PHILOSOPHY OF MIND G.W.F.

Hegel

INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any

attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i

s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as

treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.

It is otherwise with Mind. like heat. however. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. and so the self-externalism. on the other. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. as such a result. on the one hand. and not as the immediate or natural individual. At such a stage it is not yet mind.. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. matter is regarded as something true. identical ideality of it all.the truth that matter itself has no truth. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. however. Wherever there is Nature. indeed. its simple 'ideal' life. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. perhaps. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. and. a nd the soul remains the pervading. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. in a sense. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. which is potentially all things. thus come into being. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. etc. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. as absolute negativity. There. except where. The usual answer. But not merely is it. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A.SUB-SECTION A. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. not merely lacks gravity. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. and mind conceived as a thin g. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity.the passive of Aristotle. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. Mind. where the othe . which is the fund amental feature of matter. the soul is only the sleep of mind . even the capacity of offering resistance.with th is proviso.e. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . whereas the 'vital' matter. These 'imponderables' . to which they might perhaps add space and time. ANTHROPOLOGY. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. have still. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. but soul. i. li ght. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part.

as an anima mundi. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . in many case s completely.r is not . as individualized. Animals and pl ants. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. they are natural objects for consciousness. Spinoza. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. not. and telluri c life of man. These have. or. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. Hence. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. Malebranche. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. which only is. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. sidereal. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life.is moulded into it. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. on the contrary. But either this identity. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. remain for ever subject to such influences.the natural soul. In nations less intellectually emancipated. so holding. as in the case of Lei bniz. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. based upon participation in the common life of nature. re tains an abstract independence. the changes of the seasons. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. (c) Thirdly. and. in the modes of that being. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. a world-soul. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. T hus. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. when it presents itself as a single soul. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. there philosophers took God. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. disappear. into the absolute syllogism. just in proportion to his civilization. feels the difference of climates. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. described.or corporeity . it may be. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. etc. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. as so often is done. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. is too abstract. so to speak. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. with Leibniz.e. and always more or less. even these few and slight susceptibilities. upon it. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. it is a soul which feels. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. Descartes. its immediate being . and does not rise or develop into system. (b) Secondly.whence Epicurus.e. .(a) In its immediate natural mode . and. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. as in the case of Spinoza. and the periods of the day. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter.

or other disposition and idiosyncrasy.a worl d no longer incomplete. bodily structure and disposit ion. scientific. physiognomy. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. on its one side. fancies. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which.the sexual relation . whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. The contrast between the earth's poles. as alterations in it. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). hopes. shows. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. fails to meet his ideal requirements. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. This . the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. we find its diversities. talent . leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase.mind wrapped up in itself. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. we find it as the special temperament. And that individuality marks both the world which. Thirdly. shows an active half. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. carrying out these universa . and the position of the individual himself. on the whole. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. the one permanent subject. in purposes political. and as stages in its development. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. or artistic. character.on a ph ysical basis. as it exists. widely distant from each other. we see man in his true relation to his environment. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. and on the other. of families or single individuals. He begins with Childhood . but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood).

from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own.The waking is not merely for the observer. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. The characterization given in the section is abstract. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. as they may be called. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. for example. each point. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. which are often addressed to philosophy: .which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. as before explained . we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. (c) Sensibility(3) . but as a return back from the world of specialization. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. i n an unintelligent way. . sleep.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. viz. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. or self-centralized being. as already noted. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. distinguishes itself from its mere being. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. . takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. put this question to the class of ideology. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct.not as a merely negative rest from it. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. although. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. .l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity .Napoleon. in the first instance. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex.

it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. the fact is a mode of my individuality. in its own self. and religious.identity of our self-centred being.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. invested with cor poreity. be it noted. The fact that these particulars. This should hardly need enforcing. for itself. its natural peculiarity. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. One. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. blasphemy. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. ho wever. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. not mere alterations. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity).set over against consciousness. it is true. mean. the inarticulate bre athing. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious.g. the conscience. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. are in order to be felt. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. But if put in the feelin g. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. belonging as it does to natural. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. murder . are found by the waking soul. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. are our very own. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. but treated as bel onging to its most special. adultery. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. Another. is what we call sensibility. and to be as if found. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. mora l. and is so felt. in the feeling. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). on one hand. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. moral. and . and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. true. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. etc. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . primarily. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. etc.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. evil.. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. just. fornication. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. etc. godless. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. On the other hand and conversely. the naturally immedi ate. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. and the character. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. which.

of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). e. As sentient. We should have. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. set in its self-centred life. to take possessi on of it. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. especially the passions or emotions. the immediacy of mode in feeling . is to raise its substantiality. (¤ 317) .because in it. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism.e. distinction appears as mere variety . laughter. tones. 322).a psychical physiology. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. o f colours. (c) the sense of solid reality.it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. ¤ 402 Sensations. following the special character of the mental mode. What it has to do. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation .it is a soul which feels. the soul is no longe r a mere natural.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. of heavy matter. i. with its varieties of language. with which that substance is one. of self. for example.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . (¤¤ 321. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. works itself out. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. and their corporization. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. are formed from their mental source. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. sighs. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. and voice in general.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. therefore. to the character of subjectivity. but an inward. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . to realize its mastery over its own. (b) THE FEELING SOUL .in the system of the senses. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . the 'irritable' system. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. smells.the senses of definite light.g. i ts merely virtual filling-up. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. the blood. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. in a special system of bodily organs. In the usage of ordinary language.and of sound. . (¤ 300). the centre of the 'sensible' system. just because they are immediate and are found existing.

i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. acquired lore. ideas. Some times. ¤ 404 As individual. At the present stage this singleness is. in sickness. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). ideas and information. so far as that is. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. etc.the existent spe culative principle. the content is its particular world. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). in whi ch all this is stored up. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded.that world being included in it and filling it up. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. to be defined as one of feeling . omnipresent unity. once mor e come to light.. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. the corporeity. although it does not exist. As sentient. first. prima rily. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . but only to his im plicit self. By itself. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. secondly. may again sink down. it implies a want of adaptation. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. which is at the same time its predicate. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. etc. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. where the real is put past . but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. which is disease. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. In the present stage we must treat. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. but a negation. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. it brings within itself. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. to which the soul. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. virtually retained. They were not in our possession. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. the s oul is characterized as immediate. in an implicit mode. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. and to that world it stands but as to itself.as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. without existing. thoughts. Thus in the body it is one simple. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. a deep featureless characterless mine.

of life. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. intellige nt. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. not yet as its self. self-possessed. fortunes. temper. Here are two individuals. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. or capac ity. tal ent. his secular ideas.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. because immediate. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. is visibly present as another and a different individual. self-conscious. as concrete subject ivity. the psychical relationship.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. controlling genius thereof. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. whose decision is ul . and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. not a true subject reflected int o itself. The moth er is the genius of the child. it is. as yet nothing impenetrable. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. placenta. developed interests. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. and of character. injuries. of the mother. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self.a substance. say between friends.is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part.. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . etc. etc. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. etc. character. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. which.. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. idiosyncrasies. congenital disposit ion and temperament. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. the single self of the two. and is therefore passive.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. and reasonable. not as a mere possibility. as it has existence of its own. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. By the self-hood of the latter it . If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. or virtuality. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. but as efficiency and realized activity. etc. incl inations.

his fun damental interests.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . This totality forms his actual ity. first of all call for verificati on. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. it has already been call ed his genius. in which the individual here appears innnersed.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. At the same tim e. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. that it is in harmony wi th the facts.to be mere deception and impo sture. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences.to show. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. it might seem. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. educated. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. is. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. it must be added. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. on the other hand. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. in other words. intentions. on the cont rary. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. means. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. self-possessed human being is a disease. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. which are also means and ends to each other. But such a verification would. The facts. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. To that end the phenomena.

that it is a state of passivity. external one to another. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. a formal vision and awareness. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. those c onnected with female development. is this. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. exist for it as an outward objectivity. his own and that of the magnetize . in its sober moods. etc. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. or at the approach of death. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. formed.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. and hears. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. But such clairvoyance . in catalepsy. after the downfall of the Roman republic. . (Thus Cato. in whom it sees. and the like. unless by the aid of religion. the magnetizer.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. then. for example. the selfless individual. not on the spot.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. But. And because it is the adult.). subject to the power of another person. f riends. like that of the child in the womb. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. tastes. and c ontinues to be. on those left behind. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. etc. and character. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions.) Compare h ome-sickness. When the substance of both is thus made one. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. ca pable of conveying general truths.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. which lead up to the result . The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. . and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. subje ctive reason. but it is empty. wh en it is healthy and awake. and other diseases. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. is under a veil. and to know which. smells. not really a 'person'. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. which. reads. .a genius which beh olds itself. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. etc. however. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other.

This is Insanity or mental D erangement. receives. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. anticipate the full-grown an . beholds.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. causality. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness.r. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. in its capacity as individual. is without any definite points of attachment . so long as we assume independent personalities. the 'common sense'. e. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. and at the same time. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. it is still susceptible of disease. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. though all-embracing. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. In this way it is self. etc. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. which is no less a world of law. which still marks the self-feeling. for example. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. which. one sees and hears with the fingers. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. reasons. i. is impossible. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. as in other cases. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. on the contrary. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content .fe eling. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. i s just this form of immediacy. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. and hence. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. etc. between intelligent personality and objective world. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. in this nominal perception. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. In considering insanity we must. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. or med icines for them. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. The purely sensitive life. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. as in the morbid state alluded to.

it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. is undistinguis hed from them. inclination. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. as something natural and existent. i. and so also may the cure. may. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). loss of health (if it were that. earthly elements are set fr ee . so as to insert them in their proper place. Mind as such is fr ee. however. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. In the concrete. desire. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. moral and theoretical. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. instincts.d intelligent conscious subject. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. This humane treatment.just as physical disease is not an abstract. etc.e. and the rest of the passions . The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). and therefore not susceptible of this malady. pride. and their gratification). This particular being of the soul is t .that evil which is always latent in the heart. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. this life of feeling. i. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part.e. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. idea. And so too the particularity is. A violent. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. and made appear in. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. as now regarded. as a thing. . the self is to be stamped upon. as it aris es. i. mere and total. it would be death).feeling. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. such as vanity. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side .fan cies and hopes . a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. and be a realized u niversality. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. is diseased. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. and it is only as a thing. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. which is there also. is relaxed. but a contr adiction in it.. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. the. passions.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. and so makes part of the actual self.e.. but only derangement. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. that it is liable to insanity . But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. equally formal. presupposes the patient's rationality. etc. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations.merely personal love and hatred. and also desires.

heat. even in being affected by them. on the contrary. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. therefore. and for that reason n ot free. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. Habit like memory.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. nature. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. The soul is freed from them.e. partly only relative. a second nature. lacking consciou sness. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. when the co rporcity. a pure act of intuition.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. of it. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. empty space and empty time. and the generation o f habit as practice. the one and the same. and which still continues to exist. of which it is the subjective substance. weariness o .and becoming the 'ideal'.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. or dependent in regard to it. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. nor is absorbed in the m. and that as a barrier for it. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. That is to say. are only subjectiv e forms. has been absorbed by it. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). The natural qualities and alterations of age. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. so is that pure being (which. but has them and moves in them. et c. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. but the basis of consciousness. occupied.itself a simple being . because it is an immed iate being of the soul. dist inguishing it from itself . or of the immediate corpo reity as such. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. su bjective substantiality of it . sleep. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. as. i. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit.. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. For. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. but still free. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . will. this being of the soul. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. and so no longer interested. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. is reduced to unity. And consciousness it becomes. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. Habit is rightly called a second nature.he factor of its corporeity. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. and the mere substance. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits.

and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. or. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. a series of musical notes) is in me.concentration. .enabling the matter of consciousness. and especially so in the specific bodily part. whereof we sha ll speak later. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. cut off from action and reality. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. and any other purp oses and activity.. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. and the self-feeling as such. viz.g. intuition. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . to exist as substance in its corporeity. and it is habit of living which brings on death. an 'ideality' of soul . And it is true that the form of habit. and that they. nor a transient emotion or idea. are no longer bothered with it. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. or skill. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). nor an abstrac t inwardness. Thinking. like any other. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. has been by will made a habit . etc. consciousness. under its volitional and conceptual characters. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. without an express adjustment. too. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. Even here. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. which make it up. is recollection and memory. a particular organ of i ts organic system). The most ext ernal of them. etc. and particul ar. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. intelligence. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes.is felt. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. Habit on an ampler scale. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. his upright pos ture. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. to be made a power in the bodily part. etc. acquires a strength which consists in this. etc. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. made into an instrum ent.e. This is the rational liberation from them. but part and parcel of his being.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. re ligious. moral. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness.). that although the frost... by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . and no other. habit is usually passed over - .or the misfortune . whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. etc. to be his as this self. consciousness. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. the spatial direction of an individual. reflection.f the limbs. this soul. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. i. sweet tastes. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). so that when the conception (e. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. habit diminishes this feeling. casual. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. nor are they in conce ption rational. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. and thus to enable the soul. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. if quite abstract. like their satisfaction.

still vainer than a signatura rerum. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. for example. and inexpressible a modific ation. weeping.either as something contemptible .or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. and the formation of the limbs. The soul. in being related to which. but the soul. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. This note is so slight. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. and making it its own. of the mouth . (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. This externality. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. In this identity of interior and exterior. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. or the 'immediacy' of mind. indefinite. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. 1. the upright figure in general. of which it is the sign. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. etc. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. 2. Empfindung. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. Under the head of human expression are included. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. it is related to itself. Naturliche Qualitaten. 71). and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . finds itself there a single subject. And the human figure. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. 'The autho . and i s infinite self-relation.. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. as the absolut e instrument. in its concentrated self. a world external to it . in other words. for the soul. while language is its perfect expressi on.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. cuts itself off from its immediate being. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. especially the hand. or abstract universality. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. the latter subject to the former. unable to represent it in its actual universality. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. represents not itself. 3.laughter. 4. Seen from the animal world. Naturliche Seele. 5. absorbing it. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. Die fuhlende Seele.

Gewohnheit.the soul's natural life . and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities .' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. as external to it. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. as this absolute negativity. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. does not. Hence consciousness. not to the wisdom. seem to be its own activity. but to the foolishness of man.e. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity.to an equal freedom as an independent object.the light. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. It is of this latter. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. but is implicit. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . as subjective reflection in itself. 7. Selbstgefuhl. in the sphere of essence. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm).it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . like reciprocal dependence in general. and as such it is C onsciousness. i. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. but when he receives the inspired word. Ego. and . for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. 8. now. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. to it. which manifests itself and something else too . it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. thus first made explicit as the Ego. something dark and beyond it. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). but since reality. 6. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. The mind as ego is essence. is only its abstract formal ideality.

Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. again. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. is further characterized a s immediately singular.to the ego it seems an alteration of the object.a subject-objectivity. a singular. i. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. As against Spinozism.e. an intuitive intellect. immediate consciousness. but as poorest in thought. Spatial and temporal Singularn . It appears as wealth iest in matter. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . reflected in itself. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. This is sense-consciousness. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414).e. and that the philosophy. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. and even t he Idea of Nature.. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. as Reason. the substantial and qu alitative. or mere c ertainty. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). with an object set against it. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. a something. being immediate. t heir absolute interdependence. Consciousness . The object similarl y. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). Ego. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. a thing-in-itself. an existing thing. the subject of consciousness. i. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. and puts it first under the category of being. and so on. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. what makes the object the subject's own. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego.as a case of correlation . to raise its self-certainty to truth. in other words. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. etc. has emerged from Spinoz ism. and underived certainty of it. (b) self-consciou sness. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. which is not as its own.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). an existent. but only as it is in reference to something else. the notion of mind. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. for which ego is the object. first. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects.

taken in its concrete content. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. however. and not yet as external on its own part. viz. wants to take the object i n its truth. to which. experiences. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . ¤ 423 The law. lies im mediately in the other. and universalities. permanent term s. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. reflected upon. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. free from this negative l ink and from one another. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. a something external to it. not as merely immediate. Thi s inward. and sensuous consciousness. the distinction on its own part. and am aware'. but brought to rest and universality. so constr uing the object. reflected in itself. as we called it. has many properties. by being regarded in their bearings. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. p. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. the thing. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. it is related. the one of the terms. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance.bet ween the individuality of a thing which. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. and more or less by the sciences. but as mediated. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. is sense-perception. on one hand.e. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. and universal. . has. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. an abstract identity: on the other hand. in that manner.a variety of relations. to describe the sensible. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . and. of the thing is. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . or the distinction which is none. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . 73). and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal.e.). i. what it is in truth. however. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. as not externally different from the other. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. its necessity on its own part. i.ess. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . But in this manner the interior distinction is. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . or as being beside and out of itself. reflectional attributes.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. which form the alleged ground of general experience.a copy of the phenomenon. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. in this case by t he Ego. having passed beyond the sensible. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete.

to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. therefore. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. The two processes are one and the same. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. primarily describable as an individual. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. On the external side it conti nues. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. implicit in it.as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object.With this new form-characteristic. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. To this activity the object. in its immediacy. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. the latter. The certitude of one's self. this identity comes to be for the ego. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. and itself made actual. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. being merely consumed. pure 'Ideality'. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. therefore. and ma intains itself as such. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. with the nega tion of it. in this return upon itself. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. and a desire (appetite) . ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . nominally. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. is a singular. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. on the contrary . or. can make no resistance: the dialectic. on the whole. its satisfaction realized. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. knows itself implicit in the object. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. there is strictly speaking no object. and thus in it I am aware of me. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. or implicitly.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective.

however. This other. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. works off his individualist self-will. and to exist as such for the other: . and formation of it. though by the abstract. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. is yet. Force. f rom the essential point of view (i.e. While the one com batant prefers life. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. not their underlying and essential principle. ¤ 434 This status. solves the contradiction. at first immedi ately. on the ir phenomenal side. the slave. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. as one of two things for another. in the first place. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. must likewise be kept in life. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction .) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. and thus give existence to my freedom. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. we see. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. retains his single self-consciousness. the outward and visible recognition). is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression.but only p eril. and incurs a like peril for its own . except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. from one point of view. a suppression. however. In that other as ego I behold myself. then. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. therefore rude. and its being for others. in the service of the master. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. Force. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. w hich however is also still outside it. which is the basis of this phenomenon. it. when we look to the distinction of the two. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. the slave. preservation. and the means for entering into relation with them. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality.for the means of mastery. Thus arises the status of master and slave. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. ¤ 435 But secondly. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. ¤ 431 The process is a battle.e consciousness of a 'free' object. which falls on another.t he process of recognition. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . negati on of immediacy. as the existence of hi s freedom. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. Thus the death of one.

which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. and of all virtues. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. 5. state. whilst it signifies that the object.which is Reason. Truth. 4. than they are its own thoug hts. . therefore. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. the self-centred pure notion. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness .the passage to universal self. friendship. aware of what it is. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . is now itself universal. is Reason. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. fame. permeatin g and encompassing the ego.consciousness. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. 1. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. or determinations of the very being of things. For truth here has. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. honour. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. Selbstbewu§tsein. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. is mind (spirit). thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. Reason.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal .or rather it is a difference which is none. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. The uni versality of reason.is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. fatherland. valour. bu t the truth that knows it. Wahrnehmung 3. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman.f wisdom' . Die Begierde 6. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. Der Verstand. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . as its peculiar mode and immanent form. etc. ego. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . idle fame.in family. love.

above the material. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. Die Vernunft. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. in so far as it has an object. it has a mode in its knowledge. This. or. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist.. then its reality is that reason. though it no longer has an object. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . PSYCHOLOGY. in thinking also and in desire and will.7. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. i. ideation. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. and above the complication with an external object . neit her subjective nor objective.in one word. Cons ciousness is finite.apart b oth from the content. it is finite by means of its immediacy. etc. what is the same thing. the latter now an infinite form which is not. etc. SUB-SECTION C. Mind is finite. viz.mental vision. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. so far as its features are immediate or connatural.. however. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. desires. as its concept has just shown. remembering. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. like consciousness. Mind. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. etc. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features.the former a simple immediate totality. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. in so far as . restricted by that content. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . And it is a matter of no consequence. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. therefore. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom.e. which is defined as it s notion. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. in the soul as a physical mode. and which as the reality of that notion.

involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. Thus. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. and are the mind's own. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. that is. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). in so far as its existent phase.e. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. of comprehending itself. it is . In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner.e. viz. the mind finds in itself something which is. k nowledge.as being and as its own: by the one. When the affection has been rendered its own. As the theory o f Condillac states it. so far. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s.e. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. is misconceived and overlooked. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. and make the affection subjective. equally. in freedom. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. and its activity can only have itself as aim. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. and to liberate itself to its elf. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. the na tural soul (¤ 413). Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. i. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). Similarly. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. to reach and get hold of itself. or. viz. and is even there a return into itself. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. i. and being a rational knowledge. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. and the negative aspect of mental activity. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind.reality of its reason. forces. that aspect is twofold .

elevates itself. which in the first place is likewise formal . that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. and gains abstract auton omy within. for which it gains the form of universality. and of the heart without the intellect . and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason.g. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. just as they are given. Its activity has to do with the empty form . It is still extremely ill off. e. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. to definite and conceptual knowledge. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. like logic. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. merely as facts. and heartless intellects . ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. Inwards . to get at the notion and the truth. Psychology. while it has to do with autonomous products. which is only certitude. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. along with which the content is realized as rational. The nominal knowledge. This activity is cognition. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. as r eason is concrete. and therefore a restricted content. belong to a point of view utt . while the practical. is thus also a reality . The course of this elev ation is itself rational. and is immediately willed.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. wi th a material which is its own.(b) Will: practical mind. and that in its empirical condition. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence.. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. which it and the content virtually is. its content is at first only its own. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. both for the mind as such. but) enjoyment. Ou twards. as it is said. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. etc.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has.e. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . the word. in the theoretical range. This position of psychology. has a material which is only nominally such. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside.i. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. But as knowledge. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge.

or mind.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . is the fixed quality of any object of thought. like power or force.whi ch. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge).in a word . The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. are not isolated.its out-of-selfness .besides which it al so intuits. it . etc.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. memory. etc. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. or makes the concept its own. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. however. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. must lead to abandoning the effort. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. note). the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. But c ognition is genuine. It is true that even as isolated (i. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. it is admitted. conception. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . etc. intelligen ce. remembers. conceives. intuition. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. by cognitive intuition. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . is bro ught into mind. by rational conception. if answered in the negative. etc. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . etc. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality .that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. conceived as reflected into self. If they are isolated. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. imagination. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. just so far as it realizes itself. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. conception.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. cognitive conception. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. viz. as non-intelligent).e. imagination. as it is by the same method brought into nature. But the true satisfaction. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. that intuition.is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. imagines. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . remembrance. Faculty.

In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. a . as it were the closes t. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. . is swallowed up. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason.an active self-collection . hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. 254). With us. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. projects it into time and space. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling.t he factor of fixing it as our own. Feeling is the immediate.to the generalit ies of common sense . may just as likely be narrow and poor. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. with the character of something existent. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object.one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. external or internal. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. Hence feeling. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. or at least to reasons . and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. in content and value entirely contingent. this mode is simple. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. has the form of casual particularity . Now the material. the mere consciousness point of view. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne.is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity.but to his feeling. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling.his private and p articular self. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. that is t o say. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. but rather as subject ive and private. in t he truth of mind.

the germ as affirmatively containing. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. and is arbitrary or contingent. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. and inwardly divest itself of it. still continues simple. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. however. its when and where. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. though intrinsically concrete. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. The representation is the property of intelligence. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. as tho ught. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. isolated. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. which. in virtual possibility.e. for example. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . which makes it its own.the germ of the fruit. we may say. i. t ime. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. yet without being in consciousnes s.in a space and a time of its own. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. in the way we treat. .nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. no longer needs to find the content. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. as it at first recollects the intuition. with a preponderating subjectivity. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. or. and received into the universality o f the ego. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. but stored up out of consciousness. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. a rec ollection of itself. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. from the external place.

e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. The image. The content reproduced. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. and an out-put from its universal m ine. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition .in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. has always the peculiarity. as a matter of fa ct. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. In the first place. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own .¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. the matter is entirely pictorial. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. that it finds its material. by which it is authenticated. as a unit of intuition.e. . whatever be its content (from image. see Introduction to the Logic. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego.. being and universality. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. to be so and so. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. as of all intelligence. has been broken up. where it is treasured up.) . The images are in the first instance referred to this external.Image and Idea. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. under the representation (idea) with the same content. comes actually into its possession. or ide a). at first only in space and time. wherea s the idea (representation). though belonging to intelligence. reason and consequence. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. such as likeness and contrast. but a being of its own institution. present also a distinction in content. if it is to exist. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation.viz.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. ¤ 20 note. i. now that it has been endued with externality. or an intell ectual category.these modes of relation are not laws. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. where. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. notion. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . which is now the power over them. Secondly. But it is solely in the conscious subject.

it aims at making itself be and be a fact. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal.symbolic.still lacks the side o f existence. etc. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. but only a nominal reason. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. and becomes an i ndividuality. which forms their connecting link. . This force is really intelligence itself . Another point calling for special notice is that. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. allegoric. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. are unifications of t he same factors. are completely welded into one. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. when regarded as the agency of this unification. internal and external. i. Acting on this view. In other words. derived from some interest. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality.. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. These more or less concrete. and in mechanical memory it completes. a concrete subjectivity. some latent concept or Ideal principle.e. to universalize it. As reason. one's own and what is picked up. recollection. for its ideal import is its elf. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . or something of the sort. 435). is derived from the data of intuition. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . it is self-uttering. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. but they are 'syntheses'. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. . and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor.Abstraction. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. this form of being.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. or poetical imagination . what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. so far a s it is concerned. Such is creative imagination(7) . But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition.Imagination. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). is reason. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing.

its institution by intelligence. This intuition is the Sign. ¤ 459 The intuition . Such is the negativity of intelligence. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. its system. the matter of the latter is.now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. It is a n image. somewhat immediate or given (for example. conception s. and the connotation of which it is a sign. Knarren.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. something accepted. when employed as a sign. With regard to the elementary material of language. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. intuitions. The sign is some immediate intuition. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess .that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . strictly so-called. has always to do with signs only. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). language . on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers .. . the natural attributes of the intuit ion. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness.gives to sensations. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation.). Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated.R auschen. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases .invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. e tc. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). but as representative of something else. whereas in the sign. Sausen. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . In logic and psychology. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. since memory. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. in the first instance. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin .¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. and even with conception and imagination.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space.th at of vocal objects. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. the colour of the cockade. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium.in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. etc.speech and. out of which it forms i deas . and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). But in the fusion of the two elements. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. and where it is conserved. have nothing to do with each oth er. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it.

) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. like the Chinese. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. alphabetical writing. etc. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. The study of languages still in their original state. . It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454).e. we may touch. (Cf. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. on anthropological articulation. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. but. and now that. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. if it be not altogether extinguished. on the other hand. palate. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. viz. In particular. their signs in vocal language. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. as in our signs for the numbers. the planets . But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. the denomination. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are.). Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . It is only a stationary civ ilization.e. i. in chemistry and mineralogy. W.e. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. they are reduced to signs. the chemical elements. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. only in pas sing. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. As to the formal elem ent. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. as many as ten a . tongue in each) and for their combinations. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. for example. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. and only get signification as signs. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. as regards signs for mental objects. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. instead of n ames proper.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. it depends.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. . which severally receive designation. and still takes place in Canton . It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. i. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. again. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. are frequently changed. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. i.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. as.

Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. it is analysed. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality.is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. The European. of uttering its ideas most worthily . It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. or simple logical terms. Hieroglyphics.nd twenty. so that. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. as it does. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. is still for the mind simple in the name). What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. peculiar to the intellect. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as.the name. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. the simple straight stroke. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. Thus. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. i. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . while (with the facu . like alphabetic writing. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. the simple plain idea. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. . we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything.the mode. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. in the case of the Chinese Koua. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. learn ing to speak Chinese.e. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. by speaking low and soft or crying out. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. in the interest o f vision. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. Both alike require such signs. just as in modern times (as already noted. in speaking. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. however ample a connotation it may include. This feature of hieroglyphic . Engaging the attention of intelligence.

lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,

but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you

ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.

¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex

Delight. etc. and will. we have only to deal with the selfish. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. law and morality. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. grief. volition. bad. lack objective determin ation. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself).indeed infinitely so. repentance. and precisely in that way d o they . On the other hand. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. contentment. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. may be placed. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . Whereas in life. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact .retain a speciality of their own . heart. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. namely God. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. when thought. But where the objects sought are thus casual. for the latter. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason.. but presented in its universality and necessity. and duty. and thought. in feeling. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. joy.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. and still more in mind. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. right. can also be felt.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought.. the truth and. shame. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. we have this immanen . But as both. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. and evil. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. is precisely what constitutes. in its objectivity and truth. wha t is the same thing.but only in antithesis to the latter . If feelings are of the right sort. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. in their immediacy. etc. Thus it is. in which these facts. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. and to discus s their content. it is because of their quality or co ntent . but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. in their universality and necessity. on the one hand.

and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage.Up to what degree the good continue good.on one aim and object. subjectivity . the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. . to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. the question is directly raised.an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. Thus. their mutual connect ions. In what way have they. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. but to ge t realized. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. each being always in conflict to another. The answer to the question. In consequence of this formalism. indeed. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. as rights and duties. are infected with contingency. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . which is essentially self-d etermination. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . and something inappropriate to it. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. If the will is to satisfy itself. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them.and (as there are ma ny. they. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. as r egards the form of its content. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. The will. while. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. each with its private range). character. What are the good and rational propensiti es. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. talent. it is pa ssion.a development in which the content of autonomous . is at first still a natural will. Which are good and bad? . passion is neither good no r bad. on one hand. But with regard to the inclinations. It is on ly a dead. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. first of all. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind .t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. as experience shows.his inte rests of intellect. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. and their truth. therefore. admitting of gratification. however. enjoyment . in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. on the other. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. too often. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. finds in the conformity . (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. Will. be the value of tha t mode what it may. ego.natural impulse and inclination. Should.

and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. which as such is the universal. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. The morality concerns the content of the aim. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. as the content. without end. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. and social duties. As thus contradictory. either alto gether or in part.e. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. They are somet imes contrasted. this is wh at is called the interest. so far as their particularity goes. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. is his interest and . as thinking and implicitly free. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. of a universal sa tisfaction. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . i. the impulses. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. It is thus 'reflecting' will.and one satisfaction. and is option or choice. the free gift of nature. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. by another. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . However. An action is an aim of the subject. .The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. it is on them that the decision turns. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. where the subject is made to close with itself. that finds its actualizing in the agent.action loses its contingency and optionality. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. on the whole to their disadvantage. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. an act of (at least) formal r ationality.his passion. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. moral. Their mutual limitation. which is just as much no satisfacti on. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. which reflection and comparison have educed. are reduced to a m ere negative. ¤ 476 The will. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. an inactive thing. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. on one hand. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. inclinations. there would be no action at all. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. unless he had an interest in it.

and are constituted after its measure. It is thus 'Objective' Mind.e. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. is in the first instance the rational will in general. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. and the abstract singleness. just because it is the very essence of mind. aim. the divine min d present with him. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. or implicit Idea. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind.e. so that in this sphere of particular existence.e.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. and are without it still. and of which it is only t he formal activity. and object . But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. If the will. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. i. As abstract Idea again.an individuality. of present sensati on and volition.sired . or by s trength of character. with freedom itself. etc. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. If. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. he is actually free. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. If to be aware of the Idea .is matter of speculation. now that the formalism. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). its very au tonomy or freedom. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . of the family. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. for example.to be aware. still this very I . even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. he h as also. in religion as such . According to Christianity. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. The Greeks and Romans. Plat o and Aristotle. ambiguous. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit.it is the existential side of reason . even the Stoics. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . This universalism the will has as its object and aim. and is will as free intelligence. the will is an actually free will. i. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. education. however. only so far as it thinks itself . Remembering that free mind is actual mind. therefore. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. i. which i s pure and concrete at once.e . is actu ality. that is. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . have never had this Idea. or philosophy (. as realizing the idea. fortuitousness . Africa and the East. On the contrary.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. and that as its very actuality.freedom itself. did not have it. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. which realizes its own freedom of will.a universality which only ought to be. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. knows this its concept. Whole continents. as the substance of the state.

into legal. 4. Phantasie 8.not something which they have. Der freie Geist. Der Geist 2. 14. as men. Gedachtnis. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. 11. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. 12. which the content and aim of freedom has. if they are made slaves. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . Das praktische Gefuhl. but the pe rmanent character . Anschauung. 10. Die Erinnerung 6. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. moral. but which they are. Die Gluckseligkeit. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. But this freedom. Die Intelligenz. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. 16.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. Der praktische Geist 13. 1. not with laws or court s of justice. 3. Das Denken. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. 5. Inwendiges. Die Einbildungskraft.a principle of the mind and heart. 9. 15. and not less into scientific actuality.dea itself is the actuality of men . Auswendiges. is itself only a notion . religious. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. 7. Vorstellung.

is a duty. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. it exists as manner and custom. are no less its duties to punish. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. their absolute unity. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. As it (and its content) belongs to thought.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. and brings into existence i n these several wills. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. where free will has existence. to administer. Liberty. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. In the morality of the conscience. which splits up into different heads: viz. receives the form of Necessity. and what is a duty.e. are its Duties. are duties . relation to another person . anthropological data (i. so as to become its habit. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. and character.(1) When. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness.. being universal. is the Law (Right ) . in these externally objective aspects. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. but as possession by a person it is property. but in its universality. is also a right. duty in general is in me a free subject . ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. viz. i. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty.at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. But in this individualist moral sphere. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. etc. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention).. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. where they. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. my right to a thing is not merely possession.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. or Usage. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. What is a right is also a duty. But.e. etc. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact.. to be as a person. These conditi ons. temper. and is the vi rtual universal. it is a Law. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. For a mode of existence is a right. on the other hand. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. its rights of admi nistration. or legal possession. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. Liberty. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. or instituted as an authoritative power. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. The penal judicature of a government.and aim. in relation to the subjective will. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. private an d personal needs). which in it is thus at home with itself. military service. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. and it is a duty to possess things as property. etc. as the services of the members of the State in dues. in general. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. in the light of the concept. not in the form of impulse. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse.

at first in the outward appropriation. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. on its own account me rely 'practical'. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . This thing. and the I in it is abstractly external. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. possession is property. as in itself still abstract and empty. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. which as possession is a means. so as to have its existence inside it. the external sphere of its liberty . is an individual. 1. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. or by the formatio n of the thing or. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. and hence as a single being . and State. (B) When the will is reflected into self. by mere designation of it. morality of the individual conscience. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. These extremes are the persons who. as something devoid of will. civil society. it may be. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. abstract right. the infinite self-rela tion. But the set of adjustments. are simultaneously mutually independent. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. though it remains in trinsically the same. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. which is thus mutual. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. As so characterized.possession. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. Gesetz 2.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. Sitte A. but on an external thi ng. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. But this predicate. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. but as existence of the personality is an end. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. it is the right of the subjective will.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. . in the knowledge of their identity as free.

whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . produces a wrong: by which. and its acceptance by the other will. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. however. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. which thus becomes wicked. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. in that case. ¤ 495 The contract. This is naiv e. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. labour. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . But so far as my will lies in a thing. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. and. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. which. 493 seqq.the full and complete deed. then the external rec . the only diversity lies in this. non-malicious wrong. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. its changing hands. but which. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. I can just as well put it in it as not .). and recogniz ed. because they face each other. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement.just as well with draw it as not. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. is disinterested. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. expressing the civil suit. universal thing or commodi ty. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals.Contract. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. is affirmed. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. and time. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. willed.

the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance.e.is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. sets up a law . in revenge. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. Conversel y.e. The social state. But revenge.in this case the apparent recognition. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. b ut the sterling value is let slip. by the n otion.on self-determination or autonom y. which is nominal and recognized by him only . i. an d so on without end. and while the former only is respected. being conformable to the right. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. The 'reality' of right. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . as a volitional and intelligent being. the latter is violated. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. is a matter of chance). even from the range of all existen ce. This progression.) Thus the will is violently wicked. and commits a crime. or right as governed by the nature of things.a law.a universal which holds good for him. But more than possible compulsion is not. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. is at the same time only a new outrage. is the work of Revenge. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. i. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. such an action is essentially and actually null. or in corporeity. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. which is disinterested .ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. like the last. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. in which the law of nature should hold sway. This gives the wrong of fraud . or Natural Right. and can be seized only in t his quarter. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. from life. on .compulsion against the thing.st rictly so called . in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. The law of nature . of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise.punishment. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. In it the agent. and not merely the particular mode . howe ver.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. To display the nullity of such an act.where the nominal relation is retained. The former used to be the common meaning. that of the judge.

Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. though any alteration as such. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. an d allows to be imputed to it. who. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. The subjective will is morally free. the will is at the same time made a particular.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. embracing these individual point s. which was its purpose. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. be its affection w hat it may. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . and thus comes into relationship with the former. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. and willed by it. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. In point of form. This is the right of intention. Naturrecht. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. its own. so far as these features are it s inward institution. it thus includes purpose and intention . and means the m ental or intellectual in general. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. but have their assent. the reason of the will. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. recognition. sentiment. is its deed. counts only as a person. Moralitat 3. is now chara cterized as a subject . intelligence. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. etc. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. so much as it has consciously willed. Now.the other hand. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. in mere law. 1. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. conscience. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. my part in i t is to this extent formal. or even justification in his h eart.a will reflected into itself so that.and also moral wickedness. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. Das Recht. B. 2.

be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. essential and actual. on account of that existent sphere of liberty. can be wicked. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. is as g ood and as duty absolute. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. his interest and welfare must. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent.being only in this. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. This is the right to well-being. These aims. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. interests.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition.and thus including in it particularity . as individual and universal. the essential and actual good.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. in point of its matter. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action.e. but is a particul arity of his own . whether the . who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. constitute h is well-being.ion. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. And yet they ought to harmonize. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize.a universal determined in its elf . and aims. though it is a particular duty. and yet each of them. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. will . constitutes a peculiar world of its own . is not something external to him. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest.that it contains his needs. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. a good intention in case of a crime.g. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. as in happiness (¤ 479). It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . sup erseding this absolute claim of each. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. it is always something particular. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. they ought to stand in harmony. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. At the same time because good is one. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). is always fundamentally one identity. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. because the agent.

the utterly abstract semblance .to a goodness. Der Vorsatz 3. its deepest descent into itself.the standpoint of the ought. The result. i . Wickedness. th e essential thing. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not .the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. right . this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. 6. The for mer is the will of goodness. On the affirmative side. expressed by this repeated ought. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. the truth of this semblance. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. an aim essentially and actually null. the unutterable. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. to be carried out in it. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . Die Absicht und das Wohl. is only the infinite form. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. This pure self-certitude. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. in this its identity with the good. Moralitat 2. and refuse it to the wicked. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . 4. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision.good is realized. and we have passed into the field of ethical life.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. good. is. which is the good. on its negative side. which would only be abstract. Das Gute und das Bose C. Handlung. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. in the notion. non-universal. The failure of the latter consists . is abandoned. rising to its pitch. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. and duty. but is only sure of i tself. The subjectivity. which has no objectivity. in something external therefore. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. 5. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. no more exist than not. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself.of Conscience and Wickedness. which actualizes and dev elops it. and the wicked. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. 1. THE MORAL LIFE. and of the good. That. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void.

it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. . is confidence (trust) . In the latter sphere. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. however.the Political Constitution. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. as an intelligent being.Civil Society. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties.n a thing . ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. makes this union an ethical tie . etc.th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. whose independence it. without any selective refl ection. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . to the total of ethical actuality. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . controls and entirely dominates from within. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. to a spiritual significance. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. in its immediacy.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. that it is. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. as against the univers al. the individuality expres ses its special character.e . b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. as personal virtues. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n .looks upon it as his absolute final aim.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. . it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence.the Family. it exists as confidence. mind ap pears as feeling. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. i. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. is virtue.yet somewhat which without all question is. however. Thus. as deliberate work for the community. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. i.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. This is the sexual tie. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . to destiny.the genuine ethical temper. In the shape of the family. manner and cu stom . has actuality as the spirit of a nation. in its ki nd. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . temperament. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. (c) Th e self-conscious substance.monog . The ethical personality. elevated.e. But the person.Marriage. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom.

on one hand. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . thus invested with independence. This instrument. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. labour. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. being an intelligent substance. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. In virtue of such for tuitousness. to found anew such an actual family. acquire an existence of their own. ¤ 522 (3) The children. or state external.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. and thus produce more unconditional . particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. on the o ther hand. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. or nominal culture in general. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. learning. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. constitutes the general stock. and care for the future.in educating them to independent personality. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. as private persons. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. of the possessor's will. information. while. of legal regulation. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. who exist independent and free. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. as do also its industry. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . destined. originally foreign to it. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. however. into families or individuals. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases.

'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way.and ye t it should be decided. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. and industry. skill. is developed i n detail. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. and a corresponding mode of labour. 2 3/4 . its action gets direction and content through natural features. to be. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. and so on ad infinitum.dependence on the social system. option.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. exists. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. determined through reason or legal intelligence. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. Their content per se may be reasonable . and like the first a certain subsistence. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . The second. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. of mere agents. of needs. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. on the side of external existence. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. intelligence. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. however.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. as vital. ten thalers. and an ensemble of contingencies. and with it the State.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. as well as of mental culture and habit . and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. 2 4/5 years. and of means for satisfying them. this analysis. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . of the legal relationships of individual s to them. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. be the righ t and just thing.. Hence. and in it they have their social moralit y. they have their actual existence. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. Thus whether three years. Where civil society. also of aims and interests. which is honesty. or could be. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. or only 2 * .the Law. which as existence is essentially a particular. But when right. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. and accident. The third. though of course only at the final points of deci ding. talent.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . the medium created by t he action of middlemen. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. at every point. their recognition and their honour. It is a futile perfectionism to have . because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. in the course of definite manifestation. certain.

is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. the need of a simpler code . are not a new hou se.gets its universal guarantee through formalities.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. of his countrymen. first really de serving the name of laws. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. with the advance in multitude. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. . In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. which again make new decisions necessary. and in particular transforms this existence .even as his law can only be a just law. even the admiration.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. general laws. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis .into punishment (¤ 500). i. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel.to be promulgated and made known as laws . recognized. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity.as proven: .though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. who has by so doing gained the gratitude.and th e cattle too .are governed and well governed too by laws.e.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite.in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. however. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features.which though something new. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws .laws. whic h are only internally in these objects. there arises. This subjective existence. The comparison of the two species. by faith and trust.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. and t hus become authoritative . while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. being laws o f strict right. inasmuch as. These people forget that the stars . which discovers new distinctions. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. they touch only the abstract will .or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . at the same time an externally objective existence. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. to which objective existence determines i tself. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines.the ne ed. as the genuine order of life. as it is a known law. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. as universal authority and necessity.vi z. hereditary divinity or nobility.to the individualized right . in the judicial system. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. not for them. within the house . To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. like improvements on a f loor or a door. constit . as in the mental ima ges of space. But there is a contrary case. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. .as this exists as revenge .

The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. the judgement as t o the state of the fact.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . because it is only one factor. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. Conversely. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. It results also from circumstances of locality. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. . whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. and worked from that point of view.and that.'poli . because it is man's want. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. from the c onnections between nation and nation. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. mere circumstantial evidence.viz. in a uniform gen eral way. So far as concerns them. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . In so far. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. be exercised as different functions. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. as at bottom different sides. to the concrete of civil society.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. and the judgement as application of the law to it. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. . To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. appears as state. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name.as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. and their variable ingredients. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. No doubt this factor is incomplete. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. the position of an external un iversality. shou ld. then. which. so as to secure this satisfaction. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part.

through the action of the government and its several branches. First it maintains them as persons. (c) THE STATE. but.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. to the immediate agent. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . ¤ 539 As a living mind. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. which each originally takes care of for himself. they are re strictions.into the life of the universal substance. s heer subjectivity. This universal principle. Thus we have the corpora tion. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. and. On the other hand. however. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals .the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. It provides for the reasonable will . proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. receiving. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. The same unity.which volition is thereby free . Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . .international (outer-state) law. and not left to perish. self-originated. but which has a thoroughly general side. is its essence. continually produce it as their result. and self-develop ed . ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom.co nsists in a double function.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. also for that will being put in actuality. First. But. then it promotes their welfare. Secondly. which. Thirdly. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. The cons titution is existent justice .as an actuality . with all its evolution in detail. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance.ce'. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. his independent self-will and particular interest. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . differentiated in to particular agencies. and . whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. secondly. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society.one individual. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals .coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality.in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . it carries back both. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . it protects the family and guides civil society. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. the state only is as an organized whole. in this direction .the reasonable spirit of will.

its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. magistracies . But the notion of liberty. which it can without incompatibility allow. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. on the contrary. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal.e.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. However true this is. that the laws rule. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. etc. But that this freedom should e xist. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. The principle of equality. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. etc. As regards Liberty. in other words. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. etc. first. logically carried ou t. the familiar proposition. age. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good .. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. It is important therefore to study them closer. on the contrary. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. etc. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. the current notions of l . Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. skill. the citizens . . All men are by nature equ al. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. etc. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. it embodies a liberty. without further specification and development. Formerl y the legally defined rights. physical strength. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. As regards. town . it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. eligibili ty to office. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state.only it can make them . Rome.as regards taxation. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. is so little by nature. With the state there ari ses inequality. Really. i. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). authorities. directories. is abstract subjectivity. The laws themselve s. rejects all differences.punishment. talent. as regards the concrete. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . Nothing has become. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. or destroy them. the difference of governing powers and of governed. On the contrary. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth.besides their personalit y . But. and that the laws are restrict ions. were called its 'liberties'. presuppos e unequal conditions. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. or even in crime.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. otherwise have in property. etc. military service. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists.equal in the concrete. private as well as public rights of a nation. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. as it exists as s uch. as it ha ppens.pleasure an d self-will. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. Equality.

there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications.e . the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. of liberties in general. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. If . (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. however. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. and to regard a state. of others. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. with this development of particularity. ¤ 541 The really living totality . is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . and the organization of the actualization of them. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. The term political liberty. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it.a thing that has nev er happened in history. is . and thus gains moral independence. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. as a state without a constitution. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. not merely with regard to the naturalness. just as little as the making of a code of laws. The question . at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights.as sec urity of property. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. . in other words continuall .that which preserves. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. self-w ill and self-conceit. But the more we fortify liberty.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. and must deal with them as it ca n.) But the guara ntee lies also. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. with its insatiate vanity.iberty only carry us back to equality. in which this is not formally done. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . i. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. be it added.e. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side.just because of this inseparability . has an insight and conviction of his own . because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults.

and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason.in a state of society.y produces the state in general and its constitution. and the government be merely executive and dependent . the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. which taken apart is also particular).e. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . in other words. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make .the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. equally disorganizes actuality.regarded as organic totality .to make it the first power. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. of the family and of civil society. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . . The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. These. Only through t he government. (A mistake still greater. ¤ 542 In the government . with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. is the government. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power.impugns the principle of the division of powers. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. i. as in a democratic constitution. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. .the will of a decreeing individual. is the state one. however.e. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. but an actual indiv idual . the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. all-decreeing will of the state. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence).the all-sustaining. as always. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. is the self-redintegrating notion. i. In the perfect form of the state. as in the patri archal society . instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality.su bject always. the participation of all i n all affairs . and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. which includes an already existing development of differences.monarchy.or.

For it is as private persons t . and secondly the form in which it is act ualized.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. admini stration of justice or judicial power. The division of constitutions into democracy. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). aptitude. with their general opinion. there arises the participation of several in state-business. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. which having their busin ess appointed by law.are. too. legislative power. and skill for such ends. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. participate in the governmental power.'ideal' unity.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state .the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . especially in legislation . conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . and are to that degree private person s. . Thus. an actual existence. These principles are those expounded earlier. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. essentially. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. civil society. aristocracy and monarchy. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. Two points only are all-important. involve the. possess independence of a ction. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. to subjectivity. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty..viz.in short.such as ochlocracy. i. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. The pure forms . first. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. to that end and for that reason. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. lik e peace and war.partly. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . being simple self-relation. it may be . and then of nature . can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. in the history of the State. with its industry and i ts communities.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. and above all personal liberty. etc.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . as it were. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. administration and police. and with earlier transition-forms.e. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit .whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. liberty of property. That subjectivity . Secon dly.as also feudal monarchy. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices.necessary to the p rocess of evolution .

however. and form a particular kind . Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. or in its 'reflectional' universality. Take the case of England which. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty.a spiritual element . as such an aggregate.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. as the nation . and therefore more urgent. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number.the contrary must be the case . and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. is no t self-destructive. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs.as it very likely is . But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. as estates. but as organic factors. in arrangements for art and science. in the general sense of embracing a wide. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. i. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. ¤ 529 note). The des irability of such participation. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. blind force. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. so far as they form only one branch of that power .regard ed as permanent.as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. ever newly recurring. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. Experience s hows that that country .the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. inorganic shape.would be. it is not a brutish mass. which. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. s ense of general wants. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. moreover. that t hey enter upon that participation.e. demoralization. like that of the stormy. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws.which should be presupposed. wild. be they treated as mere individuals. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. In a civilized state. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. to power and act ion. in the law and liberty of property. however. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . The so-called financial law. If the main part of the requirement were . indeed the whole. range of the extern al means of government. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. elemental sea.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n.

so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion.as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . and to conceal the fact that the legislative power.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget.is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. and not actually existent. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. e. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. In their mutual relations. when it makes a decree about finance. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. and thus.e. a state of war. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. is really engaged with strict executive business. afresh. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely.i. or every few years. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. as content o f a true law. in which there would no longer be a government. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them..g. and not to be made yearly.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. and becomes the estate of bravery. In one case the . waywardness and chance have a place. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. Then again. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. of the whole of the finances. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding .e. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. but only parties. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . i.

and above all universal history. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. and in Germany more than in France and England. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. there is Reason in history. however. internat ional law rests on social usage. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. are settled and fixed. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. As this development is in time and in real existence. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing.the judgement of the world. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. In general. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. a history of its own. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. when we come to minutiae. especially on the philological side. etc. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. this note must go into further deta il. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. in defiance of . Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. which actually is and will be realized in it . and then in history.and. and on history-writing in general. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end.the plan of Provide nce. Fictions.a world-mind. in short. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. first in general. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. each of which. of a Roman epic. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. that. an d the special claims of nations on one another. and as regards its range and scope. It has. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties.of sacerdotal races . is appointed to occupy only one grade. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. both this general recognition. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . as it is a history. it. It is in time. in short. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. is called an a prio ri view of it. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. That history. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing.. On th is point. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . it passes int o universal world-history. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow.

and an exclusive interest in justice. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. i. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. as in the romance. no history . etc. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. But.). and rejects both ki nds of interest. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. and criticize events. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. or. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. The point of interest of Biography . or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire.the best-accredited history. What happens to a nation . but an age.e. not as good as a fairy tale. a nation. but violates th e principles of objective truth. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. e. state. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. a civilization. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. in the interest of so-called truth. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. and.g. has. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits.to say a word on that here . for even children expect a m otif in their stories. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances.appears to run . is not only against taste and judgement. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. express not a subjective particularity.like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. or if he declined to judge at all. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. Rome and its fortunes. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. in striking portraiture and brevity. and takes place within it. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. strictly s peaking. Ay. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. a word. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. if he had not an interest. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. on the other hand. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them.

For Spirit is consciousn ess. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history.e. have they their value and even their existence. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. i. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. Only therefore through their relationship to it. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. i. which all alik e have no stuff in them. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. in this case. is the empty form of activity. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . partly it is a cognition of philosophy. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency.e.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. while it inheres in them. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme.admitting.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. But biography too has for its background the historical world. truth. only opinions and mere ideas. a development determined by the notion of spirit. etc. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. if Rome or the German empire. are instruments.or in other words that Reason is in history . ¤ 550 This liberation of mind.an accurate report of externals. etc. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. on the contary. we may add. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion.e. is the supreme right. the absolute L aw. The mere play of sentiment. and secondly. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. i. has another ground and interest than his tory. and there fore as a work of individuals. 550). as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. liberty. But. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. really.e. and the business of so doing. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . and of its essence. to the history of religion. i. Such a doctrine . the consciousness of it. and its content is prese . which is what is pe culiar to them. which is their reward. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. potentially infinite. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. first in general. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. and their subjectivity. and are all treated as indifferent. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175).Fame. these individuals. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. the freak of humour. as over a special grade.

whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. as law and duty. cf. is the purification.e. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. i.is the peculiar perversity.Liberty. i. For that st arting. i. The spirit. in the system of laws and usages. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. ¤ 204 not e). becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. lays hold of its concr ete universality. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. that elevation to God really involves. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. is the real ethical self. as it has been already shown (¤ 192.e. i. especially ¤ 51. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance.a mere 'ought' . as true in the world of free will. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason.consciousn ess.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. Th e finite. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. actually accomplished in the ethical world. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. the idea of God it kn . stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions.e. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity.e. At this rat e. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. But . But the spirit which think s in universal history. from which the start is now made. and that on the religious. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. now gets its most concrete interpretation. This factor. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. Such apprehension. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself .this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h.as is the case with all speculative process . As regards the 'mediation' which. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . note). forme rly noticed.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. however. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit.

generally. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. and law and justice. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source.ows must be the true and real. to justification by external wo rks. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order .the body of religious truth. and even as mutually indifferent. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. and these applications of it in the religious life.e.e. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. the host as such is not at first consecrated. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality.or it may be. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. and superstition. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness.as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. and ex pecting miracles from them.working images. in point of form.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. i. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. It leads. even to bones. (In the Lutheran Church. on the contr ary. morality and conscience.e. springing from some force and power. but in the moment of enjoymen t.logi cally enough . This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. in the annihilation of its externality. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life.partly as mere moving of the lips. i. and prays others to pray .which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. and in the act of faith. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. one religious and an other ethical. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another.of bondage.addressing his devotion to miracle.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . for thought and knowledge . This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. i. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. first of all. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. then there may be created. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth .e. i. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. non-spirituality. a condition of spiritual sla very. But in poin t of form. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. differing from the former in body and value of truth. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. in its faith and in its con science. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. religion was a late r addition. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . And. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. B . but purely subjective in individuals: . but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. It lea ds to a laity.

under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. and in the use of property . Thus set free. Thus. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. i.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). sti . and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. our consciousness and subjectivity. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. .an obedience which is itself the true freedom. therefore. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. lacked liberty. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. The precept of religion. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. which does not rise in hostility against them.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. because the state is a self-possessed. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. i. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. i. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. Instead of the vow of chastity.e.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. unte nable. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere.e. so to speak a priori. the content of religion assumes quite another shape.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present.of honesty in commercial dealing. and. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. Let us suppose even that. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. So long as t he form. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. and in a special sense Philosophy. and thus only. . with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. leads it into the rea l world. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. a code of law should arise. the wisdom of the world. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. no matter how. and political institutions deduced from them must be. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies.in short. moral life in the state. founded on principles of reason. .e. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. self-realizing reason . With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. if taken alone. can law and morality exist. And instead of the vow of obe dience. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality.

to put it simply. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. that the Idea must be regent. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws .which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit.to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content.to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . however sound their provisions may be. e. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy.g. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. This absolute nucleus of man . To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. thus surmountin . Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea .is the intellectual and thinking self. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. This additional 'individuality' . and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. on one hand.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . so-called 'chambers'. Such laws.. ¤ 544 note).ll. and the power given them to fix the budget. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. from those deeper requirements which. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets.among which laws these guarantees are included. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. etc. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. when specially set in relief as genus.mi nd intrinsically concrete . or. (cf. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. thus founder on the conscience.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. . At best it is only a temporary expedient . the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind.is just this .could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. on the other hand. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution.

however. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself .). as demoralization. earlier than it does as philosophy. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. fall feeling. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. exhibits the one-sidedness. etc. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils .and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. As it left therefore behind. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. Under the subjective form. or rather must. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . religion.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . Plato. or essential being). which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. is after all only in one of its form s. and so also one-sided phase. from religion. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. Only in the principle of mind. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. pictorial representation. for th ese reasons. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. of philosophy. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. on its own s howing. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. so . which is developed similarly. but earlier than philosophy. which still escaped his intelligence. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. should knit it together and control it.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality.g the Platonic Idea (the genus.and th at on account of this very principle .the idea of the substantial moral life.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq.so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. in its philosophic phase. Political power. in its f irst immediate. he. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. But thought always . and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . Hence religion as such. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. ¤ 513. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. which is awa re of its own essence.was that creative imagination. is implicitly in absolute liberty.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . intuition. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. His state is therefore. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. the subjectivity of mind. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). But even religion. as it grows and expands. The form in its infinite tru th. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words.). But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. Religion may.

i. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. the constitut ion and the code.e. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. 7. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . while it is self-centred identity. Das System der Bedurfnisse. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. Thus ul timately. for which it is as substance. 3. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. Gesetz. Religion.in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. but rather to a sort of knowledge. 2. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. Die Weltgeschichte 10. as well as their several applications. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. Inneres Staatsrecht. 4. 6. Die Sittlichkeit. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion.as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. Das aussere Staatsrecht. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. Die Polizei und die Corporation. of God's indwelling in us. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. In the Protestant state. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. 9. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. 1. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. Weltweisheit. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. 8. Die Rechtspflege 5. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. as always. That here. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself.

is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. reconciliation. has in devotion . when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression.e. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. Art requires not only an external given material . ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. the actuality of the spirit. like the material which it uses to work in. Belief. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation.the form of immediacy as such .the shape or form of Beauty.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. as superseded in spirit. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. 1.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. into the subject which produces that work. Der absolute Geist. so that the thought embodied. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. and of gaining its concrete determination. on the other hand. viz. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . With the essential restrictedness of its content.something formal.in other words. A. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit .i. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. but . its n atural immediacy. which is only a sign of the Idea. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). On one hand.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . In this ideal.for the expression of spiritual truth . ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. or the idea. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. ¤ 411). .hence not the sp iritual unity. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. that is.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. c an. aware. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. as it is. But. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation.

and th e artist is the master of the God. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. as free spi rit.symbolic art. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. .can try to bring itself to consciousness.stil l this art is defective.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. the artist's enthusiasm. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds .and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. but as only finding himself in himself. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. but its inmost depth. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive.in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. assumes fuller and firmer features. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. though concrete and intrinsically free. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . as well as of its art and science. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. is not yet known. not yet conscious of itself. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. subjectivity. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. the principle of its law.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. that one spirit creates and informs them. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. of its actual liberty. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. or an effor t towards him . in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. is not yet absolute. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . known as the Absolute. and that is where the infinite form. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. and of its constitution. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation.

Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. and brilliancy.that it be revealed. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. then the only thing left to constitute His nat .was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. . satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit.of Nemesis. from it s side. Beautiful art. and. in which he had not revealed himse lf. still more in that external. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. Beautiful art.e. the theme and c entre of religion. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . it is from Him. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. what is more. unbeautiful sensuo usness. But with a further and deeper study. is first generated. we see that the advent of art. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. has its future in true reli gion. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . . But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. dashing t o pieces everything high and great . whose con tent is absolute mind . into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. as infinite self-realizing form . REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. which is only in the medi um of thought . and j ust for that reason. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . expression. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. The old conception .due to a one-sided survey of human life .for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. like the religion peculiar to it.it therefore is manifestation out a nd out.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. .The genuine objectivity.is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . The older religion in which the need of fine art. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the.ent in it. on the contrary. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical.into revelation. spectator find themselves at home. shows that such religion is on the decline. not the supreme liberation itself.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. revealed by God.the religion i.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. with their perso nal sense and feeling. B.

again. for that reas on. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. Go d is. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. it implies the revelation of Him. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. by C. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. however. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . though. . and.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. in it s forefront. and phenomena which succeed each other. in point of content.of the only Son . the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . To know what God as spirit is . have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. on one hand. first of all. to specul ative comprehension.just as.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. he still remains in original identity . in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. which therefore is finite. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. F.on the other hand.: Berlin 1829.requires careful and thorough speculation. with whom. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed.. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. of the world it gave away . on the other hand. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . On one hand is heaven and earth. it is. ¤ 566 In this separating.1. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. It includes. But. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. even in its manifestation. and reconciliation with the eternal being. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. which proceeds to man's self. abiding sel f-centred. directed towards the Eternal.it is therefore the absolute spirit. (a) as eternal content. Yet. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . G . the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media.. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. the spirit. the elemental and the concrete nature . presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. though different. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters.knowledge in God.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . . only standing to it in an external connection. making them presuppositions towards each other.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. as the extreme of inherent negativity. while in point of form he is. (c) as infinite return. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. not. but afterwards.is the Spirit. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. or of judgement. when it thinks. it may almost create surprise that so many. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. further.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . amid that natural ness. as in duty bound. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. staying aloof and inert. a separate being. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. That spirit.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world.

which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. th e self-centred manifestation.is taken in a merely formal. Thinking. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance.is transplanted into the world of time. in which he. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. contentless sense. is not bound by it .and. and eternal spirit in itself. and thus sensuous. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. remains master over it. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness .¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such .not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal.Irony. If the result . as infinite subjectivi ty. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . with a temporal and external sequence. C. This individual. so far. Irony.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. his natur al man and self-will. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. who as such is identified with the essence . F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. after the example of his truth. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. but alive and present in the world. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result .where the spirit closes in unity with itself . on account of his immediate nature. truth is the object of philoso phy. From this its separation into p arts. Whereas the vision-method of Art. is itself the emptiness and vanity. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. and thus. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. Further. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. this immediate. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. which from itself. Die geoffenbarte Religion. an object of contemplating vi sion .but the vision of implicit truth. But. eternal. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. secondly. In this form of truth. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. keeps himself unchanged. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. external in point of form. he. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. gives itself direction and con tent. . is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. simple. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. 1. but even to thought. through which witness of the spirit in him. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject.

on the other hand. too much for the latter. and s o religious.leaving out. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect.('Rationalism') . which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . which philosophy is. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. of course. and this necessary as free. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. opens it out in mental picture. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . finds itself already accompl ished. and against philosophy in general .stantial content into many separate shapes. only looks back on its knowledge. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. remains identical with it.it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. which determines itself to content. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. and particularly of the logical form. when driven to expound itself. or. This witness . This movement. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories.on one hand. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. with its separ ation into parts. immediate vision and its poetry. elevation of them into the absolute form. when at the close it seizes its own notion .e. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs.the underlying essence in all humanity . as also of the necessity in the two forms . Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. and acts inconsistently towards them.i. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. a nd of logic in particular.from these forms. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge .takes. but also criticized it. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. to be more precise still. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies.and from a pithless orthodoxy. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. and mediates what is thus open ed out.which may be in both the same . and whereas Religion. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. This does not prevent the spirit. The charge of Atheism.

exclusi ve. or Pantheism. On such a presuppo sition. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. without distinction. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . ¤ 71 note). it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. the secularity of th ings. from which all definite quality is excluded. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam.so much so. cows . As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. that. does not comprehend itself.that of the Egyptians to the ox . are unable and unwilling to see this . and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. also contains the generic abs tract.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. or any one man. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. are) . if we believe them.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er.or to dalai-lamas .(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. as it stands. fulfilled notion of God.all possess substantia lity.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse .(empirical things. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism.is always adora tion of an object which.of the new piety and new theology. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . that it is treated not so much as an imputation. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness.so much so. and amongst it s effusions. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. its grossest shape. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. whether higher or lower in the scale. that it has too much of him: . that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: .Everything is . God in General. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had.the Bhagavat-Gita. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. It is only his own stupidity. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. or if you will. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. but as a proved fact. most sublime. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. open to our disposal on this topic.which therefore it does not disparage. and form all that is definite in the divine universality. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. in particular. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . some of the most telling passage . and is therefore.that of the Hindu to ass es. as is well known. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. we must. and so .each and every secular thing is God.as the most authentic statement accessible . with all its absurdities. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. Without interest of its own for the concrete. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) .in the wanton assertion. Amongst the abundant resources. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf.thus he understands philosophy . This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: .g. If this theory needs no more than such a God. This new theology. Piety.of Pantheism. I select .

or a God besides. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. . from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. is alo ne the divine and God. where the empirical everything of the world. . like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. . . . and end of living things. . . however. etc. Meru among the high-topped mountains. I am the taste in water. is also the maddest of polytheisms. to a poly theism. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. The undiscerning ones. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. Hinduism. But so little concrete is this divine unity . . this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. . . . That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. . Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. which he is. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras.. any more than the Eleatic One. passion. . . But the idolatry of the wretched Hi .spiritual as its idea of God i s . the Everything. . pp.' This 'All'. at the beginning of the pass age. has the higher conception of Brahma. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. This everything. . than which there is nothing higher. . Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. rather. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. . darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. . the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). . 7 seqq. as different from that accidental. even Siva. I am life in all beings. . as also those proximate substantialities. t he pure unity of thought in itself.s. .. is not. I am also the strength o f the strong.the most excellent of everything. goodness. . and the Spinozan Substance. . . grip. besides Krishna.not everything. the One which. still God. all this is woven upon me. unessential existences.). but only . But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . . as he said before he was S iva. which Krishna calls himself. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. melt into the one Krishna. everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. vanish. or Indra. without essential being of its very own. . .that Hinduism. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . . seated in the hearts of all beings. Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. Even when. and the moon among the lunar mansions. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . 'At the end of many lives.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. p. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. so to speak . Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld.' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. .'I am the self. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. . . . nothing independent]. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. with a monstrous incons istency. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. called Gods. There is nothing else higher than myself. .' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. he is said to be the beginning. Indra. but having its truth in the substance. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. . I am the light of th e sun and the moon. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible.so powerless its.. Among letters I am the letter A. . I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. and one essential amongst them. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. middle. . Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe .

But to go back again to the question of fact. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. which. on one hand.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. the all. to which everything is God. or Spinozist. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic..of the world as one thing. imagination or speculation. is identical with the world. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. and that unity described as love. moreover. or other creature. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. when he adores the ape. or. ac osmical. For that unity. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. even in a general exoteric discussion. Hin du monotheism. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. but .in its finest purity and sublimity.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. on the contrary. and on the other. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. empirical indivi duals . in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular.g. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God.. outside it . of the relationship of God and the world. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. as it says. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. as everything.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular. the finite to the infinite.ndu. and God everything. Of the oriental. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. is discarded and absor bed. as infinite from the finite.floating in the indefinite blue . They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. That pantheism indeed .keep its independence.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. to was . we must consult th e Mohammedans. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. as the endless lot of empirical existence. e. and of empirical secular spirit. But. and. especially the Mohammedan. secondl y. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. he is as essence parted from appearance. whether they spring from heart. in relation to the popular idea of the world. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. modes of envisaging God. If. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . It is only the picture .might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. the Eleatic. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes.on the shallow conception of it . the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. after this partition. and so on .

in the pores of th e physicists .said pores being the negative. etc. I n the philosophical field they proceed. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. but only the one factor of this category of relation .is identity. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. but with concrete unity (the notion). applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. it is not. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. with abstract unity.that.falsely as a fact . with God's omnipresence. when they hear of unity . and which they ascribe to philosophy. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. they have laid hands on. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. And as in their judgement either of the two . they import them into philosophy. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. in matters admitted to be of superior. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d.and s till less take trouble about it . however. but rather its reverse. a nd assert . This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity.and relation i pso facto implies unity . e. But they show so little acquaintance with them .and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world.te a word on what a 'notion' means.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. is what one expect s. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. not the concrete unity.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. omnipresence. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. the notion and content of philosophy. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. if not even of supreme interest.the world as much as Go d . Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. composition. viz. mere ide ntity.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption.e. where they are utterly unknown. inorganic and living . and that it is the system of identity. with indefinite ideas.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . . But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. i. providence. and the empty absolute. as in the physical field the physicist. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. as Epicu rus does. But the question is.g.and that the factor of indet erminateness .they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity.has the same solid substantiality as the other. and that amongst the m there is great variety. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject.g. the most external and the worst. and that hence.

but the many-shaped modes specified. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. i. as process of the I dea's subjective activity.their everything. standing between the Mind and its essence. and which is itself the way to produce it. as other than they. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . the absolutely universal.ity . shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions.knowing reaso n. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. the notion. then. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. But to put that sort of thing. in his relation to the world. a system of identity. sunders itself. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. and the latter its universal extreme. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . If statements as to facts are put forward.e. The esoteric study of God and identity. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . for its middle term: a middle. On account of this chorus of assertions. making the former its presupposition. as of cognitions.as the mediating agent in th e process . on the shoulders of philosophy. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. not abstract unity. y .the logical system. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . nor itself to something away from them and independen t . and notions . The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. and as implicitly the Idea.which. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. is philosophy itself. Nature .presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. But in ascribing to God. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. which causes the movement and development. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea.it is the nature of the fact. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. which . which has self. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. of which liberty is the aim. which divides itself into Mind and Nature.by which notions are perverted into their opposite.it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. or as prevaricating for a purpose. an All-one doctrine.

et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. The eternal Idea. eternally sets itself to work. . in f ull fruition of its essence. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind.

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