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INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any
attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i
s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as
treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.
where the othe . was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. i.the truth that matter itself has no truth. on the one hand. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. whereas the 'vital' matter. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. and so the self-externalism. which is the fund amental feature of matter. perhaps. its simple 'ideal' life. li ght. identical ideality of it all. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. These 'imponderables' . have still. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. except where. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. and not as the immediate or natural individual. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. the soul is only the sleep of mind . but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. Wherever there is Nature. as absolute negativity. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. thus come into being. on the other. But not merely is it. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . ANTHROPOLOGY. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t.. Mind. a nd the soul remains the pervading. as such a result. matter is regarded as something true. however. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. and.SUB-SECTION A. to which they might perhaps add space and time. At such a stage it is not yet mind. indeed. It is otherwise with Mind. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. however. like heat. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. not merely lacks gravity. even the capacity of offering resistance. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. but soul. the sou l is its universal immaterialism.the passive of Aristotle. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity.e. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. etc.with th is proviso. The usual answer. There. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. which is potentially all things. and mind conceived as a thin g. in a sense.
any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. in the modes of that being. feels the difference of climates. on the contrary. Spinoza. so to speak. or. enter s into correlation with its immediate being.e. and telluri c life of man. T hus. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). sidereal. when it presents itself as a single soul. and. . re tains an abstract independence. (b) Secondly. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. so holding.the natural soul. and. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. as an anima mundi. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. Malebranche. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. they are natural objects for consciousness. These have. (c) Thirdly.(a) In its immediate natural mode . as so often is done. is too abstract. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. with Leibniz. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. even these few and slight susceptibilities.r is not . described. as in the case of Spinoza. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. into the absolute syllogism. just in proportion to his civilization. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. Descartes. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. behind it s ideality a free existence: i.e. in many case s completely. which only is. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. based upon participation in the common life of nature. disappear. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. the changes of the seasons. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . etc. and does not rise or develop into system. But either this identity. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. In nations less intellectually emancipated. remain for ever subject to such influences. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. it is a soul which feels. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. it may be. upon it.or corporeity . as in the case of Lei bniz. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus.whence Epicurus. and always more or less. Hence. its immediate being . it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. and the periods of the day. not. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. a world-soul. Animals and pl ants. there philosophers took God. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. as individualized.is moulded into it.
widely distant from each other. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it .the sexual relation . the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. on the whole. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. scientific.on a ph ysical basis. character. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). on its one side. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race.mind wrapped up in itself. the one permanent subject. He begins with Childhood . hopes. This . but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. in purposes political. and the position of the individual himself. we find its diversities. bodily structure and disposit ion. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. as it exists. shows an active half. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. fancies. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. or artistic. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. and as stages in its development. of families or single individuals. physiognomy. we find it as the special temperament. The contrast between the earth's poles. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which.a worl d no longer incomplete. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. carrying out these universa . ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. And that individuality marks both the world which. shows. and on the other. fails to meet his ideal requirements. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. we see man in his true relation to his environment. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). talent . leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. as alterations in it. Thirdly. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. As they are at once physical and mental diversities.
by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. each point. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness.The waking is not merely for the observer. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. or self-centralized being. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. distinguishes itself from its mere being. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality.Napoleon. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. sleep. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member.not as a merely negative rest from it. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . as they may be called. although. as already noted.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. which are often addressed to philosophy: . b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. The characterization given in the section is abstract. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. for example. . in the first instance. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. (c) Sensibility(3) . i n an unintelligent way. as before explained . just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. but as a return back from the world of specialization. put this question to the class of ideology. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. viz. . . takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness.
blasphemy. adultery. ho wever. are in order to be felt. The fact that these particulars.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. invested with cor poreity. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. and is so felt. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. its natural peculiarity. On the other hand and conversely.g. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. and to be as if found. fornication. moral. and religious. be it noted. etc. mora l. But if put in the feelin g. One. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. murder . in its own self. the conscience. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. evil.. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. for itself. is what we call sensibility. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. it is true. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. etc. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart.identity of our self-centred being. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. mean. and the character. the inarticulate bre athing. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. which. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. on one hand. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. are our very own. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. but treated as bel onging to its most special. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. true. and . where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved.set over against consciousness. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. the fact is a mode of my individuality. in the feeling. not mere alterations. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. the naturally immedi ate.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). belonging as it does to natural. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. Another. This should hardly need enforcing. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . just. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . etc. are found by the waking soul.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. godless. primarily. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e.
a psychical physiology. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. is to raise its substantiality. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . the centre of the 'sensible' system. We should have.it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . especially the passions or emotions. tones. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . 322). (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . i. the blood. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . distinction appears as mere variety . following the special character of the mental mode. works itself out.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight.in the system of the senses. laughter.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. (¤¤ 321. of self. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. the 'irritable' system. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. are formed from their mental source. in a special system of bodily organs. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. (c) the sense of solid reality. to take possessi on of it. to the character of subjectivity. with its varieties of language. for example. ¤ 402 Sensations. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. smells. What it has to do. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. e. (¤ 317) . but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. . The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . i ts merely virtual filling-up.and of sound.the senses of definite light. of heavy matter. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. and their corporization.it is a soul which feels. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. just because they are immediate and are found existing. sighs.g. As sentient. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast.e. therefore. set in its self-centred life. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. to realize its mastery over its own. (¤ 300).because in it. o f colours. and voice in general.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. the immediacy of mode in feeling . Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. but an inward. with which that substance is one. In the usage of ordinary language.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation.
and to that world it stands but as to itself. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. in an implicit mode.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . thoughts. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . yet as the soul is in that content still particular . in sickness. prima rily. in whi ch all this is stored up. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. it implies a want of adaptation. By itself. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. to which the soul. a deep featureless characterless mine. which is at the same time its predicate. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. once mor e come to light. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. so far as that is. virtually retained. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. the s oul is characterized as immediate. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. ¤ 404 As individual. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. but only to his im plicit self. although it does not exist. which is disease. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. etc. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. the corporeity. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. may again sink down. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. In the present stage we must treat. ideas and information.that world being included in it and filling it up. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). secondly. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. first. Thus in the body it is one simple. etc. Some times. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. omnipresent unity.. acquired lore. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. to be defined as one of feeling . They were not in our possession. but a negation.the existent spe culative principle. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). At the present stage this singleness is. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. As sentient. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). where the real is put past . But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. ideas. the content is its particular world.as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. it brings within itself. without existing.
The moth er is the genius of the child. self-conscious. congenital disposit ion and temperament. but as efficiency and realized activity. of the mother. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. injuries. etc. or virtuality. etc. not as a mere possibility. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. By the self-hood of the latter it . as yet nothing impenetrable. temper.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. it is.is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. idiosyncrasies. which.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . because immediate. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. as it has existence of its own. or capac ity. his secular ideas. is visibly present as another and a different individual.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. not yet as its self. incl inations. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. say between friends. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. the single self of the two. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). fortunes. the psychical relationship. intellige nt. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious.. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. Here are two individuals. character. etc. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. of life. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius.a substance. tal ent. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. self-possessed. as concrete subject ivity. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. etc. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. placenta. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . and is therefore passive. developed interests. not a true subject reflected int o itself. and reasonable. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. whose decision is ul . The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. controlling genius thereof. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. and of character. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational.. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature.
intentions. But such a verification would. first of all call for verificati on.to be mere deception and impo sture. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. on the other hand. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. The facts. means. it might seem. self-possessed human being is a disease. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. it has already been call ed his genius. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . in which the individual here appears innnersed. which are also means and ends to each other.to show. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead.his fun damental interests. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life.timate whatever may be the show of reasons.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . on the cont rary.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. that it is in harmony wi th the facts. is. in other words. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. At the same tim e. it must be added. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. To that end the phenomena. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. This totality forms his actual ity. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . educated. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that .
not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. and the like.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. When the substance of both is thus made one. a formal vision and awareness. . The patient in this condition is accordingly made. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. the magnetizer. like that of the child in the womb. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . and character. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it.a genius which beh olds itself. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. in its sober moods. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. however.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. ca pable of conveying general truths. then. wh en it is healthy and awake. unless by the aid of religion. But. etc. but it is empty. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e.). and c ontinues to be. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. subject to the power of another person. f riends. is under a veil. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. which lead up to the result . external one to another. his own and that of the magnetize . and other diseases. not on the spot. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. (Thus Cato. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. the selfless individual. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. which. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. that it is a state of passivity. and to know which. those c onnected with female development. exist for it as an outward objectivity. And because it is the adult. etc. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. subje ctive reason. etc. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. But such clairvoyance . in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. reads. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. formed. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. for example.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. on those left behind. after the downfall of the Roman republic. not really a 'person'. is this. .just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. and hears. smells. or at the approach of death.) Compare h ome-sickness. tastes. in whom it sees. . and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. in catalepsy.
r. beholds. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. as in the morbid state alluded to. receives. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. which. it is still susceptible of disease. in its capacity as individual. i. The purely sensitive life. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. anticipate the full-grown an . when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. between intelligent personality and objective world. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . the 'common sense'. in this nominal perception. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. causality. which is no less a world of law. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. is without any definite points of attachment . or med icines for them. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. i s just this form of immediacy. e. as in other cases. etc. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. and at the same time. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. reasons. In this way it is self. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. In considering insanity we must. on the contrary. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. etc. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. is impossible. so long as we assume independent personalities. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. and hence. one sees and hears with the fingers. which still marks the self-feeling. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared.fe eling. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. for example. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. though all-embracing. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject.
into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. equally formal.e. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling.. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world.feeling. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. This particular being of the soul is t . as it aris es. idea. etc. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. the self is to be stamped upon. i.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. such as vanity. instincts. the. In the concrete. but only derangement. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). it would be death). it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement.e. i. as now regarded.fan cies and hopes . and so also may the cure. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. however. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. presupposes the patient's rationality. and also desires. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. is diseased. is undistinguis hed from them. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. that it is liable to insanity . and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. earthly elements are set fr ee . and the rest of the passions . loss of health (if it were that. so as to insert them in their proper place. mere and total. This humane treatment. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. and their gratification). pride. passions. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. this life of feeling. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy.just as physical disease is not an abstract. and so makes part of the actual self. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. etc. is relaxed. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. and made appear in. A violent. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. as something natural and existent. which is there also. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity.e. may.. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. . as a thing. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. and it is only as a thing. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. inclination. and be a realized u niversality. i. And so too the particularity is.that evil which is always latent in the heart. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. but a contr adiction in it.d intelligent conscious subject. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. moral and theoretical. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease.merely personal love and hatred. desire. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. Mind as such is fr ee.
and becoming the 'ideal'. when the co rporcity. occupied. The natural qualities and alterations of age. i.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. and the generation o f habit as practice. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. empty space and empty time. That is to say. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. or dependent in regard to it. of it. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. but still free. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. this being of the soul. but has them and moves in them. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). and the mere substance. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. And consciousness it becomes. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. has been absorbed by it. For. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. the one and the same.. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. and which still continues to exist.he factor of its corporeity. nature. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. dist inguishing it from itself . will. a pure act of intuition. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. is reduced to unity. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. of which it is the subjective substance. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. Habit like memory. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. and for that reason n ot free. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. are only subjectiv e forms.e.itself a simple being . This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. weariness o . it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. as. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. and so no longer interested. su bjective substantiality of it . It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. lacking consciou sness. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. so is that pure being (which. nor is absorbed in the m. and that as a barrier for it.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. a second nature. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. but the basis of consciousness. sleep. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. on the contrary. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. partly only relative. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. therefore. Habit is rightly called a second nature. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. The soul is freed from them. even in being affected by them. et c. heat. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul.
casual. moral.is felt.or the misfortune . and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. that although the frost. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. which make it up. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. etc. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. Even here. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. The most ext ernal of them.. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. nor a transient emotion or idea. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. and the self-feeling as such.enabling the matter of consciousness. to exist as substance in its corporeity. i.f the limbs. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. so that when the conception (e. Habit on an ampler scale. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. and that they. are no longer bothered with it.. and particul ar. but part and parcel of his being. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. whereof we sha ll speak later. nor are they in conce ption rational. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. intelligence. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. consciousness. and no other. And it is true that the form of habit. re ligious. without an express adjustment. or skill. has been by will made a habit . made into an instrum ent. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. nor an abstrac t inwardness.. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim.). etc. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. and especially so in the specific bodily part. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. a particular organ of i ts organic system). this soul. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened.g. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. habit diminishes this feeling. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. like any other. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. and thus to enable the soul. his upright pos ture. sweet tastes. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. acquires a strength which consists in this. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. habit is usually passed over - . want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). to be made a power in the bodily part.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. an 'ideality' of soul . is open to anything w e chance to put into it. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. a series of musical notes) is in me. etc. to be his as this self. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. and any other purp oses and activity.concentration. This is the rational liberation from them. viz. reflection. etc. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. intuition. the spatial direction of an individual. Thinking. is recollection and memory. or. like their satisfaction. too. under its volitional and conceptual characters. and it is habit of living which brings on death. .a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. if quite abstract. cut off from action and reality. etc. consciousness.e.
is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. of the mouth . This note is so slight.. and i s infinite self-relation. as the absolut e instrument. absorbing it. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. in other words. in its concentrated self. Under the head of human expression are included. but the soul. Seen from the animal world. a world external to it . thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. represents not itself. In this identity of interior and exterior. the latter subject to the former. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. 3. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . finds itself there a single subject. it is related to itself. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. and the formation of the limbs. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. 1. still vainer than a signatura rerum. Naturliche Qualitaten. 2. or the 'immediacy' of mind. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. for the soul. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. indefinite. especially the hand. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. for example. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. and inexpressible a modific ation. Die fuhlende Seele. 4. etc. unable to represent it in its actual universality. 71).specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. weeping. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. And the human figure. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. and making it its own. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. of which it is the sign. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. cuts itself off from its immediate being. Naturliche Seele. The soul. though the proximate phase of mind's existence.either as something contemptible . while language is its perfect expressi on.laughter. 'The autho . and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. or abstract universality. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. the upright figure in general. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. in being related to which.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. Empfindung. 5. This externality. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature.
is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. seem to be its own activity. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. but is implicit. and as such it is C onsciousness. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. but since reality. 8. but to the foolishness of man.to an equal freedom as an independent object.the soul's natural life . PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. Selbstgefuhl. as this absolute negativity.the light. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. 6. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. Ego. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. like reciprocal dependence in general.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. i. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) .r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. is only its abstract formal ideality. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. which manifests itself and something else too . The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. but when he receives the inspired word. thus first made explicit as the Ego. to it. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind.e. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). does not. not to the wisdom. as external to it.it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. Hence consciousness. as subjective reflection in itself. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. 7. The mind as ego is essence. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. and . or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). now. something dark and beyond it. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. Gewohnheit. It is of this latter. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. in the sphere of essence.
. the subject of consciousness. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance.e. a something. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). and puts it first under the category of being. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. i. first.to the ego it seems an alteration of the object. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). This is sense-consciousness.e. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. in other words. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. is further characterized a s immediately singular. The object is only abstractly characterized as its.a subject-objectivity. with an object set against it. being immediate. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. but only as it is in reference to something else. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. which is not as its own. to raise its self-certainty to truth. and so on. but as poorest in thought.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. an intuitive intellect. immediate consciousness. an existent. (b) self-consciou sness. and even t he Idea of Nature. a singular. and underived certainty of it. for which ego is the object. Spatial and temporal Singularn . where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. As against Spinozism. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. etc. has emerged from Spinoz ism. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. and that the philosophy. again. as Reason. reflected in itself. Consciousness . the substantial and qu alitative. what makes the object the subject's own. a thing-in-itself. The object similarl y. t heir absolute interdependence. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. It appears as wealth iest in matter. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. i. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. the notion of mind. or mere c ertainty.as a case of correlation . ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. Ego. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. an existing thing.
are independent universal matters (¤ 123). and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. which form the alleged ground of general experience. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. by being regarded in their bearings.). and universal. as we called it. has many properties. wants to take the object i n its truth. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. ¤ 423 The law. however. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. and am aware'. free from this negative l ink and from one another. reflectional attributes. But in this manner the interior distinction is. and not yet as external on its own part. as not externally different from the other.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . or as being beside and out of itself. or the distinction which is none.e. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. 73).bet ween the individuality of a thing which. lies im mediately in the other. and. the distinction on its own part. reflected in itself. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. having passed beyond the sensible. and more or less by the sciences.a copy of the phenomenon.e.a variety of relations. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. its necessity on its own part. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . it is related. in this case by t he Ego. viz. p. i. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. on one hand. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. in that manner. but brought to rest and universality.ess. taken in its concrete content. to which. of the thing is. not as merely immediate. has. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. and sensuous consciousness. so constr uing the object. however. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. to describe the sensible. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. Thi s inward. an abstract identity: on the other hand. reflected upon. is sense-perception. The consciousness of such an object is intellect.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. but as mediated. and universalities. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . the thing. . experiences. i. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. the one of the terms. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. a something external to it. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . permanent term s. what it is in truth. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness .
on the contrary . To this activity the object. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. this identity comes to be for the ego. and thus in it I am aware of me. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. is a singular. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. On the external side it conti nues. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. can make no resistance: the dialectic. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. therefore. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness.With this new form-characteristic. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. being merely consumed. in this return upon itself. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . with the nega tion of it. therefore. and ma intains itself as such. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. The two processes are one and the same. nominally. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. there is strictly speaking no object. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. in its immediacy. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature.as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. implicit in it. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. or. and a desire (appetite) . on the whole. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. pure 'Ideality'. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. and itself made actual. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. its satisfaction realized. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. or implicitly. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. the latter. The certitude of one's self. knows itself implicit in the object. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. primarily describable as an individual.
Force. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . the slave. ¤ 435 But secondly. is yet. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. Thus arises the status of master and slave. works off his individualist self-will. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. which is the basis of this phenomenon. In that other as ego I behold myself. though by the abstract. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. we see. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. solves the contradiction. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. when we look to the distinction of the two. and the means for entering into relation with them. and to exist as such for the other: . in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. and formation of it.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. it. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. must likewise be kept in life. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. ¤ 434 This status. at first immedi ately. Force. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. and thus give existence to my freedom. therefore rude. as the existence of hi s freedom. however. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . f rom the essential point of view (i. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self.t he process of recognition. retains his single self-consciousness. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. w hich however is also still outside it. in the service of the master. the slave.but only p eril. which falls on another. and its being for others. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. While the one com batant prefers life. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. negati on of immediacy. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. not their underlying and essential principle. in the first place. This other. preservation. the outward and visible recognition). then.e consciousness of a 'free' object. Thus the death of one.for the means of mastery. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. as one of two things for another. from one point of view. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. and incurs a like peril for its own . however. a suppression. on the ir phenomenal side.e. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future.
or rather it is a difference which is none. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. 1. Wahrnehmung 3. and of all virtues. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. Selbstbewu§tsein. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. is mind (spirit).is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality.the passage to universal self. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. aware of what it is. whilst it signifies that the object. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. fatherland. fame. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. as its peculiar mode and immanent form.f wisdom' . is Reason. Die Begierde 6. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. etc. than they are its own thoug hts. valour. love. . is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . honour. idle fame. or determinations of the very being of things. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. Reason. Truth. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. bu t the truth that knows it.consciousness.which is Reason. 5. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . state. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . For truth here has. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. Der Verstand. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. is now itself universal. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2.in family. friendship. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. the self-centred pure notion. The uni versality of reason. therefore. ego. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. 4.
MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. then its reality is that reason. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. it has a mode in its knowledge. Mind is finite. etc. remembering. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . and above the complication with an external object .the former a simple immediate totality. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. etc. it is finite by means of its immediacy. the latter now an infinite form which is not. SUB-SECTION C. ideation. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. This. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. And it is a matter of no consequence. what is the same thing.mental vision. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. in thinking also and in desire and will. though it no longer has an object. in the soul as a physical mode. i..e.in one word. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. like consciousness. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. above the material. however. and which as the reality of that notion. viz. restricted by that content. Die Vernunft. therefore. in so far as . and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. which is defined as it s notion..7. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. or. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . Mind. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. Cons ciousness is finite. PSYCHOLOGY. in so far as it has an object. as its concept has just shown. desires. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons.apart b oth from the content. neit her subjective nor objective. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. etc.
e. that aspect is twofold . But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. in freedom.as being and as its own: by the one. in so far as its existent phase. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). and is even there a return into itself. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal.e. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. and its activity can only have itself as aim. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. Thus. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. to reach and get hold of itself. so far. Similarly. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. and to liberate itself to its elf. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. i. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. k nowledge. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. that is. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. i. When the affection has been rendered its own. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. and are the mind's own. and the negative aspect of mental activity. it is . In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. equally. viz. and being a rational knowledge. viz. and make the affection subjective. the na tural soul (¤ 413). involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. forces. the mind finds in itself something which is. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind.e. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. is misconceived and overlooked. or. As the theory o f Condillac states it. the sensible is not merely the empirical first.reality of its reason. of comprehending itself.
But as knowledge. in the theoretical range. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. merely as facts. has a material which is only nominally such.e.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. e. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. wi th a material which is its own. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. as r eason is concrete. which is only certitude. the word.(b) Will: practical mind. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. while it has to do with autonomous products. like logic. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. but) enjoyment. Inwards . The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. The nominal knowledge. Ou twards. A host of other phrases used of intelligence.i. is thus also a reality . Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. to get at the notion and the truth. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. Psychology. and is immediately willed.g.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. and heartless intellects . intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. belong to a point of view utt . This position of psychology.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. which it and the content virtually is.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. both for the mind as such. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. which in the first place is likewise formal . and that in its empirical condition. Its activity has to do with the empty form . its content is at first only its own.. along with which the content is realized as rational. and therefore a restricted content.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. for which it gains the form of universality. as it is said. and gains abstract auton omy within. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. It is still extremely ill off. while the practical. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. to definite and conceptual knowledge. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. etc. This activity is cognition. and of the heart without the intellect . just as they are given. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. elevates itself. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action.
if answered in the negative. imagination. like power or force. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. conception. imagines. however. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. It is true that even as isolated (i. cognitive conception. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . etc. must lead to abandoning the effort. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . are not isolated. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object .is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. or makes the concept its own. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. etc. But the true satisfaction.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. intuition. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . imagination. is bro ught into mind. remembers. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. Faculty. etc. memory. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). as it is by the same method brought into nature. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition.in a word .: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. or mind. etc. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. by cognitive intuition. by rational conception. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . intelligen ce.besides which it al so intuits. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. that intuition. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. just so far as it realizes itself. conceives.whi ch. If they are isolated. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. as non-intelligent). Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows .e. etc. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. it . note). conception. But c ognition is genuine.its out-of-selfness . and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. remembrance. conceived as reflected into self. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. viz. it is admitted.
and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object.but to his feeling. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. Hence feeling. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. as it were the closes t.one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . or at least to reasons . ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling.an active self-collection . of their essential relationships and real cha racters. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. Now the material. is swallowed up. that is t o say. a . as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind.his private and p articular self. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. external or internal. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy.to the generalit ies of common sense . even should its import be most sterl ing and true. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. projects it into time and space. this mode is simple. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. in content and value entirely contingent. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. .t he factor of fixing it as our own. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. Feeling is the immediate. with the character of something existent. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition.is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. has the form of casual particularity .the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. With us. but rather as subject ive and private. may just as likely be narrow and poor. the mere consciousness point of view. 254). and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. in t he truth of mind.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue.
the germ of the fruit. and inwardly divest itself of it. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. a rec ollection of itself. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. its when and where. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. in the way we treat. however. which. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. from the external place. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. which makes it its own. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. with a preponderating subjectivity. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. still continues simple. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. yet without being in consciousnes s. i. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. and received into the universality o f the ego. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. as tho ught. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. the germ as affirmatively containing. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. but stored up out of consciousness. no longer needs to find the content. in virtual possibility. . and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. as it at first recollects the intuition. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. t ime. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision.e. The representation is the property of intelligence. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . Inability to grasp a universal like t his. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. though intrinsically concrete. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. for example. isolated. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. we may say. or. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be.in a space and a time of its own. and is arbitrary or contingent. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention.
The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. comes actually into its possession. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. if it is to exist. wherea s the idea (representation). such as likeness and contrast. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. now that it has been endued with externality. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . the matter is entirely pictorial. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. has always the peculiarity. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . i. The image. though belonging to intelligence.these modes of relation are not laws. The content reproduced.) . Secondly. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. where. by which it is authenticated. whatever be its content (from image.in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. and an out-put from its universal m ine. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. that it finds its material.Image and Idea. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law.e. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. ¤ 20 note. or ide a).. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. as a matter of fa ct. as a unit of intuition. But it is solely in the conscious subject. under the representation (idea) with the same content. where it is treasured up. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . being and universality. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. In the first place. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. see Introduction to the Logic. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. at first only in space and time.viz. which is now the power over them. or an intell ectual category. has been broken up. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. but a being of its own institution. . present also a distinction in content. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. as of all intelligence. reason and consequence. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. notion. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. to be so and so.
it aims at making itself be and be a fact.. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective .Imagination. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. are completely welded into one. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. i. and in mechanical memory it completes. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). a concrete subjectivity. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. recollection. allegoric. so far a s it is concerned. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition.still lacks the side o f existence. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. some latent concept or Ideal principle. which forms their connecting link. Another point calling for special notice is that. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . As reason. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. Acting on this view. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. In other words. etc. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. are unifications of t he same factors. it is self-uttering. derived from some interest.e. Such is creative imagination(7) . what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. but they are 'syntheses'. or poetical imagination .the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). for its ideal import is its elf. internal and external. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. This force is really intelligence itself . and becomes an i ndividuality. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. is reason. These more or less concrete. this form of being. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. one's own and what is picked up.Abstraction. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. when regarded as the agency of this unification. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. is derived from the data of intuition. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. or something of the sort.symbolic. but only a nominal reason. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. 435). intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. . . The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. to universalize it.
on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers .speech and. e tc. has always to do with signs only.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. and even with conception and imagination. in the first instance.). it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l.now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. The sign is some immediate intuition. Knarren. the colour of the cockade. Sausen. and the connotation of which it is a sign. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . etc. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . since memory. conception s.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. This intuition is the Sign.. and where it is conserved. language . intuitions. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . strictly so-called. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). when employed as a sign.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. its system.gives to sensations. . It is a n image. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. its institution by intelligence. have nothing to do with each oth er.th at of vocal objects. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding.R auschen. the matter of the latter is. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. out of which it forms i deas . somewhat immediate or given (for example. With regard to the elementary material of language. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. But in the fusion of the two elements.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. ¤ 459 The intuition . signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. In logic and psychology.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. whereas in the sign. but as representative of something else. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . something accepted. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. Such is the negativity of intelligence. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium.in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation.
are frequently changed. W.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. as.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. only in pas sing. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. i. we may touch. viz. in chemistry and mineralogy. their signs in vocal language. and only get signification as signs. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. on anthropological articulation. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. as regards signs for mental objects. the planets .).see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. etc. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. palate. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. In particular. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. the denomination. and now that. for example. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. As to the formal elem ent.e.e.e. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. (Cf. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. the chemical elements. . as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. they are reduced to signs. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. and still takes place in Canton . if it be not altogether extinguished. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. as many as ten a . which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. but. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. i. it depends. again. on the other hand.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. i.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. tongue in each) and for their combinations. It is only a stationary civ ilization. which severally receive designation. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. alphabetical writing. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. . instead of n ames proper. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). as in our signs for the numbers. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. like the Chinese. The study of languages still in their original state. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing.
It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. however ample a connotation it may include. The European. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . of uttering its ideas most worthily . Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. learn ing to speak Chinese. Thus.the name. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. by speaking low and soft or crying out. peculiar to the intellect. as it does. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. is still for the mind simple in the name). Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. Both alike require such signs. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. like alphabetic writing. the simple straight stroke. Hieroglyphics. This feature of hieroglyphic . Engaging the attention of intelligence. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. in the interest o f vision. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life.is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. so that. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. . in speaking.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . while (with the facu .the mode. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. it is analysed. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs.nd twenty. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. the simple plain idea. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. or simple logical terms. i. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. just as in modern times (as already noted. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas.e. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. in the case of the Chinese Koua.
lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,
but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you
ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.
¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex
namely God. in their universality and necessity.retain a speciality of their own . is the same content as the good practical feeling has. the truth and. can also be felt. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. etc. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). and precisely in that way d o they . heart. and will. grief. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. in which these facts. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact .. on the one hand. volition. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world.. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. Whereas in life. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. and duty. it is because of their quality or co ntent . But as both. in its objectivity and truth. when thought. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. lack objective determin ation.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. may be placed. and evil. we have only to deal with the selfish. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. in feeling. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. If feelings are of the right sort. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. Thus it is. Delight. bad. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. shame. in their immediacy. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. wha t is the same thing. but presented in its universality and necessity. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. etc. and thought. and still more in mind. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. is precisely what constitutes. we have this immanen .which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t.indeed infinitely so.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. right. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. On the other hand. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. joy. for the latter.but only in antithesis to the latter . and to discus s their content. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. But where the objects sought are thus casual. law and morality. repentance. contentment. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely.
being all in one subjec t and hardly all. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. passion is neither good no r bad. and something inappropriate to it. In what way have they. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. on the other. admitting of gratification. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. but to ge t realized. is at first still a natural will. enjoyment . namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. In consequence of this formalism. character. Which are good and bad? . and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . they are based on the rational nature of the mind. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. finds in the conformity . the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. The will. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. are infected with contingency. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. which is essentially self-d etermination. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit.and (as there are ma ny. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . directly ident ical with its specific mode: . the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. Will. each being always in conflict to another.Up to what degree the good continue good. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. on one hand. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. be the value of tha t mode what it may.an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses.his inte rests of intellect. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. first of all. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. subjectivity . a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. It is on ly a dead. and their truth. But with regard to the inclinations. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . . it is pa ssion. Should. their mutual connect ions. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity.on one aim and object. talent. too often. they. however. The answer to the question.a development in which the content of autonomous . Thus. as rights and duties.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. while. ego.natural impulse and inclination. indeed. as experience shows. If the will is to satisfy itself. the question is directly raised. as r egards the form of its content. therefore. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. What are the good and rational propensiti es. each with its private range).
and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. However. which is just as much no satisfacti on. i. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. . is his interest and . which as such is the universal. Their mutual limitation. inclinations. on the whole to their disadvantage.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . are reduced to a m ere negative. and social duties. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. where the subject is made to close with itself. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . of a universal sa tisfaction. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own.e. so far as their particularity goes. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. They are somet imes contrasted. unless he had an interest in it. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. as thinking and implicitly free. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. The morality concerns the content of the aim. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. An action is an aim of the subject. either alto gether or in part.and one satisfaction. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. the impulses. As thus contradictory. it is on them that the decision turns. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. as the content. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. without end. It is thus 'reflecting' will. on one hand. this is wh at is called the interest. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. by another. partly sacrificed to that aim directly.his passion. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. the free gift of nature. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . which reflection and comparison have educed. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. an inactive thing. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. moral.action loses its contingency and optionality. there would be no action at all. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. ¤ 476 The will. and is option or choice. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. that finds its actualizing in the agent. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness.
have never had this Idea. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . or philosophy (. fortuitousness . Africa and the East. even the Stoics. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). of present sensati on and volition. education.to be aware.e.is matter of speculation. ambiguous. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. therefore. which realizes its own freedom of will. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. Whole continents. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . for example. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. he is actually free. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. which has its true being for characteristic and aim.an individuality.a universality which only ought to be. or by s trength of character. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. and are without it still. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. If. as the substance of the state. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism.e. only so far as it thinks itself . the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . On the contrary. the divine min d present with him. that is. he h as also. As abstract Idea again. and the abstract singleness. in religion as such . even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit.e . and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. the will is an actually free will. Plat o and Aristotle. or implicit Idea. etc. however. i. and object . No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. i. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. and of which it is only t he formal activity. i. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. According to Christianity. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. so that in this sphere of particular existence. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. still this very I . and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. is in the first instance the rational will in general. and are constituted after its measure. and have God's mind d welling in him: i.sired . It is thus 'Objective' Mind. If the will. its very au tonomy or freedom. and is will as free intelligence. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. and that as its very actuality. which i s pure and concrete at once. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. just because it is the very essence of mind. knows this its concept. with freedom itself.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. aim. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. The Greeks and Romans. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being .e. of the family. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. as realizing the idea. did not have it.freedom itself. now that the formalism. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. is actu ality.it is the existential side of reason . If to be aware of the Idea .
as men. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. Die Einbildungskraft. and not less into scientific actuality. 3. is itself only a notion . moral. 11. Die Erinnerung 6. 15. Phantasie 8. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. 12. 14.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. 5. Der freie Geist.not something which they have. 9. Inwendiges. but which they are. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. Der praktische Geist 13. 16. Der Geist 2. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. Gedachtnis. 1. which the content and aim of freedom has. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. Auswendiges. Vorstellung. Die Intelligenz. 10.a principle of the mind and heart.dea itself is the actuality of men . into legal. Die Gluckseligkeit. religious. Das praktische Gefuhl. if they are made slaves. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. not with laws or court s of justice. 4. But this freedom. Das Denken. 7. Anschauung. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. but the pe rmanent character . intended to develop into an objectiv e phase.
external things of nature which exist for consciousness. military service. and is the vi rtual universal. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. which in it is thus at home with itself. but in its universality. it exists as manner and custom. their absolute unity. which splits up into different heads: viz. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity.e. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. or Usage. and what is a duty.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. etc. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. are duties . or instituted as an authoritative power.(1) When.at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. What is a right is also a duty. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). and character. are no less its duties to punish. relation to another person . to administer. anthropological data (i. temper. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. not in the form of impulse. in general. duty in general is in me a free subject . ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. in the light of the concept. receives the form of Necessity.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. and it is a duty to possess things as property. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. my right to a thing is not merely possession.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth.. i. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. so as to become its habit. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. it is a Law. But. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. on the other hand.and aim. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. as the services of the members of the State in dues. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. etc. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. where they. private an d personal needs). or legal possession. But in this individualist moral sphere. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity..e. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. etc. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. to be as a person.. In the morality of the conscience. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. is a duty. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. is also a right. where free will has existence. Liberty. Liberty. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. being universal. in relation to the subjective will. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. For a mode of existence is a right. its rights of admi nistration. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. but as possession by a person it is property. are its Duties. and brings into existence i n these several wills. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. These conditi ons. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. is the Law (Right ) . and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. viz. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. in these externally objective aspects. The penal judicature of a government.
which is thus mutual. Gesetz 2. But this predicate. and State. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. possession is property. but as existence of the personality is an end. it may be. the external sphere of its liberty .it is the ethic s of actual life in family. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. in the knowledge of their identity as free. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. (B) When the will is reflected into self. and the I in it is abstractly external.possession. by mere designation of it. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. As so characterized. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. or by the formatio n of the thing or. so as to have its existence inside it. which as possession is a means. but on an external thi ng. the infinite self-rela tion. though it remains in trinsically the same. as something devoid of will. as in itself still abstract and empty. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. are simultaneously mutually independent. abstract right. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. This thing. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. Sitte A. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. morality of the individual conscience. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. civil society. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. 1. at first in the outward appropriation. on its own account me rely 'practical'. These extremes are the persons who. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. it is the right of the subjective will. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. and hence as a single being . is an individual. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. . But the set of adjustments. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part.
and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. This is naiv e. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. willed. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. in that case. is affirmed. labour. its changing hands. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . then the external rec . and. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. but which. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. the only diversity lies in this. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value.just as well with draw it as not. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. 493 seqq. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. and time. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). because they face each other.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. But so far as my will lies in a thing. however. which thus becomes wicked. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. produces a wrong: by which. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. and recogniz ed.the full and complete deed. expressing the civil suit. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. universal thing or commodi ty. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: .Contract. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. which. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. ¤ 495 The contract. is disinterested. non-malicious wrong. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles.). One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. and its acceptance by the other will. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. I can just as well put it in it as not .
in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . even from the range of all existen ce. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. The former used to be the common meaning. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action.e. is the work of Revenge. an d so on without end. or in corporeity. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. by the n otion. sets up a law .the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) .e. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such.on self-determination or autonom y. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal.) Thus the will is violently wicked. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right.st rictly so called . In it the agent. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . ¤ 499 (3) Finally. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. and can be seized only in t his quarter. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. in which the law of nature should hold sway. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. that of the judge. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it.where the nominal relation is retained. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. and not merely the particular mode . The social state.is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. such an action is essentially and actually null. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. and while the former only is respected.a universal which holds good for him. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. or Natural Right.punishment. and commits a crime. The law of nature . b ut the sterling value is let slip. which is disinterested . from life. on .compulsion against the thing. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. is a matter of chance). being conformable to the right. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. howe ver. as a volitional and intelligent being. i.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. The 'reality' of right. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. or right as governed by the nature of things. like the last. To display the nullity of such an act.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. Conversel y. But revenge. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. But more than possible compulsion is not. This progression. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him.in this case the apparent recognition. the latter is violated. is at the same time only a new outrage.a law. This gives the wrong of fraud . which is nominal and recognized by him only . in revenge. i.
But here the moral signifies volitional mode. B. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. In point of form. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. Now. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. 2. so much as it has consciously willed. be its affection w hat it may. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. it thus includes purpose and intention . and willed by it. and thus comes into relationship with the former. intelligence.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. This is the right of intention. or even justification in his h eart. conscience. an d allows to be imputed to it. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. recognition. who. sentiment. in mere law. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . 1. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. its own. counts only as a person. so far as these features are it s inward institution. Moralitat 3. but have their assent.and also moral wickedness. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds.a will reflected into itself so that. the will is at the same time made a particular. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. Das Recht. in the externality of which it only admits as its own.the other hand. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. though any alteration as such. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. etc. the reason of the will. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. my part in i t is to this extent formal. embracing these individual point s. is its deed. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. The subjective will is morally free. Naturrecht. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. is now chara cterized as a subject . THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. which was its purpose.
(c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal.and thus including in it particularity . is always fundamentally one identity. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. they ought to stand in harmony. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. and aims. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. and yet each of them. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. will . At the same time because good is one.e. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. the essential and actual good. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. whether the . And yet they ought to harmonize. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. This is the right to well-being. as individual and universal. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. though it is a particular duty. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. essential and actual. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. is not something external to him. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. because the agent. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. as in happiness (¤ 479). But at the same time in aim ing at the good.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. can be wicked. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. constitute h is well-being. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will .a universal determined in its elf .being only in this. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. a good intention in case of a crime. in point of its matter. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good.that it contains his needs. but is a particul arity of his own . interests. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world.ion.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. These aims. his interest and welfare must. it is always something particular. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. is as g ood and as duty absolute. on account of that existent sphere of liberty.g. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction .
which is the good.to a goodness. which would only be abstract. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . expressed by this repeated ought. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force.of Conscience and Wickedness. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . but is only sure of i tself. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . Wickedness. Handlung. is. to be carried out in it. The failure of the latter consists . no more exist than not. its deepest descent into itself. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. Der Vorsatz 3. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. On the affirmative side. th e essential thing. 6. The result. That. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. and of the good. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. and duty.the standpoint of the ought. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . Das Gute und das Bose C. the unutterable. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. THE MORAL LIFE. in this its identity with the good. in the notion.good is realized. is only the infinite form.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. is abandoned. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. 5. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. on its negative side.the utterly abstract semblance . 4. which actualizes and dev elops it. right .partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. and refuse it to the wicked. This pure self-certitude. an aim essentially and actually null. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. 1. which has no objectivity. and the wicked. i . just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. good. the truth of this semblance. The for mer is the will of goodness. The subjectivity. non-universal. Die Absicht und das Wohl. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . rising to its pitch. in something external therefore. Moralitat 2.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself.
¤ 514 The consciously free substance. . The ethical personality. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . controls and entirely dominates from within.n a thing .e . which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. makes this union an ethical tie . i.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it .e. This is the sexual tie. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. Thus. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. etc. as an intelligent being.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. i. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. whose independence it. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal.the Family. as personal virtues.yet somewhat which without all question is. as against the univers al. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . In the shape of the family. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present.monog .the Political Constitution.th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. without any selective refl ection. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. to a spiritual significance. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. that it is. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. elevated. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . to destiny. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. in its ki nd. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . temperament. But the person. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. manner and cu stom . is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. the individuality expres ses its special character.Marriage. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity.Civil Society.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. is confidence (trust) . whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. however.the genuine ethical temper. as deliberate work for the community. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. In the latter sphere. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. mind ap pears as feeling. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. is virtue. it exists as confidence. to the total of ethical actuality. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. . the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. in its immediacy. as the mind developed to an organic actuality .partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. however.
In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . constitutes the general stock. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . as do also its industry. and care for the future. destined. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. to found anew such an actual family.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. as private persons. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. or nominal culture in general.in educating them to independent personality.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. of the possessor's will. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . and thus produce more unconditional . or state external. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. labour. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. being an intelligent substance. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. while. of legal regulation. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. however. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. thus invested with independence. on the o ther hand. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. In virtue of such for tuitousness. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. acquire an existence of their own. on one hand. into families or individuals. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. information. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. learning. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. who exist independent and free. originally foreign to it. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. This instrument. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. ¤ 522 (3) The children. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society.
and so on ad infinitum. as well as of mental culture and habit . This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. and with it the State. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. The third. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. Their content per se may be reasonable . the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. and industry.the Law.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). 2 4/5 years. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. this analysis. But when right. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. is developed i n detail. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. It is a futile perfectionism to have . its action gets direction and content through natural features. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. and in it they have their social moralit y. talent. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . and a corresponding mode of labour. on the side of external existence. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. The second. and like the first a certain subsistence. or only 2 * . 2 3/4 . option. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. certain. and of means for satisfying them. intelligence. ten thalers. and an ensemble of contingencies. though of course only at the final points of deci ding. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . to be. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. however.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . the medium created by t he action of middlemen. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. their recognition and their honour. they have their actual existence. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity.. of needs.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . at every point.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. skill. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. determined through reason or legal intelligence. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. exists. which as existence is essentially a particular. of mere agents. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. as vital. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. and accident. in the course of definite manifestation. Hence.dependence on the social system. also of aims and interests.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . Where civil society. which is honesty. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. be the righ t and just thing. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. or could be.and ye t it should be decided. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. Thus whether three years.
being laws o f strict right. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . whic h are only internally in these objects. and in particular transforms this existence . the need of a simpler code . But there is a contrary case. of his countrymen. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. they touch only the abstract will . who has by so doing gained the gratitude.into punishment (¤ 500). even the admiration. These people forget that the stars . ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. in the judicial system. . and t hus become authoritative . In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. . like improvements on a f loor or a door.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. at the same time an externally objective existence. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. which discovers new distinctions. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. within the house . This subjective existence. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis . as universal authority and necessity.to be promulgated and made known as laws . to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . as in the mental ima ges of space. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel.the ne ed. are not a new hou se. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . however. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. recognized. as the genuine order of life.are governed and well governed too by laws. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them.vi z. with the advance in multitude. there arises.laws. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. general laws. hereditary divinity or nobility.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. The comparison of the two species. first really de serving the name of laws.in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated.and th e cattle too . and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. which again make new decisions necessary.e.as this exists as revenge .even as his law can only be a just law.to the individualized right . To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. constit . to which objective existence determines i tself. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . inasmuch as.as proven: . deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. by faith and trust. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. as it is a known law. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. i. not for them. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines.which though something new.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will.
so as to secure this satisfaction.'poli .as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. shou ld. because it is only one factor. the position of an external un iversality. then.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. which. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. . By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. to the concrete of civil society. because it is man's want. in a uniform gen eral way. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. from the c onnections between nation and nation. and the judgement as application of the law to it. and their variable ingredients. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. and worked from that point of view. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions.viz. appears as state. It results also from circumstances of locality. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. mere circumstantial evidence. In so far. No doubt this factor is incomplete. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. So far as concerns them. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. be exercised as different functions. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective.and that. . as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. as at bottom different sides. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. Conversely. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . To this therefore the accused has an absolute right.
but. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. they are re strictions. to the immediate agent. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. the state only is as an organized whole. Thus we have the corpora tion.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. It provides for the reasonable will . which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals .one individual. On the other hand. is its essence.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own .as an actuality .into the life of the universal substance. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. it carries back both. The same unity. and not left to perish. which. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. continually produce it as their result.which volition is thereby free . secondly. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . through the action of the government and its several branches.international (outer-state) law. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. but which has a thoroughly general side. then it promotes their welfare. however. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. Secondly. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. with all its evolution in detail. First. in this direction . in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. ¤ 539 As a living mind. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . self-originated. This universal principle. and . The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. it protects the family and guides civil society. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. . But. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. his independent self-will and particular interest. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. s heer subjectivity. receiving. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock.ce'. and self-develop ed . First it maintains them as persons. which each originally takes care of for himself. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. and.the reasonable spirit of will. The cons titution is existent justice . also for that will being put in actuality. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance.co nsists in a double function. (c) THE STATE. Thirdly. differentiated in to particular agencies.in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will .
Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas.pleasure an d self-will.besides their personalit y . and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. etc. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. otherwise have in property. the difference of governing powers and of governed. But the notion of liberty. etc. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. were called its 'liberties'. It is important therefore to study them closer. etc. in other words. which it can without incompatibility allow. rejects all differences.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. But.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. The laws themselve s. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. or destroy them. the citizens .as regards taxation. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. authorities.equal in the concrete. Really. However true this is. Nothing has become. the familiar proposition. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. eligibili ty to office. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. as it ha ppens. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . as regards the concrete..only it can make them . or even in crime. on the contrary. the current notions of l . age. etc. With the state there ari ses inequality. is so little by nature. private as well as public rights of a nation.e. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. All men are by nature equ al. Rome. on the contrary. i. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. As regards Liberty. physical strength. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. etc. directories. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. Equality. Formerl y the legally defined rights. talent. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. presuppos e unequal conditions. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. military service. magistracies . and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. But that this freedom should e xist. and that the laws are restrict ions. first. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. On the contrary. . skill. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. it embodies a liberty. The principle of equality. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). without further specification and development. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). As regards.punishment. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . is abstract subjectivity. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. that the laws rule. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. town . logically carried ou t. as it exists as s uch. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. etc.
What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. i. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it.e . it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. of others.iberty only carry us back to equality. with its insatiate vanity. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. self-w ill and self-conceit. and thus gains moral independence. of liberties in general. and the organization of the actualization of them. just as little as the making of a code of laws. in other words continuall . A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development.just because of this inseparability . with this development of particularity. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. however. Of it the following paragraphs will speak.a thing that has nev er happened in history. The question . The term political liberty. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. ¤ 541 The really living totality . and must deal with them as it ca n. If .) But the guara ntee lies also.that which preserves. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. is . . On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights.as sec urity of property. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. and to regard a state. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. has an insight and conviction of his own . be it added. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les.e. But the more we fortify liberty. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. not merely with regard to the naturalness. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. as a state without a constitution. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. in which this is not formally done. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it.
the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs.e. but an actual indiv idual . In the perfect form of the state. as in a democratic constitution.y produces the state in general and its constitution. ¤ 542 In the government .the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment.impugns the principle of the division of powers.the all-sustaining. of the family and of civil society. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. as in the patri archal society . which taken apart is also particular). it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. is the self-redintegrating notion. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion.monarchy. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). . the participation of all i n all affairs . and the government be merely executive and dependent . (A mistake still greater. in other words.in a state of society. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. Only through t he government. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. is the state one. is the government. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. . These. as always. equally disorganizes actuality. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. which includes an already existing development of differences. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity.e.the will of a decreeing individual. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. i. i. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. all-decreeing will of the state.regarded as organic totality . but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit.to make it the first power.su bject always. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence.or. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. however.
such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. participate in the governmental power. Secon dly.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. For it is as private persons t . Thus. aristocracy and monarchy. lik e peace and war. especially in legislation . in so far as they are finite and in course of change. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. and then of nature . being simple self-relation. That subjectivity . first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. These principles are those expounded earlier. first. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. which having their busin ess appointed by law. too. and with earlier transition-forms. essentially.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . legislative power. i. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . Two points only are all-important. an actual existence. liberty of property. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. there arises the participation of several in state-business. and above all personal liberty.as also feudal monarchy. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). possess independence of a ction. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. aptitude. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. with their general opinion. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. admini stration of justice or judicial power. involve the. administration and police. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. as it were.such as ochlocracy.partly. The pure forms . and skill for such ends. it may be . The division of constitutions into democracy.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws.in short. in the history of the State. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . civil society.'ideal' unity.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. and are to that degree private person s.e. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction.are. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . to subjectivity.viz. etc. . to that end and for that reason. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. with its industry and i ts communities. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty.. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general .
range of the extern al means of government. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion.a spiritual element . as estates. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. or in its 'reflectional' universality. in the general sense of embracing a wide. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. however. as the nation . in arrangements for art and science. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. s ense of general wants. which. and form a particular kind . ¤ 529 note). who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf.which should be presupposed. blind force. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. as such an aggregate. however. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. demoralization. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons.the contrary must be the case . But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials .e. inorganic shape. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. moreover. be they treated as mere individuals. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. like that of the stormy. so far as they form only one branch of that power . The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus.as it very likely is . The des irability of such participation. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. that t hey enter upon that participation. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. In a civilized state. i.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. is no t self-destructive.regard ed as permanent.as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. but as organic factors.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. elemental sea. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. wild. If the main part of the requirement were . The so-called financial law. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. and therefore more urgent. it is not a brutish mass.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election).nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. in the law and liberty of property. Take the case of England which. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. ever newly recurring. Experience s hows that that country . legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t .would be. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . to power and act ion. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. indeed the whole.
but only parties. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. In one case the .e. In their mutual relations.. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. in which there would no longer be a government.e.i. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. a state of war. is really engaged with strict executive business. or every few years. as content o f a true law. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. and not to be made yearly. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity .o be a law it would have to be made once for all. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal.as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . waywardness and chance have a place. when it makes a decree about finance. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. and not actually existent.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. of the whole of the finances.g. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. and thus. e.is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. and becomes the estate of bravery. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many.so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. i. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . afresh. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . Then again. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount.
are settled and fixed. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. that. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing.. each of which. and above all universal history. especially on the philological side. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. both this general recognition. it passes int o universal world-history. is appointed to occupy only one grade. It has. That history. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. and accomplish one task in the whole deed.of sacerdotal races . It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. of a Roman epic. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. a history of its own. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. this note must go into further deta il. as it is a history. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities.a world-mind. and as regards its range and scope. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. which actually is and will be realized in it . and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. internat ional law rests on social usage. As this development is in time and in real existence. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. On th is point. in short. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. and in Germany more than in France and England. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. Fictions. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. It is in time. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. an d the special claims of nations on one another. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character.and. in short. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. In general. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . however. etc. and then in history. when we come to minutiae. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . is called an a prio ri view of it. there is Reason in history.the judgement of the world. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. it. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. and on history-writing in general. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left.the plan of Provide nce. in defiance of . first in general. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations.
etc. Rome and its fortunes. on the other hand. and rejects both ki nds of interest. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. state. express not a subjective particularity. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. in the interest of so-called truth. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions.appears to run . and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. a civilization. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. strictly s peaking. and criticize events. a nation. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. as in the romance. in striking portraiture and brevity. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity.g. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance.to say a word on that here . weave them into the pictur e of general interests. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. and. and an exclusive interest in justice. e. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. Ay. What happens to a nation .). has. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. i. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. a word. or if he declined to judge at all. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. is not only against taste and judgement.e. not as good as a fairy tale. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. if he had not an interest. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). but violates th e principles of objective truth.like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. but an age. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. or. no history . and takes place within it. But. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. The point of interest of Biography . T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such.the best-accredited history.
then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. etc. and there fore as a work of individuals. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim.e. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . i. have they their value and even their existence. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. are instruments. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. a development determined by the notion of spirit. i.e. these individuals. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme.e. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. the absolute L aw. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. i. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. on the contary. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. is the supreme right. But biography too has for its background the historical world. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . while it inheres in them. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. 550). notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). in the shape of its unreflective natural usages.e. to the history of religion. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. potentially infinite. has another ground and interest than his tory.or in other words that Reason is in history . liberty. which all alik e have no stuff in them. first in general. etc. the freak of humour. The mere play of sentiment. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. which is what is pe culiar to them. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. truth. For Spirit is consciousn ess. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. which is their reward. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. really. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. as over a special grade. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour.admitting. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. Such a doctrine . no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. i. and of its essence. only opinions and mere ideas. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . the consciousness of it. But. and the business of so doing. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also .Fame. and secondly. and their subjectivity. and its content is prese . suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. we may add. and are all treated as indifferent. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance.will be par tly at least a plausible faith.an accurate report of externals. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. Only therefore through their relationship to it.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. is the empty form of activity. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. in this case. if Rome or the German empire. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort.
As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. actually accomplished in the ethical world. i.e.is the peculiar perversity. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. especially ¤ 51.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. the idea of God it kn . and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. As regards the 'mediation' which. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. from which the start is now made.e. At this rat e. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . in the system of laws and usages. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. as law and duty. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude.consciousn ess. cf. now gets its most concrete interpretation.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. is the real ethical self.e. note). It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. i. lays hold of its concr ete universality. The spirit. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. as true in the world of free will. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. and that on the religious. forme rly noticed. This factor. that elevation to God really involves. ¤ 204 not e). however. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour.as is the case with all speculative process . stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. Th e finite. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself .a mere 'ought' .Liberty. i. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. i.e. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. But the spirit which think s in universal history. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. For that st arting. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. is the purification. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. Such apprehension. But . the state rests on the ethical sentiment. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think.
This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. B .e. in point of form.ows must be the true and real. And. but in the moment of enjoymen t.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience.or it may be. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. It leads.logi cally enough . as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . then there may be created. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. It lea ds to a laity. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. and ex pecting miracles from them. and law and justice. religion was a late r addition. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated.as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. generally. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. differing from the former in body and value of truth. the host as such is not at first consecrated. first of all.the body of religious truth. springing from some force and power. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. but purely subjective in individuals: . its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . and superstition. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. and in the act of faith. non-spirituality. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. and even as mutually indifferent. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free.e. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. i. i. and prays others to pray . on the contr ary. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God.e. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. to justification by external wo rks. a condition of spiritual sla very. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. in its faith and in its con science. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . one religious and an other ethical. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members.e.partly as mere moving of the lips. (In the Lutheran Church. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. in the annihilation of its externality. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. i. and these applications of it in the religious life.addressing his devotion to miracle. for thought and knowledge . i. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. morality and conscience. even to bones. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. But in poin t of form.of bondage.working images.
the wisdom of the world. i. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. i. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. Instead of the vow of chastity. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. no matter how. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. self-realizing reason . marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. therefore. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres.e. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. i.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. sti . Thus. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. if taken alone. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty.e.in short. leads it into the rea l world. because the state is a self-possessed. So long as t he form. and in a special sense Philosophy. lacked liberty. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. founded on principles of reason. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. so to speak a priori. a code of law should arise. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. and thus only. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. Thus set free. unte nable. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. .of honesty in commercial dealing. and in the use of property . The precept of religion. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality.e. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. And instead of the vow of obe dience. . Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it.an obedience which is itself the true freedom. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . . and political institutions deduced from them must be. our consciousness and subjectivity. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. which does not rise in hostility against them. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. and. Let us suppose even that. can law and morality exist. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. moral life in the state.
and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. so-called 'chambers'. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. that the Idea must be regent. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets.is the intellectual and thinking self.is just this .g. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. . when specially set in relief as genus.among which laws these guarantees are included. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. This additional 'individuality' . to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy.to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. At best it is only a temporary expedient . ¤ 544 note). however sound their provisions may be. and the power given them to fix the budget. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. on one hand. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal.mi nd intrinsically concrete . This absolute nucleus of man . and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. on the other hand. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded.. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. e. etc.ll.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . or. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. (cf. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists .could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. Such laws. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. thus founder on the conscience. thus surmountin .to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . from those deeper requirements which. to put it simply. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution.
appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. Under the subjective form. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. religion.and th at on account of this very principle . or essential being). and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . and so also one-sided phase. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. is implicitly in absolute liberty.). which is awa re of its own essence.so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. etc. should knit it together and control it. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . intuition. earlier than it does as philosophy. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. But even religion. of philosophy.). ¤ 513. His state is therefore. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. which still escaped his intelligence. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . in its philosophic phase. but earlier than philosophy.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. he. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. Hence religion as such. But thought always . is after all only in one of its form s. Only in the principle of mind. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. which is developed similarly. the subjectivity of mind.the idea of the substantial moral life. for th ese reasons. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. however.was that creative imagination. as it grows and expands. so . on its own s howing. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. The form in its infinite tru th. or rather must. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. in its f irst immediate. Religion may. Political power. as demoralization. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. pictorial representation. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. exhibits the one-sidedness. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. Plato. from religion. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. fall feeling. As it left therefore behind. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality.
and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. 7. i. for which it is as substance. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. 3. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion.as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). Das aussere Staatsrecht. Inneres Staatsrecht. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. as always. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. Die Rechtspflege 5. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject.e. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . as well as their several applications. Die Polizei und die Corporation. Die Sittlichkeit. 9. 4. Die Weltgeschichte 10. while it is self-centred identity. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. That here. Thus ul timately. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. but rather to a sort of knowledge.in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. 1. 2. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. 6. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. 8. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. Weltweisheit. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. Das System der Bedurfnisse. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. of God's indwelling in us. the constitut ion and the code. Religion. In the Protestant state. Gesetz. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. and if that and not the truth as such is called for .
¤ 411). ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. on the other hand. but . like the material which it uses to work in. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. In this ideal. that is.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism.for the expression of spiritual truth . as superseded in spirit.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). Belief. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. its n atural immediacy. Der absolute Geist.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . Art requires not only an external given material . and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. has in devotion . A. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity.the shape or form of Beauty. But. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . On one hand.in other words. 1. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. . is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. c an.hence not the sp iritual unity. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . as it is. reconciliation. With the essential restrictedness of its content.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal.something formal. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. the actuality of the spirit. which is only a sign of the Idea. viz.the form of immediacy as such . or the idea. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art.i. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . and of gaining its concrete determination. so that the thought embodied. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth.e. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. into the subject which produces that work. aware.
The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. subjectivity.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources .e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist .in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. and of its constitution. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. as well as of its art and science. known as the Absolute. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle.symbolic art. but its inmost depth. and th e artist is the master of the God. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so .and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. assumes fuller and firmer features. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. but as only finding himself in himself. the principle of its law. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. as free spi rit. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. is not yet absolute. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. though concrete and intrinsically free.stil l this art is defective. the artist's enthusiasm. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. . and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. and that is where the infinite form. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. that one spirit creates and informs them. not yet conscious of itself. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. is not yet known. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. or an effor t towards him .can try to bring itself to consciousness.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . of its actual liberty. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive.
from it s side. and j ust for that reason. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit.ent in it. which is only in the medi um of thought . has its future in true reli gion.it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. like the religion peculiar to it. with their perso nal sense and feeling. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. on the contrary. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. shows that such religion is on the decline. not the supreme liberation itself. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . and brilliancy. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle.that it be revealed. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. what is more. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. . looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. expression.into revelation. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. But with a further and deeper study. we see that the advent of art. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . the theme and c entre of religion. still more in that external. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. unbeautiful sensuo usness. revealed by God. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. and.due to a one-sided survey of human life . is first generated. in which he had not revealed himse lf.is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. . dashing t o pieces everything high and great . If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. whose con tent is absolute mind . it is from Him. B.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . Beautiful art.the religion i.of Nemesis. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion.The genuine objectivity. . The older religion in which the need of fine art.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. as infinite self-realizing form . Beautiful art. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge .e. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . spectator find themselves at home. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. The old conception .
And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. Yet. and reconciliation with the eternal being. for that reas on. as the extreme of inherent negativity. it is. it implies the revelation of Him. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. even in its manifestation. staying aloof and inert. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . (c) as infinite return. while in point of form he is. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed.on the other hand.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters.1. in point of content. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. ¤ 566 In this separating. the spirit. not. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. directed towards the Eternal. he still remains in original identity .. which therefore is finite.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence .just as. It includes. and. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. or of judgement. amid that natural ness. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. (a) as eternal content. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. Go d is. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. on the other hand. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. but afterwards. That spirit. as in duty bound.: Berlin 1829. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning.knowledge in God. first of all.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him.is the Spirit. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories..of the only Son . If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . only standing to it in an external connection. in it s forefront. To know what God as spirit is . in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. with whom. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. when it thinks.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. On one hand is heaven and earth. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. F. to specul ative comprehension. further.requires careful and thorough speculation. again. by C. G . and phenomena which succeed each other. however. of the world it gave away .See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. But. which proceeds to man's self. making them presuppositions towards each other. the elemental and the concrete nature .it is therefore the absolute spirit. . though. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . though different. abiding sel f-centred. a separate being. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. . the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . on one hand. it may almost create surprise that so many. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality .
which from itself. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. . is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content.and. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being.is taken in a merely formal. after the example of his truth. but even to thought. but alive and present in the world. truth is the object of philoso phy.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. through which witness of the spirit in him. gives itself direction and con tent. this immediate. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. on account of his immediate nature. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. Whereas the vision-method of Art. simple.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. But. remains master over it. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. This individual. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . eternal. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. with a temporal and external sequence. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . keeps himself unchanged. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. in which he. he. so far. is not bound by it . Thinking. is itself the emptiness and vanity.Irony. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. external in point of form. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. th e self-centred manifestation. From this its separation into p arts. and thus sensuous. 1.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. and thus.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. his natur al man and self-will.but the vision of implicit truth. Irony. If the result . ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . as infinite subjectivi ty. contentless sense. an object of contemplating vi sion .¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . secondly. C. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. In this form of truth. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. and eternal spirit in itself. who as such is identified with the essence . so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding.is transplanted into the world of time. Further. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. Die geoffenbarte Religion. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy.
which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. and s o religious. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . a nd of logic in particular. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. This does not prevent the spirit. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. too much for the latter. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. This movement. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary.e. which determines itself to content. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. and against philosophy in general . and particularly of the logical form.from these forms. which philosophy is. or.on one hand. and acts inconsistently towards them. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. when at the close it seizes its own notion . The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. remains identical with it. to be more precise still. with its separ ation into parts. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. It had t oo little of God in it for the former.which may be in both the same .takes. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. of course. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. The charge of Atheism. opens it out in mental picture. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea.stantial content into many separate shapes. and mediates what is thus open ed out. only looks back on its knowledge. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. and this necessary as free. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit.leaving out. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. This witness . then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision.on the other hand.the underlying essence in all humanity . even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence.and from a pithless orthodoxy. and whereas Religion. as also of the necessity in the two forms . If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. but also criticized it. when driven to expound itself.it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. finds itself already accompl ished. immediate vision and its poetry. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. elevation of them into the absolute form. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy .i. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought.('Rationalism') .
all such definiteness is only the non-divine.thus he understands philosophy . But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. are unable and unwilling to see this .in the wanton assertion. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics.(empirical things. On such a presuppo sition. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality.which therefore it does not disparage. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. open to our disposal on this topic. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. It is only his own stupidity.each and every secular thing is God. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: .the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. as it stands. if we believe them. God in General. and amongst it s effusions. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. from which all definite quality is excluded. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof.so much so. Without interest of its own for the concrete. but as a proved fact. are) . so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. and form all that is definite in the divine universality. also contains the generic abs tract. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . and so . which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. fulfilled notion of God. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy.as the most authentic statement accessible .(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . This new theology. without distinction. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e.or to dalai-lamas .Everything is . that it has too much of him: . exclusi ve. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. If this theory needs no more than such a God. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism.of the new piety and new theology. ¤ 71 note). prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. cows . that. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God.is always adora tion of an object which. I select . As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. as is well known. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness.that of the Hindu to ass es. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. Piety. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. we must.g.all possess substantia lity. some of the most telling passage . Amongst the abundant resources. whether higher or lower in the scale. its grossest shape. most sublime. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things.of Pantheism. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) .that of the Egyptians to the ox . does not comprehend itself. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . or any one man.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . with all its absurdities.the Bhagavat-Gita. or if you will. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. and is therefore. the secularity of th ings. in particular. or Pantheism.so much so.
'At the end of many lives. nothing independent]. and end of living things. . In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. t he pure unity of thought in itself. I am the light of th e sun and the moon.. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. than which there is nothing higher. p. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. even Siva. all this is woven upon me. . Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. . That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. . . 7 seqq. the One which. . vanish. . Even when. . as different from that accidental. melt into the one Krishna. he is said to be the beginning. middle. I am life in all beings. . is not. or a God besides.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. .' This 'All'. any more than the Eleatic One. .' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). but having its truth in the substance. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. . the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. . developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend.that Hinduism. so to speak . There is nothing else higher than myself. Among letters I am the letter A.the most excellent of everything. has the higher conception of Brahma. . I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. goodness. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. still God. the Everything. . . I am also the strength o f the strong. . so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. where the empirical everything of the world. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . and the Spinozan Substance. This everything. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. Hinduism. however.. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences.s.not everything. and the moon among the lunar mansions. as he said before he was S iva. . But so little concrete is this divine unity . . Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. .' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. besides Krishna. or Indra.spiritual as its idea of God i s . rather. . grip. . think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible.so powerless its. to a poly theism. etc. which he is. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. . . Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. . with a monstrous incons istency. . . Meru among the high-topped mountains. . pp. without essential being of its very own.'I am the self. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. I am the taste in water. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . which Krishna calls himself. . unessential existences. . . . . and one essential amongst them. as also those proximate substantialities. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable.. called Gods. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. is also the maddest of polytheisms. passion. . The undiscerning ones. . not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. is alo ne the divine and God. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe .). . . Indra. seated in the hearts of all beings. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. at the beginning of the pass age. but only .
and God everything. moreover. secondl y. especially the Mohammedan. and on the other. and so on . If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. e. empirical indivi duals . but . But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. on one hand. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. whether they spring from heart. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. as it says. But to go back again to the question of fact. and that unity described as love. when he adores the ape. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. even in a general exoteric discussion. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is.in its finest purity and sublimity. as everything. to was . the all.keep its independence.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail.on the shallow conception of it . in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. is discarded and absor bed. is identical with the world. If.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual.ndu. as the endless lot of empirical existence. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. or. For that unity.of the world as one thing. we must consult th e Mohammedans. as infinite from the finite. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. outside it . after this partition. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. It is only the picture . and. Of the oriental. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. or other creature. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences.g. Hin du monotheism. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. which. he is as essence parted from appearance. to which everything is God. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. modes of envisaging God. the finite to the infinite. the Eleatic. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te.. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . imagination or speculation.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. But.. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. ac osmical. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. That pantheism indeed . or Spinozist. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. in relation to the popular idea of the world. of the relationship of God and the world.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. on the contrary. and of empirical secular spirit. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence.floating in the indefinite blue . These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God.
a nd assert .g.falsely as a fact . i.and s till less take trouble about it . in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. and that amongst the m there is great variety. however.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. as in the physical field the physicist.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world.te a word on what a 'notion' means. . but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. and that it is the system of identity. when they hear of unity . it is not. etc. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. but with concrete unity (the notion). they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on.said pores being the negative. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. as Epicu rus does.has the same solid substantiality as the other. with God's omnipresence. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. and which they ascribe to philosophy. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. the most external and the worst. and that hence.that. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. they have laid hands on. where they are utterly unknown. not the concrete unity. they import them into philosophy. e.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . mere ide ntity.e. But the question is.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. omnipresence. in the pores of th e physicists . in matters admitted to be of superior. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. I n the philosophical field they proceed. composition. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . but rather its reverse. with indefinite ideas. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. and the empty absolute. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry.and relation i pso facto implies unity . inorganic and living . Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general.is identity. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. But they show so little acquaintance with them . with abstract unity. is what one expect s. viz. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself.and that the factor of indet erminateness .g. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. the notion and content of philosophy. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. if not even of supreme interest. but only the one factor of this category of relation . Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. depend solely on the different modes of this unity.the world as much as Go d . applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. And as in their judgement either of the two . providence.
as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. in his relation to the world. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. the absolutely universal. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts .as the mediating agent in th e process .presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . as other than they. and notions . now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism.by which notions are perverted into their opposite. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. for its middle term: a middle. sunders itself. But in ascribing to God.knowing reaso n. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . this stale gossip of oneness or identity. and which is itself the way to produce it. and as implicitly the Idea. an All-one doctrine.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . i. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. or as prevaricating for a purpose.e. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. as of cognitions. If statements as to facts are put forward. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. making the former its presupposition. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . Nature . shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. a system of identity. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. On account of this chorus of assertions. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. not abstract unity. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. But to put that sort of thing. then. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning.it is the nature of the fact. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. which has self. but the many-shaped modes specified. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. is philosophy itself. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. on the shoulders of philosophy. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. which .the logical system. of which liberty is the aim.ity .their everything. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea.which. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . and the latter its universal extreme. which causes the movement and development.it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. standing between the Mind and its essence. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. the notion. y . The esoteric study of God and identity.
. eternally sets itself to work. in f ull fruition of its essence.et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. The eternal Idea.
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