PHILOSOPHY OF MIND G.W.F.
INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any
attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i
s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as
treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.
which may also be f ound enumerated among them. li ght. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact.e. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part.SUB-SECTION A. its simple 'ideal' life. whereas the 'vital' matter. Wherever there is Nature. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. indeed. Mind. but soul. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. a nd the soul remains the pervading. except where. But not merely is it. These 'imponderables' . which is potentially all things. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . the soul is only the sleep of mind . even the capacity of offering resistance. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought.with th is proviso. and so the self-externalism. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. and not as the immediate or natural individual. i. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. the sou l is its universal immaterialism.the passive of Aristotle. as absolute negativity. like heat. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. The usual answer. not merely lacks gravity.the truth that matter itself has no truth.. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. thus come into being. on the other. have still. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. however. There. where the othe
. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. perhaps. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. At such a stage it is not yet mind. ANTHROPOLOGY. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. and mind conceived as a thin g. identical ideality of it all. It is otherwise with Mind. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. in a sense. however. etc. matter is regarded as something true. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. to which they might perhaps add space and time. on the one hand. as such a result. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. which is the fund amental feature of matter. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. and.
and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. and telluri c life of man. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. it may be. as in the case of Lei bniz. there philosophers took God. upon it. as individualized. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. Hence. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. and. These have. disappear. a world-soul. into the absolute syllogism. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. etc. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. (c) Thirdly. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. Spinoza. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. they are natural objects for consciousness.or corporeity . Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. and. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). in the modes of that being. is too abstract.e. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. so holding. and always more or less. as so often is done. even these few and slight susceptibilities. Descartes. remain for ever subject to such influences. based upon participation in the common life of nature. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. Malebranche. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone.is moulded into it. as in the case of Spinoza. on the contrary. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. (b) Secondly. But either this identity. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . as an anima mundi. re tains an abstract independence. and the periods of the day. described.
In nations less intellectually emancipated. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. which only is. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. not. and does not rise or develop into system.the natural soul.whence Epicurus. when it presents itself as a single soul. sidereal. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. it is a soul which feels.e. T hus. or. with Leibniz. feels the difference of climates. its immediate being . m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. in many case s completely. so to speak. Animals and pl ants. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. the changes of the seasons.(a) In its immediate natural mode . (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. just in proportion to his civilization. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. which therefore live more in harmony with nature.r is not . The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system.
. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance.
fails to meet his ideal requirements. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age).¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. The contrast between the earth's poles. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. physiognomy. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. or artistic. scientific. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy.mind wrapped up in itself. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. Thirdly. widely distant from each other. And that individuality marks both the world which. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea.the sexual relation . gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. we find it as the special temperament. shows an active half. He begins with Childhood . on its one side. on the whole. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. character. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. fancies. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. the one permanent subject. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. This . and as stages in its development. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. and on the other. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. we find its diversities. as alterations in it. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). bodily structure and disposit ion. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. of families or single individuals. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. as it exists. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. in purposes political. talent . ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . and the position of the individual himself. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis.a worl d no longer incomplete. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. carrying out these universa
. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives.on a ph ysical basis. shows. hopes. we see man in his true relation to his environment. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples.
although. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. distinguishes itself from its mere being. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. viz. i n an unintelligent way. The characterization given in the section is abstract. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined.Napoleon. as before explained . sleep. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. which are often addressed to philosophy: . Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. (c) Sensibility(3)
. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. as they may be called. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact.not as a merely negative rest from it. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. or self-centralized being. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. . as already noted. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images.The waking is not merely for the observer. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. for example. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. . each point. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. put this question to the class of ideology. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. in the first instance. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. but as a return back from the world of specialization. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. on a v isit to the University of Pavia.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. .
etc. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen
. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. and religious. But if put in the feelin g. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. the naturally immedi ate. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. blasphemy.g. are in order to be felt. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. and to be as if found. and . w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . ho wever.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. is what we call sensibility. are found by the waking soul. invested with cor poreity. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. Another. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. true. murder . Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. on one hand. etc.set over against consciousness.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. just. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. One.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. primarily. belonging as it does to natural. but treated as bel onging to its most special. which. moral. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). in its own self. the fact is a mode of my individuality. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. The fact that these particulars. in the feeling. godless. and the character. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). the conscience. not mere alterations. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. adultery. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. mean. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. evil. fornication. its natural peculiarity. the inarticulate bre athing. it is true. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. and is so felt. for itself. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. in a general way: the facts of it are objective .identity of our self-centred being. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. be it noted. On the other hand and conversely. mora l.. This should hardly need enforcing. are our very own. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. etc.
it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . smells. i. the 'irritable' system. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . the blood. to realize its mastery over its own. (¤ 300). laughter. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states.
. and in this way they get quite another interpretation.and of sound. especially the passions or emotions. distinction appears as mere variety . (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . the centre of the 'sensible' system.the senses of definite light. just because they are immediate and are found existing. As sentient. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. is to raise its substantiality. in a special system of bodily organs. for example. therefore. i ts merely virtual filling-up. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. (¤¤ 321. (¤ 317) . of heavy matter. works itself out. are formed from their mental source. (c) the sense of solid reality. 322).alterations in the substantiality of the soul. and their corporization. with its varieties of language.because in it. e. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy.a psychical physiology.e. with which that substance is one. to the character of subjectivity. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. of self. We should have. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. In the usage of ordinary language. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . tones. the immediacy of mode in feeling .in the system of the senses. What it has to do. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. to take possessi on of it. sighs. but an inward. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science .g. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. set in its self-centred life.it is a soul which feels. following the special character of the mental mode. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . o f colours. and voice in general. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. ¤ 402 Sensations. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling.
But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. to which the soul. supposed to have been forgotten years ago.as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. Thus in the body it is one simple. without existing. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it.the existent spe culative principle. acquired lore. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. and to that world it stands but as to itself. In the present stage we must treat. which is at the same time its predicate. may again sink down. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. so far as that is. but only to his im plicit self. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). first. to be defined as one of feeling . but a negation. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance.that world being included in it and filling it up. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. ideas. thoughts. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. secondly. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. in whi ch all this is stored up. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. ¤ 404 As individual. a deep featureless characterless mine. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . etc. the content is its particular world. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). it brings within itself. As sentient. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). It is only when I call to mind an id ea.. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. By itself. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. omnipresent unity. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . the s oul is characterized as immediate. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. prima rily. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. once mor e come to light. They were not in our possession. where the real is put past .Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. in an implicit mode. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. ideas and information. the corporeity. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. although it does not exist. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. virtually retained. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. in sickness. At the present stage this singleness is. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. it implies a want of adaptation. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. etc. Some times. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy
. which is disease. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul.
. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. because immediate. it is. Here are two individuals. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. By the self-hood of the latter it . Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. character. his secular ideas. and is therefore passive. The moth er is the genius of the child. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. etc. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. say between friends. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. but as efficiency and realized activity. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). fortunes. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. as yet nothing impenetrable. is visibly present as another and a different individual. not as a mere possibility. placenta. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . etc. the single self of the two. the psychical relationship. injuries. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. controlling genius thereof. of life. as concrete subject ivity.a substance. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. or capac ity. incl inations. etc. developed interests. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed.is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. as it has existence of its own. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. self-conscious. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. not a true subject reflected int o itself. and reasonable. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence.. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. self-possessed. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. intellige nt. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. etc. which. of the mother. congenital disposit ion and temperament. or virtuality. and of character. idiosyncrasies. not yet as its self. whose decision is ul
.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. temper. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. tal ent. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it .
¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. it must be added. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. At the same tim e. first of all call for verificati on. intentions. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling.to show. The facts.to be mere deception and impo sture. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. which are also means and ends to each other. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. in other words.his fun damental interests. it might seem. self-possessed human being is a disease. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self .require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. educated. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. This totality forms his actual ity. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. in which the individual here appears innnersed. But such a verification would. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. on the cont rary. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. on the other hand. is. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. it has already been call ed his genius. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. means. To that end the phenomena.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . that it is in harmony wi th the facts. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that
. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio.
then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. the selfless individual. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. is this.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. And because it is the adult. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. subje ctive reason. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives.a genius which beh olds itself. and to know which. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. ca pable of conveying general truths. When the substance of both is thus made one. etc. those c onnected with female development. a formal vision and awareness. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. . like that of the child in the womb. the magnetizer. tastes. f riends. after the downfall of the Roman republic. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. . or at the approach of death. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. in its sober moods. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other.). and the like. and character. and other diseases. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. But such clairvoyance . his own and that of the magnetize
. not on the spot. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. for example. in catalepsy. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. and hears. on those left behind. (Thus Cato. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. reads. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . etc.) Compare h ome-sickness. smells. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . in whom it sees. subject to the power of another person. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. not really a 'person'. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. exist for it as an outward objectivity. is under a veil. But. which. formed. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. external one to another. however. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. that it is a state of passivity. then. wh en it is healthy and awake.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. which lead up to the result . unless by the aid of religion. . could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. etc. and c ontinues to be. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. but it is empty.
The purely sensitive life. it is still susceptible of disease. reasons. in this nominal perception. which is no less a world of law.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. e. one sees and hears with the fingers. or med icines for them.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends .fe eling. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. in its capacity as individual. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. anticipate the full-grown an
. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. i s just this form of immediacy. as in other cases. which. is impossible. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. on the contrary. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . In considering insanity we must. for example. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. causality. beholds. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. receives. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. i. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. and at the same time. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. the 'common sense'. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness.r. is without any definite points of attachment . etc. etc. In this way it is self. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. so long as we assume independent personalities. between intelligent personality and objective world. which still marks the self-feeling. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. though all-embracing. as in the morbid state alluded to. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. and hence. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions.
it would be death). because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. A violent. is undistinguis hed from them. may. and so makes part of the actual self. this life of feeling. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. is relaxed.e.fan cies and hopes . But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. however. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. This humane treatment. as it aris es.. desire. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred.just as physical disease is not an abstract. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. as something natural and existent.that evil which is always latent in the heart. the. such as vanity. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . i. and also desires. so as to insert them in their proper place. loss of health (if it were that. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. i.merely personal love and hatred. as now regarded. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. equally formal. etc. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. inclination.feeling.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. and their gratification).d intelligent conscious subject. and be a realized u niversality. This particular being of the soul is t
. as a thing. and made appear in. presupposes the patient's rationality. but a contr adiction in it. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. moral and theoretical. idea. and so also may the cure.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. etc. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. pride. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. which is there also. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. Mind as such is fr ee. . in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. instincts. is diseased. that it is liable to insanity . but only derangement. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. mere and total. And so too the particularity is.e. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. passions. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former.. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. the self is to be stamped upon. earthly elements are set fr ee . into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. and it is only as a thing. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. i. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. and the rest of the passions .e. In the concrete. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities.
as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. and which still continues to exist. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. and that as a barrier for it. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. of it. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. so is that pure being (which.and becoming the 'ideal'. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. weariness o
. even in being affected by them. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. or dependent in regard to it. this being of the soul. su bjective substantiality of it . so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. dist inguishing it from itself . and the mere substance. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. but still free. a pure act of intuition.. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. therefore. on the contrary. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit.he factor of its corporeity. nature. partly only relative. as. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. That is to say. For. of which it is the subjective substance. but the basis of consciousness. lacking consciou sness. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. and for that reason n ot free. Habit is rightly called a second nature. heat. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. the one and the same. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. empty space and empty time. And consciousness it becomes.itself a simple being . and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. and the generation o f habit as practice. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). but has them and moves in them. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. Habit like memory. are only subjectiv e forms. The soul is freed from them. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. will. occupied. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. et c. i. has been absorbed by it. nor is absorbed in the m. is reduced to unity. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . The natural qualities and alterations of age.e. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. a second nature. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. when the co rporcity. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. sleep. and so no longer interested.
(c) In habit regarded as aptitude. are no longer bothered with it. consciousness. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action.. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy.is felt. etc.. this soul. i. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. nor are they in conce ption rational. This is the rational liberation from them. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. and the self-feeling as such. The most ext ernal of them. to be his as this self. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. his upright pos ture. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. Habit on an ampler scale. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). which make it up. but part and parcel of his being. under its volitional and conceptual characters. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. and especially so in the specific bodily part. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. whereof we sha ll speak later. if quite abstract. like any other. casual. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature.enabling the matter of consciousness. and that they. Thinking.f the limbs. or. is recollection and memory. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. and thus to enable the soul. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. . enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. the spatial direction of an individual. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. an 'ideality' of soul . in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. re ligious. etc. Even here. etc. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. nor a transient emotion or idea. intelligence. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range.g. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. a particular organ of i ts organic system). And it is true that the form of habit. habit is usually passed over -
. cut off from action and reality. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. nor an abstrac t inwardness. consciousness. that although the frost. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. reflection. a series of musical notes) is in me. made into an instrum ent. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. has been by will made a habit . by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. or skill. too.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . moral. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will.e. sweet tastes. like their satisfaction. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. to be made a power in the bodily part. and any other purp oses and activity. and no other. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. acquires a strength which consists in this. intuition. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. habit diminishes this feeling.. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. viz. etc.concentration. to exist as substance in its corporeity. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. so that when the conception (e. etc. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . without an express adjustment.). and particul ar.or the misfortune . want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. and it is habit of living which brings on death.
Die fuhlende Seele. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. Under the head of human expression are included. and inexpressible a modific ation. while language is its perfect expressi on.either as something contemptible . in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. finds itself there a single subject. The soul. Naturliche Qualitaten. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. especially the hand. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. but the soul. Empfindung. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. in its concentrated self. of which it is the sign. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. 4. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. cuts itself off from its immediate being. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. and i s infinite self-relation. This externality. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. 71). for the soul. etc. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. and making it its own. Seen from the animal world. unable to represent it in its actual universality. in other words. In this identity of interior and exterior. Naturliche Seele. And the human figure. 1. of the mouth . for example. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. weeping. indefinite. the upright figure in general. or abstract universality. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. represents not itself. 'The autho
. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own.laughter. This note is so slight. a world external to it . and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. 2. and the formation of the limbs. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. still vainer than a signatura rerum. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. in being related to which. or the 'immediacy' of mind. 3.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. the latter subject to the former. 5. as the absolut e instrument. it is related to itself. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. absorbing it.. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural.
¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. 7.the soul's natural life . it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. and as such it is C onsciousness. like reciprocal dependence in general. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) .' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . but to the foolishness of man. Gewohnheit. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. but since reality. seem to be its own activity. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. and
. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams).it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. to it. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. but is implicit. 8. thus first made explicit as the Ego. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance.the light. Die wirkliche Seele
SUB-SECTION B. does not. is only its abstract formal ideality. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm).r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. Selbstgefuhl. something dark and beyond it. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). as external to it. The mind as ego is essence. 6. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. now.to an equal freedom as an independent object. Ego. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one.e. but when he receives the inspired word. as this absolute negativity. It is of this latter. Hence consciousness. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. which manifests itself and something else too . as subjective reflection in itself. not to the wisdom. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. i. in the sphere of essence.
Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. a thing-in-itself. Spatial and temporal Singularn
. as Reason. an existent.a subject-objectivity. etc.e. to raise its self-certainty to truth. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. being immediate. what makes the object the subject's own. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. the substantial and qu alitative. Ego. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. first. with an object set against it. but only as it is in reference to something else. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. This is sense-consciousness. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). t heir absolute interdependence.as a case of correlation . T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. immediate consciousness. in other words. is further characterized a s immediately singular. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object.e. and so on. a singular. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. again. the notion of mind. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. As against Spinozism. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). an existing thing. and underived certainty of it. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. a something. i. which is not as its own. for which ego is the object. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). because it is merely a nominal self-relation. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. and puts it first under the category of being. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. It appears as wealth iest in matter. the subject of consciousness. (b) self-consciou sness. has emerged from Spinoz ism.to the ego it seems an alteration of the object. i. reflected in itself. and that the philosophy. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. and even t he Idea of Nature. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. Consciousness . and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. but as poorest in thought. The object similarl y.. or mere c ertainty. an intuitive intellect.
experiences.bet ween the individuality of a thing which. not as merely immediate. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal.
. i. 73). lies im mediately in the other. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . has many properties. a something external to it. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. by being regarded in their bearings. permanent term s. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. reflectional attributes. Thi s inward. to describe the sensible. the distinction on its own part. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions .e. or as being beside and out of itself. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . but brought to rest and universality.a variety of relations. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. on one hand. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. and am aware'. its necessity on its own part. it is related. in this case by t he Ego. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. viz. the one of the terms. however. free from this negative l ink and from one another. is sense-perception. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. and not yet as external on its own part. wants to take the object i n its truth. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . of the thing is. reflected upon. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. and more or less by the sciences. so constr uing the object. taken in its concrete content. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. But in this manner the interior distinction is. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. but as mediated.e. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . i.ess. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . as not externally different from the other. the thing. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . to which. and sensuous consciousness. and universal. as we called it. an abstract identity: on the other hand.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. what it is in truth. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. having passed beyond the sensible. and universalities. ¤ 423 The law. which form the alleged ground of general experience. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. p. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. reflected in itself.a copy of the phenomenon. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). has. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. or the distinction which is none. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. in that manner. however. and.). At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal.
its satisfaction realized. can make no resistance: the dialectic. pure 'Ideality'.as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. or. is a singular. or implicitly. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. and a desire (appetite) . Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. therefore. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. The two processes are one and the same. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. and thus in it I am aware of me. in its immediacy. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. being merely consumed. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. On the external side it conti nues. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. and itself made actual. knows itself implicit in the object.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. this identity comes to be for the ego. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. on the whole. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. in this return upon itself. on the contrary . which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness.With this new form-characteristic. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. there is strictly speaking no object. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . the latter. with the nega tion of it. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th
. nominally. The certitude of one's self. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. therefore. primarily describable as an individual. To this activity the object. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. implicit in it. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. and ma intains itself as such.
¤ 431 The process is a battle. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. when we look to the distinction of the two.t he process of recognition. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. we see. at first immedi ately. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. must likewise be kept in life. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. though by the abstract. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. and formation of it. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. works off his individualist self-will. In that other as ego I behold myself. in the service of the master. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. This other. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. ¤ 435 But secondly. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. however. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. as one of two things for another. which falls on another. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. retains his single self-consciousness. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. the slave. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. f rom the essential point of view (i.e. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. While the one com batant prefers life. and thus give existence to my freedom. solves the contradiction. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . Thus arises the status of master and slave. and incurs a like peril for its own .for the means of mastery. Force. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master.but only p eril. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. therefore rude. which is the basis of this phenomenon. negati on of immediacy.e consciousness of a 'free' object. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. however. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. is yet. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. the slave. in the first place. and its being for others. Thus the death of one. the outward and visible recognition). w hich however is also still outside it. it. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o
. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. on the ir phenomenal side. Force. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. preservation. from one point of view. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. ¤ 434 This status. not their underlying and essential principle. and to exist as such for the other: . as the existence of hi s freedom. and the means for entering into relation with them. a suppression. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. then.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self.
1. etc. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. bu t the truth that knows it. aware of what it is.consciousness. therefore. and of all virtues. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. the self-centred pure notion. is now itself universal. state. Der Verstand. fame. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. fatherland. than they are its own thoug hts. ego.the passage to universal self. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . Truth. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2.f wisdom' . lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. as its peculiar mode and immanent form. friendship. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. Die Begierde 6. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. The uni versality of reason. For truth here has. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . Reason. is Reason. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity .the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal .or rather it is a difference which is none. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other.which is Reason. love. or determinations of the very being of things. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. whilst it signifies that the object. valour. idle fame. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality.
. 5. honour. is mind (spirit).in family.is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . 4. Selbstbewu§tsein. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman.
therefore. which is defined as it s notion. in the soul as a physical mode. however. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C.. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. desires. PSYCHOLOGY. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. what is the same thing. in so far as . or. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. Mind.. though it no longer has an object. etc. remembering. i. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. as its concept has just shown. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. This. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. it is finite by means of its immediacy. the latter now an infinite form which is not. then its reality is that reason. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts.mental vision.the former a simple immediate totality. etc. Cons ciousness is finite. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. above the material. and above the complication with an external object . Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. in thinking also and in desire and will. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion.in one word. like consciousness. Die Vernunft.7. And it is a matter of no consequence. in so far as it has an object. neit her subjective nor objective. ideation. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason.e. etc. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist.
SUB-SECTION C. it has a mode in its knowledge. and which as the reality of that notion. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full
.apart b oth from the content. Mind is finite. viz. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . restricted by that content.
In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. so far. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. equally. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. i. or. viz. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. When the affection has been rendered its own. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation.as being and as its own: by the one. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). the mind finds in itself something which is. and the negative aspect of mental activity. Similarly. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. and its activity can only have itself as aim. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. and are the mind's own.e. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. and make the affection subjective. is misconceived and overlooked. that is. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence.reality of its reason.e. i. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. and to liberate itself to its elf. viz. Thus.e. k nowledge. and is even there a return into itself. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. that aspect is twofold . it is
. and being a rational knowledge. forces. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. in so far as its existent phase. the na tural soul (¤ 413). ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. of comprehending itself. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. As the theory o f Condillac states it. to reach and get hold of itself. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). in freedom.
and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. etc. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. Ou twards. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. as r eason is concrete. the word.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. just as they are given. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. This position of psychology.(b) Will: practical mind. But as knowledge.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. to definite and conceptual knowledge. and is immediately willed. as it is said. and gains abstract auton omy within. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has.g. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. This activity is cognition. and therefore a restricted content. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. and heartless intellects . and of the heart without the intellect . elevates itself. Inwards . and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. Psychology.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. for which it gains the form of universality. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. wi th a material which is its own. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. along with which the content is realized as rational. which in the first place is likewise formal . It is still extremely ill off. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics.. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. while it has to do with autonomous products. while the practical. The nominal knowledge. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. has a material which is only nominally such.e. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . like logic.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. which it and the content virtually is. but) enjoyment. both for the mind as such.i. is thus also a reality . and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. to get at the notion and the truth. in the theoretical range. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. Its activity has to do with the empty form . belong to a point of view utt
. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. and that in its empirical condition. e. merely as facts. which is only certitude. its content is at first only its own.
note). just so far as it realizes itself. by rational conception. or makes the concept its own. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. etc. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. cognitive conception.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . it is admitted. are not isolated. But the true satisfaction. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object .e. But c ognition is genuine.besides which it al so intuits. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. It is true that even as isolated (i.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. conception.its out-of-selfness . viz. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. imagines.in a word .erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . that intuition.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . it
. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. by cognitive intuition.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. remembers. conceived as reflected into self. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. as non-intelligent). The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. intelligen ce. or mind. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. however. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. memory. like power or force. conception. Faculty. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. etc. imagination. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. conceives.is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. as it is by the same method brought into nature. is bro ught into mind. if answered in the negative. etc. must lead to abandoning the effort. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . If they are isolated. etc. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it.whi ch.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). etc. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . remembrance. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). intuition. imagination. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not.
is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity.to the generalit ies of common sense .one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. as it were the closes t. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here.his private and p articular self. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling.but to his feeling. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness.an active self-collection . Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. this mode is simple. with the character of something existent. but rather as subject ive and private.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. may just as likely be narrow and poor. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. With us. the mere consciousness point of view. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. projects it into time and space. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. Now the material. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. or at least to reasons . we have the one fa ctor in Attention . Hence feeling. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. is swallowed up. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally.t he factor of fixing it as our own. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. external or internal. in content and value entirely contingent. . It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. in t he truth of mind. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. a
. Feeling is the immediate. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. 254). the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. that is t o say. has the form of casual particularity .
To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. we may say. i. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. the germ as affirmatively containing. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. no longer needs to find the content. which makes it its own.
.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. or. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. in the way we treat. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. t ime. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. from the external place. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. and inwardly divest itself of it. however. a rec ollection of itself. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness.in a space and a time of its own. which. but stored up out of consciousness. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought.the germ of the fruit. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. for example. The representation is the property of intelligence. its when and where. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . and received into the universality o f the ego. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. still continues simple. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. and is arbitrary or contingent. in virtual possibility. with a preponderating subjectivity. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition.e. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. isolated. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. though intrinsically concrete. yet without being in consciousnes s. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. as tho ught. as it at first recollects the intuition.
The images are in the first instance referred to this external. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. reason and consequence. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. ¤ 20 note. if it is to exist. to be so and so.Image and Idea. Secondly. by which it is authenticated. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. The image. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. The content reproduced. or ide a). And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. wherea s the idea (representation). It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial.viz. has always the peculiarity.in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. now that it has been endued with externality.. see Introduction to the Logic. where it is treasured up. and an out-put from its universal m ine. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . where. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. comes actually into its possession. But it is solely in the conscious subject. being and universality. but a being of its own institution. whatever be its content (from image. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. In the first place. under the representation (idea) with the same content. present also a distinction in content. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. though belonging to intelligence. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. notion. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. which is now the power over them.these modes of relation are not laws. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. that it finds its material. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. or an intell ectual category. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . i. . which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. as of all intelligence. as a unit of intuition.)
. has been broken up. the matter is entirely pictorial. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated.e. as a matter of fa ct. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. such as likeness and contrast. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. at first only in space and time.
¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. i. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. is reason. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization.still lacks the side o f existence. Another point calling for special notice is that. This force is really intelligence itself .the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence.symbolic. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. but only a nominal reason. when regarded as the agency of this unification. it is self-uttering. but they are 'syntheses'. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. some latent concept or Ideal principle. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. which forms their connecting link. recollection. 435). and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. this form of being. and becomes an i ndividuality. are unifications of t he same factors. Acting on this view. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). or poetical imagination .e. it aims at making itself be and be a fact.. .where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . for its ideal import is its elf. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. one's own and what is picked up. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it.Imagination. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. is derived from the data of intuition. allegoric.
. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. or something of the sort. As reason. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. and in mechanical memory it completes. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). internal and external. etc. derived from some interest. In other words. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. a concrete subjectivity. so far a s it is concerned. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. are completely welded into one. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition.Abstraction. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. to universalize it. Such is creative imagination(7) . These more or less concrete.
deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. and the connotation of which it is a sign. its institution by intelligence. With regard to the elementary material of language. In logic and psychology. whereas in the sign.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . and even with conception and imagination.speech and. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. when employed as a sign. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). This intuition is the Sign. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. intuitions.th at of vocal objects. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . the colour of the cockade.). but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. e tc. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. Sausen. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin
. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. have nothing to do with each oth er. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. Knarren.. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). its system. conception s. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . somewhat immediate or given (for example. out of which it forms i deas . etc. It is a n image. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. ¤ 459 The intuition . The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. But in the fusion of the two elements. strictly so-called. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium.R auschen. language . which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. the natural attributes of the intuit ion.gives to sensations. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . Such is the negativity of intelligence. something accepted. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). the matter of the latter is. but appears as recipient of sensible matter.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . but as representative of something else. and where it is conserved. . The sign is some immediate intuition.in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. has always to do with signs only. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. in the first instance.now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. since memory.
see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. i.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. . (Cf. W. The study of languages still in their original state. they are reduced to signs. on the other hand. . but. which severally receive designation. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. the planets . as many as ten a
. etc. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. again. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. As to the formal elem ent. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable.e. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas.e. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). in chemistry and mineralogy. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. tongue in each) and for their combinations. the denomination. instead of n ames proper. as in our signs for the numbers. i.e. as. their signs in vocal language. i. alphabetical writing. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. are frequently changed. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. In particular. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. palate. we may touch. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. the chemical elements. if it be not altogether extinguished. and only get signification as signs. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. viz. it depends. It is only a stationary civ ilization. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. only in pas sing. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. like the Chinese. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. as regards signs for mental objects. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. and now that. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar.). and still takes place in Canton .) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. for example. on anthropological articulation. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions.
the name. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. i. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. so that. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. by speaking low and soft or crying out.is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. or simple logical terms. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. it is analysed. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . in speaking. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. however ample a connotation it may include. Thus. The European. in the case of the Chinese Koua. the simple plain idea. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. learn ing to speak Chinese. Hieroglyphics. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. Engaging the attention of intelligence. as it does. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility.nd twenty.the mode. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. . like alphabetic writing. Both alike require such signs. in the interest o f vision. peculiar to the intellect. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. of uttering its ideas most worthily . so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. while (with the facu
. is still for the mind simple in the name). This feature of hieroglyphic . A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. just as in modern times (as already noted.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . the simple straight stroke. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name.e.
lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,
but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you
ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.
¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex
The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. wha t is the same thing. joy. On the other hand. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. shame. and still more in mind. in their immediacy. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially.. it is because of their quality or co ntent .which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. bad. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. but presented in its universality and necessity.indeed infinitely so. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. contentment. But where the objects sought are thus casual. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. grief. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. If feelings are of the right sort. and to discus s their content. and thought. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. in their universality and necessity. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . volition. namely God. and precisely in that way d o they . The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. we have this immanen
.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. in feeling. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. lack objective determin ation. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. etc. Whereas in life. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. Thus it is. in which these facts. can also be felt. etc.. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. the truth and. But as both.retain a speciality of their own . heart. law and morality. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. for the latter. and evil. may be placed. repentance. Delight. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties.but only in antithesis to the latter . in its objectivity and truth. and duty. on the one hand. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. is precisely what constitutes. and will. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. we have only to deal with the selfish.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. right. when thought. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect.
whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . Should. What are the good and rational propensiti es. therefore. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. If the will is to satisfy itself. character. are infected with contingency.his inte rests of intellect. the question is directly raised.Up to what degree the good continue good. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. their mutual connect ions. they. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. but to ge t realized. The will. enjoyment . each being always in conflict to another. as rights and duties. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. ego. which is essentially self-d etermination. . admitting of gratification. indeed. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. In what way have they. however. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. The answer to the question. is at first still a natural will. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. on the other. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. talent.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. on one hand.natural impulse and inclination. finds in the conformity . while.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. as experience shows. it is pa ssion. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. But with regard to the inclinations. Which are good and bad? . It is on ly a dead. Will. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. In consequence of this formalism. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. first of all. too often.an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. each with its private range).and (as there are ma ny. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. as r egards the form of its content.a development in which the content of autonomous
. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. be the value of tha t mode what it may. subjectivity . in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. and something inappropriate to it. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . passion is neither good no r bad. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation.on one aim and object. Thus. and their truth. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. directly ident ical with its specific mode: .
and is option or choice.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. where the subject is made to close with itself. As thus contradictory. as the content. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. which reflection and comparison have educed. i.e. However. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. They are somet imes contrasted. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. either alto gether or in part. is his interest and .action loses its contingency and optionality. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. by another. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. as thinking and implicitly free. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim.and one satisfaction. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. . ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. An action is an aim of the subject. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. it is on them that the decision turns. on the whole to their disadvantage. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. which as such is the universal. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. Their mutual limitation. It is thus 'reflecting' will. ¤ 476 The will. the free gift of nature. there would be no action at all. the impulses. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. on one hand. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. which is just as much no satisfacti on. of a universal sa tisfaction. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de
. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. unless he had an interest in it. The morality concerns the content of the aim.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. this is wh at is called the interest.his passion. are reduced to a m ere negative. an inactive thing. without end. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. and social duties. moral. inclinations. that finds its actualizing in the agent. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. so far as their particularity goes.
the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. and are constituted after its measure. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love.sired . or by s trength of character. even the Stoics.a universality which only ought to be. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. ambiguous. If the will. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. and the abstract singleness. etc. i. therefore. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. Plat o and Aristotle. i. Whole continents. it is existent only in the immedi ate will .freedom itself. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . aim. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. of present sensati on and volition. education. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. or philosophy (. is in the first instance the rational will in general. in religion as such .the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. as the substance of the state. for example. with freedom itself. he h as also. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. The Greeks and Romans. of the family. If. If to be aware of the Idea . and are without it still. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. Africa and the East. the will is an actually free will. still this very I
. now that the formalism. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). that will is also the act of developing the Idea. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. and that as its very actuality.e . i. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . however. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. as realizing the idea. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. only so far as it thinks itself . In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. According to Christianity. so that in this sphere of particular existence. the divine min d present with him.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . did not have it. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. As abstract Idea again. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. just because it is the very essence of mind. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. and object .e. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. he is actually free. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will.is matter of speculation. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. knows this its concept.e. have never had this Idea. On the contrary. and of which it is only t he formal activity. fortuitousness . In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one.e. which realizes its own freedom of will.an individuality. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. or implicit Idea. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning.it is the existential side of reason . even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. which i s pure and concrete at once. its very au tonomy or freedom. that is. and is will as free intelligence.to be aware. is actu ality.
Vorstellung. 12. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. is itself only a notion . 4. moral. Gedachtnis. Die Einbildungskraft. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. Die Intelligenz. Auswendiges. 14. 3. Phantasie 8. Die Gluckseligkeit. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. into legal. 5. 10. but which they are. 11. 16.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e.not something which they have. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. Anschauung. Der Geist 2. and not less into scientific actuality. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. Die Erinnerung 6.a principle of the mind and heart. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function
. Das Denken. 9. religious. which the content and aim of freedom has. they would find the very substance of their life outraged.
SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. if they are made slaves. 7. not with laws or court s of justice. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. but the pe rmanent character . as men. But this freedom. 1. 15.dea itself is the actuality of men . Der praktische Geist 13. Inwendiges. Das praktische Gefuhl. Der freie Geist.
in the light of the concept.e. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. etc. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. But. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. But in this individualist moral sphere. military service. is the Law (Right ) . is also a right. their absolute unity. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse.and aim. These conditi ons. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. ought to h ave and can only have their existence.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. which in it is thus at home with itself. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. it is a Law. The penal judicature of a government. and it is a duty to possess things as property. as the services of the members of the State in dues. where free will has existence.e. its rights of admi nistration. Liberty. or Usage.. are its Duties. it exists as manner and custom. to administer. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. not in the form of impulse. private an d personal needs). In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. but as possession by a person it is property. What is a right is also a duty. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. on the other hand. where they. to be as a person. which splits up into different heads: viz. is a duty.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. are no less its duties to punish. in general. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom.at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. are duties
. duty in general is in me a free subject . which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. in these externally objective aspects. so as to become its habit. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). As it (and its content) belongs to thought.. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. but in its universality. in relation to the subjective will. or legal possession. receives the form of Necessity. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. anthropological data (i. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea.. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. i. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. etc. and is the vi rtual universal. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity.(1) When.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. and brings into existence i n these several wills. and what is a duty. being universal. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. or instituted as an authoritative power. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. In the morality of the conscience. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. etc. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. viz. Liberty. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. and character. relation to another person . my right to a thing is not merely possession. For a mode of existence is a right. temper.
As so characterized. and hence as a single being . the infinite self-rela tion. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. which is thus mutual. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. possession is property. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one.
. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. This thing. by mere designation of it. the external sphere of its liberty . (B) When the will is reflected into self. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. which as possession is a means.possession. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. are simultaneously mutually independent. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. so as to have its existence inside it. at first in the outward appropriation. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. it is the right of the subjective will. But the set of adjustments. 1. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. But this predicate. as something devoid of will. or by the formatio n of the thing or. is an individual. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. Gesetz 2. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. and the I in it is abstractly external. as in itself still abstract and empty. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. These extremes are the persons who. Sitte A. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. civil society. it may be. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . but as existence of the personality is an end. abstract right. on its own account me rely 'practical'. morality of the individual conscience. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. and State. though it remains in trinsically the same. in the knowledge of their identity as free. but on an external thi ng.
the only diversity lies in this. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. and time. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. I can just as well put it in it as not . and its acceptance by the other will. in that case. and recogniz ed. universal thing or commodi ty. however.just as well with draw it as not. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. This is naiv e. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. But so far as my will lies in a thing. produces a wrong: by which. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one.Contract. because they face each other. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. which thus becomes wicked. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. expressing the civil suit. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so .). breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . non-malicious wrong. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. willed. and. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. its changing hands. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . which. ¤ 495 The contract. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance.the full and complete deed. labour. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. but which. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. 493 seqq. is affirmed. is disinterested. then the external rec
the latter is violated. howe ver. and can be seized only in t his quarter. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. The law of nature . an d so on without end. that of the judge. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight.) Thus the will is violently wicked.on self-determination or autonom y. and not merely the particular mode . and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. and commits a crime. on
. sets up a law . This progression. The former used to be the common meaning. and while the former only is respected. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. in revenge. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will.where the nominal relation is retained. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. such an action is essentially and actually null. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. The social state. even from the range of all existen ce. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such.a law. or right as governed by the nature of things. which is nominal and recognized by him only . But more than possible compulsion is not.in this case the apparent recognition. is at the same time only a new outrage. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. as a volitional and intelligent being. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. i.e.e. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . is a matter of chance). As such it is mo rality(2) proper.punishment. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . But revenge. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. b ut the sterling value is let slip. This gives the wrong of fraud . of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. To display the nullity of such an act. Conversel y.compulsion against the thing. from life. which is disinterested . by the n otion. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. In it the agent. in which the law of nature should hold sway. being conformable to the right.st rictly so called . to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. The 'reality' of right. is the work of Revenge.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. i. or Natural Right. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. The phrase 'Law of Nature'.is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. or in corporeity.a universal which holds good for him. like the last.
Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. and willed by it. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. or even justification in his h eart.the other hand. recognition. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. 1. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. sentiment. is now chara cterized as a subject . Now. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. its own. my part in i t is to this extent formal. Das Recht. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. which was its purpose. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. the reason of the will. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. conscience. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. is its deed. the will is at the same time made a particular. intelligence. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. etc. counts only as a person. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. but have their assent. The subjective will is morally free. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. so far as these features are it s inward institution.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. so much as it has consciously willed.and also moral wickedness. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. This is the right of intention. 2. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. be its affection w hat it may. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. who. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. in mere law. and thus comes into relationship with the former. embracing these individual point s. Naturrecht. In point of form. Moralitat 3. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. B.a will reflected into itself so that. In French le moral is opposed to le physique.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. an d allows to be imputed to it. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act
. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. though any alteration as such. it thus includes purpose and intention .
who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world.a universal determined in its elf . it is always something particular. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination.and thus including in it particularity . is as g ood and as duty absolute. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . on account of that existent sphere of liberty. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. This is the right to well-being. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties.being only in this. will . following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. is always fundamentally one identity. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. essential and actual. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. whether the
.g. though it is a particular duty. because the agent. interests. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. as individual and universal. in point of its matter. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. These aims. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. And yet they ought to harmonize.e. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. a good intention in case of a crime.that it contains his needs. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. is not something external to him. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. At the same time because good is one. they ought to stand in harmony. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . constitute h is well-being. and yet each of them. his interest and welfare must.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. as in happiness (¤ 479). who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. but is a particul arity of his own . (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. and aims. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. can be wicked. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y.ion. the essential and actual good.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract.
to be carried out in it. good. on its negative side. This pure self-certitude. On the affirmative side.good is realized. in something external therefore. 6. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . 4. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. which actualizes and dev elops it. That. The for mer is the will of goodness. which is the good. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. the truth of this semblance. The failure of the latter consists . Die Absicht und das Wohl. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. The subjectivity. and refuse it to the wicked. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. right . non-universal. is. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. the unutterable. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. THE MORAL LIFE. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action.of Conscience and Wickedness. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. in the notion. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. expressed by this repeated ought. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. and duty. 5. in this its identity with the good. th e essential thing. is only the infinite form. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. Handlung.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. 1. Wickedness. rising to its pitch. and of the good. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . The result. is abandoned. which has no objectivity. an aim essentially and actually null. no more exist than not. and the wicked.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. its deepest descent into itself. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. but is only sure of i tself. Das Gute und das Bose C. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not .the utterly abstract semblance . which would only be abstract.the standpoint of the ought.to a goodness. Moralitat 2. i
. Der Vorsatz 3.
(c) Th e self-conscious substance.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. The ethical personality.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. to destiny.Marriage.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. in its ki nd.Civil Society. in its immediacy.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal.the Family.yet somewhat which without all question is. as deliberate work for the community.n a thing . i. whose independence it. to the total of ethical actuality.th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. is confidence (trust) . to a spiritual significance. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. that it is. the individuality expres ses its special character. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. as against the univers al. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. is virtue. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . etc. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. controls and entirely dominates from within. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists.e. however.the genuine ethical temper. . without any selective refl ection. as personal virtues. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. i. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. it exists as confidence. In the shape of the family. This is the sexual tie. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. makes this union an ethical tie . With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. Thus. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond .monog
. . In the latter sphere. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. manner and cu stom . In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. as an intelligent being. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. however. mind ap pears as feeling. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n .e . But the person. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . elevated.the Political Constitution. temperament.
the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. on one hand. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. destined. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. In virtue of such for tuitousness. being an intelligent substance. as do also its industry.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. ¤ 522 (3) The children. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. of legal regulation. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. This instrument. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. to found anew such an actual family. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . however. labour. who exist independent and free. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . thus invested with independence. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. originally foreign to it. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. of the possessor's will. into families or individuals. on the o ther hand. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. while. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. or nominal culture in general. constitutes the general stock.in educating them to independent personality. or state external. learning. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. information. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. and care for the future. and thus produce more unconditional
. acquire an existence of their own. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . as private persons. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract.
though of course only at the final points of deci ding. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it.. 2 4/5 years. ten thalers. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. or could be. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . exists. which is honesty. 2 3/4 . option. to be. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). which as existence is essentially a particular. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. be the righ t and just thing.the Law. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. also of aims and interests. and so on ad infinitum. in the course of definite manifestation. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. however.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. intelligence. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. and with it the State. as vital. of needs. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . their recognition and their honour. and of means for satisfying them. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . and like the first a certain subsistence. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. at every point. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. Hence. and accident. Thus whether three years. on the side of external existence. The third. they have their actual existence. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. this analysis. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right.dependence on the social system.and ye t it should be decided. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. certain. Where civil society. It is a futile perfectionism to have
. and an ensemble of contingencies. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. or only 2 * . because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. and industry. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. as well as of mental culture and habit . skill. talent. The second. is developed i n detail. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . determined through reason or legal intelligence. But when right.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. and in it they have their social moralit y. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . Their content per se may be reasonable .which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. and a corresponding mode of labour. its action gets direction and content through natural features. of mere agents.
the ne ed. the need of a simpler code .vi z. as in the mental ima ges of space. first really de serving the name of laws. constit
. They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. there arises. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone .a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. inasmuch as. The comparison of the two species. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . who has by so doing gained the gratitude. general laws.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused.to be promulgated and made known as laws . with the advance in multitude. which again make new decisions necessary.are governed and well governed too by laws. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . whic h are only internally in these objects. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. But there is a contrary case. recognized.in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated.laws. . or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. hereditary divinity or nobility.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis . deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements.even as his law can only be a just law. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known.as proven: . are not a new hou se. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . by faith and trust. even the admiration.as this exists as revenge . of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. This subjective existence. as the genuine order of life. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. at the same time an externally objective existence. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. . while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. which discovers new distinctions. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. being laws o f strict right. however. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. not for them.which though something new.into punishment (¤ 500). they touch only the abstract will . and t hus become authoritative . The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. as universal authority and necessity. and in particular transforms this existence . as it is a known law.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. like improvements on a f loor or a door. of his countrymen. These people forget that the stars .e. i. in the judicial system. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith .to the individualized right .such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. within the house . but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect.and th e cattle too . To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. to which objective existence determines i tself.
Conversely. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. and their variable ingredients.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. which.viz. . But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. and worked from that point of view. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. In so far. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity.and that. be exercised as different functions. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. So far as concerns them. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. shou ld. the position of an external un iversality. because it is man's want. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. to the concrete of civil society. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. It results also from circumstances of locality. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. because it is only one factor. then. so as to secure this satisfaction. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . Such an order acts with the power of an external state. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction.'poli
. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. mere circumstantial evidence. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. appears as state. . it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end.as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. from the c onnections between nation and nation. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. and the judgement as application of the law to it. No doubt this factor is incomplete. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. in a uniform gen eral way. as at bottom different sides.
Thus we have the corpora tion. and self-develop ed . however. to the immediate agent.one individual. The same unity. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. in this direction .ce'. The cons titution is existent justice .international (outer-state) law. Secondly. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. differentiated in to particular agencies. This universal principle. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. First.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. it protects the family and guides civil society. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . On the other hand. But. self-originated. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. secondly. but. the state only is as an organized whole. (c) THE STATE. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. through the action of the government and its several branches. as self-knowing and self-actualizing.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest.the reasonable spirit of will. also for that will being put in actuality. ¤ 539 As a living mind. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals.as an actuality .the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . It provides for the reasonable will . which each originally takes care of for himself. Thirdly. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . his independent self-will and particular interest. continually produce it as their result. but which has a thoroughly general side. s heer subjectivity. and not left to perish. First it maintains them as persons. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . which.co nsists in a double function. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness.which volition is thereby free .into the life of the universal substance. receiving. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . and. they are re strictions. it carries back both.in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . and . then it promotes their welfare.
. is its essence. with all its evolution in detail.
etc. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . directories. The principle of equality. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. that the laws rule. the citizens . rejects all differences. on the contrary. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. However true this is. as it exists as s uch. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). on the contrary.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. private as well as public rights of a nation. and that the laws are restrict ions. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . Nothing has become. talent. Equality. But. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. etc.pleasure an d self-will. etc. town . its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. magistracies . that it should be man (and not as in Greece. . but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. the current notions of l
. i. etc. skill. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. All men are by nature equ al.equal in the concrete. etc. Really. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. which it can without incompatibility allow. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. military service.e. the familiar proposition. As regards.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. it embodies a liberty. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind.only it can make them . It is important therefore to study them closer. were called its 'liberties'. is abstract subjectivity. as it ha ppens. first. etc. authorities. But that this freedom should e xist. The laws themselve s. otherwise have in property.. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). is so little by nature. presuppos e unequal conditions. logically carried ou t. But the notion of liberty. Formerl y the legally defined rights.besides their personalit y . As regards Liberty. eligibili ty to office. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. or even in crime. Rome. On the contrary. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. age. the difference of governing powers and of governed. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. physical strength.punishment. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. or destroy them. without further specification and development. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. as regards the concrete. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas.as regards taxation. in other words. With the state there ari ses inequality. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty.
. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. with this development of particularity. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. i. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights.as sec urity of property. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n .e. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. with its insatiate vanity. in so far as it has them actually existent before it.just because of this inseparability .iberty only carry us back to equality. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. in other words continuall
. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. But the more we fortify liberty. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. of others. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. If . ¤ 541 The really living totality . and to regard a state. not merely with regard to the naturalness. just as little as the making of a code of laws. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions.) But the guara ntee lies also. and thus gains moral independence. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. self-w ill and self-conceit.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . as a state without a constitution. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. in which this is not formally done.a thing that has nev er happened in history. of liberties in general. and must deal with them as it ca n. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. The question . an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. is . What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. however. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs.e . be it added. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. and the organization of the actualization of them. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. The term political liberty. has an insight and conviction of his own . because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing.that which preserves. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept.
which taken apart is also particular). The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'.y produces the state in general and its constitution. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). the participation of all i n all affairs . presupposes ignorance that the true idea. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. . and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea.su bject always.or. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. These. but an actual indiv idual .in a state of society. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society.to make it the first power. however. of the family and of civil society.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization.regarded as organic totality . in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. (A mistake still greater. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. as always. . The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. i. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. and the government be merely executive and dependent .the will of a decreeing individual. equally disorganizes actuality.the all-sustaining.e. Only through t he government. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. is the self-redintegrating notion. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to
. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments.e. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence.monarchy. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . is the state one. i. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r.impugns the principle of the division of powers. is the government. in other words. In the perfect form of the state. all-decreeing will of the state. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. as in a democratic constitution. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. which includes an already existing development of differences. ¤ 542 In the government . as in the patri archal society . But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power .
¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. and above all personal liberty.as also feudal monarchy. administration and police.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). Secon dly. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. The pure forms . that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. being simple self-relation. there arises the participation of several in state-business. as it were. it may be . to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. participate in the governmental power. first. These principles are those expounded earlier. and with earlier transition-forms. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. etc. admini stration of justice or judicial power. legislative power.'ideal' unity. and skill for such ends. That subjectivity . Two points only are all-important. possess independence of a ction. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. The division of constitutions into democracy. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. with its industry and i ts communities. i. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing .in short. aristocracy and monarchy. an actual existence..viz. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . to subjectivity. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . too. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. liberty of property. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. with their general opinion. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. and then of nature . civil society. in the history of the State. lik e peace and war.partly. and are to that degree private person s. . is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. especially in legislation . aptitude.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. essentially. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. to that end and for that reason. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. For it is as private persons t
. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy .a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . personal interference and action of th e State as one man.such as ochlocracy. which having their busin ess appointed by law.are. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices.e.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . Thus. involve the. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance.
and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. In a civilized state. If the main part of the requirement were . The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. be they treated as mere individuals.as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. The so-called financial law. however.which should be presupposed. in the law and liberty of property. elemental sea. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. as the nation . because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. it is not a brutish mass. range of the extern al means of government. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. i.a spiritual element .the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). in the general sense of embracing a wide. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. to power and act ion.regard ed as permanent.would be. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number.as it very likely is . ever newly recurring. is no t self-destructive. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. as such an aggregate.e.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. but as organic factors. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. and therefore more urgent. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. The des irability of such participation. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. blind force. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. Take the case of England which. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. Experience s hows that that country .the contrary must be the case . like that of the stormy. inorganic shape. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. however. ¤ 529 note). The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. as estates. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. indeed the whole. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. wild. that t hey enter upon that participation. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. in arrangements for art and science. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. or in its 'reflectional' universality. moreover. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t
. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. demoralization. which. and form a particular kind . so far as they form only one branch of that power . which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. s ense of general wants.
i. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. of the whole of the finances.e. Then again. when it makes a decree about finance. and not actually existent. but only parties. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence .to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. afresh. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. waywardness and chance have a place. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. a state of war.is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. as content o f a true law. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question.so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt.. In one case the
. In their mutual relations. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. and thus.i. and becomes the estate of bravery. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. e. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. and not to be made yearly. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals.e. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. in which there would no longer be a government.g. is really engaged with strict executive business. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other .this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. or every few years. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity.as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity .
and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance.the judgement of the world. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. is called an a prio ri view of it. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. and on history-writing in general. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . an d the special claims of nations on one another. that. as it is a history. of a Roman epic. which actually is and will be realized in it . it. each of which. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing.and. As this development is in time and in real existence. both this general recognition. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. in short. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. a history of its own. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. and in Germany more than in France and England. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law.the plan of Provide nce. internat ional law rests on social usage. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. and as regards its range and scope. is appointed to occupy only one grade. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness.. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. first in general. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. when we come to minutiae. and then in history. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. Fictions. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. in short. are settled and fixed. this note must go into further deta il. It has. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. In general. especially on the philological side. On th is point.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. in defiance of
. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. etc. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. it passes int o universal world-history. That history.of sacerdotal races . It is in time. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. there is Reason in history. and above all universal history. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. however. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end.a world-mind.
if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. in the interest of so-called truth. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. and an exclusive interest in justice. and.). Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. if he had not an interest. Rome and its fortunes. but an age. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. a nation. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. The point of interest of Biography . their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. etc. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. and criticize events. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. state. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. in striking portraiture and brevity. strictly s peaking. and takes place within it.g. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. not as good as a fairy tale.e. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. i. and rejects both ki nds of interest. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. or. express not a subjective particularity.appears to run
. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly.the best-accredited history. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. as in the romance. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. Ay. But. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. is not only against taste and judgement. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. e.like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. but violates th e principles of objective truth. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. on the other hand.to say a word on that here . What happens to a nation . In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. a word. no history . a civilization. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. or if he declined to judge at all. has. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass.
i. Such a doctrine . As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events.Fame. a development determined by the notion of spirit. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. The mere play of sentiment. etc.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . is the supreme right. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. i. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . in this case. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. first in general.admitting. 550). and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. and its content is prese
. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). these individuals. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency.or in other words that Reason is in history .e. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth.e. we may add. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. truth.e. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . has another ground and interest than his tory. the consciousness of it. and there fore as a work of individuals. if Rome or the German empire. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. and their subjectivity. potentially infinite. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. as over a special grade.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. really. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. and secondly. liberty. Only therefore through their relationship to it. have they their value and even their existence.e. which all alik e have no stuff in them. which is their reward. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. For Spirit is consciousn ess. But. and the business of so doing. But biography too has for its background the historical world. on the contary. i. are instruments. only opinions and mere ideas. i. and of its essence. while it inheres in them. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . which is what is pe culiar to them. the freak of humour. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. etc. is the empty form of activity. and are all treated as indifferent.an accurate report of externals. to the history of religion. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. the absolute L aw. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient.
That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . is the purification. ¤ 204 not e). For that st arting. But . becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. as true in the world of free will. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. however. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. i. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. The spirit. and that on the religious. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. note). actually accomplished in the ethical world. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. This factor. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. At this rat e. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. the idea of God it kn
. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. i.as is the case with all speculative process . of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life.e. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. lays hold of its concr ete universality.is the peculiar perversity. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel.e. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. As regards the 'mediation' which.e. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. cf. Such apprehension.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. especially ¤ 51. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. now gets its most concrete interpretation. from which the start is now made.consciousn ess. But the spirit which think s in universal history. i. is the real ethical self. that elevation to God really involves. Th e finite. as law and duty. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. i. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free.a mere 'ought' . forme rly noticed. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. in the system of laws and usages.e. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour.Liberty. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth.
All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. (In the Lutheran Church. then there may be created. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. one religious and an other ethical. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. i. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. first of all. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. and superstition. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another.ows must be the true and real. and even as mutually indifferent. It lea ds to a laity. It leads. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . morality and conscience. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. generally.as the one religion which secures the stability of governments.or it may be. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. springing from some force and power.partly as mere moving of the lips. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. and in the act of faith. B
. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God.e. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. in point of form.e. even to bones.addressing his devotion to miracle. non-spirituality. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion.of bondage. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. to justification by external wo rks. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. And. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience.e. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . on the contr ary. in the annihilation of its externality.working images. but purely subjective in individuals: . the host as such is not at first consecrated. but in the moment of enjoymen t. and ex pecting miracles from them. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. i. religion was a late r addition. for thought and knowledge . i.logi cally enough . differing from the former in body and value of truth. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. and prays others to pray .the body of religious truth.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality .e. i. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. a condition of spiritual sla very. and law and justice. But in poin t of form. and these applications of it in the religious life. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. in its faith and in its con science. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated.
moral life in the state.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). . which does not rise in hostility against them. a code of law should arise. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness.an obedience which is itself the true freedom. sti
. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. leads it into the rea l world.of honesty in commercial dealing. so to speak a priori. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. founded on principles of reason. Let us suppose even that. and in a special sense Philosophy. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. if taken alone. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . The precept of religion. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. self-realizing reason . But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. Instead of the vow of chastity. the wisdom of the world. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. lacked liberty.e. and thus only. . It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle.e. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. and. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. can law and morality exist. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. i. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. So long as t he form. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. unte nable. and political institutions deduced from them must be. i. Thus set free. Thus. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. because the state is a self-possessed.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. therefore. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. and in the use of property . It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom.e. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. And instead of the vow of obe dience. our consciousness and subjectivity. no matter how. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world.in short. .the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. i.
as the universal in a mental concept or idea. when specially set in relief as genus. thus founder on the conscience. This additional 'individuality' .among which laws these guarantees are included. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. and the power given them to fix the budget. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . (cf. from those deeper requirements which. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane.to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. e. to put it simply. on the other hand. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets.. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies.is just this . however sound their provisions may be. the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. that the Idea must be regent. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy.is the intellectual and thinking self. or. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. . It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. This absolute nucleus of man . In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. ¤ 544 note). At best it is only a temporary expedient . t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. etc.g. Such laws. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. thus surmountin
.to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . on one hand.mi nd intrinsically concrete . we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. so-called 'chambers'.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution.ll.
in its philosophic phase. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. religion. and so also one-sided phase. His state is therefore. As it left therefore behind. But even religion. the subjectivity of mind. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. etc. which is developed similarly. The form in its infinite tru th. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. of philosophy. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. so
. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states.and th at on account of this very principle . from religion. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. intuition. Political power. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. is after all only in one of its form s. he.).the form which ph ilosophy attacked .was that creative imagination. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. however. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. or rather must. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness.so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. as demoralization. which still escaped his intelligence. Religion may. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. should knit it together and control it.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. on its own s howing.the idea of the substantial moral life. Only in the principle of mind. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. which is awa re of its own essence. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . in common with all his thinking contemporaries. Under the subjective form. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. in its f irst immediate. pictorial representation. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . ¤ 513. Plato. for th ese reasons. But thought always . But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. exhibits the one-sidedness. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. earlier than it does as philosophy. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion.). and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. as it grows and expands. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. but earlier than philosophy. or essential being). The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. is implicitly in absolute liberty. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. fall feeling.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . Hence religion as such.
Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. Die Weltgeschichte 10. Gesetz. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. Weltweisheit. 9. 1. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. as well as their several applications. Das aussere Staatsrecht. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. Religion. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. the constitut ion and the code. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. as always. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. 4.in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. Die Rechtspflege 5. Das System der Bedurfnisse. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. Die Polizei und die Corporation. In the Protestant state. Die Sittlichkeit. Inneres Staatsrecht.e. for which it is as substance.as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. while it is self-centred identity. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . 8. 3. That here. Thus ul timately. 6. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. 7. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. 2. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i
. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. i. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. but rather to a sort of knowledge. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. of God's indwelling in us. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community.
it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle .the form of immediacy as such . the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. on the other hand. 1. and of gaining its concrete determination. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life.e. or the idea. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. . is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. On one hand. which is only a sign of the Idea. that is. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. but . has in devotion . because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. A. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. Der absolute Geist. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract .in other words. viz.for the expression of spiritual truth .He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. But. aware. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. the actuality of the spirit. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. its n atural immediacy. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. as superseded in spirit. c an.something formal. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. like the material which it uses to work in.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . Art requires not only an external given material . ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit
. so that the thought embodied. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. Belief. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation.i. reconciliation. ¤ 411).hence not the sp iritual unity. With the essential restrictedness of its content.the shape or form of Beauty.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . In this ideal. as it is. into the subject which produces that work.
Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . the principle of its law. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. and th e artist is the master of the God. though concrete and intrinsically free. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. the artist's enthusiasm. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. not yet conscious of itself. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity .can try to bring itself to consciousness. subjectivity.in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman
. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . and that is where the infinite form. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. or an effor t towards him . the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . as well as of its art and science.stil l this art is defective. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. but as only finding himself in himself.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . and of its constitution. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . but its inmost depth. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. assumes fuller and firmer features. . The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. as free spi rit. is not yet absolute. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. known as the Absolute. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. is not yet known.symbolic art.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. of its actual liberty. that one spirit creates and informs them. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive.
which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. it is from Him. expression. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. still more in that external. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. from it s side. and j ust for that reason.into revelation. unbeautiful sensuo usness. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit.The genuine objectivity. . whose con tent is absolute mind . we see that the advent of art. The older religion in which the need of fine art.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. .of Nemesis. and.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. like the religion peculiar to it.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. which is only in the medi um of thought . has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. in which he had not revealed himse lf. what is more. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence .is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art.that it be revealed. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. not the supreme liberation itself.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. revealed by God. dashing t o pieces everything high and great . which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. shows that such religion is on the decline. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. then the only thing left to constitute His nat
. on the contrary. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. the theme and c entre of religion. and brilliancy. as infinite self-realizing form . If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. spectator find themselves at home. Beautiful art. .the religion i. with their perso nal sense and feeling. But with a further and deeper study. Beautiful art. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . has its future in true reli gion.ent in it. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality.due to a one-sided survey of human life .it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. B. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form.e. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. is first generated. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. The old conception .
. and reconciliation with the eternal being. which proceeds to man's self. in it s forefront. of the world it gave away . But. the elemental and the concrete nature . the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. in point of content. as the extreme of inherent negativity. G . which is at fir st the presupposed principle. he still remains in original identity . further. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. though different. first of all.knowledge in God. by C.requires careful and thorough speculation.just as. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. Yet. (c) as infinite return. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. It includes. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. making them presuppositions towards each other.of the only Son . ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship.1.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . however. on the other hand. which therefore is finite. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence .ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. on one hand.is the Spirit. as in duty bound. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. On one hand is heaven and earth.. the spirit. but afterwards. ¤ 566 In this separating.on the other hand. and. with whom. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. F. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. abiding sel f-centred. amid that natural ness. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters.
. though. while in point of form he is. directed towards the Eternal. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection.it is therefore the absolute spirit.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. Go d is.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. and phenomena which succeed each other. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . only standing to it in an external connection. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. That spirit. (a) as eternal content. To know what God as spirit is . But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. . staying aloof and inert. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . it may almost create surprise that so many. or of judgement. a separate being. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. it implies the revelation of Him. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. not. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. when it thinks. to specul ative comprehension. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. even in its manifestation. for that reas on. it is. again. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on.: Berlin 1829.
Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. and thus sensuous. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling.is transplanted into the world of time. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. external in point of form. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . and thus. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . In this form of truth. is not bound by it . in which he. secondly. gives itself direction and con tent. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. th e self-centred manifestation. on account of his immediate nature. which from itself.Irony. Whereas the vision-method of Art. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. he. and eternal spirit in itself. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. his natur al man and self-will. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. but even to thought. Irony. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. so far. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. this immediate. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . who as such is identified with the essence . with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy.but the vision of implicit truth. is itself the emptiness and vanity. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy.and. If the result . by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. Further. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. as infinite subjectivi ty. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. after the example of his truth. is but subjective production and shivers the sub
. eternal. . Die geoffenbarte Religion. simple. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. contentless sense.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. an object of contemplating vi sion . has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content.is taken in a merely formal. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . C. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. This individual. Thinking. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. but alive and present in the world.where the spirit closes in unity with itself .then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. remains master over it. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. From this its separation into p arts. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. with a temporal and external sequence.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . 1. through which witness of the spirit in him. But. keeps himself unchanged. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. truth is the object of philoso phy.
a nd of logic in particular.on the other hand. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . opens it out in mental picture.i. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. when at the close it seizes its own notion . even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. finds itself already accompl ished. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. This does not prevent the spirit. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. which determines itself to content. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence.and from a pithless orthodoxy. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. too much for the latter.stantial content into many separate shapes. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. or.e. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity.which may be in both the same . The charge of Atheism. of course. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision.it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs.from these forms. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. immediate vision and its poetry. which philosophy is. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. and particularly of the logical form. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion.the underlying essence in all humanity . which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . when driven to expound itself. and this necessary as free. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained.on one hand. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content .('Rationalism') . But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. to be more precise still.leaving out. and s o religious. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. elevation of them into the absolute form. This movement. This witness . remains identical with it.takes. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge
. and whereas Religion. and mediates what is thus open ed out. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . with its separ ation into parts. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. and acts inconsistently towards them. and against philosophy in general . But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. but also criticized it. only looks back on its knowledge. as also of the necessity in the two forms .
and form all that is definite in the divine universality. most sublime. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. open to our disposal on this topic. its grossest shape. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism.so much so. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical.which therefore it does not disparage.thus he understands philosophy .all possess substantia lity. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. or any one man. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. This new theology. without distinction. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . does not comprehend itself. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. in particular. I select .that of the Hindu to ass es. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. the secularity of th ings. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. fulfilled notion of God. as it stands. if we believe them. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. On such a presuppo sition. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. also contains the generic abs tract. and amongst it s effusions. and so .of the new piety and new theology. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism.Everything is . Amongst the abundant resources. or Pantheism. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. but as a proved fact. that it has too much of him: .as the most authentic statement accessible . it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. ¤ 71 note). all such definiteness is only the non-divine. and is therefore. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e.g. are) . exclusi ve. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence.that of the Egyptians to the ox . though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. It is only his own stupidity. Piety. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God.in the wanton assertion. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. we must. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e.so much so. as is well known.is always adora tion of an object which.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er.each and every secular thing is God.of Pantheism. or if you will. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: .(empirical things. with all its absurdities. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. cows . If this theory needs no more than such a God. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. Without interest of its own for the concrete. every kind of piety (¤ 72) .the Bhagavat-Gita. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . whether higher or lower in the scale. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. that.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. from which all definite quality is excluded. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. some of the most telling passage
. God in General. are unable and unwilling to see this .or to dalai-lamas .for it is just to see the notion that they refuse .
' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. called Gods. but only . I am the discernment of the discerning ones. . rather. This everything. . But the idolatry of the wretched Hi
. Meru among the high-topped mountains. Even when. . is not. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. without essential being of its very own. .' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. . even Siva. . and the moon among the lunar mansions. . .not everything. as also those proximate substantialities. .s. at the beginning of the pass age. still God. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. . .spiritual as its idea of God i s . so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . . I am life in all beings. . or a God besides. I am the taste in water.. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. There is nothing else higher than myself. the Everything. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings .' This 'All'. p. . where the empirical everything of the world. . as he said before he was S iva. passion.that Hinduism. he is said to be the beginning. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. . . But so little concrete is this divine unity . middle. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. Among letters I am the letter A. is alo ne the divine and God. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. 7 seqq. .. . Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld.). etc. t he pure unity of thought in itself. the One which. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. and one essential amongst them. . And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . Hinduism. which he is. to a poly theism. is also the maddest of polytheisms. . developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. 'At the end of many lives. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains).'I am the self. . seated in the hearts of all beings. vanish. or Indra. than which there is nothing higher. . which Krishna calls himself. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures.the most excellent of everything. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. and end of living things. has the higher conception of Brahma. melt into the one Krishna. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. goodness. . . . . nothing independent]. with a monstrous incons istency. . any more than the Eleatic One. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. Indra. . . . On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. pp. however. but having its truth in the substance. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. . besides Krishna. unessential existences. . and the Spinozan Substance. The undiscerning ones. all this is woven upon me. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities .' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. . I am also the strength o f the strong. so to speak . Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. grip.so powerless its. . as different from that accidental. . Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel.. .
of the relationship of God and the world.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given.g.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. as everything. on one hand. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. secondl y. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. and that unity described as love. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. It is only the picture . imagination or speculation. which. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. as infinite from the finite. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. after this partition. empirical indivi duals . a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. but . it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50.on the shallow conception of it . and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. is identical with the world. and. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. and of empirical secular spirit. and so on . the all. ac osmical. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. to was
.of the world as one thing. Of the oriental. For that unity. e. especially the Mohammedan. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. is discarded and absor bed.ndu. outside it . then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God.keep its independence. But to go back again to the question of fact. on the contrary. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest.floating in the indefinite blue . in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . the Eleatic. the finite to the infinite. when he adores the ape. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. he is as essence parted from appearance. even in a general exoteric discussion. as the endless lot of empirical existence. or. or Spinozist. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. whether they spring from heart. But.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence.in its finest purity and sublimity. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. as it says. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth.. we must consult th e Mohammedans. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . That pantheism indeed .. in relation to the popular idea of the world. and on the other. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. or other creature. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. Hin du monotheism. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. and God everything. If. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. moreover. modes of envisaging God. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. to which everything is God.
perhaps under the more familiar names of e.is identity. and that amongst the m there is great variety. inorganic and living . Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories.said pores being the negative. a nd assert . they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction.that. with indefinite ideas. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. and the empty absolute. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. when they hear of unity . so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. as Epicu rus does. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. . they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry.g. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many.falsely as a fact . but rather its reverse. But the question is. as in the physical field the physicist. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d.g. in the pores of th e physicists .they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. etc.and relation i pso facto implies unity .e. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial
. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. mere ide ntity. in matters admitted to be of superior.has the same solid substantiality as the other. the notion and content of philosophy. if not even of supreme interest.and that the factor of indet erminateness . viz.the world as much as Go d . omnipresence. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . composition.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. not the concrete unity. but only the one factor of this category of relation . But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. and that hence. it is not. where they are utterly unknown. I n the philosophical field they proceed.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . the most external and the worst. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. and which they ascribe to philosophy. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. But they show so little acquaintance with them . in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. and that it is the system of identity. they have laid hands on. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. but with concrete unity (the notion). The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity.and s till less take trouble about it . Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. however. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. is what one expect s. i. providence.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. And as in their judgement either of the two . with abstract unity. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. e.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on.te a word on what a 'notion' means. with God's omnipresence. they import them into philosophy.
conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. If statements as to facts are put forward. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. not abstract unity. standing between the Mind and its essence. an All-one doctrine. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. y
. sunders itself. The esoteric study of God and identity.e.which. or as prevaricating for a purpose. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . Nature . ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. But in ascribing to God. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. a system of identity. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. nor itself to something away from them and independen t .their everything. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. this stale gossip of oneness or identity.by which notions are perverted into their opposite. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. On account of this chorus of assertions. for its middle term: a middle. and as implicitly the Idea. and the latter its universal extreme. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. and notions . shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: .knowing reaso n.it is the nature of the fact. then. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism.ity . on the shoulders of philosophy. which . the notion. But to put that sort of thing. as other than they. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. i. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . the absolutely universal. and which is itself the way to produce it. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. in his relation to the world. is philosophy itself. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. but the many-shaped modes specified. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point.the logical system. which has self.as the mediating agent in th e process . The first appearance is formed by the syllogism.it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. making the former its presupposition. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . which causes the movement and development. as of cognitions. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. of which liberty is the aim. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . and the facts in question are thoughts and notions.
The eternal Idea.et this same movement is equally the action of cognition.
. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. in f ull fruition of its essence. eternally sets itself to work.