV, Director II and
Respondent [herein petitioner] Alfredo Estrera is the Concurrent Chief of the legal staff submitted his evaluation
Regional Director, Region 10 of the Philippine Postal of the report of the investigating team. x x x
Corporation.
On same date also, respondent [herein petitioner] filed a
Sometime in the second week of March 2001 BOMBO formal charge against petitioner [herein private
RADYO, DXIF, Cagayan de Oro City aired about the respondent].
alleged pilferage and/or loss of PVAO checks and foreign
mail matters and other alleged anomalies. xxx xxx xxx

8
On June 25, 2001, respondent [herein petitioner] issued
Regional Office [Order] No. 01-12. In this Order, petitioner
[herein private respondent] was reassigned from
the Cagayan de Oro City Office to the Motor Transport
Section, Mail Distribution Center.
Relative to the formal charge, petitioner [herein private
respondent] filed a motion to quash based on the following
grounds:
(a) that the complaint was not under oath;
(b) the complaint was only signed by
Alfredo Estrera and not the Postmaster
General;
(c) that the complaint should have been signed
by the fact-finding body;
(d) that there was no preliminary investigation
conducted before the filing of the charge;
(e) that the alleged affidavit of complaining
witnesses were executed after respondent
was investigated.
On June 14, 2001, respondent [herein petitioner]
issued an Order denying the motion to quash citing as
ground, Sec. 16, par. 3, Rule II of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
xxx xxx xxx
On June 25, 2001 petitioner [herein private
respondent] filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying his motion to quash.
On July 2, 2001, respondent [herein petitioner]
issued an order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration and required petitioner [herein respondent]
to submit her answer within five (5) days from receipt of
said order.
Feeling no more other recourse, petitioner [herein private
respondent] came to this court on prohibition, injunction
with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order and damages.[6] (Words in brackets,
supplied)
The RTC ruled in favor of herein private respondent, stating thus:
x x x The complaint was not subscribed and sworn to by
complainant and respondent Alfredo Estrera. It should
have been sworn as he is not a Postmaster General. Sec.
1 (b) Rule II of the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures of
the Philippine Postal Corporation provides:
Except when initiated by the Postmaster
General, no complaint against the
subordinate official or employees shall
be given due course unless the same is
in writing and subscribed and sworn to
by the complainant.
The complaint not being sworn, had no effect. The
proceedings initially had are hereby invalidated including
the creation of the fact-finding committee and the
designation of the members thereof and their report as
well as the evaluation report of the Chief Legal Staff
relative to the findings of the fact finding committee and
the designation of Lilia F. Eduarte as hearing officer and
Rafael S. Suangco and Guiling Manalocan as prosecuting
officers. Consequently, the injunction prayed for is hereby
granted. Mrs. Lilia Eduarte,
Rafael Suangco and Guiling Manalocan are hereby
enjoined from proceeding with the hearing.
Respondent Alfredo Estrera may however, refile again the
formal charge. In so doing he should observe the
Disciplinary Rules and Procedures of the Philippine Postal
Corporation and Circular No. 97-29.
SO ORDERED.[7]
9
Petitioner no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing RTC
Order and proceeded to file a petition for certiorari with the CA which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67944.
On January 10, 2002, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution, stating
thus:
However, after going over this petition, it was
found out that petitioners failed to attach or incorporate the
authority of Alfredo O. Estrera who signed the Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping to sign for and in
behalf of petitioner Lilia F. Eduarte in violation of Section
3, paragraph 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, hence, dismissible.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this
petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner did not to file a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
Resolution and instead filed another petition for certiorari with the CA
on February 8, 2002, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
69407. On March 13, 2002, the CA issued a Resolution, to wit:
RESOLUTION
Upon examination of the present Petition
for Certiorari, with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order, and it appearing that:
a) The petition assails the
Orders dated August 21, 2001 and
October 24, 2001, granting a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction, respectively, issued by
respondent Judge
Leonardo Demecillo of the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 24, in Civil Case No. 2001-190,
entitled: Venus Kavoori, Petitioner
versus Alfredo Estrera, et al.,
Respondents, which were previously the
subjects of another petition
for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining
order earlier filed with this Court by
Alfredo O. Estrera and Lilia F. Eduarte,
and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
67944, which was dismissed by the
former Fifteenth Division on January 10,
2002. Except for the exclusion of Lilia
F. Eduarte, the present petition, which
is filed solely by Alfredo O. Estrera,
appears to be exactly the same
petition as the one docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 67944 which, to repeat, has
already been dismissed, without any
motion for reconsideration having
been filed, so that it cannot be
revived as an entirely new petition;
b) Treated as a new petition,
the instant petition appears to have
been filed out of time, considering that
the petitioner received a copy of the
assailed Order dated October 24, 2001
on November 7, 2001, so that the last
day of the 60-day period within which to
file the same expired on January 6,
2002, whereas the instant petition was
filed only on February 8, 2002 and,
hence, already late by thirty-three (33)
days;
c) Moreover, the petitioner did
not first file with the respondent court
a motion for the reconsideration of
the assailed October 24, 2001, which
is a condition precedent to the filing
of a petition for certiorari; and
d) Lastly, the certificate of
non-forum shopping incorporated in
10
 the petition at bar is defective in that
it does not disclose the earlier filing
of a similar petition by herein The Honorable Court of Appeals:
petitioner Alfredo O. Estrera and Lilia
F. Eduarte which was, however, A.) FAILED SERIOUSLY TO
dismissed, thereby violating Section 3, APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT
Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-
Procedure, in relation to Section 5, Rule FORUM SHOPPING
7 of the same Rules. INCORPORATED TO THE
PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition G.R. SP NO. 67944 WAS
is DISMISSED OUTRIGHT, and the petitioner Alfredo DEEMED IN SUBSTANTIAL
O. Estrera and counsel Atty. Rene Artemio T. Pacana are COMPLIANCE WITH THE
both directed to show cause cause, within fifteen (15) days REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION
from notice hereof, why they should not be dealt with for 3, PARAGRAPH 3, RULE 46 OF
contempt of court for engaging in forum shopping. THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE. HENCE,
SO ORDERED.[9] (Emphasis supplied) GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION.

Petitioner then filed his Manifestation/Explanation [10] and his Motion for B.) SERIOUSLY FAILED TO
Reconsideration[11] both dated March 26, 2002. He explained that his failure CONSIDER THE FACT THAT
to disclose the previous petition for certiorari was through sheer DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION
inadvertence or oversight and the belief that since the previous petition had UNDER SECTION 3,
already been dismissed, there is no longer any similar case pending with the PARAGRAPH 3, RULE 46 OF
court. THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN RELATION TO
On June 17, 2002, the CA issued the second assailed Resolution, SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE
the dispositive portion of which states thus: SAME RULES SHALL BE
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion UNDERSTOOD TO BE
for reconsideration is DENIED; and the petitioner Alfredo WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
O. Estrera and counsel, Atty. Rene Artemio T. Pacana, are
found guilty of forum shopping and EACH is sentenced to C.) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos, failing FINDING THAT THE PETITION
in which, EACH is to suffer imprisonment of three (3) DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO.
months. 69407 WAS A REVIVAL OF THE
PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-
SO ORDERED.[12] G.R. SP NO. 67944 WHICH IT
EARLIER DISMISSED;

Hence, this petition for certiorari where petitioner alleges that:

11
 D.) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
TREATING THE PETITION Court of Appeals, et al. the special civil action for certiorari
DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
69407 AS A NEW PETITION jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for
AND IN FINDING THAT THE the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an
SAME WAS FILED OUT OF error committed while so engaged does not deprive it
TIME; of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court
E.) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
FINDING HEREIN PETITIONER judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario,
AND UNDERSIGNED COUNSEL the administration of justice would not survive. Hence,
GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING where the issue or question involved affects the
AND IMPOSING THE PENALTY wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the
OF FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the
FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS same is beyond the province of a special civil action
(P15,000.00) EACH OR TO for certiorari. x x x[15] (Emphasis supplied)
SUFFER IMPRISONMENT OF
THREE (3) MONTHS IN CASE
OF FAILURE THEREOF, As can be gleaned from the afore-quoted assignment of errors in
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF the petition, the issues alleged are only possible errors of judgment,
LAW; questioning the correctness of the CAs rulings. Hence, since the issues
involved do not affect the jurisdiction of the CA, the writ of certiorari cannot
F.) SERIOUSLY FAILED TO be availed of by petitioner.
APPRECIATE AND CONSIDER
THE PRESENCE OF Nevertheless, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that the CA
EXCEPTIONAL committed no errors.
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
JUSTIFIED HEREIN Indeed, the CA acted properly in dismissing CA-G.R. No. 67944 as
PETITIONER IN FILING THE the Section 3, Rule 46 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
PETITION WITHOUT FILING A failure of petitioner to comply with any of the requirements, such as the
MOTION FOR submission of a sworn certification of non-forum shopping by all the
RECONSIDERATION; AND petitioners, is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.Petitioner no
longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated January 10,
G.) FAILING TO DECIDE THE 2002, hence, the same attained finality.
PETITION ON ITS MERITS.[13]
Although it is true that the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 67944 was without prejudice and petitioner could have re-
The petition lacks merit. filed such petition, such re-filing should still be done within the prescribed
period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, or not
Petitioner must be reminded of the function of the remedy later than sixty days from notice of the assailed Order of the RTC. The CA
of certiorari. In People v. Court of Appeals,[14] the Court expounded thus: was correct in ruling that since petitioner received said RTC Order

12
dated October 24, 2001 on November 7, 2001, the last day for filing a
petition for certiorariwas on January 6, 2002. Thus, the filing of the petition Thus, since appeal was available to petitioner, the present petition
for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69407 on February 8, 2002 was for certiorari cannot be granted.
undoubtedly beyond the 60-day period provided for under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On this point alone, CA-G.R. SP No. 69407 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
was clearly dismissible and should not be given due course.
SO ORDERED.
It is also too late for petitioner to question the CA Resolution LAGUNA METTS G.R. No. 185220
dated January 10, 2002 through the present petition for certiorari. As CORPORATION,
discussed above, a petition for certiorarishould be filed within 60 days from Petitioner,
notice of the questioned resolution. Since petitioner received said CA
Resolution on January 22, 2002,[16] the last day for filing a petition Present:
for certiorari to question the same was on March 23, 2002. The present
petition was filed only on July 31, 2002, thus, filed beyond PUNO, C.J.,
the reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari. This Court, Chairperson,
therefore, can no longer entertain any arguments against the propriety of the CARPIO,
dismissal of CA-G.R. No. 67944. - v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
Lastly, the issue of the propriety of finding petitioner guilty of BERSAMIN,
contempt for forum shopping is also not within the province of a special JJ.
action for certiorari. As stated in People v. Court of Appeals,[17] issues merely COURT OF APPEALS,
questioning the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, not the ARIES C. CAALAM and
jurisdiction of the court rendering it, are not proper for a petition for certiorari. GERALDINE ESGUERRA,
Respondents. Promulgated:
Petitioners remedy to question the CAs finding of contempt should July 27, 2009
have been to appeal via a petition for review on certiorari. However,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, such x--------------------------------------------------x
petition should be filed 15 days after receipt of the CA Resolution dated June
17, 2002. Petitioner having received said Resolution on June 24, 2002, the RESOLUTION
last day for filing a petition for review on certiorari was on July 9, 2002, but
no such petition was filed. CORONA, J.:

The axiomatic rule, as stated in Madrigal Transport, Inc.

v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,[18] is that: This petition arose from a labor case filed by private respondents
Aries C. Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra against petitioner Laguna Metts
x x x Where appeal is available, certiorari will not Corporation (LMC).[1] The labor arbiter decided in favor of private
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of respondents and found that they were illegally dismissed by LMC. On
discretion. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
substitute for the lapsed remedy of reversed the decision of the labor arbiter in a decision dated February 21,
appeal.[19] (Emphasis supplied) 2008. Private respondents motion for reconsideration was denied in a
resolution dated April 30, 2008.

13

Counsel for private respondents received the April 30, 2008
resolution of the NLRC on May 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008, he filed a motion
for extension of time to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.[2] The motion alleged that, for reasons[3] stated therein, the petition
could not be filed in the Court of Appeals within the prescribed 60-day
period.[4] Thus, a 15-day extension period was prayed for.[5]
In a resolution dated August 7, 2008,[6] the Court of Appeals
granted the motion and gave private respondents a non-extendible period of
15 days within which to file their petition for certiorari. LMC moved for the
reconsideration of the said resolution claiming that extensions of time to file
a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 4,
2007.[7] This was denied in a resolution dated October 22, 2008. According
to the appellate court, while the amendment of the third paragraph of Section
4, Rule 65 admittedly calls for stricter application to discourage the filing of
unwarranted motions for extension of time, it did not strip the Court of
Appeals of the discretionary power to grant a motion for extension in
exceptional cases to serve the ends of justice.
Aggrieved, LMC now assails the resolutions dated August 7, 2008
and October 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in this petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It contends that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted private respondents
motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari as the Court of
Appeals had no power to grant something that had already been expressly
deleted from the rules.
We agree.
Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not
be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit. [8] As a
corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking
certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent
needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By
their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. [9]
In De Los Santos v. Court of Appeals,[10] we ruled:
Section 4 of Rule 65 prescribes a period of 60
days within which to file a petition for certiorari. The 60-
day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time
for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition
asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower
court. The period was specifically set to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy
disposition of their case. (emphasis supplied)
While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the
period for filing a petition for certiorari beyond the 60-day period,[11] the
amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions
of time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph that
previously permitted such extensions.
Section 4, Rule 65 previously read:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.
14
 No extension of time to file the petition shall be
granted except for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding 15 days.[12] (emphasis supplied)
With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it now reads:
SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. The
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a
municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an
officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or
not the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction.
If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-
judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or
these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or omission of a
municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be
filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.
As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or
phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the
deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a
change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should
accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its
amendment.[13]
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to
grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for
such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said
paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule
65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day
period within which to file a petition for certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is
essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the
paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did
away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for
certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or
from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
In granting the private respondents motion for extension of time to
file petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals disregarded A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC. The action amounted to a modification, if not outright reversal, by the
Court of Appeals of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In so doing, the Court of Appeals
arrogated to itself a power it did not possess, a power that only this Court
may exercise.[14] For this reason, the challenged resolutions dated August 7,
2008 and October 22, 2008 were invalid as they were rendered by the Court
of Appeals in excess of its jurisdiction.
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals retained the discretion to
grant extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari for compelling reasons,
the reasons proffered by private respondents counsel did not qualify as
compelling. Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving.[15] Standing
alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule.[16]
As to the other ground cited by private respondents counsel, suffice
it to say that it was a bare allegation unsubstantiated by any proof or affidavit
of merit. Besides, they could have filed the petition on time with a motion to
be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis. While social justice requires that the
law look tenderly on the disadvantaged sectors of society, neither the rich
nor the poor has a license to disregard rules of procedure. The fundamental
rule of human relations enjoins everyone, regardless of standing in life, to
duly observe procedural rules as an aspect of acting with justice, giving
everyone his due and observing honesty and good faith. [17] For indeed, while
technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly
procedure is essential to the success of that quest to which all courts are
devoted.[18]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolutions
dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
15
G.R. SP No. 104510 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the
said case is ordered DISMISSEDfor having been filed out of time.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191215 February 3, 2014
THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly INTERMARE MARITIME
AGENCIES, INC.)/ OCEANIC NAVIGATION LTD. and NICANOR B.
ALTARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMANDA C. MENDIGORIN (In behalf of her
deceased husband GUILLERMO MENDIGORIN), Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails
the Resolution1 dated November 20, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 110808 for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA, through the
said Resolution, entertained private respondent's Petition for Certiorari2
despite having been filed 15 days late and allowed her to correct the
technical infirmities therein. Also assailed is the CA's February 10, 2010
Resolution3 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to
Dismiss4 and giving private respondent another chance to cure the
remaining deficiencies of the petition.
Factual Antecedents
This case stemmed from a complaint for death benefits, unpaid salaries,
sickness allowance, refund of medical expenses, damages and attorney’s
fees filed by Amanda C. Mendigorin (private respondent) against petitioner
Thenamaris Philippines, Inc., formerly Intermare Maritime Agencies,
Inc./Oceanic Navigation Ltd., (Thenamaris), represented by its general
manager, Capt. Nicanor B. Altares (petitioner), filed with the Labor Arbiter
(LA). Private respondent is the widow of seafarer Guillermo M. Mendigorin
(Guillermo) who was employed by Thenamaris for 27 years as an oiler and
eventually, as second engineer in the latter’s vessels. Guillermo was
diagnosed with and died of colon cancer during the term of the employment
contract between him and Thenamaris.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
Ultimately, the LA promulgated his Decision5 dated January 29, 2008 in
favor of private respondent. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the complainant [herein private respondent] and finding respondents
[herein petitioners] liable to pay jointly and severally: (a) death benefits
amounting to US $50,000.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of actual
payment; (b) reimbursement of medical expenses amounting to
₱102,759.74; [(c)] moral and exemplary damages amounting to ₱100,000.00
and ₱50,000.00 respectively; and (d) attorney’s fees in the [amount of] ten
percent (10%) of the total monetary award.
All other claims are DENIED.6
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
On appeal, the NLRC reversed7 the LA’s Decision.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration.8 In a Resolution9 dated June
29, 2009, however, her motion was denied for lack of merit.
Private respondent, through counsel, received the June 29, 2009 Resolution
of the NLRC on July 8, 2009. Sixty-two days thereafter, or on September 8,
2009, she filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari10
before the CA. Private respondent alleged that she had until September 7,
2009 (as September 6, 2009, the actual last day for filing, fell on a Sunday)
within which to file a petition for certiorari. However, as her counsel was then
saddled and occupied with equally important cases, it would be impossible
for him to file the petition on time, especially since the case involves
voluminous documents necessary in the preparation thereof. Accordingly,
private respondent asked for an extension of 15 days from September 7,
2009, or until September 22, 2009, within which to file the petition.
On September 22, 2009, private respondent filed her Petition for Certiorari11
before the CA.
16
Action of the Court of Appeals
In a Resolution12 dated November 20, 2009, the CA noted that private
respondent’s Petition for Certiorari was filed 15 days late and suffers from
procedural infirmities. Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the
CA entertained the petition and directed private respondent to cure the
technical flaws in her petition. Thus:
The Court, in the interest of justice, resolved to NOTE the petition for
certiorari filed on September 22, 2009, albeit the same was filed fifteen (15)
days late.
A perusal of the instant petition reveals the following procedural infirmities,
namely:
(1) The attached Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping does not
conform with the requirements under Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules of
Notarial Practice, as a Community Tax Certificate is no longer considered
competent evidence of an affiant’s identity; and
(2) Except for the copy of the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission, no other copies of pertinent and
relevant pleadings/documents are attached therewith, such as petitioner’s
Complaint, respondent’s Memorandum of Appeal, petitioner’s Opposition to
Respondent’s Appeal, if any, all of which may aid this Court in judiciously
resolving the issues raised in the petition.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court, in line with the rule that cases should be
determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of
their causes and defenses have been given, rather than on technicality or
some procedural imperfections, resolved to DIRECT petitioner to submit
anew a Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping which complies
with the requirements of the rules, and clear and legible copies of the
aforementioned pleadings/documents, within ten (10) days from receipt of
notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Dismiss,14
strongly opposing private respondent’s Motion for Extension to File Petition
for Certiorari for being an absolutely prohibited pleading. Citing Laguna
Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,15 petitioners argued that A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC16 effectively rendered the 60-day period for filing a petition for
certiorari non-extendible after it deleted portions of Rule 65 pertaining to
extension of time to file petition. Thus, as the rule now stands, petitions for
certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from
the order denying a motion for reconsideration.17
Petitioners also contended that even assuming that an extension is still
allowable, private respondent’s motion for extension is nevertheless a
useless piece of paper as it was filed beyond the 60-day period for filing a
petition for certiorari.
Lastly, petitioners asserted that as private respondent’s motion for extension
is a prohibited pleading, as well as one filed outside of the reglementary
period, then private respondent’s Petition for Certiorari is a mere scrap of
paper with no remedial value whatsoever. Consequently, the Decision of the
NLRC has become final and executory and is beyond the ambit of judicial
review.
In the meantime, private respondent submitted her Compliance18 with the
CA’s Resolution of November 20, 2009. Nevertheless, she still failed to
attach thereto copies of her Complaint filed before the LA and Memorandum
filed with the NLRC.
In a Resolution19 dated February 10, 2010, the CA denied petitioners’
motion and, instead, gave private respondent one last opportunity to fully
comply with its November 20, 2009 Resolution by submitting clear and
legible copies of the still lacking pleadings within five days from notice
thereof.
Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari.
Entry of Judgment20 was already issued by the NLRC on August 13, 2009.
Per NLRC Rules, the June 29, 2009 Resolution became final and executory
on July 18, 2009 and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Issues
1. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT NOTED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE
17
PRIVATE RESPONDENT INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT FOR
HAVING BEEN FILED BEYOND THE MANDATORY AND
JURISDICTIONAL 60-DAY PERIOD REQUIRED BY SECTION 4, RULE 65
OF THE RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED BY A.M. NO. 07-7-12-SC.
2. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN, IN NOTING THE VERY LATE PETITION FILED BY
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT, IT GROSSLY IGNORED THIS
HONORABLE COURT’S VERY RECENT RULING IN LAGUNA METTS
CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM AND
GERALDINE ESGUERRA (G.R. NO. 185220, JULY 27, 2009), WHICH
DISALLOWED ANY MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65.21 (Underscoring and
emphasis in the original)
Our Ruling
There is merit in the petition.
In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.22 we had the occasion to
settle the seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue
of whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. In
said case we stated that the general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metts
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,23 is that a petition for certiorari must be
filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying
a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment
introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC24 where no provision for the filing of a
motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original
Section 4 of Rule 6525 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.26 Under exceptional
cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan,27 the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s
sound discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the provisions in
Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time did not make the filing of such
pleading absolutely prohibited. "If such were the intention, the deleted
portion could just have simply been reworded to state that ‘no extension of
time to file the petition shall be granted.’ Absent such a prohibition, motions
for extension are allowed, subject to the court’s sound discretion."28
Then in Labao v. Flores,29 we laid down some of the exceptions to the strict
application of the 60-day period rule, thus:
[T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1)
most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within
a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without
appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to
each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12)
importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by
the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.1âwphi1 Thus, there
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
rules.
In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel’s receipt of the June 29,
2009 NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until
September 7, 2009 to file her petition or a motion for extension, as
September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday.
However, the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009.30 It is a
fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be
filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended; otherwise, the
same is of no effect since there would no longer be any period to extend,
and the assailed judgment or order will have become final and executory.31
Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of
the litigant invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was
unable to abide by the rules.32 Here, the reason offered for availing of the
motion for extension is the heavy workload of private respondent’s counsel,
which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated in Labao.
Time and again, we have held that the excuse of "heavy workload is relative
and often self-serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate
from the 60-day rule."33
Thus, private respondent’s motion for extension should have been denied
outright.
18
Notably, the CA’s November 20, 2009 Resolution refrained from ruling on
the timeliness of private respondent’s motion for extension. Instead, it
directly ruled on the Petition for Certiorari as seen by its statement "[t]he
Court x x x resolved to NOTE the petition for certiorari x x x, albeit the same
was filed fifteen (15) days late." To our mind, the foregoing pronouncement
is an indirect acknowledgment on the part of the CA that the motion for
extension was indeed filed late. Yet it opted to still entertain and "note" the
Petition for Certiorari, justifying its action as being "in the interest of justice."
We do not approve of the CA’s ruling on the matter because, as the motion
for extension should have been denied outright, it necessarily follows that
the Petition for Certiorari is, in the words of petitioners, a "mere scrap of
paper with no remedial value whatsoever."
In Negros Slashers, Inc. v. Teng,34 which likewise dealt with the late filing of
a petition for certiorari, we recognized that although procedural rules ought
to be strictly enforced by courts in order to impart stability in the legal
system, we have, nonetheless, relaxed the rigid application of the rules of
procedure in several cases to afford the parties the opportunity to fully
ventilate their cases on the merits. This is because the ends of justice would
be better served if the parties were given the chance to argue their causes
and defenses. We are likewise constantly reminded that the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the opposing
claims of the competing parties and always be guided by the principle that
procedure must not hinder but, rather, promote the administration of justice.
Concomitant thereto:
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to
speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to due process. In
numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules
when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity. x x
x35
Here, even assuming that the late filing of the petition would merit relaxation
of the rules, the CA’s resolution would have only been acceptable had
private respondent shown respect for the rules by submitting a petition for
certiorari which is sufficient in form. In contrast, what private respondent filed
was a petition plagued by several infirmities. Worse, when the CA allowed
petitioner to cure the deficiencies, she failed to fully comply such that she
had to be given, albeit undeservingly, one last chance to submit the still
lacking copies of the pertinent pleadings required of her by the CA.
More importantly, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright in view
of the fact that the June 29, 2009 Resolution of the NLRC denying private
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration had already become final and
executory as of July 18, 2009.36 Thus, it has no jurisdiction to entertain the
petition, except to order its dismissal. In Labao, we held that:
The NLRC’s resolution became final ten (10) days after counsel’s receipt,
and the respondent’s failure to file the petition within the required (60)-day
period rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the resolution.
Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of
the land. All the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to
rest once a judgment becomes final and executory; execution of the decision
proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights are acquired by the winning
party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
decision on the case. After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is
tantamount to a decision on the merits. Otherwise, there will be no end to
litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist
in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and
order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.37
In sum, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended
underserved and unwarranted liberality to private respondent. "There is
grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of
law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on
caprice, whim and despotism xx x."38 Such is present here as shown by the
CA's obstinate refusal to dismiss the case despite the late filing of the motion
for extension and the flimsy excuse for the extension sought, the late filing of
the petition and the numerous infirmities attending the same, and private
respondent's continued defiance of its directive. These circumstances serve
to highlight private respondent's propensity to disregard the very rules that
the courts, the litigants and the lawyers are duty-bound to follow.
19

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Court of
Appeals Resolutions dated November 20, 2009 and February 10, 2010 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Petition for
Certiorari filed by private respondent Amanda C. Mendigorim in CA-G.R. SP
No. 110808 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175723, February 04, 2014
THE CITY OF MANILA, REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA,
JR., AND MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE CITY
TREASURER OF MANILA, Petitioners, v. HON. CARIDAD H.
GRECIA�CUERDO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 112, PASAY CITY; SM MART, INC.;
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER;
SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON
PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.;
SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION AND SIGNATURE LINES,
Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions1 dated April
6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA�G.R.
SP No. 87948.
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer,
petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January
to December 2002 against private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime
Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware
Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart
Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition
to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section
14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said
assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to
collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes
assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits,
private respondents were constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77
assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City] the complaint denominated as one for �Refund or Recovery
of Illegally and/or Erroneously�Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition
with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction� which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 04�0019�CFM before public respondent�s sala
[at Branch 112]. In the amended complaint they filed on February 16, 2004,
private respondents alleged that, in relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative of the limitations
and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local
Government Code] on double taxation. They further averred that petitioner
city�s Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM
had already been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the
Department of Justice.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In its Order3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents�
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied it in its
Order5 dated October 15, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing
the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC.6
In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed
petitioners� petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the
said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents� complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is
vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded
jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition
for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said
case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its
Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
20
Hence, the present petition raising the following To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary �
I� Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in 3,118,104.63
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. �
To plaintiff Star Appliances Center
II� Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its �
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a 2,152,316.54
Writ of Injunction the petitioners[,] their agents and/or authorized �
representatives from implementing Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc.
of Manila, as amended, against private respondents. �
1,362,750.34
III� Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its �
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc.
Injunction despite failure of private respondents to make a written claim for �
tax credit or refund with the City Treasurer of Manila. 419,689.04
�
IV� Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care Health Stores Phils., Inc.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that under �
Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, they are mere 231,453.62
collecting agents of the City Government. �
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp.
V� Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its �
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of 140,908.54
Injunction because petitioner City of Manila and its constituents would result �
to greater damage and prejudice thereof. (sic)8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp.
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant �
petition should be denied for being moot and academic. 220,204.70
�
U pon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp.
discovered that a Decision9 in the main case had already been rendered by �
the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which reads as 94,906.34
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary �
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders � � � �
JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant to grant a tax TOTAL: �
refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code P 19,316,458.77
of the City of Manila as amended for the year 2002 in the following �
amounts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21,
To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.
�
P 11,462,525.02 SO ORDERED.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
�

21
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above
Decision had already become final and executory per the Certificate of
Finality11 issued by the same trial court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ
of Execution12 was issued by the RTC on November 25, 2009.
In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the issues raised in the
present petition, which merely involve the incident on the preliminary
injunction issued by the RTC, have already become moot and academic
considering that the trial court, in its decision on the merits in the main case,
has already ruled in favor of respondents and that the same decision is now
final and executory. Well entrenched is the rule that where the issues have
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby
rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.13
In any case , the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on jurisdiction
raised by petitioners owing to its significance and for future guidance of both
bench and bar. It is a settled principle that courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.14
However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the
Court deems it proper to likewise address a procedural error which
petitioners committed.
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the
Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their petition filed with the said court
and their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute
that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as
they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an
assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved
party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case.15
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally�settled rule that a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based
on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.16 As such, it cannot be a substitute for
a lost appeal.17
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of
Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated
a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if
the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which
to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are
averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the
rules.18 Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15�day
reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
that an error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the
issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules
and, thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
certiorari.
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central issue
in this case. The basic question posed before this Court is whether or not the
CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA 1125)
creating the CTA and giving to the said court jurisdiction over the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for
customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or release
of property affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation
thereto; or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part
of law administered by the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property or other matters
arising under the Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative
thereto.
22
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282
(RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA,
enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate
court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory act
provides thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. � The CTA shall exercise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a
specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a
denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original
or appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for
customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release
of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or
other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by
the Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of
real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment
appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him
automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and
Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of
nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of
Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving
dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively,
of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic
Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to
impose said duties.
b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein
provided:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from
violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code
and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned
in this paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of
charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos ( P
1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried
by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any
provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the
civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately
from the criminal action will be recognized.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respected
territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax
cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and
executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provides,
23
however, that collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees,
exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (
P 1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection
cases:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them, in their
respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax
collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective
jurisdiction.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly stated
that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or
resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,there is no
categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282,
which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed
before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere
existence of appellate jurisdiction.20 Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v.
COMELEC,21Garcia v. De Jesus,22Veloria v. COMELEC,23Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,24 and Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan,25 this Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or
tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which
expressly gives these tribunals such power.26 It must be observed,
however, that with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,27 these
rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi�judicial
powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 824928 now
provides that the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari,habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the
Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives
the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power
to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of
certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under
Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such
power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and
that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly
interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases
falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus,
follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the
CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also
such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should
only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as
the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al.29 that �if a case may
24
be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court
or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.�30 This principle was affirmed in
De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,31 where the Court stated that �a court may
issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has
jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions
of the lower court.�32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were
reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo33 and Bulilis
v. Nuez.34
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that
when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners� contention that jurisdiction over
their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the
exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over
basically the same subject matter � precisely the split�jurisdiction situation
which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.35 The Court
cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering
that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local
tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power.
Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents� complaint for tax refund is vested in
the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the
same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one
court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an
incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced
judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the
law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by
giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against
interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the
appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in
consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of
appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the
RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in
aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the
CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should
co�exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by
appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete
supervision over the acts of the latter.36
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power
necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the
subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the
appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the
decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters
necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this
purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any
act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in
cases pending before it.37
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with
a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it
to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as
powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them
in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its
process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same
level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of
justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are
necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are
essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to
the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and
suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to
maintain the court�s jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the
litigants.38
Thus, this Court has held that �while a court may be expressly granted the
incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of
jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary
25
and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing
laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its
judgments and mandates.�39 Hence, demands, matters or questions
ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming
within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal
matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide
matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance.40
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the
authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning
interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the
powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule
that, insofar as quasi�judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue
writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by
law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their appellate
jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi�judicial bodies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193253, September 08, 2015
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE AGNES VST
DEVANADERA, ACTING SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
HONORABLE JOVENCITO R. ZU�O, PEDRITO L. RANCES, ARMAN A.
DE ANDRES, PAUL CHI TING CO, KENNETH PUNDANERA, MANUEL T.
CO, SALLY L. CO, STANLEY L. TAN, ROCHELLE E. VICENCIO, LIZA R.
MAGAWAY, JANICE L. CO, VIVENCIO ABA�O, GREG YU, EDWIN
AGUSTIN, VICTOR D. PIAMONTE, UNIOIL PETROLEUM PHILIPPINES,
INC., AND OILINK, INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Resolutions dated March 26, 20101 and August 4, 2010,2 and to reinstate
the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 113069, or in the alternative, to
issue a decision finding probable cause to prosecute the private respondents
for violation of Sections 3601 and 3602, in relation to Sections 2503 and
2530, paragraphs f and 1 (3), (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines (TCCP), as amended.
The antecedents are as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Private respondent UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. is engaged in
marketing, distribution, and sale of petroleum, oil and other products, while
its co-respondent OILINK International, Inc. is engaged in manufacturing,
importing, exporting, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in at wholesale and
retails of petroleum, oil, gas and of any and all refinements and by�products
thereof. Except for respondent Victor D. Piamonte who is a Licensed
Customs Broker, the following private respondents are either officers or
directors of UNIOIL or OILINK:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Paul Chi Ting Co - Chairman of UNIOIL and OILINK
2. Kenneth Pundanera - President/Director of UNIOIL
3. Manuel T. Co - Officer/Director of UNIOIL
4. Sally L. Co - Officer/Director of UNIOIL
5. Stanley L. Tan - Officer/Director of UNIOIL
6. Rochelle E. Vicencio - Corporate Administrative Supervisor of UNIOIL
7. Liza R. Magaway - President of OILINK
8. Janice L. Co - Director of OILINK
9. Vivencio Aba�o - Director of OILINK
10. Greg Yu - Director of OILINK
11. Edwin Agustin - Corporate Secretary of OILINK
On January 30, 2007, Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales of petitioner
Bureau of Customs (BOC) issued Audit Notification Letter (ANL) No.
0701246,3 informing the President of OILINK that the Post Entry Audit
Group (PEAG) of the BOC will be conducting a compliance audit, including
the examination, inspection, verification and/or investigation of all pertinent
records of OILINK's import transactions for the past three (3)-year period
counted from the said date.
26

On March 2, 2007, a pre-audit conference was held between the BOC Audit
Team4 and the representatives of OILINK.5 During the conference, the Audit
Team explained to OILINK representatives the purpose of the post-entry
audit and the manner by which it would be conducted, and advised it as to
the import documents required for such audit.
On March 14, 2007, OILINK submitted to the Audit Team the following
documents: Post-Entry Audit Group General Customs Questionnaire,
General Information Sheet for the year 2006, SEC Registration, Articles of
Incorporation, Company By-laws, and Audited Financial Report for the year
2005.
On April 20, 2007, the Audit Team requested OILINK to submit the other
documents stated in the List of Initial Requirements for Submission, namely:
2004 Audited Financial Report, 2004-2006 Quarterly VAT Returns with the
accompanying schedule of importations, Organizational chart/structure, and
List of foreign suppliers with details on the products imported and the total
amount, on a yearly basis.
On May 7, 2007, OILINK expressed its willingness to comply with the
request for the production of the said documents, but claimed that it was
hampered by the resignation of its employees from the Accounting and
Supply Department. OILINK also averred that it would refer the matter to the
Commissioner of Customs in view of the independent investigation being
conducted by the latter.
On June 4, 2007, OILINK sent a letter stating that the documents which the
Audit Team previously requested were available with the Special Committee
of the BOC, and that it could not open in the meantime its Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) - registered books of accounts for validation and review
purposes.
In a letter dated July 11, 2007, the Audit Team informed OILINK of the
adverse effects of its request for the postponement of the exit conference
and its continuous refusal to furnish it the required documents. It advised
OILINK that such acts constitute as waiver on its part to be informed of the
audit findings and an administrative case would be filed against it, without
prejudice to the filing of a criminal action.
On July 24, 2007, Commissioner Morales approved the filing of an
administrative case against OILINK for failure to comply with the
requirements of Customs Administrative Order (CAO) No. 4-2004.6 Such
case was filed on July 30, 2007.
On September 20, 2007, an Order was issued by the Legal Service of the
BOC, submitting the case for resolution in view of OILINK's failure to file its
Answer within the prescribed period.
On December 14, 2007, the Legal Service of the BOC rendered a Decision
finding that OILINK violated Section IV.A.2(c) and (e) of CAO 4-20047 when
it refused to furnish the Audit Team copies of the required documents,
despite repeated demands. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds herein respondent
liable for violating Sections IV.A.2 (c) and (e) of Customs Administrative
Order No. 4-2004, and a DECISION is hereby rendered:cralawlawlibrary
1. Ordering OILINK� INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION to pay the
equivalent of twenty percent (20%) ad valorem on the article/s subject of the
Importation for which no records were kept and maintained as prescribed in
Section 2504 of the Customs Code in the amount of Pesos: Two Billion
Seven Hundred Sixty-Four Million Eight Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand Three
Hundred Four and 80/100 (Php 2,764,859,304.80);
2. Ordering the Bureau of Customs to hold the delivery or release of
subsequent imported articles to answer for the fine, any revised assessment,
and/or as a penalty for failure to keep records.
This is without prejudice to the filing of a criminal case or any appropriate
legal action against the importer in order to protect the interest of the
government and deter other importers from committing the same offense.
SO ORDERED8
Pursuant to the Decision dated December 14, 2007, Commissioner Morales,
in a letter9 of even date, directed the President of OILINK to pay the BOC
the administrative fine of P2,764,859,304.80 for violation of CAO No. 4-2004,
in relation to Section 2504 of the TCCP. Copy of the said Decision and letter
were served to OILINK through personal service on December 28,
2007.10cralawrednad
27
On March 13, 2008, Atty. Noemi B. Alcala, Officer-in-Charge, Collection
Service, Revenue and Monitoring Group, sent a final demand letter for
OILINK to settle the administrative fine, otherwise, the BOC will be
compelled to file the necessary legal action and put in force Section 150811
of the TCCP against its succeeding shipments to protect the government's
interest.12cralawrednad
On April 23, 2008, a Hold Order13 was issued by Horacio P. Suansing, Jr.,
District Collector, Port of Manila, against all shipments of OILINK for failure
to settle its outstanding account with the BOC and to protect the interest of
the government pursuant to Section 1508 of the TCCP.
On May 2, 2008, Rochelle E. Vicencio, Corporate Administrative Supervisor
of UNIOIL, citing the existing Terminalling Agreement dated January 2, 2008
with OILINK for the Storage of UNIOIL's aromatic process oil and industrial
lubricating oils (collectively, "base oils"), requested District Collector
Suansing Jr. to allow it to withdraw base oils from OILINK's temporarily
closed Terminal.
On May 6, 2008, Commissioner Morales granted the request of UNIOIL to
withdraw its base oils stored at OILINK's terminal/depot based on the
Terminalling Agreement between the two companies, subject to the following
conditions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1.� Only Unioil products shall be withdrawn subject to proper inventory by
the BIR and BOC.
2.� Appropriate duties and taxes due on the products to be withdrawn are
fully paid or settled.
3.� The company should allow the operation/withdrawal to be closely
monitored and continuously underguarded by assigned Customs
personnel.14
On May 9, 2008, a Warrant of Seizure and Detention (WSD), docketed as
Seizure Identification (S.I.) No. 2008-082, was issued by District Collector
Suansing Jr., directing the BOC officials to seal and padlock the oil
tanks/depots of OILINK located in Bataan.
On May 12, 2008, Kenneth C. Pundanera, Operations Manager of UNIOIL,
requested Zaldy E. Almoradie, District Collector of Mariveles, Bataan, for
permission to release UNIOIL-owned products from OILINK's storage
terminal. Pertinent portion of the request letter
reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Unioil is a licensed importer of various Petroleum Products by virtue of its
import license LTAD-0-021-2002 issued on March 26, 2002 which was
revised to include all other petroleum products in 2007 through LTAMII (P)
001-10-07-13639. To pursue its line of business, Unioil has an existing
Terminalling Agreement with Oilink for the storage of various Unioil products
at the Oilink terminal located at Lucanin Pt, Mariveles, Bataan.
In view of the said temporary closure of Oilink's terminal, Unioil is currently
unable to fully utilize its leased tanks as well as make use of the products
contained therein. We understand that there is still an unresolved issue
between Oilink and the Bureau of Customs. However, with all due respect,
said issue should not affect Unioil because it is not a party to the same,
furthermore there is a legal and binding terminalling agreement between
Oilink and Unioil which should be honored.
Last May 8, 2008, an asphalt importation for Unioil Petroleum Philippines,
Inc. arrived in Mariveles, Bataan. This was issued the corresponding
discharging permit by the Bureau of Customs. All duties, excise taxes and
value added taxes for this product have already been settled. However, we
are still unable to withdraw these products in order to serve our customers
who are using the product to supply major government infrastructure projects
in the country.
In line with the endorsement coming from the Bureau of Customs
Commissioner Napoleon D. Morales issued last May 6, 2008, Unioil has
complied with the conditions stipulated therein which
are:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Only Unioil products shall be withdrawn subject to proper inventory by the
BIR and BOC.
2. Appropriate duties and taxes due on the products to be withdrawn are fully
paid or settled.
3. The company (Unioil) should allow the operation/withdrawal to be closely
monitored and continuously underguarded by assigned Customs personnel.
28
In this regard, may we respectfully request your good office to please allow As far as Unioil is concerned, we affirm to your good office that the products
Unioil to withdraw from Oilink's terminal its products which are stored in the withdrawn/loaded at the Terminal are entirely Unioil products. Unioil owns
following tanks[:]15cralawrednad these products pursuant to its supply and terminalling agreements with
Oilink. (We shall be submitting to you copies of these documents as soon as
TANK they arrive from our office in Manila.) In addition, due to the issue involving
PROD Oilink and the Bureau of Customs, Unioil was forced to secure its petroleum
CONTENTS (Liters) products from local sources in order to comply with its valid contractual
2 commitments.
diesel
2,171,670.00 Unioil intended to withdraw these products because it believed in good faith
6 and based on documents in its possession that it is allowed to do so. Unioil
rexo based its intention pursuant to the Indorsements of the Collector of the Port
1,862,846.00 of Manila as well as the Office of the Commissioner that allowed the
10 withdrawal of Unioil products subject to compliance with the three (3)
asphalt conditions specified in the abovementioned Indorsements.
4,573.14
13 This being the precedent, we believe in good faith that, since Unioil owns the
gasoline products, and it is considered a stranger to the issue between Oilink and the
809,345.00 Bureau, then Unioil is allowed to withdraw the products it owns subject to the
14 compliance with the three (3) stated conditions. Besides, any withdrawal is
gasoline covered by an appropriate delivery receipt, which would clearly indicate that
746,629.00 Unioil owns the products being withdrawn.17
17
diesel In a complaint-affidavit dated December 15, 2008, Atty. Balmyrson M.
360,097.00 Valdez, a member of the petitioner BOC's Anti-Oil Smuggling Coordinating
19 Committee that investigated the illegal withdrawal by UNIOIL of oil products
sn500 consigned to OILINK, valued at P181,988,627.00 with corresponding duties
203,659.00 and taxes in the amount of P35,507,597.00, accused the private
20 respondents of violation of Sections 360118 and 3602,19 in relation to
sn500 Sections 250320 and 2530,21 paragraphs f and 1 (3), (4) and (5), of the
643,236.00 TCCP.

In the same request letter, District Collector Almoradie approved the release
of the above petroleum products through a handwritten note dated May 12,
2008: "All concerned: Pls. allow the release of the Unioil-owned products
from the Oilink Storage Terminal per this request. Thanks."16cralawrednad
On May 15, 2008, Pundanera wrote a clarificatory letter pursuant to the
verbal instruction of District Collector Almoradie to explain the withdrawal of
products from the Terminal of OILINK, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In a letter22 dated December 15, 2008, Commissioner Morales referred to
the Office of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno the said complaint-
affidavit, together with its annexes, for preliminary investigation. During the
said investigation, BOC's counsel appeared and all of the private
respondents submitted their respective counter-affidavits.
In a Resolution23 dated May 29, 2009, public respondent Arman A. De
Andres, State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ), recommended
the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. The

29
Resolution was approved by public respondents Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Pedrito L. Ranees and Chief State Prosecutor Zuflo. On
automatic review, the Resolution was affirmed by then Secretary of Justice
Raul M. Gonzales.24cralawrednad
Dissatisfied, the BOC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the public respondent, the Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes VST
Devanadera, in a Resolution25cralawred dated December 28, 2009.
On March 11, 2010, the BOC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
In the Resolution dated March 26, 2010, the CA dismissed outright the
petition due to procedural defects:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The instant petition (i) contains no explanation why service thereof was not
done personally (Sec. 11, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure); (ii) shows
that it has no proper verification and certification against forum shopping and
(iii) the docket and other lawful fees payment is short by P1,530.0026
In the Resolution dated August 4, 2010, the CA denied the private
respondents' motion for reconsideration of the March 26, 2010 Resolution,
as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We made a cursory examination of the petition filed in this case as well as
the whole rollo of the case. It is our finding that, up to the date hereof, the
petitioner has not duly submitted to this Court another set of petition with a
certification against forum shopping embodied therein or appended thereto.
Thus, the petition really suffers from a fatal defect until now, and so, the
petitioner has to bear the consequence thereof.27
The CA stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a
party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed
except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not
mean that Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the
prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their
just resolution.
Aggrieved, the BOC filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising
the following issues:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT, ALLEGEDLY, IT DID NOT RECEIVE
THE SECOND AND COMPLETE COPY OF THE PETITION, CONTAINING
THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM
SHOPPING.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED ITS 26
MARCH 2010 RESOLUTION, DISMISSING THE PETITION ON ACCOUNT
OF MERE TECHNICALITIES.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT LOOK INTO THE MERITS OF THE
CASE, WHERE IT WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT THERE IS
PROBABLE CAUSE TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR TRIAL FOR
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3601 AND 3602 IN RELATION TO SECTION
2530, PARAGRAPHS (E), AND SECTION 3604 (D), (E), (F), AND (H) OF
THE TCCP, AS AMENDED.28
The petition is partly meritorious.
Although the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter was not raised
at bench by either of the parties, the Court will first address such question
before delving into the procedural and substantive issues of the instant
petition. After all, it is the duty of the courts to consider the question of
jurisdiction before they look into other matters involved in the case, even
though such question is not raised by any of the parties.29 Courts are bound
to take notice of the limits of their authority and, even if such question is
neither raised by the pleadings nor suggested by counsel, they may
recognize the want of jurisdiction and act accordingly by staying pleadings,
dismissing the action, or otherwise noticing the defect, at any stage of the
proceedings.30 Besides, issues or errors not raised by the parties may be
resolved by the Court where, as in this case, the issue is one of jurisdiction;
it is necessary in arriving at a just decision; and the resolution of the issues
raised by the parties depend upon the determination of the unassigned issue
or error, or is necessary to give justice to the parties.31cralawrednad
30

On the issue of whether or not the CA has certiorari jurisdiction over the
resolution of the Acting Secretary of Justice, affirming the dismissal of the
complaint-affidavit for violation of provisions of the TCCP due to lack of
probable cause, the Court rules in negative.
The elementary rule is that the CA has jurisdiction to review the resolution of
the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.32 However, with the
enactment33 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9282, amending R.A. No. 112534 by
expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and
elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction, it
is no longer clear which between the CA and the CTA has jurisdiction to
review through a petition for certiorari the DOJ resolution in preliminary
investigations involving tax and tariff offenses.
Apropos is City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo35 where the Court en banc
declared that the CTA has appellate jurisdiction over a special civil action for
certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax
case, despite the fact that there is no categorical statement to that effect
under R.A. No. 1125, as well as the amendatory R.A. No. 9282.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals,
Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate
court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue,
among others, a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of
certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under
Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such
power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and
that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly
interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases
falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus,
follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the
CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also
such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should
only be considered as partial, not total.
xxxx
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that
when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their
certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the
exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over
basically the same subject matter - precisely the split-jurisdiction situation
which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court cannot
accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the
law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local
tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power.
Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the
CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the
same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one
31
court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an
incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced
judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the
law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by
giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against
interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the
appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in
consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of
appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the
RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in
aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the
CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-
exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by
appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete
supervision over the acts of the latter.
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power
necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the
subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the
appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the
decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters
necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this
purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any
act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in
cases pending before it.
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with
a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it
to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as
powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them
in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its
process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same
level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of
justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are
necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are
essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to
the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and
suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to
maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the
litigants.
Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the
incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of
jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary
and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing
laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its
judgments and mandates." Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary
or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the
above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined,
since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even
though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters
which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the
authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning
interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the
powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.36
Since the Court ruled in City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo31 that the
CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari questioning an
interlocutory order of the RTC in a local tax case via express constitutional
mandate and for being inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it
can also be reasonably concluded based on the same premise that the CTA
has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ
resolution in a preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses.
If the Court were to rule that jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing
such DOJ resolution lies with the CA, it would be confirming the exercise by
two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the
32
same subject matter - precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is
anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court cannot accept
that such was the legislative intent, especially considering that R.A. No. 9282
expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence
over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases
without mention of any other court that may exercise such
power.38cralawrednad
Concededly, there is no clear statement under R.A. No. 1125, the
amendatory R.A. No. 9282, let alone in the Constitution, that the CTA has
original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari. By virtue of Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, vesting judicial power in the Supreme Court
and such lower courts as may be established by law, to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, in relation to Section 5(5), Article VIII
thereof, vesting upon it the power to promulgate rules concerning practice
and procedure in all courts, the Court thus declares that the CA's original
jurisdiction39 over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution in a
preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily
transferred to the CTA pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282,40 and that
such petition shall be governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. Accordingly, it is the CTA, not the CA, which has jurisdiction over
the petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution of dismissal of the
BOC's complaint-affidavit against private respondents for violation of the
TCCR
On the procedural issue of whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari on the sole ground of lack of verification and certification against
forum shopping, the Court rules in the affirmative, despite the above
discussion that such petition should have been filed with the CTA.
In Traveno, et al. v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
et al.,41 the Court restated the jurisprudence on non-compliance with the
requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification
against forum shopping:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement
on or submission of defective verification, and non- compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum
shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax
the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special
circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case.' Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.42
While it admittedly filed a petition for certiorari without a certification against
forum shopping on March 11, 2010, the BOC claimed to have subsequently
complied with such requirement by filing through registered mail a complete
set of such petition, the following day which was also the last day of the
reglementary period. The problem arose when the CA failed to receive such
complete set of the petition for certiorari with the verification and certification
against forum shopping. In support of the motion for reconsideration of the
CA's March 26, 2010 resolution which dismissed outright the petition, the
BOC asserted that it filed a complete set of petition by registered mail. It also
submitted an affidavit of the person who did the mailing as required by
Section 12,43 Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, including the registry receipt
33
numbers, but not the receipts themselves which were allegedly attached to
the original copy mailed to the CA. Instead of ordering the BOC to secure a
certification from the postmaster to verify if a complete set of the petition was
indeed filed by registered mail, the CA -after examining the whole case rollo
and finding that no other set of petition with a certification against forum
shopping was duly submitted - denied the motion for reconsideration.
Faced with the issue of whether or not there is a need to relax the strict
compliance with procedural rules in order that the ends of justice may be
served thereby and whether "special circumstances or compelling reasons"
are present to warrant a liberal interpretation of such rules, the Court rules -
after a careful review of the merits of the case - in the affirmative.
Despite the BOC's failed attempt to comply with the requirement of
verification and certification against forum shopping, the Court cannot simply
ignore the CA's perfunctory dismissal of the petition on such sole procedural
ground vis-a-vis the paramount public interest in the subject matter and the
substantial amount involved, i.e., the alleged illegal withdrawal of oil products
worth P181,988,627.00 with corresponding duties and taxes worth
P35,507,597.00. Due to the presence of such special circumstances and in
the interest of justice, the CA should have at least passed upon the
substantive issue raised in the petition, instead of dismissing it on such
procedural ground. Although it does not condone the failure of BOC to
comply with the said basic requirement, the Court is constrained to exercise
the inherent power to suspend its own rules in order to do justice in this
particular case.
Given that the petition for certiorari should have been filed with the CTA, the
mistake committed by the BOC in filing such petition before the CA may be
excused. In this regard, Court takes note that nothing in R.A. No. 1125, as
amended by R.A. No. 9282, indicates that a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 may be filed with the CTA. Despite the enactment of R.A. No. 9282 on
March 30, 2004, it was only about ten (10) years later in the case of City of
Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo44 that the Court ruled that the authority of the
CTA to take cognizance of such petitions is included in the powers granted
by the Constitution, as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. While the rule on perfection of appeals cannot be classified as a
difficult question of law,45 mistake in the construction or application of a
doubtful question of law, as in this case, may be considered as a mistake of
fact, excusing the BOC from the consequences of the erroneous filing of its
petition with the CA.
As the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari solely due to a procedural
defect without resolving the issue of whether or not the Acting Secretary of
Justice gravely abused her discretion in affirming the dismissal of the BOC's
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause, the Court ought to reinstate
the petition and refer it to the CTA for proper disposition. For one, as a highly
specialized court specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax and
customs cases,46 the CTA is dedicated exclusively to the study and
consideration of revenue-related problems, and has necessarily developed
an expertise on the subject.47 For another, the referral of the petition to the
CTA is in line with the policy of hierarchy of courts in order to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further overcrowding of its docket.48cralawrednad
Be that as it may, the Court stressed in The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections49 that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an
iron-clad rule, and that it has full discretionary power to take cognizance and
assume jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari filed directly with it
for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the
issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition. Recognized exceptions
to the said doctrine are as follows: (a) when there are genuine issues of
constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (b)
when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (c) cases of first
impression where no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts
on the matter; (d) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the
Court; (e) where exigency in certain situations necessitate urgency in the
resolution of the cases; (f) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional
organ; (g) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from
the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of their right to freedom
of expression; and (h) the petition includes questions that are dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the
broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be
patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate
remedy.50 Since the present case includes questions that are dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the
broader interest of justice, as well as to avoid multiplicity of suits and further
delay in its disposition, the Court shall directly resolve the petition for
certiorari, instead of referring it to the CTA.
34
On the substantive issue of whether the Acting Secretary of Justice gravely
abused her discretion in affirming the dismissal of the BOC's complaint-
affidavit for lack of probable cause, the settled policy of non�interference in
the prosecutor's exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the
prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause. As the Court explained in Unilever
Philippines, Inc. v. Tan:51cralawrednad
The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in
court is essentially an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance,
with the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The
prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have wide latitude of discretion in
the conduct of preliminary investigation; and their findings with respect to the
existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally not subject to
review by the Court.
Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the
prosecutor's exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the
prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause. Courts can neither override their
determination nor substitute their own judgment for that of the latter. They
cannot likewise order the prosecution of the accused when the prosecutor
has not found a prima facie case.
Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. The
Constitution itself allows (and even directs) court action where executive
discretion has been gravely abused. In other words, the court may intervene
in the executive determination of probable cause, review the findings and
conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of
probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation
when necessary for the orderly administration of justice.52
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as
such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial.53 As explained in Sy v. Secretary of Justice,54 citing
Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice:55cralawrednad
x x x [Probable cause] is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor
as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not
mean "actual or positive cause"; nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for
the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.56
To find out if there is a reasonable ground to believe that acts or ommissions
complained of constitute the offenses charged, the Court must first examine
whether or not the allegations against private respondents in the BOC's
complaint-affidavit constitute the offenses of unlawful importation under
Section 3601 and various fraudulent practices against customs revenue
under Section 3602 of the TCCP.
In Jardeleza v. People,57 the Court discussed the concepts of unlawful
importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP, and various fraudulent
practices against customs revenue under Section 3602 thereof,
thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 3601 of the TCC was designed to supplement the existing provisions
of the TCC against the means leading up to smuggling, which might render it
beneficial by a substantive and criminal statement separately providing for
the punishment of smuggling. The law was intended not to merge into one
and the same offense all the many acts which are classified and punished by
different penalties, penal or administrative, but to legislate against the overt
act of smuggling itself. This is manifested by the use of the words
"fraudulently" and "contrary to law" in the law.
Smuggling is committed by any person who: (1) fraudulently imports or
brings into the Philippines any article contrary to law; (2) assists in so doing
any article contrary to law; or (3) receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any
manner facilitate the transportation, concealment or sale of such goods after
importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law.
The phrase "contrary to law" in Section 3601 qualifies the phrases "imports
or brings into the Philippines" and "assists in so doing," and not the word
"article." The law penalizes the importation of any merchandise in any
manner contrary to law.
The word "law" includes regulations having the force and effect of law,
meaning substantive or legislative type rules as opposed to general
35
statements of policy or rules of agency, organization, procedures or
positions. An inherent characteristic of a substantive rule is one affecting
individual rights and obligations; the regulation must have been promulgated
pursuant to a congressional grant of quasi-legislative authority; the
regulation must have been promulgated in conformity to with
congressionally-imposed procedural requisites.
xxxx
Section 3602 of the TCC, on the other hand, provides:cralawlawlibrary
Sec. 3602. Various Fraudulent Practices Against Customs Revenue. � Any
person who makes or attempts to make any entry of imported or exported
article by means of any false or fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit,
letter, paper or by any means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by
any means of any false or fraudulent practice whatsoever, or knowingly
effects any entry of goods, wares or merchandise, at less than the true
weight or measures thereof or upon a false classification as to quality or
value, or by the payment of less than the amount legally due, or knowingly
and wilfully files any false or fraudulent entry or claim for the payment of
drawback or refund of duties upon the exportation of merchandise, or makes
or files any affidavit, abstract, record, certificate or other document, with a
view to securing the payment to himself or others of any drawback,
allowance or refund of duties on the exportation of merchandise, greater
than that legally due thereon, or who shall be guilty of any wilful act or
omission shall, for each offense, be punished in accordance with the
penalties prescribed in the preceding section.
The provision enumerates the various fraudulent practices against customs
revenue, such as the entry of imported or exported articles by means of any
false or fraudulent invoice, statement or practice; the entry of goods at less
than the true weight or measure; or the filing of any false or fraudulent entry
for the payment of drawback or refund of duties.
The fraud contemplated by law must be intentional fraud, consisting of
deception, willfully and deliberately dared or resorted to in order to give up
some right. The offender must have acted knowingly and with the specific
intent to deceive for the purpose of causing financial loss to another; even
false representations or statements or omissions of material facts come
within fraudulent intent. The fraud envisaged in the law includes the
suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to
disclose. Fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent concealment are of the
same genre.
Fraudulent concealment presupposes a duty to disclose the truth and that
disclosure was not made when opportunity to speak and inform was present,
and that the party to whom the duty of disclosure as to a material fact was
due was thereby induced to act to his injury. Fraud is not confined to words
or positive assertions; it may consist as well of deeds, acts or artifice of a
nature calculated to mislead another and thus allow one to obtain an undue
advantage.58
In unlawful importation, also known as outright smuggling, goods and articles
of commerce are brought into the country without the required importation
documents, or are disposed of in the local market without having been
cleared by the BOC or other authorized government agencies, to evade the
payment of correct taxes, duties and other charges. Such goods and articles
do not undergo the processing and clearing procedures at the BOC, and are
not declared through submission of import documents, such as the import
entry and internal revenue declaration.
In various fraudulent practices against customs revenue, also known as
technical smuggling, on the other hand, the goods and articles are brought
into the country through fraudulent, falsified or erroneous declarations, to
substantially reduce, if not totally avoid, the payment of correct taxes, duties
and other charges. Such goods and articles pass through the BOC, but the
processing and clearing procedures are attended by fraudulent acts in order
to evade the payment of correct taxes, duties, and other charges. Often
committed by means of misclassification of the nature, quality or value of
goods and articles, undervaluation in terms of their price, quality or weight,
and misdeclaration of their kind, such form of smuggling is made possible
through the involvement of the importers, the brokers and even some
customs officials and personnel.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court holds that private respondents
cannot be charged with unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the
TCCP because there is no allegation in the BOC's complaint-affidavit to the
effect that they committed any of the following acts: (1) fraudulently imported
or brought into the Philippines the subject petroleum products, contrary to
law; (2) assisted in so doing; or (3) received, concealed, bought, sold or in
any manner facilitated the transportation, concealment or sale of such goods
after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law.
36
The said acts constituting unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the
TCCP can hardly be gathered from the following allegations in the BOC's
complaint-affidavit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
19.1 From May 23, 2007 to February 10, 2008, UNIOIL is not an accredited
importer of the BOC;
19.2 From the time UNIOIL was accredited on February 11, 2008 until the
time of its request to withdraw its oil products on 02 May 2008, they did not
import Gasoil (diesel) and Mogas Gasoline;
19.3 The Terminalling Agreement allegedly executed between OILINK and
UNIOIL was obviously for the purpose of circumventing the Warrant of
Seizure and Detention issued against the shipments of OILINK aside from
the fact that it was only executed on 02 January 2008 after the decision of
the Commissioner finding OILINK liable to pay an administrative fine of Two
Billion Seven Hundred Sixty-Four Million Eight Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand
Three Hundred Four Pesos and 80/100 (Php2,764,859,304.80);
19.4 Only base oil should have been withdrawn by UNIOIL since it is the
only product subject of its request and approved by the Commissioner;
19.5 UNIOIL withdrew Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas which were not covered by
importations;
19.6 Finally, the illegal release/withdrawal of the oil products deprived the
government of the supposed partial payment on the Php2.7 billion liability of
OILINK in the" approximate amount of Phpl81,988,627 representing the
customs value of the released/withdrawn oil products and estimated duties
and taxes of Php35,507,597 due thereon or the total amount of
Php217,496,224.00.59cralawrednad
xxxx
21.1 When UNIOIL withdrew Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas without filing the
corresponding Import Entry, the shipment becomes unlawful per se and thus
falls under unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended;
21.2 The fact that UNIOIL and OILINK executed a belated Terminalling
Agreement after the issuance of the Warrant of Seizure and Detention
showed the fraudulent intent of the respondents whereby UNIOIL can still
withdraw the oil products stored at OILINK's depot likewise in clear violation
of section 3601 and 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
as amended;
21.3 The fact that the UNIOIL make [sic] it appear that they are the owner of
Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas when in truth and in fact they did not import said
products make them liable for [violation of] Section 3602 of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended and falsification;60
Since the foregoing allegations do not constitute the crime of unlawful
importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP, the Acting Secretary of Justice
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she affirmed the State
Prosecutor's dismissal the BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of probable
cause.
Neither could private respondents be charged with various fraudulent
practices against customs revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP as the
above allegations do hot fall under any of the following acts or omissions
constituting such crime/s: (1) making or attempting to make any entry of
imported or exported article: (a) by means of any false or fraudulent invoice,
declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by any means of any false statement,
written or verbal; or (b) by any means of any false or fraudulent practice
whatsoever; or (2) knowingly effecting any entry of goods, wares or
merchandise, at less than the true weight or measures thereof or upon a
false classification as to quality or value, or by the payment of less than the
amount legally due; or (3) knowingly and wilfully filing any false or fraudulent
entry or claim for the payment of drawback or refund of duties upon the
exportation of merchandise; or (4) making or filing any affidavit, abstract,
record, certificate or other document, with a view to securing the payment to
himself or others of any drawback, allowance or refund of duties on the
exportation of merchandise, greater than that legally due thereon.
Related to various fraudulent practices against customs revenue by means
of undervaluation, misclassification and misdeclaration in the import entry is
the following provision of R.A. No. 7651 - An Act to Revitalize and
Strengthen the Bureau of Customs, Amending for the Purpose Certain
Sections of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as
amended:61cralawrednad
Sec. 2503. Undervaluation, Misclassification and Misdeclaration in Entry. -
When the dutiable value of the imported articles shall be so declared and
entered that the duties, based on the declaration of the importer on the face
of the entry, would be less by ten percent (10%) than should be legally
collected, or when the imported articles shall be so described and entered
that the duties based on the importer's description on the face of the entry
37
would be less by ten percent (10%) than should be legally collected based
on the tariff classification, or when the dutiable weight, measurement or
quantity of imported articles is found upon examination to exceed by ten
percent (10%) or more than the entered weight, measurement or quantity, a
surcharge shall be collected from the importer in an amount of not less than
the difference between the full duty and the estimated duty based upon the
declaration of the importer, nor more than twice of such difference: Provided,
that an undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight, measurement or quantity of
more than thirty percent (30%) between the value, weight, measurement, or
quantity declared in the entry, and the actual value, weight, quantity, or
measurement shall constitute a prima facie evidence of fraud penalized
under Sec. 2530 of this Code: Provided, further, that any misdeclared or
undeclared imported articles/items found upon examination shall ipso facto
be forfeited in favor of the Government to be disposed of pursuant to the
provisions of this Code.
When the undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or misdeclaration
in the import entry is intentional, the importer shall be subject to the penal
provision under Sec. 3602 of this Code.62
A careful reading of the BOC's complaint-affidavit would show that there is
no allegation to the effect that private respondents committed
undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight, measurement or quantity of more
than thirty percent (30%) between the value, weight, measurement, or
quantity declared in the entry, and the actual value, weight, quantity, or
measurement which constitute prima facie evidence of fraud. Nor is there an
allegation that they intentionally committed undervaluation, misdescription,
misclassification or misdeclaration in the import entry. Since the allegations
in the BOC's complaint-affidavit fall short of the acts or omissions
constituting the various fraudulent acts against customs revenue under
Section 3602 of the TCCP, the Acting Secretary of Justice correctly ruled
that there was no probable cause to believe that they committed such
crime/s.
While it is true that the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of
errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include a correction of the
public respondents' evaluation of the evidence and factual findings thereon,
it is sometimes necessary to delve into factual issues in order to resolve the
allegations of grave abuse of discretion as a ground for the special civil
action of certiorari63 In light of this principle, the Court reviews the following
findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice in affirming the State Prosecutor's
dismissal of the BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of probable
cause:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondents are being charged for unlawful importation under Section
3601, and fraudulent practices against customs revenues under Section
3602, of the TCCP, as amended. For these charges to prosper, complainant
must prove, first and foremost, that the subject articles were imported. On
this score alone, complainant has miserably failed.
Indeed, except for complainant's sweeping allegation, no clear and
convincing proof was presented to show that the subject petroleum products
(gasoil and mogas) withdrawn by Unioil from the oil depot/terminal of Oilink
were imported. For, only when the articles are imported that the
importer/consignee is required to file an import entry declaration and pay the
corresponding customs duties and taxes. The fact that complainant's record
fails to show that an import entry was filed for the subject articles does not
altogether make out a case of unlawful importation under Section 3601, or
fraudulent practices against customs revenue under Section 3602, of the
TCCP, without having first determined whether the subject articles are
indeed imported. Thus, in this case, complainant still bears the burden of
proof to show that the subject petroleum products are imported, by means of
documents other than the import entry declaration, such as but not limited to,
the transport documents consisting of the inward foreign manifest, bill of
lading, commercial invoice and packing list, all indicating that the goods were
bought from a supplier/seller in a foreign country and imported or transported
to the Philippines. Instead[,] complainant merely surmised that since the
subject products were placed under warrant of seizure and detention[,] they
must necessarily be imported. Regrettably, speculation and surmises do not
constitute evidence and should not, therefore, be taken against the
respondents, x x x Taken in this light, we find more weight and credence in
respondent Unioil's claim that the subject petroleum products were not
imported by them, but were locally purchased, more so since it was able to
present local sales invoices covering the same.
Even assuming gratia argumenti that the subject petroleum products were
imported, it still behooves the complainant to present clear and convincing
proof that the importation was unlawful or that it was carried out through any
fraudulent means, practice or device to prejudice the government. But again,
complainant failed to discharge this burden.
38
As can be culled from the records, the warrant of seizure and detention
docketed as Seizure Identification No. 2008-082, which covers various gas
tanks already stored at Oilink's depot/terminal located at Lucanin Pt,
Mariveles, Bataan, was issued pursuant to Section 2536, in relation to
Section 1508, of the TCCP because of Oilink's failure to pay the
administrative fine of P2,764,859,304.80 that was previously meted against
the company for its failure/refusal to submit to a post entry audit. In fact, the
delivery of all shipments consigned to or handled directly or indirectly by
Oilink was put on hold as per order of the Customs Commissioner dated
April 23, 2008 pursuant to Section 1508 of the TCCP, also for the same
reason. There was nothing on record which shows, or from which it could be
inferred, that the warrant of seizure and detention or hold order were
imposed pursuant to Section 2530 of the same Code which relates, among
others, to unlawfully imported articles or those imported through any
fraudulent practice or device to prejudice the government, much less due to
non-payment of the corresponding customs duties and taxes due on the
shipments/articles covered by the warrant of seizure and detention. Again,
what complainant's evidence clearly shows is that Oilink's failure to pay the
administrative fine precipitated the issuance of the warrant of seizure and
detention and hold order.64
After a careful review of records, the Court affirms the dismissal of the
BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause, but partly digresses
from the reasoning of the Acting Secretary of Justice in arriving at such
conclusion. While the Acting Secretary of Justice correctly stated that the act
of fraudulent importation of articles must be first proven in order to be
charged for violation of Section 3601 of the TCCP, the Court disagrees that
proof of such importation is also required for various fraudulent practices
against customs revenue under Section 3602 thereof.
As held in Jardeleza v. People,65 the crime of unlawful importation under
Section 3601 of the TCCP is complete, in the absence of a bona fide intent
to make entry and pay duties when the prohibited article enters Philippine
territory. Importation, which consists of bringing an article into the country
from the outside, is complete when the taxable, dutiable commodity is
brought within the limits of the port of entry.66 Entry through a customs
house is not the essence of the act.67 On the other hand, as regards
Section 3602 of the TCCP which particularly deals with the making or
attempting to make a fraudulent entry of imported or exported articles, the
term "entry" in customs law has a triple meaning, namely: (1) the documents
filed at the customs house; (2) the submission and acceptance of the
documents; and (3) the procedure of passing goods through the customs
house.68 In view thereof, it is only for charges for unlawful importation under
Section 3601 that the BOC must first prove that the subject articles were
imported. For violation of Section 3602, in contrast, what must be proved is
the act of making or attempting to make such entry of articles.
The Court likewise disagrees with the finding of the Acting Secretary of
Justice that the BOC failed to prove that the products subject of the WSD
were imported. No such proof was necessary because private respondents
themselves presented in support of their counter-affidavits copies of import
entries which can be considered as prima facie evidence that OILINK
imported the subject petroleum products. At any rate, the Acting Secretary of
Justice aptly gave credence to their twenty (20) sales invoices70 covering
the dates October 1, 2007 until April 30, 2008 which tend to prove that
UNIOIL locally purchased such products from OILINK even before the BOC
rendered the Decision dated December 14, 2007 imposing a
P2,764,859,304.80 administrative fine, and holding the delivery or release of
its subsequently imported articles to answer for the fine, any revised
assessment and/or penalty for failure to keep records.
The Court also finds as misplaced the BOC's reliance on the Terminalling
Agreement dated January 2, 2008 and the Certification71 that UNIOIL made
no importation of Gasoil (diesel) and Mogas gasoline from January 2007 up
to June 2008 in order to prove that it illegally imported the said products.
Such documentary evidence tend to prove only that UNIOIL was engaged in
the importation of petroleum products and that it did not import the said
products during the said period. Such documents, however, do not negate
the evidence on record which tend to show that OILINK was the one that
filed the import entries,72 and that UNIOIL locally purchased from OILINK
such products as indicated in the sales invoices.73 Not being the importer of
such products, UNIOIL, its directors and officers, are not required to file their
corresponding import entries. Hence, contrary to the BOC's allegation,
UNIOIL's withdrawal of the Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas gasoline without filing
the corresponding import entries can neither be considered as unlawful
importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP nor as a fraudulent practice
against customs revenue under Section 3602 thereof.
Moreover, the fact that private respondent Paul Chi Ting Co is both the
Chairman of UNIOIL and OILINK is not enough to justify the application of
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. In fact, mere ownership by a
single stockholder or by another corporation of a substantial block of shares
39
of a corporation does not, standing alone, provide sufficient justification for
disregarding the separate corporate personality.74 In Kukan International
Corporation v. Hon. Judge Reyes, et al.,75 the Court explained the
application of the said doctrine in this wise:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In fine, to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction, it must be shown
by clear and convincing proof that the separate and distinct personality of the
corporation was purposefully employed to evade a legitimate and binding
commitment and perpetuate a fraud or like wrongdoings. To be sure, the
Court has, on numerous occasions, applied the principle where a corporation
is dissolved and its assets are transferred to another to avoid a financial
liability of the first corporation with the result that the second corporation
should be considered a continuation and successor of the first entity.
In those instances when the Court pierced the veil of corporate fiction of two
corporations, there was a confluence of the following factors:cralawlawlibrary
1. A first corporation is dissolved;
2. The assets of the first corporation is transferred to a second corporation to
avoid a financial liability of the first corporation; and
3. Both corporations are owned and controlled by the same persons such
that the second corporation should be considered as a continuation and
successor of the first corporation.76
Granted that the principle of piercing the veil of corporate entity comes into
play only during the trial of the case for the purpose of determining liability,77
it is noteworthy that even the BOC itself virtually recognized that OILINK and
UNIOIL are separate and distinct entities when it alleged that only the base
oil products should have been withdrawn by UNIOIL, since they were the
only products subject of its request and approved by the Customs
Commissioner. As discussed above, however, private respondents were
able to present sales invoices which tend to show that UNIOIL locally
purchased Gasoil (diesel) and Mogas gasoline products from OILINK.
Hence, the BOC cannot invoke the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
entity in this case.
On a final note, the Court stresses that OILINK, its directors or officers, and
Victor D. Piamonte, the Licensed Customs Broker, may still be held liable for
various fraudulent practices against customs revenue under Section 3602 of
the TCCP, if the final results of the post-entry audit and examination would
show that they committed any of the following acts or omissions: (1) making
or attempting to make any entry of imported or exported article: (a) by means
of any false or fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by
any means of any false statement, written or verbal; or (b) by any means of
any false or fraudulent practice; or (2) intentional undervaluation,
misdescription, misclassification or misdeclaration in the import entries; or
(3) undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight, measurement or quantity of
more than thirty percent (30%) between the value, weight, measurement, or
quantity declared in the entries, and the actual value, weight, quantity, or
measurement. This is consistent with Section 230178 (Warrant for Detention
of Property-Cash Bond) of the TCCP which states that nothing therein shall
be construed as relieving the owner or importer from any criminal liability
which may arise from any violation of law committed in connection with the
importation of articles, which in this case were placed under a WSD for
failure of the importer, OILINK, to submit the required post-entry audit
documents under CAO No. 4-2004.
In addition, OILINK and its directors or officers may be held liable under
Section 16 of R.A. No. 9135:79cralawrednad
SEC. 16. A new section to be known as Section 3611 is hereby inserted in
Part 3, Title VII of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as
amended, which shall read as follows:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 3611. Failure to Pay Correct Duties and Taxes on Imported Goods. -
Any person who, after being subjected to post-entry audit and examination
as provided in Section 3515 of Part 2, Title VII hereof, is found to have
incurred deficiencies in duties and taxes paid for imported goods, shall be
penalized according to three (3) degrees of culpability subject to any
mitigating, aggravating or extraordinary factors that are clearly established
by the available evidence:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Negligence - When the deficiency results from an offender's failure,
through an act or acts of omission or commission, to exercise reasonable
care and competence to ensure that a statement made is correct, it shall be
determined to be negligent and punishable by a fine equivalent to not less
than one-half (1/2) but not more than two (2) times the revenue loss.
(b) Gross Negligence - When a deficiency results from an act or acts of
omission or commission done with actual knowledge or wanton disregard for
the relevant facts and with indifference to or disregard for the offender's
obligation under the statute, it shall be determined to be grossly negligent
and punishable by a fine equivalent to not less than two and a half (2 1/2)
but not more than four (4) times the revenue loss.
40
 YNARES-SANTIAGO,
(c) Fraud - When the material false statement or act in connection with the SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
transaction was committed or omitted knowingly, voluntarily and in his capacity as Chairman of the CARPIO,
intentionally, as established by clear and convincing evidence, it shall be Housing and Urban Development AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
determined to be fraudulent and be punishable by a fine equivalent to not Coordinating Council (HUDCC), CORONA,
less than five (5) times but not more than eight (8) times the revenue loss ATTY. EDGARDO PAMINTUAN, CARPIO MORALES,
and imprisonment of not less than two (2) years but not more than eight (8) in his capacity as General Manager of CALLEJO, SR.,
years. the National Housing Authority (NHA), AZCUNA,
The decision of the Commissioner of Customs, upon proper hearing, to MR. PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his TINGA,
impose penalties as prescribed in this Section may be appealed in capacity as Chairman of the Presidential CHICO-NAZARIO,
accordance with Section 2402 hereof.80 Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), GARCIA, and
MAYOR FELICIANO BELMONTE, in VELASCO, JR., JJ.
With respect to the directors or officers of OILINK, they may further be held his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City,
liable jointly and severally for all damages suffered by the government on SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in her
account of such violation of Sections 3602 and 3611 of the TCCP, upon capacity as Secretary of the Department
clear and convincing proof that they willfully and knowingly voted for or of Environment and Natural Resources
assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or was guilty of gross (DENR) and SECRETARY FLORENTE Promulgated:
negligence or bad faith in directing its corporate affairs. SORIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Public Works and
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Highways (DPWH) as ex-officio members
Resolutions dated March 26, 2010 and August 4, 2010, in CA-G.R. SP No. of the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT August 3, 2006
113069, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated December CENTER ADMINISTRATION
28, 2009 of the Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanedera, which COMMITTEE,
upheld the State Prosecutor's dismissal of the complaint-affidavit filed by the Respondents.
Bureau of Customs for lack of probable cause, is AFFIRMED. This is without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal and administrative charges x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
under Sections 3602 and 3611 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, as amended, against private respondents OILINK, its officers
and directors, and Victor D. Piamonte, if the final results of the post-entry
audit and examination would show that they violated the said provisions. DECISION

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary TINGA, J.:

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS G.R. No. 163980
ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
F. APOLINARIO, in his personal Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
capacity and as President of Holy and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., Present: enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No.
Petitioners, 9207, otherwise known as the National Government Center (NGC) Housing
PANGANIBAN, C.J., and Land Utilization Act of 2003.
- versus - PUNO,
QUISUMBING,

41
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a
homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented
by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own
personal capacity and on behalf of the association.
Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government
Center Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant
petition, the Committee was composed of Secretary Michael Defensor,
Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the National
Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential
Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of Quezon
City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances
authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the
National Government Center (NGC).
On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution
Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national
government site to be known as the NGC.[1]
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site
from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the
disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents
therein.[2]
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion
excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No.
1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on
September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded
portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become
beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program. [3]
On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into
law R.A. No. 9207. Among the salient provisions of the law are the following:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure
of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the
NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing,
socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other
purposes.
SEC. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of
the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide
Residents. Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is
hereby amended by excluding from the coverage thereof,
184 hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the
east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the
same open for disposition to bona fide residents
therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona
fide residents on the west side shall be based on the
census survey conducted in 1994 and the determination of
the bona fide residents on the east side shall be based on
the census survey conducted in 1994 and occupancy
verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further,
That all existing legal agreements, programs and plans
signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken,
consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
adopted.
SEC. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of
the National Government Center Site for Local
Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic,
Charitable, Educational and Religious Purposes. Certain
portions of land within the aforesaid area for local
government or community facilities, socioeconomic,
charitable, educational and religious institutions are hereby
reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That
only those institutions already operating and with existing
facilities or structures, or those occupying the land may
avail of the disposition program established under the
provisions this Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining
the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of
42
 these institutions, the existing site allocation shall be
used as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in
determining the reasonable lot allocation of
such institutions without specific lot allocations, the land
area that may be allocated to them shall be based on the
area actually used by said institutions at the time of
effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207,[4] the Committee
formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207
on June 29, 2004. Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition, raising
the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1
(B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION
ACT OF 2003 SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID
FOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW IT SEEKS
TO IMPLEMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1
(B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION
ACT OF 2003 SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID
FOR BEING ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND
WHIMSICAL.[5]
First, the procedural matters.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that petitioner
Association cannot question the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2) and
Section 3.2 (c.1) since it does not claim any right over the NGC East Side.
Section 3.1 (b.2) provides for the maximum lot area that may be awarded to
a resident-beneficiary of the NGC East Side, while Section 3.2 (c.1) imposes
a lot price escalation penalty to a qualified beneficiary who fails to execute a
contract to sell within the prescribed period. [6] Also, the OSG contends that
since petitioner association is not the duly recognized peoples organization
in the NGC and since petitioners not qualify as beneficiaries, they cannot
question the manner of disposition of lots in the NGC.[7]
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[8]
Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant
petition, whether or not it is the duly recognized association of homeowners
in the NGC. There is no dispute that the individual members of petitioner
association are residents of the NGC. As such they are covered and stand to
be either benefited or injured by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly as
regards the selection process of beneficiaries and lot allocation to qualified
beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may assail those provisions in the
IRR which it believes to be unfavorable to the rights of its members. Contrary
to the OSGs allegation that the failure of petitioner association and its
members to qualify as beneficiaries effectively bars them from questioning
the provisions of the IRR, such circumstance precisely operates to confer on
them the legal personality to assail the IRR. Certainly, petitioner and its
members have sustained direct injury arising from the enforcement of the
IRR in that they have been disqualified and eliminated from the selection
process. While it is true that petitioners claim rights over the NGC West Side
only and thus cannot be affected by the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2),
which refers to the NGC East Side, the rest of the assailed provisions of the
IRR, namely, Sections 3.1 (a.4), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2 (c.1), govern the
disposition of lots in the West Side itself or all the lots in the NGC.
We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus
standi. The petition does not merit dismissal on that ground.
43
 There are, however, other procedural impediments to the granting
of the instant petition. The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition
is an improper remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie against
the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.[9] Since in issuing the questioned
IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition
under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant
prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG contends. For their part,
respondent Mayor of Quezon City[10] and respondent NHA[11] contend that
petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the instant
petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.
The cited breaches are mortal. The petition deserves to be spurned
as a consequence.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-
legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations
which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.[12]
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where
the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to
its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-
making or quasi-legislative power.[13]
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative
power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition
rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is
invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the
statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in
the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same.[14]
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity
of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-
legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.[15]
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance
of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, so warrant. [16] A direct invocation of the
Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition.[17]
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,[18] the Court said that it will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such
as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment
of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction.[19] A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition
shows no compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the Courts
taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to
state any reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the
validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article
VIII of the
Constitution,[20] the Courts power to evaluate the validity of an
implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus,
following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have
been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an
IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an
extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction,
or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[21] Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against
44
legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order
to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.[22] Prohibition is
the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power
by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the
bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained.[23] Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR,
petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which
properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case,
petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to
perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately
be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary
restraining order.
In a number of petitions,[24] the Court adequately resolved them on
other grounds without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there
were no compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the
instant petition may be dismissed based on the foregoing procedural
grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of this
petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In proper cases,
procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial
justice. And the power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules
whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned. [25]
Now, we turn to the substantive aspects of the petition. The
outcome, however, is just as dismal for petitioners.
Petitioners assail the following provisions of the IRR:
Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site
to the bonafide residents
3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries
xxxx
(a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be
based on the Code of Policies and subject to the condition
that a beneficiary is qualified to acquire only one (1) lot
with a minimum of 36 sq. m. and maximum of 54 sq. m.
and subject further to the availability of lots.
xxxx
(b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary
shall be processed and evaluated based on the Code of
Policies including the minimum and maximum lot
allocation of 35 sq. m. and 60 sq. m.
xxxx
3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell
(a) Westside
(a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall
execute Contract to Sell (CTS) within sixty (60)
days from the effectivity of the IRR in order to
avail of the lot at P700.00 per sq. m.
xxxx
(c) for both eastside and westside
(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to
execute CTS on the deadline set in item a.1
above in case of westside and in case of eastside
six (6) months after approval of the subdivision
plan shall be subjected to lot price escalation.
The rate shall be based on the formula
to be set by the National Housing Authority
factoring therein the affordability criteria. The new
rate shall be approved by the NGC-
Administration Committee (NGC-AC).
45
 Petitioners contend that the aforequoted provisions of the IRR are
constitutionally infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in conflict with
the object and purpose of the law sought to be implemented.
First. According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be
awarded to qualified beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is
not in harmony with the provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which mandates that
the lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries shall be based on the area actually
used or occupied by bona fide residents without limitation to area. The
argument is utterly baseless.
The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified
into two groups, namely, the urban poor or the bona fide residents within the
NGC site and certain government institutions including the local government.
Section 3, R.A. No. 9207 mandates the allocation of additional property
within the NGC for disposition to its bona fideresidents and the manner by
which this area may be distributed to qualified beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A.
No. 9207, on the other hand, governs the lot disposition to government
institutions. While it is true that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207 has a proviso
mandating that the lot allocation shall be based on the land area actually
used or occupied at the time of the laws effectivity, this proviso applies only
to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the local government,
socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions which do not
have specific lot allocations, and not to the bona fide residents of NGC.
There is no proviso which even hints that a bona fide resident of the NGC is
likewise entitled to the lot area actually occupied by him.
Petitioners interpretation is also not supported by the policy of R.A.
No. 9207 and the prior proclamations establishing the NGC. The
governments policy to set aside public property aims to benefit not only
the urban poor but also the local government and various government
institutions devoted to socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious
purposes.[26] Thus, although Proclamation No. 137 authorized the sale of lots
to bona fide residents in the NGC, only a third of the entire area of the NGC
was declared open for disposition subject to the condition that those portions
being used or earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes would be
excluded from the housing program for NGC residents. The same policy
of rational and optimal land use can be read in Proclamation No. 248
issued by then President Ramos. Although the proclamation recognized the
rapid increase in the population density in the NGC, it did not allocate
additional property within the NGC for urban poor housing but instead
authorized the vertical development of the same 150 hectares identified
previously by Proclamation No. 137 since the distribution of individual lots
would not adequately provide for the housing needs of all the bona
fideresidents in the NGC.
In addition, as provided in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207, the
institutional beneficiaries shall be allocated the areas actually occupied by
them; hence, the portions intended for the institutional beneficiaries is fixed
and cannot be allocated for other non-institutional beneficiaries. Thus, the
areas not intended for institutional beneficiaries would have to be equitably
distributed among the bona fide residents of the NGC. In order to
accommodate all qualified residents, a limitation on the area to be awarded
to each beneficiary must be fixed as a necessary consequence.
Second. Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes
the selling rate of a lot at P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not
provide for the price. They add Sec. 3.2 (c.1) penalizes a beneficiary who
fails to execute a contract to sell within six (6) months from the approval of
the subdivision plan by imposing a price escalation, while there is no such
penalty imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that the assailed
provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and should be nullified. The argument
deserves scant consideration.
Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or
contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not
necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof.[27] All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the law.[28]
In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power
to administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the
disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and the
statutes objective of urban poor housing is the power of the Committee to
formulate the manner by which the reserved property may be allocated to
the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee is mandated to fill
in the details such as the qualifications of beneficiaries, the selling price of
the lots, the terms and conditions governing the sale and other key
46
particulars necessary to implement the objective of the law. These details
are purposely omitted from the statute and their determination is left to the
discretion of the Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge
and technical expertise over these matters.
The Committees authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be
likened to the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a
delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that
the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the
absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may
be implied.[29] In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling
price of the lots is unreasonable.
The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed
to a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed
period is also within the Committees authority to formulate guidelines and
policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay
down the terms and conditions governing the disposition of said lots,
provided that these are reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable
about prescribing a period within which the parties must execute the contract
to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell and is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR
suffers from a procedural flaw. According to them the IRR was adopted and
concurred in by several representatives of peoples organizations contrary to
the express mandate of R.A. No. 9207 that only two representatives from
duly recognized peoples organizations must compose the NGCAC which
promulgated the assailed IRR. It is worth noting that petitioner association is
not a duly recognized peoples organization.
In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or
regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process
requirement is deemed complied with. That there is observance of more than
the minimum requirements of due process in the adoption of the questioned
IRR is not a ground to invalidate the same.
In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural
deficiencies.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L.
HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and
CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners,
vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD
and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural
gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation
Study of 1996,1 the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
National Capital Region,2 a study of the Asian Development Bank,3 the
Manila Observatory4 and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources5 (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle
ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke
engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air
pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action
against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of
dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions
emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have caused
detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall
quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions
47
from engine combustion when these react to other pollutants. For instance,
petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog;
with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and
other compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel
emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. According to
petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely
burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the
necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects the
nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.6
Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the
country will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations
are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power generation
over the next 10 years, and with the continuing high demand for motor
vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major
sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of the
Philippine Environment Monitor 20027, stating that in four of the country's
major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10,
a finer PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs causing serious health
problems, is estimated at over US$430 million.8 The study also reports that
the emissions of PMs have caused the following:
· Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about US$140
million.
· Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at about
US$120 million.
· Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila
(averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to six times in Metro
Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million. This is a 70 percent
increase, over a decade, when compared with the findings of a similar study
done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases.9
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91
and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to
the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that
pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8
to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school children
and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also revealed
that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary
function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly
due to the emissions of PUVs.
To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs,
petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a
natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small
amounts of propane and butane,10 is colorless and odorless and considered
the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal
and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline
and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon
emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur
dioxide. Although, according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that
it produces more methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming.11
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their
petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use
CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987
Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of
Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of
1999."
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners'
motion to implead the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General,
cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the
writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued
only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is
required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.15 Further citing
existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a
discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act
done.
48
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that
petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of
motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No.
8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel and
avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for
PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative
fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to
implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover,
he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 2616 of Rep.
Act No. 8749, that is required to set the specifications for all types of fuel and
fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved efficiency
and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section 2117 of the cited
Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards
for motor vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot alter, change or
modify the emission standards. The Solicitor General opines that the Court
should declare the instant petition for mandamus without merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the
administrative and regulatory powers to implement measures in accordance
with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically
Section 218 and Section 21.19 Petitioners state that under these laws and
with all the available information provided by the DOE on the benefits of
CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to
recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as alternative fuel while air
pollution brought about by the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the
environment and the people, is tantamount to neglect in the performance of
a duty which the law enjoins.
Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners
insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the very same Section
3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor General invokes.
In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO
BRING THE PRESENT ACTION
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY LAW
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY
RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE OF
REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED
NATURAL GAS (CNG)
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO
REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL
GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS20
Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal
personality to bring this petition before us? Second, Should mandamus issue
against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?
According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987 Constitution is
the policy statement that bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air
in a healthy environment. This policy is enunciated in Oposa.22 The
implementation of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These,
according to petitioners, are the bases for their standing to file the instant
petition. They aver that when there is an omission by the government to
safeguard a right, in this case their right to clean air, then, the citizens can
resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by the
government. This, they say, is embodied in Section 423 of Rep. Act No.
8749.
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the
government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor
vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies' awareness and
knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the
responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents' functions
and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.
The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent
government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to
compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor General
explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the
emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only
goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it
does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General
avers that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up
with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
49

Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only
procedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners
propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and unchartered
course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his ponencia in
the Oposa case,24 describes as "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-
generational justice."
Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have
standing to bring their case before this Court. Even respondents do not
question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right
of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party's
standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the
exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of
the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle
of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases
demand that they be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount
importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also
impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counter-productive
and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to emissions of
motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these
considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.
Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and
if the writ could issue against respondents.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of
the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in
case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said,
…It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to
require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of
conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the
petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues
in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely
expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to
do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The
writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to
exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced
hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already articulated in
operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of
1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically provides that when
PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on
respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the
emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this
Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR]
shall review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the
need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to
ensure substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and
welfare of the general public.
Paragraph (b) states:
b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs,
shall develop an action plan for the control and management of air pollution
from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality Framework . . .
. (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked
to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an
action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the
DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles
50
prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for motor
vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
In Oposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. We also
said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to
advance the said right.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their
prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require
PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are general mandates that do
not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is
an executive order implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles.
Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for
Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. The program
recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel for vehicle
which has the potential to produce substantially lower pollutants; and the Malampaya
Gas-to-Power Project as representing the beginning of the natural gas industry of the
Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of its objectives,
the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore, one of the
components of the program is the development of CNG refueling stations and all
related facilities in strategic locations in the country to serve the needs of CNG-
powered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of
2002, designated the DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing the natural gas
industry of the country with the DENR, through the EMB and (b) in formulating
emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC,
working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG
fuel utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and
Luzon through the issuance of directives/orders providing preferential franchises in
present day major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly opened routes…"
A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a
cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had
been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by
petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to
use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At
most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant
preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to
operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys."
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a
coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.27 The
need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be
preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is
procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that
we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves
the environmental problems raised in this petition.
In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and
healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and
"inter-generational justice" in Oposa,28 where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to
prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right
of petitioners and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if
the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,… it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon
the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come. . ."29
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we
have placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet,
as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as
they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the
citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants
emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to
pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify
a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It
appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific
statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners
before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
51