INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any

attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i

s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as

treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.

The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. The usual answer. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. have still. matter is regarded as something true. ANTHROPOLOGY. where the othe . But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. as absolute negativity. At such a stage it is not yet mind. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . which is potentially all things. however. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t.. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. identical ideality of it all. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. perhaps. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. on the one hand.with th is proviso. and mind conceived as a thin g. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. Mind. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. indeed.SUB-SECTION A. except where. a nd the soul remains the pervading. and so the self-externalism. and not as the immediate or natural individual. There. even the capacity of offering resistance. which is the fund amental feature of matter. These 'imponderables' . li ght. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. on the other. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. in a sense. and. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself.the truth that matter itself has no truth.e. to which they might perhaps add space and time. the soul is only the sleep of mind . which may also be f ound enumerated among them. not merely lacks gravity. But not merely is it. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. like heat. Wherever there is Nature. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. thus come into being. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . whereas the 'vital' matter.the passive of Aristotle. It is otherwise with Mind. as such a result. etc. i. but soul. however. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. its simple 'ideal' life. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and.

not. Hence. But either this identity. into the absolute syllogism. sidereal. in many case s completely. is too abstract. (c) Thirdly. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. Spinoza. they are natural objects for consciousness. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. described. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. as so often is done. on the contrary. Descartes. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. These have. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. T hus. based upon participation in the common life of nature. and the periods of the day. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. as in the case of Spinoza. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. Animals and pl ants. re tains an abstract independence. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. upon it. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. just in proportion to his civilization. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. as an anima mundi. etc. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom.(a) In its immediate natural mode . as individualized.or corporeity . though his Monad of monads brings things into being. feels the difference of climates. so holding. . so to speak. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . as in the case of Lei bniz. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. (b) Secondly. remain for ever subject to such influences. and.r is not .the natural soul. there philosophers took God. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. when it presents itself as a single soul. In nations less intellectually emancipated. disappear. even these few and slight susceptibilities. and always more or less. it may be. it is a soul which feels. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. and does not rise or develop into system.e. the changes of the seasons.e. its immediate being . A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. in the modes of that being. with Leibniz. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. and. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus.whence Epicurus. and telluri c life of man. Malebranche. a world-soul. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. which only moulded into it. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. or.

Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. He begins with Childhood . while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. Thirdly. and the position of the individual himself. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. This . fancies. and as stages in its development. character. on its one side.a worl d no longer incomplete. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. shows. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. And that individuality marks both the world which. in purposes political. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. talent . on the whole. or artistic. of families or single individuals. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. we see man in his true relation to his environment. fails to meet his ideal requirements.on a ph ysical basis.the sexual relation . and on the other. the one permanent subject. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. widely distant from each other. The contrast between the earth's poles. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). as alterations in it. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. physiognomy. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. shows an active half. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). we find its diversities. as it exists. bodily structure and disposit ion. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). hopes.mind wrapped up in itself. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. scientific. carrying out these universa . recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). we find it as the special temperament.

in the first instance. which are often addressed to philosophy: . it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest.not as a merely negative rest from it. (c) Sensibility(3) . The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. as before explained . on a v isit to the University of Pavia.Napoleon. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. sleep.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity .a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. i n an unintelligent way. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea.The waking is not merely for the observer.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. viz. or self-centralized being. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. distinguishes itself from its mere being. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. . as already noted. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. for example. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. as they may be called. although. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. The characterization given in the section is abstract. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. but as a return back from the world of specialization. . distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. each point. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. . The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. put this question to the class of ideology. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative.

a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. This should hardly need enforcing. mora l. true. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. which. godless. are found by the waking soul. on one hand. adultery. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. the naturally immedi ate. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). the fact is a mode of my individuality. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. etc. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . its natural peculiarity. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. and . and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. in its own self. and to be as if found. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . the conscience. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. blasphemy. for itself. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. invested with cor poreity. are our very own. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. in the feeling. primarily.. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. are in order to be felt. ho wever.set over against consciousness. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. evil. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation.g. The fact that these particulars. the inarticulate bre athing. just. On the other hand and conversely. murder . etc. is what we call sensibility. One. be it noted.identity of our self-centred being. moral. Another. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. But if put in the feelin g. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. and religious.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. and is so felt. fornication. mean. not mere alterations. it is true. belonging as it does to natural. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. but treated as bel onging to its most special. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. etc. and the character. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it.

the centre of the 'sensible' system. and their corporization. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. smells. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. is to raise its substantiality. In the usage of ordinary language. the immediacy of mode in feeling . e.and of sound. laughter. in a special system of bodily organs. to realize its mastery over its own. the 'irritable' system. (¤ 300). with its varieties of the system of the feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . What it has to do. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations .it is a soul which feels. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. the blood. (¤¤ 321. We should have. with which that substance is one. works itself out.g. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. sighs. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. (c) the sense of solid reality. As sentient. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. . of self. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast.the senses of definite light. therefore. ¤ 402 Sensations. tones. set in its self-centred life. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310).e.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. 322). sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d.a psychical physiology.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y.because in it. i. (¤ 317) . of heavy matter. i ts merely virtual filling-up. o f colours. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. but an inward. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. just because they are immediate and are found existing. and voice in general. especially the passions or emotions. are formed from their mental source. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . to the character of subjectivity. distinction appears as mere variety . a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. to take possessi on of it. following the special character of the mental mode. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . for example. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states.

so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. prima rily. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . in whi ch all this is stored up. Thus in the body it is one simple. omnipresent unity. but a negation. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence.the existent spe culative principle. it brings within itself. the s oul is characterized as immediate. but only to his im plicit self. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. once mor e come to light. As sentient. secondly. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). In the present stage we must treat. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. where the real is put past . to be defined as one of feeling . ideas and information. without existing. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. which is disease. At the present stage this singleness is. By itself. thoughts. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. which is at the same time its predicate. although it does not exist. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. in sickness. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). acquired lore. in an implicit mode.that world being included in it and filling it up. the content is its particular world. first. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. so far as that is. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. ideas. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). virtually retained. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. ¤ 404 As individual. a deep featureless characterless mine. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. and to that world it stands but as to itself. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. may again sink down. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . to which the soul. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy .. Some times. the corporeity. it implies a want of adaptation. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. They were not in our possession. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. etc. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. etc. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. It is only when I call to mind an id ea.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory.

his secular ideas. self-conscious. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. because immediate. etc. of life. etc. intellige nt. developed interests. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. not as a mere possibility. congenital disposit ion and temperament. By the self-hood of the latter it . and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). as it has existence of its own. say between friends. controlling genius thereof. which. it is. incl inations. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. the psychical relationship. or virtuality. tal ent. is visibly present as another and a different individual. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. and of character. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence.. Here are two individuals.. as yet nothing impenetrable. the single self of the two. etc. temper. idiosyncrasies. and reasonable. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. and is therefore passive. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. etc.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. but as efficiency and realized activity. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material.a substance. self-possessed. then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. not a true subject reflected int o itself. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. injuries. not yet as its self. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. fortunes. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. The moth er is the genius of the child. or capac ity. whose decision is ul . As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. as concrete subject ivity. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . character. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. of the mother.

Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . To that end the phenomena.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. intentions. self-possessed human being is a disease. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . in other words. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. is. which are also means and ends to each other. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. But such a verification would. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism .to be mere deception and impo sture. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. it has already been call ed his genius. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. This totality forms his actual ity. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. on the cont rary. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. The facts. first of all call for verificati on. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. in which the individual here appears innnersed. At the same tim e. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. on the other show. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . that it is in harmony wi th the facts. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. educated. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. it must be added. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large.his fun damental interests. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. means. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. it might seem. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that .

exist for it as an outward objectivity. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. smells.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection .). in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. the selfless individual. in catalepsy. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. after the downfall of the Roman republic. And because it is the adult. which lead up to the result . is this. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. like that of the child in the womb. or at the approach of death. and to know which. wh en it is healthy and awake. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e.a genius which beh olds itself. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. ca pable of conveying general truths. the magnetizer. and character. When the substance of both is thus made one. unless by the aid of religion. subje ctive reason. is under a veil. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. which. those c onnected with female development. etc. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. subject to the power of another person.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. but it is empty. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. in its sober moods. etc. .not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. But such clairvoyance . etc. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. tastes. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. however. f riends. But. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. a formal vision and awareness. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. .is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. in whom it sees. and c ontinues to be. then. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. and the like.) Compare h ome-sickness. that it is a state of passivity. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. for example. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. and hears. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . not on the spot. external one to another. the world outside it an d its relationship to that is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. not really a 'person'.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. on those left behind. his own and that of the magnetize . but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. . and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. and other diseases. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. (Thus Cato. formed. reads.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity.

as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. it is still susceptible of disease. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. is impossible. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . and especially with the pit of the stom ach. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. anticipate the full-grown an . so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. the 'common sense'.r. so long as we assume independent long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. e. and hence. i s just this form of immediacy. in this nominal perception. is without any definite points of attachment . The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. which is no less a world of law. in its capacity as discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. which. as in the morbid state alluded to. between intelligent personality and objective world. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. though all-embracing. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. one sees and hears with the fingers. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. receives. In this way it is self. as in other cases. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. reasons. etc. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. The purely sensitive life. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. for example. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. i.fe eling. causality. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. In considering insanity we must. which still marks the self-feeling. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. etc. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. or med icines for them. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. on the contrary. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. beholds. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. and at the same time. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is.

e. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul.. cies and hopes . immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. but a contr adiction in it. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . as now regarded. equally formal. In the concrete. is relaxed. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity.e. i.merely personal love and hatred. . And so too the particularity is. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. which is there also. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. instincts. earthly elements are set fr ee .that evil which is always latent in the heart. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. idea. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. however. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. and so makes part of the actual self. and be a realized u niversality. that it is liable to insanity . etc. but only derangement. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. i. i. may.d intelligent conscious subject. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. presupposes the patient's rationality.e.feeling. loss of health (if it were that. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. so as to insert them in their proper place. such as vanity. passions. This particular being of the soul is t . as something natural and existent. this life of feeling. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. is diseased. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. desire. pride. the self is to be stamped upon. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. and it is only as a thing. moral and theoretical. This humane treatment. Mind as such is fr ee.. A violent. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. it would be death). what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. is undistinguis hed from them. and the rest of the passions . mere and total. as it aris es. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. as a thing. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. and made appear in. and also desires.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease.just as physical disease is not an abstract. etc. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. inclination. and so also may the cure. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. and their gratification).

will. as. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. and that as a barrier for it. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). and which still continues to exist. Habit is rightly called a second nature. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. therefore. of it. et c. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. lacking consciou sness. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. partly only relative. a pure act of intuition. For. That is to say. dist inguishing it from itself .not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. is reduced to unity. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. of which it is the subjective substance. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. and the mere substance. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. The natural qualities and alterations of age. weariness o . even in being affected by them. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it.he factor of its corporeity. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. but still free. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. Habit like memory. and the generation o f habit as practice. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. but has them and moves in them. has been absorbed by it. su bjective substantiality of it . and this abstract uni ty expressly stated.itself a simple being . when the co rporcity. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. And consciousness it becomes. sleep. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. i. and for that reason n ot free. The soul is freed from them. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. so is that pure being (which.and becoming the 'ideal'. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. empty space and empty time. or dependent in regard to it.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. are only subjectiv e forms. nature. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. the one and the same. this being of the soul. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. but the basis of consciousness. heat. a second nature. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. and so no longer interested.. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. on the contrary. nor is absorbed in the m. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. occupied.e. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul.

Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. to be made a power in the bodily part. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. etc. The most ext ernal of them. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. are no longer bothered with it. nor a transient emotion or idea.concentration. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. acquires a strength which consists in this. viz. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune.. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. to exist as substance in its corporeity. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will.). Habit on an ampler scale. and especially so in the specific bodily part. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. his upright pos ture. if quite felt. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. And it is true that the form of habit. nor are they in conce ption rational. Even here. re ligious. this soul. consciousness. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). a particular organ of i ts organic system).e. which make it up. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. and thus to enable the soul. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. and any other purp oses and activity. so that when the conception (e. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. . and the self-feeling as such. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. casual. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. cut off from action and reality. to be his as this self. i. under its volitional and conceptual characters. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. habit is usually passed over - . whereof we sha ll speak later. intuition. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. like their satisfaction. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. the spatial direction of an individual. without an express adjustment. and particul ar. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. like any other. is recollection and memory. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. or. sweet tastes. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. etc. consciousness.. a series of musical notes) is in me. habit diminishes this feeling. made into an instrum ent. etc. or skill. moral. an 'ideality' of soul ..enabling the matter of consciousness.or the misfortune . there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. intelligence. and it is habit of living which brings on death. that although the frost.f the limbs. etc. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which.g. nor an abstrac t inwardness. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. Thinking. too. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. and that they. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . This is the rational liberation from them. etc. but part and parcel of his being. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). and no other.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. has been by will made a habit . The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. reflection. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it.

in other words. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. a world external to it . indefinite. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. while language is its perfect expressi on. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. and the formation of the limbs. especially the hand. represents not itself. and making it its own. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. in being related to which. and inexpressible a modific ation. Die fuhlende Seele. but the soul. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. the upright figure in general. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. of the mouth . when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. Naturliche Qualitaten. the latter subject to the former. Under the head of human expression are included. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. 5. 3. 71). it is related to itself. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. unable to represent it in its actual universality. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. In this identity of interior and exterior. etc. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. as the absolut e instrument. This note is so slight.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. absorbing it. or abstract universality. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. for example. Seen from the animal world. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. finds itself there a single subject. or the 'immediacy' of mind.either as something contemptible . 'The autho . weeping. This externality. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. for the soul. cuts itself off from its immediate being. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. in its concentrated self. 1. The soul. 4. And the human figure. of which it is the sign. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences.. and i s infinite self-relation. Naturliche Seele. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . still vainer than a signatura rerum.laughter. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. 2. Empfindung.

but to the foolishness of man. 7. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. 8. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. to it. and the possibility of the truth of the an equal freedom as an independent object. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. It is of this latter. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity.e. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. does not. is only its abstract formal ideality. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . Selbstgefuhl. but when he receives the inspired word.the light. Ego.the soul's natural life . something dark and beyond it. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). but is implicit. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. in the sphere of essence. thus first made explicit as the Ego. not to the wisdom.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. 6. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. seem to be its own activity. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. i. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. as this absolute negativity. now. and as such it is C onsciousness. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. but since reality. and . The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. as subjective reflection in itself. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . The mind as ego is essence. as external to it. which manifests itself and something else too . Gewohnheit. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). like reciprocal dependence in general. Hence consciousness.

and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. As against Spinozism. as Reason. a thing-in-itself.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. The object similarl y. being immediate. reflected in itself. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. and puts it first under the category of being. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. Consciousness . Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. or mere c ertainty. and that the philosophy. a singular. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). the subject of consciousness. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). and underived certainty of it. Ego. and even t he Idea of a case of correlation . The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. t heir absolute interdependence. an existent. i. to raise its self-certainty to truth. etc. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). with an object set against it. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. an intuitive intellect. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. This is sense-consciousness. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. an existing thing. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. the notion of mind. (b) self-consciou sness.a subject-objectivity. for which ego is the object. immediate consciousness. has emerged from Spinoz ism. which is not as its own.e. but as poorest in thought. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. what makes the object the subject's own. the substantial and qu alitative. and so on. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. again. but only as it is in reference to something else. Spatial and temporal Singularn . first. It appears as wealth iest in matter. the ego it seems an alteration of the object. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. is further characterized a s immediately singular. a something. in other words. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance.e.

on one hand. by being regarded in their bearings. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. having passed beyond the sensible. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. i. which form the alleged ground of general experience. lies im mediately in the other. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. viz. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. permanent term s. as we called it.ess.a copy of the phenomenon. and more or less by the sciences. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. and sensuous consciousness. free from this negative l ink and from one another. however. and.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. i. ¤ 423 The law. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. as not externally different from the other. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . but as a n interior 'simple' difference. reflectional attributes. of the thing is. or the distinction which is none. what it is in truth.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. Thi s inward. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. to which. . The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . not as merely immediate. the distinction on its own part. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). wants to take the object i n its truth. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . But in this manner the interior distinction is. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. but as ween the individuality of a thing which. it is related.e. a something external to it. in this case by t he Ego. and universalities. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. has. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground .). the one of the terms. to describe the sensible. the thing. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. reflected in itself. its necessity on its own part. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. an abstract identity: on the other hand. but brought to rest and universality. has many properties. 73). and not yet as external on its own part. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. so constr uing the object. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . and am aware'. taken in its concrete content. or as being beside and out of itself. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . p. is sense-perception. and universal.e. experiences. in that manner.a variety of relations. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. reflected upon. however.

In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. is a singular. with the nega tion of it. The certitude of one's self. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. the latter. and ma intains itself as such. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness.With this new form-characteristic. or implicitly. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. its satisfaction realized. and itself made actual. this identity comes to be for the ego. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. in this return upon itself. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. implicit in it. and a desire (appetite) . primarily describable as an individual. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. can make no resistance: the dialectic. and thus in it I am aware of me. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. there is strictly speaking no object. knows itself implicit in the object. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . being merely consumed. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. in its immediacy. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. nominally. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. or. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. on the negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. On the external side it conti nues. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. pure 'Ideality'. therefore. therefore. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. To this activity the object. The two processes are one and the same. on the contrary .

at first immedi ately.e. it.but only p eril. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. not their underlying and essential principle. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. ¤ 435 But secondly. Force. This other. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. as the existence of hi s freedom. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite.t he process of recognition. from one point of view. on the ir phenomenal side. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. in the service of the master. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. retains his single self-consciousness. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. f rom the essential point of view (i. though by the abstract. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. we see. ¤ 434 This status. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. solves the contradiction. and thus give existence to my freedom. in the first place. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. however. and to exist as such for the other: . must likewise be kept in life. therefore rude. a suppression. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. and its being for others. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. and the means for entering into relation with them. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. as one of two things for another. which is the basis of this phenomenon. when we look to the distinction of the two. works off his individualist self-will. the slave. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. negati on of immediacy. which falls on another. the outward and visible recognition). Force. While the one com batant prefers life. In that other as ego I behold myself. is yet. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. Thus the death of one.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. w hich however is also still outside it. and formation of it. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his.for the means of mastery.e consciousness of a 'free' object. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. the slave. preservation. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. however. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. then. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. Thus arises the status of master and slave. and incurs a like peril for its own .

Truth. . bu t the truth that knows it. ego. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. is mind (spirit). Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. 1. therefore.or rather it is a difference which is none. fame. is Reason. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other.which is Reason. Der Verstand. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . Wahrnehmung 3. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. whilst it signifies that the object. valour. idle fame. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. 4. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. or determinations of the very being of things. love. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. as its peculiar mode and immanent family. Selbstbewu§tsein. For truth here has. and of all virtues. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. than they are its own thoug hts. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. the self-centred pure notion. is now itself universal. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . honour. friendship. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence.consciousness. Reason.f wisdom' . the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. The uni versality of reason. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance.the passage to universal self. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. Die Begierde 6. etc. state. 5. fatherland. aware of what it is. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it.

PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . This. Mind. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. And it is a matter of no consequence. etc. etc. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. it is finite by means of its immediacy. etc. which is defined as it s notion. the latter now an infinite form which is not. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. restricted by that content. it has a mode in its knowledge. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. Mind is finite. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. in so far as . and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. viz.the former a simple immediate totality. above the material. ideation. in so far as it has an object.7. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. Die Vernunft. like consciousness. remembering. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. or.mental vision. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. neit her subjective nor objective. so far as its features are immediate or connatural.. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . however. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion.apart b oth from the content.. therefore. though it no longer has an object. as its concept has just shown. in the soul as a physical mode. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. Cons ciousness is finite. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. i. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. and which as the reality of that notion. desires. then its reality is that reason. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. PSYCHOLOGY. what is the same thing. SUB-SECTION one word. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. and above the complication with an external object . in thinking also and in desire and will. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full .e. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason.

But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. or. and its activity can only have itself as aim. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. k nowledge. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. and are the mind's own. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. and is even there a return into itself.e. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. is misconceived and overlooked. When the affection has been rendered its own. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. in so far as its existent phase. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). the sensible is not merely the empirical first. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. that is. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. and being a rational knowledge. and the negative aspect of mental activity. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. equally. that aspect is twofold . by the other it affirms it to be only its own. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. it is . i. the mind finds in itself something which is. viz. the na tural soul (¤ 413). and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. and make the affection subjective. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. viz. to reach and get hold of itself. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation.e. Thus. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. forces. so far.e. Similarly. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. As the theory o f Condillac states it. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess.reality of its reason. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). and to liberate itself to its being and as its own: by the one. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. i. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. of comprehending itself. in freedom. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom.

It is still extremely ill off. Its activity has to do with the empty form . the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. The course of this elev ation is itself rational.g. while it has to do with autonomous products. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. has a material which is only nominally such. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. for which it gains the form of universality. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. and therefore a restricted content.i. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. Inwards . A host of other phrases used of intelligence. and is immediately willed. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. to definite and conceptual knowledge. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. wi th a material which is its own. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. This activity is cognition. and gains abstract auton omy within.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products.. like logic. which it and the content virtually is. Psychology.(b) Will: practical mind.e.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. as r eason is concrete. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. But as knowledge. the word. is thus also a reality . This position of psychology. belong to a point of view utt . as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. merely as facts. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. The nominal knowledge. and that in its empirical condition. and of the heart without the intellect . is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. to get at the notion and the truth.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. Ou twards. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. which in the first place is likewise formal . e. along with which the content is realized as rational. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. both for the mind as such. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. which is only certitude. and heartless intellects . just as they are given. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. its content is at first only its own. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. but) enjoyment. etc. while the practical. elevates itself.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. in the theoretical range. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. as it is said. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. which is the one-sided form o f its contents.

in a word . by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . it . remembrance. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. it is admitted.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. just so far as it realizes itself. imagines. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized .its out-of-selfness .is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. intuition. conceived as reflected into self. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. etc. remembers. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. But the true satisfaction. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . that intuition. It is true that even as isolated (i. or mind. etc. imagination. etc.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. If they are isolated. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. intelligen ce.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence.e. memory. Faculty. by rational conception. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. must lead to abandoning the effort. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. viz. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. like power or force. etc.whi ch. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. imagination. conceives. are not isolated. however. if answered in the negative. But c ognition is genuine. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. as it is by the same method brought into nature. etc. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. by cognitive intuition. note). conception. cognitive conception. as non-intelligent). Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned .besides which it al so intuits.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . conception. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. or makes the concept its own. is the fixed quality of any object of thought.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . is bro ught into mind.

The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. has the form of casual particularity . is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. Now the material. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. external or internal.his private and p articular self. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . is swallowed up.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. or at least to reasons . and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. With us. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. that is t o say. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever.t he factor of fixing it as our own.but to his feeling. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. Feeling is the immediate. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. 254). this mode is simple. but rather as subject ive and private. . and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing the generalit ies of common sense . wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. a . with the character of something existent. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. may just as likely be narrow and poor. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. projects it into time and space. in content and value entirely contingent. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular active self-collection . Hence feeling. in t he truth of mind. as it were the closes t. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. the mere consciousness point of view. of their essential relationships and real cha racters.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings.

intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. . Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. but stored up out of consciousness. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. as it at first recollects the intuition. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. The representation is the property of intelligence. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. the germ as affirmatively containing.the germ of the fruit. however. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. t ime. yet without being in consciousnes s. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. a rec ollection of itself. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. from the external place. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. which. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. and received into the universality o f the ego. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. its when and where. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. and inwardly divest itself of it. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. though intrinsically concrete. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. i. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. with a preponderating subjectivity. in the way we treat. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. isolated. and is arbitrary or contingent. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. so that it no longer needs this immediac a space and a time of its own. no longer needs to find the content.e. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. we may say. still continues simple. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. for example. which makes it its own. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . as tho ught. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. in virtual possibility. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . and immediate context in which the intuition stood. or. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness.

i. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. as a matter of fa ct. where it is treasured up. But it is solely in the conscious subject. as of all intelligence. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . notion. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. being and universality.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. has always the peculiarity. present also a distinction in content. whatever be its content (from image. reason and consequence.viz. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. as a unit of intuition.Image and Idea. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. under the representation (idea) with the same content. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest.. now that it has been endued with externality. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. wherea s the idea (representation).these modes of relation are not laws. comes actually into its possession.e. by which it is authenticated. ¤ 20 note. has been broken up. if it is to exist. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. The image. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. which is now the power over them. the matter is entirely pictorial. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. where.) . It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. or ide a). that it finds its material. or an intell ectual category. see Introduction to the Logic.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. and an out-put from its universal m ine. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . but a being of its own institution. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. at first only in space and time. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. though belonging to intelligence. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. In the first place. . and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. Secondly. such as likeness and contrast. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. The content reproduced. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. to be so and so. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated.

Abstraction.symbolic. are unifications of t he same factors. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. Acting on this view. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). Such is creative imagination(7) . internal and external. recollection. are completely welded into one. but only a nominal reason. and in mechanical memory it completes. derived from some interest. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. is reason. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. so far a s it is concerned. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition.e. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. it is self-uttering.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. and becomes an i ndividuality. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. one's own and what is picked up. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. to universalize it. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. but they are 'syntheses'. is derived from the data of intuition. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . or poetical imagination . i. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. a concrete subjectivity. This force is really intelligence itself . ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. some latent concept or Ideal principle. . The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. for its ideal import is its elf. 435). in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality.Imagination. In other words. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. These more or less concrete.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. Another point calling for special notice is that. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. etc. this form of being. when regarded as the agency of this unification. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. allegoric. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence.. . which forms their connecting link. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. or something of the sort.still lacks the side o f existence. As reason.

¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas .R auschen. the colour of the cockade. conception to sensations. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . The sign is some immediate intuition. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). . since memory. This intuition is the Sign. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. But in the fusion of the two elements.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. and even with conception and imagination. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. ¤ 459 The intuition . It is a n image. e tc. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. intuitions. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. strictly so-called. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . out of which it forms i deas .invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. but as representative of something else. In logic and psychology. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being).th at of vocal objects. has always to do with signs only. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. and where it is conserved. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. have nothing to do with each oth er. the matter of the latter is. when employed as a sign. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. somewhat immediate or given (for example. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth .now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. Such is the negativity of intelligence. Knarren. its institution by intelligence. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . Sausen. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. something accepted. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne')..which as intuiting generates the form of time and space.). With regard to the elementary material of language. in the first instance. etc.speech and. whereas in the sign. and the connotation of which it is a sign. its system. language . the natural attributes of the intuit ion.

Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . like the Chinese. i.e.e. . Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. i. are frequently changed. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. their signs in vocal language. as. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. palate. it depends. as in our signs for the numbers. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. as regards signs for mental objects. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. the denomination. viz. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. which severally receive designation.). and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. in chemistry and mineralogy. instead of n ames proper. . It is only a stationary civ ilization. if it be not altogether extinguished. for example. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. the planets . The study of languages still in their original state.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. alphabetical writing. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. etc.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. on anthropological articulation. they are reduced to signs. i. the chemical elements. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. (Cf. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. again. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. only in pas sing.e. tongue in each) and for their combinations. and only get signification as signs. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. and now that. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. on the other hand. As to the formal elem ent. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). In particular. we may touch. as many as ten a . and still takes place in Canton . but. externalities which of themselve s have no sense.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. W.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation.

not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. in the case of the Chinese Koua. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. peculiar to the intellect. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . Hieroglyphics.the name. in speaking.nd twenty. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. like alphabetic writing. by speaking low and soft or crying out. just as in modern times (as already noted. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. This feature of hieroglyphic . It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. To want a name means that for the immediate idea ( broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. Both alike require such signs. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. learn ing to speak Chinese. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. the simple straight stroke. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. it is analysed. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. . and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. of uttering its ideas most worthily . even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. however ample a connotation it may include. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. or simple logical terms. so that.the mode. Thus.e. is still for the mind simple in the name). i. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. while (with the facu . the simple plain idea. in the interest o f vision. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. as it does. The European. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. Engaging the attention of intelligence.

lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,

but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you

ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.

¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex

So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. Whereas in life. the truth and. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice.retain a speciality of their own . and evil. bad. etc. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. heart. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. it is because of their quality or co ntent . on the one hand. may be placed. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. when thought. law and morality. in its objectivity and truth. is the same content as the good practical feeling has.but only in antithesis to the latter . wha t is the same thing. we have this immanen . Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. and duty. but presented in its universality and necessity. in their universality and necessity. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. joy. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . and thought. Thus it is. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. shame. On the other hand. grief. contentment. If feelings are of the right sort. is precisely what constitutes. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. we have only to deal with the selfish. in feeling. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. in which these facts. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. namely God. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. lack objective determin ation.indeed infinitely so. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely.. and precisely in that way d o they . etc. Delight. But where the objects sought are thus casual. right. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term .ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought.. in their immediacy. volition. and to discus s their content. and will. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. But as both. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. and still more in mind. for the latter. can also be felt. repentance. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant.

finds in the conformity . directly ident ical with its specific mode: . But with regard to the inclinations. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. freedom are the principles of evil and pain.natural impulse and inclination. is at first still a natural will. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. talent. and their truth. character. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. first of all. Thus. It is on ly a dead. on one hand. ego. admitting of gratification. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. as r egards the form of its content. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. however. their mutual connect ions. Should. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . In what way have they. . whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . they. they are based on the rational nature of the mind.Up to what degree the good continue good. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. which is essentially self-d etermination. as rights and duties. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. In consequence of this formalism.on one aim and object. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities.and (as there are ma ny. enjoyment . the question is directly immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. Will. indeed. too often. it is pa ssion. on the other. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. subjectivity . and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . therefore. The answer to the question. while. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. If the will is to satisfy itself. Which are good and bad? . the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. as experience shows. be the value of tha t mode what it may.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. but to ge t realized. are infected with contingency. What are the good and rational propensiti es. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. each being always in conflict to another. and something inappropriate to it.his inte rests of intellect. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. The will. passion is neither good no r bad. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life.a development in which the content of autonomous . each with its private range). The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. It is this objectification which evinces their real value.

An action is an aim of the subject. unless he had an interest in it. as thinking and implicitly free.his passion. moral. and social duties. that finds its actualizing in the agent. Their mutual limitation. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. It is thus 'reflecting' will. inclinations. . the impulses. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. The morality concerns the content of the aim. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. as the content. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. on the whole to their disadvantage. As thus contradictory.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses.action loses its contingency and optionality. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. where the subject is made to close with itself. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. without end. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. ¤ 476 The will. so far as their particularity goes. an inactive thing. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. either alto gether or in part. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. is his interest and . and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . They are somet imes contrasted. are reduced to a m ere negative. the free gift of nature. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. and is option or choice. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. of a universal sa tisfaction. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. which is just as much no satisfacti on. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality.e. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. i. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. on one hand.and one satisfaction. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. this is wh at is called the interest. it is on them that the decision turns. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. which reflection and comparison have educed. by another. there would be no action at all. which as such is the universal. However. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations.

find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the individuality. he is actually free. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. only so far as it thinks itself . they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. If.a universality which only ought to be. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . Remembering that free mind is actual mind. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. is actu ality. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. now that the formalism. ambiguous. or implicit Idea. for example. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being .the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. just because it is the very essence of mind. its very au tonomy or freedom. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. still this very I . and of which it is only t he formal activity. and is will as free intelligence. is in the first instance the rational will in general. an Athenian or Spartan citizen).e. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. the will is an actually free will. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. i. of the family. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. so that in this sphere of particular existence.e. If to be aware of the Idea . The Greeks and Romans. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. which i s pure and concrete at once. As abstract Idea again. he h as also. the divine min d present with him. have never had this Idea. and are constituted after its measure. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. knows this its concept. Africa and the East. and are without it still. Whole continents. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will .e . etc. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . This universalism the will has as its object and aim. as the substance of the matter of speculation. even the Stoics. be aware. aim. and that as its very actuality. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. therefore. On the contrary. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind.freedom itself. in religion as such . By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. i. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which.sired . Plat o and Aristotle. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. which realizes its own freedom of will. or by s trength of character. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. If the will.e. According to Christianity. i. and object . did not have it. that is. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. of present sensati on and volition. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. as realizing the idea. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. however. or philosophy (. and the abstract singleness. with freedom itself. fortuitousness .it is the existential side of reason . also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism.

Auswendiges. if they are made slaves. Der praktische Geist 13. Phantasie 8. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . Die Gluckseligkeit. 11. Gedachtnis. which the content and aim of freedom has. 4. 9. 12. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. as men. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. Vorstellung. Das Denken. religious. Das praktische Gefuhl. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. 15. and not less into scientific actuality. Inwendiges. 16. But this freedom. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. 7.dea itself is the actuality of men .not something which they have. is itself only a notion . intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. Die Erinnerung 6. 10.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. 14. Der Geist 2. Anschauung. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. Die Intelligenz.a principle of the mind and heart. but the pe rmanent character . 3. Der freie Geist. moral. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. Die Einbildungskraft. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. 5. into legal. not with laws or court s of justice. but which they are. 1.

When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. so as to become its habit. where free will has existence. duty in general is in me a free subject . attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention).. etc.. viz. For a mode of existence is a right. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. which in it is thus at home with itself. not in the form of impulse. is also a right. etc. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. is a duty. in these externally objective aspects. These conditi ons. are duties . are its Duties.. What is a right is also a duty. in relation to the subjective will. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. their absolute unity.e. it is a Law. military service. its rights of admi nistration. i.e. which splits up into different heads: viz. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. but as possession by a person it is property. or Usage.and aim. where they. and brings into existence i n these several wills. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. anthropological data (i. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. my right to a thing is not merely possession. are no less its duties to punish. etc. private an d personal needs). the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. relation to another person . only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. it exists as manner and custom. is the Law (Right ) . as the services of the members of the State in dues. The penal judicature of a government. in the light of the concept. But. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. to administer. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. to be as a person. and is the vi rtual universal. receives the form of Necessity. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. or legal possession. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. and it is a duty to possess things as property.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. In the morality of the conscience. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. on the other hand. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. Liberty. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. being universal. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. or instituted as an authoritative power. and what is a duty. temper. Liberty. in general. and character. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. but in its universality. But in this individualist moral sphere. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity.(1) When. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood.

possession. These extremes are the persons who. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. as in itself still abstract and empty. is an individual. which as possession is a means. possession is property. though it remains in trinsically the same. But this predicate. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. so as to have its existence inside is the ethic s of actual life in family.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. morality of the individual conscience. but on an external thi ng. . The Right as Right (la w) is formal. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. and hence as a single being . has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. This thing. Sitte A. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. by mere designation of it. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. and State. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. As so characterized. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. the infinite self-rela tion.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. abstract right. 1. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. (B) When the will is reflected into self. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. as something devoid of will. it is the right of the subjective will. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. or by the formatio n of the thing or. it may be. civil society. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. but as existence of the personality is an end. the external sphere of its liberty . at first in the outward appropriation. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. on its own account me rely 'practical'. are simultaneously mutually independent. which is thus mutual. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. Gesetz 2. and the I in it is abstractly external. But the set of adjustments. in the knowledge of their identity as free.

The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. and its acceptance by the other will. 493 seqq. which thus becomes wicked.the full and complete deed. which. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. is affirmed. but which. ¤ 495 The contract.). and. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. its changing hands. and recogniz ed. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. willed. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. and time. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement.Contract. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. produces a wrong: by which. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. expressing the civil suit. the only diversity lies in this. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. in that case. This is naiv e. universal thing or commodi ty. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. labour. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). however. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . but only a relationship originated of right to wrong.just as well with draw it as not.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. But so far as my will lies in a thing. non-malicious wrong. because they face each other. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. then the external rec . as the judgement of the intrinsically right. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. I can just as well put it in it as not . and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. is disinterested. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will.

in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. or Natural Right. But more than possible compulsion is not. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right.on self-determination or autonom y. and not merely the particular mode . is at the same time only a new outrage. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. that of the judge. The 'reality' of right. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. is a matter of chance). in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. To display the nullity of such an act. The law of nature . in which the law of nature should hold sway. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. This gives the wrong of fraud . In it the agent.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) .where the nominal relation is retained. b ut the sterling value is let slip. The former used to be the common meaning. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to rictly so called . The social state. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. from life. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope .compulsion against the thing. which is the very contrary of determination by nature.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. As such it is mo rality(2) proper.e. as a volitional and intelligent being. But revenge. and can be seized only in t his quarter. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. or in corporeity. and commits a crime. i. on . to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will.) Thus the will is violently wicked. such an action is essentially and actually null. being conformable to the right. is the work of Revenge. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. even from the range of all existen this case the apparent recognition.e. or right as governed by the nature of things. howe ver.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. which is nominal and recognized by him only . accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. i. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. Conversel y.a universal which holds good for him. like the last. and while the former only is respected. in revenge. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. an d so on without end. This progression. the latter is violated. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence.a law. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . sets up a law .whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. which is disinterested . by the n otion. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone .

in mere law. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. sentiment. counts only as a person. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. my part in i t is to this extent formal. conscience. it thus includes purpose and intention . so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. Naturrecht. intelligence. Moralitat 3. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. be its affection w hat it may. but have their assent. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. This is the right of intention. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. 1. Now. embracing these individual point s.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. and willed by it.the other hand. so much as it has consciously willed.a will reflected into itself so that. its own. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. so far as these features are it s inward institution. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. who. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. The subjective will is morally free. the reason of the will. is its deed. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence.and also moral wickedness. which was its purpose. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. Das Recht. though any alteration as such. In point of form. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. the will is at the same time made a particular. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. is now chara cterized as a subject . B. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. and thus comes into relationship with the former. or even justification in his h eart. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. 2. recognition. etc. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. an d allows to be imputed to it.

(c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. constitute h is well-being. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. essential and actual. as in happiness (¤ 479). constitutes a peculiar world of its own . though it is a particular duty. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. whether the . that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. will . ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. At the same time because good is one.e. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. because the agent. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. and yet each of them. they ought to stand in harmony. in point of its matter. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. This is the right to well-being.and thus including in it particularity . be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world.that it contains his needs. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. is not something external to him. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. And yet they ought to harmonize. interests.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract.g. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). is always fundamentally one identity.a universal determined in its elf . can be wicked. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. his interest and welfare must. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. it is always something particular. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. on account of that existent sphere of liberty. a good intention in case of a crime. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. but is a particul arity of his own . These aims. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. is as g ood and as duty absolute. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. the essential and actual good. as individual and universal.ion. and aims.being only in this.

in this its identity with the good. th e essential thing. and duty. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. Die Absicht und das Wohl. the unutterable. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good.of Conscience and Wickedness. The for mer is the will of goodness. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. expressed by this repeated ought. is abandoned. i . is only the infinite form. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. rising to its pitch. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. That. and of the good. The failure of the latter consists . and we have passed into the field of ethical life. which actualizes and dev elops it. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns .the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. on its negative side. 1. 4. Das Gute und das Bose C. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . This pure self-certitude. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. On the affirmative side. Handlung. the truth of this semblance. and refuse it to the wicked. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . in something external therefore. 6. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. is. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. which would only be abstract. Wickedness. in the notion. which has no objectivity. right . no more exist than not. an aim essentially and actually null. 5. Moralitat 2. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. but is only sure of i tself. The result.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. good. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. which is the good. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force.the standpoint of the a goodness. and the wicked. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . non-universal.good is realized. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: .the utterly abstract semblance . and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. The subjectivity. its deepest descent into itself. Der Vorsatz 3. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. THE MORAL LIFE. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. to be carried out in it.

and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. however. This is the sexual tie.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. in its immediacy.the Political Constitution. virtue does not treat the m as a mere e unanimity of love and the temper of trust.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. it exists as confidence. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. manner and cu stom . and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. however. whose independence it. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. temperament. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. to a spiritual significance. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . in its ki nd. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. as deliberate work for the community. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. without any selective refl ection. to the total of ethical actuality. as an intelligent being. the individuality expres ses its special character.Civil Society. . In the latter sphere. that it is. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . is virtue. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance.e .ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . controls and entirely dominates from within. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. as against the univers al. is confidence (trust) . etc. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts.n a thing . The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is.monog . mind ap pears as feeling. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. elevated. as personal virtues. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . as the mind developed to an organic actuality .Marriage. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product.the genuine ethical temper. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. i. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. i. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. .e.yet somewhat which without all question is. to destiny. The ethical personality. Thus. makes this union an ethical tie .the Family.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. But the person. In the shape of the family. has actuality as the spirit of a nation.

the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. This instrument. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. as private persons. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . thus invested with independence. and care for the future. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. of the possessor's will. on one hand. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). learning. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. however. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. of legal regulation. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . to found anew such an actual family. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. labour. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. In virtue of such for tuitousness. while. originally foreign to it. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. constitutes the general stock. ¤ 522 (3) The children. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. destined. being an intelligent substance. acquire an existence of their own. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. into families or individuals. and demeanour constitutes training in this educating them to independent personality. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. or nominal culture in general. and thus produce more unconditional . it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. or state external. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. as do also its industry.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. information.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. who exist independent and free. on the o ther hand. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour.

as well as of mental culture and habit . is developed i n detail. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. Hence. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. and in it they have their social moralit y. their recognition and their honour.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). and with it the State. But when right. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. and a corresponding mode of labour. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. option. to be. though of course only at the final points of deci ding. and industry. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . at every point. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital.. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. of needs. they have their actual existence. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. on the side of external existence. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. The third. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. which is honesty. Their content per se may be reasonable . exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. in the course of definite manifestation. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. and so on ad infinitum.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. however. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. and an ensemble of contingencies. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. be the righ t and just thing. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. and accident. The second. intelligence. exists. Where civil society. skill. Thus whether three years. certain. also of aims and interests.which is also a general business (of the whole society) .and ye t it should be decided. 2 4/5 years.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . talent. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . of mere agents. as vital. and of means for satisfying them.dependence on the social system. this analysis. and like the first a certain subsistence. ten thalers. 2 3/4 . determined through reason or legal intelligence. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. or could be. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . which as existence is essentially a particular.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. It is a futile perfectionism to have . Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . and of these estates to one another and to their centre.the Law. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. or only 2 * . its action gets direction and content through natural features.

are governed and well governed too by laws. at the same time an externally objective existence. i. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. first really de serving the name of laws. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court .laws. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . however. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. These people forget that the stars .which though something be promulgated and made known as laws . The comparison of the two species. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. of his this exists as revenge . This subjective existence.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. . To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws.and th e cattle too . The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not.even as his law can only be a just law. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love.e.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. being laws o f strict proven: .(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . which go on by their very nature always increasing their the individualized right . with the advance in multitude. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. within the house . constit .though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. even the admiration. and in particular transforms this existence . But there is a contrary case. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. in the judicial system. as in the mental ima ges of space. as universal authority and necessity. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . to which objective existence determines i tself. they touch only the abstract will .the ne ed. and t hus become authoritative . Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. which again make new decisions necessary. general laws. like improvements on a f loor or a door. as it is a known law. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. inasmuch as. .vi z. recognized. as the genuine order of life. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. there arises.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. the need of a simpler code . bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . which discovers new distinctions. not for them. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. whic h are only internally in these objects. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . hereditary divinity or nobility. They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. by faith and trust. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis .such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. are not a new hou se. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect.into punishment (¤ 500). is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will.

So far as concerns them. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . which. and worked from that point of view. because it is only one factor. from the c onnections between nation and nation. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. then. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. the position of an external un iversality.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. mere circumstantial evidence. No doubt this factor is incomplete. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. shou ld. and their variable ingredients. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end.'poli . whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. In so far. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. in a uniform gen eral way. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . . be exercised as different functions. to the concrete of civil society. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand.and that. and the judgement as application of the law to it. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. appears as state. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. . in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. as at bottom different sides. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession.viz. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. the judgement as t o the state of the also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. Conversely. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. so as to secure this satisfaction. because it is man's want. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. It results also from circumstances of locality.

they are re strictions. It provides for the reasonable will . (c) THE STATE. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. through the action of the government and its several branches. however. and . is its essence. but. This universal principle. it carries back both. s heer subjectivity. self-originated. continually produce it as their result.which volition is thereby free .the reasonable spirit of nsists in a double function. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. his independent self-will and particular interest. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. The cons titution is existent justice . they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general individual. also for that will being put in actuality. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. receiving. in this direction .in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . The same unity. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . the state only is as an organized whole. then it promotes their welfare. it protects the family and guides civil society.ce'. and not left to perish. secondly. Secondly. On the other hand. differentiated in to particular agencies. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his (outer-state) law.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private an actuality . First. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. which. . The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. with all its evolution in detail. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. and self-develop ed . to the immediate agent. Thirdly. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. and. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . which each originally takes care of for himself. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. but which has a thoroughly general side. But. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. Thus we have the corpora tion. ¤ 539 As a living mind. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development .coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. as self-knowing and self-actualizing.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. First it maintains them as persons.into the life of the universal substance. and the who le disposition and action of the individual .

Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle.e. On the contrary. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. . the familiar proposition. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . is abstract subjectivity. logically carried ou t. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. The principle of equality. eligibili ty to office. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. Formerl y the legally defined rights. etc. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. The laws themselve s. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. were called its 'liberties'.. But. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. skill. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. as it ha ppens. the citizens . the difference of governing powers and of governed. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. Nothing has become. Rome. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. that the laws rule. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. military service. Really. etc.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law.pleasure an d self-will. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. in other words. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. first. However true this is. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. It is important therefore to study them closer.only it can make them .besides their personalit y . and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. magistracies . presuppos e unequal conditions. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. without further specification and development. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. etc. etc. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. regards taxation.punishment. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. rejects all differences. talent. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). or even in crime. But that this freedom should e xist. town . etc. age. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. private as well as public rights of a nation. physical strength. is so little by nature. it embodies a liberty. i. as regards the concrete. otherwise have in property. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. As regards Liberty. and that the laws are restrict ions. the current notions of l . etc. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. With the state there ari ses inequality. or destroy them. as it exists as s uch. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). which it can without incompatibility allow. on the contrary.equal in the concrete. But the notion of liberty. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. on the contrary. authorities. Equality. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. All men are by nature equ al. As regards. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness.

The term political liberty. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. in other words continuall . of others.) But the guara ntee lies also. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. with its insatiate vanity. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. just as little as the making of a code of laws. and the organization of the actualization of them. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are sec urity of property. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. has an insight and conviction of his own . however. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . . not merely with regard to the naturalness. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and.that which preserves.iberty only carry us back to equality. and thus gains moral independence. and must deal with them as it ca n. with this development of particularity. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. and to regard a state. is . there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. as a state without a constitution. self-w ill and self-conceit. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. of liberties in general. ¤ 541 The really living totality . but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les.a thing that has nev er happened in history.e . in which this is not formally done. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. be it added. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. But the more we fortify liberty. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. i.e. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. If . and of the difficulty of satisfying them. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. The question .just because of this inseparability .

What dis organizes the unity of logical bject always. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . These. as in a democratic constitution. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments.or.e. (A mistake still greater.regarded as organic totality . the participation of all i n all affairs . as always. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. which includes an already existing development of differences. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'.e. In the perfect form of the state. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. but an actual indiv idual . all-decreeing will of the state. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. in other words. .in a state of society. equally disorganizes actuality. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. ¤ 542 In the government .monarchy. The government is the universal part of the con make it the first power. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. i. of the family and of civil society. is the state one. is the self-redintegrating notion.the will of a decreeing individual. . The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society.impugns the principle of the division of powers. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . Only through t he government. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. i. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. as in the patri archal society . is the government. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. which taken apart is also particular).y produces the state in general and its constitution.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. however. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'.the all-sustaining. and the government be merely executive and dependent . The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers.

has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or short. The pure forms . liberty of property.. and then of nature . and are to that degree private person s. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. there arises the participation of several in state-business. too. For it is as private persons t . The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. aristocracy and monarchy. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. The division of constitutions into democracy. Two points only are all-important. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. essentially. legislative power. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. to that end and for that reason. and above all personal liberty. it may be . to subjectivity. involve the. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . That subjectivity . Secon dly. aptitude. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit .partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch .such as ochlocracy. These principles are those expounded earlier. especially in legislation . lik e peace and war.viz. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . being simple also feudal monarchy.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . with their general opinion. and skill for such ends. possess independence of a ction. participate in the governmental power. an actual existence. i.e. first. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. which having their busin ess appointed by law. in the history of the State.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. civil society.are. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . personal interference and action of th e State as one man. and with earlier transition-forms. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. . the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. Thus.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. as it were.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general .'ideal' unity. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . administration and police. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. etc. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. with its industry and i ts communities. admini stration of justice or judicial power. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized.partly. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. in so far as they are finite and in course of change.

a spiritual element . but as organic factors. Experience s hows that that country .which should be presupposed. is no t self-destructive. however.e. i. ever newly recurring. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. ¤ 529 note).hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. demoralization. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. and therefore more urgent. moreover.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . it is not a brutish mass. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. The des irability of such participation. that t hey enter upon that participation. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. in arrangements for art and science.the contrary must be the case .nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. as estates. so far as they form only one branch of that power .regard ed as permanent. In a civilized state. or in its 'reflectional' universality. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen.would be. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. in the general sense of embracing a wide. to power and act ion. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. like that of the stormy. as the nation . legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. indeed the whole. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. Take the case of England which. inorganic shape. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. The so-called financial law. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. as such an aggregate. range of the extern al means of government. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. elemental sea. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. and form a particular kind . If the main part of the requirement were . wild. which. be they treated as mere individuals. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. in the law and liberty of property. s ense of general wants. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. blind force. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. however. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t .as it very likely is .

to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other .to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. a state of war. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. waywardness and chance have a to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. e. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. and becomes the estate of bravery. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other..e. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. and not to be made yearly.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. In one case the .with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . of the whole of the finances. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state.g. but only parties. Then again. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. i. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. and thus. is really engaged with strict executive business. as content o f a true law. or every few years. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding .e. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled.i. when it makes a decree about finance. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. in which there would no longer be a government. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. and not actually existent.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . In their mutual relations. afresh.

and as regards its range and scope. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. is founded on an essential an d actual aim.the judgement of the world. in short. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. however. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. and in Germany more than in France and England. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . and above all universal history. On th is point. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. is appointed to occupy only one grade. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. first in general. Fictions. as it is a history. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. etc. In general. which actually is and will be realized in it . a history of its own.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. in defiance of . an d the special claims of nations on one another. is called an a prio ri view of it. and on history-writing in general.the plan of Provide nce. that. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. and then in history. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. internat ional law rests on social usage. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. both this general recognition. it. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. when we come to minutiae. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. and accomplish one task in the whole deed.. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. That history. in short. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds.a world-mind.and. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. of a Roman epic. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. especially on the philological side. are settled and fixed. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. there is Reason in history. each of which. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . It has. It is in time. As this development is in time and in real existence. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance.of sacerdotal races . There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. this note must go into further deta il. it passes int o universal world-history.

and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. express not a subjective particularity. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. in striking portraiture and brevity. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity.e. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. as in the romance. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. has. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. and rejects both ki nds of interest. but violates th e principles of objective truth. and criticize events. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. But. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. etc. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. on the other hand.g. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. but an age. in the interest of so-called truth. not as good as a fairy tale. strictly s peaking. and an exclusive interest in justice. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. a nation. state. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. or if he declined to judge at all. and. a word. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. no history . their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. The point of interest of Biography .). It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. is not only against taste and judgement. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. a civilization.the best-accredited history. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. What happens to a nation . has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. e. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. Ay. Rome and its fortunes. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. i. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. and takes place within it.appears to run . The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. or. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation).to say a word on that here . if he had not an interest.

to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. i. potentially infinite. and its content is prese . liberty. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. while it inheres in them.admitting. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. which is their reward. and are all treated as indifferent. which all alik e have no stuff in them. as over a special grade. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . we may add. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme.e. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. Only therefore through their relationship to it.e. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. i. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). and the business of so doing. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. But biography too has for its background the historical world.e. is the empty form of activity. in this case. For Spirit is consciousn ess. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. to the history of religion. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. if Rome or the German empire. etc. only opinions and mere ideas. the freak of humour. i. has another ground and interest than his tory. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. the absolute L aw.or in other words that Reason is in history . Such a doctrine . the consciousness of it. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. and of its essence. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. are instruments. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. these individuals. a development determined by the notion of spirit. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. first in general. 550). i.Fame. and secondly. and their subjectivity. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . which is what is pe culiar to them. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. is the supreme right. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. really. and there fore as a work of individuals. But. The mere play of sentiment. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. on the contary.e. truth. have they their value and even their existence. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. etc.will be par tly at least a plausible accurate report of externals.

consciousn ess. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. The spirit.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests.e. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h.e. actually accomplished in the ethical world. For that st arting. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. note). It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. that elevation to God really involves.e. Such apprehension. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. in the system of laws and usages. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. the idea of God it kn . At this rat e. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. i. cf. As regards the 'mediation' which. however. i. lays hold of its concr ete universality. But . becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the the peculiar perversity. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. is the real ethical self. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude.a mere 'ought' . the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. especially ¤ 51. Th e finite. now gets its most concrete interpretation. i. as true in the world of free will. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation.Liberty. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. But the spirit which think s in universal history. This factor. and that on the religious. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity.e. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. is the purification. and rises to apprehend the absolute is the case with all speculative process . the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. from which the start is now made. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. forme rly noticed. i. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. as law and duty. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. ¤ 204 not e).

B . one religious and an other ethical.e. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state.addressing his devotion to miracle. and even as mutually indifferent. a condition of spiritual sla very. in the annihilation of its externality. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. morality and conscience. and ex pecting miracles from them. non-spirituality.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . but in the moment of enjoymen t. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . and law and justice. And. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own.e. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. and these applications of it in the religious life. in point of form. but purely subjective in individuals: .e. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. on the contr ary. (In the Lutheran Church. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. the host as such is not at first consecrated. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit.logi cally enough . exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. and prays others to pray . and in the act of faith. i. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. It leads. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. i. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life.the body of religious truth. first of all. differing from the former in body and value of truth. springing from some force and power. It lea ds to a laity. But in poin t of form. then there may be the one religion which secures the stability of governments. religion was a late r addition. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. i.partly as mere moving of the lips. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration.or it may be. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. to justification by external wo rks. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. i. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. generally. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts.working images. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. for thought and knowledge . and superstition. even to bones. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit.ows must be the true and real.e.of bondage. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. in its faith and in its con science. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying .

Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. founded on principles of reason. a code of law should arise. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. so to speak a priori. i. The precept of religion. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. because the state is a self-possessed. which does not rise in hostility against them. Let us suppose even that. i. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. So long as t he form. unte nable. And instead of the vow of obe dience. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . sti .e. the wisdom of the world.of honesty in commercial dealing. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. and thus only. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential obedience which is itself the true freedom. our consciousness and subjectivity. . It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. therefore. can law and morality exist. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. and in the use of property . under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. lacked liberty. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. Instead of the vow of chastity.e. moral life in the state.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. and political institutions deduced from them must be. self-realizing reason .in short. if taken alone. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. Thus set free. and. and in a special sense Philosophy. .the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. no matter how. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it.e. Thus. . It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. i.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. leads it into the rea l world. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society.

t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. This absolute nucleus of man . and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. so-called 'chambers'. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. etc. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. Such laws. to put it simply. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. ¤ 544 note). This additional 'individuality' .ll. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. however sound their provisions may be. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external just this . the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . or. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit.mi nd intrinsically concrete . if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. on the other hand.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. e. from those deeper requirements which. (cf. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. thus founder on the conscience. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the the intellectual and thinking self. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. on one hand. thus surmountin .among which laws these guarantees are included. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution.g. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. . and the power given them to fix the budget. At best it is only a temporary expedient . Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. that the Idea must be regent. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. when specially set in relief as genus. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea .

is after all only in one of its form s. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. religion. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. intuition. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. fall feeling. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. in its f irst immediate. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . for th ese reasons. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. as demoralization. Religion may. from religion. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. ¤ 513. earlier than it does as philosophy. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. as it grows and expands. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state.the idea of the substantial moral life. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . But thought always . The form in its infinite tru th.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind.was that creative imagination.the form which ph ilosophy attacked .). in common with all his thinking contemporaries. Only in the principle of mind.and th at on account of this very principle . and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. in its philosophic phase. he. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. Political power. the subjectivity of mind. which is awa re of its own essence. Hence religion as such. on its own s howing. and so also one-sided phase. etc. His state is therefore. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion).g the Platonic Idea (the genus. Plato. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. pictorial representation. which still escaped his long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. or rather must. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. But even religion. Under the subjective form. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . or essential being). but earlier than philosophy. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. exhibits the one-sidedness.). should knit it together and control it. so . lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. of philosophy. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. As it left therefore behind. however. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. is implicitly in absolute liberty. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. which is developed similarly.

e. 7. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . In the Protestant state. Das System der Bedurfnisse. as well as their several to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. Die Polizei und die Corporation. Die Sittlichkeit. the constitut ion and the code. Das aussere Staatsrecht. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. 8. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). Thus ul timately. Gesetz. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. i. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. That here. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. 6. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. 1. while it is self-centred identity. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. Die Weltgeschichte 10. 3. 9. 2. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. Die Rechtspflege 5. for which it is as substance. Weltweisheit. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. but rather to a sort of knowledge. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. Religion. as always. of God's indwelling in us. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. Inneres Staatsrecht. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea.

reconciliation. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. but . ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . With the essential restrictedness of its content. its n atural immediacy. has in devotion . that is. . the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation.the form of immediacy as such .e. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism.i. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation.the shape or form of Beauty. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. as superseded in spirit. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. or the idea. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. Der absolute Geist. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . and of gaining its concrete determination. Art requires not only an external given material . c an. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity.something formal.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. In this ideal. viz. But. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. aware. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. On one hand. which is only a sign of the Idea. as it is. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. the actuality of the spirit. into the subject which produces that work. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . A.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . 1.for the expression of spiritual truth .hence not the sp iritual unity. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. like the material which it uses to work in. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract .in other words. ¤ 411). Belief. so that the thought embodied. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. on the other hand.

without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. of its actual liberty. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. subjectivity.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources .can try to bring itself to consciousness. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . or an effor t towards him . which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. is not yet known. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. and th e artist is the master of the God. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . . as well as of its art and science. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist.stil l this art is defective. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. though concrete and intrinsically free. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . the artist's enthusiasm. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. and of its constitution. but as only finding himself in himself. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form.symbolic art. and that is where the infinite form. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . known as the Absolute. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. is not yet absolute. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. the principle of its law. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. assumes fuller and firmer features. as free spi rit. without admixture and unspotted from its short how the nature of a nation's moral life. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. that one spirit creates and informs them.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . but its inmost depth. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. not yet conscious of itself. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality.

The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit.into revelation. the theme and c entre of still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. The older religion in which the need of fine art. still more in that external. then the only thing left to constitute His nat .the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. and brilliancy. on the contrary. Beautiful art. Beautiful art. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. has its future in true reli gion.ent in it. But with a further and deeper study. The old conception . spectator find themselves at home. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world .e. with their perso nal sense and feeling. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. and. . The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity .that it be revealed.of Nemesis. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. and j ust for that reason. B. expression. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . whose con tent is absolute mind . we see that the advent of art. as infinite self-realizing form .it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. it is from Him. is first generated. what is more. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape .The genuine objectivity. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. unbeautiful sensuo usness. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. . which is only in the medi um of thought . shows that such religion is on the decline.due to a one-sided survey of human life . revealed by God. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. . which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. not the supreme liberation itself. from it s side.the religion i. dashing t o pieces everything high and great .the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . like the religion peculiar to it.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. in which he had not revealed himse lf. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art.

(a) as eternal content. It includes. but afterwards. even in its manifestation. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation.. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. F.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him.: Berlin 1829.requires careful and thorough speculation. That spirit. making them presuppositions towards each other. which proceeds to man's self. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. as in duty bound.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God.just as. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. though different. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. But. to specul ative comprehension. further. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . it may almost create surprise that so many. or of judgement. in it s forefront. on the other hand. directed towards the the Spirit. Yet. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. the elemental and the concrete nature . which is at fir st the presupposed principle. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. for that reas on.1. the spirit. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. which therefore is finite. . first of all. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. and. not. a separate being. with whom. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. . This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content.on the other hand. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. To know what God as spirit is . amid that natural ness.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. Go d apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . it implies the revelation of Him. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. by C. again. on one hand.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. in point of content. it is. ¤ 566 In this separating. and reconciliation with the eternal being. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . The eternal 'moment' of mediation . though.. however.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. On one hand is heaven and earth. G . it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. staying aloof and inert. of the world it gave away . when it thinks.knowledge in God. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. as the extreme of inherent negativity. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its is therefore the absolute spirit. abiding sel f-centred.of the only Son . standing in action an d reaction with such nature. (c) as infinite return. only standing to it in an external connection. and phenomena which succeed each other. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. he still remains in original identity . while in point of form he is.

knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. on account of his immediate nature. Die geoffenbarte Religion. This individual. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. Irony. with a temporal and external sequence. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. and thus. Thinking. C. and thus sensuous.and. as infinite subjectivi ty. through which witness of the spirit in him. who as such is identified with the essence . is itself the emptiness and vanity. an object of contemplating vi sion . constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. eternal. so far. In this form of truth. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. in which he. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. his natur al man and self-will.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. after the example of his truth. truth is the object of philoso phy. he. remains master over it. Whereas the vision-method of Art. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. keeps himself unchanged. external in point of form. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion.where the spirit closes in unity with itself .then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. contentless sense. but alive and present in the world. is not bound by it .but the vision of implicit truth. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. 1. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. this immediate. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . secondly. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. but even to thought. which from itself. From this its separation into p arts. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. . to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. a nd therefore by chance and its own good taken in a merely formal. th e self-centred manifestation. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. If the result . the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. But. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . Further. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute transplanted into the world of time. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. gives itself direction and con tent.Irony. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) .not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. and eternal spirit in itself. simple.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked.

which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. This does not prevent the spirit. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . and mediates what is thus open ed out. when at the close it seizes its own notion . Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. opens it out in mental picture. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. with its separ ation into parts. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object.from these forms. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation .stantial content into many separate shapes. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. but also criticized it. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. and against philosophy in general . and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. finds itself already accompl ished.the underlying essence in all humanity . which philosophy is. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects.takes. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. or. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . immediate vision and its poetry. elevation of them into the absolute form.('Rationalism') . to be more precise still. It had t oo little of God in it for the former.and from a pithless orthodoxy. and particularly of the logical form. This movement. and this necessary as free. This witness . wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man.on the other hand. and acts inconsistently towards them. when driven to expound itself. as also of the necessity in the two forms . the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason.leaving out. of course. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. which determines itself to strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. remains identical with it. too much for the latter. only looks back on its knowledge. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. The charge of Atheism. a nd of logic in particular.e.on one hand. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity.i. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. and s o religious.which may be in both the same . and whereas Religion.

The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. also contains the generic abs tract. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. in particular.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. ¤ 71 note). so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. If this theory needs no more than such a God. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism.Everything is .or to dalai-lamas . and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof.that of the Hindu to ass the wanton assertion. open to our disposal on this topic. are) . But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion.of the new piety and new theology. or any one man.g.each and every secular thing is God.all possess substantia lity. fulfilled notion of God. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine.the Bhagavat-Gita. but as a proved fact. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. and form all that is definite in the divine universality. are unable and unwilling to see this . does not comprehend itself. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. every kind of piety (¤ 72) .thus he understands philosophy .(empirical things. whether higher or lower in the scale. that. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . that it has too much of him: .so much so. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. or if you will. as it stands. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e.which therefore it does not always adora tion of an object which. the secularity of th ings. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. we must. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. from which all definite quality is excluded. God in General. without distinction.of Pantheism. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse .as the most authentic statement accessible . For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . exclusi ve. with all its absurdities. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. cows . Piety. and amongst it s effusions. as is well known. It is only his own much so. and is therefore. and so . To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. I select . or Pantheism. Without interest of its own for the concrete. some of the most telling passage . goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . On such a presuppo sition. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. if we believe them. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. This new theology. most sublime.that of the Egyptians to the ox . its grossest shape.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. Amongst the abundant resources.

all this is woven upon me. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. Hinduism. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. I am life in all beings. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. pp. etc. Even when. everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. middle. . . the Everything. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . as also those proximate substantialities. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . as he said before he was S iva. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. . which Krishna calls himself. p. . the One which. rather. seated in the hearts of all beings. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. besides Krishna. and the moon among the lunar mansions. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. . (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. but only . . as different from that accidental. is not. where the empirical everything of the world. grip. . . On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. . I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. goodness.). . . called Gods. I am also the strength o f the strong. . . passion. and the Spinozan Substance. . . . Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor powerless its. is also the maddest of polytheisms. There is nothing else higher than myself. even Siva.. . . Meru among the high-topped mountains. . at the beginning of the pass age. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods.the most excellent of everything. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. is alo ne the divine and God.. .. . . without essential being of its very own. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. and end of living things. than which there is nothing higher. any more than the Eleatic One. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. or Indra.spiritual as its idea of God i s . .that Hinduism. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. . . however.not everything.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. . I am "Om" in all the Vedas. I am the taste in water. . which he is. to a poly theism. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings .' This 'All'. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. or a God besides. . like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. with a monstrous incons istency.s. but having its truth in the substance. . Indra. But so little concrete is this divine unity . still God. has the higher conception of Brahma.' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. . . Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. This everything. . . vanish. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . 'At the end of many lives. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. nothing independent]. t he pure unity of thought in itself. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. . melt into the one Krishna. 7 seqq. he is said to be the beginning. and one essential amongst them. .'I am the self. Among letters I am the letter A. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. so to speak . The undiscerning ones. unessential existences. . I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. . the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures.

That pantheism indeed .of the world as one thing. But. the Eleatic. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. Hin du monotheism. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. as infinite from the finite. on the contrary. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth.. e. which. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One .might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. even in a general exoteric discussion. and so on . but . or other creature. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. the finite to the infinite.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. when he adores the ape. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. whether they spring from heart. the all. It is only the picture . we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. Of the oriental. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. and that unity described as love. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. moreover. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. and God everything.on the shallow conception of it . empirical indivi duals . is discarded and absor bed. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. especially the Mohammedan. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. as it says. modes of envisaging God.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. imagination or speculation. in relation to the popular idea of the world.g. But to go back again to the question of fact. on one hand. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. and on the other. If. of the relationship of God and the world. after this partition. ac osmical. is identical with the world. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. to was .) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. and of empirical secular spirit. to which everything is God. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. we must consult th e Mohammedans. For that unity. as the endless lot of empirical existence. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. he is as essence parted from appearance. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness.keep its independence. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is its finest purity and sublimity. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in it as a lot of Gods or as secular.. as everything. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. outside it . then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . secondl y.floating in the indefinite blue . or Spinozist. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. or. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. and.

they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. composition. however. it is not.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. I n the philosophical field they proceed.g.the world as much as Go d . etc. as in the physical field the physicist. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. and the empty absolute. the most external and the identity. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity.and that the factor of indet erminateness . but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. viz. providence. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. But they show so little acquaintance with them .has the same solid substantiality as the other. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. And as in their judgement either of the two . they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. they import them into philosophy. in matters admitted to be of superior.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . mere ide ntity. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest.and s till less take trouble about it . with God's omnipresence. .te a word on what a 'notion' means. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. with indefinite ideas. perhaps under the more familiar names of e.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified.and relation i pso facto implies unity . Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity.g. and which they ascribe to philosophy. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . inorganic and living . if not even of supreme interest. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . and that hence. e. with abstract unity. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. and that it is the system of identity. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters .falsely as a fact . as Epicu rus does. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. where they are utterly unknown.said pores being the negative.e. i. in the pores of th e physicists . they have laid hands on. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. a nd assert . but only the one factor of this category of relation .that. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. omnipresence. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. the notion and content of philosophy. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. not the concrete unity. But the question is. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. and that amongst the m there is great variety. but rather its reverse. when they hear of unity . is what one expect s. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. but with concrete unity (the notion). something supposed to exist beside the material reality.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like.

ity . ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: .it is the nature of the fact. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. Nature . They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or which notions are perverted into their opposite.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . an All-one doctrine. which has self. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. standing between the Mind and its essence. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. of which liberty is the aim. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. and the latter its universal extreme. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. on the shoulders of philosophy. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement.their everything. and which is itself the way to produce it. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. in his relation to the world. y . not abstract unity. for its middle term: a middle. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. or as prevaricating for a purpose. making the former its presupposition.knowing reaso n. On account of this chorus of assertions.the logical system. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. as of cognitions. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. sunders itself. and notions . but the many-shaped modes specified. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. which . as other than they. the absolutely universal. and as implicitly the Idea. the notion.e. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. If statements as to facts are put forward. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world.which. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. The esoteric study of God and identity. But in ascribing to God. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking the mediating agent in th e process . they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. But to put that sort of thing.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . then. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . which causes the movement and development. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. is philosophy itself. a system of identity. i.

et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. in f ull fruition of its essence. eternally sets itself to work. The eternal Idea. .

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful