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INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any
attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i
s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as
treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.
to which they might perhaps add space and time. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. which is the fund amental feature of matter. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. on the other. and not as the immediate or natural individual. thus come into being. however. as absolute negativity. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. identical ideality of it all. in a sense. not merely lacks gravity.the truth that matter itself has no truth. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. etc. even the capacity of offering resistance. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. the soul is only the sleep of mind .the passive of Aristotle. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . At such a stage it is not yet mind. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact.e.SUB-SECTION A. indeed. But not merely is it.with th is proviso. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. matter is regarded as something true. Wherever there is Nature. whereas the 'vital' matter. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. as such a result. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. have still. however. except where. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. and. ANTHROPOLOGY. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. where the othe . on the one hand. li ght. and so the self-externalism. It is otherwise with Mind. Mind.. which is potentially all things. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. and mind conceived as a thin g. but soul. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. like heat. a nd the soul remains the pervading. i. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. There. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. perhaps. These 'imponderables' . The usual answer. its simple 'ideal' life. the sou l is its universal immaterialism.
and telluri c life of man. in the modes of that being. upon it. as individualized. Animals and pl ants. Hence. when it presents itself as a single soul. and always more or less. as in the case of Lei bniz. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. (b) Secondly. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. even these few and slight susceptibilities. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. is too abstract. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. or. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life.r is not . its immediate being . enter s into correlation with its immediate being. in many case s completely. as in the case of Spinoza. as so often is done. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom.e. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. re tains an abstract independence. on the contrary. with Leibniz. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). it may be. feels the difference of climates.e. (c) Thirdly. and does not rise or develop into system.is moulded into it. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . and the periods of the day. Descartes. . disappear.(a) In its immediate natural mode . Malebranche. as an anima mundi. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. so holding. sidereal. not. there philosophers took God. into the absolute syllogism. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. the changes of the seasons. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. just in proportion to his civilization. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. These have. which only is. Spinoza. a world-soul. it is a soul which feels. they are natural objects for consciousness. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. based upon participation in the common life of nature. But either this identity. described. etc. In nations less intellectually emancipated. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. remain for ever subject to such influences. so to speak. and. and.whence Epicurus. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression.or corporeity . (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul.the natural soul. T hus. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy.
¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). of families or single individuals. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. shows. character. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). we find it as the special temperament. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. physiognomy. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. He begins with Childhood . and on the other. This . or artistic. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. widely distant from each other. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. And that individuality marks both the world which. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. the one permanent subject. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. we find its diversities. and as stages in its development. fancies. scientific. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. as alterations in it. carrying out these universa . hopes. on its one side. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. shows an active half. fails to meet his ideal requirements. Thirdly. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. in purposes political. and the position of the individual himself. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age).the sexual relation . The contrast between the earth's poles.a worl d no longer incomplete.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe.on a ph ysical basis. we see man in his true relation to his environment. talent .mind wrapped up in itself. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). bodily structure and disposit ion. on the whole. as it exists. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis.
. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . although. The characterization given in the section is abstract. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. as they may be called.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. . or self-centralized being. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . as before explained . for example. viz. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. i n an unintelligent way. . in the first instance. which are often addressed to philosophy: . containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence.The waking is not merely for the observer. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. put this question to the class of ideology. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. (c) Sensibility(3) . The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. each point. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated.not as a merely negative rest from it. distinguishes itself from its mere being.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. but as a return back from the world of specialization. as already noted.Napoleon. sleep. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest.
Another.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. murder . No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. ho wever. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. etc. etc. mora l. But if put in the feelin g. be it noted. and to be as if found. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. is what we call sensibility. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. the naturally immedi ate. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. just. not mere alterations. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. adultery.set over against consciousness. which. and religious. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. for itself.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. but treated as bel onging to its most special. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. its natural peculiarity. the conscience. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. are in order to be felt. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. in its own self. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . moral. are found by the waking soul. are our very own. On the other hand and conversely. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. in the feeling. primarily. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). where they are impl icitly as in their substance. it is true. the inarticulate bre athing. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. invested with cor poreity. belonging as it does to natural.. true. etc. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . where what at first is a corporeal affection (e.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity.g. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. the fact is a mode of my individuality. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. and is so felt. and . But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. mean. blasphemy. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. on one hand. fornication. and the character. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. godless. The fact that these particulars. One. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. evil. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . This should hardly need enforcing. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good.identity of our self-centred being. In this way we have two spheres of feeling.
¤ 402 Sensations. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. of self. distinction appears as mere variety . What it has to do. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations.e.it is a soul which feels. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . the 'irritable' system. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . e. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. to realize its mastery over its own. the soul is no longe r a mere natural.the senses of definite light.a psychical physiology. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). (¤ 300).(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. the blood. (¤ 317) . following the special character of the mental mode.g. and in this way they get quite another interpretation.and of sound. (¤¤ 321. to the character of subjectivity. the centre of the 'sensible' system. the immediacy of mode in feeling . of heavy matter.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. . with its varieties of language. tones. especially the passions or emotions. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. set in its self-centred life. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . o f colours. to take possessi on of it. smells. works itself out. therefore. sighs. for example. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . (c) the sense of solid reality. are formed from their mental source. and voice in general. As sentient. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y.because in it. 322). and their corporization. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. i ts merely virtual filling-up. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. i. is to raise its substantiality. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . In the usage of ordinary language. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states.it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is .whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. with which that substance is one. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. but an inward. laughter.in the system of the senses. in a special system of bodily organs. We should have.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. just because they are immediate and are found existing. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy.
with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. the s oul is characterized as immediate. in sickness. ¤ 404 As individual. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). but only to his im plicit self. it brings within itself. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. where the real is put past . In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . first. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . the corporeity. Thus in the body it is one simple. but a negation. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. They were not in our possession. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. thoughts. In the present stage we must treat. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. ideas and information.that world being included in it and filling it up. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). prima rily. although it does not exist. secondly. acquired lore. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. Some times. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. once mor e come to light. By itself. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. etc. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. which is disease. a deep featureless characterless mine. As sentient.the existent spe culative principle. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. which is at the same time its predicate. omnipresent unity. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. in whi ch all this is stored up. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view.. the content is its particular world. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. in an implicit mode. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. etc. and to that world it stands but as to itself. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). so far as that is. ideas. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. without existing. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. virtually retained. may again sink down. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. to which the soul.as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. At the present stage this singleness is. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. to be defined as one of feeling . it implies a want of adaptation.
especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena).externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. idiosyncrasies. etc. The moth er is the genius of the child. is visibly present as another and a different individual. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. temper. whose decision is ul . But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. character. and of character. not yet as its self. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. intellige nt. which. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. Here are two individuals. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. of life.a substance. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord.. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . self-possessed.is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. of the mother. and is therefore passive. placenta. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. controlling genius thereof. as concrete subject ivity. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . because immediate. or capac ity. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. say between friends. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. etc. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts .¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. incl inations. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . etc. the single self of the two. not as a mere possibility. congenital disposit ion and temperament.. as yet nothing impenetrable. injuries. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. the psychical relationship. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. and reasonable. principles-everything in short belonging to the character.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. etc. self-conscious. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. By the self-hood of the latter it . in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. but as efficiency and realized activity. or virtuality. as it has existence of its own. not a true subject reflected int o itself. it is. his secular ideas. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. tal ent. developed interests. fortunes.
it must be added. This totality forms his actual ity. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence.his fun damental interests.to show.to be mere deception and impo sture. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. To that end the phenomena. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. intentions. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. At the same tim e. self-possessed human being is a disease.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. in other words. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. But such a verification would. first of all call for verificati on. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. is. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . on the other hand. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . it has already been call ed his genius. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. which are also means and ends to each other. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . The facts. in which the individual here appears innnersed. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. on the cont rary. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. means. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . it might seem. that it is in harmony wi th the facts. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. educated. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect.
ca pable of conveying general truths. which lead up to the result . not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. but it is empty. etc. the selfless individual.a genius which beh olds itself. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. and to know which. . in catalepsy. that it is a state of passivity. wh en it is healthy and awake. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. and hears. reads. But. on those left behind. exist for it as an outward objectivity.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. in its sober moods. subject to the power of another person. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. is under a veil.). after the downfall of the Roman republic. not really a 'person'. a formal vision and awareness. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. and the like. When the substance of both is thus made one. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. But such clairvoyance . and c ontinues to be. smells. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. And because it is the adult.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. in whom it sees. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. subje ctive reason. those c onnected with female development. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. formed. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. is this. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. . . and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. external one to another. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . The patient in this condition is accordingly made. his own and that of the magnetize . has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. or at the approach of death. not on the spot.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. (Thus Cato. and other diseases. which. etc. however.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. tastes. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. then. like that of the child in the womb. unless by the aid of religion.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . and character. f riends. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. for example.) Compare h ome-sickness. the magnetizer. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. etc.
it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness.r. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. which still marks the self-feeling. beholds. i. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. in its capacity as individual. The purely sensitive life. it is still susceptible of disease. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. the 'common sense'. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. e. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. In this way it is self. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. as in other cases. and at the same time. reasons.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. so long as we assume independent personalities. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. though all-embracing. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. anticipate the full-grown an . In considering insanity we must. which. receives. on the contrary. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. one sees and hears with the fingers.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. for example. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. between intelligent personality and objective world. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. etc. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. which is no less a world of law. in this nominal perception. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. as in the morbid state alluded to. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. etc. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. is impossible. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. i s just this form of immediacy. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. and hence. is without any definite points of attachment . causality. or med icines for them.fe eling. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content .
and so makes part of the actual self. this life of feeling. This particular being of the soul is t . But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. and the rest of the passions . is undistinguis hed from them. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. i. In the concrete. This humane treatment.e. but only derangement. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. and so also may the cure. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. as something natural and existent.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. . what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. it would be death). and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. such as vanity. however. loss of health (if it were that.. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. the self is to be stamped upon. as a thing.d intelligent conscious subject. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. instincts.fan cies and hopes .just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. And so too the particularity is. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side .that evil which is always latent in the heart.. may. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. as now regarded. passions. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. and their gratification). When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. inclination. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. moral and theoretical. desire. etc. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason.e. etc.feeling. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). Mind as such is fr ee.e. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. idea. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. i. so as to insert them in their proper place. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part.merely personal love and hatred.just as physical disease is not an abstract. that it is liable to insanity . earthly elements are set fr ee . pride. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. and be a realized u niversality. A violent. mere and total. the. presupposes the patient's rationality. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. is relaxed. and it is only as a thing. but a contr adiction in it. as it aris es. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. and made appear in. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. is diseased. equally formal. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. i. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. which is there also. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. and also desires.
or dependent in regard to it.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. without feeling or consciousness of the fact.. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. has been absorbed by it. the one and the same. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. And consciousness it becomes. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . weariness o . so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits.e. will. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. even in being affected by them. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. dist inguishing it from itself . if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. a second nature. su bjective substantiality of it . empty space and empty time. The natural qualities and alterations of age. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . and so no longer interested. For. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. Habit like memory. of it.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. and for that reason n ot free. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. sleep. The soul is freed from them. i. partly only relative. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). but still free. heat. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them.itself a simple being . a pure act of intuition. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. are only subjectiv e forms. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such.and becoming the 'ideal'. Habit is rightly called a second nature. and the generation o f habit as practice. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. et c. of which it is the subjective substance. but has them and moves in them.he factor of its corporeity. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. That is to say. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. when the co rporcity. and the mere substance. occupied. on the contrary. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. as. but the basis of consciousness. therefore. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. so is that pure being (which. is reduced to unity. lacking consciou sness. and that as a barrier for it. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. this being of the soul.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. nor is absorbed in the m. and which still continues to exist. nature.
enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. cut off from action and reality. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. made into an instrum ent. and particul ar. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. nor an abstrac t inwardness. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude.concentration. are no longer bothered with it. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. which make it up. etc. moral. etc. too. etc. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. habit diminishes this feeling. whereof we sha ll speak later. and thus to enable the soul. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. The most ext ernal of them. is open to anything w e chance to put into it.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. Habit on an ampler scale. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance.f the limbs. to exist as substance in its corporeity. or.e. And it is true that the form of habit. intelligence. and no other.or the misfortune . the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. reflection. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. under its volitional and conceptual characters. has been by will made a habit . and any other purp oses and activity. re ligious. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. intuition. like their satisfaction. this soul. Thinking.. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. is recollection and memory. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. etc. Even here. etc. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. and it is habit of living which brings on death. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. a series of musical notes) is in me. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. and that they. his upright pos ture. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. or skill. an 'ideality' of soul . without an express adjustment. and the self-feeling as such. This is the rational liberation from them. consciousness. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. if quite abstract. and especially so in the specific bodily part. . the spatial direction of an individual. but part and parcel of his being. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. consciousness. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). sweet tastes. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. nor are they in conce ption rational. habit is usually passed over - . there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. a particular organ of i ts organic system). i..).enabling the matter of consciousness.g. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. to be his as this self. so that when the conception (e. acquires a strength which consists in this. casual. that although the frost. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. like any other.is felt.. nor a transient emotion or idea. to be made a power in the bodily part. viz.
and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. Naturliche Seele. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. The soul. Under the head of human expression are included. but the soul. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. In this identity of interior and exterior. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. or abstract universality. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. And the human figure. 2. 1. represents not itself. and making it its own. while language is its perfect expressi on. as the absolut e instrument. in its concentrated self.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. for example. absorbing it. indefinite. 5. in being related to which. finds itself there a single subject. 71). thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. in other words. This note is so slight. cuts itself off from its immediate being. the upright figure in general. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. and inexpressible a modific ation. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature.either as something contemptible . 'The autho . Die fuhlende Seele. weeping. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. still vainer than a signatura rerum.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. Naturliche Qualitaten.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. the latter subject to the former. of the mouth . (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul.. etc. Empfindung. it is related to itself. especially the hand. or the 'immediacy' of mind. 3. This externality. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. unable to represent it in its actual universality. a world external to it . The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. 4. and the formation of the limbs. and i s infinite self-relation. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate.laughter. of which it is the sign. for the soul. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. Seen from the animal world.
is only its abstract formal ideality. thus first made explicit as the Ego. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. i. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind.e. 8. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep.the light. in the sphere of essence. which manifests itself and something else too . seem to be its own activity. as this absolute negativity. as subjective reflection in itself. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. something dark and beyond it.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). not to the wisdom. but when he receives the inspired word. 7. as external to it. to it. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). Gewohnheit. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. but is implicit. Selbstgefuhl. now. Ego. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. Hence consciousness. but since reality. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality.it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . but to the foolishness of man. like reciprocal dependence in general.to an equal freedom as an independent object. It is of this latter. The mind as ego is essence. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . and .' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. does not. and as such it is C onsciousness. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. 6. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious).the soul's natural life . PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B.
only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. The object similarl y. and puts it first under the category of being. as Reason. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. has emerged from Spinoz ism. for which ego is the object. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). an existing thing. in other words. a something. first. reflected in itself.a subject-objectivity. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. Spatial and temporal Singularn . again. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object.to the ego it seems an alteration of the object. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414).as a case of correlation . t heir absolute interdependence.. a singular. is further characterized a s immediately singular. but as poorest in thought.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. to raise its self-certainty to truth.e. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. and even t he Idea of Nature.e. i. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. which is not as its own. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. It appears as wealth iest in matter. and so on. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. being immediate. and underived certainty of it. a thing-in-itself. an intuitive intellect. This is sense-consciousness. etc. immediate consciousness. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. the subject of consciousness. the substantial and qu alitative. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. and that the philosophy. As against Spinozism. i. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. Ego. what makes the object the subject's own. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . but only as it is in reference to something else. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. an existent. (b) self-consciou sness. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. with an object set against it. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. the notion of mind. Consciousness . or mere c ertainty.
taken in its concrete content. its necessity on its own part. and universal. a something external to it.e. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. not as merely immediate. but as mediated. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . or the distinction which is none. wants to take the object i n its truth. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. by being regarded in their bearings. reflected in itself.ess. and am aware'. Thi s inward. But in this manner the interior distinction is. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. the one of the terms. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . however. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. experiences. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. the distinction on its own part. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. lies im mediately in the other. to which. is sense-perception. as not externally different from the other.bet ween the individuality of a thing which. as we called it. which form the alleged ground of general experience. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. i. and more or less by the sciences. and universalities. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . however. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. so constr uing the object. in this case by t he Ego. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . but as a n interior 'simple' difference.a variety of relations.a copy of the phenomenon. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . on one hand. p. reflectional attributes. and. it is related. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. free from this negative l ink and from one another. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. in that manner. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. reflected upon. but brought to rest and universality. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. what it is in truth. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. ¤ 423 The law. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. permanent term s. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. has. or as being beside and out of itself. the thing. to describe the sensible. i. .). having passed beyond the sensible. and sensuous consciousness. an abstract identity: on the other hand. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. of the thing is. has many properties. viz. and not yet as external on its own part. in so far as its distinction is the inward one.e. 73).
towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective.as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . The two processes are one and the same. and itself made actual. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness.With this new form-characteristic. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. in this return upon itself. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. there is strictly speaking no object. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. can make no resistance: the dialectic. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . knows itself implicit in the object. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. on the whole. primarily describable as an individual. this identity comes to be for the ego. To this activity the object. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. the latter. on the contrary . nominally. therefore. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. with the nega tion of it. therefore. its satisfaction realized. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. and a desire (appetite) . ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. and thus in it I am aware of me. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. being merely consumed. pure 'Ideality'. The certitude of one's self. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. is a singular. On the external side it conti nues. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. or. and ma intains itself as such. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. implicit in it. in its immediacy. or implicitly.
e. While the one com batant prefers life. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. however. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. at first immedi ately. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. must likewise be kept in life. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. on the ir phenomenal side.e consciousness of a 'free' object. Thus the death of one. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . which is the basis of this phenomenon. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. as one of two things for another. which falls on another.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. from one point of view. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. and to exist as such for the other: . the slave. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. Thus arises the status of master and slave. though by the abstract. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. therefore rude. not their underlying and essential principle. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. works off his individualist self-will. and thus give existence to my freedom. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. and formation of it. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. in the service of the master. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual.for the means of mastery. In that other as ego I behold myself. f rom the essential point of view (i. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. Force. and incurs a like peril for its own . ¤ 435 But secondly. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. Force.but only p eril. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. then. preservation. we see.t he process of recognition. retains his single self-consciousness. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. negati on of immediacy. when we look to the distinction of the two. it. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. is yet. ¤ 434 This status. as the existence of hi s freedom. This other. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. however. in the first place. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. and its being for others. w hich however is also still outside it. the outward and visible recognition). solves the contradiction. a suppression. the slave. and the means for entering into relation with them.
or rather it is a difference which is none. the self-centred pure notion. and of all virtues. Selbstbewu§tsein. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. aware of what it is. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . permeatin g and encompassing the ego. . and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. as its peculiar mode and immanent form. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. The uni versality of reason. than they are its own thoug hts.consciousness. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. 4. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. is mind (spirit). But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. etc. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. is Reason. therefore. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it.which is Reason. love. idle fame. For truth here has.is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. fame. ego. Truth. bu t the truth that knows it. state. is now itself universal. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness.the passage to universal self. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . whilst it signifies that the object. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. 5. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity.f wisdom' . Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. Der Verstand. Wahrnehmung 3. fatherland. 1.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . honour. Reason. valour. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . friendship.in family. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. or determinations of the very being of things. Die Begierde 6. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other.
Cons ciousness is finite. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. above the material. ideation..the former a simple immediate totality. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist.e. which is defined as it s notion. and which as the reality of that notion. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. Mind. as its concept has just shown. viz. in thinking also and in desire and will.apart b oth from the content. etc. Mind is finite. etc.in one word. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. etc. i. it is finite by means of its immediacy. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. in the soul as a physical mode. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. And it is a matter of no consequence. restricted by that content. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. though it no longer has an object. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. in so far as . therefore. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . PSYCHOLOGY. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. what is the same thing. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. the latter now an infinite form which is not. This. and above the complication with an external object .mental vision. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. Die Vernunft. like consciousness. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. in so far as it has an object. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. remembering. however. neit her subjective nor objective. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . then its reality is that reason. it has a mode in its knowledge. SUB-SECTION C.. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. or.7. desires.
and being a rational knowledge. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. viz. in so far as its existent phase. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. and to liberate itself to its elf.e.as being and as its own: by the one. As the theory o f Condillac states it. so far. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. that is. in freedom. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. forces.e. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. i. When the affection has been rendered its own. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. that aspect is twofold . and its activity can only have itself as aim. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. Similarly. and are the mind's own. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. and make the affection subjective. equally. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). if we consider the initial aspect of mind. k nowledge. viz. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. of comprehending itself. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. i. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. it is .reality of its reason. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. to reach and get hold of itself.e. the na tural soul (¤ 413). is misconceived and overlooked. and is even there a return into itself. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. or. and the negative aspect of mental activity. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. the mind finds in itself something which is. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. Thus. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation.
This activity is cognition.i. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness.g. e.e. wi th a material which is its own. in the theoretical range. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. to definite and conceptual knowledge. and heartless intellects . or the activity of intelligence could be without will. But as knowledge. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. while it has to do with autonomous products. which in the first place is likewise formal . the word. but) enjoyment. Ou twards.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. its content is at first only its own. and therefore a restricted content. elevates itself. This position of psychology. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. which is the one-sided form o f its contents.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. Its activity has to do with the empty form .the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. and of the heart without the intellect . both for the mind as such. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. The nominal knowledge. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. which is only certitude. Psychology. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. It is still extremely ill off. merely as facts. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. belong to a point of view utt .. is thus also a reality .only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. while the practical. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. Inwards . and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. and that in its empirical condition. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. as it is said. as r eason is concrete. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. to get at the notion and the truth. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another.(b) Will: practical mind. just as they are given. has a material which is only nominally such. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. which it and the content virtually is. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. like logic. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. along with which the content is realized as rational. for which it gains the form of universality. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. etc. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. and is immediately willed. and gains abstract auton omy within.
in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. But c ognition is genuine. It is true that even as isolated (i. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. must lead to abandoning the effort. If they are isolated. conceived as reflected into self. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. it .in a word . The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). cognitive conception. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. as non-intelligent). and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. like power or force. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. just so far as it realizes itself. that intuition. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. But the true satisfaction. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. by cognitive intuition. as it is by the same method brought into nature. remembrance.whi ch. imagination. by rational conception.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. conception. etc. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. or mind. intuition. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question.besides which it al so intuits. Faculty. memory. if answered in the negative.e. etc.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. it is admitted. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . note).exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . intelligen ce. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. viz. is bro ught into mind. etc. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. etc. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . To take up such a position is i n the first instance. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. are not isolated. imagination.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized .erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. imagines. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. remembers. etc. conception.is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. or makes the concept its own. conceives. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. however.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection.its out-of-selfness .
the only thing to do is to let him alo ne.his private and p articular self. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. with the character of something existent. Hence feeling. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . which the mind as it fe els is to itself. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. the mere consciousness point of view. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. or at least to reasons . in content and value entirely contingent. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. has the form of casual particularity . If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. With us. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object.one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. that is t o say. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. 254). It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. .the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. Feeling is the immediate. projects it into time and space. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. but rather as subject ive and private.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity .It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. this mode is simple. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements.an active self-collection . It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. in t he truth of mind. Now the material.to the generalit ies of common sense . In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason.is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. is swallowed up. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. external or internal. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence.t he factor of fixing it as our own. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. as it were the closes t. may just as likely be narrow and poor. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things.but to his feeling. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. a . Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling.
with a preponderating subjectivity. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. a rec ollection of itself. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. but stored up out of consciousness. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. t ime. its when and where. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. as it at first recollects the intuition. as tho ught. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. the germ as affirmatively containing. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. we may say. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . or. and received into the universality o f the ego. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. which. in the way we treat. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. isolated. for example. in virtual possibility. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. still continues simple. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . i.in a space and a time of its own. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness.e. no longer needs to find the content. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. from the external place.the germ of the fruit. which makes it its own. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. however. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. The representation is the property of intelligence. yet without being in consciousnes s. . (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. and inwardly divest itself of it. and is arbitrary or contingent. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. though intrinsically concrete. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward.
But it is solely in the conscious subject. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. whatever be its content (from image.Image and Idea.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. ¤ 20 note. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . and the internal and its own by the attribution of being.e. Secondly. the matter is entirely pictorial. by which it is authenticated. at first only in space and time. In the first place. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. has been broken up. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. . The content reproduced.in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. if it is to exist. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . or ide a). reason and consequence. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. which is now the power over them. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . under the representation (idea) with the same content. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject.viz. comes actually into its possession. as of all intelligence. as a matter of fa ct. wherea s the idea (representation).) . e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. now that it has been endued with externality. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. though belonging to intelligence. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. i. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. such as likeness and contrast. where. and an out-put from its universal m ine. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. being and universality. The image. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. or an intell ectual category. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. but a being of its own institution. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. notion. that it finds its material. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. has always the peculiarity. where it is treasured up.these modes of relation are not laws. see Introduction to the Logic. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. present also a distinction in content.. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. as a unit of intuition. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. to be so and so.
and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. Such is creative imagination(7) . it aims at making itself be and be a fact. and becomes an i ndividuality. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. for its ideal import is its elf. but only a nominal reason. derived from some interest. These more or less concrete. is derived from the data of intuition. are unifications of t he same factors. to universalize it. but they are 'syntheses'. As reason. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. and in mechanical memory it completes. i..Abstraction. Another point calling for special notice is that.Imagination. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. recollection. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. In other words. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. or poetical imagination . this form of being.e. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition.symbolic. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. it is self-uttering. Acting on this view. a concrete subjectivity. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. . T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). one's own and what is picked up. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. is reason. are completely welded into one. or something of the sort.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. when regarded as the agency of this unification. . allegoric. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. This force is really intelligence itself . intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. internal and external. etc. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. 435). a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . some latent concept or Ideal principle.still lacks the side o f existence. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. so far a s it is concerned. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. which forms their connecting link.
somewhat immediate or given (for example. something accepted. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). But in the fusion of the two elements. its system. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being).invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. its institution by intelligence.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. since memory. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . In logic and psychology. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases .in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . out of which it forms i deas .). it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. Knarren. . but as representative of something else. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. ¤ 459 The intuition . signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. the matter of the latter is. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . e tc. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical..th at of vocal objects.R auschen. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers .¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. etc. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. Such is the negativity of intelligence. have nothing to do with each oth er. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. whereas in the sign. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. conception s. Sausen.now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. This intuition is the Sign. and the connotation of which it is a sign. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. strictly so-called. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality.speech and. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . With regard to the elementary material of language. It is a n image. but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. and where it is conserved. intuitions. and even with conception and imagination.gives to sensations. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. The sign is some immediate intuition. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. language . which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. has always to do with signs only. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. in the first instance. the colour of the cockade. when employed as a sign.
At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification.e. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. and only get signification as signs. their signs in vocal language. It is only a stationary civ ilization. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. etc. are frequently changed. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. palate. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. the denomination. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. which severally receive designation.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. and still takes place in Canton . viz.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. . but. (Cf. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. i. alphabetical writing. In particular. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. only in pas sing. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. .see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. as in our signs for the numbers. W. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. for example. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. and now that. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). in chemistry and mineralogy. i. on the other hand. The study of languages still in their original state. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. i. like the Chinese. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . the chemical elements. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. on anthropological articulation.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements.). uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. tongue in each) and for their combinations. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. as. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. it depends. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. instead of n ames proper. if it be not altogether extinguished. again. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. the planets . For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. we may touch. as many as ten a . they are reduced to signs. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language.e.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language.e. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. As to the formal elem ent. as regards signs for mental objects.
the simple straight stroke. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound.nd twenty.is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. however ample a connotation it may include. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. learn ing to speak Chinese. Hieroglyphics. as it does. the simple plain idea. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. This feature of hieroglyphic . in the case of the Chinese Koua. i. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. like alphabetic writing. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs.the mode. of uttering its ideas most worthily . as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. Both alike require such signs. while (with the facu . the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. in speaking. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. just as in modern times (as already noted. by speaking low and soft or crying out. so that. Thus. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. or simple logical terms. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . it is analysed. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. .e.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. peculiar to the intellect. is still for the mind simple in the name). and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it.the name. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. The European. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. in the interest o f vision. Engaging the attention of intelligence. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us.
lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,
but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you
ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.
¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex
is precisely what constitutes. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. and thought. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. Thus it is. etc. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind.but only in antithesis to the latter . may be placed. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. when thought. and evil. Delight. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. On the other hand. But as both.. the truth and. etc.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. but presented in its universality and necessity. heart. and duty. If feelings are of the right sort. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. and will. joy. repentance. Whereas in life. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. it is because of their quality or co ntent . the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. and precisely in that way d o they . on the one hand. But where the objects sought are thus casual. namely God. law and morality. for the latter. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general.. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. in their immediacy. grief. right. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . we have this immanen . bad. and to discus s their content. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. wha t is the same thing. in feeling. volition. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them.indeed infinitely so. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. and still more in mind.retain a speciality of their own . the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. in which these facts. we have only to deal with the selfish. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. in their universality and necessity. contentment. in its objectivity and truth. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. lack objective determin ation.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. shame. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. can also be felt.
an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. The answer to the question. each being always in conflict to another. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. In what way have they. the question is directly raised. each with its private range). freedom are the principles of evil and pain.an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. What are the good and rational propensiti es. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life.a development in which the content of autonomous . Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. If the will is to satisfy itself. is at first still a natural will. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. and their truth.his inte rests of intellect. on one hand. while. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. In consequence of this formalism. talent. character. Will. . directly ident ical with its specific mode: . on the other. as r egards the form of its content. finds in the conformity . it is pa ssion. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation.and (as there are ma ny.Up to what degree the good continue good. are infected with contingency. they. It is on ly a dead. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . But with regard to the inclinations. which is essentially self-d etermination. indeed. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. as experience shows. Which are good and bad? . subjectivity . passion is neither good no r bad. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . as rights and duties. enjoyment . therefore. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. Thus.on one aim and object. The will. admitting of gratification. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. too often. their mutual connect ions. ego. however.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. Should. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. and something inappropriate to it. be the value of tha t mode what it may. but to ge t realized. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. first of all. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity.natural impulse and inclination. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And.
which is just as much no satisfacti on. . are reduced to a m ere negative. either alto gether or in part. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. The morality concerns the content of the aim. there would be no action at all. moral. by another. They are somet imes contrasted. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. the impulses.e. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake.his passion. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. It is thus 'reflecting' will. i. As thus contradictory. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. that finds its actualizing in the agent. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. inclinations. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. of a universal sa tisfaction. as the content. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. on the whole to their disadvantage. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. An action is an aim of the subject. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. it is on them that the decision turns. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. is his interest and . so far as their particularity goes. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. which reflection and comparison have educed. and social duties.action loses its contingency and optionality. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. where the subject is made to close with itself. an inactive thing. which as such is the universal. on one hand.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. unless he had an interest in it. as thinking and implicitly free. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses.and one satisfaction. Their mutual limitation. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. However. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. this is wh at is called the interest. ¤ 476 The will. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. and is option or choice. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . without end. the free gift of nature.
still this very I . education.e . i. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. If to be aware of the Idea . and of which it is only t he formal activity. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as.it is the existential side of reason . find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. and is will as free intelligence. Whole continents. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love.e.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. even the Stoics.e. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). It is thus 'Objective' Mind.sired . If the will. and that as its very actuality. or by s trength of character. i. and the abstract singleness. he is actually free. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. that is. the divine min d present with him. for example. did not have it. Plat o and Aristotle. or philosophy (. aim. which realizes its own freedom of will. and object . in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite.an individuality. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. According to Christianity. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. therefore. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. The Greeks and Romans. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. its very au tonomy or freedom. as the substance of the state.to be aware.e. i. only so far as it thinks itself . When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. of present sensati on and volition. and are without it still. of the family. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. he h as also. in religion as such . and are constituted after its measure. fortuitousness . have never had this Idea. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. the will is an actually free will. On the contrary. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. however. As abstract Idea again. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. or implicit Idea. as realizing the idea.freedom itself. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. now that the formalism. ambiguous. which i s pure and concrete at once. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. with freedom itself. it is existent only in the immedi ate will .a universality which only ought to be. so that in this sphere of particular existence. Africa and the East. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. etc. just because it is the very essence of mind. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. is in the first instance the rational will in general. If. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. knows this its concept. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. is actu ality.is matter of speculation.
Inwendiges. Der freie Geist. 12. Die Erinnerung 6. but the pe rmanent character . 14. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. Anschauung. Auswendiges. Phantasie 8. Der praktische Geist 13. 4. as men. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. 3. but which they are. Der Geist 2. 15. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. Die Intelligenz. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. and not less into scientific actuality. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . into legal. 5. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. 7. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. Vorstellung. Das praktische Gefuhl. Gedachtnis. Die Gluckseligkeit. Das Denken.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. 16. moral. 10. 11. religious. Die Einbildungskraft. But this freedom. which the content and aim of freedom has. is itself only a notion .not something which they have. not with laws or court s of justice.a principle of the mind and heart. if they are made slaves.dea itself is the actuality of men . 1. 9.
Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. in relation to the subjective will. private an d personal needs). locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. it is a Law. etc. so as to become its habit. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. For a mode of existence is a right. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. or instituted as an authoritative power. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will.e. but in its universality. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. and character. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. where they. But. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. are duties . but as possession by a person it is property. anthropological data (i.and aim. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. as the services of the members of the State in dues. are its Duties.e. and brings into existence i n these several wills. which in it is thus at home with itself. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. in the light of the concept. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. viz. relation to another person . Liberty. What is a right is also a duty. where free will has existence. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). their absolute unity. and is the vi rtual universal. to be as a person. or Usage. being universal. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. Liberty. are no less its duties to punish. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept.. i. is also a right.at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. its rights of admi nistration. In the morality of the conscience. it exists as manner and custom. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. in general. in these externally objective aspects. on the other hand. But in this individualist moral sphere. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. or legal possession. and it is a duty to possess things as property. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. The penal judicature of a government.. not in the form of impulse. temper. is a duty. duty in general is in me a free subject . military service. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. which splits up into different heads: viz..(1) When. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. is the Law (Right ) . These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. etc. and what is a duty. to administer. receives the form of Necessity. These conditi ons. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. etc. my right to a thing is not merely possession.
But this predicate. though it remains in trinsically the same. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. But the set of adjustments.possession. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. on its own account me rely 'practical'. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. 1. as something devoid of will. or by the formatio n of the thing or. in the knowledge of their identity as free. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. and hence as a single being . at first in the outward appropriation. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. by mere designation of it. it may be. it is the right of the subjective will. so as to have its existence inside it. and State. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. but as existence of the personality is an end. Sitte A. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . This thing. and the I in it is abstractly external. abstract right. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. but on an external thi ng. as in itself still abstract and empty. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. possession is property. (B) When the will is reflected into self. Gesetz 2. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. the external sphere of its liberty . the infinite self-rela tion. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. These extremes are the persons who.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. morality of the individual conscience. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. As so characterized. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. is an individual. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. which is thus mutual. are simultaneously mutually independent. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. which as possession is a means. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. . civil society. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular.
which thus becomes wicked. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. universal thing or commodi ty.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. and recogniz ed. 493 seqq. This is naiv e. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. and its acceptance by the other will. I can just as well put it in it as not . in that case. is affirmed. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). and time. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. expressing the civil suit. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. and. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law.Contract. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. But so far as my will lies in a thing. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement.the full and complete deed. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. then the external rec . involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. labour. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. which.). because they face each other. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles.just as well with draw it as not. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. its changing hands. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. produces a wrong: by which. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. willed. is disinterested. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. non-malicious wrong. ¤ 495 The contract. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. but which. however. the only diversity lies in this. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91.
on self-determination or autonom y.a law. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. as a volitional and intelligent being. in revenge. Conversel y. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope .a universal which holds good for him. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. on . is at the same time only a new outrage. or right as governed by the nature of things. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. But revenge. the latter is violated. b ut the sterling value is let slip.) Thus the will is violently wicked. and can be seized only in t his quarter. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . which is nominal and recognized by him only . such an action is essentially and actually null. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. by the n otion. i. i. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. and while the former only is respected. The 'reality' of right.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. is a matter of chance). The phrase 'Law of Nature'. The former used to be the common meaning. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. This gives the wrong of fraud . in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. that of the judge. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance.where the nominal relation is retained. an d so on without end. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. from life. or Natural Right. This progression.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. In it the agent. But more than possible compulsion is not. The law of nature . being conformable to the right.e. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. The social state.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature.compulsion against the thing. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. howe ver.e. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. or in corporeity. and commits a crime. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. and not merely the particular mode .st rictly so called . has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. which is disinterested . To display the nullity of such an act. like the last.in this case the apparent recognition. sets up a law . in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will.is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force.punishment. in which the law of nature should hold sway. even from the range of all existen ce.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. is the work of Revenge. ¤ 499 (3) Finally.
a will reflected into itself so that. The subjective will is morally free. and willed by it. is its deed. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. which was its purpose. who. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . that external existence is also independent of the a gent. counts only as a person. but have their assent. Naturrecht. etc. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. be its affection w hat it may. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. recognition. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. Das Recht. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. the reason of the will. 1.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. the will is at the same time made a particular. so far as these features are it s inward institution. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. is now chara cterized as a subject .and also moral wickedness. 2. embracing these individual point s. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. its own. or even justification in his h eart. sentiment.the other hand. so much as it has consciously willed. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. it thus includes purpose and intention . though any alteration as such. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. Now. conscience. In point of form. and thus comes into relationship with the former. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. intelligence. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. in mere law. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. This is the right of intention. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. an d allows to be imputed to it. my part in i t is to this extent formal. B. Moralitat 3.
(c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. whether the . These aims. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination.being only in this. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. they ought to stand in harmony. can be wicked. because the agent. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. though it is a particular duty.ion. constitute h is well-being. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . essential and actual. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. and yet each of them. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good.a universal determined in its elf . whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. a good intention in case of a crime. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular.and thus including in it particularity . make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. interests. This is the right to well-being. it is always something particular.g. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. And yet they ought to harmonize.e. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. his interest and welfare must. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. in point of its matter. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. the essential and actual good.that it contains his needs. as individual and universal. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. and aims. At the same time because good is one. is always fundamentally one identity. as in happiness (¤ 479). but is a particul arity of his own . It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. will . and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. is as g ood and as duty absolute. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. is not something external to him. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. on account of that existent sphere of liberty. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence.
is abandoned.the standpoint of the ought. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. The subjectivity. 1. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective .to a goodness.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. right . 5. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. and of the good. is.of Conscience and Wickedness. THE MORAL LIFE. Das Gute und das Bose C. in the notion. 4. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. rising to its pitch. no more exist than not. on its negative side. Moralitat 2. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. in something external therefore. The for mer is the will of goodness. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. Wickedness. which is the good. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. th e essential thing. the unutterable. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction.good is realized. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. which actualizes and dev elops it. 6. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. its deepest descent into itself. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . This pure self-certitude. On the affirmative side. That. i . good. Der Vorsatz 3. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. and refuse it to the wicked. The failure of the latter consists . the truth of this semblance. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. and the wicked. to be carried out in it. is only the infinite form. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. but is only sure of i tself. The result. in this its identity with the good.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. non-universal. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . Die Absicht und das Wohl. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . an aim essentially and actually null. Handlung. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. which has no objectivity. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . and duty. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. which would only be abstract.the utterly abstract semblance . expressed by this repeated ought.
virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. the individuality expres ses its special character.monog . without any selective refl ection. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it .yet somewhat which without all question is. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. however. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . But the person. The ethical personality. etc. in its immediacy. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance.e. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality .The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. temperament. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. . the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. mind ap pears as feeling. as an intelligent being. elevated.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. as personal virtues. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. it exists as confidence. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. i. is confidence (trust) . With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. . and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. that it is. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. In the latter sphere.n a thing . This is the sexual tie. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond .the genuine ethical temper. In the shape of the family. is virtue.th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust.the Family. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. to a spiritual significance. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. Thus. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . as the mind developed to an organic actuality . to destiny. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. manner and cu stom . to the total of ethical actuality. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom.the Political Constitution. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. controls and entirely dominates from within. however. as deliberate work for the community. (c) Th e self-conscious substance.Marriage. as against the univers al.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being.Civil Society. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. makes this union an ethical tie .e . is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. whose independence it. in its ki nd. i.
(b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. thus invested with independence. or nominal culture in general. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . labour. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. This instrument. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . of the possessor's will. as private persons. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. who exist independent and free. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. learning. while. of legal regulation. or state external. on one hand. being an intelligent substance. and thus produce more unconditional . and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. to found anew such an actual family. constitutes the general stock. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests.in educating them to independent personality. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. on the o ther hand. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. however.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. into families or individuals.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. information. In virtue of such for tuitousness. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . as do also its industry. and care for the future. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. originally foreign to it. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. acquire an existence of their own. destined. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . ¤ 522 (3) The children. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour.
of mere agents. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. is developed i n detail. and of means for satisfying them. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . b ecause of the finitude of its materials. The second. and like the first a certain subsistence. ten thalers. Their content per se may be reasonable . certain. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . which as existence is essentially a particular. 2 3/4 . But when right. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority .dependence on the social system.and ye t it should be decided. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. It is a futile perfectionism to have . of the legal relationships of individual s to them. intelligence. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. The third. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. of needs. as well as of mental culture and habit . the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. and so on ad infinitum. determined through reason or legal intelligence. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. to be. and industry. be the righ t and just thing. or could be.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. Hence. Where civil society. and an ensemble of contingencies. on the side of external existence. in the course of definite manifestation. or only 2 * . can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . 2 4/5 years. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. and with it the State. and accident.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence.. option.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . as vital. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. exists.the Law. its action gets direction and content through natural features. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. Thus whether three years. their recognition and their honour. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. they have their actual existence. which is honesty. at every point. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. this analysis. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. and in it they have their social moralit y. also of aims and interests. talent. skill. though of course only at the final points of deci ding. and a corresponding mode of labour. however. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity.
whic h are only internally in these objects.e. being laws o f strict right. which again make new decisions necessary. as it is a known law. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. the need of a simpler code . To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused.into punishment (¤ 500). The comparison of the two species.as this exists as revenge . inasmuch as.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. But there is a contrary case. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. of his countrymen. by faith and trust. general laws. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. within the house . they touch only the abstract will . To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. constit . There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. to which objective existence determines i tself.and th e cattle too . while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice.in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. at the same time an externally objective existence. and t hus become authoritative .even as his law can only be a just law. i. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis .vi z.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'.which though something new. however. hereditary divinity or nobility. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. This subjective existence. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. even the admiration. as universal authority and necessity. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. as the genuine order of life.to the individualized right . Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms.the ne ed. as in the mental ima ges of space. first really de serving the name of laws. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. recognized. and in particular transforms this existence . there arises. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . like improvements on a f loor or a door. are not a new hou se.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. in the judicial system. with the advance in multitude. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them.to be promulgated and made known as laws . These people forget that the stars . The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court .gets its universal guarantee through formalities. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements.as proven: . of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features.are governed and well governed too by laws. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. . who has by so doing gained the gratitude. which discovers new distinctions. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion.laws. . not for them.
viz. because it is man's want. from the c onnections between nation and nation. and their variable ingredients. which. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity.'poli . the judgement as t o the state of the fact. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. and the judgement as application of the law to it. to the concrete of civil society. In so far. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. and worked from that point of view.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. and to maint ain that end in them and against them.as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. then. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . because it is only one factor. mere circumstantial evidence. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. be exercised as different functions. so as to secure this satisfaction. . In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. the position of an external un iversality. appears as state.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . . The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. No doubt this factor is incomplete. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. So far as concerns them. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. shou ld. in a uniform gen eral way. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. It results also from circumstances of locality. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. as at bottom different sides. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted.and that. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. Conversely.
(c) THE STATE. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. But. it carries back both. it protects the family and guides civil society. through the action of the government and its several branches. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. the state only is as an organized whole. with all its evolution in detail. Thus we have the corpora tion. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. Thirdly. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. and . First. Secondly. The same unity. self-originated. First it maintains them as persons. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. It provides for the reasonable will .international (outer-state) law. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. however.the reasonable spirit of will.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. his independent self-will and particular interest. and. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . in this direction . s heer subjectivity. differentiated in to particular agencies.which volition is thereby free . secondly. they are re strictions.ce'. . to the immediate agent. is its essence. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. continually produce it as their result. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness.as an actuality . and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock.co nsists in a double function. then it promotes their welfare. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. and not left to perish.one individual.in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . but. which each originally takes care of for himself. receiving. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . but which has a thoroughly general side. On the other hand. which. The cons titution is existent justice . ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals.into the life of the universal substance. also for that will being put in actuality. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . This universal principle.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . and the who le disposition and action of the individual . The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. ¤ 539 As a living mind. and self-develop ed .const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality.
age. Formerl y the legally defined rights. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. etc. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. directories. and that the laws are restrict ions. It is important therefore to study them closer. presuppos e unequal conditions. etc. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person.as regards taxation. it embodies a liberty. as a person capable of property (¤ 488).which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. However true this is. is so little by nature. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. . as it exists as s uch. But that this freedom should e xist. Equality.only it can make them .. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. physical strength. the familiar proposition. the current notions of l . It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. i. that the laws rule. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. or destroy them. otherwise have in property. etc. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. private as well as public rights of a nation. The laws themselve s. But the notion of liberty.punishment. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. on the contrary. logically carried ou t. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. eligibili ty to office. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. as it ha ppens. authorities. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. first. town . military service. As regards. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. in other words. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. On the contrary. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality .Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. is abstract subjectivity. without further specification and development. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. were called its 'liberties'. As regards Liberty. The principle of equality. All men are by nature equ al. Nothing has become. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. or even in crime. Really. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. But. etc. as regards the concrete. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth.besides their personalit y . etc. on the contrary. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. rejects all differences. magistracies .pleasure an d self-will. talent. etc. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions).e. which it can without incompatibility allow.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. Rome. the citizens . Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . the difference of governing powers and of governed. skill.equal in the concrete. With the state there ari ses inequality. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'.
A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development.iberty only carry us back to equality. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. and thus gains moral independence. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. If .a thing that has nev er happened in history. not merely with regard to the naturalness. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. i. The term political liberty. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. be it added. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. and to regard a state. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. and the organization of the actualization of them. with its insatiate vanity.) But the guara ntee lies also. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. is . the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. . ¤ 541 The really living totality . as a state without a constitution. and must deal with them as it ca n. The question . the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made.just because of this inseparability . an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. But the more we fortify liberty. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. just as little as the making of a code of laws. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. self-w ill and self-conceit. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. with this development of particularity. in other words continuall . as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. however. of others. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. of liberties in general. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications.e .e. in which this is not formally done.as sec urity of property.that which preserves. has an insight and conviction of his own . and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept.
Only through t he government. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. ¤ 542 In the government . but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. the participation of all i n all affairs . and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. in other words.su bject always. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. i. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . as in the patri archal society . all-decreeing will of the state. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. presupposes ignorance that the true idea.in a state of society. is the self-redintegrating notion. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). but an actual indiv idual . instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit.y produces the state in general and its constitution.to make it the first power. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. is the state one. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. equally disorganizes actuality. .or. In the perfect form of the state. . as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence.impugns the principle of the division of powers. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence .the will of a decreeing individual. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. however. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence.the all-sustaining. (A mistake still greater. as always. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. and the government be merely executive and dependent . The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason.monarchy. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers.regarded as organic totality . What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. as in a democratic constitution. i.e.e. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . of the family and of civil society. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. These. is the government. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. which includes an already existing development of differences. which taken apart is also particular). But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . The government is the universal part of the con stitution.
The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. For it is as private persons t . conjoined both with forms of their degeneration .partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. etc. admini stration of justice or judicial power. and above all personal liberty. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. with its industry and i ts communities. involve the. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general.necessary to the p rocess of evolution .being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. administration and police. essentially. Secon dly. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. liberty of property.e. aptitude. Thus. . The pure forms . that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. Two points only are all-important. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . and then of nature . the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. which having their busin ess appointed by law. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . and with earlier transition-forms. in the history of the State. there arises the participation of several in state-business. an actual existence. aristocracy and monarchy. civil society. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. and skill for such ends.. participate in the governmental power.viz. possess independence of a ction.partly. i. being simple self-relation. and are to that degree private person s. as it were. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. too. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty.as also feudal monarchy. lik e peace and war.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. legislative power. That subjectivity . These principles are those expounded earlier. especially in legislation .are. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. The division of constitutions into democracy.in short. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. first. with their general opinion. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. to subjectivity.'ideal' unity.such as ochlocracy. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch .a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. it may be . to that end and for that reason.
and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . Take the case of England which. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. The des irability of such participation. as such an aggregate. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. inorganic shape. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. be they treated as mere individuals. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. however. as estates. which. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. but as organic factors. demoralization. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. i. and therefore more urgent. in the general sense of embracing a wide. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. it is not a brutish mass. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. The so-called financial law. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. s ense of general wants.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. blind force. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. that t hey enter upon that participation. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. Experience s hows that that country .which should be presupposed.the contrary must be the case . who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. in the law and liberty of property.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. or in its 'reflectional' universality. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs.as it very likely is . to power and act ion. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. ¤ 529 note). 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. elemental sea. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates.would be. moreover. however. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. If the main part of the requirement were .e. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. and form a particular kind . Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened.as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. so far as they form only one branch of that power . The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. is no t self-destructive. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs.a spiritual element . If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence.regard ed as permanent. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. indeed the whole. as the nation . wild. ever newly recurring. like that of the stormy. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . range of the extern al means of government. In a civilized state. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. in arrangements for art and science.
o be a law it would have to be made once for all. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute.is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . a state of war.e. waywardness and chance have a place. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . afresh. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. and becomes the estate of bravery.e. as content o f a true law. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were.i. In one case the . and not actually existent.. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled.so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. when it makes a decree about finance. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. i. In their mutual relations. in which there would no longer be a government. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . is really engaged with strict executive business. but only parties. and not to be made yearly. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. Then again.as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . or every few years. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power.g. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. and thus. e. of the whole of the finances. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions.
etc. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. that. is called an a prio ri view of it. in short. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . That history. however. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. which actually is and will be realized in it . it passes int o universal world-history. a history of its own. are settled and fixed. and above all universal history. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . It has. and as regards its range and scope. It is in time. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. in short.a world-mind.and.of sacerdotal races . su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. especially on the philological side. As this development is in time and in real existence. first in general. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. of a Roman epic. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. there is Reason in history. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. internat ional law rests on social usage. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. each of which. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. and then in history. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. In general. as it is a history. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. it. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. and in Germany more than in France and England. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. both this general recognition. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. and on history-writing in general. On th is point.. in defiance of . an d the special claims of nations on one another. this note must go into further deta il.the plan of Provide nce. is founded on an essential an d actual aim.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow.the judgement of the world. Fictions. is appointed to occupy only one grade. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. when we come to minutiae. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions.
has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). strictly s peaking. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. but an age. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy.).the best-accredited history. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. in the interest of so-called truth. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. in striking portraiture and brevity. and criticize events.e. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose.g. as in the romance. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. a civilization. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. Rome and its fortunes. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. a word. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. What happens to a nation . no history . The point of interest of Biography . not as good as a fairy tale. and an exclusive interest in justice. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. and takes place within it. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. But. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. on the other hand. and rejects both ki nds of interest. state. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. express not a subjective particularity. or. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. i. but violates th e principles of objective truth. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. or if he declined to judge at all. is not only against taste and judgement.appears to run . if he had not an interest. and. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation.to say a word on that here . e. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. etc. has. Ay. a nation.like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances.
and are all treated as indifferent. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. truth. liberty. which is what is pe culiar to them. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. and the business of so doing. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. and secondly. the freak of humour. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history.or in other words that Reason is in history .directly counter to any universal scope and aim. only opinions and mere ideas. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. i. 550). and its content is prese . And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. and their subjectivity.e. etc. But. the absolute L aw. has another ground and interest than his tory.e. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). really. which all alik e have no stuff in them. to the history of religion.an accurate report of externals.e.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. these individuals. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . in this case. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. the consciousness of it. potentially infinite. i. But biography too has for its background the historical world. while it inheres in them. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. etc. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. a development determined by the notion of spirit. i. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. which is their reward. are instruments. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. first in general.e. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition.admitting.Fame. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. i. on the contary. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. have they their value and even their existence. as over a special grade. is the empty form of activity. The mere play of sentiment. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . For Spirit is consciousn ess. we may add. if Rome or the German empire. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. Only therefore through their relationship to it. Such a doctrine . so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. and of its essence. is the supreme right. and there fore as a work of individuals.
in the system of laws and usages. i. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind.as is the case with all speculative process . is the purification. from which the start is now made. i.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world.Liberty.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. especially ¤ 51. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. As regards the 'mediation' which. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. lays hold of its concr ete universality. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests.is the peculiar perversity. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions.e. Such apprehension. note). whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. At this rat e. however.e.e. This factor. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. For that st arting. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. and that on the religious.a mere 'ought' . of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude.consciousn ess. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. now gets its most concrete interpretation. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. as law and duty. actually accomplished in the ethical world. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. forme rly noticed. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. Th e finite. as true in the world of free will. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. i. that elevation to God really involves. ¤ 204 not e). Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. is the real ethical self. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. But . the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . The spirit. the idea of God it kn . while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. i.e. cf. But the spirit which think s in universal history.
or it may be. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own.partly as mere moving of the lips. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. first of all. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. and these applications of it in the religious life. i. religion was a late r addition. and prays others to pray . and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. and law and justice.working images. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. i.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. and in the act of faith. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source.of bondage. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . but purely subjective in individuals: . This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has.as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. and ex pecting miracles from them. generally.e. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. even to bones. And.e. the host as such is not at first consecrated. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness.e.addressing his devotion to miracle. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. It lea ds to a laity. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. and even as mutually indifferent. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. in the annihilation of its externality. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. i.logi cally enough . It leads.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. then there may be created. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own.the body of religious truth. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. one religious and an other ethical. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. in its faith and in its con science.e. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. for thought and knowledge . in point of form. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. (In the Lutheran Church. but in the moment of enjoymen t. a condition of spiritual sla very. B . But in poin t of form. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised .ows must be the true and real. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . to justification by external wo rks. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. springing from some force and power. differing from the former in body and value of truth. i. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . on the contr ary. non-spirituality. morality and conscience. and superstition. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free.
And instead of the vow of obe dience. lacked liberty. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. and. which does not rise in hostility against them. i. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth.e. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. if taken alone. because the state is a self-possessed. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. Thus set free. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. a code of law should arise. i.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. and in a special sense Philosophy. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. so to speak a priori. self-realizing reason . It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. unte nable. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. no matter how. Thus. sti . it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. . .e. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor.of honesty in commercial dealing. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. and political institutions deduced from them must be. can law and morality exist. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. . therefore.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power.in short. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. Instead of the vow of chastity. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. moral life in the state. the wisdom of the world. our consciousness and subjectivity. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . So long as t he form.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). leads it into the rea l world. founded on principles of reason. and thus only. The precept of religion. Let us suppose even that. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation.e. and in the use of property .an obedience which is itself the true freedom. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. i.
is the intellectual and thinking self.is just this . that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. . and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. and the power given them to fix the budget. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. when specially set in relief as genus. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. This additional 'individuality' . To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists .ll. however sound their provisions may be. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. ¤ 544 note). and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. thus surmountin . The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. from those deeper requirements which. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . so-called 'chambers'. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . At best it is only a temporary expedient . which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. or. Such laws. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea .to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. etc. e. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. on one hand.among which laws these guarantees are included. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. This absolute nucleus of man .g. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees.to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. on the other hand. to put it simply. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. thus founder on the conscience. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. that the Idea must be regent.mi nd intrinsically concrete . In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. (cf..
so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. But thought always . But even religion. ¤ 513. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . etc. fall feeling. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. Political power. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion).the form which ph ilosophy attacked . as it grows and expands. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. however. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . but earlier than philosophy. of philosophy. Hence religion as such. The form in its infinite tru th. religion. so .so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. which is developed similarly. in its f irst immediate. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. on its own s howing. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. intuition. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. which still escaped his intelligence.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. pictorial representation. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. as demoralization. exhibits the one-sidedness.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. from religion. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. or rather must. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. is after all only in one of its form s.and th at on account of this very principle . wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality.). the subjectivity of mind. should knit it together and control it. Only in the principle of mind. Religion may.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . which is awa re of its own essence. in common with all his thinking contemporaries.was that creative imagination. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. Under the subjective form. As it left therefore behind. is implicitly in absolute liberty. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. earlier than it does as philosophy. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. or essential being). and so also one-sided phase. in its philosophic phase. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. he. Plato. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. for th ese reasons.the idea of the substantial moral life. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation.). It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. His state is therefore. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power.
Die Weltgeschichte 10. 8. for which it is as substance. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. 1. Das aussere Staatsrecht. That here. Die Polizei und die Corporation. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. while it is self-centred identity. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. Weltweisheit. Gesetz. 7. Die Sittlichkeit. the constitut ion and the code. Inneres Staatsrecht. 2. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. 3. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. In the Protestant state. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. but rather to a sort of knowledge. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion.in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. Das System der Bedurfnisse. as well as their several applications. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. 9. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. as always. i. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. 6. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. 4. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . Religion.as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means).e. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. of God's indwelling in us. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. Die Rechtspflege 5. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. Thus ul timately.
e. like the material which it uses to work in. . c an.i.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. so that the thought embodied. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. its n atural immediacy.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf.the form of immediacy as such . In this ideal.hence not the sp iritual unity. 1. ¤ 411).for the expression of spiritual truth . it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. Der absolute Geist. aware. viz. A. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. Belief. But. but . or the idea. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. on the other hand. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. as superseded in spirit. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. which is only a sign of the Idea.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . Art requires not only an external given material . reconciliation.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it.something formal.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence .in other words. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. that is. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. On one hand. as it is. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. the actuality of the spirit. and of gaining its concrete determination.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas).the shape or form of Beauty. With the essential restrictedness of its content. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. into the subject which produces that work. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . has in devotion . and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it.
for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. though concrete and intrinsically free. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . and th e artist is the master of the God. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. assumes fuller and firmer features. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. or an effor t towards him . is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. but as only finding himself in himself.stil l this art is defective. is not yet known. subjectivity.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal.can try to bring itself to consciousness. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive.in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it.symbolic art. the artist's enthusiasm. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. the principle of its law.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. and that is where the infinite form. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. that one spirit creates and informs them. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. as free spi rit. not yet conscious of itself. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. known as the Absolute. as well as of its art and science. but its inmost depth. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. is not yet absolute. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. of its actual liberty. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. . and of its constitution. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man .
unbeautiful sensuo usness. with their perso nal sense and feeling. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. then the only thing left to constitute His nat .of Nemesis. on the contrary. and brilliancy. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. and j ust for that reason. as infinite self-realizing form . But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. Beautiful art. is first generated. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit.it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. from it s side. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. The older religion in which the need of fine art. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. B. and. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. Beautiful art. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed.the religion i. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. spectator find themselves at home.ent in it. . not the supreme liberation itself. has its future in true reli gion. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence .for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the.that it be revealed. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. whose con tent is absolute mind . we see that the advent of art. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . . The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. which is only in the medi um of thought . ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. The old conception . Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. still more in that external. it is from Him.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit.due to a one-sided survey of human life .e. what is more.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. the theme and c entre of religion. shows that such religion is on the decline.The genuine objectivity.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . like the religion peculiar to it.into revelation.is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . . which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. in which he had not revealed himse lf. revealed by God. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. But with a further and deeper study. expression. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . dashing t o pieces everything high and great . has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself.
the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. and phenomena which succeed each other. which therefore is finite. first of all. Yet. staying aloof and inert. That spirit. however.. amid that natural ness. on the other hand.knowledge in God. as in duty bound. not. further. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. of the world it gave away . and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. On one hand is heaven and earth. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. (a) as eternal content. Go d is. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. It includes. it may almost create surprise that so many.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. for that reas on. to specul ative comprehension.. making them presuppositions towards each other. .1. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. though different. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y .: Berlin 1829. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. but afterwards.on the other hand. directed towards the Eternal. though. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself.is the Spirit. again. abiding sel f-centred. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. as the extreme of inherent negativity.just as. the spirit. it implies the revelation of Him. (c) as infinite return. in it s forefront. only standing to it in an external connection.of the only Son .it is therefore the absolute spirit. But. by C. the elemental and the concrete nature .the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. To know what God as spirit is .ure would be to ascribe envy to Him.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. a separate being. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. while in point of form he is. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. and reconciliation with the eternal being. which proceeds to man's self. and. with whom. in point of content. when it thinks. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. or of judgement. ¤ 566 In this separating. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . G . even in its manifestation.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts .requires careful and thorough speculation. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . he still remains in original identity . it is. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. on one hand. . F. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories.
Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. keeps himself unchanged. who as such is identified with the essence . falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. on account of his immediate nature. . Irony. contentless sense.Irony. is not bound by it .then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. secondly. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . In this form of truth.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. remains master over it. is itself the emptiness and vanity. But. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. If the result . and thus. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. in which he. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. 1.where the spirit closes in unity with itself .but the vision of implicit truth. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance.is transplanted into the world of time. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . This individual. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. Die geoffenbarte Religion. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. th e self-centred manifestation. so far. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . Further. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. C. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. he. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. his natur al man and self-will. as infinite subjectivi ty.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . and thus sensuous. gives itself direction and con tent. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. eternal. this immediate. From this its separation into p arts. after the example of his truth. Whereas the vision-method of Art. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. and eternal spirit in itself.is taken in a merely formal. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. Thinking. but alive and present in the world. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. which from itself. external in point of form. an object of contemplating vi sion . but even to thought. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. with a temporal and external sequence.and. truth is the object of philoso phy. through which witness of the spirit in him. simple. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. is but subjective production and shivers the sub .
on one hand. too much for the latter. This movement. and whereas Religion. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. and particularly of the logical form.takes. as also of the necessity in the two forms . In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them.from these forms. when driven to expound itself. opens it out in mental picture. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. and against philosophy in general .it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. This witness . immediate vision and its poetry. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit.stantial content into many separate shapes. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. and s o religious.e. which determines itself to content. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. a nd of logic in particular. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. to be more precise still. which philosophy is. and this necessary as free. This does not prevent the spirit.i. and acts inconsistently towards them. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. remains identical with it. and mediates what is thus open ed out. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. of course. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. or. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. finds itself already accompl ished. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . with its separ ation into parts.on the other hand.which may be in both the same . This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms .the underlying essence in all humanity . or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content .('Rationalism') . but also criticized it. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained.and from a pithless orthodoxy. when at the close it seizes its own notion . first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. elevation of them into the absolute form. The charge of Atheism. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. only looks back on its knowledge.leaving out. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy .
To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind .that of the Egyptians to the ox .the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. some of the most telling passage . are unable and unwilling to see this . and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. and is therefore. God in General. also contains the generic abs tract. if we believe them. its grossest shape.each and every secular thing is God. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself.of Pantheism. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness.in the wanton assertion. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. the secularity of th ings. or if you will.thus he understands philosophy . and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. we must. does not comprehend itself. exclusi ve. Piety. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. from which all definite quality is excluded. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. without distinction.(empirical things.g. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. as it stands.is always adora tion of an object which. whether higher or lower in the scale. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. most sublime. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. every kind of piety (¤ 72) .that of the Hindu to ass es.which therefore it does not disparage. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. If this theory needs no more than such a God.or to dalai-lamas . This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. It is only his own stupidity. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. that. This new theology. in particular. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. as is well known. and amongst it s effusions. and so . it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy.of the new piety and new theology. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. Without interest of its own for the concrete. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) .Everything is . but as a proved fact. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. Amongst the abundant resources. with all its absurdities. fulfilled notion of God. or Pantheism. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. or any one man.all possess substantia lity. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism.the Bhagavat-Gita. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion .that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. ¤ 71 note).as the most authentic statement accessible . The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. I select .(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. open to our disposal on this topic. cows .so much so. are) . But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . On such a presuppo sition. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . that it has too much of him: . The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. and form all that is definite in the divine universality. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . that it is treated not so much as an imputation.so much so. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: .
. the One which.that Hinduism. .' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. is not. There is nothing else higher than myself. . with a monstrous incons istency. pp. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . passion. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. and one essential amongst them. . . has the higher conception of Brahma. and end of living things. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. p.not everything. . . I am the spring amo ng the seasons. . he is said to be the beginning. . which he is. grip. 7 seqq. 'At the end of many lives. all this is woven upon me. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. and the moon among the lunar mansions. . . . But so little concrete is this divine unity . than which there is nothing higher. but only . . . (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. seated in the hearts of all beings. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. . darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. Meru among the high-topped mountains. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. unessential existences. . The undiscerning ones.'I am the self. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. . as he said before he was S iva. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . . nothing independent].' This 'All'. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . vanish. to a poly theism. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld.. goodness. . I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me.so powerless its..spiritual as its idea of God i s . any more than the Eleatic One.). Hinduism. I am the taste in water. .the most excellent of everything. called Gods. . even Siva. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. Among letters I am the letter A. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. or Indra. as different from that accidental.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. . middle. . but defin ed as the 'accidental'. . the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. melt into the one Krishna. is alo ne the divine and God. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. . at the beginning of the pass age.. everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. the Everything. or a God besides. so to speak . I am life in all beings. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. . But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. Even when. . Indra. without essential being of its very own. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. . . which Krishna calls himself. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . . . This everything. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. t he pure unity of thought in itself. . . . . besides Krishna. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences.s. where the empirical everything of the world. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. still God. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . and the Spinozan Substance. etc. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. rather. . I am also the strength o f the strong. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. .' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. but having its truth in the substance. however. is also the maddest of polytheisms. as also those proximate substantialities.
keep its independence. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. the all. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic..g.in its finest purity and sublimity. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. moreover. But to go back again to the question of fact. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . is identical with the world. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. imagination or speculation.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular. after this partition. and so on . when he adores the ape.. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. to was .floating in the indefinite blue . to which everything is God. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50.ndu.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. and on the other. we must consult th e Mohammedans. or. he is as essence parted from appearance. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. the Eleatic. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth.of the world as one thing. even in a general exoteric discussion. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. of the relationship of God and the world. If. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. in relation to the popular idea of the world.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. as it says. and that unity described as love. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. and of empirical secular spirit. on one hand. as the endless lot of empirical existence. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. outside it .on the shallow conception of it . and. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. especially the Mohammedan. as everything. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. or Spinozist. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. e. or other creature. which. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. But. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. the finite to the infinite. That pantheism indeed . as infinite from the finite. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. ac osmical. modes of envisaging God. and God everything. empirical indivi duals . They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. For that unity. on the contrary. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. secondl y.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. Hin du monotheism. is discarded and absor bed. but . Of the oriental. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. It is only the picture . (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. whether they spring from heart.
Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. but only the one factor of this category of relation . they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. however. e. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. the notion and content of philosophy. viz. with indefinite ideas. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. depend solely on the different modes of this unity.te a word on what a 'notion' means. not the concrete unity. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. inorganic and living . and the empty absolute. is what one expect s. but with concrete unity (the notion). and which they ascribe to philosophy. they import them into philosophy. mere ide ntity.e. I n the philosophical field they proceed. with God's omnipresence. in the pores of th e physicists . and that it is the system of identity.the world as much as Go d . they have laid hands on. omnipresence. with abstract unity.and relation i pso facto implies unity . who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . as in the physical field the physicist. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. where they are utterly unknown. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. when they hear of unity . so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea.and that the factor of indet erminateness . providence. composition.falsely as a fact . the most external and the worst.is identity. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. and that amongst the m there is great variety.and s till less take trouble about it . if not even of supreme interest. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. But the question is. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one.g. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. . and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . and that hence. but rather its reverse. a nd assert . Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. as Epicu rus does. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. in matters admitted to be of superior. etc.said pores being the negative. it is not. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. And as in their judgement either of the two . at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world.g. i. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. But they show so little acquaintance with them .has the same solid substantiality as the other.that.
so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. sunders itself.the logical system. for its middle term: a middle. But to put that sort of thing. which has self. The esoteric study of God and identity. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind.knowing reaso n. but the many-shaped modes specified. the notion.it is the nature of the fact. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. on the shoulders of philosophy. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point.by which notions are perverted into their opposite. then. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. y . making the former its presupposition. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. in his relation to the world. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. If statements as to facts are put forward. a system of identity. On account of this chorus of assertions.e. standing between the Mind and its essence.ity . or as prevaricating for a purpose. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. which . nor itself to something away from them and independen t . The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. Nature .their everything.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . and which is itself the way to produce it. as of cognitions. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism.which.it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. the absolutely universal. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. not abstract unity. as other than they. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. i. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment.as the mediating agent in th e process . as process of the I dea's subjective activity. and the latter its universal extreme. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. But in ascribing to God. and as implicitly the Idea. is philosophy itself. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. and notions . of which liberty is the aim. an All-one doctrine. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . which causes the movement and development. which divides itself into Mind and Nature.
engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind.et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. in f ull fruition of its essence. eternally sets itself to work. . The eternal Idea.