INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any

attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i

s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as

treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.

The usual answer. ANTHROPOLOGY. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. These 'imponderables' . and. At such a stage it is not yet mind. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. Wherever there is Nature. perhaps. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. except where. have still. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. and mind conceived as a thin g. the soul is only the sleep of mind . the sou l is its universal immaterialism. as such a result. There. matter is regarded as something true.with th is proviso. on the other. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. which is potentially all things. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. indeed. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. however. its simple 'ideal' life. like heat.the passive of Aristotle. a nd the soul remains the pervading. identical ideality of it all. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. even the capacity of offering resistance. li ght.SUB-SECTION A.the truth that matter itself has no truth. as absolute negativity. on the one hand. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality.. to which they might perhaps add space and time. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity.e. however. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . and the only problem was how to comprehend it. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. It is otherwise with Mind. thus come into being. Mind. not merely lacks gravity. which is the fund amental feature of matter. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. etc. and so the self-externalism. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. i. but soul. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. whereas the 'vital' matter. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. in a sense. But not merely is it. where the othe . but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. and not as the immediate or natural individual. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other.

and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . (c) Thirdly. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. they are natural objects for consciousness. as in the case of Spinoza. there philosophers took God. upon it. not. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. and always more or less. re tains an abstract independence. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. the changes of the seasons. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. Spinoza. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. even these few and slight susceptibilities. with Leibniz. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). it may be.or corporeity . bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. in many case s completely. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. based upon participation in the common life of nature. which only is. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. T hus. as so often is done. or. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. and telluri c life of man. just in proportion to his civilization. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. remain for ever subject to such influences. and the periods of the day. sidereal. Animals and pl ants. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. In nations less intellectually emancipated. as individualized. and does not rise or develop into system. described. feels the difference of climates. Descartes. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. But either this identity.r is not . so holding. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. as in the case of Lei moulded into it. and. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. in the modes of that being. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. etc. as an anima mundi. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus.the natural soul. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. disappear. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. These have. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. (b) Secondly.e. its immediate being . any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. is too abstract.e.(a) In its immediate natural mode . on the contrary. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. though his Monad of monads brings things into being.whence Epicurus. and. when it presents itself as a single soul. Hence. a world-soul. into the absolute syllogism. so to speak. . it is a soul which feels. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. Malebranche.

talent . but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. carrying out these universa .the sexual relation . we find it as the special temperament. in purposes political. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. shows an active half. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. we see man in his true relation to his environment. or artistic. And that individuality marks both the world which. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. we find its diversities. This .on a ph ysical basis. on its one side. and on the other. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. and the position of the individual himself. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. of families or single individuals. on the whole. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. scientific. and as stages in its development. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. character.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. as it exists. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. physiognomy. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. the one permanent subject. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. He begins with Childhood . shows. widely distant from each other. The contrast between the earth's poles. hopes. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. as alterations in it. fancies. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. fails to meet his ideal requirements. Thirdly. bodily structure and disposit ion.a worl d no longer incomplete.mind wrapped up in itself.

distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. The characterization given in the section is abstract. but as a return back from the world of specialization. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. as already noted. in the first instance. .l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. although. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego.not as a merely negative rest from it. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. . or self-centralized being. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. each point. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. (c) Sensibility(3) . for example. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. i n an unintelligent way.The waking is not merely for the observer. distinguishes itself from its mere being. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. sleep. . as before explained . and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . which are often addressed to philosophy: . we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. as they may be called. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . viz. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact.Napoleon. put this question to the class of ideology.

ho wever. moral. its natural peculiarity. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. godless. and to be as if found. and religious. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. and is so felt. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. mean. not mere alterations. and .identity of our self-centred being. Another. etc. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. the conscience.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good.. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). On the other hand and conversely. are our very own. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. But if put in the feelin g. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. are in order to be felt. it is true. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. etc.set over against consciousness. fornication. as 'ideally' in it and made its own.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . blasphemy. This should hardly need enforcing. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. the inarticulate bre athing. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. true. are found by the waking soul. on one hand. adultery. etc. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . the naturally immedi ate. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. but treated as bel onging to its most special. invested with cor poreity. belonging as it does to natural. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. One. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. which. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. in its own self. in a general way: the facts of it are objective .? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. evil. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. mora l. the fact is a mode of my individuality. murder . everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. just. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. primarily. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. be it noted. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. in the feeling. is what we call sensibility.g. The fact that these particulars. and the character. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. for itself. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences.

i. of self. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . distinction appears as mere variety .but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. and their corporization. laughter. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize is a soul which feels. and voice in general. are formed from their mental source. sighs.g. for example. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. o f colours. What it has to do. to the character of subjectivity. with which that substance is one. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . . e. works itself out. (¤¤ 321. in a special system of bodily organs. In the usage of ordinary the system of the senses. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . ¤ 402 Sensations. just because they are immediate and are found existing. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. to realize its mastery over its own. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. to take possessi on of it. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications.a psychical physiology.the senses of definite light. tones. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). the immediacy of mode in feeling . especially the passions or emotions.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. but an inward. (¤ 317) .it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . 322). smells. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. (c) the sense of solid reality. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. following the special character of the mental mode. (b) THE FEELING SOUL .and of sound.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. of heavy matter.because in it. is to raise its substantiality. (¤ 300). the 'irritable' system. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. with its varieties of language. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. therefore. set in its self-centred life. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . i ts merely virtual filling-up. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . the blood. As sentient. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. We should have. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. the centre of the 'sensible' system. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy.e.

that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. the s oul is characterized as immediate. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. ¤ 404 As individual. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. thoughts. the content is its particular world. to which the soul. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. in whi ch all this is stored up. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. In the present stage we must treat. secondly. virtually retained. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject.. By itself. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. it implies a want of adaptation. and to that world it stands but as to itself. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. where the real is put past . first. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . etc. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . At the present stage this singleness is. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. it brings within itself. so far as that is. etc. acquired lore. ideas and information. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). As sentient. which is embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. although it does not exist. once mor e come to light. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul.the existent spe culative principle. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. which is at the same time its predicate. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). They were not in our possession. but a negation. prima rily. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. ideas. the corporeity.that world being included in it and filling it up. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. a deep featureless characterless mine. but only to his im plicit self. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. Some times. omnipresent unity. may again sink down. to be defined as one of feeling . The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. Thus in the body it is one simple. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. in an implicit mode. without existing. in sickness.

because then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. say between friends. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. of the mother. idiosyncrasies. tal ent. the psychical relationship. Here are two individuals. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. placenta. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. not a true subject reflected int o itself. and is therefore passive. as it has existence of its own. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. congenital disposit ion and temperament. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . intellige nt. or capac ity. and reasonable. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). self-conscious. which. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. and of character. controlling genius thereof. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. By the self-hood of the latter it . etc. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. but as efficiency and realized activity. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. temper. is visibly present as another and a different individual.a substance. not yet as its self. it is. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. not as a mere possibility.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. etc. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. etc. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. or virtuality. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . of life. his secular ideas. The moth er is the genius of the child. incl inations. fortunes. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. the single self of the two. as yet nothing impenetrable. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. whose decision is ul . as concrete subject ivity. self-possessed. developed interests. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. etc. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material.. character. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate .. injuries.

and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. in other words. intentions.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead.his fun damental interests. it might seem. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. be mere deception and impo sture. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. self-possessed human being is a disease. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. it has already been call ed his genius. which are also means and ends to each other. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . But such a verification would. To that end the phenomena. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. in which the individual here appears innnersed. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. that it is in harmony wi th the facts. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. first of all call for verificati on. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. on the cont rary. The facts. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . At the same tim e. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. is. it must be added. means. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. on the other hand. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. This totality forms his actual ity. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses .

and character. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. then. or at the approach of death. subje ctive reason. and to know which. the selfless individual. and c ontinues to be.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . and hears. which. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. . which lead up to the result . those c onnected with female development. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. etc. his own and that of the magnetize . The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. ca pable of conveying general truths. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. not really a 'person'. for example. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. .(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. (Thus Cato. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. not on the spot. is this. a formal vision and awareness. unless by the aid of religion. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. But such clairvoyance . then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. smells. in whom it sees.a genius which beh olds itself. and the like. subject to the power of another person. wh en it is healthy and awake. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. after the downfall of the Roman republic. . not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. and other diseases. exist for it as an outward objectivity.) Compare h ome-sickness. reads. f riends. When the substance of both is thus made one. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. in catalepsy. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. on those left behind. But. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. tastes. formed. but it is empty. etc.).not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. in its sober moods. the magnetizer. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. that it is a state of passivity. is under a veil. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. And because it is the adult. like that of the child in the womb. etc. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. however. external one to another.

for example. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. on the contrary. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. is without any definite points of attachment . beholds. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. etc. the 'common sense'. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. is impossible. which is no less a world of law. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. in this nominal perception. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. In this way it is self. long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. The purely sensitive life. it is still susceptible of disease. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. In considering insanity we must. receives. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. anticipate the full-grown an . or med icines for them.fe eling. which. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. so long as we assume independent personalities. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. as in other cases. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. e. i s just this form of immediacy. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself.r. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. and hence. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. though all-embracing. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. between intelligent personality and objective world. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. i. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. which still marks the self-feeling. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. and at the same time. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. causality. as in the morbid state alluded to. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. in its capacity as individual. one sees and hears with the fingers.

In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. desire. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. it would be death). the self is to be stamped upon. so as to insert them in their proper place. and be a realized u niversality.d intelligent conscious subject. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. is diseased. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. i. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. is relaxed. and so makes part of the actual self. This humane treatment. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. which is there also. as now regarded. that it is liable to insanity . only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. pride. presupposes the patient's rationality. is undistinguis hed from them. and also desires. passions. loss of health (if it were that. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . instincts. and it is only as a thing.e. equally formal. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. as something natural and existent. i. And so too the particularity is.e. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. earthly elements are set fr ee . the. idea. and so also may the cure. moral and theoretical. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. such as vanity. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. however. Mind as such is fr ee. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease.feeling.. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. This particular being of the soul is t . but only derangement.that evil which is always latent in the heart. In the concrete. and the rest of the passions . A violent. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles.merely personal love and hatred.. mere and total. i. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. as a thing. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. but a contr adiction in cies and hopes . and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. and made appear in. etc. etc.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it.e. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. as it aris es. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. inclination. . this life of feeling. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility).just as physical disease is not an abstract. may. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. and their gratification).

the one and the same. dist inguishing it from itself . as. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. will. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality.. a pure act of intuition. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. and that as a barrier for it. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. so is that pure being (which. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. and the generation o f habit as practice. but the basis of consciousness. therefore. i. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. lacking consciou sness. even in being affected by them. heat. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. weariness o . In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. but still free. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. on the contrary. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. et c. empty space and empty time. occupied. and so no longer interested. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . and for that reason n ot free. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. The natural qualities and alterations of age. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. a second nature. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. Habit is rightly called a second nature. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). or dependent in regard to it. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. sleep. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. The soul is freed from them.itself a simple being . without feeling or consciousness of the fact. of which it is the subjective substance. and which still continues to exist. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. For. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence.e.he factor of its corporeity. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. nature.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. and the mere substance. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . su bjective substantiality of it . And consciousness it becomes. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. nor is absorbed in the m. of it. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. is reduced to unity. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. has been absorbed by it. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. this being of the soul. Habit like memory.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. when the co rporcity. are only subjectiv e forms. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175).and becoming the 'ideal'. but has them and moves in them. partly only relative. That is to say. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his.

consciousness. And it is true that the form of habit. consciousness. etc. and it is habit of living which brings on death. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. that although the frost. a series of musical notes) is in me. an 'ideality' of soul . nor are they in conce ption rational. acquires a strength which consists in this. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. sweet tastes.or the misfortune . fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. reflection. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. and no other. re ligious. habit diminishes this feeling. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. and the self-feeling as such. made into an instrum ent. but part and parcel of his being. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. to exist as substance in its corporeity. etc. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. whereof we sha ll speak later.g. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. nor an abstrac t inwardness. . is recollection and memory. Even here. without an express adjustment. This is the rational liberation from them. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. like any other. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. to be his as this self. to be made a power in the bodily part. his upright pos ture. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. viz. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. which make it up. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. etc. under its volitional and conceptual characters.enabling the matter of consciousness. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. and that they. a particular organ of i ts organic system). casual. or skill. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. so that when the conception (e.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . i. and especially so in the specific bodily part. Habit on an ampler scale.. and thus to enable the soul. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier.). cut off from action and reality. and any other purp oses and activity. too. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache).is felt. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. Thinking. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. etc. etc. if quite abstract. this soul. habit is usually passed over - .. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance.e.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. are no longer bothered with it. intelligence. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. and particul ar. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self.concentration. the spatial direction of an individual. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n.f the limbs. moral. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim.. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . has been by will made a habit . or. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. nor a transient emotion or idea. The most ext ernal of them. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. like their satisfaction. intuition.

but the soul. still vainer than a signatura rerum. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. the latter subject to the former.laughter. Empfindung. unable to represent it in its actual universality. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. in other words. and the formation of the limbs. it is related to itself. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. especially the hand. And the human figure. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. of which it is the sign. as the absolut e instrument. for the soul. Seen from the animal world. Naturliche Seele. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. and i s infinite self-relation. while language is its perfect expressi on. Die fuhlende Seele. cuts itself off from its immediate being. in being related to which. of the mouth . 1. represents not itself. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. and inexpressible a modific ation.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. 2. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. for example. the upright figure in general. indefinite. This note is so slight. weeping. Under the head of human expression are included. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. etc. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. finds itself there a single subject. a world external to it . which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . But for the mind it is only its first appearance. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. 5. or the 'immediacy' of mind.either as something contemptible . in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind.. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. 3. absorbing it. Naturliche Qualitaten. and making it its own. in its concentrated self. In this identity of interior and exterior. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. This externality. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. 4. 'The autho . Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. The soul. 71).but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. or abstract universality.

and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. now. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. as this absolute negativity. Gewohnheit. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. Hence consciousness. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. Ego. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. 6. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. Selbstgefuhl. in the sphere of essence. like reciprocal dependence in general. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities .to an equal freedom as an independent object.the light. 8. not to the wisdom. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. but since reality. It is of this latter. 7. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. but is implicit. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). thus first made explicit as the Ego.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. and . and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. seem to be its own activity. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind.e. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. but when he receives the inspired word. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. to it. something dark and beyond it.the soul's natural life . The mind as ego is essence. does not. i. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. which manifests itself and something else too . is only its abstract formal ideality. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. as subjective reflection in itself. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. and as such it is C onsciousness. as external to it. but to the foolishness of man. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) .

i. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. or mere c ertainty. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. the subject of consciousness.e. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. the ego it seems an alteration of the object. first. the notion of mind. reflected in itself. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. As against Spinozism.a subject-objectivity. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. and that the philosophy. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. Consciousness . (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. for which ego is the object.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. being immediate. t heir absolute interdependence. an existing thing. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). i. what makes the object the subject's own. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. and so on. but only as it is in reference to something else. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. but as poorest in a case of correlation . Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . and even t he Idea of Nature. immediate consciousness. a thing-in-itself. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. Spatial and temporal Singularn . in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. as Reason. has emerged from Spinoz ism. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. a singular. It appears as wealth iest in matter. which is not as its own. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414).. is further characterized a s immediately singular. in other words. the substantial and qu alitative. with an object set against it. an intuitive intellect. This is sense-consciousness. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. (b) self-consciou sness. Ego. a something. The object similarl y. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). and underived certainty of it. an existent. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will.e. to raise its self-certainty to truth. and puts it first under the category of being. etc.

The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . i. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. 73). (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . the one of the terms. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). having passed beyond the sensible. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . and. however. but as mediated. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. it is related. of the thing is. the thing. taken in its concrete content. to which. the distinction on its own part. but as a n interior 'simple' difference.a variety of relations. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. wants to take the object i n its truth. or the distinction which is none. an abstract identity: on the other hand. on one hand. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. in this case by t he Ego. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. .a copy of the phenomenon. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. in that manner. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . has. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . p. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. as we called it. ¤ 423 The law. or as being beside and out of itself. as not externally different from the other. what it is in truth. and universal. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. free from this negative l ink and from one another.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. Thi s inward. lies im mediately in the other. however. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . permanent term s. and more or less by the sciences. and universalities. experiences. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. not as merely immediate. But in this manner the interior distinction is. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground .between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal.ess.). its necessity on its own part. reflected upon. has many properties. reflectional attributes. is sense-perception. and am aware'. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know.e. viz. and sensuous consciousness. i. and not yet as external on its own part. which form the alleged ground of general experience. so constr uing the object. by being regarded in their bearings. but brought to rest and ween the individuality of a thing which. The consciousness of such an object is intellect.e. reflected in itself. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. to describe the sensible. a something external to it.

and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. this identity comes to be for the ego. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. or implicitly. therefore. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. On the external side it conti nues. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. and thus in it I am aware of me. primarily describable as an individual. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . pure 'Ideality'. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. being merely consumed. there is strictly speaking no object. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. knows itself implicit in the object. implicit in it. its satisfaction realized. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. in this return upon itself. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. on the contrary .the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. in its immediacy. the latter. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative.With this new form-characteristic. The certitude of one's self. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. and itself made actual. To this activity the object. or. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. The two processes are one and the same. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. is a singular. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . nominally. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. can make no resistance: the dialectic. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. with the nega tion of it. on the whole. and a desire (appetite) . all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. and ma intains itself as such. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. therefore.

and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. Force. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. f rom the essential point of view (i. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . w hich however is also still outside it. must likewise be kept in life. in the service of the master. in the first place. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. works off his individualist self-will. not their underlying and essential principle. the slave. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. however. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. at first immedi ately. on the ir phenomenal side. as the existence of hi s freedom. and to exist as such for the other: . so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. This other. however. is not on that acc ount a basis of right.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self.t he process of recognition. solves the contradiction. a nd yet also an immediately existing object.for the means of mastery. Thus the death of one. the outward and visible recognition). (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union.e. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. ¤ 435 But secondly. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. Force. it. and its being for others. which falls on another. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. While the one com batant prefers life. we see. when we look to the distinction of the two. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. In that other as ego I behold myself. retains his single self-consciousness. negati on of immediacy. the slave. preservation. a suppression. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. though by the abstract. ¤ 434 This status.e consciousness of a 'free' object. and thus give existence to my freedom.but only p eril. is yet. and incurs a like peril for its own . and the means for entering into relation with them. which is the basis of this phenomenon. then. as one of two things for another. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. from one point of view. Thus arises the status of master and slave. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. and formation of it. therefore rude.

The uni versality of reason. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. is now itself universal. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. friendship. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other.the passage to universal self. . as its peculiar mode and immanent form. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. etc. whilst it signifies that the object. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. state. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. the self-centred pure notion. than they are its own thoug hts. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. or determinations of the very being of things. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. Truth.or rather it is a difference which is none. Selbstbewu§tsein. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. valour. is Reason. 5. fatherland. bu t the truth that knows it. Reason. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity.consciousness. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. ego. For truth here has. honour. and of all virtues.which is family. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . love. 4. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. therefore. Wahrnehmung 3. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness .is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . 1. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. aware of what it is. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . idle fame.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . Die Begierde 6. is mind (spirit). But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity .f wisdom' . Der Verstand. fame. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance.

or. Mind. and above the complication with an external object . which is defined as it s notion. in the soul as a physical mode. though it no longer has an object. etc.. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. neit her subjective nor objective. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion.apart b oth from the content. Mind is finite. the latter now an infinite form which is not. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist.mental vision. This. etc. above the material. etc. ideation. restricted by that content. therefore.7. then its reality is that reason. it has a mode in its knowledge. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. as its concept has just shown. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C.e. remembering. Cons ciousness is finite. however. in thinking also and in desire and will. PSYCHOLOGY. in so far as it has an object. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. in so far as . The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical one word. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. SUB-SECTION C. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental .the former a simple immediate totality. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. desires. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. like consciousness. i.. Die Vernunft. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . it is finite by means of its immediacy. and which as the reality of that notion. viz. what is the same thing. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. And it is a matter of no consequence.

but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. it is .reality of its reason. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a being and as its own: by the one. the mind finds in itself something which is. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. to reach and get hold of itself. is misconceived and overlooked. Thus. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). so far. and its activity can only have itself as aim. As the theory o f Condillac states it. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. i. Similarly. that is. and are the mind's own. forces. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. that aspect is twofold . if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. viz. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. equally. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence.e. and is even there a return into itself.e. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. the na tural soul (¤ 413). ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. k nowledge. in so far as its existent phase. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. of comprehending itself. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. and the negative aspect of mental activity. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. and to liberate itself to its elf. in freedom. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. When the affection has been rendered its own. or. and make the affection subjective.e. and being a rational knowledge. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. viz. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. i.

of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. Psychology. The nominal knowledge. Inwards . and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. But as knowledge. to get at the notion and the truth. e. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . etc.g. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. and is immediately willed. the word. to definite and conceptual knowledge. as it is said.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. but) enjoyment. which in the first place is likewise formal . like logic. and gains abstract auton omy within. and heartless intellects . mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology.i.e. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. This activity is cognition.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. for which it gains the form of universality. in the theoretical range. along with which the content is realized as rational. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. just as they are given. Ou twards. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. while the practical. as r eason is concrete. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. its content is at first only its own. is thus also a reality . intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. belong to a point of view utt .take the worthless fo r the essential nature. merely as facts. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. This position of psychology. while it has to do with autonomous products. and of the heart without the intellect .. Its activity has to do with the empty form . The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. wi th a material which is its own. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. and that in its empirical condition. has a material which is only nominally such. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. elevates itself. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. and therefore a restricted content.(b) Will: practical mind. both for the mind as such. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. It is still extremely ill off. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. which it and the content virtually is. which is only certitude. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. A host of other phrases used of intelligence.

It is true that even as isolated (i. conception. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. it is admitted. But the true satisfaction. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . as non-intelligent). is bro ught into mind. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. etc. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . or mind. if answered in the negative. intelligen ce. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge).erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. by cognitive intuition. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). is the fixed quality of any object of thought. etc. remembrance. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not.e. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality .but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . by rational conception. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. like power or force. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . conception.whi ch. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. just so far as it realizes itself. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. are not isolated. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. imagination. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. etc. as it is by the same method brought into nature. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. intuition. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . conceived as reflected into self. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. note).of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. etc. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces.its out-of-selfness . conceives. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. etc. must lead to abandoning the effort. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. imagination. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . But c ognition is genuine. that intuition. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. If they are isolated. (1) an inarticulate embryonic li a word . Faculty. cognitive conception. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. viz. however. remembers. it .besides which it al so intuits. or makes the concept its own. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. memory. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition.

t he factor of fixing it as our own. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of active self-collection . but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity .one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. in content and value entirely contingent.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. we have the one fa ctor in Attention .to the generalit ies of common sense . as it were the closes t. that is t o say. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. has the form of casual particularity . the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas.his private and p articular self. is swallowed up.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. With us. Hence feeling. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. or at least to reasons .is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. Feeling is the immediate. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. the mere consciousness point of view.but to his feeling. may just as likely be narrow and poor. 254). or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. in t he truth of mind. .not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. but rather as subject ive and private. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. Now the material. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. external or internal. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. this mode is simple. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . projects it into time and space. with the character of something existent. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. a . because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'.

so that it no longer needs this immediac y. which. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. i.e. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. its when and where. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. in virtual possibility. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. in the way we treat. and is arbitrary or contingent. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. which makes it its own. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. though intrinsically concrete. a rec ollection of itself. as it at first recollects the intuition. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. The representation is the property of intelligence. we may say. or. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the a space and a time of its own. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . and immediate context in which the intuition stood. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. from the external place. for example. yet without being in consciousnes s. still continues simple. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. but stored up out of consciousness. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. and received into the universality o f the ego.the germ of the fruit. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. no longer needs to find the content. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. isolated. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. . as tho ught. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. with a preponderating subjectivity.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. the germ as affirmatively containing. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. t ime. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. and inwardly divest itself of it. however. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas.

being and universality. i. In the first place.Image and Idea. reason and consequence. wherea s the idea (representation). or ide a). e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. where it is treasured up. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. as a matter of fa ct. The content reproduced.. has been broken up. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. to be so and so.these modes of relation are not laws. at first only in space and time. present also a distinction in content. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law.e. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. comes actually into its possession. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality.) . by which it is authenticated. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. whatever be its content (from image. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. The image. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. or an intell ectual category. as a unit of intuition. now that it has been endued with externality. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . the matter is entirely pictorial.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. see Introduction to the Logic. and an out-put from its universal m ine. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . which is now the power over them. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. But it is solely in the conscious subject. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. under the representation (idea) with the same content. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. such as likeness and contrast. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged.viz. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. . an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . where. notion. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. but a being of its own institution. though belonging to intelligence. as of all intelligence. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . has always the peculiarity.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. Secondly. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. that it finds its them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. ¤ 20 note. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. if it is to exist. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. The images are in the first instance referred to this external.

435).where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . is reason.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. i.e. This force is really intelligence itself .Imagination. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. As reason. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. or poetical imagination . its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). but they are 'syntheses'. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. Such is creative imagination(7) . when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). allegoric. are completely welded into one. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. one's own and what is picked up. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . etc.still lacks the side o f existence. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. In other words. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. a concrete subjectivity. this form of being. so far a s it is concerned. These more or less concrete. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. derived from some interest. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. for its ideal import is its elf. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. is derived from the data of intuition. Another point calling for special notice is that.Abstraction. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. internal and external. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. . . some latent concept or Ideal principle. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. or something of the sort. are unifications of t he same factors. and becomes an i ndividuality. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it.symbolic. Acting on this view. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. when regarded as the agency of this unification. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . and in mechanical memory it completes. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. which forms their connecting link. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. recollection.. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. but only a nominal reason. to universalize it. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. it is self-uttering.

and even with conception and imagination. But in the fusion of the two elements. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . has always to do with signs only. strictly so-called. conception s. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. the matter of the latter is. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. when employed as a sign. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. . out of which it forms i deas . This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. whereas in the sign. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . in the first instance. its institution by intelligence. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. somewhat immediate or given (for example. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. something accepted.).R auschen. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being).that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . have nothing to do with each oth er. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. Such is the negativity of intelligence. ¤ 459 The intuition .¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. and where it is conserved. In logic and psychology. The sign is some immediate intuition. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. intuitions. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401).gives to sensations. It is a n image. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . and the connotation of which it is a sign. etc.speech and. but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. its system.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. Knarren. This intuition is the Sign. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . language . e tc. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. the colour of the at of vocal objects.. since memory. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. but as representative of something else. With regard to the elementary material of language.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth .

by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. . in chemistry and mineralogy. It is only a stationary civ ilization.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. W. viz. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language.e. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. again. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. for example. In particular. i. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. palate. i. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. As to the formal elem ent. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). as in our signs for the numbers. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. instead of n ames proper. they are reduced to signs. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . their signs in vocal language. as many as ten a . like the Chinese.e. i. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. it depends. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. the chemical elements. if it be not altogether extinguished. on anthropological articulation. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. and now that. are frequently changed. . (Cf. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings.). only in pas sing. externalities which of themselve s have no sense.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. and still takes place in Canton .the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. alphabetical writing. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. the denomination. we may touch. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs.e. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. as. The study of languages still in their original state. etc. the planets . on the other hand. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. tongue in each) and for their combinations. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. but. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. and only get signification as signs. which severally receive designation. as regards signs for mental objects. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation.

like alphabetic writing. by speaking low and soft or crying out. of uttering its ideas most worthily . A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. Hieroglyphics. peculiar to the intellect.the name. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. The broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. Engaging the attention of intelligence. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. in the interest o f vision.e. learn ing to speak Chinese. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. in the case of the Chinese Koua. just as in modern times (as already noted. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. This feature of hieroglyphic . It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas.nd twenty. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. it is analysed. is still for the mind simple in the name). however ample a connotation it may include. so that. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. the simple plain idea. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. as it does. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways.the mode. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. Thus. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. . or simple logical terms. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. i. while (with the facu . Both alike require such signs. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. in speaking. the simple straight stroke. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s.

lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,

but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you

ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.

¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex

the truth and. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. for the latter. we have only to deal with the selfish. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . and duty. joy. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. shame.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. we have this immanen . and evil. grief. in their universality and necessity.but only in antithesis to the latter .retain a speciality of their own . law and morality. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. But as both. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. contentment. when thought. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence.indeed infinitely so.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. If feelings are of the right sort. it is because of their quality or co ntent . in which these facts. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. bad. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. and to discus s their content. volition. heart. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. in their immediacy. Whereas in life. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. wha t is the same thing. right. Delight. namely God. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. may be placed.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. can also be felt. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). is precisely what constitutes. Thus it is. etc. lack objective determin ation. but presented in its universality and necessity. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. on the one hand. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . and will. But where the objects sought are thus casual. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. and still more in mind. repentance. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. On the other hand. in feeling. in its objectivity and truth. etc. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth.. and precisely in that way d o they .. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. and thought.

his inte rests of intellect. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. while.a development in which the content of autonomous . be the value of tha t mode what it may. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. What are the good and rational propensiti es. ego. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. But with regard to the inclinations.on one aim and object. but to ge t realized. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. too often. as experience shows. first of all. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. If the will is to satisfy itself. on one aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. It is on ly a dead. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . finds in the conformity . however. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. on the other. The will. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. Will. In what way have they. is at first still a natural will. and something inappropriate to it. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. they. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . character. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. therefore. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . In consequence of this formalism. are infected with contingency. . passion is neither good no r bad. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. their mutual connect ions. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. the question is directly raised. talent. admitting of gratification. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. each being always in conflict to another. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. which is essentially self-d etermination.and (as there are ma ny.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity.Up to what degree the good continue good. Which are good and bad? . and their truth. each with its private range). as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. as r egards the form of its content. Should. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. The answer to the question. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . it is pa ssion. Thus. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. enjoyment . subjectivity . freedom are the principles of evil and pain. as rights and duties. indeed.natural impulse and inclination.

The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. an inactive thing. They are somet imes contrasted. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. either alto gether or in part. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. It is thus 'reflecting' will. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. unless he had an interest in it. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. without end. Their mutual limitation. where the subject is made to close with itself. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. As thus contradictory. which as such is the universal. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de .The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. .action loses its contingency and optionality. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . i. ¤ 476 The will. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. An action is an aim of the subject. on the whole to their disadvantage. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. on one hand. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . partly sacrificed to that aim directly. The morality concerns the content of the aim. the free gift of nature. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. so far as their particularity goes. there would be no action at all. as the content. and social duties. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. that finds its actualizing in the agent. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. it is on them that the decision turns. inclinations. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. as thinking and implicitly free. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. the impulses. are reduced to a m ere negative. is his interest and . as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity.e. by another. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea.and one satisfaction. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. which is just as much no satisfacti on. which reflection and comparison have educed.his passion. this is wh at is called the interest. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. However. moral. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. and is option or choice. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. of a universal sa tisfaction. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake.

e. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. etc. and is will as free intelligence. now that the formalism. fortuitousness . It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. and the abstract singleness. i. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. knows this its concept. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. and that as its very actuality. is in the first instance the rational will in general. which i s pure and concrete at individuality. only so far as it thinks itself . and object . which realizes its own freedom of will. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. or philosophy (. with freedom itself. and are without it still. have never had this Idea.e. so that in this sphere of particular existence. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite.a universality which only ought to be. for example. ambiguous. he h as also. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. aim. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. in religion as such .the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim.e .to be aware. still this very I . they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . the divine min d present with him. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. just because it is the very essence of mind. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. education. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. that will is also the act of developing the matter of speculation. If the will. The Greeks and Romans. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . the will is an actually free will. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. i.sired . and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. or by s trength of character. as the substance of the state. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). its very au tonomy or freedom. however. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. that is. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. of the family. As abstract Idea again. If. and of which it is only t he formal activity. even the Stoics.e. as realizing the idea. and are constituted after its is the existential side of reason . (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. If to be aware of the Idea . Whole continents. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . of present sensati on and volition. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. On the contrary. therefore. Plat o and Aristotle. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. is actu ality. did not have it. or implicit Idea. According to Christianity.freedom itself. Africa and the East. he is actually free. i. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself.

moral. if they are made slaves. 4. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. 1. Die Intelligenz. Die Erinnerung 6. 11. religious. Inwendiges. Der Geist 2. which the content and aim of freedom has. 9. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. 16. 5. 7. Vorstellung. Der freie Geist. 10.not something which they have. But this freedom.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. Gedachtnis. 12. Das Denken. Phantasie 8. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. and not less into scientific actuality. as men. Der praktische Geist 13. Die Gluckseligkeit.dea itself is the actuality of men .a principle of the mind and heart. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. is itself only a notion . This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. Auswendiges. 15. but which they are. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. but the pe rmanent character . into legal. 14. 3. Anschauung. Die Einbildungskraft. not with laws or court s of justice. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . Das praktische Gefuhl.

But. in these externally objective aspects. or Usage. Liberty. it is a Law. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. etc. temper. which splits up into different heads: viz. so as to become its habit. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. receives the form of Necessity. etc. my right to a thing is not merely possession.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. viz.e.. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. For a mode of existence is a right. But in this individualist moral sphere. relation to another person . and what is a duty. and it is a duty to possess things as property. Liberty. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. and is the vi rtual universal. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. i. but as possession by a person it is property. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. etc.. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. its rights of admi nistration.e. in the light of the concept. is a duty. not in the form of impulse. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. private an d personal needs). ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty.. as the services of the members of the State in dues. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea.and aim. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. and brings into existence i n these several wills. it exists as manner and custom. to administer. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. where they. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. in general. The penal judicature of a government. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. is the Law (Right ) . What is a right is also a duty. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. are no less its duties to punish. and character. These conditi ons. making the latter a world moulded by the fo the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). but in its universality. In the morality of the conscience. their absolute unity.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. to be as a person. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. being universal.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. are its Duties.(1) When. or legal possession. which in it is thus at home with itself. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. where free will has existence. military service. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. duty in general is in me a free subject . on the other hand. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. or instituted as an authoritative power. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. in relation to the subjective will. are duties . anthropological data (i. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. is also a right. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse.

is an individual. possession is property. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . and hence as a single being . The Right as Right (la w) is formal. though it remains in trinsically the same. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. in the knowledge of their identity as free. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. so as to have its existence inside it. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. on its own account me rely 'practical'. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. This thing. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. . ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. (B) When the will is reflected into self. and the I in it is abstractly external. the external sphere of its liberty . b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. by mere designation of it.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property.possession. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. But the set of adjustments. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. abstract right. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. it is the right of the subjective will. which is thus mutual. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. These extremes are the persons who. are simultaneously mutually independent. civil society. as in itself still abstract and empty. but on an external thi ng. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. But this predicate. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. 1. but as existence of the personality is an end. or by the formatio n of the thing or. As so characterized. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. it may be. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. Gesetz 2. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. as something devoid of will. Sitte A. morality of the individual conscience. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. which as possession is a means. the infinite self-rela tion. at first in the outward appropriation. and State.

493 seqq. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. and its acceptance by the other will. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another.the full and complete deed. non-malicious wrong. I can just as well put it in it as not . whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. is affirmed.). as the judgement of the intrinsically right. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. is disinterested. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. which thus becomes wicked.just as well with draw it as not. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. which. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. and. but which. This is naiv e. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. in that case. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. the only diversity lies in this. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. its changing hands. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. expressing the civil suit. But so far as my will lies in a thing. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. labour. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . and time. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. because they face each other.Contract. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). universal thing or commodi ty. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. and recogniz ed. however. produces a wrong: by which. willed. then the external rec . In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. ¤ 495 The contract. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous.

and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. In it the agent. howe ver. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. The 'reality' of right.ognition of right is separated from the right's true for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. sets up a law . in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r this case the apparent recognition.where the nominal relation is retained. being conformable to the right. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him.punishment. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. To display the nullity of such an act. The law of nature . by the n otion. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. Conversel y. and can be seized only in t his quarter. such an action is essentially and actually null. from life.a universal which holds good for him. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. But revenge. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. The social state. and while the former only is respected.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . or Natural Right. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. in which the law of nature should hold sway. i.) Thus the will is violently wicked. or right as governed by the nature of things. and commits a crime. on .a law. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. even from the range of all existen ce. or in corporeity. But more than possible compulsion is not. The former used to be the common meaning. This progression. is at the same time only a new outrage. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal.e. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. is a matter of chance). is the work of Revenge. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . in revenge. This gives the wrong of fraud . ¤ 499 (3) Finally. i. and not merely the particular mode . b ut the sterling value is let slip. which is nominal and recognized by him only .compulsion against the thing. the latter is violated. like the last. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. which is disinterested . It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . as a volitional and intelligent being. that of the judge.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature.on self-determination or autonom y. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . ¤ 500 As an outrage on rictly so called . an d so on without end. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll.

The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. intelligence. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. and thus comes into relationship with the former. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. 1. the will is at the same time made a particular. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. who. though any alteration as such. my part in i t is to this extent formal. an d allows to be imputed to it. its own. which was its purpose. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. The subjective will is morally free. Moralitat 3. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. 2. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. the reason of the will. it thus includes purpose and intention . (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . This is the right of intention. in mere law. so much as it has consciously willed. sentiment. is now chara cterized as a subject . it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. In point of form. B. but have their assent. etc. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. embracing these individual point s. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another.the other hand.and also moral wickedness. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. be its affection w hat it may. and willed by it. Das Recht.a will reflected into itself so that. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. Now. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. so far as these features are it s inward institution. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. in the externality of which it only admits as its own.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. is its deed. Naturrecht. conscience. counts only as a person. or even justification in his h eart. recognition.

g. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. can be wicked.ion. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. is always fundamentally one identity. and aims. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. because the agent.a universal determined in its elf . that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. At the same time because good is one. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. as individual and universal. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. And yet they ought to harmonize. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. interests. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. This is the right to well-being. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. whether the . though it is a particular duty. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. they ought to stand in harmony. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . but is a particul arity of his own . the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. on account of that existent sphere of liberty.that it contains his needs. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. is as g ood and as duty absolute.e. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. constitute h is well-being. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. and yet each of them. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. will . is not something external to him.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. his interest and welfare must. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. These aims.being only in this. the essential and actual good.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. as in happiness (¤ 479). Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. essential and actual. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. a good intention in case of a crime. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. in point of its matter. constitutes a peculiar world of its own .and thus including in it particularity . Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. it is always something particular. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself.

the unutterable. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. and the wicked. The subjectivity. th e essential thing. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. 4.of Conscience and Wickedness. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. rising to its pitch. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness.the standpoint of the ought. Wickedness. Moralitat 2. the truth of this semblance. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . 6. non-universal. which is the good. in the notion. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of a goodness. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. good. no more exist than not. on its negative side. which actualizes and dev elops it. 5. On the affirmative side. which would only be abstract. but is only sure of i tself. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. is only the infinite form. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. its deepest descent into itself. i . In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . Das Gute und das Bose C. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. Handlung. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. expressed by this repeated ought. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. and of the good. The for mer is the will of goodness. Der Vorsatz 3. in something external therefore. This pure self-certitude. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. is. THE MORAL LIFE. and refuse it to the wicked. which has no objectivity. in this its identity with the good. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . is abandoned.the utterly abstract semblance . and duty. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . The failure of the latter consists .good is realized. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. Die Absicht und das Wohl. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . 1. The result. to be carried out in it. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. an aim essentially and actually null. That.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. right .the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself.

abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. . The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this.monog . virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. however. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. in its ki nd. to a spiritual significance. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. as personal virtues. This is the sexual tie. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. Thus.e. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. is virtue.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . as deliberate work for the community.e . as the mind developed to an organic actuality . i. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. whose independence it. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. In the shape of the family. is confidence (trust) . b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. in its immediacy.the Family. to the total of ethical actuality. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . ¤ 514 The consciously free substance.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being.n a thing .the Political e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. etc. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. temperament. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . that it is. The ethical personality. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'.Marriage. as against the univers al. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. the individuality expres ses its special character.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. has actuality as the spirit of a nation.Civil Society. makes this union an ethical tie .where self-conscious liberty has become nature. to destiny.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. In the latter sphere.the genuine ethical temper. as an intelligent being. manner and cu stom . and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. i. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. without any selective refl ection. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. mind ap pears as feeling. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. But the person. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. elevated. controls and entirely dominates from within.yet somewhat which without all question is. . and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. it exists as confidence. however.

by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. or nominal culture in general. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. and thus produce more unconditional . acquire an existence of their own. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage educating them to independent personality. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. as do also its industry. however. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . ¤ 522 (3) The children. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. destined. as private persons. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . This instrument. thus invested with independence. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. learning. and care for the future. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. into families or individuals. labour. while. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. originally foreign to it. who exist independent and free. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. In virtue of such for tuitousness. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. on one hand. constitutes the general stock. of the possessor's will. being an intelligent substance. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. of legal regulation. on the o ther hand. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. information. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. or state external. to found anew such an actual family.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them.

as well as of mental culture and habit .dependence on the social system.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). they have their actual existence. of needs. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. as vital. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. though of course only at the final points of deci ding. Thus whether three years.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . this analysis. talent. or could be. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. and with it the State. and accident. skill. Where civil society. ten thalers. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. and of means for satisfying them. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. also of aims and interests. at every point. exists.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. The second. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. certain. and in it they have their social moralit y. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. intelligence.. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. or only 2 * . is developed i n detail. in the course of definite manifestation. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. which as existence is essentially a particular. 2 4/5 years. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. and a corresponding mode of labour. Their content per se may be reasonable . 2 3/4 . and of these estates to one another and to their centre. and so on ad infinitum. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . on the side of external existence. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s.the Law. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. But when right. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. option. however. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. their recognition and their honour. which is honesty. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. be the righ t and just thing. It is a futile perfectionism to have . determined through reason or legal intelligence. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness.and ye t it should be decided. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. of mere agents. to be. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . The third. Hence. and like the first a certain subsistence. and industry. and an ensemble of contingencies. its action gets direction and content through natural features.

by faith and trust. general laws. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. But there is a contrary case. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . first really de serving the name of laws.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone .in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. .to be promulgated and made known as laws .or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused.e. as universal authority and necessity. there arises. to which objective existence determines i tself. even the admiration. constit . recognized.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. and in particular transforms this existence . not for them. at the same time an externally objective existence.and th e cattle too .as this exists as revenge . within the house . The comparison of the two species. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. the need of a simpler code .to the individualized right . . deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law .even as his law can only be a just law. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. whic h are only internally in these z.laws. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. of his countrymen. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. i.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. which discovers new distinctions. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number.which though something new. as in the mental ima ges of space. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . inasmuch as. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular proven: . they touch only the abstract will . Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. and t hus become authoritative . with the advance in multitude. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. however. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love.the ne ed. being laws o f strict right. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. which again make new decisions necessary.into punishment (¤ 500).i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused .are governed and well governed too by laws. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. These people forget that the stars . hereditary divinity or nobility. This subjective existence. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. in the judicial system. are not a new hou se. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. as it is a known law. like improvements on a f loor or a door. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. as the genuine order of life.

It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. It results also from circumstances of locality. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. as at bottom different sides. shou ld.'poli . from the c onnections between nation and nation. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . mere circumstantial evidence. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. So far as concerns them.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. because it is man's want. in a uniform gen eral way. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. which. because it is only one factor. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. and their variable ingredients. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. to the concrete of civil society.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. . appears as state. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. be exercised as different functions. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. and worked from that point of view. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken .viz. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. Conversely. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. then. so as to secure this satisfaction. In so far. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. . But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. and the judgement as application of the law to it. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. the position of an external un iversality. No doubt this factor is incomplete.and that. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end.

const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. which each originally takes care of for himself. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. the state only is as an organized whole. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals .in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . The same unity. and not left to perish. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. differentiated in to particular agencies. But. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. Thus we have the corpora tion. to the immediate agent. but. it carries back both. but which has a thoroughly general side. it protects the family and guides civil society. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . and. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . with all its evolution in detail. On the other hand. receiving. secondly.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. (c) THE STATE. however. The cons titution is existent justice . at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. in this direction .one individual.the reasonable spirit of will.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness.into the life of the universal substance. First it maintains them as persons. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. self-originated. his independent self-will and particular (outer-state) law. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest.which volition is thereby free . is its essence. ¤ 539 As a living mind. through the action of the government and its several an actuality .co nsists in a double function. and . continually produce it as their result.ce'. which. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. It provides for the reasonable will . then it promotes their welfare. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. First. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. and self-develop ed . This universal principle. . as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. s heer subjectivity. Secondly. they are re strictions. Thirdly. also for that will being put in actuality. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development .

without further specification and development. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. as it ha ppens. or destroy them. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality.only it can make them . But the notion of liberty. etc. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. . which it can without incompatibility allow. The laws themselve s. it embodies a liberty. were called its 'liberties'. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. Really. authorities. The principle of equality. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . But. logically carried ou t. the citizens . and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. is so little by nature. However true this is. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. town .as regards taxation. As regards. With the state there ari ses inequality. magistracies . more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. etc. private as well as public rights of a nation. Rome. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. on the contrary. otherwise have in property.pleasure an d self-will. directories. the familiar proposition.e. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . presuppos e unequal conditions. and that the laws are restrict ions. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. military service. first. physical strength. is abstract subjectivity. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state.besides their personalit y . but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. eligibili ty to office. Equality. Nothing has become. age. or even in crime. etc. talent.equal in the concrete. etc. on the contrary. But that this freedom should e xist. that the laws rule. Formerl y the legally defined rights. etc. as regards the concrete. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. It is important therefore to study them closer.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions.punishment.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. All men are by nature equ al. As regards Liberty. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . in other words. as it exists as s uch. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. skill. the difference of governing powers and of governed. i. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. the current notions of l . blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'.. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. rejects all differences. etc. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. On the contrary. as a person capable of property (¤ 488).

not merely with regard to the naturalness. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality.) But the guara ntee lies also. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. and must deal with them as it ca n. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. self-w ill and self-conceit. i. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. with its insatiate sec urity of property. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . and is and could grow to such height only in modern states.e.that which preserves. and the organization of the actualization of them. ¤ 541 The really living totality . it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. has an insight and conviction of his own . Of it the following paragraphs will speak. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. If . A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. be it added. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. as a state without a constitution. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. The term political liberty. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. just as little as the making of a code of laws. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. in other words continuall .a thing that has nev er happened in history. . and of the difficulty of satisfying them. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. of liberties in general. and thus gains moral independence. however. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. is .e . but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. of others. with this development of particularity. But the more we fortify liberty. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. and to regard a state.just because of this inseparability . Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that.iberty only carry us back to equality. in which this is not formally done. The question .

is the self-redintegrating notion.or. as in a democratic constitution.monarchy. is the state one. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence).regarded as organic totality . but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. which taken apart is also particular). Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. . . The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. and the government be merely executive and dependent . The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. is the government. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence .to make it the first power. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle.y produces the state in general and its constitution. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. These. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. ¤ 542 In the government . But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . but an actual indiv idual . all-decreeing will of the state. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . as always. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. however.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. which includes an already existing development of differences.e. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. i. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function.e. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv bject always. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general.the all-sustaining. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. Only through t he government. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. i. (A mistake still greater. of the family and of civil society. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. In the perfect form of the state. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. in other words.the will of a decreeing individual. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization.impugns the principle of the division of powers. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'.in a state of society. equally disorganizes actuality. as in the patri archal society . The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. the participation of all i n all affairs .

¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. These principles are those expounded earlier. That subjectivity . and then of nature . the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. Secon dly. civil society. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. The pure forms . conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . Two points only are all-important.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. to subjectivity. lik e peace and war.'ideal' unity. For it is as private persons t . it may be .oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . to that end and for that reason. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . short. being simple self-relation. with its industry and i ts communities. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. an actual existence. involve the. The division of constitutions into democracy. which having their busin ess appointed by law. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. especially in legislation . . that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. participate in the governmental power. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. with their general opinion.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. possess independence of a ction. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit .as also feudal monarchy. essentially. legislative power.such as ochlocracy.necessary to the p rocess of evolution .being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . and above all personal liberty.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. and with earlier transition-forms. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . and are to that degree private person s. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. etc. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. liberty of property. there arises the participation of several in state-business. and skill for such ends. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power.are. aptitude. first. i. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. in the history of the State..e. Thus.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. admini stration of justice or judicial power. administration and police.partly.viz. as it were. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. aristocracy and monarchy. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws.

But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. in the general sense of embracing a wide. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. or in its 'reflectional' it very likely is . and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. elemental sea. be they treated as mere individuals. range of the extern al means of government. moreover. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. The des irability of such participation. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. to power and act ion. i.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. so far as they form only one branch of that power . which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. it is not a brutish mass. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. wild. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. demoralization. Take the case of England which. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. but as organic factors. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. Experience s hows that that country .hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. like that of the stormy. The so-called financial law. as such an aggregate.the contrary must be the case . Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. and therefore more urgent. In a civilized state. however.e. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number.which should be presupposed.a spiritual element . is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. in arrangements for art and science. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. in the law and liberty of property. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. as the nation . If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. that t hey enter upon that participation. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. If the main part of the requirement were . the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. which. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. is no t self-destructive. however. ¤ 529 note).regard ed as permanent. as estates. and form a particular kind . ever newly recurring. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . indeed the whole. inorganic shape. blind force. s ense of general wants.would be. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n.

a state of war. and not to be made yearly. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence .as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . in which there would no longer be a government. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. e. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. is really engaged with strict executive business. when it makes a decree about finance. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. of the whole of the finances. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . and becomes the estate of bravery.i. as content o f a true law. In one case the .e. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . or every few years. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . and to conceal the fact that the legislative power.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. and thus.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. waywardness and chance have a place. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. Then again. afresh. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal.g. but only parties. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. i. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. and not actually existent.e. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . In their mutual relations.

has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality.a world-mind. an d the special claims of nations on one another. is appointed to occupy only one grade.and.the plan of Provide nce. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. internat ional law rests on social usage. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. both this general recognition. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. It has. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions.of sacerdotal races . especially on the philological side. and above all universal history. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. and on history-writing in general. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. that. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. etc. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit .. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. in short. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. there is Reason in history. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. and as regards its range and scope. first in general. each of which. Fictions. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. when we come to minutiae. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. it. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . In general. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. this note must go into further deta il. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. It is in time. As this development is in time and in real existence.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. is called an a prio ri view of it. a history of its own. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. however. On th is point. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. it passes int o universal world-history. are settled and fixed. in short. and in Germany more than in France and England. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. in defiance of . su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day.the judgement of the world. That history. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. which actually is and will be realized in it . as it is a history. and then in history. of a Roman epic.

Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. Rome and its fortunes. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. and an exclusive interest in justice. and rejects both ki nds of interest. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it.g. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. in the interest of so-called truth. is not only against taste and judgement. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. and takes place within it. a civilization. and. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. but an age. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). in striking portraiture and brevity. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. state. e. or if he declined to judge at all. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. Ay. and criticize events. i. etc. or.the best-accredited history. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. a word. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice.e. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear.appears to run . The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. a nation. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. but violates th e principles of objective truth. no history . on the other hand. has. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. strictly s peaking. not as good as a fairy the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. as in the romance. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. say a word on that here . But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. The point of interest of Biography . What happens to a nation . express not a subjective particularity. if he had not an interest.).

Such a doctrine . then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. are instruments. has another ground and interest than his tory. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. The mere play of sentiment. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. these individuals. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. etc. if Rome or the German empire. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. have they their value and even their existence. first in general.e. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. and their subjectivity. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. on the contary. and are all treated as indifferent. which is what is pe culiar to them. But. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. only opinions and mere ideas. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient.Fame. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity.admitting. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also .an accurate report of externals. But biography too has for its background the historical world. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. truth. i. which all alik e have no stuff in them. while it inheres in them. etc. i. For Spirit is consciousn ess. in this case. we may add. the absolute L aw. is the supreme right. which is their reward. is the empty form of activity.e. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . Only therefore through their relationship to it. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. a development determined by the notion of spirit. the freak of humour. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour.e. to the history of religion. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. liberty. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements.e.or in other words that Reason is in history . 550). What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. as over a special grade. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. potentially infinite. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. i. and the business of so doing. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. and its content is prese . the consciousness of it. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. and secondly. really. i. and of its essence. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. and there fore as a work of individuals. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency.

The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. that elevation to God really involves.a mere 'ought' . and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. is the purification. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. The spirit. i. i. i. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate .is the peculiar perversity. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. But . Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. is the real ethical self. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . and here in mind is also kn own as its is the case with all speculative process . It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. For that st arting. As regards the 'mediation' which. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. as true in the world of free will. lays hold of its concr ete universality. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. now gets its most concrete interpretation. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. especially ¤ 51. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions.consciousn ess. from which the start is now made. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. the idea of God it kn .e. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. i. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire.e. forme rly noticed. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. and that on the religious. Th e finite. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. as law and duty. ¤ 204 not e). Such apprehension.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. This factor. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. actually accomplished in the ethical world. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. in the system of laws and usages.e. At this rat e. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf.e. note). however.Liberty. cf.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. But the spirit which think s in universal history.

All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. and law and justice. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. It lea ds to a laity. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion.e. and in the act of faith.e. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. then there may be created. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. non-spirituality. differing from the former in body and value of truth.addressing his devotion to miracle. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. first of all.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. and superstition. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . and even as mutually indifferent. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . but in the moment of enjoymen t. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . but purely subjective in individuals: . as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. And. in its faith and in its con science.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only.partly as mere moving of the lips. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. i. It leads. religion was a late r addition. in point of form. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . morality and conscience. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. B . It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. to justification by external wo rks. for thought and knowledge . And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. one religious and an other ethical.the body of religious truth. springing from some force and power. the host as such is not at first consecrated. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. i. a condition of spiritual sla very.of bondage. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. (In the Lutheran Church. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. and these applications of it in the religious life. i. and prays others to pray .logi cally enough . exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality.working images. on the contr ary. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. and ex pecting miracles from the one religion which secures the stability of governments.or it may be. i. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . even to bones.ows must be the true and real. But in poin t of form.e. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. in the annihilation of its externality.e. generally. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit.

The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it.of honesty in commercial dealing. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. and. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. i. the wisdom of the world. and in a special sense Philosophy. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. our consciousness and subjectivity. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit.e. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. therefore. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. because the state is a self-possessed. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. . leads it into the rea l world. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. unte nable. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. if taken alone. Thus. . so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. self-realizing reason . and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. moral life in the state.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. a code of law should arise. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. lacked obedience which is itself the true freedom. i. founded on principles of reason. which does not rise in hostility against short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. Let us suppose even that. And instead of the vow of obe dience.e. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. Instead of the vow of chastity. So long as t he form.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. and thus only. i. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. and political institutions deduced from them must be. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. The precept of religion. . so to speak a priori. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their short. no matter how. and in the use of property . under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. sti . can law and morality exist. Thus set free.e.

and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. (cf.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit.mi nd intrinsically concrete . thus founder on the conscience. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. to put it simply.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. that the Idea must be regent. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. or. This absolute nucleus of man . on one hand.ll. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. ¤ 544 note). to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. when specially set in relief as genus.g. however sound their provisions may be. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness.among which laws these guarantees are included. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . Such laws. This additional 'individuality' .to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. so-called 'chambers'. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti just this . from those deeper requirements the intellectual and thinking self. on the other hand. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. etc. and the power given them to fix the budget. e. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. thus surmountin . .on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness.. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought .to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. At best it is only a temporary expedient .

of philosophy.and th at on account of this very principle . The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. etc. in its philosophic phase. intuition. Under the subjective form.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. so . which is awa re of its own essence. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. But thought always . As it left therefore behind. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. from religion. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. is after all only in one of its form s. however. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. he. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness.). as it grows and expands. The form in its infinite tru th. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. should knit it together and control it. but earlier than philosophy. which still escaped his intelligence. or rather must. His state is therefore. or essential being). of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. fall feeling. earlier than it does as philosophy. Religion may. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. the subjectivity of mind. Hence religion as such. pictorial representation. as demoralization. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. But even religion. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. exhibits the one-sidedness. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself .and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. for th ese reasons. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy .through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . Political power. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. which is developed similarly. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content.was that creative imagination. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). ¤ 513.the idea of the substantial moral life. is implicitly in absolute liberty. religion. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils .g the Platonic Idea (the genus. on its own s howing. and so also one-sided phase. Plato. Only in the principle of mind. in its f irst immediate. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism.).

and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. 7. while it is self-centred identity. 9. Die Rechtspflege 5. Weltweisheit. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. In the Protestant state. 4. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. Gesetz. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. Die Polizei und die Corporation. 8. That this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community.e. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. Thus ul timately. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. as always. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . Das System der Bedurfnisse. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. 6. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. the constitut ion and the code. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. for which it is as substance. 3. Inneres Staatsrecht. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. but rather to a sort of knowledge. Religion. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. 1. Das aussere Staatsrecht. to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. Die Sittlichkeit. 2. as well as their several applications. Die Weltgeschichte 10. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. of God's indwelling in us. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth.

the actuality of the spirit. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. its n atural immediacy. and of gaining its concrete determination. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of other words. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . Der absolute Geist. like the material which it uses to work in. on the other hand.i. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. In this ideal.something formal. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. but . as superseded in spirit.for the expression of spiritual truth . These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. that is. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . 1. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. c an. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. A. reconciliation.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. aware. has in devotion . which is only a sign of the Idea. Art requires not only an external given material .hence not the sp iritual unity. But. ¤ 411). On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. into the subject which produces that work.e. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. as it is. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . . ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. With the essential restrictedness of its content. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess ( the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . Belief.the form of immediacy as such . so that the thought embodied. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. viz. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . or the idea. On one hand.the shape or form of Beauty. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression.

but its inmost depth. is not yet absolute. as well as of its art and science. that one spirit creates and informs them. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. or an effor t towards him . is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e short how the nature of a nation's moral life. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . as free spi rit. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. . in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. known as the Absolute. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. of its actual liberty. subjectivity. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. but as only finding himself in himself. and of its constitution. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . though concrete and intrinsically free. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. and that is where the infinite form. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. is not yet known.symbolic art. assumes fuller and firmer features.can try to bring itself to consciousness. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. and th e artist is the master of the God. the principle of its law. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so .stil l this art is defective. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. not yet conscious of itself. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. the artist's enthusiasm.

At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. spectator find themselves at home. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . still more in that external. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull.due to a one-sided survey of human life . and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence .that it be revealed. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. Beautiful art. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. But with a further and deeper study. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. Beautiful art. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. revealed by God. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. expression. whose con tent is absolute mind . shows that such religion is on the decline. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. . and brilliancy. . B. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. and. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . not the supreme liberation itself. with their perso nal sense and feeling. from it s side. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . The old conception . we see that the advent of art. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation.The genuine objectivity.of Nemesis. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. The older religion in which the need of fine art. the theme and c entre of therefore is manifestation out a nd out. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. what is more.ent in it. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed.into revelation. as infinite self-realizing form . and j ust for that reason. in which he had not revealed himse lf. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. unbeautiful sensuo usness.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. it is from Him. which is only in the medi um of thought . has its future in true reli still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. on the contrary.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. . dashing t o pieces everything high and great .the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. like the religion peculiar to it. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art.the religion i. is first generated.

to specul ative comprehension.: Berlin apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. and reconciliation with the eternal being. It includes. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. even in its manifestation. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. ¤ 566 In this separating. it may almost create surprise that so many. not. for that reas on. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. abiding sel f-centred. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. he still remains in original identity .1. as in duty bound. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. again. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. directed towards the Eternal. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of the Spirit. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. the spirit. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . (a) as eternal content. and.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . as the extreme of inherent negativity.on the other hand.. (c) as infinite return. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. amid that natural ness.knowledge in God. in it s forefront. Go d is. on the other hand. Yet.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. F. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . and phenomena which succeed each other. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. But. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. on one hand. though. however. it implies the revelation of Him. To know what God as spirit is . by C.requires careful and thorough speculation. which proceeds to man's self. first of all. it is. though different.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . . which therefore is finite.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation.of the only Son . and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . of the world it gave away .ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. a separate fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. the elemental and the concrete nature . staying aloof and is therefore the absolute spirit. or of judgement. On one hand is heaven and earth. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. . when it thinks. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. That spirit.just as. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. making them presuppositions towards each other. while in point of form he is. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. with whom. G . but afterwards. in point of content. only standing to it in an external connection. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. further.

Whereas the vision-method of Art. keeps himself unchanged. But. th e self-centred manifestation. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. is itself the emptiness and vanity. so far. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. with a temporal and external sequence.and. this immediate. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. Die geoffenbarte Religion. after the example of his truth. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. external in point of form. Irony. and thus. If the result . as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness .of subjectivity and the no tion itself. C. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. . a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. he. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . is but subjective production and shivers the sub . I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. remains master over it. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. Further. secondly.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. eternal. From this its separation into p arts.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. simple. but alive and present in the world. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . through which witness of the spirit in him.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness.but the vision of implicit truth. which from itself. in which he. contentless sense. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst taken in a merely formal.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. and eternal spirit in itself. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. This individual. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. who as such is identified with the essence . 1. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. but even to thought. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. gives itself direction and con tent. is not bound by it . in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. an object of contemplating vi sion . on account of his immediate nature. his natur al man and self-will. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. as infinite subjectivi ty. Thinking. In this form of truth.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . truth is the object of philoso phy. and thus transplanted into the world of time.

which philosophy is.from these forms. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. This witness . and acts inconsistently towards them.e. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. remains identical with it. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea.on the other hand. with its separ ation into parts. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. to be more precise still. a nd of logic in particular.('Rationalism') .it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. This does not prevent the spirit.which may be in both the same . finds itself already accompl ished.i. and mediates what is thus open ed out. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. too much for the latter. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion.stantial content into many separate shapes. and particularly of the logical form. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. The charge of Atheism. immediate vision and its poetry. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. of course. This movement. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. and whereas Religion.the underlying essence in all humanity . or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion.and from a pithless orthodoxy. when at the close it seizes its own notion .leaving out. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. opens it out in mental picture. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . elevation of them into the absolute form. when driven to expound itself. which determines itself to content. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. and this necessary as free. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . or.on one hand. as also of the necessity in the two forms . Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. but also criticized it. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. and s o religious. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . and against philosophy in general . which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . only looks back on its knowledge.takes.

that it has too much of him: . ¤ 71 note). which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. exclusi ve.of Pantheism. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. If this theory needs no more than such a God.(empirical things.g.that of the Egyptians to the ox . It is only his own stupidity. but as a proved fact. and amongst it s effusions. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism.thus he understands philosophy . thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics.the Bhagavat-Gita. or if you will. we must. without distinction. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. some of the most telling passage . or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. and is therefore. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. with all its absurdities. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. does not comprehend itself. most sublime. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions.that of the Hindu to ass es.each and every secular thing is God. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . On such a presuppo much so. whether higher or lower in the scale. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. open to our disposal on this topic. its grossest shape. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. are unable and unwilling to see this . had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . all such definiteness is only the non-divine. are) . Without interest of its own for the concrete. or Pantheism. from which all definite quality is excluded.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. This new theology.or to dalai-lamas . that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine.which therefore it does not disparage. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. God in General. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. that. also contains the generic abs tract. Amongst the abundant resources.all possess substantia lity. I select . or any one man. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. as is well known.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . and form all that is definite in the divine universality. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion.of the new piety and new theology. in particular. prolix and reiterative ad always adora tion of an object which. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in the wanton assertion. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. if we believe them. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid the most authentic statement accessible . it treats it only as an i nterest which others once much so. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . the secularity of th ings. fulfilled notion of God. and so . and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. cows .the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. as it stands.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. Piety.Everything is .

But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. .s. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. . the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). . Even when. . he is said to be the beginning. any more than the Eleatic One. I am the taste in water.. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . rather.. . middle. nothing independent]. but only . . 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . even Siva. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. is not. . called Gods. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. besides Krishna. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. with a monstrous incons istency. . grip. . That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. at the beginning of the pass age. so to speak . the One which. but having its truth in the substance. Meru among the high-topped mountains. and end of living things. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. I am life in all beings. to a poly theism. as also those proximate substantialities. pp. is also the maddest of polytheisms. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. .' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. .the most excellent of everything. . I am the light of th e sun and the moon. . . And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. . is alo ne the divine and God. . the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. .' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. . . . darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. however. as he said before he was S iva. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. than which there is nothing higher. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es.). . Indra.spiritual as its idea of God i s . . etc. has the higher conception of Brahma. 7 seqq. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. There is nothing else higher than myself. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. goodness. . . This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. all this is woven upon me. passion. and the moon among the lunar mansions. or a God besides. . melt into the one Krishna. . without essential being of its very own. still God. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. . seated in the hearts of all beings. t he pure unity of thought in itself. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. Among letters I am the letter A.'I am the self. Whichever for m of deity one worships with powerless its. .that Hinduism. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. . . not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. the Everything. 'At the end of many lives. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . I am also the strength o f the strong. which he is. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. . But so little concrete is this divine unity . everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. and one essential amongst them. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . . . vanish. and the Spinozan Substance. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences.' This 'All'.not everything. . where the empirical everything of the world. as different from that accidental. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. which Krishna calls himself. . unessential existences.. p.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. . This everything. or Indra. . Hinduism. The undiscerning ones.

in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. For that unity. as everything. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. as the endless lot of empirical existence.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. empirical indivi duals . Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. or Spinozist. the finite to the infinite. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. and on the other. Hin du monotheism. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. but .in its finest purity and sublimity. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given.on the shallow conception of it . the Eleatic. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. ac it as a lot of Gods or as secular.keep its independence. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. But.. when he adores the ape. in relation to the popular idea of the world. as infinite from the finite.. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One .not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. to which everything is God. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. and so on . The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. outside it . or. imagination or speculation. he is as essence parted from appearance. It is only the picture . secondl y. which. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. moreover. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. whether they spring from heart.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. to was .ndu. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. But to go back again to the question of fact.g. on one hand. on the contrary. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. we must consult th e Mohammedans. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. of the relationship of God and the world. is identical with the world. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. and God everything. modes of envisaging God. is discarded and absor bed. If. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. Of the oriental. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. after this partition. even in a general exoteric discussion. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. e. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. especially the Mohammedan. as it says. That pantheism indeed .floating in the indefinite blue . and that unity described as love.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. or other creature. and. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. the all. and of empirical secular spirit.of the world as one thing. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty.

something supposed to exist beside the material reality. omnipresence. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. But they show so little acquaintance with them . Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. as Epicu rus does. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. as in the physical field the physicist.and that the factor of indet erminateness . but with concrete unity (the notion). But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. in matters admitted to be of superior.e.and relation i pso facto implies unity . applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. composition. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. with abstract unity. e.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. but only the one factor of this category of relation .te a word on what a 'notion' means. But the question is. if not even of supreme interest. when they hear of unity .g. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . . with indefinite ideas.the world as much as Go d . and that amongst the m there is great variety. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. and that it is the system of identity. a nd assert . they have laid hands on. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception.that. viz. And as in their judgement either of the two . and lose sight of the chief point of interest . at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. perhaps under the more familiar names of e.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another.falsely as a fact . inorganic and living . I n the philosophical field they proceed. it is not. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. is what one expect s.has the same solid substantiality as the other. but rather its reverse. and which they ascribe to philosophy. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. mere ide ntity. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. with God's omnipresence.said pores being the negative. i. the most external and the worst.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. the notion and content of philosophy. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the identity.g. they import them into philosophy. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. in the pores of th e physicists . Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. etc. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. and the empty absolute. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. and that hence. however. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. not the concrete unity. where they are utterly unknown.and s till less take trouble about it . providence.

If statements as to facts are put forward. is philosophy itself. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. the absolutely universal. But in ascribing to God. which is based on the Lo gical system as is the nature of the fact. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. On account of this chorus of assertions. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . making the former its presupposition. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. which . ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo the mediating agent in th e process . or as prevaricating for a purpose. in his relation to the world. and as implicitly the Idea. y .knowing reaso n. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. of which liberty is the aim. and which is itself the way to produce it. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. The esoteric study of God and identity. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. and the latter its universal extreme. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . nor itself to something away from them and independen t . the notion. then.ity . so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. a system of identity. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. for its middle term: a middle. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. and the facts in question are thoughts and which notions are perverted into their opposite. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. standing between the Mind and its essence.e. but the many-shaped modes specified. as of cognitions. which has self. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. i. But to put that sort of thing. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. and notions . Nature . conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space.the logical system.their everything. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: .which. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. on the shoulders of philosophy. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . as other than they. which causes the movement and development. not abstract unity. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. an All-one doctrine. sunders itself.

The eternal Idea. eternally sets itself to this same movement is equally the action of cognition. . engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. in f ull fruition of its essence.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful