INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any

attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i

s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as

treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.

even the capacity of offering resistance. however. Wherever there is Nature. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. its simple 'ideal' life. identical ideality of it all. The usual answer. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. like heat. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. Mind. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. as absolute negativity. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. which is potentially all things. on the other.SUB-SECTION A.the passive of Aristotle. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. There. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. These 'imponderables' . which is the fund amental feature of matter. At such a stage it is not yet mind. on the one hand. in a sense. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life .e.the truth that matter itself has no truth. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. have still. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. It is otherwise with Mind. but soul. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. matter is regarded as something true. where the othe . a nd the soul remains the pervading. etc. and mind conceived as a thin g. But not merely is it. and. and not as the immediate or natural individual. except where. i. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. ANTHROPOLOGY. indeed. thus come into being. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. li ght. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part.. perhaps. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. not merely lacks gravity. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. and so the self-externalism. however. whereas the 'vital' matter. as such a result. to which they might perhaps add space and time.with th is proviso. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . the soul is only the sleep of mind .

r is not . Descartes. (c) Thirdly. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. so holding. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. on the contrary. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. and telluri c life of man. it may be. based upon participation in the common life of nature. Spinoza. there philosophers took God. . upon it. not. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. as so often is done. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. it is a soul which feels. and. Malebranche. sidereal. as in the case of Spinoza. and does not rise or develop into system.e. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. and always more or less. its immediate being .(a) In its immediate natural mode . (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. T hus. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. Hence. described. as an anima mundi. is too abstract. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world.whence Epicurus. These have. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold.or corporeity . and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this moulded into it. In nations less intellectually emancipated. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. feels the difference of climates. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. remain for ever subject to such influences. Animals and pl ants. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. in the modes of that being. as individualized. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. into the absolute syllogism. or. (b) Secondly. in many case s completely.the natural soul. as in the case of Lei bniz. re tains an abstract independence. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. even these few and slight susceptibilities. disappear. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). with Leibniz. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. they are natural objects for consciousness. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions.e. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. when it presents itself as a single soul. a world-soul. and. so to speak. etc. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. and the periods of the day. the changes of the seasons. just in proportion to his civilization. But either this identity. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. which only is. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first .

but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. hopes. physiognomy. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. on the whole. we find it as the special temperament. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. we find its diversities. shows an active half. Thirdly. as it exists. bodily structure and disposit ion. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. carrying out these universa . that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. talent . scientific. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. This . or other disposition and idiosyncrasy.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. and the position of the individual himself. The contrast between the earth's poles. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. He begins with Childhood . By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which.the sexual relation . introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. and as stages in its development. widely distant from each other. shows. of families or single individuals. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. we see man in his true relation to his environment.a worl d no longer incomplete. the one permanent subject. fails to meet his ideal requirements. fancies. in purposes political. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. as alterations in it. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject.mind wrapped up in itself. and on the other. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. And that individuality marks both the world which. on its one side. or artistic. character. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age).on a ph ysical basis.

sleep. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. although. distinguishes itself from its mere being. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. put this question to the class of ideology. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person.not as a merely negative rest from it.The waking is not merely for the observer. in the first instance. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. viz.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity .Napoleon. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. . ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . (c) Sensibility(3) . as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. for example. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. i n an unintelligent way. as before explained . takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff .which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. . But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. as already noted. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. .In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. but as a return back from the world of specialization. which are often addressed to philosophy: . The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. each point. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. as they may be called. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. or self-centralized being. The characterization given in the section is abstract. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams.

of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. On the other hand and conversely. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. the fact is a mode of my individuality.g. The fact that these particulars. primarily. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. just. murder . however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. invested with cor poreity. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. on one hand. not mere alterations. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. the conscience. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. and . where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. which. This should hardly need enforcing. the inarticulate bre athing.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. be it noted. is what we call sensibility.identity of our self-centred being. ho wever. are our very own. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. it is true.set over against consciousness. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. Another. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. But if put in the feelin g. its natural peculiarity. and is so felt. in its own self. are in order to be felt. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. true. adultery.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. in the feeling. godless. blasphemy. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. etc.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . moral. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. etc. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . the naturally immedi ate. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. for itself. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. are found by the waking soul. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. fornication. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. etc. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. mora l. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. mean. and to be as if found. and the character. One. evil. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. belonging as it does to natural.. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. but treated as bel onging to its most special. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. and religious. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum).

. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. for example. with its varieties of language. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. (c) the sense of solid reality. As sentient. distinction appears as mere variety . (¤¤ 321. In the usage of ordinary language. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). but an inward. 322). is to raise its substantiality.e.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. the blood. smells. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. to realize its mastery over its own. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. of heavy matter. i. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . set in its self-centred life. e. sighs. (¤ 300). are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . i ts merely virtual filling-up. just because they are immediate and are found existing. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. the soul is no longe r a mere natural.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . are formed from their mental source. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . (¤ 317) . We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears.because in it. following the special character of the mental mode. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. of self.g. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. the immediacy of mode in feeling . therefore. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation .the senses of definite light. We should have. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. and voice in general. especially the passions or emotions. the centre of the 'sensible' system.a psychical physiology. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste.and of sound. o f colours. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. and their corporization. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. in a special system of bodily organs. laughter. works itself out. ¤ 402 Sensations. tones. to the character of subjectivity. with which that substance is one. the 'irritable' system. What it has to do. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. to take possessi on of it.but of the feeling (sense) of r is a soul which the system of the senses. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality.

omnipresent unity. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. although it does not exist. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. which is at the same time its predicate. etc. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. and to that world it stands but as to itself. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). a deep featureless characterless mine. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . it brings within itself. secondly. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. etc. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . which is disease. where the real is put past . In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. the s oul is characterized as immediate. They were not in our possession. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. Some times. first. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. it implies a want of adaptation. prima rily. without existing. virtually retained. By itself. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. ideas. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. As sentient. once mor e come to light. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. the corporeity. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former.that world being included in it and filling it up.. thoughts. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. in sickness. to which the soul. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. but a negation.the existent spe culative principle. but only to his im plicit self.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. ideas and information. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. At the present stage this singleness is. In the present stage we must treat. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. ¤ 404 As individual. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. Thus in the body it is one simple. to be defined as one of feeling . acquired lore. in an implicit mode. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . the content is its particular world. so far as that is. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. may again sink down. in whi ch all this is stored up. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul.

is visibly present as another and a different individual. which. intellige nt. self-conscious. it is. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. or virtuality. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. the single self of the two. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . The moth er is the genius of the child.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. but as efficiency and realized activity. and is therefore passive. of life. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . whose decision is ul . as concrete subject ivity. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. developed interests. placenta.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. as it has existence of its own. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena).externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. or capac ity. not yet as its self. injuries. Here are two individuals. etc. his secular ideas. etc. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. not a true subject reflected int o itself. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. tal ent. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. and reasonable. as yet nothing impenetrable. By the self-hood of the latter it . but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. fortunes. character. not as a mere possibility. self-possessed. congenital disposit ion and temperament. and of character. etc. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. temper.. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. controlling genius thereof. because immediate. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part.a substance. idiosyncrasies. the psychical relationship. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. say between friends.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual.. etc. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. incl inations. of the mother. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate .

The facts. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. educated.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. it must be added. is. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective show. which are also means and ends to each other. means. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio.his fun damental interests. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. on the cont rary. self-possessed human being is a disease. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . in which the individual here appears innnersed. To that end the phenomena. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. intentions. But such a verification would. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. it has already been call ed his genius. At the same tim e. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. first of all call for verificati on. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. it might seem. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate be mere deception and impo sture. that it is in harmony wi th the facts. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. on the other hand. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. in other words. This totality forms his actual ity.

the magnetizer. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. and character. is under a veil. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. subject to the power of another person. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in.). it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. then. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. external one to another. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. not on the spot.) Compare h ome-sickness. in whom it sees. wh en it is healthy and awake.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other.a genius which beh olds itself. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. . etc. etc. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. his own and that of the magnetize . he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. in catalepsy. And because it is the adult. not really a 'person'.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. But such clairvoyance . and other for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. . it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. those c onnected with female development.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. But. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. the selfless individual. When the substance of both is thus made one. smells. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. which lead up to the result .As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. reads. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. in its sober moods. or at the approach of death. subje ctive reason. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. is this. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. however.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. (Thus Cato. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. etc. that it is a state of passivity. ca pable of conveying general is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. and to know which. and hears. unless by the aid of religion. formed. f riends. but it is empty. and the like. which. exist for it as an outward objectivity. on those left behind. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . like that of the child in the womb. a formal vision and awareness. tastes. after the downfall of the Roman republic. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. for example. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. and c ontinues to be. .

unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. on the contrary. in its capacity as individual. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. i. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is.fe eling. which. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. receives. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. reasons. as in the morbid state alluded to. it is still susceptible of disease. which is no less a world of law. etc. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. The purely sensitive life. in this nominal perception. etc. so long as we assume independent personalities. for example. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. as in other cases. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. beholds. is impossible. which still marks the self-feeling. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. and at the same time. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. one sees and hears with the fingers. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. or med icines for them. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. is without any definite points of attachment . in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. the 'common sense'. between intelligent personality and objective world. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure.r. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. e. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. In considering insanity we must. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. and hence. anticipate the full-grown an . This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. causality. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. In this way it is self. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. i s just this form of immediacy. though all-embracing. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness.

which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. loss of health (if it were that. etc..merely personal love and hatred. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. equally formal. pride. and so makes part of the actual self. idea. but only derangement.. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. as a thing. and be a realized u niversality. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. is relaxed.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. A violent. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. as it aris es. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. is undistinguis hed from them. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. as now regarded. inclination. however.that evil which is always latent in the heart.e. the. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. which is there also. and therefore not susceptible of this cies and hopes . that it is liable to insanity . But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. this life of feeling. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. and the rest of the passions . it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. i. instincts. . what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account.e. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. moral and theoretical. desire. but a contr adiction in it.feeling. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. mere and total. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. is diseased. earthly elements are set fr ee . and also desires. and so also may the cure. as something natural and existent. This particular being of the soul is t . only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. etc. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. such as vanity.d intelligent conscious subject. presupposes the patient's rationality. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . passions. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. it would be death). Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. In the concrete. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. Mind as such is fr ee. and it is only as a thing. and their gratification). but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred.just as physical disease is not an abstract.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. so as to insert them in their proper place. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. i. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. This humane treatment. and made appear in. may. i. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. And so too the particularity is.e. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. the self is to be stamped upon.

so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. su bjective substantiality of it . empty space and empty time. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. has been absorbed by it. but has them and moves in them. is reduced to unity. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. and for that reason n ot free. are only subjectiv e forms. nor is absorbed in the m. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them.e. sleep. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. Habit is rightly called a second nature. therefore. et c. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). of which it is the subjective substance. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . even in being affected by them. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. a second nature. and the mere substance. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged .he factor of its corporeity. a pure act of intuition.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. or dependent in regard to it. but still free. heat. so is that pure being (which. weariness o . without feeling or consciousness of the fact. Habit like memory. And consciousness it becomes. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. lacking consciou sness. That is to say.itself a simple being . as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality.. dist inguishing it from itself . this being of the soul.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. and so no longer interested. when the co rporcity.and becoming the 'ideal'. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. nature. For. i. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. and which still continues to exist. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. will. on the contrary. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. and that as a barrier for it. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). and the generation o f habit as practice. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. the one and the same. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. The soul is freed from them. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. occupied. of it. but the basis of consciousness. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. The natural qualities and alterations of age.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. partly only relative. as. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings.

the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. is recollection and memory.f the limbs.. under its volitional and conceptual characters. to be made a power in the bodily part. or. which make it up. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature.concentration. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. etc. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). and the self-feeling as such. consciousness. The most ext ernal of them. to be his as this self. without an express adjustment. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. i. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. a particular organ of i ts organic system). . fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. nor a transient emotion or idea. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. This is the rational liberation from them. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. whereof we sha ll speak later. acquires a strength which consists in this. etc. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. etc. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. are no longer bothered with it. habit is usually passed over - . and any other purp oses and activity. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. casual. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self.enabling the matter of consciousness. or skill. made into an instrum ent. this soul.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. has been by will made a habit . sweet tastes.). To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. consciousness. viz. moral. cut off from action and reality. Thinking. intuition. nor an abstrac t inwardness. his upright pos ture. re ligious. if quite abstract. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. nor are they in conce ption rational.e. and that they. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility.or the misfortune . is open to anything w e chance to put into it. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. intelligence. too. And it is true that the form of habit. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. and no other. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. like any other. and especially so in the specific bodily part. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. so that when the conception (e. Habit on an ampler scale. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. an 'ideality' of soul . like their satisfaction. that although the frost. habit diminishes this feeling. and only so lo ng as he wills it without felt. etc. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. etc.. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. Even here. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). and it is habit of living which brings on death.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. and particul ar. the spatial direction of an individual. reflection. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. but part and parcel of his being. and thus to enable the soul. to exist as substance in its corporeity. a series of musical notes) is in me. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune.g. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened.

71). of which it is the sign. etc. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. for example. in being related to which. Empfindung. in other words. weeping. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. And the human figure. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. The soul. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. 'The autho . placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. unable to represent it in its actual universality. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. Under the head of human expression are included. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. 2. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. Naturliche Seele. as the absolut e instrument.. still vainer than a signatura rerum. This externality. cuts itself off from its immediate being. and i s infinite self-relation. 4. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. Seen from the animal world. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. and the formation of the limbs. represents not itself. or abstract universality. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. but the soul. Naturliche Qualitaten. the upright figure in general.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. for the soul. it is related to itself. a world external to it . t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. and making it its own. while language is its perfect expressi on. and inexpressible a modific ation. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. in its concentrated self.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. 1. the latter subject to the former. indefinite. 3. Plato says in the Timaeus (p.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. 5. of the mouth . Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. especially the hand. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. Die fuhlende Seele. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns.either as something contemptible . or the 'immediacy' of mind.laughter. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. This note is so slight. absorbing it. finds itself there a single subject. In this identity of interior and exterior.

as subjective reflection in itself. like reciprocal dependence in general. to it. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. is only its abstract formal ideality. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . Ego is infinite self-relation of mind.e. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. thus first made explicit as the Ego. something dark and beyond it. It is of this latter. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. but when he receives the inspired an equal freedom as an independent object. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) .the soul's natural life . and . PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. as external to it. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. PHENOMENOLOGY OF is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. now. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. 6. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. Hence consciousness. Selbstgefuhl. 8. and as such it is C onsciousness. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). Ego. seem to be its own activity. but is implicit. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. i. not to the wisdom.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. 7. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. as this absolute negativity. Gewohnheit. The mind as ego is essence. which manifests itself and something else too . in the sphere of essence. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity.the light. does not. but to the foolishness of man. but since reality. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind.

but as poorest in thought. with an object set against it. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). has emerged from Spinoz ism. for which ego is the object. an existing thing. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. immediate consciousness. etc. t heir absolute interdependence. what makes the object the subject's own. reflected in itself. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). Consciousness . because it is merely a nominal self-relation. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is a case of correlation . Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. and puts it first under the category of being. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general.e. the subject of consciousness. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. As against Spinozism. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. again. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. i. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. Spatial and temporal Singularn . The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. in other words. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. This is sense-consciousness. Ego. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. but only as it is in reference to something else. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. first. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. the substantial and qu alitative.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. a thing-in-itself. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'.e. and underived certainty of it. and so on. (b) self-consciou sness. a something. which is not as its own. the notion of mind. being immediate.a subject-objectivity.. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). The object similarl y. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. an the ego it seems an alteration of the object. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. and that the philosophy. to raise its self-certainty to truth. and even t he Idea of Nature. is further characterized a s immediately singular. as Reason. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. i. an intuitive intellect. or mere c ertainty. a singular. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. It appears as wealth iest in matter.

and universalities. i. to describe the sensible. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. experiences. the thing. has. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. permanent term s. by being regarded in their bearings. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness .bet ween the individuality of a thing which. in that manner. as not externally different from the other. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. its necessity on its own part. or the distinction which is none. But in this manner the interior distinction is. but brought to rest and universality.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. which form the alleged ground of general experience. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. free from this negative l ink and from one another. not as merely immediate. as we called it. in this case by t he Ego. and sensuous consciousness. however. having passed beyond the sensible. viz. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal.ess.e. reflected upon. it is related. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. ¤ 423 The law. . (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. the distinction on its own part. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. and universal. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. reflected in itself. so constr uing the object. is sense-perception. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. an abstract identity: on the other hand.a copy of the phenomenon. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . i. what it is in truth. but as mediated. lies im mediately in the other. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. or as being beside and out of itself.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. of the thing is. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . Thi s inward. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. and am aware'. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). however. reflectional attributes. wants to take the object i n its truth. the one of the terms.). at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. to which.e. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible.a variety of relations. taken in its concrete content. p. 73). But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. and not yet as external on its own part. and. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. a something external to it. and more or less by the sciences. has many properties. on one hand.

and itself made actual. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. in this return upon itself. On the external side it conti nues. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. there is strictly speaking no object. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. on the contrary . ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. pure 'Ideality'. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. in its immediacy. with the nega tion of it. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . To this activity the object. knows itself implicit in the object. therefore. implicit in it.With this new form-characteristic. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. nominally. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. and a desire (appetite) . the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . and thus in it I am aware of me. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. The certitude of one's self. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. on the whole. primarily describable as an individual. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. and ma intains itself as such. this identity comes to be for the ego. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. or. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. the latter. The two processes are one and the same. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. its satisfaction realized. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. is a singular. being merely consumed. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. therefore. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. or implicitly. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. can make no resistance: the negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object.

as the existence of hi s freedom. when we look to the distinction of the two. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. then. and the means for entering into relation with them. the slave. Thus the death of one. not their underlying and essential principle. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. negati on of immediacy. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o .e. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. as one of two things for another. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. While the one com batant prefers life. we see. Thus arises the status of master and slave. on the ir phenomenal side. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. works off his individualist self-will. it. in the first place. in the service of the master.t he process of recognition. at first immedi ately. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction .for the means of mastery. In that other as ego I behold myself. and formation of it. ¤ 434 This status. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. Force. is yet. and its being for others. the outward and visible recognition). which is the basis of this phenomenon. the slave. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. from one point of view. however. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. and to exist as such for the other: . retains his single self-consciousness. however. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. solves the contradiction. preservation. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. This other. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. ¤ 431 The process is a battle.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness.but only p eril. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. w hich however is also still outside it.e consciousness of a 'free' object. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. a suppression. therefore rude. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. f rom the essential point of view (i. Force. must likewise be kept in life. though by the abstract. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. and thus give existence to my freedom. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. which falls on another. ¤ 435 But secondly. and incurs a like peril for its own . in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality.

(c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. therefore. For truth here has. whilst it signifies that the object. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . ego. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. or determinations of the very being of things. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . The uni versality of reason. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. fatherland.f wisdom' . honour. 4.the passage to universal self. Reason. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. etc. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. .in family.consciousness. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. friendship. Selbstbewu§tsein. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. 5. the self-centred pure notion. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein.which is Reason. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness.or rather it is a difference which is none. fame. Truth. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . bu t the truth that knows it. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . Wahrnehmung 3. aware of what it is. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. is mind (spirit). valour. Der Verstand. is now itself universal. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. as its peculiar mode and immanent form. state. idle fame. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. Die Begierde 6. 1. than they are its own thoug hts. love. and of all virtues.

The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. PSYCHOLOGY. like consciousness. in so far as . so far as its features are immediate or connatural. and which as the reality of that notion. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. it is finite by means of its immediacy. viz. ideation. This. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object.mental vision. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. then its reality is that reason. above the material. And it is a matter of no consequence. etc. the latter now an infinite form which is not. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. though it no longer has an object. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason.apart b oth from the content. it has a mode in its one word. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. Cons ciousness is finite.7. however. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features..the former a simple immediate totality. or.e. SUB-SECTION C. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. neit her subjective nor objective. i. in thinking also and in desire and will. in so far as it has an object. and above the complication with an external object . Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . which is defined as it s notion. Mind is finite. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. Mind. etc. Die Vernunft. desires. restricted by that content. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. etc. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. as its concept has just shown. in the soul as a physical mode. therefore. remembering. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n.. what is the same thing. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness .

Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. equally. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. k nowledge. it is . as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. in freedom. Thus. that is. When the affection has been rendered its own. i. and the negative aspect of mental activity. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. in so far as its existent phase. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy.e. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). the sensible is not merely the empirical first. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. and is even there a return into itself. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. to reach and get hold of itself. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. As the theory o f Condillac states it. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. the mind finds in itself something which is. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. the na tural soul (¤ 413). there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin being and as its own: by the one. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. and are the mind's own. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. that aspect is twofold . so far. and its activity can only have itself as aim. viz.reality of its reason. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. viz. and make the affection subjective. and being a rational knowledge. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. of comprehending itself. or. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. Similarly. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. and to liberate itself to its elf. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom.e. forces. is misconceived and overlooked. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s.e. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). if we consider the initial aspect of mind. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). i. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation.

and that in its empirical condition. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has.i. The nominal knowledge. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. but) enjoyment. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. which is only certitude. just as they are given. This position of psychology. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. to definite and conceptual knowledge.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. Its activity has to do with the empty form . Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. along with which the content is realized as rational. merely as facts. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. the word. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. in the theoretical range. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. while the practical. as it is said.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. has a material which is only nominally such.. while it has to do with autonomous products. Psychology. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. Ou twards. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. like logic. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. and is immediately willed. Inwards . which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. both for the mind as such. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. elevates itself.(b) Will: practical mind.e. etc. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. for which it gains the form of universality. and of the heart without the intellect . mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . its content is at first only its own. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. which it and the content virtually is. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. is thus also a reality . as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. and therefore a restricted content. e. and gains abstract auton omy within. to get at the notion and the truth. as r eason is concrete. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. This activity is cognition. which in the first place is likewise formal . It is still extremely ill off. and heartless intellects .g. But as knowledge. wi th a material which is its own. belong to a point of view utt . all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality.

is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. Faculty.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). or makes the concept its own. note). however. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. remembrance. just so far as it realizes itself. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. If they are isolated. But the true satisfaction.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. imagination. memory. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. cognitive conception. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas .its out-of-selfness . etc. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . if answered in the negative. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. intelligen ce. must lead to abandoning the effort. It is true that even as isolated (i. etc.e. like power or force. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. etc. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . a word .erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. imagines. etc. conception. by cognitive intuition. that intuition. as non-intelligent). etc. intuition. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . conceived as reflected into self. conception. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. by rational conception.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. it . It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. it is admitted.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. But c ognition is genuine.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . is the fixed quality of any object of thought. viz.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act.besides which it al so intuits. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute.whi ch. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. are not isolated. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. conceives. is bro ught into mind. or mind. imagination. as it is by the same method brought into nature.

To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. in content and value entirely contingent. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. that is t o say.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. Feeling is the immediate.the abstract identical direction of mind (in the generalit ies of common sense . Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. has the form of casual particularity . but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. the mere consciousness point of view. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. as it were the closes in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. . the only thing to do is to let him alo active self-collection . It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas.t he factor of fixing it as our own. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . or at least to reasons . 254). in t he truth of mind. Now the material. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. external or internal.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . is swallowed up. may just as likely be narrow and poor. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. but rather as subject ive and private. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. With us. a . and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. with the character of something existent. this mode is simple. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247.his private and p articular self. projects it into time and space. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. Hence feeling. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition.but to his feeling. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind.

as tho ught. its when and where. the germ as affirmatively containing. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. though intrinsically concrete. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. but stored up out of consciousness. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. in the way we treat. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . isolated. a space and a time of its own. we may say. still continues simple. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. a rec ollection of itself.the germ of the fruit. however. in virtual possibility. . and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. and received into the universality o f the ego. from the external place. which. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. i. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. as it at first recollects the intuition. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. t ime. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. The representation is the property of intelligence. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. with a preponderating subjectivity. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. for example. and is arbitrary or contingent. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. which makes it its own. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. no longer needs to find the content. and inwardly divest itself of it. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. yet without being in consciousnes s.e. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things.

Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality.Image and Idea. though belonging to intelligence. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own .in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. reason and consequence. such as likeness and contrast. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. where it is treasured up. notion. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. by which it is authenticated.e. now that it has been endued with externality. to be so and so. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. has been broken up. . of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. i. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition .) . which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. the matter is entirely pictorial. comes actually into its possession. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. has always the peculiarity. but a being of its own institution. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. whatever be its content (from image. under the representation (idea) with the same content. The image. which is now the power over them. being and universality. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . as a unit of intuition. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. that it finds its material. In the first place.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. as a matter of fa ct. as of all intelligence. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. where. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law.viz. if it is to exist.. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. and an out-put from its universal m ine. see Introduction to the Logic. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. or an intell ectual category. Secondly. present also a distinction in content. But it is solely in the conscious subject. The content reproduced. wherea s the idea (representation). where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego.these modes of relation are not laws. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. or ide a). ¤ 20 note. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. at first only in space and time.

Acting on this view. These more or less concrete. when regarded as the agency of this unification. . which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. or something of the sort. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. allegoric. is derived from the data of intuition. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. etc. and in mechanical memory it completes. some latent concept or Ideal principle. this form of being. derived from some interest. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. or poetical imagination .symbolic. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. but only a nominal reason. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material.still lacks the side o f existence. for its ideal import is its elf. In other words.Imagination. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. which forms their connecting link. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . a concrete subjectivity. are unifications of t he same factors. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal.Abstraction.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . Such is creative imagination(7) . ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . 435). internal and external. Another point calling for special notice is that. is reason. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445.. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). are completely welded into one. but they are 'syntheses'. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. This force is really intelligence itself . and becomes an i ndividuality. so far a s it is concerned. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. i. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. it is self-uttering. to universalize it. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. recollection. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. As reason. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. one's own and what is picked up.e. . The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper.

whereas in the sign. language .th at of vocal objects. its institution by intelligence. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. something accepted. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . This intuition is the Sign. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. conception s. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. the colour of the cockade. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . when employed as a sign.. Sausen.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. strictly so-called. With regard to the elementary material of language. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). etc. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared.). but appears as recipient of sensible matter. intuitions. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . The sign is some immediate intuition. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. and the connotation of which it is a sign. ¤ 459 The intuition . It is a n image. have nothing to do with each oth er. its system. since memory. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence .speech and. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. In logic and to sensations. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. somewhat immediate or given (for example. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). and even with conception and imagination. but as representative of something else. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. Such is the negativity of intelligence. in the first instance. has always to do with signs only.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. and where it is conserved. e tc. the matter of the latter is. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. . Knarren. But in the fusion of the two elements. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth .R auschen. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. out of which it forms i deas .invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm.

. only in pas sing.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. and now that.e.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. as regards signs for mental objects. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. the chemical elements. the denomination.e. as in our signs for the numbers. but. their signs in vocal language.e. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. for example. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. i. It is only a stationary civ ilization. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. and only get signification as signs.). we may touch. tongue in each) and for their combinations. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs .Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. if it be not altogether extinguished. palate. like the Chinese. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. viz. (Cf. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. it depends. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. The study of languages still in their original state. the planets . people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. again. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. on anthropological articulation. alphabetical writing. as many as ten a . Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. and still takes place in Canton . i. . as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. as. instead of n ames proper. on the other hand. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. As to the formal elem ent. which severally receive designation. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. etc. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. In particular. are frequently changed. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. i. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. in chemistry and mineralogy. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. W. they are reduced to signs.

Hieroglyphics. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. or simple logical terms. This feature of hieroglyphic . as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears.the name. is still for the mind simple in the name). it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. learn ing to speak Chinese. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. like alphabetic writing. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. the simple plain idea. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. however ample a connotation it may include. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such.nd twenty. while (with the facu .e. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. as it does.the mode. of uttering its ideas most worthily . in the interest o f vision.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. the simple straight stroke. it is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. in speaking. Engaging the attention of intelligence. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. peculiar to the intellect. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. Both alike require such signs. so that. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. The European. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. by speaking low and soft or crying out. . which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. just as in modern times (as already noted. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. i.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . Thus. in the case of the Chinese Koua.

lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,

but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you

ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.

¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex

Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. for the latter. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. joy. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. can also be felt. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. Delight.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. Whereas in life. we have this immanen . The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. wha t is the same thing. Thus it is. in their universality and necessity. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. is precisely what constitutes. we have only to deal with the selfish. but presented in its universality and necessity. and will. volition. and to discus s their content. right. etc.. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. heart. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. and evil. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil.indeed infinitely so. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. namely God. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. and still more in mind. contentment. But where the objects sought are thus casual. and duty. in its objectivity and truth. shame. may be placed. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. If feelings are of the right sort. grief. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. on the one hand. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. the truth and. in feeling. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . when thought. and precisely in that way d o they . and thought. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. in their immediacy. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form.but only in antithesis to the latter . ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject.retain a speciality of their own . On the other hand..which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. But as both. lack objective determin ation. it is because of their quality or co ntent . are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. repentance. in which these facts. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. bad. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. etc. law and morality. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world.

first of all. Should. it is pa ssion. and something inappropriate to aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. but to ge t realized. on the other. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . It is this objectification which evinces their real value.a development in which the content of autonomous . admitting of gratification. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. and their truth. The will. are infected with contingency. The answer to the question. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. passion is neither good no r bad. however. as rights and duties. as r egards the form of its content. be the value of tha t mode what it may. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. In consequence of this formalism.natural impulse and inclination. Which are good and bad? . It is on ly a dead. But with regard to the inclinations. What are the good and rational propensiti es. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. which is essentially self-d etermination. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. subjectivity . . immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . on one hand. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. indeed.Up to what degree the good continue good. If the will is to satisfy itself. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. each being always in conflict to another. therefore. too often.and (as there are ma ny. is at first still a natural will. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. talent.on one aim and object. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. each with its private range).t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. enjoyment . to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . character. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. Will. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. they. the question is directly raised. as experience shows. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. In what way have they. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. finds in the conformity . a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. their mutual connect ions. while. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them.his inte rests of intellect. Thus.

As thus contradictory. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. so far as their particularity goes. of a universal sa tisfaction. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. unless he had an interest in it. which as such is the universal. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . is his interest and . an inactive thing. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. as the content. are reduced to a m ere negative. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. However.his passion. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. as thinking and implicitly free. there would be no action at all. Their mutual limitation. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. which is just as much no satisfacti on.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. They are somet imes contrasted. the free gift of nature. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. ¤ 476 The will. the impulses. that finds its actualizing in the agent. it is on them that the decision turns. where the subject is made to close with itself. this is wh at is called the interest. and social duties. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. i. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. without end. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. An action is an aim of the subject. . inclinations.and one satisfaction. either alto gether or in part. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. and is option or choice. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. moral. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. on the whole to their disadvantage. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. which reflection and comparison have educed. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. The morality concerns the content of the aim. It is thus 'reflecting' will. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. by another.action loses its contingency and optionality. on one hand. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements.e.

even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. aim. and is will as free intelligence. only so far as it thinks itself . and because implicit only the no tion of absolute be aware. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. i. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. If to be aware of the Idea . which has its true being for characteristic and aim.e. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. did not have it. of the family. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. etc. i. have never had this Idea. as realizing the idea. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted .it is the existential side of reason . When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. According to Christianity. The Greeks and Romans. or philosophy (. is actu ality. with freedom itself. is in the first instance the rational will in general.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. even the Stoics. education. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. ambiguous. as the substance of the state. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. or by s trength of character. so that in this sphere of particular existence. still this very I . or implicit Idea. and that as its very actuality. Africa and the East. If the will. Whole continents. the will is an actually free will. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. which i s pure and concrete at once. which realizes its own freedom of will. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . i. therefore. fortuitousness . But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. in religion as such .freedom itself.sired . find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. he h as also. and the abstract singleness. of present sensati on and volition. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. the divine min d present with him. that is. for example. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. he is actually free. If. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. and object . that will is also the act of developing the Idea. and are constituted after its measure. Plat o and Aristotle. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. now that the matter of speculation. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. however. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as.e. just because it is the very essence of mind. On the contrary. and are without it individuality. it is existent only in the immedi ate will .e.a universality which only ought to be. knows this its concept. its very au tonomy or freedom. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. As abstract Idea again.e . and of which it is only t he formal activity.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world.

SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will.dea itself is the actuality of men . Der Geist 2. 4. into legal. 14. Die Erinnerung 6. Das praktische Gefuhl. moral. Die Intelligenz. Die Einbildungskraft. if they are made slaves. 9. they would find the very substance of their life outraged.a principle of the mind and heart. Anschauung. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. But this freedom. 16. 11. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. is itself only a notion . its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. 12. Die Gluckseligkeit. 10. 15. Auswendiges. and not less into scientific actuality. not with laws or court s of justice. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. Vorstellung. 7. but the pe rmanent character . which the content and aim of freedom has. but which they are. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. Der freie Geist. 1. Das Denken. Phantasie 8. as men. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. religious. 5. Der praktische Geist 13. Gedachtnis. Inwendiges.not something which they have. 3. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function .

it exists as manner and custom. which splits up into different heads: viz. relation to another person . and character. in general. where they. Liberty. in the light of the concept. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. In the morality of the conscience. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. as the services of the members of the State in dues. in these externally objective aspects. is a duty. in relation to the subjective will. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. For a mode of existence is a right. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. or Usage. What is a right is also a duty. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. Liberty. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. viz. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. on the other hand. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. being universal. shaped into the actuality of a w orld.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law.. are its Duties.. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. and is the vi rtual universal. or instituted as an authoritative power. but as possession by a person it is property. is also a right. and brings into existence i n these several wills. etc. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. etc. to administer. The penal judicature of a government. private an d personal needs). which in it is thus at home with itself.(1) When. it is a Law. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. are no less its duties to punish.e. their absolute unity. or legal possession. my right to a thing is not merely possession. is the Law (Right ) . When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. receives the form of Necessity. but in its universality.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. anthropological data (i. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. But. temper. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. i. and it is a duty to possess things as property. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. These conditi ons. where free will has existence. But in this individualist moral sphere. and what is a duty. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners.e. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. military service. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). its rights of admi nistration. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. so as to become its habit. are duties . ought to h ave and can only have their existence. duty in general is in me a free subject . not in the form of impulse.. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority.and aim. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. to be as a person. etc.

Gesetz 2. and hence as a single being . Sitte A. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. and State. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. though it remains in trinsically the same. or by the formatio n of the thing or.possession. These extremes are the persons who. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. which as possession is a means. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. at first in the outward appropriation. but as existence of the personality is an end. But the set of is the ethic s of actual life in family.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. civil society. by mere designation of it. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . possession is property. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. in the knowledge of their identity as free. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. are simultaneously mutually independent. But this predicate. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. as something devoid of will. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. 1. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. on its own account me rely 'practical'. As so characterized. (B) When the will is reflected into self. but on an external thi ng. it may be. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. the external sphere of its liberty . so as to have its existence inside it. it is the right of the subjective will. and the I in it is abstractly external. is an individual. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. abstract right. . ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. This thing. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. which is thus mutual. as in itself still abstract and empty. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. morality of the individual conscience. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. the infinite self-rela tion.

The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. and. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. willed. labour. ¤ 495 The contract. its changing hands. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. however. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. eac h and all are invested with a show of right.). a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. but which.Contract. which thus becomes wicked. produces a wrong: by which. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. the only diversity lies in this. expressing the civil suit. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. is affirmed. 493 seqq. But so far as my will lies in a thing. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. because they face each other. and recogniz ed. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. and time. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. which. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. in that case. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law.the full and complete deed. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. universal thing or commodi ty.just as well with draw it as not. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. is disinterested. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. This is naiv e. then the external rec . and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. I can just as well put it in it as not . and its acceptance by the other will. non-malicious wrong.

(He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it.compulsion against the thing. i. To display the nullity of such an act. as a volitional and intelligent being. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . or Natural Right. even from the range of all existen ce. sets up a law .on self-determination or autonom y. In it the agent. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. But revenge. which is the very contrary of determination by nature.where the nominal relation is retained.punishment. or in corporeity. in which the law of nature should hold sway. the latter is violated. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. is at the same time only a new outrage. which is disinterested . is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . and while the former only is respected.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. howe ver. in revenge. The law of nature . and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon rictly so called .whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. such an action is essentially and actually null. is a matter of chance). ¤ 499 (3) Finally. and commits a crime. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. which is nominal and recognized by him only . The former used to be the common meaning.a law. like the last. The social state. This gives the wrong of fraud . The 'reality' of right. and not merely the particular mode .(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. an d so on without end. or right as governed by the nature of things. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. that of the judge. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance.e. from this case the apparent recognition.a universal which holds good for him. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. But more than possible compulsion is not. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. b ut the sterling value is let slip. being conformable to the right. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. is the work of Revenge. on . This progression.) Thus the will is violently wicked.e. by the n otion. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. i. and can be seized only in t his quarter. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope .the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. Conversel y.

conscience. though any alteration as such. The subjective will is morally free. and thus comes into relationship with the former. be its affection w hat it may. or even justification in his h eart. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. intelligence. embracing these individual point s.the other hand. Moralitat 3. is its deed.and also moral wickedness. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. etc. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. so far as these features are it s inward institution. 2. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. sentiment. and willed by it. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. In point of form.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. 1. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. is now chara cterized as a subject . But here the moral signifies volitional mode. Das Recht. but have their assent. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. the reason of the will. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. my part in i t is to this extent formal. which was its purpose. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. in mere law. an d allows to be imputed to it. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. who. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. its own. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. the will is at the same time made a particular. so much as it has consciously willed. This is the right of intention. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. it thus includes purpose and intention . is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. Naturrecht. Now.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action.a will reflected into itself so that. B. counts only as a person. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. recognition. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized.

because the agent.a universal determined in its elf . ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. as in happiness (¤ 479). At the same time because good is one. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. can be wicked. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. essential and actual. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which.e. it is always something particular. whether the . Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. when similarly comprehended in a single aim.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. is as g ood and as duty absolute. This is the right to well-being. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world.and thus including in it particularity . In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . These aims.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. on account of that existent sphere of liberty.that it contains his needs. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive.ion. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. in point of its matter.g. though it is a particular duty. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. the essential and actual good. is always fundamentally one identity. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. And yet they ought to harmonize. constitute h is well-being. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. his interest and welfare must. as individual and universal. and aims. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. they ought to stand in harmony.being only in this. but is a particul arity of his own . will . Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. and yet each of them. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. is not something external to him. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. a good intention in case of a crime. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. interests. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it.

1. on its negative side. Moralitat 2. which is the good. the truth of this semblance. 6. no more exist than not. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. Der Vorsatz 3. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself.good is realized. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. but is only sure of i tself. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. This pure a goodness. 5. Wickedness. to be carried out in it. in something external therefore. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . the unutterable. and the wicked. i . The subjectivity. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . THE MORAL LIFE. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . and duty. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. expressed by this repeated ought. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. its deepest descent into itself. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself.the utterly abstract semblance . The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. That. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. which would only be abstract. in the notion. Die Absicht und das Wohl.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . rising to its pitch. which actualizes and dev elops it. and refuse it to the wicked. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. Das Gute und das Bose C. which has no objectivity. 4. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . and of the good. is. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. non-universal. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. is abandoned.of Conscience and Wickedness. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. th e essential thing. good. The result.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. The failure of the latter consists .the standpoint of the ought. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . an aim essentially and actually null.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. The for mer is the will of goodness. Handlung. in this its identity with the good. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. On the affirmative side. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. right . is only the infinite form. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision.

¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind .where self-conscious liberty has become nature. as personal virtues. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product.e. etc. it exists as confidence.n a thing . is confidence (trust) . ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence.e . it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. But the person. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit.the Family. as against the univers al.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. the individuality expres ses its special character. In the shape of the family. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. whose independence it. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal.monog . temperament. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. .The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. manner and cu stom . With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. in its ki nd. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being .yet somewhat which without all question is. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. however. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. to a spiritual significance. The ethical personality. This is the sexual tie. however. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . that it is. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . to destiny.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it .th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this.the genuine ethical temper. as an intelligent being. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. In the latter sphere. makes this union an ethical tie . Thus. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. without any selective refl ection. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. elevated. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. is virtue.Civil Society. i. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being.the Political Constitution. mind ap pears as feeling. . controls and entirely dominates from within. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. to the total of ethical actuality. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. i.Marriage. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. as deliberate work for the community. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. in its immediacy. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject.

the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. however. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. destined. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. on one hand. constitutes the general stock. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. This instrument. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. acquire an existence of their own.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. information. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. or state external. as private persons. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. In virtue of such for tuitousness. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. labour. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. while. to found anew such an actual family. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. into families or individuals. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. as do also its industry. or nominal culture in general. of the possessor's will. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . of legal regulation. thus invested with independence. and care for the future. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. who exist independent and free. and thus produce more unconditional .amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. originally foreign to educating them to independent personality. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. being an intelligent substance. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . learning. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. ¤ 522 (3) The children. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. on the o ther hand. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society.

their recognition and their honour.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. option. on the side of external existence. and an ensemble of contingencies. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. and with it the State. But when right. 2 4/5 years.the Law. and in it they have their social moralit y.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . however. also of aims and interests. and of means for satisfying them. they have their actual existence. in the course of definite manifestation.. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. its action gets direction and content through natural features. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles .dependence on the social system. Thus whether three years. as well as of mental culture and habit . the medium created by t he action of middlemen. or could be. at every point. The third. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. ten thalers. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill.and ye t it should be decided. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. skill. is developed i n detail. this analysis. be the righ t and just thing. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. of needs. though of course only at the final points of deci ding. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). The second. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. certain. to be. Their content per se may be reasonable . that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . which as existence is essentially a particular. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. and a corresponding mode of labour.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . It is a futile perfectionism to have . Where civil society. talent. as vital. and so on ad infinitum. and accident. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. Hence. which is honesty. and industry. determined through reason or legal intelligence. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. and like the first a certain subsistence. or only 2 * . exists. intelligence. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. of mere agents. 2 3/4 .

and t hus become authoritative . In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. there arises. at the same time an externally objective existence. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known.into punishment (¤ 500). to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. . in the judicial system.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone .in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. inasmuch as. i. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. recognized.and th e cattle too . The comparison of the two species. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . are not a new hou se. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. to which objective existence determines i the individualized right . but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. like improvements on a f loor or a door. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. of his countrymen. as universal authority and necessity. which go on by their very nature always increasing their z. within the house . To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. whic h are only internally in these objects. as it is a known law.the ne ed. as the genuine order of life. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. . ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . even the admiration. This subjective existence. they touch only the abstract will . but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. however. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith .to be promulgated and made known as laws . as in the mental ima ges of space.are governed and well governed too by laws.laws. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. hereditary divinity or nobility. the need of a simpler code .itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. not for them.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. which again make new decisions necessary. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them.even as his law can only be a just this exists as revenge . constit . These people forget that the stars . The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis . being laws o f strict right. and in particular transforms this existence . general laws. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. which discovers new proven: . by faith and trust. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. with the advance in multitude. But there is a contrary case.which though something new. first really de serving the name of laws.

appears as state. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. Conversely. In so far. so as to secure this satisfaction. in a uniform gen eral way. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act.viz. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. and their variable ingredients. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. and the judgement as application of the law to it.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. No doubt this factor is incomplete.and that. . be exercised as different functions. then. the position of an external un iversality. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession.'poli . to the concrete of civil society. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. as at bottom different sides. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. It results also from circumstances of locality. because it is only one factor. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. So far as concerns them. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . which. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. from the c onnections between nation and nation. and worked from that point of view. . and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. because it is man's want. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . shou ld. mere circumstantial evidence.

then it promotes their welfare. secondly. but. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. Thirdly. they are re strictions. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. (c) THE STATE. ¤ 539 As a living mind. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. to the immediate agent.into the life of the universal substance. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. continually produce it as their result. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. But.ce'. but which has a thoroughly general side. in this direction . ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . which is in the famil y as a feeling of love.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. however. receiving. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. differentiated in to particular agencies.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . and . they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . it carries back both. Thus we have the corpora tion. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal (outer-state) law. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. First it maintains them as persons. On the other hand. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . which. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. s heer subjectivity. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . it protects the family and guides civil society.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. the state only is as an organized whole. self-originated. First. through the action of the government and its several branches. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. with all its evolution in detail. and. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . The cons titution is existent justice .as an actuality . and not left to perish. which each originally takes care of for nsists in a double function. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . and self-develop ed .which volition is thereby free .the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject.the reasonable spirit of will. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. It provides for the reasonable will . also for that will being put in actuality. The same unity. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. is its essence. Secondly. .const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. This universal principle. his independent self-will and particular individual.

the citizens . But. logically carried ou t.e. rejects all differences. military service. as it exists as s uch. talent. town . With the state there ari ses inequality. that the laws rule. it embodies a liberty.punishment. the difference of governing powers and of governed. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. on the contrary. is abstract subjectivity. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. or destroy them. or even in crime. were called its 'liberties'. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). eligibili ty to office. etc. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. is so little by nature. physical strength. skill. private as well as public rights of a nation.pleasure an d self-will. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state.. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. the familiar proposition.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. as it ha ppens. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. which it can without incompatibility allow. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. the current notions of l . otherwise have in property. However true this is. age. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless regards taxation. Formerl y the legally defined rights. It is important therefore to study them closer. etc. presuppos e unequal conditions. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. as regards the concrete. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. authorities.besides their personalit y . on the contrary. The laws themselve s. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. in other words. As regards. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. The principle of equality. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. directories. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. Rome. Really. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. But that this freedom should e xist. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness.equal in the concrete. . To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . as a person capable of property (¤ 488). This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. Equality. first. etc. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. i. As regards Liberty. magistracies . and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. On the contrary. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. But the notion of liberty. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. etc. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. All men are by nature equ al. Nothing has become. without further specification and development. etc. and that the laws are restrict ions.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle.only it can make them . etc.

in other words continuall . self-w ill and self-conceit. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. . and to regard a state. The question .that which preserves.a thing that has nev er happened in history. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. of others. ¤ 541 The really living totality . as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. of liberties in general.e . has an insight and conviction of his own . And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. not merely with regard to the naturalness. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. is . of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . in which this is not formally done. i.iberty only carry us back to equality. just as little as the making of a code of laws. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. and thus gains moral independence. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. If . however. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les.just because of this inseparability . By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. and the organization of the actualization of them. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute sec urity of property. The term political liberty. But the more we fortify liberty. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. with this development of particularity.e. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. with its insatiate vanity. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. and must deal with them as it ca n. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. as a state without a constitution. be it added. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions.) But the guara ntee lies also.

according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. as in a democratic bject always. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. is the state one. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. ¤ 542 In the government . The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium.the will of a decreeing individual. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . its highest peak and all-pervasive unity.y produces the state in general and its constitution. i. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. all-decreeing will of the state. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence.or. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. . of the family and of civil society. Only through t he government. in other words.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. and the government be merely executive and dependent .to make it the first power.regarded as organic totality .e.impugns the principle of the division of powers. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'.e. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal.monarchy. as always. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. equally disorganizes actuality. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. is the government. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. i. the participation of all i n all affairs . These. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence .the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve a state of society. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. as in the patri archal society . and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers.the all-sustaining. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. however. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. (A mistake still greater. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. . is the self-redintegrating notion. but an actual indiv idual . In the perfect form of the state. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). which includes an already existing development of differences. which taken apart is also particular).

has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. in the history of the State. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. with their general opinion. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . administration and police. admini stration of justice or judicial power. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . an actual existence. with its industry and i ts communities.viz. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. as it were. civil society. possess independence of a ction. liberty of property.partly.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. and with earlier transition-forms. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. These principles are those expounded earlier. For it is as private persons t . and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. lik e peace and war.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . especially in legislation . involve the. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training.such as ochlocracy. etc.'ideal' unity.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. The division of constitutions into democracy. being simple self-relation. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. there arises the participation of several in state-business. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment .the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . personal interference and action of th e State as one man. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). legislative power. and skill for such ends. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch .as also feudal monarchy. participate in the governmental power. Thus. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. and then of nature . it may be . in so far as they are finite and in course of change. Secon short. to that end and for that reason. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices.are. and are to that degree private person s. Two points only are all-important. aptitude.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. and above all personal liberty. to subjectivity. too. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. i. aristocracy and monarchy. The pure forms . which having their busin ess appointed by law. That subjectivity . The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs.e. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power.. first. essentially. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. .oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy .

Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. Take the case of England which. which. or in its 'reflectional' universality. If the main part of the requirement were . it is not a brutish mass. and form a particular kind . legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. inorganic shape. is no t self-destructive. moreover. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. in the general sense of embracing a wide. because private persons have a predominant share in public af compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. In a civilized state. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf.e. s ense of general wants.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est.would be.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. so far as they form only one branch of that power . has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. to power and act ion. wild. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. Experience s hows that that country . i. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. like that of the stormy. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. as estates.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights.the contrary must be the case . range of the extern al means of government. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. in arrangements for art and science. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete.a spiritual element . In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. as such an aggregate. ¤ 529 note). and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. blind force. elemental sea. as the nation . The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. The des irability of such participation. in the law and liberty of property. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. that t hey enter upon that participation. The so-called financial law.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. be they treated as mere individuals. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . ever newly recurring. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. but as organic factors.which should be presupposed. and therefore more urgent.regard ed as permanent. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. however. it very likely is . Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. however. indeed the whole.

this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real.i. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. In one case the . Then again.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . In their mutual relations. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence.. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. when it makes a decree about finance. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. a state of war. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. afresh. and not actually existent. keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. and becomes the estate of bravery. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . waywardness and chance have a place. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. of the whole of the finances. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. in which there would no longer be a government. is really engaged with strict executive business. as content o f a true law. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. but only parties. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding .e. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage.e. and not to be made yearly. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . and thus. or every few years. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. e.

it. however. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance.. both this general recognition. is appointed to occupy only one grade.of sacerdotal races . It is in time. On th is point. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. a history of its own. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions.and. etc. of a Roman epic. It has. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. when we come to minutiae.a world-mind. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. which actually is and will be realized in it . those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . as it is a history. and then in history. and on history-writing in general. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. is called an a prio ri view of it. and above all universal history. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. first in general. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. each of which. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. That history. in short. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. In general. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. especially on the philological side. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted.the plan of Provide nce. and as regards its range and scope. there is Reason in history. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. in defiance of . this note must go into further deta il. an d the special claims of nations on one another. in short. that. internat ional law rests on social usage.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. it passes int o universal world-history.the judgement of the world. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. Fictions. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. As this development is in time and in real existence. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. are settled and fixed. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. and in Germany more than in France and England. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow.

a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. i. no history . a word. and criticize events. as in the romance. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. What happens to a nation . we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. on the other hand. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. in the interest of so-called truth.the best-accredited history. but an say a word on that here . Rome and its fortunes.). and takes place within it. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. a civilization.g. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. if he had not an interest. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. or.appears to run . It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. strictly s peaking. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality.e. e. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. and rejects both ki nds of interest. The point of interest of Biography . or if he declined to judge at all. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. is not only against taste and judgement. etc. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. and an exclusive interest in justice. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. Ay. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. But. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. not as good as a fairy tale. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. has. but violates th e principles of objective truth. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. a nation. state. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. express not a subjective particularity. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. in striking portraiture and brevity. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. and. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly.

What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . as over a special grade. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. the absolute L aw. to the history of religion. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient.Fame. only opinions and mere ideas.e. on the contary. a development determined by the notion of spirit. the consciousness of it. we may add. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. But. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. is the supreme right. truth.admitting. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. liberty. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. are instruments.e. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. while it inheres in them. if Rome or the German empire. The mere play of sentiment. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. But biography too has for its background the historical world. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. and their subjectivity. which all alik e have no stuff in them. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. and its content is prese .will be par tly at least a plausible faith. have they their value and even their existence. the freak of humour. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . these individuals. Such a doctrine . really. i. and are all treated as indifferent. i. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. is the empty form of activity. etc. potentially infinite. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. and of its essence. and there fore as a work of accurate report of externals. i.e. Only therefore through their relationship to it. i. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. 550). Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . which is their reward. etc. which is what is pe culiar to them.or in other words that Reason is in history . first in general. and secondly. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. For Spirit is consciousn ess. has another ground and interest than his tory. in this case. and the business of so doing. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged.e. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness .

from which the start is now made. But the spirit which think s in universal history. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. as law and duty. i. however. now gets its most concrete interpretation. forme rly noticed. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. cf. in the system of laws and usages. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. Such apprehension. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of the peculiar perversity. i.consciousn ess.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate .this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. For that st arting.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. is the real ethical self. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . At this rat is the case with all speculative process . and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. Th e finite.e. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth.e.a mere 'ought' . of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. i. is the purification. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. the idea of God it kn . becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. and that on the religious. actually accomplished in the ethical world. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. note).Liberty. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. This factor. But . as true in the world of free will.e. especially ¤ 51. As regards the 'mediation' which. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. lays hold of its concr ete universality. that elevation to God really involves. i. The spirit. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. ¤ 204 not e).e. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct.

i. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. i. in point of form. a condition of spiritual sla very.the body of religious truth. and superstition. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. then there may be created.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) .as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. B . The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience.e. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts.working images. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . first of all. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. and ex pecting miracles from them. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . and law and justice.e. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking.logi cally enough .or it may be. i. But in poin t of form. even to bones. And. and prays others to pray . All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. religion was a late r addition. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. but purely subjective in individuals: . (In the Lutheran Church. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. one religious and an other ethical. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. the host as such is not at first consecrated. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. and in the act of faith. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . differing from the former in body and value of truth. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. i.addressing his devotion to miracle.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only.partly as mere moving of the lips. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness.e.e. for thought and knowledge . exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. and these applications of it in the religious life. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . morality and conscience. generally. It leads. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . but in the moment of enjoymen t. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. in the annihilation of its externality.ows must be the true and real. and even as mutually indifferent. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. It lea ds to a laity. in its faith and in its con science. springing from some force and power.of bondage. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. to justification by external wo rks. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. on the contr ary. non-spirituality.

The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. . which does not rise in hostility against them. Thus set free. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and obedience which is itself the true freedom. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. self-realizing reason . so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. therefore. a code of law should arise. so to speak a priori. unte nable. . And instead of the vow of obe dience. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. So long as t he short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. The precept of religion. our consciousness and subjectivity. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. can law and morality exist. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. i. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). sti .in short. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness.e. and in a special sense Philosophy. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. i. no matter how. . moral life in the state. and thus only. because the state is a self-possessed. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. and. and in the use of property . But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. Thus. lacked liberty. Let us suppose even that. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. i. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life.of honesty in commercial dealing. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self.e. if taken alone. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. founded on principles of reason. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. and political institutions deduced from them must be. the wisdom of the world. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. Instead of the vow of chastity.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies.e. leads it into the rea l world. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned.

the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. .could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. just this . Such laws. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. on one have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. to put it simply. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. ¤ 544 note). on the other hand. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. e. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the the intellectual and thinking self. thus surmountin . as the universal in a mental concept or idea. or. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. so-called 'chambers'.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. that the Idea must be regent.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. when specially set in relief as genus.. (cf. and the power given them to fix the budget. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. This additional 'individuality' . Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. thus founder on the conscience. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. At best it is only a temporary expedient . In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself.mi nd intrinsically concrete .among which laws these guarantees are included. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. This absolute nucleus of man . The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. from those deeper requirements which.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists .g.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . however sound their provisions may be. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves.

was that creative imagination. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. so . broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. should knit it together and control it. Only in the principle of mind. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. or essential being). which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . Under the subjective form. for th ese reasons. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. and so also one-sided phase. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. which still escaped his intelligence. or rather must. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. Hence religion as such. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. Plato. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists .through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . but earlier than philosophy. as demoralization.). is implicitly in absolute liberty. ¤ 513. As it left therefore behind.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. the subjectivity of long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. religion. in its philosophic phase. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. exhibits the one-sidedness. earlier than it does as philosophy.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. of philosophy. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. he. Religion may. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. however. fall feeling. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words.the idea of the substantial moral life. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. on its own s howing. intuition. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations.and th at on account of this very principle . etc. But even religion. as it grows and expands. His state is therefore. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). which is developed similarly. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. pictorial representation. But thought always . in its f irst immediate. which is awa re of its own essence. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . Political power.). The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. is after all only in one of its form s.g the Platonic Idea (the genus.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. from religion. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. The form in its infinite tru th.

The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. the constitut ion and the code. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). for which it is as substance. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. Das System der Bedurfnisse. 9. Thus ul timately. 6. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. Die Sittlichkeit. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. Religion. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. That here. as well as their several applications. Inneres this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. 3. Weltweisheit. i. Das aussere Staatsrecht. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. 1. of God's indwelling in us. while it is self-centred identity. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself.e. Gesetz. 7. 4. as always. Die Polizei und die Corporation. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. Die Rechtspflege 5. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. In the Protestant state. 2. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. but rather to a sort of knowledge. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. Die Weltgeschichte 10. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength.

ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of other words. the actuality of the spirit. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. but .the shape or form of Beauty. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. and of gaining its concrete determination. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art.hence not the sp iritual unity. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. With the essential restrictedness of its content. its n atural immediacy. aware. which is only a sign of the Idea. or the idea. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. on the other hand. But. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. ¤ 411). when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail.something formal. has in devotion . Belief. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. Art requires not only an external given material . .must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth.i. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. that is. viz. as superseded in spirit. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. A. into the subject which produces that work. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. reconciliation.the form of immediacy as such .e.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence .He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit .(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. like the material which it uses to work in. On one hand.for the expression of spiritual truth . that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . In this ideal. as it is. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. c an. so that the thought embodied. 1. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . Der absolute Geist.

a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. is not yet known. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. as well as of its art and science. is not yet absolute. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. though concrete and intrinsically free. known as the Absolute.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist .for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman .symbolic art. assumes fuller and firmer features. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world.can try to bring itself to consciousness. not yet conscious of itself. and th e artist is the master of the God. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. as free spi rit. and that is where the infinite form. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . .a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. the principle of its law. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. of its actual liberty. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. that one spirit creates and informs them. subjectivity. or an effor t towards him . The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. and of its constitution.stil l this art is defective. but as only finding himself in himself. but its inmost depth. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. the artist's enthusiasm. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet short how the nature of a nation's moral life. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form.

in which he had not revealed himse lf. on the contrary. we see that the advent of art.into revelation. what is more. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. . shows that such religion is on the decline. revealed by God. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. Beautiful art. But with a further and deeper study. The older religion in which the need of fine art. which is only in the medi um of thought . and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . .is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. . as infinite self-realizing form . has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit .the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. B. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain therefore is manifestation out a nd out. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . then the only thing left to constitute His nat .the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. and j ust for that reason.The genuine objectivity. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. Beautiful art. and brilliancy. still more in that external. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality.of Nemesis. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. and.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. whose con tent is absolute mind . it is from Him. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. unbeautiful sensuo usness. the theme and c entre of religion. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power.ent in it.due to a one-sided survey of human life . dashing t o pieces everything high and great . which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. not the supreme liberation itself. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit.that it be revealed. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed.the religion i. is first generated. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. with their perso nal sense and feeling. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. expression. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. from it s side. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. The old conception . like the religion peculiar to it. has its future in true reli gion. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. spectator find themselves at home.e.

directed towards the Eternal. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. G . If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . which proceeds to man's self. though different.: Berlin 1829. On one hand is heaven and earth. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. a separate being. as in duty bound. it may almost create surprise that so many. It includes.requires careful and thorough speculation.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. Yet. even in its manifestation. by C. Go d is. staying aloof and inert. which therefore is finite. to specul ative comprehension.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness.just as. F. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness.knowledge in God. in point of content. in it s forefront.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . (c) as infinite return. when it thinks. while in point of form he is. of the world it gave away . but afterwards. it implies the revelation of the Spirit.on the other hand. he still remains in original identity . abiding sel f-centred. making them presuppositions towards each other. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. ¤ 566 In this separating. (a) as eternal content. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God.1. with whom. That spirit. the spirit. on the other hand. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. and reconciliation with the eternal being. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. But. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. for that reas on. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. only standing to it in an external connection. To know what God as spirit is . and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. amid that natural ness.. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. on one hand. and. the elemental and the concrete nature .the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . further. as the extreme of inherent negativity. though. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. first of all. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. not. however.of the only Son . . it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. it is.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. or of judgement. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . again. .it is therefore the absolute fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. and phenomena which succeed each other. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters..

in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. is itself the emptiness and vanity. th e self-centred manifestation. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . external in point of form. an object of contemplating vi sion . and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. and thus. as infinite subjectivi ty. If the result . is not bound by it . as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . eternal. In this form of transplanted into the world of time. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. Further. truth is the object of philoso phy.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. contentless sense. C. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. this immediate. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. he. but even to thought. From this its separation into p arts. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also taken in a merely formal. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. and thus sensuous. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . simple. Die geoffenbarte Religion. on account of his immediate nature. and eternal spirit in itself.but the vision of implicit truth. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. 1. with a temporal and external sequence. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. This individual. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . but alive and present in the world. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. who as such is identified with the essence . so far.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. keeps himself unchanged.and. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. But.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . Thinking. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. secondly. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. . so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such .Irony. Irony. in which he. gives itself direction and con tent. which from itself. through which witness of the spirit in him. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. after the example of his truth. his natur al man and self-will. Whereas the vision-method of Art. remains master over it. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence.

and s o religious. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit.on one hand.which may be in both the same . even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. remains identical with it. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards.('Rationalism') . and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. immediate vision and its poetry. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. elevation of them into the absolute form. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. and whereas Religion.i.and from a pithless orthodoxy. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. which determines itself to content. of course. but also criticized it. or. to be more precise still. a nd of logic in particular. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies.e. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. and acts inconsistently towards them. This movement. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. only looks back on its knowledge. with its separ ation into parts. which philosophy is. and against philosophy in general . Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. This witness .takes. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. The charge of Atheism. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. when driven to expound itself. finds itself already accompl ished. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. as also of the necessity in the two forms . and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. and particularly of the logical form. and this necessary as free.leaving out.from these forms. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content .the underlying essence in all humanity . Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same .stantial content into many separate shapes. opens it out in mental picture. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. This does not prevent the spirit. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. and mediates what is thus open ed out. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . too much for the latter.on the other hand. when at the close it seizes its own notion . wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man.

that it has too much of him: . Amongst the abundant resources. and so . it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. open to our disposal on this topic.that of the Egyptians to the ox .thus he understands philosophy . Without interest of its own for the concrete.the Bhagavat-Gita. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality.all possess substantia lity. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) .that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. we must. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . ¤ 71 note). If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. that. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. are) . If this theory needs no more than such a the wanton assertion. It is only his own stupidity. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . without distinction. most sublime. and amongst it s effusions. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . I select . so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. exclusi ve. On such a presuppo sition. but as a proved fact. in particular.(empirical things. God in General. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their always adora tion of an object which. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: .Everything is . though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism.each and every secular thing is God. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. its grossest shape.of Pantheism.g. as it stands. This new theology. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. the secularity of th ings.which therefore it does not disparage. with all its absurdities. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. or if you will. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. cows . and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. does not comprehend itself. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. if we believe them. or Pantheism. whether higher or lower in the scale. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. Piety. and is therefore. fulfilled notion of much much so. and form all that is definite in the divine universality. from which all definite quality is excluded. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er.that of the Hindu to ass es. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. are unable and unwilling to see this . or any one man. as is well known.or to dalai-lamas .of the new piety and new theology. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. some of the most telling passage . also contains the generic abs the most authentic statement accessible . almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind .

.s. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . . . as different from that accidental. called Gods. which Krishna calls himself.. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. where the empirical everything of the world. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. t he pure unity of thought in itself. This everything. . . Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith.the most excellent of everything. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his.spiritual as its idea of God i s . middle. or Indra. There is nothing else higher than myself. . I am also the strength o f the strong. . pp. is not. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains).' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. . still God. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. but having its truth in the substance.'I am the self. and the moon among the lunar mansions. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. besides Krishna. etc. or a God besides. 'At the end of many lives. . Among letters I am the letter A. rather. which he is. melt into the one Krishna. I am the taste in water.' This 'All'. goodness. vanish. as also those proximate substantialities. everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. without essential being of its very own. unessential existences. Even when. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . nothing independent]. But so little concrete is this divine unity . and end of living things. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. . seated in the hearts of all beings. to a poly theism. Indra. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . he is said to be the beginning. but only . and the Spinozan Substance. at the beginning of the pass age.). I am "Om" in all the Vedas. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . the Everything. . . (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. Hinduism.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel.that Hinduism. . . . this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. passion. . On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. and one essential amongst them. . . Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. . . has the higher conception of Brahma. . .' Even in these totally sensuous delineations.. so to speak . I am life in all beings. is also the maddest of polytheisms. even Siva. all this is woven upon me.not everything. . I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. the One which. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. . Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. . as he said before he was S iva. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. . I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. . with a monstrous incons istency. . 7 seqq. . Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . I am the light of th e sun and the moon. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. . This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . grip. any more than the Eleatic One. . .. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. .so powerless its. however. The undiscerning ones. . Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. Meru among the high-topped mountains. than which there is nothing higher. . is alo ne the divine and God. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. p. . .

is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. For that unity. and.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. after this partition. the Eleatic. we must consult th e Mohammedans. the finite to the infinite. empirical indivi duals . and so on .of the world as one thing. the all.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. of the relationship of God and the world. as it says.g. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. That pantheism indeed . or Spinozist. e.ndu. outside it . These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. or. Hin du monotheism. which. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. The clo se of philosophy is not the place.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. on one hand. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. to which everything is God. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism.. as the endless lot of empirical existence.floating in the indefinite blue . we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in it as a lot of Gods or as secular. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity.on the shallow conception of it . It is only the picture . when he adores the ape. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. and on the other. he is as essence parted from appearance. on the contrary. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. ac osmical. But to go back again to the question of fact. even in a general exoteric discussion. moreover. but . or other creature. to was . no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. and God everything.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic.. Of the oriental. But. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. and that unity described as love. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. as everything. modes of envisaging God. is discarded and absor bed. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. and of empirical secular spirit. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. whether they spring from heart. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. If. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. in relation to the popular idea of the world. is identical with the world. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is its finest purity and sublimity. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. as infinite from the finite. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic.keep its independence. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. secondl y. imagination or speculation. especially the Mohammedan.

i.and that the factor of indet erminateness . when they hear of unity .e. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like.that. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. is what one expect s. as Epicu rus does. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial .that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. and that hence. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. with indefinite ideas. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world.has the same solid substantiality as the other. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. not the concrete unity. but only the one factor of this category of relation . but rather its reverse. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. omnipresence. composition. the notion and content of philosophy. but with concrete unity (the notion).or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) .they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. and that amongst the m there is great variety. where they are utterly unknown.g. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. if not even of supreme interest. providence. they import them into philosophy. inorganic and living . at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. in matters admitted to be of superior. and that it is the system of identity. I n the philosophical field they proceed.falsely as a fact . they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. And as in their judgement either of the two . Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. and the empty identity.the world as much as Go d . it is not. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. etc.te a word on what a 'notion' means. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. e.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. depend solely on the different modes of this unity.said pores being the negative.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. But they show so little acquaintance with them . . a nd assert . viz. the most external and the worst. mere ide ntity. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. in the pores of th e physicists . it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . with abstract unity. as in the physical field the physicist. however.and relation i pso facto implies unity . they have laid hands on.and s till less take trouble about it . The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. and which they ascribe to philosophy. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. But the question is. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. with God's omnipresence.g. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest.

the logical system. the notion. and notions . or as prevaricating for a purpose. is philosophy itself. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. as other than they. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality.their everything. Nature . y . But to put that sort of thing. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. and which is itself the way to produce it. making the former its presupposition. of which liberty is the aim. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment.knowing reaso n. not abstract unity. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . and the latter its universal extreme. on the shoulders of philosophy.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. but the many-shaped modes specified. sunders itself. as of cognitions. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. On account of this chorus of assertions. i. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. the absolutely universal. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . which causes the movement and development. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. If statements as to facts are put forward.e. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. standing between the Mind and its essence. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism.which. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. and as implicitly the Idea. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . nor itself to something away from them and independen t . for its middle term: a has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. a system of identity. But in ascribing to God. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. The esoteric study of God and identity. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. is the nature of the fact. in his relation to the world. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . and the facts in question are thoughts and the mediating agent in th e process . It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. an All-one doctrine. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ which notions are perverted into their opposite. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. which . ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea.ity . as process of the I dea's subjective activity. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. which has self. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement.

eternally sets itself to work. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. The eternal Idea. .et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. in f ull fruition of its essence.

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