INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any

attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i

s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as

treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.

or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. There. indeed. except where. however. and mind conceived as a thin g. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. and. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized.with th is proviso. its simple 'ideal' life. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. whereas the 'vital' matter. These 'imponderables' . Wherever there is Nature. etc. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. It is otherwise with Mind. have still. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. where the othe .the passive of Aristotle. in a sense. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . which may also be f ound enumerated among them. on the other. as such a result. matter is regarded as something true. and not as the immediate or natural individual. like heat. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. perhaps. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. which is the fund amental feature of matter.the truth that matter itself has no truth. The usual answer. But not merely is it. identical ideality of it all. and so the self-externalism. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. li ght. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. even the capacity of offering resistance. not merely lacks gravity. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. however. Mind. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. the soul is only the sleep of mind . a nd the soul remains the pervading. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other.e. ANTHROPOLOGY. i. as absolute negativity. on the one hand. but soul. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact.SUB-SECTION A. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. which is potentially all things. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t.. At such a stage it is not yet mind. to which they might perhaps add space and time. thus come into being. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another.

Descartes. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend.whence Epicurus. though his Monad of monads brings things into being.or corporeity . described. there philosophers took God. in the modes of that being. based upon participation in the common life of nature. Animals and pl ants. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions.(a) In its immediate natural mode . is too abstract. re tains an abstract independence. (c) Thirdly.the natural soul. These have.r is not . its immediate being . any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. in many case s completely. so holding. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. upon it. which only is. or. on the contrary. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. remain for ever subject to such influences. it may be. and always more or less. which therefore live more in harmony with moulded into it. and telluri c life of man. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus.e. (b) Secondly. when it presents itself as a single soul. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. merely as another word for the incomprehensible.e. In nations less intellectually emancipated. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. But either this identity. . disappear. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. T hus. just in proportion to his civilization. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. as an anima mundi. as so often is done. a world-soul. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. sidereal. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. even these few and slight susceptibilities. Spinoza. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. and does not rise or develop into system. etc. it is a soul which feels. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. and. Malebranche. so to speak. with Leibniz. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. as individualized. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. and. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. Hence. not. feels the difference of climates. and the periods of the day. as in the case of Spinoza. as in the case of Lei bniz. they are natural objects for consciousness. into the absolute syllogism. the changes of the seasons.

mind wrapped up in itself. we see man in his true relation to his environment. fancies. on its one side. Thirdly. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. in purposes political. widely distant from each other. physiognomy. the one permanent subject. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. character. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. carrying out these universa . As they are at once physical and mental diversities. shows an active half. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. on the whole. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives.a worl d no longer incomplete. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. we find its diversities. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood).¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. This . (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. and the position of the individual himself. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. And that individuality marks both the world which. hopes. bodily structure and disposit ion. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). and as stages in its development. The contrast between the earth's poles. and on the other. as alterations in it. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. of families or single individuals. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. shows. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. fails to meet his ideal requirements. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology.the sexual relation . but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. as it exists. He begins with Childhood . scientific. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. we find it as the special temperament. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. talent . or artistic.on a ph ysical basis. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit.

which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. as already noted. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. for example. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). but as a return back from the world of specialization. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. The characterization given in the section is abstract. viz. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. in the first instance. . only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams.The waking is not merely for the observer. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own.Napoleon. i n an unintelligent way. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex.not as a merely negative rest from it. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. (c) Sensibility(3) . distinguishes itself from its mere being. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. as before explained . b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. which are often addressed to philosophy: . on a v isit to the University of Pavia. . sleep. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. as they may be called. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. or self-centralized being. although. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. each point. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff .In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity .l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. .which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. put this question to the class of ideology.

Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. ho wever. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. belonging as it does to natural. murder . the inarticulate bre athing. the naturally immedi ate. are our very own. One. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). are in order to be felt. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. But if put in the feelin g. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. for itself. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears.. and . blasphemy. etc. The fact that these particulars. Another. are found by the waking soul. This should hardly need enforcing. moral. godless. which. true. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. etc. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. mora l. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. but treated as bel onging to its most special. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. is what we call sensibility. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. fornication. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. mean. its natural peculiarity. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. be it noted. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. the conscience. on one hand. and is so felt.g. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. adultery. it is true. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences.identity of our self-centred being. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. etc.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. in its own self. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. the fact is a mode of my individuality. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. evil. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. invested with cor poreity. not mere alterations. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. and religious. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. in the feeling. On the other hand and conversely.set over against consciousness. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. primarily.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). and to be as if found. just. and the character.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject.

and their corporization. distinction appears as mere variety . but an inward. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y.the senses of definite light. the immediacy of mode in feeling . The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . works itself out. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . in a special system of bodily organs. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . i ts merely virtual filling-up. (¤ 300). the centre of the 'sensible' system. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. are formed from their mental source. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. As sentient. is to raise its substantiality. sighs.g. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. for example. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. smells. to take possessi on of it. o f colours.because in it. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. the blood. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . tones. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . the 'irritable' system.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. especially the passions or emotions. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. (¤ 317) .it is a soul which feels. therefore. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. ¤ 402 Sensations. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. In the usage of ordinary language. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). 322). with its varieties of language. (¤¤ 321. (c) the sense of solid reality.a psychical physiology. . following the special character of the mental mode. We should have. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. set in its self-centred life.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. and voice in general. to the character of subjectivity.e. feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations .whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. with which that substance is one. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. i.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. to realize its mastery over its own. of heavy matter. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being.and of sound. just because they are immediate and are found existing. of the system of the senses. laughter. What it has to do.

the s oul is characterized as immediate. and to that world it stands but as to itself. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. ideas and information. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. ¤ 404 As individual. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. etc. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. secondly. once mor e come to light. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former..that world being included in it and filling it up. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. in whi ch all this is stored up. thoughts. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is.the existent spe culative principle. Thus in the body it is one simple. In the present stage we must treat. although it does not exist. a deep featureless characterless mine. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . first. ideas. prima rily. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. virtually retained. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. to be defined as one of feeling . and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. which is at the same time its predicate. acquired lore. to which the soul. They were not in our possession. omnipresent unity. but a negation. the content is its particular world. of the abstract psychical modifications by embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. without existing. where the real is put past . it implies a want of adaptation. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. etc. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. may again sink down. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . but only to his im plicit self. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. in sickness. in an implicit mode. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). By itself. it brings within itself. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. At the present stage this singleness is. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). which is disease. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . the corporeity. As sentient. Some times. so far as that is.

but as efficiency and realized activity. say between friends. of the mother. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. not as a mere possibility. tal ent. not a true subject reflected int o itself. The moth er is the genius of the child. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. and of character. and is therefore passive. etc. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. as concrete subject ivity. idiosyncrasies. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. placenta. character. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. because immediate. or virtuality. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. Here are two individuals. the psychical relationship. is visibly present as another and a different individual. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. injuries. it is. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. etc. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. not yet as its self. whose decision is ul . The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life.. self-conscious. which. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious.. as it has existence of its own. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . the single self of the two.a substance. temper. of life. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. his secular ideas. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. etc.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). developed interests. fortunes. intellige nt. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. controlling genius thereof. etc. By the self-hood of the latter it . self-possessed. or capac ity. congenital disposit ion and temperament. incl inations. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. as yet nothing impenetrable. and reasonable.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual.a subject which may even exist as another individu al.

educated. it must be added. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. in which the individual here appears innnersed. show. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. it might seem. in other words. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. The facts. This totality forms his actual ity. on the cont rary. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. But such a verification would. To that end the phenomena. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. means. that it is in harmony wi th the facts. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible be mere deception and impo sture. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. is. it has already been call ed his genius. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. self-possessed human being is a disease. At the same tim e. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses .timate whatever may be the show of reasons. on the other hand. which are also means and ends to each other. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. first of all call for verificati on.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling.his fun damental interests. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us.

does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. the magnetizer. that it is a state of passivity. his own and that of the magnetize . the selfless individual. and hears. in its sober moods. not on the spot. a formal vision and awareness. which. then. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. unless by the aid of religion. like that of the child in the womb. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. in catalepsy.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. . and to know which. on those left behind. after the downfall of the Roman republic. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. subje ctive reason. for example.) Compare h ome-sickness. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. external one to another. not really a 'person'. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. those c onnected with female development. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. tastes. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. But such clairvoyance . and the like. and other diseases. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . (Thus Cato. wh en it is healthy and awake. And because it is the adult. or at the approach of death. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. but it is empty. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality.a genius which beh olds itself. in whom it sees. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. is this. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. subject to the power of another person. is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. which lead up to the result . When the substance of both is thus made one. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. smells. .conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance.). but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. is under a veil. . formed. etc. exist for it as an outward objectivity. etc. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . etc. f riends. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. and character. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. ca pable of conveying general truths. and c ontinues to be. But. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. reads. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport.

which. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. in its capacity as individual. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. one sees and hears with the fingers. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. is impossible. between intelligent personality and objective world. it is still susceptible of disease. beholds. as in the morbid state alluded to. i. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. etc. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. e. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. In considering insanity we must. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. receives. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling.fe eling. on the contrary. which is no less a world of law. reasons.r. and hence. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. or med icines for them. as in other cases. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. and at the same time. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . and especially with the pit of the stom ach. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. etc. is without any definite points of attachment . independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content .to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. so long as we assume independent personalities. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. though all-embracing. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. the 'common sense'. In this way it is self. for example. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. in this nominal perception. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. i s just this form of immediacy. which still marks the self-feeling. anticipate the full-grown an . it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. The purely sensitive life. causality. This is Insanity or mental D erangement.

The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. this life of feeling.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. may. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. This particular being of the soul is t . instead of being 'idealize d' in the former.just as physical disease is not an abstract. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. . as something natural and existent.e. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. This humane treatment. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which.e. as a cies and hopes . and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. equally formal. i. and so makes part of the actual self. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. And so too the particularity is. which is there also. i. passions. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). and so also may the cure. loss of health (if it were that. instincts. however. desire. idea. the self is to be stamped upon. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. pride. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. mere and total.merely personal love and hatred. that it is liable to insanity . as it aris es. and it is only as a thing. i. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. and also desires. is relaxed.that evil which is always latent in the heart.d intelligent conscious subject. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. etc. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. such as vanity. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. but only derangement. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. A violent. and their gratification). Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. and made appear in.. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. In the concrete. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. it would be death). and the rest of the passions . moral and theoretical. earthly elements are set fr ee . immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. so as to insert them in their proper place. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. but a contr adiction in it. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. inclination. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . is undistinguis hed from them.. etc.feeling. as now regarded. the. and be a realized u niversality. presupposes the patient's rationality. Mind as such is fr ee.e. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. is diseased.

and so no longer interested. lacking consciou sness. su bjective substantiality of it . The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. but the basis of consciousness. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. this being of the soul. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). will. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. i. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity.and becoming the 'ideal'. nature. but still free. The natural qualities and alterations of age. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. the one and the same. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. empty space and empty time. Habit like memory. That is to say.he factor of its corporeity. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. et c. when the co rporcity. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. dist inguishing it from itself . that recu rs in a series of units of sensation.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. occupied. as. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul.e. heat. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. on the contrary. is reduced to unity. weariness o . and for that reason n ot free. of it. And consciousness it becomes. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. sleep. are only subjectiv e forms. without feeling or consciousness of the fact.. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. so is that pure being (which. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. but has them and moves in them. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. nor is absorbed in the m. partly only relative. and that as a barrier for it. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. or dependent in regard to it. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. of which it is the subjective substance. even in being affected by them. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. Habit is rightly called a second nature. and which still continues to exist. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. and the generation o f habit as practice. has been absorbed by it. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. a pure act of intuition. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. a second nature. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such.itself a simple being . therefore. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. For. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. and the mere substance. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged .say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. The soul is freed from them.

and that they.e. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range.. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. Habit on an ampler scale. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. a particular organ of i ts organic system). intelligence. without an express adjustment. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. and no other. viz..concentration. This is the rational liberation from them. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. that although the frost. so that when the conception (e. habit is usually passed over - . nor are they in conce ption rational. And it is true that the form of habit. intuition. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. nor a transient emotion or idea. and it is habit of living which brings on death. felt. and particul ar. to be made a power in the bodily part. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. under its volitional and conceptual characters. and the self-feeling as such. if quite abstract.enabling the matter of consciousness. like any other. which make it up. etc. Even here. to be his as this self. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. habit diminishes this feeling. to exist as substance in its corporeity. a series of musical notes) is in me.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. consciousness. and thus to enable the soul. etc. acquires a strength which consists in this.. too.). which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. etc. and especially so in the specific bodily part. The most ext ernal of them. are no longer bothered with it. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. whereof we sha ll speak later. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. and any other purp oses and activity. reflection. has been by will made a habit . nor an abstrac t inwardness. or skill. i. like their satisfaction. made into an instrum ent. his upright pos ture. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. . etc. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range.f the limbs. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. casual. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. or. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. etc. cut off from action and reality.or the misfortune . no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). an 'ideality' of soul . Thinking. is recollection and memory. moral. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. this soul. but part and parcel of his being. sweet tastes.g. re ligious. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. the spatial direction of an individual.

unable to represent it in its actual universality. And the human figure. Naturliche Qualitaten. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. the latter subject to the former. 4. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. Seen from the animal world. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. etc. and inexpressible a modific ation. and i s infinite self-relation. and the formation of the limbs. 5. or the 'immediacy' of mind. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. as the absolut e instrument. the upright figure in general. 71). Die fuhlende Seele. in other words. absorbing it. weeping.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. a world external to it . Empfindung. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . or abstract universality. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. This externality. Naturliche Seele. it is related to itself. of the mouth . but the soul. indefinite. for example. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own.either as something contemptible . The soul. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. represents not itself. especially the hand. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. 'The autho . finds itself there a single subject. in being related to which. 3. This note is so slight. Under the head of human expression are included. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. In this identity of interior and exterior. 2. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. in its concentrated self. cuts itself off from its immediate being. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology.laughter. for the soul. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. 1. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. of which it is the sign. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. still vainer than a signatura rerum.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. and making it its own. while language is its perfect expressi on. though the proximate phase of mind's existence.. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision.

as external to is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship .r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. thus first made explicit as the Ego. is only its abstract formal ideality. as subjective reflection in itself. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. which manifests itself and something else too . PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). but since reality. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. but when he receives the inspired word. in the sphere of essence. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. Hence consciousness. like reciprocal dependence in general.the soul's natural life . the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. 8. something dark and beyond it. but is implicit. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. The mind as ego is essence. an equal freedom as an independent object. Selbstgefuhl. to it. but to the foolishness of man. does not. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. seem to be its own activity. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . not to the wisdom. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. 7. now. as this absolute negativity. It is of this latter.e. Gewohnheit. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm).the light. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. and as such it is C onsciousness. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. 6. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. and . but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. i.

(a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. the substantial and qu alitative. As against Spinozism. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given the ego it seems an alteration of the object. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. and underived certainty of it. immediate consciousness. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. i.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. This is sense-consciousness. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness.. an existent. has emerged from Spinoz ism.e. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. for which ego is the a case of correlation . and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. an existing thing. first.e. which is not as its own. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . (b) self-consciou sness. and that the philosophy. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. with an object set against it. being immediate. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. t heir absolute interdependence. Consciousness . Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). because it is merely a nominal self-relation. a thing-in-itself. a singular. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. the subject of consciousness. The object similarl y. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. the notion of mind. a something. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. again. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). and so on. an intuitive intellect. and puts it first under the category of being. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. Ego. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. in other words. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). It appears as wealth iest in matter.a subject-objectivity. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. i. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. etc. is further characterized a s immediately singular. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. and even t he Idea of Nature. reflected in itself. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. what makes the object the subject's own. but only as it is in reference to something else. to raise its self-certainty to truth. but as poorest in thought. or mere c ertainty. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. Spatial and temporal Singularn . as Reason. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind.

in so far as its distinction is the inward one. viz. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. But in this manner the interior distinction is. reflected upon. on one hand. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. i.e. and not yet as external on its own part. but as mediated. Thi s ween the individuality of a thing which.). lies im mediately in the other. as not externally different from the other. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. or as being beside and out of itself. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. and universal. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . and sensuous consciousness. taken in its concrete content. which form the alleged ground of general experience. reflected in itself. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . a something external to it. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . reflectional attributes. free from this negative l ink and from one another. so constr uing the object. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. The consciousness of such an object is intellect.a copy of the phenomenon. to which.e. has many properties. of the thing is. having passed beyond the sensible. p. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . but brought to rest and universality. and universalities. as we called it. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. has. an abstract identity: on the other hand. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . its necessity on its own part. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. and. to describe the sensible. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. in this case by t he Ego. or the distinction which is none. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. i. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. not as merely immediate.ess. in that manner.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. it is related. by being regarded in their bearings. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). . what it is in truth. wants to take the object i n its truth. the distinction on its own part. the thing. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. experiences. and more or less by the sciences. 73). is sense-perception. and am aware'. however. ¤ 423 The law. the one of the terms. permanent term s. however.a variety of relations. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena .

towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . this identity comes to be for the ego. in this return upon itself. its satisfaction realized. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. on the whole. and ma intains itself as such. To this activity the object. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. can make no resistance: the dialectic. nominally. pure 'Ideality'. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. knows itself implicit in the object. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. or implicitly. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. or. The certitude of one's self. and itself made actual. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. in its immediacy. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. implicit in it. on the contrary . primarily describable as an individual. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. therefore. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. and thus in it I am aware of me. The two processes are one and the same. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object.With this new form-characteristic. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . there is strictly speaking no object. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. therefore. and a desire (appetite) . consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. with the nega tion of it. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. being merely consumed. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. is a singular. the latter. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. On the external side it conti nues. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former.

I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. must likewise be kept in life. in the service of the master. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. solves the contradiction. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. and the means for entering into relation with them. negati on of immediacy. and to exist as such for the other: . the outward and visible recognition). Force. and thus give existence to my freedom. While the one com batant prefers life. then. though by the abstract.t he process of recognition. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. therefore rude. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. and incurs a like peril for its own . which falls on another. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression.e. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. preservation. not their underlying and essential principle. we see. Thus arises the status of master and slave. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. as one of two things for another. which is the basis of this phenomenon.but only p eril. when we look to the distinction of the two. the slave. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction .) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. a suppression. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. on the ir phenomenal side. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. ¤ 435 But secondly. retains his single self-consciousness. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. at first immedi ately. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. w hich however is also still outside it. is yet. in the first place. f rom the essential point of view (i. it. ¤ 434 This status. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self.for the means of mastery. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. In that other as ego I behold myself. however. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. the slave. and formation of it. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. This other. from one point of view. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior.e consciousness of a 'free' object. Force. and its being for others. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. however. as the existence of hi s freedom. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. Thus the death of one. works off his individualist self-will. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me.

as its peculiar mode and immanent form. etc. Der Verstand. honour. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. .the passage to universal self. 1. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. is mind (spirit). (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. or determinations of the very being of things. fame. love. whilst it signifies that the object. the self-centred pure notion. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . 4. than they are its own thoug hts. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . Die Begierde 6.consciousness. 5. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. is now itself universal. and of all virtues. friendship.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal .in family.or rather it is a difference which is none. is Reason. Wahrnehmung 3. aware of what it is. state. Reason.f wisdom' . bu t the truth that knows it. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. Truth. ego. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . Selbstbewu§tsein. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . idle fame. fatherland.which is Reason. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. valour. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. The uni versality of reason. therefore. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. For truth here has.

. etc. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins.mental vision.. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. the latter now an infinite form which is not. i. therefore. SUB-SECTION C. like consciousness.the former a simple immediate totality. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. however. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. in so far as it has an object. it has a mode in its knowledge. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. then its reality is that reason. in so far as .e. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . etc. and above the complication with an external object . by being subjectiv e or only a notion. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . remembering. which is defined as it s notion. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist.apart b oth from the content. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. PSYCHOLOGY. what is the same thing. viz. it is finite by means of its immediacy. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. ideation. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. though it no longer has an object. or. This.7. above the material. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. And it is a matter of no consequence. Cons ciousness is finite. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. etc. restricted by that content. in the soul as a physical mode. and which as the reality of that notion. desires. Mind. neit her subjective nor objective. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio one word. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. as its concept has just shown. Die Vernunft. in thinking also and in desire and will. Mind is finite. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion.

as having its full and free characterization i n itself. and is even there a return into itself. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. that is. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity.e. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. so far. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various being and as its own: by the one. in freedom. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. viz. k nowledge. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. Similarly. the mind finds in itself something which is. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character).e. in so far as its existent phase. and its activity can only have itself as aim. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). or. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. As the theory o f Condillac states it. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. When the affection has been rendered its own. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. equally. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. and being a rational knowledge. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. it is . and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. that aspect is twofold . the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. and to liberate itself to its elf. forces.reality of its reason. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. i. to reach and get hold of itself. the na tural soul (¤ 413). and make the affection subjective. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. i. Thus. viz. is misconceived and overlooked.e. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. and the negative aspect of mental activity. of comprehending itself. and are the mind's own.

and therefore a restricted content. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. as it is said. has a material which is only nominally such. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. belong to a point of view utt . that it receives and accepts impressions from outside.e. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. This position of psychology. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. is thus also a reality . Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. while the practical. and is immediately willed. But as knowledge.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . while it has to do with autonomous products. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. Inwards . as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. the word. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. wi th a material which is its own. Its activity has to do with the empty form .g. but) enjoyment. like logic. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. which in the first place is likewise formal . The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. along with which the content is realized as rational.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. and of the heart without the intellect . which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. just as they are given. as r eason is concrete. in the theoretical range. both for the mind as such. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. elevates itself. Ou twards. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. and gains abstract auton omy within.(b) Will: practical mind. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. its content is at first only its own.. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. merely as facts. which is only certitude. The nominal knowledge. which it and the content virtually is. to definite and conceptual knowledge. for which it gains the form of universality. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. This activity is cognition. to get at the notion and the truth. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. etc. and heartless intellects . so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. It is still extremely ill off. e. and that in its empirical condition. Psychology. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own.i.

Faculty. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. like power or force. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question.e. intuition. is bro ught into mind. etc. memory.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. conceived as reflected into self. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . viz. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. remembrance. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. note). the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. conception. If they are isolated. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. by cognitive intuition. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. intelligen ce. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. etc. it . as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times.its out-of-selfness . To take up such a position is i n the first instance. as non-intelligent). etc. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . must lead to abandoning the effort. etc. if answered in the negative. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. remembers. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. But c ognition is genuine.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. are not isolated. imagination. as it is by the same method brought into nature.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . The stages of its realizing activity are intuition.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. etc. or mind. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence.whi ch. (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. or makes the concept its own. just so far as it realizes itself. it is admitted. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . But the true satisfaction.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere a word . conceives. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . cognitive conception. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. however. imagination.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . conception. It is true that even as isolated (i. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. that intuition. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. by rational conception.besides which it al so intuits.

but to his feeling. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here.his private and p articular self. with the character of something active self-collection .the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. but rather as subject ive and private. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. may just as likely be narrow and poor. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. Now the in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. With us. that is t o say.t he factor of fixing it as our own. in content and value entirely contingent. 254). ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . which the mind as it fe els is to itself. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. external or internal. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of the generalit ies of common sense . the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. in t he truth of mind. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. Hence feeling. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. the mere consciousness point of view. or at least to reasons .not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. is swallowed up. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. a . is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . has the form of casual particularity . whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. . and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. projects it into time and space. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. Feeling is the in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. this mode is simple. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . as it were the closes t. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'.

isolated. in the way we treat. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. yet without being in consciousnes s.the germ of the fruit. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. but stored up out of consciousness. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. as tho ught. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. and is arbitrary or contingent. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . in virtual possibility. however. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. a rec ollection of itself. .in a space and a time of its own. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. The representation is the property of intelligence. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. or. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. though intrinsically concrete. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. and inwardly divest itself of it. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. with a preponderating subjectivity.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. its when and where. t ime. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . i. the germ as affirmatively containing. we may say. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. as it at first recollects the intuition. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. which makes it its own. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. which. and received into the universality o f the ego. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. for example. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things.e. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. no longer needs to find the content. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. still continues simple. from the external place. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness.

that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. Secondly. that it finds its material.e. see Introduction to the Logic.these modes of relation are not laws. which is now the power over them. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. as a matter of fa ct. by which it is authenticated. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. or an intell ectual category. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. wherea s the idea (representation). ¤ 20 note. has been broken up. as a unit of intuition. but a being of its own institution. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. i. now that it has been endued with externality. where it is treasured up. and an out-put from its universal m ine. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. if it is to exist. or ide a). notion. comes actually into its possession. the matter is entirely pictorial. In the first place.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. present also a distinction in content. But it is solely in the conscious subject. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy.viz. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. reason and them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. The image. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence..Image and Idea. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. though belonging to intelligence. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. under the representation (idea) with the same content. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. The content reproduced. at first only in space and time. being and universality. such as likeness and contrast. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . has always the peculiarity. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. where. whatever be its content (from image.) . just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. . has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. to be so and so. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. as of all intelligence. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged.

or something of the sort. is reason. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other.. which forms their connecting link. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. As reason. Acting on this view. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal.e. a concrete subjectivity.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . . is derived from the data of intuition. In other words. to universalize it. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. derived from some interest. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. Another point calling for special notice is that. etc. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality.Imagination. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. or poetical imagination . intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. allegoric. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal.still lacks the side o f existence. and in mechanical memory it completes.Abstraction. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. and becomes an i ndividuality. 435). for its ideal import is its elf. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. These more or less concrete. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. but they are 'syntheses'. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. some latent concept or Ideal principle. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . Such is creative imagination(7) .symbolic. This force is really intelligence itself .the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . are completely welded into one. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. but only a nominal reason. one's own and what is picked up. internal and external. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. it is self-uttering. when regarded as the agency of this unification. recollection. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. . this form of being. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. so far a s it is concerned. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. i. are unifications of t he same factors.

Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . since memory. and the connotation of which it is a sign. conception s. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . something accepted. have nothing to do with each oth er. This intuition is the Sign. .). the matter of the latter is.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. somewhat immediate or given (for example. and even with conception and imagination. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. its system. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. whereas in the sign. out of which it forms i deas . but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . in the first instance. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. etc. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . but appears as recipient of sensible matter. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing to sensations. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared.. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. the colour of the cockade. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. its institution by intelligence. language . The sign is some immediate intuition. Such is the negativity of intelligence.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). but as representative of something else. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. Knarren. It is a n image. strictly so-called. But in the fusion of the two elements.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . and where it is conserved. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . Sausen. when employed as a sign. intuitions. has always to do with signs only. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne').speech and. ¤ 459 The intuition . and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. In logic and psychology.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. e tc. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e.R at of vocal objects. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . With regard to the elementary material of language.

are frequently changed. again. tongue in each) and for their combinations. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. on the other hand. i. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). Having been originally sensu ous intuitions.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. for example. and still takes place in Canton . As to the formal elem ent. alphabetical writing. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . W. viz. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. In particular. (Cf. only in pas sing. . upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. we may touch. as. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. instead of n ames proper. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. but. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. on anthropological articulation. the planets . and now that.e. in chemistry and mineralogy. palate. the chemical elements. i. their signs in vocal language. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. it depends. the denomination. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. like the Chinese. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. as regards signs for mental objects.e.e. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. they are reduced to signs.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. as many as ten a . which severally receive designation. The study of languages still in their original state. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. as in our signs for the numbers.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. i.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously.). if it be not altogether extinguished. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. . At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. etc.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. It is only a stationary civ ilization. and only get signification as signs. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects.

the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language .the name. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them.nd twenty. i. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. however ample a connotation it may include. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. as it does. learn ing to speak Chinese. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. the simple plain idea. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. so that. by speaking low and soft or crying out. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. or simple logical terms. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word .e. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. Engaging the attention of intelligence. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. peculiar to the intellect. the simple straight stroke. Hieroglyphics. like alphabetic writing. The European. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. in the case of the Chinese broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. This feature of hieroglyphic . To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. is still for the mind simple in the name). of uttering its ideas most worthily . It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. in the interest o f vision. . s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. in speaking. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. Thus. just as in modern times (as already noted. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character.the mode. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. Both alike require such signs. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. it is analysed. while (with the facu .

lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,

but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you

ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.

¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex

it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. can also be felt. in its objectivity and truth. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. grief. repentance. and precisely in that way d o they . for the latter. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. we have this immanen . For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. when thought. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . contentment. and thought. right.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. etc. is precisely what constitutes. heart. Delight. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. it is because of their quality or co ntent . and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. But as both. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. lack objective determin ation. and to discus s their content. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . If feelings are of the right sort. may be placed. volition. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. etc. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. and still more in mind. we have only to deal with the selfish. in their immediacy..ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them.. bad. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). and evil. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. joy. law and morality. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. in which these facts. Thus it is.indeed infinitely so. and will. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. shame. in feeling. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. But where the objects sought are thus casual. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. On the other hand. wha t is the same thing. in their universality and necessity.but only in antithesis to the latter . Whereas in life. and duty. on the one hand. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant.retain a speciality of their own . but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. but presented in its universality and necessity. namely God. the truth and.

admitting of gratification. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. Should. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. If the will is to satisfy itself. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. are infected with contingency. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. on one hand. the question is directly raised. ego. enjoyment .and (as there are ma ny. indeed. each with its private range). an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. while. it is pa ssion. directly ident ical with its specific mode: .a development in which the content of autonomous . the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. .Up to what degree the good continue good. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. which is essentially self-d etermination. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . Which are good and bad? . their mutual connect ions. The answer to the question. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. Will. on the other.his inte rests of intellect. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. It is this objectification which evinces their real aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. talent. passion is neither good no r bad. In consequence of this formalism. But with regard to the inclinations. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . character. be the value of tha t mode what it may. however. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. finds in the conformity . In what way have they. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. is at first still a natural will. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. Thus. first of all.on one aim and object. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. therefore. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. each being always in conflict to another. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. The will. as rights and duties.natural impulse and inclination. and their truth. and something inappropriate to it. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. as experience shows. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. as r egards the form of its content. It is on ly a dead. too often. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. but to ge t realized. they. subjectivity . Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. What are the good and rational propensiti es.

I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. They are somet imes contrasted. unless he had an interest in it. an inactive thing. that finds its actualizing in the agent. which is just as much no satisfacti on. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. Their mutual limitation. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. .and one satisfaction. ¤ 476 The will. moral. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. so far as their particularity goes.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . However. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. as the content. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. i. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed.action loses its contingency and optionality. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action.his passion. this is wh at is called the interest. on one hand. of a universal sa tisfaction. and social duties. inclinations. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . on the whole to their disadvantage. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. The morality concerns the content of the aim. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. which reflection and comparison have educed. by another. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. the impulses. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. It is thus 'reflecting' will. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. and is option or choice. As thus contradictory. the free gift of nature.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. there would be no action at all.e. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. An action is an aim of the subject. which as such is the universal. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. is his interest and . ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. without end. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. it is on them that the decision turns. are reduced to a m ere negative. as thinking and implicitly free. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. where the subject is made to close with itself. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. either alto gether or in part.

By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. and the abstract singleness. he h as also. now that the formalism. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. etc. and of which it is only t he formal activity.sired . man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. therefore. As abstract Idea again. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . and that as its very actuality. and are without it still. education. i.e. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. so that in this sphere of particular existence. did not have it. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. the divine min d present with him. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite.e . which realizes its own freedom of will. It is thus 'Objective' individuality. its very au tonomy or freedom.e. of the family. as realizing the idea. and are constituted after its measure. aim. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. or by s trength of character. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. i. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. with freedom itself. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. is actu ality. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . If the will. or implicit Idea. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . still this very I . only so far as it thinks itself . the will is an actually free will. i. If.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. is in the first instance the rational will in general.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. just because it is the very essence of mind. or philosophy (.a universality which only ought to be. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. According to Christianity. for example. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that matter of speculation. Africa and the East. have never had this Idea. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. ambiguous. he is actually free. in religion as such . an Athenian or Spartan citizen). find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. as the substance of the state. Whole continents. knows this its concept. and is will as free intelligence. The Greeks and Romans. Plat o and Aristotle. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. which i s pure and concrete at once. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. On the is the existential side of reason . even the Stoics.e. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind.freedom itself. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. of present sensati on and volition. fortuitousness . that is. If to be aware of the Idea . man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . however. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the be aware. and object . When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which.

SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea.not something which they have. 1. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. 10. 5. but which they are. which the content and aim of freedom has. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. 3. 7. 16. But this freedom. Das Denken.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. 11. Der praktische Geist 13. Der Geist 2. Die Gluckseligkeit. not with laws or court s of justice. Gedachtnis. Inwendiges. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. is itself only a notion . and not less into scientific actuality. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. Phantasie 8. 9. religious. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will.a principle of the mind and heart. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. Der freie Geist. Vorstellung. if they are made slaves. Die Intelligenz. into legal. but the pe rmanent character . Die Einbildungskraft. Die Erinnerung 6. 12. moral. Anschauung.dea itself is the actuality of men . 14. as men. Auswendiges. 4. 15. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. Das praktische Gefuhl.

What is a right is also a duty. etc. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. it exists as manner and custom. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. viz. i. duty in general is in me a free subject . ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty.e.. or Usage. is a duty. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. but as possession by a person it is property. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. its rights of admi nistration. where free will has existence. But in this individualist moral sphere. But. and character. not in the form of the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. as the services of the members of the State in dues. etc. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. etc. temper. on the other hand. The penal judicature of a government. In the morality of the conscience. in the light of the concept. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. relation to another person . when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. military service. so as to become its habit. being universal. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. in general. or instituted as an authoritative power. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. are duties . which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. to administer.. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. is the Law (Right ) . Liberty.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. These conditi ons. their absolute unity. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. which splits up into different heads: viz. receives the form of Necessity. where they. which in it is thus at home with itself. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. or legal possession. For a mode of existence is a right. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. Liberty. and brings into existence i n these several wills. private an d personal needs).. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. it is a Law. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). and what is a duty. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. anthropological data (i.e. in relation to the subjective will.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. and is the vi rtual universal. are its Duties. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact.and aim. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. to be as a person. are no less its duties to punish. my right to a thing is not merely possession. is also a right. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. but in its universality. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. and it is a duty to possess things as property.(1) When. in these externally objective aspects.

the external sphere of its liberty . ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom.possession. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. at first in the outward appropriation. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. which is thus mutual. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. Gesetz 2.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. As so characterized. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. in the knowledge of their identity as free. and hence as a single being . has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . and State. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. though it remains in trinsically the same. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. is an individual. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. by mere designation of it. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. But the set of adjustments. which as possession is a means. Sitte A. it is the right of the subjective will. morality of the individual conscience. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. 1. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. civil society. but on an external thi ng. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. . the infinite self-rela tion. or by the formatio n of the thing or. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. But this predicate. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. and the I in it is abstractly external. This is the ethic s of actual life in family. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. as in itself still abstract and empty. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. so as to have its existence inside it. on its own account me rely 'practical'. (B) When the will is reflected into self. abstract right. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. but as existence of the personality is an end. are simultaneously mutually independent. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. possession is property. it may be. These extremes are the persons who. as something devoid of will.

¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). produces a wrong: by which. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . and time. and recogniz ed. which. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other.the full and complete deed.). (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance.Contract. is disinterested. which thus becomes wicked.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. ¤ 495 The contract. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. I can just as well put it in it as not . It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. and. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. is affirmed. This is naiv e. the only diversity lies in this. But so far as my will lies in a thing. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. willed. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. 493 seqq. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. its changing hands. in that case. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. then the external rec . labour. and its acceptance by the other will. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. non-malicious wrong. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. however. expressing the civil suit. universal thing or commodi ty. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. because they face each other. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . as the judgement of the intrinsically right. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. but which.just as well with draw it as not.

and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal.e. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. This progression.compulsion against the thing. sets up a law . so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. The former used to be the common meaning. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . even from the range of all existen ce.punishment. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. b ut the sterling value is let slip. an d so on without this case the apparent recognition. i. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. which is disinterested . The law of nature .is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. that of the judge. and while the former only is respected.a universal which holds good for him. which is nominal and recognized by him only .) Thus the will is violently rictly so called . or right as governed by the nature of things.e. or in corporeity. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. in revenge. like the last. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. the latter is violated. But more than possible compulsion is not. and not merely the particular mode . so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. howe ver. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. is the work of Revenge. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. being conformable to the right. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. In it the agent. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. in which the law of nature should hold sway. by the n otion.a law. as a volitional and intelligent being. is a matter of chance). such an action is essentially and actually null.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. or Natural Right. The 'reality' of right. and commits a crime. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. from life. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. The social state. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. i. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. This gives the wrong of fraud . and can be seized only in t his quarter. To display the nullity of such an act. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. But revenge.on self-determination or autonom y. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. Conversel y. is at the same time only a new outrage. on .where the nominal relation is retained. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope .

in mere law. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another.a will reflected into itself so that.the other hand. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. counts only as a person. and thus comes into relationship with the former. so far as these features are it s inward institution. or even justification in his h eart. Das Recht. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. my part in i t is to this extent formal. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. This is the right of intention. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. is its deed. 1. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . and means the m ental or intellectual in general. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual.and also moral wickedness. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. which was its purpose. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. B. recognition. be its affection w hat it may. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. In point of form. 2. so much as it has consciously willed. The subjective will is morally free. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. Moralitat 3.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. its own. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. Naturrecht. embracing these individual point s. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. Now. intelligence. who. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. though any alteration as such. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. the will is at the same time made a particular. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. an d allows to be imputed to it. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. and willed by it. the reason of the will. conscience. etc. in the externality of which it only admits as its own.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. sentiment. is now chara cterized as a subject . but have their assent. it thus includes purpose and intention . In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed.

and aims. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. interests. as in happiness (¤ 479). though it is a particular duty. constitute h is well-being. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. At the same time because good is one. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. a good intention in case of a crime. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. they ought to stand in harmony.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. is not something external to him. This is the right to well-being. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. but is a particul arity of his own .that it contains his needs. essential and actual. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. These aims. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. it is always something particular. is as g ood and as duty absolute. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty.and thus including in it particularity . which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself.g.e. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. the essential and actual good. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . as individual and universal. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. and yet each of them. in point of its matter. when similarly comprehended in a single aim.a universal determined in its elf . it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. is always fundamentally one identity. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality.being only in this. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. will . on account of that existent sphere of liberty. his interest and welfare must.ion. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. can be wicked. And yet they ought to harmonize. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . whether the . because the agent. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world.

the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. on its negative side. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . is abandoned. Wickedness. non-universal. th e essential thing. in something external therefore. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. 5. the truth of this semblance. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . good. which would only be abstract. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . its deepest descent into itself. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. in the notion. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. Moralitat 2. and refuse it to the wicked.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. which is the good. 4. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. right . The failure of the latter consists . but is only sure of i tself.of Conscience and Wickedness. and the wicked.the utterly abstract semblance . and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . an aim essentially and actually null. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. The result. 1. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. THE MORAL LIFE. expressed by this repeated ought. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . and we have passed into the field of ethical life.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction.good is realized.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. is only the infinite form. The subjectivity. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. On the affirmative side. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. to be carried out in it. This pure self-certitude. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. i . no more exist than not. Das Gute und das Bose C. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. The for mer is the will of goodness.the standpoint of the ought. is. which has no a goodness. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. Handlung. and of the good. which actualizes and dev elops it. Die Absicht und das Wohl. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. in this its identity with the good. the unutterable. That. and duty. rising to its pitch. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. 6. Der Vorsatz 3.

that it is. This is the sexual e unanimity of love and the temper of trust.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . as against the univers al. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. mind ap pears as feeling. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists.the genuine ethical temper. The ethical personality. In the latter sphere.e . has actuality as the spirit of a nation. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. to destiny. in its immediacy. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al.yet somewhat which without all question is. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will.Marriage. makes this union an ethical tie . i. is virtue.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. as deliberate work for the community.monog . it exists as confidence. Thus. But the person. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . without any selective refl ection. elevated. i. the individuality expres ses its special character. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage.n a thing . it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. whose independence it. to a spiritual significance. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind .looks upon it as his absolute final aim. in its ki nd. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. manner and cu stom . (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. controls and entirely dominates from within. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . however.the Political Constitution. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. is confidence (trust) . and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. . In the shape of the family. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. to the total of ethical actuality. temperament. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality.Civil Society. . however. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. as an intelligent being. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. as personal virtues.where self-conscious liberty has become nature.e. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. etc.the Family. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity.

(a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . originally foreign to it. In virtue of such for tuitousness. destined. or state external. and care for the future. constitutes the general stock. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. ¤ 522 (3) The children. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. labour. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. to found anew such an actual family. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). thus invested with independence. as private persons. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. as do also its industry. learning. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . of legal regulation. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. or nominal culture in general.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. information. acquire an existence of their own. on one hand. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. This instrument. and thus produce more unconditional . of the possessor's will. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral educating them to independent personality. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. being an intelligent substance. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. on the o ther hand. into families or individuals. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. who exist independent and free. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. however. while. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children.

their recognition and their honour. which is honesty. The third. Thus whether three years. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. of needs. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. which as existence is essentially a particular. to be. also of aims and interests. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles .which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. ten thalers. certain. on the side of external existence. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. skill. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. is developed i n detail. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. or only 2 * . at every point. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. in the course of definite manifestation. this analysis. and like the first a certain subsistence. or could be. and a corresponding mode of labour.the Law. Where civil society. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. of mere agents. 2 3/4 . where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates.dependence on the social system. and so on ad infinitum. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. and of means for satisfying them. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. its action gets direction and content through natural features. and in it they have their social moralit y. But when right. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. and with it the State. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. The second.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. intelligence.and ye t it should be decided. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . as vital. 2 4/5 years.. Hence.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . determined through reason or legal intelligence. they have their actual existence. and accident. option. exists. though of course only at the final points of deci ding. however. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. be the righ t and just thing. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. as well as of mental culture and habit . It is a futile perfectionism to have . and an ensemble of contingencies. and industry. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. talent. Their content per se may be reasonable . of the legal relationships of individual s to them.

a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them.which though something new. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. by faith and trust. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . the need of a simpler code .to the individualized right . hereditary divinity or nobility. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the z. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a proven: .and th e cattle too . as in the mental ima ges of space. in the judicial system. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. But there is a contrary case. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. i.even as his law can only be a just law. even the admiration. These people forget that the stars . as universal authority and this exists as revenge .i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. are not a new hou se. This subjective existence. recognized. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis .a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. as it is a known law.are governed and well governed too by laws. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law .the ne ed. with the advance in multitude. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. like improvements on a f loor or a door. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . to which objective existence determines i tself. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will.into punishment (¤ 500). They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. they touch only the abstract will . but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. first really de serving the name of laws. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. The comparison of the two species. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. being laws o f strict right. at the same time an externally objective existence. inasmuch as. however. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . . which discovers new co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. and in particular transforms this existence .such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. there arises. .to be promulgated and made known as laws . which again make new decisions necessary. whic h are only internally in these objects. constit . and t hus become authoritative . of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel.laws.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. not for them. general laws. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. within the house .e.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. as the genuine order of life. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . of his countrymen.

to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. and the judgement as application of the law to it.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. appears as state. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. from the c onnections between nation and nation. so as to secure this satisfaction. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. . but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name.viz. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . because it is only one factor.'poli . and their variable ingredients. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. Conversely. shou ld. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. then. In so far. mere circumstantial evidence. It results also from circumstances of locality. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. So far as concerns them. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. to the concrete of civil society. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. in a uniform gen eral way. because it is man's want. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. the position of an external un iversality. . as at bottom different sides.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. be exercised as different functions. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. which. and worked from that point of view. No doubt this factor is incomplete. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement.and that.

First it maintains them as persons.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. it protects the family and guides civil society. receiving.ce'.one individual. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. the state only is as an organized whole. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. secondly. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . ¤ 539 As a living mind. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. Thirdly. The same unity. and self-develop ed . with all its evolution in detail. which each originally takes care of for himself. Secondly. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. his independent self-will and particular interest.into the life of the universal (outer-state) law. nsists in a double function. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. to the immediate agent. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. s heer subjectivity.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. through the action of the government and its several branches. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . On the other hand.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. (c) THE STATE. This universal principle.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. they are re strictions. is its essence. however.which volition is thereby free . and the who le disposition and action of the individual . but. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of an actuality . But. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. . in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. First. and . Thus we have the corpora tion. continually produce it as their result. It provides for the reasonable will . in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. self-originated. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. also for that will being put in actuality. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . in this direction . proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. which. but which has a thoroughly general side.the reasonable spirit of will. and not left to perish. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . then it promotes their welfare. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. it carries back both. differentiated in to particular agencies. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. The cons titution is existent justice .

pleasure an d self-will. directories. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. the current notions of l . the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. private as well as public rights of a nation. as it ha ppens. The laws themselve s. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind.. etc. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. But that this freedom should e xist. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . etc.punishment. on the contrary. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. magistracies . that it should be man (and not as in Greece. talent.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup regards taxation. it embodies a liberty. or destroy them. Formerl y the legally defined rights. . But the notion of liberty. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). Equality. in other words. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . as it exists as s uch. without further specification and development. But. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. It is important therefore to study them closer. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. Really. On the contrary. As regards. is abstract subjectivity. The principle of equality. as regards the concrete. which it can without incompatibility allow. first. the difference of governing powers and of governed. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. or even in crime.only it can make them . blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. the citizens . is so little by nature. military service. age. skill. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. Nothing has become. With the state there ari ses inequality. eligibili ty to office. As regards Liberty. etc. the familiar proposition. All men are by nature equ al. town . but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. authorities. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. otherwise have in property. presuppos e unequal conditions. on the contrary. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). Rome. and that the laws are restrict ions. physical strength. that the laws rule. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. etc.e. rejects all differences. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom.besides their personalit y .equal in the concrete. However true this is. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. were called its 'liberties'. i. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. etc. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. logically carried ou t. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. etc.

be it added. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. in so far as it has them actually existent before it.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . in other words continuall .a thing that has nev er happened in history. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . i. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. of others. with this development of particularity. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. however.e. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les.e . A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. is . as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. and the organization of the actualization of them. and to regard a state. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. in which this is not formally done. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. The question . ¤ 541 The really living totality . self-w ill and self-conceit. of liberties in general.iberty only carry us back to equality. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. and thus gains moral independence. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. with its insatiate vanity. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. If . but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. and must deal with them as it ca n. just as little as the making of a code of laws.) But the guara ntee lies also. . The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit.just because of this inseparability . has an insight and conviction of his own . The term political liberty. But the more we fortify liberty. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. not merely with regard to the naturalness. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications.that which preserves. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. and of the difficulty of satisfying them.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every sec urity of property. as a state without a constitution. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests.

all-decreeing will of the state. in other words.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. however. of the family and of civil society. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. but an actual indiv idual . its highest peak and all-pervasive unity.e. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). is the self-redintegrating notion. is the state one. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. which taken apart is also particular).the all-sustaining. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to .impugns the principle of the division of powers. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. Only through t he government. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. as in a democratic constitution. is the government. the participation of all i n all affairs .e.the will of a decreeing individual. In the perfect form of the state. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs.y produces the state in general and its constitution. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. .su bject always. . with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part a state of society. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity.regarded as organic totality . equally disorganizes actuality. which includes an already existing development of differences. (A mistake still greater. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . i. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. and the government be merely executive and dependent . The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r.or. as always. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the make it the first power. ¤ 542 In the government . as in the patri archal society . These. i. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal.monarchy.

and are to that degree private person s. lik e peace and war. first.such as ochlocracy. Thus. to subjectivity. there arises the participation of several in state-business. Two points only are all-important. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. as it were. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. being simple self-relation.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. especially in legislation . participate in the governmental power. aristocracy and monarchy. possess independence of a ction. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life.e. it may be . to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. These principles are those expounded earlier. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . with its industry and i ts communities. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. involve the.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. essentially. i. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. Secon dly. civil society. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. aptitude. That subjectivity . For it is as private persons t .whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. . These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. which having their busin ess appointed by law. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. and skill for such ends. in so far as they are finite and in course of change.partly. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . with their general opinion.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. to that end and for that reason. etc. and above all personal also feudal monarchy. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. The pure forms . liberty of property. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. in the history of the State.'ideal' unity. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something.. The division of constitutions into democracy. and with earlier transition-forms. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . legislative short.are. admini stration of justice or judicial power. and then of nature .if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs.viz. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). an actual existence. administration and police. too.

acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. or in its 'reflectional' universality. elemental sea. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. which. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. but as organic factors. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. that t hey enter upon that participation. so far as they form only one branch of that power . inorganic shape. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. moreover.a spiritual element . in the law and liberty of property. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . s ense of general wants. in the general sense of embracing a wide. however. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. indeed the whole. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number.e. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. however.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. The so-called financial law. i. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election).which should be presupposed. The des irability of such participation. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. In a civilized state. and therefore more urgent. Experience s hows that that country . in arrangements for art and science. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. it is not a brutish mass. be they treated as mere individuals. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. Take the case of England which. like that of the stormy. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. and form a particular kind . and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. demoralization. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. If the main part of the requirement were . The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. wild.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. as estates. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative it very likely is .regard ed as permanent. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. ¤ 529 note). But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. range of the extern al means of government. is no t self-destructive. blind force. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs.the contrary must be the case . as such an aggregate. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . ever newly recurring. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty.would be. as the nation . By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. to power and act ion. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs.

and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. and becomes the estate of bravery. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other .g. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. waywardness and chance have a place. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. and not to be made yearly.i. i. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. as content o f a true law. In their mutual relations. a state of war.e. but only parties. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. Then again. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. when it makes a decree about finance. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal.. of the whole of the finances. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. afresh. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. and not actually existent. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. in which there would no longer be a government. or every few years. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs.e. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. In one case the . in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. and thus.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . is really engaged with strict executive business. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals.

It has. and on history-writing in general. is called an a prio ri view of it. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. which actually is and will be realized in it . that.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. of a Roman epic. an d the special claims of nations on one another. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. in short. in short.of sacerdotal races . have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. each of which.. first in general. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. is appointed to occupy only one grade. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. a history of its own. both this general recognition. this note must go into further deta il. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. etc. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. On th is point. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. it passes int o universal world-history. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. In general. are settled and fixed. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. as it is a history. and above all universal history. It is in time. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people.a world-mind. there is Reason in history. it. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. Fictions.the judgement of the world. As this development is in time and in real existence.the plan of Provide nce. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. and then in history. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence.and. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . and in Germany more than in France and England. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. however. and as regards its range and scope. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. That history. internat ional law rests on social usage. when we come to minutiae. especially on the philological side. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. in defiance of .

strictly s peaking. Rome and its fortunes. e. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. is not only against taste and judgement. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents.g. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n say a word on that here . even such singularities as a petty occurrence. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. no history . in the interest of so-called truth. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. a civilization. The point of interest of Biography . and criticize events. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. etc. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. and takes place within it. and rejects both ki nds of interest.the best-accredited history. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. state.e. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. and an exclusive interest in justice. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. has. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material.appears to run . or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. in striking portraiture and brevity. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. but violates th e principles of objective truth. and. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. Ay. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. i. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation.). But. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. or if he declined to judge at all. a nation. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. if he had not an interest. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. What happens to a nation . just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. on the other hand. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. not as good as a fairy tale. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. as in the romance. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. but an age. express not a subjective particularity. or. a word. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott.

an accurate report of externals.e. But. and secondly. Only therefore through their relationship to it. the consciousness of it. 550). i. which all alik e have no stuff in them.Fame. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. and of its essence. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. the freak of humour. only opinions and mere ideas. liberty. while it inheres in them. as over a special grade. Such a doctrine . What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . i. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being.or in other words that Reason is in history . ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. i.e. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance.will be par tly at least a plausible faith.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. on the contary. and its content is prese .e. a development determined by the notion of spirit. The mere play of sentiment. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. truth. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. these individuals. first in general. really. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175).admitting. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. and the business of so doing. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. and there fore as a work of individuals. But biography too has for its background the historical world. is the supreme right. have they their value and even their existence. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. which is what is pe culiar to them. to the history of religion. and their subjectivity. potentially infinite. and are all treated as indifferent. etc. i. For Spirit is consciousn ess. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. in this case. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. if Rome or the German empire. etc. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. are instruments. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. has another ground and interest than his tory. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. is the empty form of activity. which is their reward. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . we may add. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . the absolute L aw. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit.e.

It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. from which the start is now made.e. is the purification. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice.a mere 'ought' . and that on the religious. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. is the case with all speculative process . the idea of God it kn . At this rat e. Th e finite.consciousn ess. i. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. But the spirit which think s in universal history. But . It rises to apprehend itself in its the peculiar perversity. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions.e. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. is the real ethical self. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate .e. i. especially ¤ 51. The spirit. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world.e. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. i. actually accomplished in the ethical world. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. in the system of laws and usages.Liberty. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. however. forme rly noticed. now gets its most concrete interpretation. lays hold of its concr ete universality. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. i. ¤ 204 not e). of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. For that st arting. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. Such apprehension. as law and duty. as true in the world of free will. note). This factor. As regards the 'mediation' which.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. that elevation to God really involves. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence.

It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . and superstition.working images. It lea ds to a laity. for thought and knowledge . even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. in the annihilation of its externality. i. springing from some force and power. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. It leads. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state.e.logi cally enough . So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality.ows must be the true and real. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience.addressing his devotion to miracle. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. first of all. one religious and an other ethical. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. morality and conscience. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. to justification by external wo rks.the body of religious truth. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . and even as mutually indifferent. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking.of bondage. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts.e. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. B . Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. then there may be created. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . in point of form. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness the one religion which secures the stability of governments. even to bones. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God.e. differing from the former in body and value of truth. but purely subjective in individuals: .(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . in its faith and in its con science. generally.partly as mere moving of the lips. and in the act of faith. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. a condition of spiritual sla very. and law and justice. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . i. i. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. and these applications of it in the religious life. on the contr ary. But in poin t of form.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. the host as such is not at first consecrated.e. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. religion was a late r addition.or it may be. and ex pecting miracles from them. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. and prays others to pray .) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . but in the moment of enjoymen t. i. (In the Lutheran Church. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . And. non-spirituality. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality.

leads it into the rea l world. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. i.of honesty in commercial dealing. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. . only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. The precept of religion. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. our consciousness and subjectivity. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. . no matter how. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. self-realizing reason . . and in a special sense Philosophy. i. i. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. Instead of the vow of chastity. unte obedience which is itself the true freedom.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence.e. and in the use of property . 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. Thus set free. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. Let us suppose even that. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. short.e. so to speak a priori. lacked liberty. a code of law should arise. which does not rise in hostility against them. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. and. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. if taken alone. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. can law and morality exist. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. and political institutions deduced from them must be. founded on principles of reason. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . the content of religion assumes quite another shape. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. moral life in the state. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. sti . the wisdom of the world. and thus only. And instead of the vow of obe dience.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). because the state is a self-possessed. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. So long as t he form. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order.

What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. thus surmountin . and the power given them to fix the budget. or. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced.g. e. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. Such laws. This additional 'individuality' . It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. from those deeper requirements which.ll. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. on the other hand.among which laws these guarantees are included. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. (cf. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea .when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking.mi nd intrinsically concrete . To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness.. thus founder on the conscience. when specially set in relief as genus. .to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists .t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. on one hand. so-called 'chambers'. to put it simply. At best it is only a temporary expedient .to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. etc. that the Idea must be just this . as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws .on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. however sound their provisions may the intellectual and thinking self.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. This absolute nucleus of man . The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. ¤ 544 note).which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies.

broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). exhibits the one-sidedness. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . which still escaped his intelligence. he. which is awa re of its own essence. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. As it left therefore behind. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. pictorial representation. in its f irst immediate. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. but earlier than philosophy. But thought always . should knit it together and control it. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. Political power. or essential being). on its own s howing. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. The form in its infinite tru th. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. But even religion. which is developed similarly. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. in its philosophic phase. religion. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists .the idea of the substantial moral life. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. is implicitly in absolute liberty.was that creative imagination.). so . wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. the subjectivity of mind.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. fall feeling. however. earlier than it does as philosophy. of philosophy. Plato. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. Under the subjective form. as it grows and expands. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. for th ese reasons.and th at on account of this very principle .). Hence religion as such.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. etc. His state is therefore. as demoralization. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. intuition. Religion may. Only in the principle of mind. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. from religion.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . or rather must. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. is after all only in one of its form s. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. ¤ 513. and so also one-sided phase.

Inneres Staatsrecht. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. while it is self-centred identity. Thus ul timately. as well as their several applications. Religion. Die Sittlichkeit. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. Gesetz. Weltweisheit. the constitut ion and the code. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. That here. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). 8. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. Das aussere Staatsrecht. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. 4. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). 7. as always. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. but rather to a sort of knowledge. for which it is as substance. Das System der Bedurfnisse. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. Die Rechtspflege 5. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject.e. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. Die Polizei und die Corporation. 6. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. of God's indwelling in us. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. 1. i. Die Weltgeschichte 10. 3. 9. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. In the Protestant state. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life.

the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. as it is. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. c an. the actuality of the spirit.e.hence not the sp iritual unity. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. On one hand. other words. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression.i. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit .at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . ¤ 411). It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. . 1. aware. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas).the shape or form of Beauty. which is only a sign of the Idea. Belief. as superseded in spirit. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. its n atural immediacy. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. into the subject which produces that work.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. Art requires not only an external given material . that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle .for the expression of spiritual truth . is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. With the essential restrictedness of its content. In this ideal.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. that is. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit.the form of immediacy as such . like the material which it uses to work in.something formal. But.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . has in devotion . it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. A.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . so that the thought embodied. Der absolute Geist. reconciliation. but . or the idea. and of gaining its concrete determination. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. on the other hand.

Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. but as only finding himself in himself. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . and that is where the infinite form. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . and th e artist is the master of the God. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter.can try to bring itself to consciousness. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. assumes fuller and firmer features. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. or an effor t towards him . corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. .e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness .symbolic art. not yet conscious of itself. subjectivity. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . which is thus self-confident and of good short how the nature of a nation's moral life. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. the artist's enthusiasm. is not yet known. that one spirit creates and informs them. as well as of its art and science.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . known as the Absolute. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. the principle of its law. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being.stil l this art is defective. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. of its actual liberty. though concrete and intrinsically free. as free spi rit. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. is not yet absolute. but its inmost depth. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. and of its constitution.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal.

has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . and. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. . But with a further and deeper study. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. The old conception . and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself.due to a one-sided survey of human life . from it s side. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. Beautiful art. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . The older religion in which the need of fine art. has its future in true reli gion. we see that the advent of art.that it be revealed. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. B. . unbeautiful sensuo usness. and j ust for that reason. revealed by God. still more in that external. is first generated. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the.e.of Nemesis. on the contrary. and brilliancy.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. like the religion peculiar to it.ent in it. it is from Him.into revelation. in which he had not revealed himse lf. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical.The genuine objectivity. not the supreme liberation itself. whose con tent is absolute mind . because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. which is only in the medi um of thought . for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . Beautiful art.the religion i.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. the theme and c entre of religion. as infinite self-realizing form .it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. spectator find themselves at home. with their perso nal sense and feeling. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . . REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. what is more. shows that such religion is on the decline. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world .the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. dashing t o pieces everything high and great . expression. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God.

presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. even in its manifestation. though. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. directed towards the Eternal. making them presuppositions towards each other. and phenomena which succeed each other. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . it is. when it the Spirit. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. of the world it gave away . G . in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. in point of content. it implies the revelation of Him. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality .knowledge in God. again. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. It includes.1.of the only Son . on the other hand. (a) as eternal content. as the extreme of inherent negativity. But. it may almost create surprise that so many. or of judgement. That spirit. . not. the spirit. and. Go d is. in it s forefront. and reconciliation with the eternal being.just as.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . to specul ative apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. (c) as infinite fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. further. though different. F. only standing to it in an external connection. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. Yet.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. which proceeds to man's self. which therefore is finite. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. ¤ 566 In this separating. however. but afterwards.: Berlin 1829. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world.requires careful and thorough speculation. abiding sel f-centred.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. amid that natural ness. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. On one hand is heaven and earth. for that reas on. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. To know what God as spirit is . by C. on one hand. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is is therefore the absolute spirit. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on.. while in point of form he is. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . first of all. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. with whom.on the other hand. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. .ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. he still remains in original identity . and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. staying aloof and inert.. a separate being. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. as in duty bound. the elemental and the concrete nature .

in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. This individual. remains master over it. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. as infinite subjectivi ty. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. external in point of form.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. is not bound by it .of subjectivity and the no tion itself. Irony. eternal. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. his natur al man and taken in a merely formal. In this form of truth. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. through which witness of the spirit in him. Further. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite transplanted into the world of time. who as such is identified with the essence . and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. simple. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity.but the vision of implicit truth. th e self-centred manifestation. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. and eternal spirit in itself. he. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. contentless sense. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. but alive and present in the world. after the example of his truth.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. so far. this immediate. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute .where the spirit closes in unity with itself . Thinking. which from itself.Irony. an object of contemplating vi sion . truth is the object of philoso phy. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. Whereas the vision-method of Art. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. Die geoffenbarte Religion. is itself the emptiness and vanity. 1.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . with a temporal and external sequence. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. and thus. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. but even to thought. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. secondly. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. keeps himself unchanged. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. From this its separation into p arts. in which he. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. But. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. . C. gives itself direction and con tent.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. If the result . and thus sensuous. on account of his immediate nature.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself .and.

and mediates what is thus open ed out. with its separ ation into parts. finds itself already accompl ished. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. and s o religious. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. This witness .('Rationalism') . even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. which philosophy is.e. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. and against philosophy in general .from these forms. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . when driven to expound itself. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained.i. This movement.stantial content into many separate shapes. too much for the latter. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. which determines itself to content. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. but also criticized it. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. elevation of them into the absolute form. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . of course.the underlying essence in all humanity . first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. only looks back on its knowledge.leaving out. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . and this necessary as free. when at the close it seizes its own notion .and from a pithless orthodoxy. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . The charge of Atheism. and whereas Religion. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. immediate vision and its poetry. or. and particularly of the logical form. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. to be more precise still. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. It had t oo little of God in it for the strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion.takes.which may be in both the same . from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . remains identical with it. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object.on one hand. a nd of logic in particular. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. and acts inconsistently towards them. This does not prevent the spirit.on the other hand. as also of the necessity in the two forms . it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . opens it out in mental picture.

But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to much so. On such a presuppo sition. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. with all its absurdities. are) . Without interest of its own for the concrete. as it stands. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. and amongst it s effusions.(empirical things.thus he understands philosophy . are unable and unwilling to see this . or Pantheism.each and every secular thing is God. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality.all possess substantia lity. exclusi ve. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. in particular. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. and is therefore. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. we must. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . or if you will. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. Amongst the abundant resources. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. open to our disposal on this topic. that.that of the Hindu to ass es. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being.of Pantheism. but as a proved fact. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . as is well known.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. If this theory needs no more than such a the wanton assertion. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. some of the most telling passage .that of the Egyptians to the ox . though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. also contains the generic abs tract. Piety. It is only his own stupidity. ¤ 71 note). or any one man. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. cows . it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. most sublime. I select . does not comprehend much so.or to dalai-lamas .the Bhagavat-Gita. and form all that is definite in the divine universality.of the new piety and new theology. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. its grossest shape. if we believe them. fulfilled notion of God. whether higher or lower in the scale. God in General. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with always adora tion of an object which. that it has too much of him: . without distinction. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. This new theology.g.which therefore it does not disparage. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. the secularity of th ings. from which all definite quality is excluded. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God.Everything is .as the most authentic statement accessible . and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . and so .for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . all such definiteness is only the non-divine. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: .

Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. Indra. and the moon among the lunar mansions. at the beginning of the pass age. The undiscerning ones. 7 seqq. . like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. . . Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. . everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. .. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his.that Hinduism. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . . is also the maddest of polytheisms. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend.. . Hinduism.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. all this is woven upon me. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. and end of living things. . I am life in all beings. as he said before he was S iva. however. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. vanish. . . . . . . I am also the strength o f the strong. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. is alo ne the divine and God. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. grip. besides Krishna.. he is said to be the beginning. and the Spinozan Substance.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. There is nothing else higher than myself. . which he is. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. t he pure unity of thought in itself. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). . melt into the one Krishna. Among letters I am the letter A. But so little concrete is this divine unity . with a monstrous incons istency. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. pp. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be .' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. but only . . without essential being of its very own. as different from that accidental. Even when. . Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. even Siva. 'At the end of many lives. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . .'I am the self. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . still God. any more than the Eleatic One. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. which Krishna calls himself. p. .' This 'All'. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. . This everything. . . or Indra. unessential powerless its. I am the taste in water. where the empirical everything of the world. seated in the hearts of all beings. middle. . or a God besides. etc. as also those proximate substantialities. .spiritual as its idea of God i s . . not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. nothing independent].the most excellent of everything. is not. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. . But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. has the higher conception of Brahma. . Meru among the high-topped mountains. called Gods. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. to a poly theism.not everything. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. . and one essential amongst them. . . I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. . . . (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. rather.). think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. . the Everything. so to speak . . but having its truth in the substance. . passion. the One which.s. goodness. than which there is nothing higher.

or Spinozist. as infinite from the finite. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. as everything. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of its finest purity and sublimity. even in a general exoteric discussion.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular.. That pantheism indeed . of the relationship of God and the world. but . to which everything is God. after this partition. the all. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. Hin du monotheism. imagination or speculation. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. which. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. For that unity. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. empirical indivi duals . outside it .g.ndu. the Eleatic. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in it as a lot of Gods or as secular.keep its independence.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. and God everything. or. especially the Mohammedan. when he adores the ape. and so on . the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. in relation to the popular idea of the world. on one hand. as it says. and that unity described as love. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. ac osmical. whether they spring from heart. But to go back again to the question of fact. to was . is discarded and absor bed. he is as essence parted from appearance.of the world as one thing. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. the finite to the infinite. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. e.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. or other creature. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. on the contrary. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. moreover. and on the other.on the shallow conception of it . If. and of empirical secular spirit.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. is identical with the world.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. Of the oriental. modes of envisaging God. But. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God.floating in the indefinite blue . as the endless lot of empirical existence. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. It is only the picture . no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. we must consult th e Mohammedans. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. and.. secondl y.

But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. and that amongst the m there is great variety. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. in matters admitted to be of superior. with God's omnipresence. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . and which they ascribe to philosophy. it is not. as in the physical field the physicist. a nd assert . That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness.falsely as a fact . and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. not the concrete unity.that. viz. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. the most external and the worst. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. and that hence. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them.the world as much as Go d .g. But the question is. but with concrete unity (the notion).te a word on what a 'notion' means. but only the one factor of this category of relation . so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea.said pores being the negative. if not even of supreme interest. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. with abstract unity.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. composition. when they hear of unity . Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. inorganic and living . But they show so little acquaintance with them . i. as Epicu rus does. I n the philosophical field they proceed. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one.has the same solid substantiality as the other. . But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. they have laid hands on. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. they import them into philosophy. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures.and that the factor of indet erminateness . And as in their judgement either of the two . perhaps under the more familiar names of e. and the empty absolute. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general.and s till less take trouble about it .is identity. but rather its reverse. mere ide ntity. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . and that it is the system of identity. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. with indefinite ideas. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world.and relation i pso facto implies unity . The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. etc.e. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. in the pores of th e physicists . however. where they are utterly unknown. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one.g. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. omnipresence. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . the notion and content of philosophy. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. is what one expect s. providence. e. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction.

as the mediating agent in th e process .ity . not abstract unity. The esoteric study of God and identity. an All-one doctrine. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. a system of identity. as of cognitions. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. On account of this chorus of assertions.their everything. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea.the logical system. But to put that sort of thing. which . and which is itself the way to produce it.knowing reaso n. and as implicitly the Idea. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. it is indispensable to get hold of their has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. standing between the Mind and its essence. on the shoulders of philosophy. the notion. but the many-shaped modes specified. If statements as to facts are put forward. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. i. which has self. of which liberty is the aim. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. Nature . in his relation to the world. the absolutely universal. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ is the nature of the fact. is philosophy itself. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. nor itself to something away from them and independen t .by which notions are perverted into their opposite. But in ascribing to God. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. then. which causes the movement and development. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. and the latter its universal extreme. for its middle term: a middle. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. as other than they. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . this stale gossip of oneness or identity.e. sunders itself. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate .which. or as prevaricating for a purpose. making the former its presupposition.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. y . which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. and notions .

. eternally sets itself to work. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. The eternal Idea. in f ull fruition of its this same movement is equally the action of cognition.

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