INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any

attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i

s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as

treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.

a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. as such a result. Mind. li ght. but soul. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. where the othe .the passive of Aristotle. except where. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. The usual answer. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. and.the truth that matter itself has no truth. perhaps.. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. which is potentially all things.with th is proviso. like heat. etc. to which they might perhaps add space and time. i. its simple 'ideal' life. and mind conceived as a thin g. indeed. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. a nd the soul remains the pervading. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. as absolute negativity. have still. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material.SUB-SECTION A. But not merely is it. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. the soul is only the sleep of mind . and not as the immediate or natural individual. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. which is the fund amental feature of matter.e. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. ANTHROPOLOGY. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. not merely lacks gravity. on the one hand. on the other. and so the self-externalism. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. even the capacity of offering resistance. At such a stage it is not yet mind. These 'imponderables' . Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. identical ideality of it all. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. however. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. however. There. Wherever there is Nature. matter is regarded as something true. in a sense. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. thus come into being. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. It is otherwise with Mind. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. whereas the 'vital' matter. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life .

disappear. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. Malebranche. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. remain for ever subject to such influences. . in the modes of that being. as individualized. which only is. even these few and slight susceptibilities. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. (c) Thirdly. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. just in proportion to his civilization.e. into the absolute syllogism.(a) In its immediate natural mode . on the moulded into it. it is a soul which feels. the changes of the seasons. feels the difference of climates. there philosophers took God. In nations less intellectually emancipated. etc. it may be. described. so to speak. T hus. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. as in the case of Lei bniz. they are natural objects for consciousness. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. in many case s completely. which therefore live more in harmony with nature.or corporeity .whence Epicurus. when it presents itself as a single soul. is too abstract. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. based upon participation in the common life of nature. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. upon it. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. so holding. with Leibniz. These have. re tains an abstract independence. as in the case of Spinoza. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. and always more or less. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. and. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. or. and does not rise or develop into system. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. Spinoza. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i.r is not . when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. its immediate being . we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. as an anima mundi. Animals and pl ants. a world-soul. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. and telluri c life of man.the natural soul. not. as so often is done. and. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. Descartes. sidereal. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. But either this identity. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. (b) Secondly. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . Hence.e. and the periods of the day. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). behind it s ideality a free existence: i.

while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. He begins with Childhood . in purposes political. fancies. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race.the sexual relation . who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). And that individuality marks both the world which.mind wrapped up in itself. carrying out these universa . ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. of families or single individuals. character. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. and on the other. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. The contrast between the earth's poles. shows. shows an active half. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. as alterations in it. we find it as the special temperament. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love.a worl d no longer incomplete. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which.on a ph ysical basis. the one permanent subject. scientific.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. Thirdly. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. we see man in his true relation to his environment. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. on the whole. fails to meet his ideal requirements. widely distant from each other. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). physiognomy. on its one side. or artistic. talent . leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. and the position of the individual himself. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. and as stages in its development. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. bodily structure and disposit ion. This . that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. as it exists. we find its diversities. hopes.

¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. as before explained . distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. but as a return back from the world of specialization. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. .Napoleon. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. . which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. . this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. which are often addressed to philosophy: . But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. as they may be called. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . distinguishes itself from its mere being. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. although. i n an unintelligent way. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. as already noted.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness.The waking is not merely for the observer. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. for example. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. or self-centralized being. (c) Sensibility(3) . But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. The characterization given in the section is abstract. in the first instance. sleep. put this question to the class of ideology.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . viz. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. each point. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact.not as a merely negative rest from it. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness.

But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts.identity of our self-centred being. On the other hand and conversely. just. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. true. mora l. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. and to be as if found. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. the naturally immedi ate.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. its natural peculiarity. etc. godless.g. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. on one hand. for itself. But if put in the feelin g. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . mean. the conscience. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. in the feeling. the fact is a mode of my individuality. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. moral. primarily. are in order to be felt. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. ho wever. adultery. and is so felt. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. are our very own. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. not mere alterations. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . blasphemy. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. murder . fornication. The fact that these particulars. and religious. but treated as bel onging to its most special. etc. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. belonging as it does to natural. in its own self. is what we call sensibility. as 'ideally' in it and made its own.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. invested with cor poreity. and . yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. and the character. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. evil. One. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. etc.set over against consciousness. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. be it noted. Another. the inarticulate bre athing. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good.. are found by the waking soul. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). This should hardly need enforcing. which. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. it is true.

is to raise its substantiality.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. especially the passions or emotions.a psychical physiology. just because they are immediate and are found existing. in a special system of bodily organs. We should have. with its varieties of language. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. works itself out. of self.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. and their corporization. e. following the special character of the mental mode. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310).it is a soul which feels.e. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. sighs. i.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation.g. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. the immediacy of mode in feeling .it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . to the character of subjectivity. . set in its self-centred life. to realize its mastery over its own. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y.the senses of definite light. for example. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . As sentient. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. smells. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. i ts merely virtual filling-up. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. the 'irritable' system. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. o f the system of the senses. In the usage of ordinary language. What it has to do. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. (c) the sense of solid reality. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. but an inward. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . 322). But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. (¤ 300). (¤¤ 321. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. are formed from their mental source. laughter. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . therefore. (¤ 317) . ¤ 402 Sensations.because in it. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. tones. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. with which that substance is one. the centre of the 'sensible' system. of heavy matter. and voice in general. the blood. to take possessi on of it.and of sound. distinction appears as mere variety . Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent.

in whi ch all this is stored up. so far as that is. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. but a negation. omnipresent unity. which is disease.. to which the soul. where the real is put past . (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. Thus in the body it is one simple. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. the content is its particular world. the s oul is characterized as immediate. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. ideas. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). and to that world it stands but as to itself. without existing. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. to be defined as one of feeling . virtually retained. By itself. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). once mor e come to light. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. although it does not exist.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. a deep featureless characterless mine. ¤ 404 As individual. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. etc. They were not in our possession. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. ideas and information. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. it brings within itself. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . This substance i s still the content of its natural life. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. in an implicit mode. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. Some times. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. secondly. which is at the same time its predicate. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real.that world being included in it and filling it up. thoughts. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. the embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. At the present stage this singleness is. etc. In the present stage we must treat. acquired lore. As sentient. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. may again sink down. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. prima rily. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. it implies a want of adaptation.the existent spe culative principle. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. first. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. in sickness. but only to his im plicit self. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world .

. etc. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. because immediate. idiosyncrasies. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). not yet as its self. The moth er is the genius of the child. of the mother. and reasonable. developed interests.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. etc. but as efficiency and realized activity. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. etc. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. say between friends. it is. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. and of character. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: .a subject which may even exist as another individu al. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. incl inations. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. the psychical relationship. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. injuries. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. as yet nothing impenetrable. is visibly present as another and a different individual. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. and is therefore passive. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. temper.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. controlling genius thereof. or capac ity. intellige nt. Here are two individuals. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence.. whose decision is ul . as concrete subject ivity. as it has existence of its own. self-conscious. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. self-possessed. the single self of the two. placenta. character. not a true subject reflected int o itself. fortunes. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. which. his secular ideas. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul.a substance. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts .externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. tal ent. congenital disposit ion and temperament. or virtuality. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. By the self-hood of the latter it . etc. not as a mere possibility. of life.

Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil .his fun damental interests. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . At the same tim e. it has already been call ed his genius. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. on the cont rary. it might seem. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. that it is in harmony wi th the facts. on the other hand. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. in which the individual here appears innnersed. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. This totality forms his actual ity. To that end the phenomena. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. But such a verification would. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. first of all call for verificati on. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. The facts. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. which are also means and ends to each other. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. it must be added. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . self-possessed human being is a disease. in other words. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. intentions. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent show. be mere deception and impo sture. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. educated. is.

conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. smells. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. (Thus Cato. then. exist for it as an outward objectivity. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood.). which. When the substance of both is thus made one.a genius which beh olds itself. ca pable of conveying general truths. in its sober moods.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. tastes. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. f riends. wh en it is healthy and awake. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. on those left behind. and other diseases.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. his own and that of the magnetize . the selfless individual. in whom it sees. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. external one to another. is this. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . a formal vision and awareness. which lead up to the result . and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. and c ontinues to is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. and the like. is under a veil.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. unless by the aid of religion. in catalepsy. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. for example. But.) Compare h ome-sickness. But such clairvoyance . . it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. that it is a state of passivity. and hears. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. subject to the power of another person. but it is empty. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. formed.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. those c onnected with female development. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. etc. etc. for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. after the downfall of the Roman republic. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. however. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. etc. not really a 'person'. and to know which. subje ctive reason. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. And because it is the adult. and character. . not on the spot. . the magnetizer. like that of the child in the womb. or at the approach of death.

In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. in this nominal perception. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. etc. as in other cases. between intelligent personality and objective world. i. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. is impossible. In considering insanity we must. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. causality. receives. though all-embracing. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. it is still susceptible of disease. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. which is no less a world of law. i s just this form of immediacy.r. etc. and at the same time. The purely sensitive life. In this way it is self. as in the morbid state alluded to. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. and hence. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. reasons. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. the 'common sense'. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. for example. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. in its capacity as individual. which still marks the self-feeling. on the contrary.fe eling. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. or med icines for them. beholds. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. e. so long as we assume independent personalities. anticipate the full-grown an . is without any definite points of attachment . unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. which. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . one sees and hears with the fingers. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. This is Insanity or mental D erangement.

and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. i. A violent. is diseased. and it is only as a thing. the. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. which is there also. pride. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. loss of health (if it were that. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. equally formal. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . instincts. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. but a contr adiction in cies and hopes . earthly elements are set fr ee . as it aris es. this life of feeling.. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. as a thing. as now regarded. but only derangement. as something natural and existent. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. and made appear in. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. passions. This particular being of the soul is t . It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. such as vanity. and so also may the cure.feeling. and therefore not susceptible of this malady.. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. and their gratification). is relaxed. so as to insert them in their proper place. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). etc. idea. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. may. presupposes the patient's rationality. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart.just as physical disease is not an abstract. and the rest of the passions . The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. however. and so makes part of the actual self.e. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities.that evil which is always latent in the heart. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred.merely personal love and hatred.e. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. and be a realized u niversality. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. This humane treatment. In the concrete. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. is undistinguis hed from them. inclination. i. etc. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. i. and also desires. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. mere and total. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). .the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling.e. Mind as such is fr ee. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character.d intelligent conscious subject. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. the self is to be stamped upon. moral and theoretical. it would be death). that it is liable to insanity . immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. And so too the particularity is. desire.

not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. a second nature. lacking consciou sness. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. when the co rporcity. and so no longer interested. For.and becoming the 'ideal'. nature.e. and that as a barrier for it. et c. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. on the contrary. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. empty space and empty time. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. a pure act of intuition. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . sleep. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul.he factor of its corporeity. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. Habit is rightly called a second nature. even in being affected by them. but still free. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. has been absorbed by it. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. su bjective substantiality of it . nor is absorbed in the m. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). is reduced to unity. and the mere substance. occupied. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. as. i. will. or dependent in regard to it. but the basis of consciousness. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. weariness o . of it. That is to say. so is that pure being (which. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. but has them and moves in them. And consciousness it becomes. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. are only subjectiv e forms. the one and the same. Habit like memory. partly only relative. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. The soul is freed from them. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. heat. dist inguishing it from itself . and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another.itself a simple being . has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self .just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. of which it is the subjective substance. and the generation o f habit as practice. and for that reason n ot free.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient.. therefore. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. this being of the soul. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). and which still continues to exist. The natural qualities and alterations of age. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits.

In scientific studies of the soul and the mind.or the misfortune . and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. Habit on an ampler scale. and particul ar. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. intelligence.g. this soul. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. nor an abstrac t inwardness. nor are they in conce ption rational.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. etc.enabling the matter of consciousness. and no other. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. like any other. acquires a strength which consists in this. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. habit diminishes this feeling. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. to exist as substance in its felt. re ligious. and thus to enable the soul. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. if quite abstract.concentration. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. the spatial direction of an individual. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. and any other purp oses and activity. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious.e. and that they. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . moral. casual. made into an instrum ent. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. . whereof we sha ll speak later. Thinking. The most ext ernal of them.. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. consciousness. This is the rational liberation from them. consciousness. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. an 'ideality' of soul . a particular organ of i ts organic system). Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action.). that although the frost.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . viz. intuition. etc. reflection. which make it up.. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). cut off from action and reality. so that when the conception (e.. and it is habit of living which brings on death. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. without an express adjustment. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. like their satisfaction. to be made a power in the bodily part. too. and the self-feeling as such. a series of musical notes) is in me. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). or. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. or skill. is recollection and memory. habit is usually passed over - . nor a transient emotion or idea. etc. but part and parcel of his being. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. his upright pos ture. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. etc. And it is true that the form of habit. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se.f the limbs. to be his as this self. sweet tastes. are no longer bothered with it. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. etc. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. under its volitional and conceptual characters. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. i. and especially so in the specific bodily part. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. Even here. has been by will made a habit .

Seen from the animal world. 'The autho . still vainer than a signatura rerum. a world external to it . because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. represents not itself. for the soul. of which it is the sign. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. the upright figure in general. 2. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. 5. as the absolut e instrument. weeping.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. absorbing it. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. Under the head of human expression are included. In this identity of interior and exterior. but the soul.. in being related to which. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. and i s infinite self-relation. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. in its concentrated self. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. and inexpressible a modific ation. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision.laughter. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. Empfindung. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. while language is its perfect expressi on. And the human figure. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. in other words. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. for example. it is related to itself. 71). ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. This externality.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself.either as something contemptible . 1. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. This note is so slight. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. finds itself there a single subject. and making it its own. The soul. or abstract universality. 3. cuts itself off from its immediate being. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. Naturliche Seele. of the mouth . or the 'immediacy' of mind. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. etc. the latter subject to the former. Naturliche Qualitaten. Die fuhlende Seele. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. unable to represent it in its actual universality. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. and the formation of the limbs. especially the hand. 4. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. indefinite. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue.

thus first made explicit as the Ego. but to the foolishness of man. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind.e. but since reality. 6. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. i. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. now. Ego. The mind as ego is essence. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) .' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). as subjective reflection in itself. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. not to the wisdom. to it. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. seem to be its own activity. Hence consciousness. something dark and beyond it. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of an equal freedom as an independent object. Selbstgefuhl. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. like reciprocal dependence in general. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. but is implicit.the light. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. 7. but when he receives the inspired word. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. which manifests itself and something else too . that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. as external to it. and as such it is C onsciousness. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep.the soul's natural life . is only its abstract formal is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . It is of this latter. as this absolute negativity. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. does not. and . Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. in the sphere of essence. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. Gewohnheit. 8.

being immediate. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. The object similarl y.e.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking.a subject-objectivity. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. for which ego is the object. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. an intuitive intellect. with an object set against it. and so on. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. an existing thing. a something. a thing-in-itself. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. This is sense-consciousness. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. As against Spinozism. i. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . a singular. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. t heir absolute interdependence. the notion of mind. or mere c ertainty. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. the subject of consciousness. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). Spatial and temporal Singularn . and even t he Idea of Nature. again. which is not as its own.e. and underived certainty of it. first. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). but only as it is in reference to something else. has emerged from Spinoz ism. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). (b) self-consciou sness. Consciousness . ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. i. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. etc. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. immediate the ego it seems an alteration of the object.. and that the philosophy. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. the substantial and qu alitative. what makes the object the subject's own. Ego. reflected in itself. in other words. an existent. It appears as wealth iest in matter. is further characterized a s immediately singular. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. but as poorest in thought. and puts it first under the category of being. to raise its self-certainty to a case of correlation . Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. as Reason. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object.

At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness.e. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. the thing. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. reflectional attributes. and universal. reflected upon. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). But in this manner the interior distinction is. but as mediated. is sense-perception. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . it also for that reason contains the multiplicity.a copy of the phenomenon. an abstract identity: on the other hand. viz. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. and. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. as not externally different from the other. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections.). or as being beside and out of itself. in this case by t he Ego. so constr uing the object.e. has. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. not as merely immediate.a variety of relations.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. permanent term s. which form the alleged ground of general experience. its necessity on its own part. . it is related. of the thing is. Thi s inward. wants to take the object i n its truth. however. experiences. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. by being regarded in their bearings. on one hand. 73). The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. having passed beyond the sensible. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. as we called it. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . and universalities. to which. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. but brought to rest and universality. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. the distinction on its own part. and more or less by the sciences. and am aware'. has many properties. the one of the terms. what it is in truth. in that manner. a something external to it. lies im mediately in the other. reflected in itself. and sensuous consciousness. i. however. ¤ 423 The ween the individuality of a thing which. and not yet as external on its own part. p.ess. to describe the sensible.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. i. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . taken in its concrete content. or the distinction which is none. free from this negative l ink and from one another. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . It is therefore a tissue of contradictions .

primarily describable as an individual. on the whole. its satisfaction realized. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. knows itself implicit in the object. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . is a singular. therefore.With this new form-characteristic. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. or. negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. there is strictly speaking no object. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. therefore. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. in this return upon itself. being merely consumed. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. and itself made actual. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. implicit in it. To this activity the object. can make no resistance: the dialectic. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. the latter. The two processes are one and the same. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. with the nega tion of it. on the contrary . because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. this identity comes to be for the ego. The certitude of one's self. pure 'Ideality'. in its immediacy. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. and a desire (appetite) . which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. and ma intains itself as such. On the external side it conti nues. or implicitly. and thus in it I am aware of me. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself.

While the one com batant prefers life. as the existence of hi s freedom. and to exist as such for the other: . when we look to the distinction of the two. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . a suppression. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. it. This other. from one point of view. solves the contradiction. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. which falls on another. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. however. however. is yet. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. the outward and visible recognition). for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. Thus arises the status of master and slave. in the service of the master. though by the abstract. then. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. must likewise be kept in life. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. and its being for others. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. the slave. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . at first immedi ately. on the ir phenomenal side. not their underlying and essential principle. and thus give existence to my freedom. and formation of it. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. f rom the essential point of view (i. negati on of immediacy. ¤ 435 But secondly. the slave. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. therefore rude. preservation.for the means of mastery. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. retains his single self-consciousness. ¤ 434 This status. Force. and incurs a like peril for its own . in the first place. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. w hich however is also still outside it. Thus the death of one. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate.t he process of recognition.e. works off his individualist self-will. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. and the means for entering into relation with them.e consciousness of a 'free' object. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. which is the basis of this phenomenon. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. we see. Force. In that other as ego I behold myself.but only p eril. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. as one of two things for another. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self.

Wahrnehmung 3. is now itself universal. than they are its own thoug hts. fame.the passage to universal self. or determinations of the very being of things.consciousness. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. bu t the truth that knows it. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . honour. friendship. The uni versality of reason. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. is Reason. ego. state. whilst it signifies that the object. 1. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. Der Verstand. as its peculiar mode and immanent family. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. idle fame. . therefore. 4. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. For truth here has.f wisdom' . Selbstbewu§tsein. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. love. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. valour. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . Die Begierde 6. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. Reason. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. etc. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. and of all virtues. 5.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . is mind (spirit). fatherland. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other.or rather it is a difference which is none. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . the self-centred pure notion. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. Truth.which is Reason. aware of what it is.

The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. it has a mode in its knowledge. and above the complication with an external object . or. Mind is finite. viz.7. Mind. Cons ciousness is finite. it is finite by means of its immediacy. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own one word. neit her subjective nor objective. in so far as . the latter now an infinite form which is not. PSYCHOLOGY. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins.mental vision.e. what is the same thing. etc. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. so far as its features are immediate or connatural.. like consciousness. Die Vernunft. above the material. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. though it no longer has an object. SUB-SECTION C. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . then its reality is that reason. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. etc. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. therefore. i. desires. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. This. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom.the former a simple immediate totality. in the soul as a physical mode.apart b oth from the content. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness.. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. ideation. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. in so far as it has an object. restricted by that content. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. remembering. etc. which is defined as it s notion. And it is a matter of no consequence. as its concept has just shown. however. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. in thinking also and in desire and will. and which as the reality of that notion.

In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity.e. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). and is even there a return into itself. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. and the negative aspect of mental activity. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. is misconceived and overlooked. and are the mind's own. it is . and make the affection subjective. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. Thus. to reach and get hold of itself. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis.e. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. viz. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. in so far as its existent phase. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. the mind finds in itself something which is. As the theory o f Condillac states it. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. i. i. viz. the na tural soul (¤ 413). in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. and to liberate itself to its elf.e. and its activity can only have itself as aim. so far. equally. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity.reality of its reason. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. Similarly. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. in freedom. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. or. of comprehending itself. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. that aspect is twofold .as being and as its own: by the one. forces. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. When the affection has been rendered its own. k nowledge. and being a rational knowledge. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. that is. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt.

and is immediately willed. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. and therefore a restricted content. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. wi th a material which is its own. The nominal knowledge. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. and of the heart without the intellect . is thus also a reality . It is still extremely ill off. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. for which it gains the form of universality.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. and gains abstract auton omy within. e. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth .only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. like logic.i. as it is said. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. but) enjoyment.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. etc.g.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. This position of psychology. Ou twards. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. merely as facts. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. which it and the content virtually is. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. and that in its empirical condition. while it has to do with autonomous products..(b) Will: practical mind. But as knowledge. the word. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. which in the first place is likewise formal . its content is at first only its own. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. This activity is cognition. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. both for the mind as such. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. Inwards . so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. elevates itself. along with which the content is realized as rational. while the practical. which is only certitude.e. to get at the notion and the truth. belong to a point of view utt . has a material which is only nominally such. just as they are given. as r eason is concrete. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. Its activity has to do with the empty form . The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. Psychology. in the theoretical range. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. and heartless intellects . to definite and conceptual knowledge. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason.

imagination.its out-of-selfness . The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. But the true satisfaction. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. by rational conception. conception. however. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. just so far as it realizes a word . if answered in the negative. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form ( (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. that intuition.whi ch. imagination. It is true that even as isolated (i.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. etc. by cognitive intuition. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. or mind. or makes the concept its own. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. as non-intelligent). Faculty. etc. conceived as reflected into self.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. are not isolated. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition.besides which it al so intuits. imagines. it .e. memory. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). cognitive conception. note). but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . If they are isolated. But c ognition is genuine. conceives. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. like power or force. etc. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. conception. it is admitted.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . etc.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . as it is by the same method brought into nature. viz. must lead to abandoning the effort. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . etc. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . intuition. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. intelligen ce. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible .: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). remembers. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. is bro ught into mind. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . remembrance.

as it were the closes t. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . external or internal. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ the generalit ies of common sense .t he factor of fixing it as our own. in t he truth of mind. Now the material. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . of their essential relationships and real cha racters. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. is swallowed up. this mode is simple. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. that is t o say.but to his feeling.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. . but rather as subject ive and private. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. Feeling is the immediate. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. in content and value entirely contingent. or at least to reasons . Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. Hence feeling. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. may just as likely be narrow and poor. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . even should its import be most sterl ing and true. which the mind as it fe els is to in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. with the character of something existent. a . and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. 254). and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. the mere consciousness point of view. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. has the form of casual particularity . as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . With us.his private and p articular self. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent active self-collection . projects it into time and space.

a rec ollection of a space and a time of its own. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. as it at first recollects the intuition. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. and inwardly divest itself of it.the germ of the fruit.e. . no longer needs to find the content. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. however. which makes it its own. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. still continues simple. or. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. the germ as affirmatively containing. and received into the universality o f the ego. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. yet without being in consciousnes s. with a preponderating subjectivity. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. The representation is the property of intelligence. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. which. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. we may say. for example. in the way we treat. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . as tho ught. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. isolated. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. and is arbitrary or contingent. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. from the external place. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. t ime. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. but stored up out of consciousness. its when and where. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. though intrinsically concrete. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. in virtual possibility. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. i. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree.

if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. wherea s the idea (representation). Secondly. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. which is now the power over them. see Introduction to the Logic. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. i. whatever be its content (from image. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. . (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. at first only in space and time. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. reason and consequence. and an out-put from its universal m ine. to be so and so. now that it has been endued with externality. such as likeness and contrast. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. as a matter of fa ct.e. comes actually into its possession. the matter is entirely pictorial.these modes of relation are not laws.. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. but a being of its own institution. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. The image. as of all intelligence. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. as a unit of intuition. where it is treasured up. by which it is authenticated.viz. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. In the first place. ¤ 20 note.) . Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. being and universality. has always the peculiarity. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. that it finds its material. or ide a). It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . or an intell ectual category. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. present also a distinction in content. under the representation (idea) with the same content.Image and Idea. notion. if it is to exist. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. The content reproduced. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. where. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. But it is solely in the conscious subject. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . has been broken up. though belonging to intelligence. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest.

and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. but only a nominal reason. This force is really intelligence itself . For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. when regarded as the agency of this unification. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. allegoric. Such is creative imagination(7) . a concrete subjectivity. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. or something of the sort. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). and in mechanical memory it completes. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). but they are 'syntheses'. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. 435). is reason. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. and becomes an i ndividuality. it is self-uttering. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. which forms their connecting link. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. Another point calling for special notice is that. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. for its ideal import is its elf.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. internal and external. As reason. this form of being. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition.e. are unifications of t he same factors. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle.still lacks the side o f existence. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. derived from some interest. . intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. or poetical imagination . it aims at making itself be and be a fact. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. one's own and what is picked up. In other words. are completely welded into one.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. so far a s it is concerned. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. etc. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. recollection. some latent concept or Ideal principle. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective .Abstraction. . to universalize it.symbolic. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition.Imagination. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. These more or less concrete. is derived from the data of intuition.. i. Acting on this view.

and even with conception and imagination.). the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated.speech and. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. With regard to the elementary material of language.R auschen. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. in the first instance. It is a n image. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. the colour of the cockade. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers .there have been collected more than a hundred such at of vocal objects. language . something accepted. has always to do with signs only. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin .now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . its institution by intelligence.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. and where it is conserved. conception s. but as representative of something else. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. the matter of the latter is. its system. somewhat immediate or given (for example. out of which it forms i deas .¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. ¤ 459 The intuition . But in the fusion of the two elements. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). Sausen. when employed as a to sensations. have nothing to do with each oth er. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. whereas in the sign. since memory. In logic and psychology. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. . it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). This intuition is the Sign. etc. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. intuitions. The sign is some immediate intuition. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . strictly so-called. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. e tc. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. and the connotation of which it is a sign.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases ..that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . Such is the negativity of intelligence. Knarren. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix.

it depends. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. etc. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. In particular. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. like the Chinese. in chemistry and mineralogy. As to the formal elem ent. (Cf.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. viz. externalities which of themselve s have no sense.e. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. the chemical elements. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs.e. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. the denomination. we may touch.e. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. It is only a stationary civ ilization. the planets . upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. . people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. and now that. as. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. only in pas sing. as regards signs for mental objects. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. . But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. i. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. they are reduced to signs. on the other hand. which severally receive designation. The study of languages still in their original state. are frequently changed.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. on anthropological articulation. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. their signs in vocal language. as in our signs for the numbers. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. for example. W. and still takes place in Canton .The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. palate. instead of n ames proper. i. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. as many as ten a . and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. again. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. but.). if it be not altogether extinguished. tongue in each) and for their combinations. and only get signification as signs. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. alphabetical writing. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. i.

learn ing to speak Chinese. however ample a connotation it may include. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. as it does. Engaging the attention of intelligence. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. Both alike require such signs. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. while (with the facu . is still for the mind simple in the name). which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such.the name. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. so that. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. Thus. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. of uttering its ideas most worthily . Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. like alphabetic writing. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language.e.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. Hieroglyphics. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. The European. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. . Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . peculiar to the intellect. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. This feature of hieroglyphic . the simple straight stroke.nd twenty. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. by speaking low and soft or crying out. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. in the interest o f vision. or simple logical terms. in the case of the Chinese Koua. just as in modern times (as already noted. i. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. in speaking. the simple plain idea. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. it is analysed. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name.the mode.

lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,

but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you

ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.

¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex

in which these facts. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. grief. but presented in its universality and necessity. we have only to deal with the selfish. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. can also be felt. it is because of their quality or co ntent . and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling.retain a speciality of their own . may be placed. and thought. in its objectivity and truth. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. etc. and precisely in that way d o they . contentment. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . Thus it is. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. Delight. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. and duty. is precisely what constitutes. If feelings are of the right sort. volition. But as both. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. on the one hand. heart. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. shame. On the other hand. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact .but only in antithesis to the latter . the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. joy.indeed infinitely so. and evil. etc. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. wha t is the same thing. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be.. lack objective determin ation. in feeling. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy.. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. law and morality. bad. we have this immanen . repentance. and to discus s their content. Whereas in life. and still more in mind. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). when thought. namely God. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. and will.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. for the latter. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. in their immediacy. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. in their universality and necessity. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. But where the objects sought are thus casual. right. the truth and. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form.

each with its private range). as rights and duties. In what way have they. Which are good and bad? . (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. therefore. indeed. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. are infected with contingency. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. Should. Thus. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. however.Up to what degree the good continue good. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. on the other. The answer to the question. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. as r egards the form of its content. finds in the conformity . the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. passion is neither good no r bad. . too often. while. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. each being always in conflict to another. but to ge t realized. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. their mutual connect ions. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. In consequence of this formalism. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical .natural impulse and inclination. It is on ly a dead. subjectivity .as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. and something inappropriate to it. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. as experience shows. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. The will. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. Will. talent. character. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. What are the good and rational propensiti es. and their truth.and (as there are ma ny. enjoyment . on one aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. is at first still a natural will. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. the question is directly raised. ego. first of all. If the will is to satisfy itself. admitting of gratification. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. it is pa ssion. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. which is essentially self-d etermination.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. be the value of tha t mode what it may. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. But with regard to the inclinations.on one aim and object. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . they.a development in which the content of autonomous .his inte rests of intellect.

it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. on the whole to their disadvantage. moral. as the content. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. by another. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. that finds its actualizing in the agent. so far as their particularity goes. as thinking and implicitly free. They are somet imes contrasted. where the subject is made to close with itself. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. the impulses. it is on them that the decision turns. an inactive thing.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . It rea lizes itself in a particularity. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. inclinations. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. Their mutual limitation. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. An action is an aim of the subject. either alto gether or in part. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. and is option or choice. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. are reduced to a m ere negative. which reflection and comparison have educed. the free gift of nature. on one hand. and social duties. It is thus 'reflecting' will. which as such is the universal. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. this is wh at is called the interest. i.his passion. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. unless he had an interest in it. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. is his interest and . there would be no action at all. without end.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. which is just as much no satisfacti on.e. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. However. The morality concerns the content of the aim. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim.and one satisfaction. As thus contradictory. . ¤ 476 The will. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. of a universal sa tisfaction.action loses its contingency and optionality.

and of which it is only t he formal activity. now that the formalism. and are without it still. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being .e. Africa and the East. as realizing the matter of speculation. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. is actu ality. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. education. the divine min d present with him. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . and object .an individuality. If to be aware of the Idea . i. he h as also. etc. its very au tonomy or freedom. the will is an actually free will. for example. and that as its very actuality. even the Stoics. ambiguous. fortuitousness . there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning.sired .it is the existential side of reason . aim. This universalism the will has as its object and aim.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. which i s pure and concrete at once. that is. and are constituted after its measure. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. still this very I . or implicit Idea. or by s trength of character. and the abstract singleness. did not have it. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . an Athenian or Spartan citizen). with freedom itself. however. i. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God be aware. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. If the will. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. The Greeks and Romans. As abstract Idea again.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. i. of the family. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. Whole continents. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished.e. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. is in the first instance the rational will in general. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. therefore. or philosophy (. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. which realizes its own freedom of will. only so far as it thinks itself . Remembering that free mind is actual mind. Plat o and Aristotle. According to Christianity. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. so that in this sphere of particular existence. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. have never had this Idea. he is actually free.e . On the contrary. knows this its concept. and is will as free intelligence. of present sensati on and volition.freedom itself. If. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. as the substance of the state. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. in religion as such .a universality which only ought to be.e. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. just because it is the very essence of mind.

Die Intelligenz. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase.a principle of the mind and heart. 11. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. Gedachtnis. not with laws or court s of justice. 3. Der Geist 2. they would find the very substance of their life outraged.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. 10. 14. is itself only a notion .not something which they have. Das praktische Gefuhl. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. Auswendiges. religious. moral. 16.dea itself is the actuality of men . which the content and aim of freedom has. if they are made slaves. 12. Vorstellung. but the pe rmanent character . but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. Phantasie 8. Die Gluckseligkeit. as men. but which they are. Inwendiges. Der praktische Geist 13. and not less into scientific actuality. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. 1. 4. Die Einbildungskraft. But this freedom. Anschauung. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . Die Erinnerung 6. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. 15. Der freie Geist. 5. Das Denken. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. into legal. 9. 7.

the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. For a mode of existence is a right. my right to a thing is not merely possession. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. etc. etc. private an d personal needs).and aim. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. in the light of the concept. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. or Usage. In the morality of the conscience.. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. in general. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. as the services of the members of the State in the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. to administer. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. and brings into existence i n these several wills. which splits up into different heads: viz. But. relation to another person . and it is a duty to possess things as property.. so as to become its habit.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. which in it is thus at home with itself. Liberty. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. receives the form of Necessity.. temper. are its Duties. but in its universality. on the other hand. are duties . but as possession by a person it is property. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). is also a right. But in this individualist moral sphere. viz. is a duty. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. it exists as manner and custom. being universal. or legal possession. to be as a person. not in the form of impulse. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. and character. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. and is the vi rtual universal. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood.e. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. Liberty. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. anthropological data (i. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. What is a right is also a duty. As it (and its content) belongs to thought.(1) When. military service. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. These conditi ons. its rights of admi nistration. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. duty in general is in me a free subject . it is a Law. is the Law (Right ) .e. etc. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. where free will has existence. in relation to the subjective will. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. or instituted as an authoritative power. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. i. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. where they. in these externally objective aspects. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. are no less its duties to punish. and what is a duty. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. their absolute unity. The penal judicature of a government.

abstract right. the external sphere of its liberty . as in itself still abstract and empty. it may be. This thing. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. But this is the ethic s of actual life in family. so as to have its existence inside it. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. 1. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. it is the right of the subjective will. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . As so characterized. as something devoid of will. in the knowledge of their identity as free. Gesetz 2. at first in the outward appropriation.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. and the I in it is abstractly external. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. . or by the formatio n of the thing or. by mere designation of it. civil society. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. though it remains in trinsically the same. but as existence of the personality is an end. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. the infinite self-rela tion. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. and State. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. on its own account me rely 'practical'. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right.possession. morality of the individual conscience. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. are simultaneously mutually independent. These extremes are the persons who. is an individual. and hence as a single being . possession is property. (B) When the will is reflected into self. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. But the set of adjustments. which as possession is a means. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. but on an external thi ng. Sitte A. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. which is thus mutual. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person.

In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. and its acceptance by the other will.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. its changing hands. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. This is naiv e. is affirmed. willed. in that case. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . and.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. the only diversity lies in this. But so far as my will lies in a thing. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). I can just as well put it in it as not . and recogniz ed. however. but which.the full and complete deed. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. non-malicious wrong. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. ¤ 495 The contract. labour. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals.just as well with draw it as not. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will.Contract. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. which thus becomes wicked. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. produces a wrong: by which. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. because they face each other. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. then the external rec . 493 seqq.). and time. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. universal thing or commodi ty. is disinterested. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. which. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. expressing the civil suit. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another.

It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. or Natural Right. The social state. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. which is nominal and recognized by him only . to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. or in corporeity. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action.compulsion against the thing. is a matter of chance). i. sets up a law . This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. and while the former only is respected. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. like the last. This gives the wrong of fraud . the latter is violated. an d so on without end. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. howe ver. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. i. by the n this case the apparent recognition. or right as governed by the nature of things. Conversel y. b ut the sterling value is let slip.where the nominal relation is retained. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. in which the law of nature should hold sway. is the work of Revenge. that of the judge.) Thus the will is violently wicked. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . from life. In it the agent.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. as a volitional and intelligent being. The 'reality' of right. such an action is essentially and actually null. The law of nature . is at the same time only a new outrage.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) .ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. which is the very contrary of determination by nature.on self-determination or autonom y. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will.a universal which holds good for him.a law. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. which is disinterested . and commits a crime.punishment. But more than possible compulsion is not. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. being conformable to the right. This progression. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as rictly so called . and not merely the particular mode . ¤ 499 (3) for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. The former used to be the common meaning.e. on . the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. and can be seized only in t his quarter.e. even from the range of all existen ce. But revenge. To display the nullity of such an act. in revenge.

so much as it has consciously willed. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof.a will reflected into itself so that. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. so far as these features are it s inward institution. Das Recht. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. B.and also moral wickedness. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. the reason of the will. and thus comes into relationship with the former. and willed by it. recognition. The subjective will is morally free. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. This is the right of intention. counts only as a person. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. 1. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. though any alteration as such. be its affection w hat it may. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. intelligence. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. an d allows to be imputed to it. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. embracing these individual point s. the will is at the same time made a particular. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. Moralitat 3. conscience. in mere law. but have their assent. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. 2. is now chara cterized as a subject . or even justification in his h eart. its own. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. is its deed. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed.the other hand. etc. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. which was its purpose. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. Now. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . who. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. sentiment. it thus includes purpose and intention . my part in i t is to this extent formal. Naturrecht. In point of form. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition.

and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. interests. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. the essential and actual good. though it is a particular duty.g. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world.being only in this. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . a good intention in case of a crime.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. as in happiness (¤ 479). in point of its matter. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. essential and actual. sup erseding this absolute claim of each.ion. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. and aims. can be wicked.that it contains his needs. as individual and universal. These aims.a universal determined in its elf . Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. it is always something particular. constitutes a peculiar world of its own .and thus including in it particularity . but is a particul arity of his own . thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. is as g ood and as duty absolute. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. This is the right to well-being. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. because the agent. and yet each of them. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . is not something external to him. At the same time because good is one. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. his interest and welfare must. whether the . ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. will . is always fundamentally one identity.e. they ought to stand in harmony. on account of that existent sphere of liberty. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. And yet they ought to harmonize. constitute h is well-being. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it.

The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. The result. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. Handlung.of Conscience and Wickedness. expressed by this repeated ought.the standpoint of the ought. 5. 6.the utterly abstract semblance . in the a goodness. is. which has no objectivity. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. its deepest descent into itself. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. Wickedness. the unutterable. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. on its negative side. The for mer is the will of goodness.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. On the affirmative side. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. to be carried out in it.good is realized. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. which actualizes and dev elops it. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: .contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. 1. rising to its pitch. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. THE MORAL LIFE. i . In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . Das Gute und das Bose C. in this its identity with the good. which is the good. Die Absicht und das Wohl. Der Vorsatz 3. th e essential thing. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. This pure self-certitude. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. no more exist than not. and the wicked.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . Moralitat 2. an aim essentially and actually null. the truth of this semblance. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. The subjectivity. but is only sure of i tself. That. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . is only the infinite form. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. right . and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. and of the good. in something external therefore. 4. and duty. and refuse it to the wicked. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. which would only be abstract. non-universal. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. The failure of the latter consists . good. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. is abandoned. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective .

In the shape of the family. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . is on the other a transitio n into a universal e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. as deliberate work for the community. to destiny.the genuine ethical temper.the Political Constitution. Thus. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. it exists as confidence. as personal virtues. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. elevated.Marriage. mind ap pears as feeling. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. to a spiritual significance.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. controls and entirely dominates from within. i. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. in its immediacy. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. is confidence (trust) . ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . is virtue. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. however. however. In the latter sphere. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. as an intelligent being. that it is. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. to the total of ethical actuality. temperament. makes this union an ethical tie . .The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. i. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to.looks upon it as his absolute final aim.Civil Society. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. This is the sexual tie. the individuality expres ses its special character. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. has actuality as the spirit of a nation.n a thing . the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. manner and cu stom .e. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. etc. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. in its ki nd. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. .e .yet somewhat which without all question is. The ethical personality. But the person. as against the univers al. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being .the Family. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind .monog . and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. whose independence it. without any selective refl ection. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity.

but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. who exist independent and free. constitutes the general stock. acquire an existence of their own. while. of legal regulation. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. of the possessor's will. destined. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. to found anew such an actual family. ¤ 522 (3) The children. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular educating them to independent personality. or nominal culture in general. into families or individuals. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. and care for the future. This instrument. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. originally foreign to it. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . learning. or state external. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. being an intelligent substance. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. on one hand. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. In virtue of such for tuitousness. as do also its industry. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. as private persons. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. and thus produce more unconditional . Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. on the o ther hand. thus invested with independence. information. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . however. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. labour.

of mere agents. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. or could be. which as existence is essentially a particular. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. and of means for satisfying them. and accident. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. intelligence. of needs. certain. ten thalers.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . its action gets direction and content through natural features.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. option. be the righ t and just thing. is developed i n detail. The third. however.the Law. and with it the State. 2 4/5 years. of the legal relationships of individual s to them.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way.dependence on the social system. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. on the side of external existence. Where civil society. or only 2 * . though of course only at the final points of deci ding. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. Hence. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. and so on ad infinitum.. determined through reason or legal intelligence. and in it they have their social moralit y. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. this analysis.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . which is honesty. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. talent. and a corresponding mode of labour. and like the first a certain subsistence. in the course of definite manifestation. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. to be. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . the medium created by t he action of middlemen. also of aims and interests. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. at every point. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. as vital.and ye t it should be decided. their recognition and their honour. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. It is a futile perfectionism to have . and industry. as well as of mental culture and habit . which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. Thus whether three years. Their content per se may be reasonable . exists. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. The second. they have their actual existence. and an ensemble of contingencies. But when right. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . 2 3/4 . This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. skill. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). because guaranteed throu gh the whole society.

which again make new decisions necessary. however.which though something new. are not a new hou se. of his countrymen.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. .though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. at the same time an externally objective existence. as it is a known law. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . . has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis .vi z. general laws.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. there arises. to which objective existence determines i tself. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. The comparison of the two proven: . in the judicial system. These people forget that the stars . whic h are only internally in these objects. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . who has by so doing gained the co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. they touch only the abstract will . To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. But there is a contrary case. This subjective existence. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms.laws. even the admiration. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. i.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. being laws o f strict right. not for them. by faith and trust. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. constit .(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. which discovers new distinctions. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. recognized.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. and in particular transforms this existence . and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural be promulgated and made known as laws . They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . inasmuch as. first really de serving the name of laws.and th e cattle too . ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the this exists as revenge . or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. within the house .even as his law can only be a just law.the ne ed. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. the need of a simpler code . Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . hereditary divinity or nobility. and t hus become authoritative . There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity.are governed and well governed too by laws. as universal authority and necessity. with the advance in multitude. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features.into punishment (¤ 500).gets its universal guarantee through formalities. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. as the genuine order of the individualized right . like improvements on a f loor or a door.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. as in the mental ima ges of space. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known.

from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . the judgement as t o the state of the fact. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right.and that. So far as concerns them. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. so as to secure this satisfaction. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted.'poli . Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. be exercised as different functions. and the judgement as application of the law to it. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. . from the c onnections between nation and nation. and their variable ingredients. mere circumstantial evidence. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. It results also from circumstances of locality. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. the position of an external un also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. shou ld. because it is man's want. appears as state. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. and worked from that point of view. which. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. Conversely. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want .utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. .It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. In so far.viz. to the concrete of civil society. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. because it is only one factor. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. as at bottom different sides. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. in a uniform gen eral way. No doubt this factor is incomplete. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. then. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal.

receiving. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . secondly. The cons titution is existent justice . continually produce it as their result. it carries back both. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. it protects the family and guides civil (outer-state) law. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . differentiated in to particular agencies. which. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals .into the life of the universal substance. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. his independent self-will and particular interest. . ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. The same unity. the state only is as an organized individual. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. in this direction . they are re strictions.which volition is thereby free . which each originally takes care of for an actuality . First. ¤ 539 As a living mind. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. with all its evolution in detail. and not left to perish. then it promotes their welfare. and. and . as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. however. It provides for the reasonable will . is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. but which has a thoroughly general side. nsists in a double function. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. but. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. On the other hand. (c) THE STATE. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. Thirdly. so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will .and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. First it maintains them as persons.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. Secondly.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. through the action of the government and its several branches.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual.ce'. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. This universal principle. and self-develop ed . and the who le disposition and action of the individual . to the immediate agent.the reasonable spirit of will. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . Thus we have the corpora tion. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. is its essence. also for that will being put in actuality. s heer subjectivity.

It is important therefore to study them closer. rejects all differences.besides their personalit y . logically carried ou t. etc. that the laws rule. Nothing has become. the citizens . or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. etc. age. were called its 'liberties'. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. On the contrary. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. as it exists as s uch. But.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. skill. is so little by nature. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. Equality. All men are by nature equ al. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. it embodies a liberty. etc. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good .only it can make them . the difference of governing powers and of governed. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. etc. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. or destroy them. As regards Liberty. without further specification and development. and that the laws are restrict ions.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. otherwise have in property. town . and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. which it can without incompatibility allow. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. The laws themselve s.equal in the concrete. first. Formerl y the legally defined rights.pleasure an d self-will. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. or even in crime. But that this freedom should e xist. i.e. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. private as well as public rights of a nation. However true this is. Rome.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. The principle of equality. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. is abstract regards taxation. eligibili ty to office. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state.punishment. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person.. But the notion of liberty. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. physical strength. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. etc. as it ha ppens. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. on the contrary. in other words. magistracies . the current notions of l . That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. military service. as regards the concrete. directories. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . authorities. etc. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. With the state there ari ses inequality. on the contrary. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . . Really. presuppos e unequal conditions. talent. the familiar proposition. As regards.

an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. ¤ 541 The really living totality . in other words continuall . but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. however. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept.) But the guara ntee lies also.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question.that which preserves. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights.iberty only carry us back to equality. has an insight and conviction of his own . at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. be it added. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. is . of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. and thus gains moral independence.e . as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. But the more we fortify liberty. The term political sec urity of property. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. i. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. . and of the difficulty of satisfying them.a thing that has nev er happened in history. of others. not merely with regard to the naturalness.just because of this inseparability . it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. and the organization of the actualization of them. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education.e. self-w ill and self-conceit. just as little as the making of a code of laws. with this development of particularity. as a state without a constitution. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. and must deal with them as it ca n. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. The question . What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. and to regard a state. with its insatiate vanity. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. in which this is not formally done. of liberties in general. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. If . Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions.

The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. . and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. but an actual indiv idual . (A mistake still greater. its highest peak and all-pervasive a state of society. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . Only through t he government. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. which taken apart is also particular). with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. however. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion.or. of the family and of civil society. equally disorganizes actuality. In the perfect form of the state. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal.regarded as organic totality . But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . and the government be merely executive and dependent . is the state one. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. is the self-redintegrating notion. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts.impugns the principle of the division of powers. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. which includes an already existing development of differences. .monarchy. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'.y produces the state in general and its constitution. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. in other words. i. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence .su bject always. ¤ 542 In the government .the will of a decreeing individual. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). is the government. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea.e. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. i. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. These. the participation of all i n all affairs . The government is the universal part of the con stitution.e. as always. as in the patri archal society .) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's make it the first power.the all-sustaining. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. all-decreeing will of the state. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. as in a democratic constitution.

Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice.. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. which having their busin ess appointed by law. involve the. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. Secon dly. i. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. too. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. . first. it may be .such as ochlocracy. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . The pure forms . to that end and for that reason. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. civil society. and then of nature . such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. essentially. to subjectivity.are. with their general opinion. legislative short. For it is as private persons t . Thus. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. Two points only are all-important. aristocracy and monarchy. and with earlier transition-forms.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general .viz. and above all personal liberty. and are to that degree private person s. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined).e.'ideal' unity.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . an actual existence.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . lik e peace and war. with its industry and i ts communities.partly. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. possess independence of a ction. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . admini stration of justice or judicial power. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. especially in legislation . The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. participate in the governmental power. in the history of the State. liberty of property. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. also feudal monarchy. The division of constitutions into democracy. there arises the participation of several in state-business. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. being simple self-relation. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. and skill for such ends. That subjectivity . ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. as it were. aptitude. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . administration and police. These principles are those expounded earlier.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state .

demoralization. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. In a civilized state. ever newly recurring. as estates. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . however. in arrangements for art and science. blind force. ¤ 529 note). and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. be they treated as mere individuals. range of the extern al means of government. which. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. moreover. as the nation . or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. Take the case of England which. that t hey enter upon that participation. is no t self-destructive. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. The des irability of such participation. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. but as organic factors. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. because private persons have a predominant share in public af it very likely is . it is not a brutish mass. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. wild.the contrary must be the case . in the law and liberty of property.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election).nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. i.e. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. indeed the whole. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions.a spiritual element . elemental sea. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. and form a particular kind . 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. in the general sense of embracing a wide. If the main part of the requirement were .regard ed as permanent. so far as they form only one branch of that power . to power and act ion. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. inorganic shape. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. s ense of general wants. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. The so-called financial law. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. Experience s hows that that country . The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf.would be. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. however. or in its 'reflectional' universality. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t .which should be presupposed. as such an aggregate. like that of the stormy. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . and therefore more urgent. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates.

In their mutual relations. as content o f a true law. e. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . of the whole of the finances. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. and not actually existent. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . in which there would no longer be a government. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. and not to be made yearly. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. Then again. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. and thus. i. or every few years. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity.. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. but only parties. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. waywardness and chance have a place. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget.i. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs.g. a state of war. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. is really engaged with strict executive business. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. In one case the . and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. afresh. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions.e. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. and becomes the estate of bravery. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely.e. when it makes a decree about finance. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage.

this note must go into further deta il. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. It has. is appointed to occupy only one grade. internat ional law rests on social usage. and then in history. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. in defiance of . It is in time.a world-mind. As this development is in time and in real existence. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. are settled and fixed. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. a history of its own. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. both this general recognition. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. Fictions. is called an a prio ri view of it. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. as it is a history. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States.of sacerdotal races . its several stages and steps ar e the national minds.the judgement of the world. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. which actually is and will be realized in it . when we come to minutiae. it passes int o universal world-history. it. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. in short. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. that. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. and on history-writing in general. On th is point. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. and above all universal history. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. In general. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. That history. especially on the philological side. however.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. there is Reason in history. and as regards its range and scope. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. and in Germany more than in France and England. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality.. an d the special claims of nations on one another. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences .and. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. first in general. of a Roman epic. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. etc. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected.the plan of Provide nce. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. each of which. in short.

the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. e. in striking portraiture and brevity. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. strictly s peaking. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances.g. or. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. and rejects both ki nds of interest. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. and an exclusive interest in justice. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim.). state. express not a subjective particularity. but an age. or if he declined to judge at all. But. if he had not an interest. no history . this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. etc. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. is not only against taste and judgement. and. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. a word. even such singularities as a petty occurrence.e. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. Rome and its fortunes. in the interest of so-called truth. and criticize events. a civilization. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. a nation. The point of interest of Biography . such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. not as good as a fairy tale. as in the romance. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. i. has. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or say a word on that here . into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. on the other hand.appears to run . a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. What happens to a nation . In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. but violates th e principles of objective truth. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. and takes place within it.the best-accredited history.

I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. these individuals. i. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . For Spirit is consciousn ess. is the empty form of activity. if Rome or the German empire. really. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. But. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . are instruments. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity.admitting. have they their value and even their existence. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. and its content is prese . And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. 550).e. as over a special grade. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . which is their reward. the consciousness of it. liberty. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. etc.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim.or in other words that Reason is in history . and secondly. in this case. and their subjectivity. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth.e. potentially infinite. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being.will be par tly at least a plausible accurate report of externals. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. Only therefore through their relationship to it. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. truth. and the business of so doing.Fame. etc. to the history of religion. the absolute L aw. i. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. first in general. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. i. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. and are all treated as indifferent. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. a development determined by the notion of spirit. Such a doctrine . without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . and there fore as a work of individuals.e. while it inheres in them. which all alik e have no stuff in them. has another ground and interest than his tory. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. and of its essence. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. i. The mere play of sentiment. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. is the supreme right. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will.e. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. only opinions and mere ideas. on the contary. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. the freak of humour. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. we may add. which is what is pe culiar to them. But biography too has for its background the historical world.

But . The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. however. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. i. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. For that st arting. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests.Liberty.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by.consciousn ess. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions.e. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . But the spirit which think s in universal history. This factor. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. as true in the world of free will. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. Such is the case with all speculative process . i. in the system of laws and usages. The spirit. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. and that on the religious. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. especially ¤ 51.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. lays hold of its concr ete universality. now gets its most concrete interpretation. the idea of God it kn . still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. is the purification. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. i. that elevation to God really involves.e. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate .e.e. At this rat e. ¤ 204 not e). As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. As regards the 'mediation' which. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut the peculiar perversity. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. from which the start is now made. as law and duty. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. actually accomplished in the ethical world. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. cf. Th e finite. is the real ethical self. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. note).a mere 'ought' . i. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. forme rly noticed.

something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. And. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. springing from some force and power.e.e. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. morality and conscience.addressing his devotion to miracle.working images. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. and superstition. i. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. and even as mutually indifferent. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. then there may be created. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. a condition of spiritual sla very. one religious and an other ethical. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. non-spirituality.the body of religious truth. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration.e. (In the Lutheran Church.of bondage. It lea ds to a laity. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . and ex pecting miracles from them. and these applications of it in the religious life.or it may be. But in poin t of form. to justification by external wo rks. and in the act of faith. i. and law and justice. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . i.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. in its faith and in its con science. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. for thought and knowledge . generally. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state.e. It the one religion which secures the stability of governments.partly as mere moving of the lips. but in the moment of enjoymen t. in point of form. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. first of all. the host as such is not at first consecrated. B . and prays others to pray . on the contr ary. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. even to bones. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . differing from the former in body and value of truth. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. but purely subjective in individuals: . and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others.logi cally enough .ows must be the true and real. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. religion was a late r addition. i. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. in the annihilation of its externality. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has.

and political institutions deduced from them must be.of honesty in commercial dealing.e. moral life in the state. leads it into the rea l world. and in a special sense Philosophy. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. because the state is a self-possessed. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. . therefore. Instead of the vow of chastity. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. Thus set free. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of obedience which is itself the true freedom. no matter how.e. self-realizing reason . The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. So long as t he form. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason.e. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. if taken alone. . unte nable. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. Thus. sti . what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. The precept of short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. founded on principles of reason. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. and thus only. And instead of the vow of obe dience. a code of law should arise.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). can law and morality exist. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. i. lacked liberty. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . i. i. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. so to speak a short. . with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. the wisdom of the world. Let us suppose even that. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. and. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. which does not rise in hostility against them. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. and in the use of property . our consciousness and subjectivity. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world.

that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. that the Idea must be regent.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets.mi nd intrinsically concrete ..when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. ¤ 544 note). It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. thus surmountin . It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane.among which laws these guarantees are included. when specially set in relief as genus. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness.g. e. thus founder on the have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. (cf. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. and the power given them to fix the budget. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. on one hand. from those deeper requirements which. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. This additional 'individuality' . and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the the intellectual and thinking self. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind just this . which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. on the other hand. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. At best it is only a temporary expedient .on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . . This absolute nucleus of man . whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. however sound their provisions may be. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . or. to put it simply. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution.ll. etc. Such laws.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . so-called 'chambers'.

wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note.). which still escaped his intelligence.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. Under the subjective form. pictorial representation. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. Plato. as it grows and expands. or essential being). Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. But thought always . a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. ¤ long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation.was that creative imagination. from religion. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. but earlier than philosophy. which is developed similarly. As it left therefore behind. Political power. he. fall feeling. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. is implicitly in absolute liberty. is after all only in one of its form s. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. and so also one-sided phase. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). for th ese reasons. on its own s howing. His state is therefore.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. etc. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. in its philosophic phase. exhibits the one-sidedness.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. so . or rather must. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. Religion may. should knit it together and control it. however. religion.).g the Platonic Idea (the genus. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words.and th at on account of this very principle . intuition. Only in the principle of mind. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. earlier than it does as philosophy. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . Hence religion as such. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . as demoralization. The form in its infinite tru th. in its f irst immediate. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . which is awa re of its own essence. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. of philosophy. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. the subjectivity of mind. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. But even religion. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity.the idea of the substantial moral life. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality.

1. 7. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. Die Sittlichkeit. Gesetz. Die Weltgeschichte this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. In the Protestant state. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. of God's indwelling in us. Die Rechtspflege 5. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. 2. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. for which it is as substance. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. 9. Thus ul timately. Das System der Bedurfnisse. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. Die Polizei und die Corporation. i. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. Inneres Staatsrecht. as well as their several applications. 6. the constitut ion and the code. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. 4. That here. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. as always. but rather to a sort of knowledge. Weltweisheit. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. 3. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. 8. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. Religion. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. while it is self-centred identity. Das aussere to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion.e.

on the other hand.something formal. and of gaining its concrete determination. 1. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. but . These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. In this ideal. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. c an. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. or the idea. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . reconciliation. which is only a sign of the Idea. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. Art requires not only an external given material .e.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . its n atural immediacy. On one hand. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of other words. the actuality of the spirit. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea.for the expression of spiritual truth . Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. so that the thought embodied.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) .(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. as it is. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit .must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. as superseded in spirit. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. Der absolute Geist. ¤ 411).i. A. and t he subject which contemplates and worships the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . viz. . into the subject which produces that work. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape.hence not the sp iritual unity.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. But. that is. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. Belief. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression.the shape or form of Beauty. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . With the essential restrictedness of its content. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. has in devotion . in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. aware. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. like the material which it uses to work in. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life.the form of immediacy as such .

a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. as well as of its art and science. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. the artist's enthusiasm. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. . without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. the principle of its law. not yet conscious of itself. of its actual liberty. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. or an effor t towards him . assumes fuller and firmer features. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man .stil l this art is defective. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. but its inmost depth. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. and th e artist is the master of the God. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. as free spi rit. is not yet absolute. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. that one spirit creates and informs them. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. known as the Absolute. subjectivity. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its short how the nature of a nation's moral life. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. is not yet known.can try to bring itself to consciousness. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it.symbolic art. and of its constitution. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . and that is where the infinite form. though concrete and intrinsically free. but as only finding himself in himself.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity .

that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. in which he had not revealed himse lf. it is from Him.ent in it. is first generated.into revelation.e. still more in that external. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. revealed by God.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. The older religion in which the need of fine art. like the religion peculiar to it. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed.of Nemesis. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . whose con tent is absolute mind . the theme and c entre of therefore is manifestation out a nd out.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. . it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. and brilliancy. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. has its future in true reli gion. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. which is only in the medi um of thought . and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'.the religion i. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical.due to a one-sided survey of human life . which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . with their perso nal sense and feeling.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. we see that the advent of art. what is more. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . shows that such religion is on the decline.The genuine still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. The old conception . At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. and. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. as infinite self-realizing form . But with a further and deeper study. on the contrary. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. spectator find themselves at home. and j ust for that reason. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . from it s side. dashing t o pieces everything high and great . B.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. .the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. Beautiful art. not the supreme liberation itself. expression. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. unbeautiful sensuo usness.that it be revealed. Beautiful art. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. .

completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . . while in point of form he is.on the other hand. only standing to it in an external connection. and reconciliation with the eternal being. it is. or of judgement. making them presuppositions towards each other.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. by C. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. To know what God as spirit is . it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. amid that natural ness. it may almost create surprise that so many. But. (c) as infinite return. however. to specul ative comprehension.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. even in its manifestation. the elemental and the concrete nature . on one hand. he still remains in original identity . directed towards the Eternal. . have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. On one hand is heaven and earth.knowledge in God. first of all.: Berlin 1829.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. though different. a separate being. F. Yet.. in point of content.just as.requires careful and thorough speculation. standing in action an d reaction with such fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. abiding sel f-centred. which therefore is finite. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is the Spirit. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . which proceeds to man's self. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. as in duty bound. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . with whom. in it s forefront. and.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. It apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . (a) as eternal content. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . for that reas on. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. though. on the other is therefore the absolute spirit. and phenomena which succeed each other. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. but afterwards.1. ¤ 566 In this separating. staying aloof and inert.. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. G . not. Go d is. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. further. That spirit. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. the spirit.of the only Son . such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. again. as the extreme of inherent negativity. when it thinks. of the world it gave away . And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. it implies the revelation of Him.

keeps himself unchanged. Whereas the vision-method of Art. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. This individual. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. But. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. If the result . throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. which from itself. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. simple.but the vision of implicit truth. Further. he. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . In this form of truth.and.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. on account of his immediate nature. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. secondly. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. with a temporal and external sequence. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. his natur al man and self-will. is not bound by it . in which he. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence.where the spirit closes in unity with itself .is transplanted into the world of taken in a merely formal. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. this immediate. Thinking. and thus sensuous. but even to thought. contentless sense. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . eternal. so far.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . who as such is identified with the essence . but alive and present in the world. th e self-centred manifestation. truth is the object of philoso phy. external in point of form. 1. .Irony. as infinite subjectivi ty. C. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. Irony. From this its separation into p arts.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. and eternal spirit in itself. and thus. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. gives itself direction and con tent. an object of contemplating vi sion . Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. remains master over it. is itself the emptiness and vanity. through which witness of the spirit in him.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. after the example of his truth. Die geoffenbarte Religion. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result .

but also criticized it.the underlying essence in all humanity . a nd of logic in particular. which determines itself to content. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision.takes. and whereas Religion. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. and s o religious. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. opens it out in mental picture. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . The charge of Atheism. and against philosophy in general . from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. elevation of them into the absolute form. and this necessary as free.on one hand. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . immediate vision and its poetry. and particularly of the logical form. as also of the necessity in the two forms .on the other hand.leaving out. to be more precise still. which philosophy is. and mediates what is thus open ed out. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. when at the close it seizes its own notion . which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. when driven to expound itself. too much for the latter. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . remains identical with it. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought.which may be in both the same . and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity.and from a pithless orthodoxy. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. finds itself already accompl ished. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards.i. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. and acts inconsistently towards them. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. of course. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. This does not prevent the spirit. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity.e. This witness .stantial content into many separate shapes. or. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. This movement. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God).from these forms. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy .('Rationalism') . Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. with its separ ation into parts. only looks back on its knowledge. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion.

which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. God in General. I select . Piety. and amongst it s effusions. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. On such a presuppo sition. and form all that is definite in the divine universality. from which all definite quality is excluded. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. that. as it stands. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. also contains the generic abs tract. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached.the Bhagavat-Gita. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. or any one man. exclusi ve. without distinction. It is only his own stupidity. Without interest of its own for the concrete. This new theology. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system ( always adora tion of an object which. If this theory needs no more than such a God. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness.or to dalai-lamas . and so .that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence.that of the Hindu to ass es. if we believe them. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. fulfilled notion of God. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . that it is treated not so much as an imputation. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. or Pantheism. that it has too much of him: .Everything is . or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion.of the new piety and new theology. does not comprehend itself. we must.g. whether higher or lower in the scale. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact.each and every secular thing is God. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion .that of the Egyptians to the ox . Amongst the abundant resources.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. ¤ 71 note). in particular.which therefore it does not disparage. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. are) . are unable and unwilling to see this .as the most authentic statement accessible . and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . cows . every kind of piety (¤ 72) . open to our disposal on this much so. as is well known. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with the wanton assertion. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . or if you will. some of the most telling passage . Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. most sublime.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. but as a proved fact.thus he understands philosophy . with all its absurdities. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical.(empirical much so. and is therefore. its grossest shape. the secularity of th ings.of Pantheism.all possess substantia lity. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion.

at the beginning of the pass age. has the higher conception of Brahma.spiritual as its idea of God i s . he is said to be the beginning. unessential existences. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . I am "Om" in all the Vedas. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. I am the taste in water. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything.that Hinduism. Meru among the high-topped mountains. grip. and one essential amongst them. goodness. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. pp. which Krishna calls himself.s. . middle. . And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . The undiscerning ones.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. . 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . Indra.the most excellent of everything.). the One which. This everything. nothing independent]. which he is. all this is woven upon me. Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. where the empirical everything of the world. is also the maddest of polytheisms.. . still God. seated in the hearts of all beings. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. but having its truth in the substance. 'At the end of many lives. . .not everything. than which there is nothing higher. everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences.. . I am the light of th e sun and the moon. even Siva. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . . 7 seqq. and the Spinozan Substance. as also those proximate substantialities. besides Krishna. . . vanish. . But so little concrete is this divine unity . . any more than the Eleatic One. . . and end of living things.' This 'All'.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. or a God besides. Among letters I am the letter A. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. without essential being of its very own. . . Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . p. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). . Even when. . There is nothing else higher than myself. I am life in all beings. is alo ne the divine and powerless its. to a poly theism. melt into the one Krishna. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. with a monstrous incons istency. etc. . . or Indra. . Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. called Gods. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. . from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. and the moon among the lunar mansions. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. so to speak . as he said before he was S iva. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. . But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. . That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. as different from that accidental. . the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. . . like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. . . Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. . . Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities .' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. . I am also the strength o f the strong. t he pure unity of thought in itself. . . . passion. . This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. but only . the Everything. however.'I am the self.. Hinduism. rather. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. is not. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. .

in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. and God everything. and of empirical secular spirit. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . imagination or speculation. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. and. But.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. is identical with the world. in relation to the popular idea of the world. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. or. we must consult th e Mohammedans. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. e. whether they spring from heart. Hin du monotheism. on the contrary. as it says. But to go back again to the question of fact. but .) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. when he adores the ape. and on the other. and that unity described as love.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. ac osmical. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. modes of envisaging God. moreover. Of the oriental. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. or Spinozist. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50.. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . outside it . is discarded and absor bed. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. especially the Mohammedan.of the world as one thing. he is as essence parted from appearance. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. after this partition.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. and so on .keep its independence. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. to was . That pantheism indeed . the finite to the infinite. or other creature. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. For that unity. as infinite from the finite. empirical indivi duals . a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. to which everything is God. of the relationship of God and the world.g. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. secondl its finest purity and sublimity. on one hand. If. which.floating in the indefinite blue . the Eleatic.on the shallow conception of it . as it as a lot of Gods or as secular. even in a general exoteric discussion. the all.ndu. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. as the endless lot of empirical existence. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. It is only the picture . (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld.

inorganic and living . in matters admitted to be of superior. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes.and relation i pso facto implies unity . the notion and content of philosophy. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. . mere ide ntity. in the pores of th e physicists . with God's omnipresence. depend solely on the different modes of this unity.said pores being the negative.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. viz. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. i. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. as Epicu rus does. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. when they hear of unity . something supposed to exist beside the material reality. but rather its reverse.the world as much as Go d . But they show so little acquaintance with them . e. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . composition. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. if not even of supreme interest. omnipresence. they have laid hands on. and that hence. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . and which they ascribe to philosophy. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . as in the physical field the physicist. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. and that it is the system of identity. And as in their judgement either of the two .they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. but only the one factor of this category of relation .and s till less take trouble about it . and lose sight of the chief point of interest . however.falsely as a fact . But the question is. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. they import them into philosophy. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. etc. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. but with concrete unity (the notion). Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest.g. a nd assert .and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. providence. and that amongst the m there is great variety.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified.that. I n the philosophical field they proceed. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. it is not. and the empty absolute. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else.has the same solid substantiality as the other. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many.te a word on what a 'notion' means. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. the most external and the worst. where they are utterly unknown. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable.g. not the concrete unity. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. is what one expect s.and that the factor of indet erminateness . That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. with indefinite ideas. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. with abstract unity.

But to put that sort of thing. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. or as prevaricating for a purpose. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. an All-one doctrine. on the shoulders of philosophy. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. and as implicitly the Idea. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. standing between the Mind and its essence. in his relation to the is the nature of the fact. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine.ity . Nature .which. But in ascribing to God. making the former its presupposition. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. which divides itself into Mind and which notions are perverted into their the mediating agent in th e process . then. the notion. i. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. On account of this chorus of assertions. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . y . so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. which .presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. and the latter its universal extreme. but the many-shaped modes specified. for its middle term: a middle. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point.knowing reaso n. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. and notions . Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. which has self. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. is philosophy itself. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. not abstract unity. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . this stale gossip of oneness or identity. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. If statements as to facts are put forward.e. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. the absolutely universal. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. a system of identity. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. as other than they. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity.the logical system. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. sunders itself. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. and which is itself the way to produce it.their everything.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . which causes the movement and development. The esoteric study of God and identity. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. as of cognitions. of which liberty is the aim.

. The eternal Idea. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute this same movement is equally the action of cognition. eternally sets itself to work. in f ull fruition of its essence.

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