INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any

attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i

s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as

treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.

SUB-SECTION A. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. except where. as such a result. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. however. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. its simple 'ideal' life. which is potentially all things. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . as absolute negativity. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. There. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. whereas the 'vital' matter.the truth that matter itself has no truth. ANTHROPOLOGY. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. Mind. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery.e. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. not merely lacks gravity. matter is regarded as something true.with th is proviso. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. But not merely is it. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. and so the self-externalism. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. but soul. like heat. The usual answer. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. on the one hand. on the other. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. even the capacity of offering resistance. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. a nd the soul remains the pervading. It is otherwise with Mind. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact.the passive of Aristotle. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. and. have still. identical ideality of it all. where the othe . perhaps. li ght. At such a stage it is not yet mind. however. to which they might perhaps add space and time. and mind conceived as a thin g. and not as the immediate or natural individual. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. thus come into being. i.. in a sense. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. the soul is only the sleep of mind . etc. Wherever there is Nature. indeed. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. These 'imponderables' . which is the fund amental feature of matter. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity.

described. (b) Secondly. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. disappear. just in proportion to his civilization. remain for ever subject to such influences.or corporeity . The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. and always more or less. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. its immediate being . (c) Thirdly. Spinoza. as so often is done. Hence. in many case s completely. is too abstract.the natural soul. and. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). so to speak. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. or. and the periods of the day. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. into the absolute syllogism. T hus. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. and. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. so holding. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. feels the difference of climates. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. it is a soul which feels. . with Leibniz. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. and telluri c life of man. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. as an anima mundi. In nations less intellectually emancipated.e. These have.r is not . on the contrary. a world-soul. moulded into it. the changes of the seasons. Malebranche. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. there philosophers took God. But either this identity. as individualized. it may be. and does not rise or develop into system. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. in the modes of that being. Animals and pl ants. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. which only is. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. not.(a) In its immediate natural mode . But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. sidereal. as in the case of Spinoza. based upon participation in the common life of nature. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . they are natural objects for consciousness. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject.e. re tains an abstract independence. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. upon it. even these few and slight susceptibilities. enter s into correlation with its immediate being.whence Epicurus. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. when it presents itself as a single soul. Descartes. as in the case of Lei bniz.

Thirdly. and as stages in its development. fancies. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. of families or single individuals. and on the other. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. or artistic. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. shows.the sexual relation . but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. This . the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. fails to meet his ideal requirements. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which.on a ph ysical basis. as it exists. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points.mind wrapped up in itself.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. on the whole. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. talent . on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). the one permanent subject. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. bodily structure and disposit ion. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. in purposes political. And that individuality marks both the world which. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. on its one side. carrying out these universa . where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. character. The contrast between the earth's poles. scientific. we find it as the special temperament. hopes. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. widely distant from each other. and the position of the individual himself. as alterations in it. we find its diversities. we see man in his true relation to his environment. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). shows an active half.a worl d no longer incomplete. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. physiognomy. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. He begins with Childhood .

as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. i n an unintelligent way. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. viz. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . each point. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work.The waking is not merely for the observer. as they may be called. put this question to the class of ideology. sleep. for example.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. . and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. as already noted. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. distinguishes itself from its mere being. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. but as a return back from the world of specialization. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. The characterization given in the section is abstract. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. . in the first instance. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family.not as a merely negative rest from it.Napoleon. although. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . . but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. (c) Sensibility(3) . as before explained . or self-centralized being. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. which are often addressed to philosophy: .In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering.

for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. and . and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. not mere alterations. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). on one hand. the fact is a mode of my individuality. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. its natural peculiarity. belonging as it does to natural. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). mean. are in order to be felt. ho wever. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. But if put in the feelin g. but treated as bel onging to its most special. is what we call sensibility. evil. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. true. in the feeling. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. adultery. and is so felt. and religious.identity of our self-centred being. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. This should hardly need enforcing. godless. etc. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart.g. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. it is true. On the other hand and conversely. and the character. and to be as if found. the naturally immedi ate. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. for itself. the inarticulate bre athing. blasphemy. One. primarily. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. are found by the waking soul.set over against consciousness.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. moral. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. invested with cor poreity. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. Another. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. the conscience. just. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. murder ..? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. fornication. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. are our very own. etc. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. in its own self. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . be it noted. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. etc. which. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. mora l. The fact that these particulars. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability.

i. What it has to do.a psychical physiology. We should have. but an the system of the senses. works itself out. of self. smells. the blood. (¤ 317) . In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. o f colours. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. i ts merely virtual filling-up. to realize its mastery over its own. the centre of the 'sensible' system. In the usage of ordinary language. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. with its varieties of feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). ¤ 402 Sensations. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. .because in it. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life .alterations in the substantiality of the soul. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science .e. of heavy matter. (c) the sense of solid reality. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. the 'irritable' system. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. with which that substance is one. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. e. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. to take possessi on of it.g. sighs. the soul is no longe r a mere is a soul which feels.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. 322). and their corporization. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. especially the passions or emotions. is to raise its substantiality. the immediacy of mode in feeling . set in its self-centred life. are formed from their mental source.the senses of definite light. just because they are immediate and are found existing. following the special character of the mental mode. tones. and voice in general. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . (¤¤ 321. in a special system of bodily organs. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. therefore. to the character of subjectivity. (¤ 300). As sentient. distinction appears as mere variety . laughter. and in this way they get quite another interpretation.and of sound. for example. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications.

so far as that is. where the real is put past . etc. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. and to that world it stands but as to itself. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. thoughts. which is at the same time its predicate. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. it brings within itself. in whi ch all this is stored up. the content is its particular world.. although it does not exist. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. it implies a want of adaptation. but a negation. which is disease. the s oul is characterized as immediate. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. In the present stage we must treat. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). omnipresent unity. to be defined as one of feeling . It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). They were not in our possession. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. to which the soul. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . This substance i s still the content of its natural life. virtually retained. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. prima rily. Thus in the body it is one simple.the existent spe culative principle. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . in an implicit mode. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. but only to his im plicit self. As sentient. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. ideas. ideas and information. Some times. etc. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. may again sink down. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . which repre sents it as the negation of the real. At the present stage this singleness is. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. first. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. ¤ 404 As individual. By itself. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. a deep featureless characterless mine. acquired lore. secondly. without existing.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. in sickness. once mor e come to light. the corporeity.that world being included in it and filling it up. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it.

and of character. character. of the mother. temper. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. is visibly present as another and a different individual.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. not yet as its self. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. intellige nt. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. and is therefore passive. Here are two individuals. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate .a substance. or capac ity.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. but as efficiency and realized activity. or virtuality. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. incl inations. which. etc. tal ent. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. etc. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. as yet nothing impenetrable. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. congenital disposit ion and temperament. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. self-possessed. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. as it has existence of its own. not as a mere possibility.. say between friends. etc. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. the psychical relationship. idiosyncrasies. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. developed interests. controlling genius then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. of life. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. as concrete subject ivity. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . fortunes. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. and reasonable. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. placenta. not a true subject reflected int o itself. whose decision is ul . injuries. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. it is. because immediate. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). the single self of the two. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. etc. self-conscious.. By the self-hood of the latter it . his secular ideas. The moth er is the genius of the child.

self-possessed human being is a disease. intentions. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man.his fun damental interests. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. which are also means and ends to each other. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. But such a verification would. it must be added. The facts. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist show.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. in which the individual here appears innnersed. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. on the other hand. is. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. educated. first of all call for verificati on. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. on the cont rary. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. in other words. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . that it is in harmony wi th the facts. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. To that end the phenomena. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. it might seem. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. At the same tim e. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism .infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. means. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. it has already been call ed his genius. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible be mere deception and impo sture. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. This totality forms his actual ity. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes.

f riends. subje ctive reason. the magnetizer. after the downfall of the Roman republic. smells.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. like that of the child in the womb. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. in its sober moods. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. But such clairvoyance . The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. tastes. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . on those left behind. but it is empty. is this. a formal vision and awareness. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. that it is a state of passivity. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. in catalepsy. then. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. for example. the selfless individual. and hears. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives.).(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity.a genius which beh olds itself. formed.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. When the substance of both is thus made one. however. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. in whom it sees. unless by the aid of religion.) Compare h ome-sickness. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. . he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. etc. and the like. those c onnected with female development. and to know which. etc. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. and character. not really a 'person'. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. . wh en it is healthy and awake. And because it is the adult. reads. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. is under a veil. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. not on the for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. and c ontinues to be. (Thus Cato. which. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. etc. ca pable of conveying general truths. exist for it as an outward objectivity. and other diseases. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. external one to another.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. or at the approach of death. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . his own and that of the magnetize . It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. But. which lead up to the result . subject to the power of another person. .it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear.

when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. for example. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness.fe eling. i s just this form of immediacy. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. as in the morbid state alluded to. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. in this nominal perception. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. is impossible. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. as in other cases. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . etc. In considering insanity we must. i. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. causality. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . beholds. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. which. e. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. and hence. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. so long as we assume independent personalities. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. between intelligent personality and objective world. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. on the contrary. which still marks the self-feeling. anticipate the full-grown an . it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. one sees and hears with the fingers. which is no less a world of law. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. is without any definite points of attachment . it is still susceptible of long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. reasons. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. the 'common sense'. In this way it is discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. receives. The purely sensitive life. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. etc. though all-embracing. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. or med icines for them. in its capacity as individual. and at the same time.r. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics.

. and made appear in.merely personal love and hatred. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. however. and so makes part of the actual self. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy.feeling. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . And so too the particularity is. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. as a thing. instincts. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. it would be death). is undistinguis hed from them. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. earthly elements are set fr ee . Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character.e. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. and the rest of the passions . He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. etc. pride. i. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. passions. i. is diseased. the. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. this life of feeling. moral and theoretical. may. loss of health (if it were cies and hopes . and their gratification). A violent. and be a realized u niversality. equally formal. the self is to be stamped upon. . presupposes the patient's rationality. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. and it is only as a thing. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. inclination. idea. i.that evil which is always latent in the heart. In the concrete. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. but a contr adiction in it. as it aris es. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. mere and total. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. and also desires. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. as something natural and existent. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. is relaxed.e. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. but only derangement. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. that it is liable to insanity . but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. such as vanity. This humane treatment. desire. and so also may the cure. which is there also. Mind as such is fr ee.just as physical disease is not an abstract. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. This particular being of the soul is t . it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement.. etc. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires.e. as now regarded. so as to insert them in their proper place. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement).the settled fixture of som e finite element in it.d intelligent conscious subject.

The natural qualities and alterations of age. as. occupied. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. and which still continues to exist. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. a second nature.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. dist inguishing it from itself . heat. the one and the same. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. this being of the soul. empty space and empty time. so is that pure being (which. and for that reason n ot free. will. Habit like memory.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. of it. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. and so no longer interested. weariness o . but the basis of consciousness. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. sleep. and that as a barrier for it. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. nature. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. i. nor is absorbed in the m. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. is reduced to unity. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. of which it is the subjective substance. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. has been absorbed by it. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. but has them and moves in them. et c. are only subjectiv e forms. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject.. lacking consciou sness. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. partly only relative. but still free. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. and the generation o f habit as practice.he factor of its corporeity. Habit is rightly called a second nature. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. a pure act of intuition. on the contrary. For.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. The soul is freed from them.e. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self .and becoming the 'ideal'. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. therefore. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence.itself a simple being . That is to say. and the mere substance. su bjective substantiality of it . because it is an immed iate being of the soul. or dependent in regard to it. when the co rporcity. even in being affected by them. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. And consciousness it becomes. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality.

And it is true that the form of habit. an 'ideality' of soul . made into an instrum ent. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. The most ext ernal of them. reflection. to be made a power in the bodily part. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. or skill. like their satisfaction. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. too. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. this soul. to exist as substance in its corporeity. and the self-feeling as such. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. Thinking. whereof we sha ll speak later.e. This is the rational liberation from them. and any other purp oses and activity. and no other. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. intuition. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. without an express adjustment. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. viz. i. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. Even here. under its volitional and conceptual characters.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness .or the misfortune . Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility.). in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. habit diminishes this feeling. so that when the conception (e. acquires a strength which consists in this. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual.concentration. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). like any other. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. or. a particular organ of i ts organic system). sweet tastes. consciousness. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. a series of musical notes) is in me. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. nor a transient emotion or idea. and especially so in the specific bodily part. habit is usually passed over - . . fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. moral. casual. and thus to enable the soul.f the limbs. which make it up. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless.enabling the matter of consciousness. and that they. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. cut off from action and reality. re ligious. that although the frost. consciousness. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature.. etc. intelligence. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. if quite abstract. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. etc. is recollection and memory. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. etc. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. but part and parcel of his being. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness.g..which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. Habit on an ampler scale. and it is habit of living which brings on death. nor are they in conce ption rational. and particul ar. to be his as this self. nor an abstrac t inwardness. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. are no longer bothered with it. his upright pos ture. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . however free and active in its own pure element it b felt. etc. the spatial direction of an individual.. etc. has been by will made a habit .

and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. 4. 'The autho . placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. In this identity of interior and exterior. as the absolut e instrument.either as something contemptible . the latter subject to the former. And the human figure. absorbing it.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. still vainer than a signatura rerum. unable to represent it in its actual universality. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. represents not itself. in its concentrated self. 1. or the 'immediacy' of mind. and making it its own. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. it is related to itself. while language is its perfect expressi on.laughter. in other words. finds itself there a single subject. indefinite. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. the upright figure in general. 2. Under the head of human expression are included. and inexpressible a modific ation. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. and the formation of the limbs. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. 71). weeping. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. of which it is the sign. 3. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. This externality. for the soul. etc. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. 5. Empfindung. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. and i s infinite self-relation.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. Seen from the animal world. a world external to it . The soul.. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. cuts itself off from its immediate being. or abstract universality. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. Die fuhlende Seele. of the mouth . thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. Naturliche Qualitaten. This note is so slight. Naturliche Seele. for example. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. in being related to which. especially the hand. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. but the soul. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject .

but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. like reciprocal dependence in general. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . is only its abstract formal ideality. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). now. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. seem to be its own activity. not to the wisdom. as this absolute negativity. Hence consciousness.the light. which manifests itself and something else too . but since reality. something dark and beyond an equal freedom as an independent object. but to the foolishness of man. i. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. to it. does not. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object.the soul's natural life . it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. The mind as ego is essence. It is of this latter. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. but is implicit. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. and . as subjective reflection in itself. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. 6. Selbstgefuhl. Gewohnheit. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. and as such it is C onsciousness.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. in the sphere of essence. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). 7. thus first made explicit as the Ego. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. 8. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. as external to it. but when he receives the inspired word.e. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm).

an existent. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). but only as it is in reference to something else. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. but as poorest in thought. As against Spinozism. the subject of consciousness. i.a subject-objectivity. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). to raise its self-certainty to truth. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. It appears as wealth iest in matter. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. the notion of mind. an existing thing. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. and that the philosophy. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). in other words. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). Consciousness . what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. first. t heir absolute interdependence. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as a case of correlation . being immediate. a thing-in-itself. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. or mere c ertainty. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. an intuitive intellect. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. and puts it first under the category of being. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. as Reason. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in the ego it seems an alteration of the object. what makes the object the subject's own. The object similarl y.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. Ego. has emerged from Spinoz ism. reflected in itself. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. is further characterized a s immediately singular. which is not as its own. etc. a singular. (b) self-consciou sness. i. Spatial and temporal Singularn . because it is merely a nominal self-relation.e. and underived certainty of it. This is sense-consciousness.e. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. immediate consciousness. the substantial and qu alitative. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. again. for which ego is the object. and so on.. and even t he Idea of Nature. a something. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. with an object set against it.

lies im mediately in the other. p. the one of the terms. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. a something external to it. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . and am aware'.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. and more or less by the sciences. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. reflectional attributes. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. so constr uing the object. permanent term s. has many properties.e. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . 73). The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . not as merely immediate. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. but as mediated. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. in this case by t he Ego. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. but brought to rest and universality. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. its necessity on its own part. having passed beyond the sensible. and ween the individuality of a thing which.e. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. or as being beside and out of itself. has. or the distinction which is none. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. as not externally different from the other. wants to take the object i n its truth. of the thing is. and not yet as external on its own part. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. however. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. experiences. free from this negative l ink and from one another. and universalities. on one hand. however. But in this manner the interior distinction is. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. ¤ 423 The law. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . it is related.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . in that manner.ess. is sense-perception. the thing. what it is in truth. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. the distinction on its own part.). an abstract identity: on the other hand. reflected upon. i. to which.a copy of the phenomenon. to describe the sensible. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). viz. as we called it. which form the alleged ground of general experience. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. . and sensuous consciousness. by being regarded in their bearings. i. and. Thi s inward.a variety of relations. taken in its concrete content. reflected in itself.

the latter. or implicitly. knows itself implicit in the object. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. on the contrary . in its immediacy. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. being merely consumed. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . on the whole. its satisfaction realized. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. or. implicit in it. in this return upon itself. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. The certitude of one's self. this identity comes to be for the ego. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. therefore. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. The two processes are one and the same. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. and ma intains itself as such. and itself made actual. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. To this activity the object. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom.With this new form-characteristic. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. pure 'Ideality'. and a desire (appetite) . But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. primarily describable as an individual. there is strictly speaking no object. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. On the external side it conti nues. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness .the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. with the nega tion of it. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. is a singular. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. and thus in it I am aware of me. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. therefore. nominally. can make no resistance: the dialectic. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive.

This other. solves the contradiction. ¤ 434 This status.e consciousness of a 'free' object. and the means for entering into relation with them.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. the outward and visible recognition).for the means of mastery. and thus give existence to my freedom. at first immedi ately. which is the basis of this phenomenon. a suppression. is yet. though by the abstract. we see. and its being for others. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. in the service of the master. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. retains his single self-consciousness. preservation. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. Force. then. it. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. works off his individualist self-will. Force. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. however. not their underlying and essential principle. the slave.e. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. Thus the death of one. in the first place. on the ir phenomenal side. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. ¤ 435 But secondly. While the one com batant prefers life. and to exist as such for the other: . Thus arises the status of master and slave. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. therefore rude. w hich however is also still outside it. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. when we look to the distinction of the two. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. from one point of view. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. as the existence of hi s freedom. In that other as ego I behold myself. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. the slave. however. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. must likewise be kept in life. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. and incurs a like peril for its own . and formation of it.t he process of recognition. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness.but only p eril. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. negati on of immediacy. which falls on another. as one of two things for another. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. f rom the essential point of view (i.

But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. aware of what it is. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. or determinations of the very being of things. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. honour. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§ family. friendship. 4. Der Verstand. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. is mind (spirit). also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. therefore. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . etc. and of all virtues.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . For truth here has. Wahrnehmung 3. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. valour. 5. Selbstbewu§tsein. Reason. whilst it signifies that the object. The uni versality of reason. Die Begierde 6. 1. . Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . than they are its own thoug hts.or rather it is a difference which is none. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. as its peculiar mode and immanent form. bu t the truth that knows it. the self-centred pure notion. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. is now itself universal.consciousness. is Reason. love. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . ego. state. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other.which is Reason. idle fame. fame.f wisdom' .the passage to universal self. fatherland. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality.

and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. SUB-SECTION C. remembering. and above the complication with an external object . then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. etc. in so far as it has an object. in thinking also and in desire and will. then its reality is that reason.the former a simple immediate totality. desires. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. Die Vernunft. or. in so far as . though it no longer has an object. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. however. and which as the reality of that notion.7. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason.e. restricted by that content. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. it is finite by means of its immediacy. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons.mental vision. viz. the latter now an infinite form which is not.apart b oth from the content. which is defined as it s notion. in the soul as a physical mode. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. above the material. what is the same thing. etc. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . ideation. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . i. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom... Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . Mind is finite. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. etc. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. Cons ciousness is finite. neit her subjective nor objective. as its concept has just shown. therefore. like consciousness. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. This. one word. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. And it is a matter of no consequence. PSYCHOLOGY. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. it has a mode in its knowledge.

and its activity can only have itself as aim. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. that is. the na tural soul (¤ 413). but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. that aspect is twofold . of comprehending itself. it is .as being and as its own: by the one. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character).e. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). or. i.reality of its reason. equally. i. to reach and get hold of itself. and is even there a return into itself. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. forces. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. Thus. Similarly. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415).e. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. in freedom. As the theory o f Condillac states it. viz. and being a rational knowledge. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. and make the affection subjective. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. When the affection has been rendered its own. the mind finds in itself something which is. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. in so far as its existent phase. and are the mind's own. is misconceived and overlooked. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. k nowledge. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment.e. viz. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. and to liberate itself to its elf. and the negative aspect of mental activity. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. so far. it thereby reduces itself to finitude.

to get at the notion and the truth.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. But as knowledge. It is still extremely ill off. in the theoretical range. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. as r eason is concrete. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. merely as facts. and therefore a restricted content. for which it gains the form of universality. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. which it and the content virtually is. and gains abstract auton omy within. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. as it is said.(b) Will: practical mind. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. Inwards . is thus also a reality . elevates itself.e. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. to definite and conceptual knowledge. and heartless intellects . has a material which is only nominally such. its content is at first only its own. which in the first place is likewise formal . and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. which is only certitude. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. etc.i. the word. The nominal knowledge. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. both for the mind as such. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. and of the heart without the intellect . and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason..only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. but) enjoyment. and that in its empirical condition. Psychology. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. Its activity has to do with the empty form . Ou twards. wi th a material which is its own. just as they are given. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. belong to a point of view utt . This position of psychology. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. This activity is cognition. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. e. and is immediately willed. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. while the practical. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. like logic.g. along with which the content is realized as rational. while it has to do with autonomous products.

are not isolated. conceived as reflected into self. it . etc. etc. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. that intuition. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. cognitive conception. remembers. note). In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. as non-intelligent). The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. as it is by the same method brought into nature. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. etc.its out-of-selfness . The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. imagines. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . remembrance. But the true satisfaction. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . just so far as it realizes itself. must lead to abandoning the effort. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. conceives. conception. But c ognition is genuine. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. or mind. imagination. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. etc.e. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. however.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. by cognitive intuition. or makes the concept its own. intuition.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. imagination. etc. (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. Faculty. by rational conception. memory. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge).in a word . by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas .whi ch. is bro ught into mind.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. if answered in the negative. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . it is admitted. conception.besides which it al so intuits. like power or force. intelligen ce. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. It is true that even as isolated (i. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. If they are isolated.

. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. in content and value entirely contingent. this mode is simple. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. Feeling is the immediate. Hence feeling. in t he truth of mind.his private and p articular self.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. with the character of something existent. but rather as subject ive and private.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. that is t o say.t he factor of fixing it as our own. has the form of casual particularity . wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. and in any case is the form of the particular and the generalit ies of common sense .an active self-collection . but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . a . the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . which the mind as it fe els is to itself. projects it into time and space. external or internal. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. With us. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. or at least to reasons . and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. 254).is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. is swallowed up.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. may just as likely be narrow and poor. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. the mere consciousness point of view. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. Now the material. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity .but to his feeling. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. as it were the closes t. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind.

as tho ught. which makes it its a space and a time of its own. with a preponderating subjectivity. as it at first recollects the intuition. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. its when and where. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. The representation is the property of intelligence.e. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. though intrinsically concrete. but stored up out of consciousness. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. from the external place. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. still continues simple. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . and is arbitrary or contingent. t ime. and inwardly divest itself of it. so that it no longer needs this immediac y.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons.the germ of the fruit. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. no longer needs to find the content. for example. a rec ollection of itself. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. in the way we treat. . but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. which. or. yet without being in consciousnes s. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. and received into the universality o f the ego. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. however. isolated. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. the germ as affirmatively containing. i. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. we may say. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. in virtual possibility. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient.

belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. i. or an intell ectual category. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it.e. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. though belonging to intelligence.. such as likeness and contrast. being and universality. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing.) . where. reason and consequence. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . whatever be its content (from image. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. has been broken up. In the first place.Image and Idea. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. but a being of its own institution. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. see Introduction to the Logic. if it is to exist. as of all intelligence. at first only in space and time. The image. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. that it finds its material. or ide a). which is now the power over them. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. and an out-put from its universal m ine. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. . (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. as a unit of intuition. But it is solely in the conscious subject. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. where it is treasured up. comes actually into its possession. The content reproduced. to be so and so. now that it has been endued with externality. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. Secondly. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea.viz. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. wherea s the idea (representation). as a matter of fa ct. present also a distinction in content.these modes of relation are not laws. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. notion. the matter is entirely pictorial. ¤ 20 note. has always the peculiarity. by which it is authenticated. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . under the representation (idea) with the same content.

this form of being. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). i. is derived from the data of intuition. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. some latent concept or Ideal principle. In other words. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed .e. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. 435). As reason. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. and becomes an i ndividuality.symbolic. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. which forms their connecting link. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. but only a nominal reason. recollection. allegoric. Another point calling for special notice is that. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. is reason.still lacks the side o f existence. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. for its ideal import is its elf.Imagination. but they are 'syntheses'. and in mechanical memory it completes. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. a concrete subjectivity. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. derived from some interest. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. it is self-uttering. These more or less concrete. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. or poetical imagination . . because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. to universalize it. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. Such is creative imagination(7) . Acting on this view. etc. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such.Abstraction. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal.. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. internal and external. so far a s it is concerned. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. are completely welded into one.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. . or something of the sort. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. when regarded as the agency of this unification. are unifications of t he same factors. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). This force is really intelligence itself . in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. one's own and what is picked up. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence.

R auschen. has always to do with signs only. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas .there have been collected more than a hundred such words. out of which it forms i deas . somewhat immediate or given (for example. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. and even with conception and at of vocal objects. its institution by intelligence. In logic and psychology. whereas in the sign. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature.). but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). This intuition is the Sign. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . have nothing to do with each oth er. and the connotation of which it is a sign. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases .. etc. language . which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). Such is the negativity of intelligence. It is a n image. . the natural attributes of the intuit ion. since memory. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . But in the fusion of the two elements. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical to sensations. in the first instance. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. when employed as a sign. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. With regard to the elementary material of language. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. Knarren. something accepted.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. The sign is some immediate intuition.speech and. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. and where it is its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. the colour of the cockade. e tc. but as representative of something else. the matter of the latter is. strictly so-called.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. its system. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. conception s. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. Sausen.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). intuitions. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . ¤ 459 The intuition .

and still takes place in Canton . i. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . i. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. The study of languages still in their original state. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. but. etc. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. i. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. which severally receive designation. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. they are reduced to signs. externalities which of themselve s have no sense.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. as. are frequently changed. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. again.e. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. and now that. . and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. and only get signification as signs. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. on anthropological articulation. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. like the Chinese. as many as ten a . von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. as regards signs for mental objects. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. if it be not altogether extinguished. the planets . which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. it depends. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. palate. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. As to the formal elem ent. viz. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. It is only a stationary civ ilization. In particular. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. the denomination. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. instead of n ames proper. tongue in each) and for their combinations. their signs in vocal language. W. in chemistry and mineralogy. on the other hand. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects.). which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. for example. as in our signs for the numbers. (Cf. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). only in pas sing. the chemical elements. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. .e. we may touch. alphabetical writing. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs.e.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements.

the name. however ample a connotation it may include. by speaking low and soft or crying out. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. just as in modern times (as already noted. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. or simple logical terms.the mode. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. Thus. like alphabetic writing. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. learn ing to speak Chinese. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . so that. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. i. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. in the interest o f vision. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. the simple plain idea. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. it is analysed. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. Both alike require such signs. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones.e.nd twenty.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. Engaging the attention of broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. as it does.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. This feature of hieroglyphic . in the case of the Chinese Koua. while (with the facu . Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. Hieroglyphics. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. is still for the mind simple in the name). at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. The European. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. in speaking. peculiar to the intellect. the simple straight stroke. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. of uttering its ideas most worthily . .

lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,

but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you

ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.

¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex

retain a speciality of their own . in feeling. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. may be placed. right. contentment. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. shame. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. On the other hand. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. the truth and. in their immediacy. law and morality.. heart. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. joy. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. and will. and duty. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. but presented in its universality and necessity. and still more in mind. in which these facts. lack objective determin ation. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. volition. and evil. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). and precisely in that way d o they . But as both. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. in their universality and necessity. If feelings are of the right sort. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. bad. Delight. etc. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. grief. it is because of their quality or co ntent . Thus it is. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. in its objectivity and truth. etc. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world.. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . namely God. Whereas in life. can also be felt. is the same content as the good practical feeling has.indeed infinitely so. But where the objects sought are thus casual. and to discus s their content. when thought. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind.but only in antithesis to the latter . we have this immanen . considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. for the latter.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. repentance. and thought. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. on the one hand. we have only to deal with the selfish. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. is precisely what constitutes. wha t is the same thing.

are infected with contingency. each being always in conflict to another. as experience shows. however.and (as there are ma ny. therefore. while. admitting of gratification. . finds in the conformity . freedom are the principles of evil and pain. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. their mutual connect ions. on the other. indeed. immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. passion is neither good no r bad. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment.a development in which the content of autonomous . If the will is to satisfy itself.on one aim and object. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. Which are good and bad? . directly ident ical with its specific mode: . they. The will. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. first of all. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. is at first still a natural will. Will. too aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. and their truth. but to ge t realized. Should. and something inappropriate to it. on one hand. In consequence of this formalism. It is on ly a dead. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. be the value of tha t mode what it may. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical .his inte rests of intellect. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. subjectivity . and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. each with its private range). ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse.Up to what degree the good continue good. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. as r egards the form of its content. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. as rights and duties. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. But with regard to the inclinations. talent. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. What are the good and rational propensiti es. the question is directly raised. enjoyment . In what way have they. it is pa ssion. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. character. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And.natural impulse and inclination. Thus. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. The answer to the question. which is essentially self-d etermination.

there would be no action at all. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. unless he had an interest in it. and is option or choice. either alto gether or in part. An action is an aim of the subject. ¤ 476 The will. is his interest and . on one hand.his passion. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. The morality concerns the content of the aim. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . without end. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. it is on them that the decision turns. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. and social duties. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses.e. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. moral. as the content. However. which is just as much no satisfacti on. i. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. so far as their particularity goes. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. which reflection and comparison have educed.and one satisfaction. They are somet imes contrasted. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. inclinations. are reduced to a m ere negative. which as such is the universal. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. by another. of a universal sa tisfaction. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. Their mutual limitation. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. this is wh at is called the interest. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. on the whole to their disadvantage. where the subject is made to close with itself. . the free gift of nature. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. It is thus 'reflecting' will. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. as thinking and implicitly free. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. an inactive thing. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. the impulses. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. As thus contradictory.action loses its contingency and optionality. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. that finds its actualizing in the agent.

and are constituted after its measure. or by s trength of character. fortuitousness . its very au tonomy or freedom. have never had this Idea. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. or philosophy (. of the family. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. and that as its very actuality. According to Christianity. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. Africa and the East. and is will as free intelligence. as realizing the idea. now that the formalism.sired . an Athenian or Spartan citizen). it is existent only in the immedi ate will . of present sensati on and volition. and object . for example. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. As abstract Idea again. i. only so far as it thinks itself . It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. the will is an actually free will. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. If. the divine min d present with him. i. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. education. which i s pure and concrete at once. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. On the contrary. knows this its concept. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. and the abstract singleness. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. he is actually free.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable be aware. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. in religion as such . that will is also the act of developing the Idea. Remembering that free mind is actual mind.e. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. is in the first instance the rational will in general. is the existential side of reason . When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. Whole continents. and of which it is only t he formal activity. even the Stoics. that is. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. and are without it still. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. etc. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. i. just because it is the very essence of mind. Plat o and Aristotle. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. he h as also. If to be aware of the Idea . also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. so that in this sphere of particular existence.freedom itself. did not have it. The Greeks and Romans.e. they saw tha t it is only by birth ( matter of speculation. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . as the substance of the state. If the will. still this very I . the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . ambiguous. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. however. which realizes its own freedom of individuality.a universality which only ought to be. or implicit Idea. with freedom itself. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. is actu ality.e . aim.

Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. Auswendiges. if they are made slaves. 5.a principle of the mind and heart. Der Geist 2. Vorstellung. Die Intelligenz. into legal. and not less into scientific actuality. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. Phantasie 8. 9. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. 3. Gedachtnis. 11. Die Einbildungskraft.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. 1. 16. 7. 14. but the pe rmanent character . 4. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. 10. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . Die Erinnerung 6.dea itself is the actuality of men . as men. Die Gluckseligkeit. Anschauung. moral. Das praktische Gefuhl. is itself only a notion . religious. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. which the content and aim of freedom has. Das Denken. not with laws or court s of justice. Inwendiges. But this freedom.not something which they have. Der freie Geist. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. but which they are. 12. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. 15. Der praktische Geist 13.

which in it is thus at home with itself. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. my right to a thing is not merely possession. where free will has existence. but as possession by a person it is property. are duties . ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. What is a right is also a duty. or legal possession. and character. so as to become its habit. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. their absolute unity. etc. or instituted as an authoritative power. private an d personal needs). and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. For a mode of existence is a right.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'.e. etc. are its Duties.e. which splits up into different heads: viz. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. duty in general is in me a free subject .. and brings into existence i n these several wills. in general. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. receives the form of Necessity. and it is a duty to possess things as property. is the Law (Right ) . is also a right.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. but in its universality. and what is a duty. Liberty. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. But. The penal judicature of a government. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. viz. i. But in this individualist moral sphere. are no less its duties to punish. not in the form of impulse. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. Liberty. on the other hand... In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. where they. is a duty. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. in these externally objective aspects.and aim. its rights of admi nistration. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. in the light of the concept. etc. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality.(1) When.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. being universal. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. in relation to the subjective will. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. These conditi ons. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. or Usage. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. relation to another person . shaped into the actuality of a w orld. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. In the morality of the conscience. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. as the services of the members of the State in dues. to administer. anthropological data (i. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. it is a Law. military service. to be as a person. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. temper. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. it exists as manner and custom. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. and is the vi rtual universal. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition.

These extremes are the persons who. As so characterized. which as possession is a means. and is the ethic s of actual life in family. possession is property. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. 1. is an individual. the infinite self-rela tion. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. Sitte A. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. which is thus mutual. are simultaneously mutually independent. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. but as existence of the personality is an end. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. Gesetz 2.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. the external sphere of its liberty . as in itself still abstract and empty. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. but on an external thi ng. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. But the set of adjustments.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. at first in the outward appropriation. by mere designation of it. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. abstract right. . (C) When the free will is the substantial will. as something devoid of will. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. so as to have its existence inside it. (B) When the will is reflected into self. and hence as a single being . the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. civil society. morality of the individual conscience. though it remains in trinsically the same.possession. it may be. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. But this predicate. it is the right of the subjective will. or by the formatio n of the thing or. and the I in it is abstractly external. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. on its own account me rely 'practical'. This thing. in the knowledge of their identity as free. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular.

the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . which. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. is affirmed. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation.). This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. in that case. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. labour. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. is disinterested. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . expressing the civil suit. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. and. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary.just as well with draw it as not. This is naiv e. ¤ 495 The contract. but which. the only diversity lies in this. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. because they face each other. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. however. non-malicious wrong. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception).the full and complete deed. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. and recogniz ed. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. I can just as well put it in it as not . willed. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. and its acceptance by the other will. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. which thus becomes wicked. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. produces a wrong: by which. its changing hands. But so far as my will lies in a thing. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity.Contract. 493 seqq. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. and time. then the external rec . as the judgement of the intrinsically right. universal thing or commodi ty. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing.

ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. Conversel y. that of the judge. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. The law of nature . of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. howe ver. the latter is violated.e.on self-determination or autonom y. in which the law of nature should hold sway. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. and commits a crime. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. on . or in corporeity. The former used to be the common meaning. i.) Thus the will is violently wicked.a law. which is the very contrary of determination by nature.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. This this case the apparent recognition.e. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone .(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . in revenge. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. like the last. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right.punishment. But revenge.where the nominal relation is retained. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. i. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. The 'reality' of rictly so called . as a volitional and intelligent being. is at the same time only a new outrage. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. an d so on without end.compulsion against the thing. b ut the sterling value is let for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. or right as governed by the nature of things. sets up a law . by the n otion. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. The social state. or Natural Right. such an action is essentially and actually null. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. from life. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. In it the agent. which is nominal and recognized by him only . This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . being conformable to the right. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will.a universal which holds good for him. even from the range of all existen ce. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. This gives the wrong of fraud . To display the nullity of such an act. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. and can be seized only in t his quarter. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. is the work of Revenge. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. which is disinterested . the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. and while the former only is respected. and not merely the particular mode . is a matter of chance). But more than possible compulsion is not.

This is the right of intention. counts only as a person. so much as it has consciously willed. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. In point of form. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. 2. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. the will is at the same time made a particular. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. Now.a will reflected into itself so that. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. an d allows to be imputed to it. Das Recht. is now chara cterized as a subject . but have their assent. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. which was its purpose. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. The subjective will is morally free.the other hand. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. though any alteration as such. it thus includes purpose and intention . (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections.and also moral wickedness. or even justification in his h eart. Moralitat 3. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. in mere law.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. recognition. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. Naturrecht. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. my part in i t is to this extent formal. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. be its affection w hat it may. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. is its deed. 1. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. who. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. so far as these features are it s inward institution. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. sentiment. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. embracing these individual point s. etc. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. and willed by it. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. and thus comes into relationship with the former. its own. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . intelligence. the reason of the will. conscience. B. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence.

(c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . there awakes here the deepest contradiction. constitute h is well-being. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. they ought to stand in harmony. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. is as g ood and as duty absolute.e. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. as in happiness (¤ 479). an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will .ion.that it contains his needs. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. the essential and actual good. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. essential and actual. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent.g. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. can be wicked. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty.a universal determined in its elf . will . At the same time because good is one.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. in point of its matter. his interest and welfare must. a good intention in case of a crime. interests. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. but is a particul arity of his own .still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. on account of that existent sphere of liberty. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. constitutes a peculiar world of its own .and thus including in it particularity .another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. and yet each of them. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. it is always something particular. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. These aims. And yet they ought to harmonize. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. as individual and universal.being only in this. because the agent. is not something external to him. is always fundamentally one identity. whether the . following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. and aims. This is the right to well-being. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. though it is a particular duty.

as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself.of Conscience and Wickedness. and refuse it to the wicked. th e essential thing. Handlung. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . Das Gute und das Bose C.good is realized. but is only sure of i tself. good. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. which is the a goodness. The failure of the latter consists . 5. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. is only the infinite form. and duty.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. the truth of this semblance. the unutterable. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. Wickedness. rising to its pitch. in the notion. The subjectivity. right . That. i . In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . 4. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. Die Absicht und das Wohl. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. Der Vorsatz 3. and of the good. on its negative side. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . which actualizes and dev elops it. This pure self-certitude. its deepest descent into itself. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. The for mer is the will of goodness. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns .the utterly abstract semblance . The result. to be carried out in it. is. Moralitat 2. expressed by this repeated ought. no more exist than not. an aim essentially and actually null. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. and the wicked. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . in something external therefore. in this its identity with the good. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. 1.the standpoint of the ought. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. is abandoned. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. which would only be abstract. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. 6. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. On the affirmative side. which has no objectivity.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. THE MORAL LIFE. non-universal. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will.

partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. to destiny. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. is confidence (trust) . abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will.Marriage. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. In the latter sphere. as an intelligent being. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . controls and entirely dominates from within. mind ap pears as feeling. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind .the Political Constitution. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. In the shape of the family. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. .n a thing . ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . manner and cu stom . virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. e unanimity of love and the temper of trust.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. makes this union an ethical tie . in its ki nd.monog . i. to the total of ethical actuality. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. i.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. the individuality expres ses its special character. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. elevated. to a spiritual significance. as against the univers al. however. This is the sexual tie.Civil Society. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being .the genuine ethical temper. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. it exists as confidence. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom.e . (c) Th e self-conscious substance. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. whose independence it. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this.the Family. But the person. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. as personal virtues. When these two impe rfections are suppressed.e. as deliberate work for the community. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. The ethical personality. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. is virtue. however. that it is. without any selective refl ection.yet somewhat which without all question is. . Thus.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. temperament. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. in its immediacy.

This instrument. and care for the future. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. on one hand. of the possessor's will. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. acquire an existence of their own. being an intelligent substance. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. destined. on the o ther hand. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. In virtue of such for tuitousness. as private persons. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. as do also its industry. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. originally foreign to it. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . ¤ 522 (3) The children. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. into families or individuals. to found anew such an actual family.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). and thus produce more unconditional . ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. however. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. constitutes the general stock. labour. learning. or nominal culture in general. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. who exist independent and free. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. information. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. thus invested with independence. while. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already educating them to independent personality. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. or state external. of legal regulation. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union.

the Law.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. Hence.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. they have their actual existence. intelligence. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. to be. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. option. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . and like the first a certain subsistence. Their content per se may be reasonable . Where civil society. of needs. also of aims and interests. and an ensemble of contingencies. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. and with it the State. however. and so on ad infinitum. certain. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. as well as of mental culture and habit . (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. which as existence is essentially a particular. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital.dependence on the social system. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. 2 4/5 years. and in it they have their social moralit y. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . The second. The third. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. It is a futile perfectionism to have . ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. is developed i n detail. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. its action gets direction and content through natural features. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. or could be. of mere agents. skill. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. in the course of definite manifestation. be the righ t and just thing. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. and a corresponding mode of labour. this analysis.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . of the legal relationships of individual s to them. But when right.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). though of course only at the final points of deci ding. and industry. at every point. talent. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. 2 3/4 . exists.and ye t it should be decided. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. and of means for satisfying them. ten thalers. or only 2 * . Thus whether three years. determined through reason or legal intelligence. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. as vital. on the side of external existence. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. and accident. their recognition and their honour. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour .. which is honesty.

are not a new hou se. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . But there is a contrary this exists as revenge . general laws. with the advance in the individualized right . being laws o f strict right. which discovers new distinctions. to which objective existence determines i z. This subjective be promulgated and made known as laws . There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. as the genuine order of life. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. as in the mental ima ges of space. in the judicial system.into punishment (¤ 500).are governed and well governed too by laws. as it is a known law. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith .in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis .which though something new. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love.laws. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. there arises. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. The comparison of the two species. the need of a simpler code . however. of his countrymen. constit . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. . and t hus become authoritative . i.and th e cattle too . at the same time an externally objective existence. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. by faith and trust. whic h are only internally in these objects. hereditary divinity or nobility. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. first really de serving the name of laws. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. and in particular transforms this existence .i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. even the admiration. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. recognized. These people forget that the stars . inasmuch as. .e. which again make new decisions necessary.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will.the ne ed. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. like improvements on a f loor or a door.gets its universal guarantee through proven: . They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. within the house . ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws .even as his law can only be a just law. as universal authority and necessity. not for them.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. they touch only the abstract will . The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws.

It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. in a uniform gen eral way. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. So far as concerns them. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. No doubt this factor is incomplete. which.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. In so far. as at bottom different sides. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. to the concrete of civil society. It results also from circumstances of locality. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. appears as state. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. and worked from that point of view. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement.viz. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. . it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. the position of an external un iversality. shou ld.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. because it is only one factor. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. from the c onnections between nation and nation.'poli . then. and the judgement as application of the law to it. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. mere circumstantial evidence. be exercised as different functions. .and that. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. so as to secure this satisfaction. because it is man's want. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. and their variable ingredients. Conversely. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity.

the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. his independent self-will and particular interest. and self-develop ed .ce'.as an actuality . This universal principle. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. to the immediate agent. in this direction . the state only is as an organized whole. ¤ 539 As a living mind. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. The cons titution is existent justice . . as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. however.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . and. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. it carries back both. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. which.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current individual.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. is its essence. But. it protects the family and guides civil society. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . First. On the other hand. which each originally takes care of for himself. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . also for that will being put in actuality. then it promotes their welfare. but which has a thoroughly general side. First it maintains them as persons. self-originated. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of nsists in a double function. s heer subjectivity. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end.the reasonable spirit of will. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. Thus we have the corpora tion. Secondly. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. continually produce it as their result. secondly. they are re strictions. differentiated in to particular (outer-state) law. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. through the action of the government and its several branches. receiving. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. Thirdly. (c) THE STATE. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals .which volition is thereby free . The same unity. It provides for the reasonable will . with all its evolution in detail.into the life of the universal substance. and . so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will .coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. and not left to perish. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. as self-knowing and self-actualizing.

presuppos e unequal conditions. rejects all differences. is so little by nature. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind.equal in the concrete. as it exists as s uch. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good ..which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. the difference of governing powers and of governed. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. authorities. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. etc. were called its 'liberties'. without further specification and development. Rome. etc. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. All men are by nature equ al. military service. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom.only it can make them .as regards taxation. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. Equality.pleasure an d self-will. in other words. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. As regards Liberty. otherwise have in property. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. magistracies . the familiar proposition. logically carried ou t. physical strength. talent. that the laws rule. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. etc. on the contrary. But. first. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. as regards the concrete.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty.e. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind.punishment. age. it embodies a liberty. and that the laws are restrict ions. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. However true this is. or even in crime. the citizens . it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . On the contrary. As regards. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. or destroy them. is abstract subjectivity. etc. . and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. private as well as public rights of a nation. Formerl y the legally defined rights. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. town . the final aim and result of the co nstitution. the current notions of l . on the contrary. But that this freedom should e xist. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial.besides their personalit y . and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. Nothing has become. etc. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. It is important therefore to study them closer. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. eligibili ty to office. Really. which it can without incompatibility allow. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. The laws themselve s. But the notion of liberty. directories. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. i. With the state there ari ses inequality. The principle of equality.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. skill. etc. as it ha ppens.

¤ 541 The really living totality . and to regard a state. The term political liberty. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i.a thing that has nev er happened in history. of others. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. But the more we fortify liberty. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. in other words continuall . and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. not merely with regard to the naturalness. and must deal with them as it ca n. however. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. If . and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n .iberty only carry us back to equality. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs.) But the guara ntee lies also. as a state without a constitution. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. with this development of particularity. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. with its insatiate vanity. in which this is not formally done. self-w ill and self-conceit. is . and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. the re moval of all checks on the individual sec urity of property. be it added. has an insight and conviction of his own . is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society.e . the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction.just because of this inseparability . there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions.that which preserves. of liberties in general. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. and thus gains moral independence.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . just as little as the making of a code of laws. and the organization of the actualization of them. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. The question . (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. i. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question.e. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. . as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education.

i. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments.e. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make .to make it the first power. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit.monarchy. i.y produces the state in general and its constitution. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle.the all-sustaining. as in the patri archal society . The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers.impugns the principle of the division of powers. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. The government is the universal part of the con stitution.regarded as organic totality . it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. which includes an already existing development of differences. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. is the self-redintegrating notion. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. as in a democratic constitution. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. . As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power .su bject always. of the family and of civil society. These. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. Only through t he government. as always. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. ¤ 542 In the government . and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. however. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. is the government. the participation of all i n all affairs . is the state one. but an actual indiv idual . but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason.e. which taken apart is also particular). the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. in other words. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein.the will of a decreeing individual. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. all-decreeing will of the state. In the perfect form of the state. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence.or. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's a state of society.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. and the government be merely executive and dependent . (A mistake still greater. equally disorganizes actuality. .

essentially. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . admini stration of justice or judicial power. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. and are to that degree private person s. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. possess independence of a ction. legislative power. civil society. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . also feudal monarchy. there arises the participation of several in state-business. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . too. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. lik e peace and war. involve the. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. with its industry and i ts communities.are. an actual existence. etc.partly. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. with their general opinion. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. to that end and for that reason.'ideal' unity. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. and skill for such ends. which having their busin ess appointed by law. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. and above all personal liberty. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. Secon dly. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined).e. That subjectivity . can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. administration and police. aristocracy and monarchy. Thus. These principles are those expounded earlier. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. and with earlier transition-forms.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. liberty of property. The pure forms . The division of constitutions into democracy.such as ochlocracy. aptitude. and then of nature ..viz.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. . being simple self-relation. it may be .if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . Two points only are all-important. in the history of the State. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea short. especially in legislation .a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. first. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. to subjectivity. participate in the governmental power. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. For it is as private persons t .oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy .partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. as it were. in so far as they are finite and in course of change.

as estates. however. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. i. elemental sea. demoralization. however. in the general sense of embracing a wide. and form a particular kind .e. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. wild. Take the case of England which.a spiritual element . moreover. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. but as organic factors. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. inorganic shape. be they treated as mere individuals. it is not a brutish mass. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . is no t self-destructive. like that of the stormy. to power and act ion. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. in arrangements for art and science. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. blind force. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. range of the extern al means of government. The so-called financial law. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. in the law and liberty of property. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. so far as they form only one branch of that power . the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . that t hey enter upon that participation. or in its 'reflectional' it very likely is .regard ed as permanent.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. which.which should be presupposed. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. as the nation . But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. In a civilized state.would be. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. s ense of general wants. ever newly recurring. If the main part of the requirement were . Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share.the contrary must be the case . or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. ¤ 529 note). as such an aggregate. Experience s hows that that country . and therefore more urgent. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. The des irability of such participation. indeed the whole.

waywardness and chance have a place. i. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled.i. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. of the whole of the finances. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. In one case the . for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. afresh.e.g. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. when it makes a decree about finance. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. and not to be made yearly. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. as content o f a true law. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. or every few years. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . In their mutual relations.o be a law it would have to be made once for making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. and becomes the estate of bravery. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. a state of the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . and not actually existent.e. but only to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. Then again. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. in which there would no longer be a government. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other .. is really engaged with strict executive business. and thus. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. e.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive .

has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. in short. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. when we come to minutiae. as it is a history. is called an a prio ri view of it. especially on the philological side. however. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. an d the special claims of nations on one another. and as regards its range and scope. this note must go into further deta il. there is Reason in history.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever.the judgement of the world. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. a history of its own. internat ional law rests on social usage.of sacerdotal races . which actually is and will be realized in it . those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing.the plan of Provide nce. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . That history. Fictions. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. and above all universal history. in short. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. On th is point. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. that. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. etc. first in general. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. As this development is in time and in real existence. and then in history. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground.a world-mind. and in Germany more than in France and England. are settled and fixed. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. and on history-writing in general. in defiance of . su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. In general. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. is appointed to occupy only one grade. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. both this general recognition. it passes int o universal world-history. It has.. It is in time. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. it. each of which. of a Roman epic.and.

But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. and criticize events. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. The point of interest of Biography . no history . and. But. etc. as in the romance. and rejects both ki nds of interest. and an exclusive interest in justice. strictly s peaking. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. Ay. on the other hand. in the interest of so-called truth. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. is not only against taste and judgement. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. What happens to a nation . It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. has. but an age. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. state.). e. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence.the best-accredited history.g. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed.e. express not a subjective particularity. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of say a word on that here . In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. or. i. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. a civilization. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. not as good as a fairy tale. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. Rome and its fortunes. or if he declined to judge at all. and takes place within it. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. but violates th e principles of objective truth. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. a word. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. in striking portraiture and brevity.appears to run . a nation. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. if he had not an interest. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals.

What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. to the history of religion. first in general. are instruments. 550). we may add. only opinions and mere ideas. But. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. and are all treated as indifferent. the consciousness of it. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. the absolute L aw. which all alik e have no stuff in them. and its content is prese . as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. liberty. etc.e. i. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). if Rome or the German empire.e. and the business of so doing. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency.e. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. which is their reward. has another ground and interest than his tory. potentially infinite. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness .Fame. and their subjectivity. the freak of humour. truth. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. and of its essence. is the supreme right. and there fore as a work of individuals. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events.e. while it inheres in them.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. a development determined by the notion of spirit. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. For Spirit is consciousn ess. i. these individuals. which is what is pe culiar to them. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. i. accurate report of externals. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. as over a special grade. have they their value and even their existence. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. and secondly. etc. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. The mere play of sentiment. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. on the contary. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. But biography too has for its background the historical world. Only therefore through their relationship to it. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . in the shape of its unreflective natural usages.or in other words that Reason is in history . really. Such a doctrine . no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme.admitting.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. in this case. is the empty form of activity.

stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. that elevation to God really involves. as true in the world of free will. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. actually accomplished in the ethical world. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. Th e finite. is the real ethical self.consciousn ess.a mere 'ought' . Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. This factor. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated is the case with all speculative process . abstract in the formal treatment of logic. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. is the the peculiar perversity. At this rat e. note). As regards the 'mediation' which.Liberty. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. lays hold of its concr ete universality. and that on the religious. as law and duty. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free.e. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. the idea of God it kn .point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. in the system of laws and usages. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour.e. i. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. Such apprehension. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. For that st arting. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. i. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. especially ¤ 51. however.e. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. The spirit. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. cf. i. But the spirit which think s in universal history. i. forme rly noticed. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . from which the start is now made. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. But . The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. now gets its most concrete interpretation. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. ¤ 204 not e).

in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. and these applications of it in the religious life. on the contr ary. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. i. but purely subjective in individuals: . but in the moment of enjoymen the one religion which secures the stability of governments. generally. And. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. religion was a late r addition.working images. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. It lea ds to a laity. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. B . as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order .partly as mere moving of the lips. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . one religious and an other ethical. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. (In the Lutheran Church.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . It leads. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state.or it may be. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. and in the act of faith. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. and ex pecting miracles from them. a condition of spiritual sla very. first of all. i. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. and prays others to pray . only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. i. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. i. to justification by external wo rks.the body of religious truth. and law and justice. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . and even as mutually indifferent. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has.addressing his devotion to miracle. morality and conscience.of bondage. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. in the annihilation of its externality.ows must be the true and real. even to bones.e. in point of form.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality .e. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. then there may be created. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts.e. the host as such is not at first consecrated. differing from the former in body and value of truth. springing from some force and power. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. But in poin t of form. for thought and knowledge . The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. in its faith and in its con science. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. receiving its knowledge of divine truth.e. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own.logi cally enough . and superstition. non-spirituality. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another.

ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. . Instead of the vow of chastity. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion.of honesty in commercial dealing. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. unte short. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. lacked liberty. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. therefore. a code of law should arise. founded on principles of reason. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. i. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. . and in a special sense Philosophy.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. Thus. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. the wisdom of the world. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. which does not rise in hostility against them. leads it into the rea l world. and. because the state is a self-possessed. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. moral life in the state. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. The precept of religion. .e. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason.e. if taken alone. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. And instead of the vow of obe dience. Thus set free. sti . can law and morality exist. and thus only. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. our consciousness and subjectivity. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. so to speak a priori. no matter how. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. So long as t he form. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. and in the use of property . i. Let us suppose even that. and political institutions deduced from them must be. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual obedience which is itself the true short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality.e. self-realizing reason .the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. i. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present.

if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. however sound their provisions may be. on the other hand. when specially set in relief as genus. and the power given them to fix the budget. that the Idea must be regent. ¤ 544 note). to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. thus surmountin . It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . At best it is only a temporary expedient .. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. . we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself.mi nd intrinsically concrete . Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . as the universal in a mental concept or idea. thus founder on the conscience. etc. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. e. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. (cf. on one hand. from those deeper requirements which. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. to put it simply. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea .is the intellectual and thinking self. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . This absolute nucleus of man . Such laws. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. This additional 'individuality' .g.ll. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. and it comes to existence in his just this .on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. or.among which laws these guarantees are included. the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. so-called 'chambers'.

exhibits the one-sidedness.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. earlier than it does as philosophy. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. in common with all his thinking contemporaries.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. which still escaped his intelligence. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. as it grows and expands. so . should knit it together and control it. is after all only in one of its form s.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. fall feeling. from religion. of philosophy. Hence religion as such. on its own s howing. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state .so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. pictorial representation. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state.and th at on account of this very principle . His state is therefore. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. however. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. in its philosophic phase.was that creative imagination. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought.the form which ph ilosophy attacked .and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . intuition. which is awa re of its own essence. or essential being).the idea of the substantial moral life. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. is implicitly in absolute liberty. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. or rather must. But thought always . Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. Plato.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. as demoralization. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. But even religion. Religion may. etc. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. but earlier than philosophy. ¤ 513. the subjectivity of mind. Under the subjective form. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. he. Only in the principle of mind. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. and so also one-sided phase. As it left therefore behind. in its f irst immediate. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content.). and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. Political power. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. The form in its infinite tru th. religion. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . which is developed similarly. for th ese reasons.).

must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. 2. the constitut ion and the code. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. but rather to a sort of knowledge. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. Weltweisheit. 7. as well as their several applications. Die Rechtspflege 5. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. Die Weltgeschichte 10. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. 1.e. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. i. 3. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. Thus ul timately. while it is self-centred identity. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. Religion. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. of God's indwelling in us. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. Die Sittlichkeit. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. 6. as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). Das aussere Staatsrecht. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. Inneres Staatsrecht. In the Protestant state. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. Die Polizei und die Corporation. 8. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. for which it is as substance. 9. Das System der Bedurfnisse. That here. Gesetz.

so that the thought embodied. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . Art requires not only an external given material .in other words. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. .must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. With the essential restrictedness of its content. its n atural immediacy. that is. c an.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. Belief. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. But. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art.i. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . viz. 1. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle .the shape or form of Beauty. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . On one hand. aware. as it is. and of gaining its concrete determination.something formal. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. ¤ 411).hence not the sp iritual unity. into the subject which produces that work. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. on the other hand.for the expression of spiritual truth . without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. In this ideal. like the material which it uses to work in. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. reconciliation. or the idea. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. but . ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. which is only a sign of the Idea. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. as superseded in spirit.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas).e. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. A. Der absolute Geist.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . has in devotion . Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y.the form of immediacy as such . breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. the actuality of the spirit.

The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being.stil l this art is defective. that one spirit creates and informs them. the principle of its law. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. is not yet known. as free spi rit. .can try to bring itself to consciousness. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . and th e artist is the master of the God. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. is not yet absolute. but as only finding himself in himself. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. though concrete and intrinsically free. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. and of its constitution. subjectivity. as well as of its art and science. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . assumes fuller and firmer features. known as the Absolute.symbolic art.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. not yet conscious of itself. of its actual liberty. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic short how the nature of a nation's moral life. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . the artist's enthusiasm. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. or an effor t towards him . without admixture and unspotted from its contingency.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . but its inmost depth. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. and that is where the infinite form. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist.

e. we see that the advent of art. what is more.the religion i. then the only thing left to constitute His nat .that it be revealed. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the.into revelation. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . has its future in true reli therefore is manifestation out a nd out.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. it is from Him. as infinite self-realizing form . The old conception . The older religion in which the need of fine art. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. Beautiful art. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. which is only in the medi um of thought . has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. the theme and c entre of religion. with their perso nal sense and feeling. not the supreme liberation itself.ent in it. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. from it s side. dashing t o pieces everything high and great . unbeautiful sensuo usness. . The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. B. is first generated. in which he had not revealed himse lf. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . still more in that external. expression.due to a one-sided survey of human life . for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. . But with a further and deeper study.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. and. spectator find themselves at home. and brilliancy. revealed by God. Beautiful art. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. shows that such religion is on the decline.of still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. like the religion peculiar to it.The genuine objectivity.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. whose con tent is absolute mind . looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. on the contrary.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. .for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. and j ust for that reason.

in it s forefront. . the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y .it is therefore the absolute spirit. with whom. he still remains in original identity . which is at fir st the presupposed principle. it implies the revelation of Him. and phenomena which succeed each other. a separate being. it may almost create surprise that so many. and reconciliation with the eternal being. when it thinks. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. first of all.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world.. (a) as eternal content. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. But. on the other hand. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. however. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. but afterwards. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . in point of content.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. making them presuppositions towards each other. further. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content.1. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. and. G . the elemental and the concrete nature .the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. which therefore is finite. or of judgement.on the other hand. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. .. it is.: Berlin 1829. Yet. as in duty bound.requires careful and thorough speculation. as the extreme of inherent negativity. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son.knowledge in God. staying aloof and inert. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality .of the only Son . standing in action an d reaction with such nature.just as. though. though the Spirit. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought .ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. while in point of form he is. again. even in its manifestation. abiding sel f-centred. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. ¤ 566 In this separating. Go d is. to specul ative comprehension. On one hand is heaven and earth. not. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. the spirit. of the world it gave away .at fi rst only 'rationalizing' apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . on one hand. by C. which proceeds to man's self. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. It includes. directed towards the Eternal. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. (c) as infinite return. for that reas on. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. To know what God as spirit is . only standing to it in an external connection. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. F. That spirit. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. amid that natural ness.

yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. remains master over it. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. . Further. simple. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. C. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. on account of his immediate nature. Irony. through which witness of the spirit in him. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. Thinking. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. keeps himself unchanged. who as such is identified with the essence . is itself the emptiness and vanity. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . external in point of form. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. secondly. But. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such .then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. after the example of his truth. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . and eternal spirit in itself.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. so far. as infinite subjectivi ty. In this form of truth. Whereas the vision-method of Art. 1. but alive and present in the world. gives itself direction and con tent. in which he. If the result . an object of contemplating vi sion . This individual.of subjectivity and the no tion taken in a merely formal.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . eternal. is not bound by it . he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. with a temporal and external sequence.but the vision of implicit truth. his natur al man and self-will. but even to thought. and thus sensuous. this immediate.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . From this its separation into p arts. contentless sense. he. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. which from itself. truth is the object of philoso phy. and thus. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion.and. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. F or such subject therefore it is at first an transplanted into the world of time. Die geoffenbarte Religion.Irony. th e self-centred manifestation.

and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. elevation of them into the absolute form. and acts inconsistently towards strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. This movement. when driven to expound itself. which determines itself to content. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. of course. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. and whereas Religion. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. and mediates what is thus open ed out.on the other hand. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. or. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. The charge of Atheism.e. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision.i. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man.the underlying essence in all humanity . and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. which philosophy is. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms .which may be in both the same . a nd of logic in particular. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party.from these forms. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. and particularly of the logical form. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. remains identical with it. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained.takes. only looks back on its knowledge. as also of the necessity in the two forms . just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. and this necessary as free. but also criticized it. This does not prevent the spirit. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality.('Rationalism') . then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion.on one hand. opens it out in mental picture. when at the close it seizes its own notion . finds itself already accompl ished. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. and s o religious. and against philosophy in general . from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). with its separ ation into parts. to be more precise still.stantial content into many separate shapes. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect.and from a pithless orthodoxy. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. too much for the latter. immediate vision and its poetry. This witness . or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories.leaving out. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation .

The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. that it has too much of him: . it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. its grossest shape. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. that. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . some of the most telling passage . or if you will. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . exclusi ve. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. as it stands. I select . To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid the most authentic statement accessible . we must. whether higher or lower in the scale. and form all that is definite in the divine universality. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached.the Bhagavat-Gita. the secularity of th ings.of Pantheism. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. It is only his own much so. are) . which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism.(empirical things. God in General.thus he understands philosophy . The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. but as a proved fact. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e.all possess substantia lity. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. and so . If this theory needs no more than such a God. and is therefore.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. On such a presuppo sition. in particular.g.that of the Egyptians to the ox . Amongst the abundant resources. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. This new theology.Everything is . so as to fi nd God in everything called religion.which therefore it does not disparage. Spinozism) of Atheism than of much so. from which all definite quality is excluded. and amongst it s effusions.of the new piety and new theology. also contains the generic abs tract. without distinction. or Pantheism.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. Piety. as is well known. all such definiteness is only the non-divine.each and every secular thing is God. or any one man. does not comprehend itself. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur the wanton assertion. with all its absurdities. most sublime. ¤ 71 note). open to our disposal on this topic.that of the Hindu to ass es. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . cows . are unable and unwilling to see this . it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. if we believe always adora tion of an object which. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) .(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself.or to dalai-lamas . fulfilled notion of God. Without interest of its own for the concrete. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: .

from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. or a God besides. 'At the end of many lives. . so to speak . .' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. melt into the one Krishna. is also the maddest of polytheisms. even Siva. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone.'I am the self. . p. which he is. Among letters I am the letter A. grip. and the Spinozan Substance. . . however. Indra. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. the Everything. where the empirical everything of the world. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. still God. . And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. . at the beginning of the pass age. without essential being of its very own. .s. as also those proximate substantialities.that Hinduism. goodness. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. . think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. 7 seqq. . . . has the higher conception of Brahma. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. . etc. besides Krishna. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. but only . and one essential amongst them. nothing independent]. . Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. t he pure unity of thought in itself. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . I am also the strength o f the strong. as different from that accidental. everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences.' This 'All'. the One which. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. middle. . . is not. all this is woven upon me. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. or Indra. with a monstrous incons istency.). . . There is nothing else higher than myself. . Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. pp. This everything. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. .' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. . seated in the hearts of all beings. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. I am life in all beings.. . than which there is nothing higher.. unessential existences.not everything. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. . powerless its. . as he said before he was S iva. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. . . darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . . Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. vanish.spiritual as its idea of God i s . Meru among the high-topped mountains. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. The undiscerning ones. . On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. . That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. is alo ne the divine and God. and end of living things. called Gods. . but having its truth in the substance. and the moon among the lunar mansions. . which Krishna calls himself. rather.the most excellent of everything. . any more than the Eleatic One. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. I am the taste in water. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). to a poly theism. he is said to be the beginning. Hinduism. But so little concrete is this divine unity . I am "Om" in all the Vedas.. . . . . Even when. .' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi .

of the world as one thing. It is only the picture . which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. as infinite from the it as a lot of Gods or as secular. empirical indivi duals . the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld.on the shallow conception of it . it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. as everything. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. to was . on one hand. whether they spring from heart.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. outside it . in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. is discarded and absor bed. That pantheism indeed . and that unity described as love. For that unity. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. the Eleatic. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity.. we must consult th e Mohammedans. on the contrary. but . the finite to the infinite.ndu. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. when he adores the ape. and of empirical secular spirit. or. after this partition. which.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences.floating in the indefinite blue . modes of envisaging God. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. is identical with the world. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. or other creature. in relation to the popular idea of the world. ac osmical. as the endless lot of empirical existence. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. But to go back again to the question of fact. secondl y. the all. of the relationship of God and the world. But. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind .. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. e.g. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. and God everything. or Spinozist. he is as essence parted from its finest purity and sublimity. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. even in a general exoteric discussion. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. and so on . Hin du monotheism. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest.keep its independence. as it says. If. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. and. to which everything is God. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . imagination or speculation. Of the oriental. moreover. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. especially the Mohammedan. and on the other.

at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. with indefinite ideas. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general.g.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. in the pores of th e physicists . Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. mere ide ntity. providence. and that hence. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. is what one expect s. But they show so little acquaintance with them . the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. the notion and content of philosophy. etc. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear identity. viz. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. a nd assert . i. with abstract unity.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. it is not. as in the physical field the physicist.and s till less take trouble about it . perhaps under the more familiar names of e.e. where they are utterly unknown. the most external and the worst. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself.falsely as a fact . when they hear of unity . not the concrete unity. . but rather its reverse. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness.the world as much as Go d . and which they ascribe to philosophy.and relation i pso facto implies unity . they import them into philosophy. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . But the question is.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. and that it is the system of identity. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. however. something supposed to exist beside the material reality.g. if not even of supreme interest. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. and that amongst the m there is great variety.and that the factor of indet erminateness . depend solely on the different modes of this unity.te a word on what a 'notion' means. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. composition. in matters admitted to be of superior. and the empty absolute. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. omnipresence. And as in their judgement either of the two . who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . as Epicu rus does. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. but only the one factor of this category of relation . they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. e.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. I n the philosophical field they proceed. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. with God's omnipresence.that. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism.has the same solid substantiality as the other. they have laid hands on.said pores being the negative. but with concrete unity (the notion).that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. inorganic and living .

as process of the I dea's subjective activity. a system of identity. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. which causes the movement and development. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. then. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions.knowing reaso n. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. y .it is the nature of the fact. for its middle term: a middle. but the many-shaped modes specified.which. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. The esoteric study of God and identity.their everything. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. If statements as to facts are put forward. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . and the latter its universal extreme. which . on the shoulders of philosophy. as other than they. the notion. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. Nature . and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. in his relation to the world. making the former its presupposition. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. which has self. as of cognitions. sunders itself. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with which notions are perverted into their opposite. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. and as implicitly the Idea. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous.e. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . not abstract unity.the logical system. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . and which is itself the way to produce it. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea.ity . But to put that sort of thing. an All-one doctrine. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. and notions . and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. i. is philosophy itself. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. or as prevaricating for a purpose. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. But in ascribing to God. the absolutely universal. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. standing between the Mind and its essence. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. On account of this chorus of assertions. of which liberty is the the mediating agent in th e process .

engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. eternally sets itself to this same movement is equally the action of cognition. in f ull fruition of its essence. The eternal Idea. .

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