INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any

attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i

s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as

treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.

as absolute negativity. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. a nd the soul remains the pervading. even the capacity of offering resistance. not merely lacks gravity.with th is proviso. There. and so the self-externalism.SUB-SECTION A. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. But not merely is it. which may also be f ound enumerated among them.the truth that matter itself has no truth. perhaps. matter is regarded as something true. to which they might perhaps add space and time. like heat. ANTHROPOLOGY. identical ideality of it all. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. i. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. except where. but soul. and mind conceived as a thin g. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. however. which is potentially all things. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. where the othe . This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact.the passive of Aristotle. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. on the other. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. Mind. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. The usual answer. These 'imponderables' .e. as such a result. Wherever there is Nature.. At such a stage it is not yet mind. which is the fund amental feature of matter. It is otherwise with Mind. however. li ght. in a sense. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. etc. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . its simple 'ideal' life. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. whereas the 'vital' matter. and not as the immediate or natural individual. on the one hand. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. have still. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. indeed. thus come into being. and. the soul is only the sleep of mind .

as in the case of Spinoza. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. just in proportion to his civilization. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. even these few and slight susceptibilities. upon it. But either this identity. Spinoza. which only is.e. disappear. These have. (b) Secondly. described. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. so holding. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. into the absolute syllogism. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . Hence. In nations less intellectually emancipated. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects.e. in the modes of that being. with Leibniz. sidereal. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. or. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. and.(a) In its immediate natural mode . The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. merely as another word for the incomprehensible.or corporeity . the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). and does not rise or develop into system.whence Epicurus. not. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. etc. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. T hus. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom.the natural soul. they are natural objects for consciousness. on the contrary. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. when it presents itself as a single soul. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. as in the case of Lei bniz. . was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. Malebranche. and the periods of the day. the changes of the seasons. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. in many case s completely. as so often is done. a world-soul. and always more or less. as an anima mundi. feels the difference of climates. and. and telluri c life of man. its immediate being . is too abstract. remain for ever subject to such influences. there philosophers took God. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. Descartes. based upon participation in the common life of nature. as individualized. it is a soul which feels. Animals and pl ants. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical.r is not .is moulded into it. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. it may be. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. (c) Thirdly. re tains an abstract independence. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. so to speak. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression.

a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. as alterations in it. character. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). the one permanent subject.on a ph ysical basis. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. fancies.mind wrapped up in itself.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). physiognomy. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. and on the other. in purposes political. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. shows an active half. and as stages in its development. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own.the sexual relation . while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. as it exists. and the position of the individual himself. He begins with Childhood . talent . The contrast between the earth's poles. on the whole. This . bodily structure and disposit ion. we find its diversities.a worl d no longer incomplete. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. Thirdly. fails to meet his ideal requirements. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. we find it as the special temperament. on its one side. And that individuality marks both the world which. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. hopes. shows. or artistic. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. of families or single individuals. scientific. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. widely distant from each other. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. we see man in his true relation to his environment. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . carrying out these universa .

viz.Napoleon. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. as already noted. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. for example. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. i n an unintelligent way. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. . distinguishes itself from its mere being. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. put this question to the class of ideology.not as a merely negative rest from it. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. sleep.The waking is not merely for the observer. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. . The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. .a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. but as a return back from the world of specialization.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. each point. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. although.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. or self-centralized being. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. The characterization given in the section is abstract. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. as they may be called. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. (c) Sensibility(3) . or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. as before explained . in the first instance. which are often addressed to philosophy: .

and to be as if found. The fact that these particulars. primarily.set over against consciousness. be it noted. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. adultery. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . godless. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. in the feeling. just. is what we call sensibility. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. fornication. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. in its own self. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness.. blasphemy. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. and the character.g. are found by the waking soul. mean. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . In this way we have two spheres of feeling. This should hardly need enforcing. moral. the fact is a mode of my individuality. etc. but treated as bel onging to its most special. and is so felt.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. on one hand. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. for itself. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. true. not mere alterations. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. the naturally immedi ate. the conscience. One. etc. invested with cor poreity. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. evil. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. etc. and religious. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. which. belonging as it does to natural. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). the inarticulate bre athing. On the other hand and conversely. are our very own. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. ho wever. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. mora l. Another. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. and . jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen .identity of our self-centred being. are in order to be felt. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). its natural peculiarity.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. it is true. murder . But if put in the feelin g. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own.

As sentient. following the special character of the mental mode. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. in a special system of bodily organs. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere is a soul which feels. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. to realize its mastery over its own. distinction appears as mere variety . smells. o f colours. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. the soul is no longe r a mere natural.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. tones. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . . with which that substance is one.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. therefore. is to raise its substantiality. (c) the sense of solid reality. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). and their corporization. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. e. and voice in general.alterations in the substantiality of the soul.because in it. laughter. In the usage of ordinary language. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. of self. but an inward. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. sighs. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. the blood. with its varieties of language. (¤¤ 321. ¤ 402 Sensations. What it has to do. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. the immediacy of mode in feeling . as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being.a psychical physiology. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . We should have. 322). set in its self-centred life. to take possessi on of it.g. just because they are immediate and are found existing. (¤ 317) . the 'irritable' system. i ts merely virtual filling-up. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science .and of sound. of heavy matter. especially the passions or emotions. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two .in the system of the senses. works itself out. i. the centre of the 'sensible' system. for example. to the character of subjectivity. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. are formed from their mental source. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. (¤ 300).the senses of definite light.

the corporeity. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. once mor e come to light. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. Thus in the body it is one simple. ideas. prima rily. which repre sents it as the negation of the real.that world being included in it and filling it up. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. At the present stage this singleness is. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. without existing. a deep featureless characterless mine. which is at the same time its predicate. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. acquired lore. in sickness. to which the soul. thoughts. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. although it does not embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). virtually retained.. to be defined as one of feeling . the s oul is characterized as immediate. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. As sentient. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . first. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. the content is its particular world. They were not in our possession. so far as that is. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. which is disease. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. Some times. etc. may again sink down. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. it implies a want of adaptation. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. omnipresent unity. where the real is put past . and to that world it stands but as to itself. ¤ 404 As individual. etc. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. In the present stage we must treat. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. it brings within itself. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. in whi ch all this is stored up. but a negation. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. secondly. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . By itself.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness.the existent spe culative principle. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). ideas and information. but only to his im plicit self. in an implicit mode.

his secular ideas. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . By the self-hood of the latter it . for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. whose decision is ul . but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. as yet nothing impenetrable. incl inations. fortunes.. it is. of the mother. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. as it has existence of its own. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. temper. congenital disposit ion and temperament. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). etc. intellige nt. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . self-possessed. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. etc. tal ent. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts .a substance. and is therefore passive. is visibly present as another and a different individual. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. of life.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . but as efficiency and realized activity. the psychical relationship. the single self of the two. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. not as a mere possibility. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. placenta. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. Here are two individuals. developed interests. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. injuries. say between friends. and reasonable. not yet as its self. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. self-conscious. or virtuality. which. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. The moth er is the genius of the child. etc. because immediate. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. or capac ity.. etc. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. as concrete subject ivity. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. and of character. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. character. controlling genius thereof. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. not a true subject reflected int o itself.

which are also means and ends to each other. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. To that end the phenomena. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . self-possessed human being is a disease. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. is. it has already been call ed his genius. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. But such a verification be mere deception and impo sture. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. it must be added. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. The facts. At the same tim e. intentions. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. in which the individual here appears innnersed. it might seem. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . means. show. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. on the other hand. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. first of all call for verificati on. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. that it is in harmony wi th the facts.his fun damental interests. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. on the cont rary. This totality forms his actual ity. in other words. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large.

not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . . there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. is under a veil. his own and that of the magnetize .). and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own.a genius which beh olds itself. formed. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. tastes. and to know is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. in catalepsy. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. and other diseases. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. like that of the child in the womb. . (Thus Cato. that it is a state of passivity. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. after the downfall of the Roman republic. then. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. etc. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance.) Compare h ome-sickness. etc. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. And because it is the adult. or at the approach of death. on those left behind. those c onnected with female development. f riends.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. exist for it as an outward objectivity. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. and character. subject to the power of another person. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. but it is empty. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. for example. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. When the substance of both is thus made for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. the selfless individual. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. subje ctive reason. external one to another. and the like. smells. unless by the aid of religion. which lead up to the result . reads. the magnetizer. in whom it sees. in its sober moods. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. and c ontinues to be. which. .not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. etc. and hears. ca pable of conveying general truths. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. however. wh en it is healthy and awake. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. a formal vision and awareness. not really a 'person'. is this. not on the spot.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. But. But such clairvoyance . and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality.

i s just this form of immediacy. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. or med icines for them. causality. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. so long as we assume independent personalities. it is still susceptible of disease. reasons. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. as in other cases. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. This is Insanity or mental D erangement.fe eling. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. the 'common sense'. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. etc. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. In this way it is self. one sees and hears with the fingers. and at the same time. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. which is no less a world of law. between intelligent personality and objective world. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. i. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. in this nominal perception. receives. and is so at the same time only in the particular long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. which. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . The purely sensitive life. beholds. and hence. for example. anticipate the full-grown an . and especially with the pit of the stom ach. on the contrary. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. In considering insanity we must. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. though all-embracing. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. etc. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. as in the morbid state alluded to. in its capacity as individual. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. which still marks the self-feeling. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. is impossible. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. is without any definite points of attachment . Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction.r. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. e.

But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. it would be death). and so makes part of the actual self.e. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. moral and theoretical.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. i. A violent. as now regarded. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character.d intelligent conscious subject. is relaxed. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. This particular being of the soul is t . idea. this life of feeling.just as physical disease is not an abstract.. In the concrete. the. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. and it is only as a thing. but a contr adiction in it. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. etc. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. such as vanity. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. and their gratification). as a thing. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. and made appear in. as something natural and existent.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. but only derangement. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). mere and total.e. presupposes the patient's rationality.feeling. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual cies and hopes . however. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. i. passions. is undistinguis hed from them. may. . it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. desire. Mind as such is fr ee. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. inclination. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. and be a realized u niversality. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. This humane treatment. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other.that evil which is always latent in the heart.merely personal love and hatred. equally formal. the self is to be stamped upon. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling.. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. and also desires. earthly elements are set fr ee . so as to insert them in their proper place. as it aris es.e. i. And so too the particularity is. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. and the rest of the passions . loss of health (if it were that. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. and so also may the cure. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. which is there also. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. etc. is diseased. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . pride. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. instincts. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. that it is liable to insanity . The mind which is in a condition of mere being.

through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. but has them and moves in them. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. therefore. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. has been absorbed by it. And consciousness it becomes. Habit is rightly called a second nature. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. because it is an immed iate being of the soul.. et c. but still free. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession.e. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. a pure act of intuition. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. The natural qualities and alterations of age. and so no longer interested. occupied. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. or dependent in regard to it. partly only relative. so is that pure being (which. but the basis of consciousness. nature.and becoming the 'ideal'. weariness o . Habit like memory. as. are only subjectiv e forms. will. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. and the mere substance. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession.itself a simple being . dist inguishing it from itself . and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. and for that reason n ot free.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. this being of the soul. lacking consciou sness. i. The soul is freed from them. the one and the same. nor is absorbed in the m. when the co rporcity. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . and that as a barrier for it. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. sleep. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. heat. and which still continues to exist. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. That is to say.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. a second nature. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. empty space and empty time. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. of which it is the subjective substance. su bjective substantiality of it . and the generation o f habit as practice. on the contrary. is reduced to unity. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. even in being affected by them. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul.he factor of its corporeity. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. For. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. of it. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence.

enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. etc. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. under its volitional and conceptual characters. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. like any other. this soul. to be made a power in the bodily part. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. acquires a strength which consists in this. whereof we sha ll speak later.f the limbs.. nor an abstrac t inwardness. but part and parcel of his being. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. or skill. to exist as substance in its corporeity. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. etc. without an express adjustment. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). cut off from action and reality. and it is habit of living which brings on death. to be his as this self.g.. habit diminishes this feeling.e. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. And it is true that the form of habit. and that they. The most ext ernal of them. a particular organ of i ts organic system). viz.concentration. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. reflection. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. consciousness. too. and thus to enable the soul. an 'ideality' of soul . etc.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. intuition. Habit on an ampler scale. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. intelligence. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. sweet tastes. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. has been by will made a habit .. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. the spatial direction of an individual. and particul ar. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. are no longer bothered with it. and especially so in the specific bodily part. i. nor a transient emotion or idea. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. etc. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. which make it up. and the self-feeling as such. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which.or the misfortune . a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. .is felt. so that when the conception (e.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness .enabling the matter of consciousness. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). or. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. nor are they in conce ption rational.). and no other. consciousness. is recollection and memory. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. like their satisfaction. habit is usually passed over - . that although the frost. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. Thinking. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. a series of musical notes) is in me. re ligious. Even here. etc. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. and any other purp oses and activity. if quite abstract. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. made into an instrum ent. casual. his upright pos ture. This is the rational liberation from them. moral.

the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. This note is so slight. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. as the absolut e instrument. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. for example. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. the upright figure in general. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. Naturliche Qualitaten. and inexpressible a modific ation. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. unable to represent it in its actual universality. of which it is the sign. for the soul. Under the head of human expression are included. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. 2. cuts itself off from its immediate being.either as something contemptible . Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. The soul. Die fuhlende Seele. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . a world external to it . when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. 1. while language is its perfect expressi on. finds itself there a single subject. weeping. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. 4. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. still vainer than a signatura rerum. the latter subject to the former. Seen from the animal world. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. in its concentrated self.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. and making it its own. of the mouth . indefinite. Naturliche Seele. in other words.. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. especially the hand. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. or abstract universality. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. etc. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. but the soul. 71). it is related to itself. This externality. In this identity of interior and exterior. in being related to which. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. and the formation of the limbs. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. Empfindung. represents not itself. And the human figure. and i s infinite self-relation. 3. 'The autho . was therefore one of the vainest fancies.laughter. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. or the 'immediacy' of mind. 5. absorbing it.

it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. thus first made explicit as the Ego.the soul's natural life .the light. to it. is only its abstract formal ideality. something dark and beyond it. The mind as ego is essence. but when he receives the inspired word. 8. an equal freedom as an independent object. in the sphere of essence. does not. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm).e. which manifests itself and something else too . like reciprocal dependence in general. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). It is of this latter. as this absolute negativity. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. as subjective reflection in itself. but since reality. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. Gewohnheit. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . but is implicit. and . i. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. 7. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. but to the foolishness of is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. seem to be its own activity. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. 6. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). not to the wisdom. Ego. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. Hence consciousness. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. and as such it is C onsciousness.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. now. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. as external to it. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B.

The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. a thing-in-itself. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. and underived certainty of it. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. an existing thing. what makes the object the subject's own. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate.e. first. It appears as wealth iest in matter. an a case of correlation . t heir absolute interdependence. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . Spatial and temporal Singularn . but only as it is in reference to something else. The object similarl y. As against Spinozism. etc. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is.a subject-objectivity. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. as Reason. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. (b) self-consciou sness. a singular. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. is further characterized a s immediately singular. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. and so on. and that the philosophy. or mere c ertainty. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. for which ego is the object. which is not as its own. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. an intuitive intellect. Ego. being the ego it seems an alteration of the object. and even t he Idea of Nature. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. with an object set against it. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. and puts it first under the category of being. This is sense-consciousness. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. reflected in itself. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. but as poorest in thought. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). immediate consciousness. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance.e. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. again. to raise its self-certainty to truth. the subject of consciousness. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. in other words. the substantial and qu alitative. the notion of mind. i. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). i.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. a something. has emerged from Spinoz ism. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. Consciousness .

ess. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. and universal.a variety of relations. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. however. its necessity on its own part. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. not as merely immediate. reflected in itself. in that manner. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . But in this manner the interior distinction is. or the distinction which is none. and. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). but as mediated. and universalities. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. a something external to it. and not yet as external on its own part. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. the distinction on its own part. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. the thing. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. viz. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . i. an abstract identity: on the other hand. of the thing is. . so constr uing the object. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . or as being beside and out of itself. lies im mediately in the other. Thi s inward. experiences. having passed beyond the sensible. is sense-perception. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates.e. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. and am aware'. 73). permanent term s. however. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. reflected upon. on one ween the individuality of a thing which. has. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal.). the one of the terms. reflectional attributes. which form the alleged ground of general experience. to which. ¤ 423 The law. by being regarded in their bearings. to describe the sensible. i. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. it is related. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. as not externally different from the other. and sensuous consciousness. has many properties.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. what it is in truth. taken in its concrete content.a copy of the phenomenon. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. as we called it. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. in this case by t he Ego. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . but as a n interior 'simple' difference. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. free from this negative l ink and from one another.e. p. and more or less by the sciences. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. but brought to rest and universality. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . wants to take the object i n its truth. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth .

nominally.With this new form-characteristic. and a desire (appetite) . the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. being merely consumed. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. can make no resistance: the dialectic. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. The two processes are one and the same.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. the latter. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . in its immediacy. or. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. and itself made actual. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. therefore. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. in this return upon itself. The certitude of one's negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. primarily describable as an individual. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. its satisfaction realized. is a singular. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. there is strictly speaking no object. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. on the contrary . which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. On the external side it conti nues. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. knows itself implicit in the object. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. therefore. and ma intains itself as such. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. To this activity the object. this identity comes to be for the ego. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. and thus in it I am aware of me. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. with the nega tion of it. or implicitly. pure 'Ideality'. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. on the whole. implicit in it.

(b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. must likewise be kept in life. and to exist as such for the other: . though by the abstract. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. as the existence of hi s freedom. in the service of the master. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . Thus arises the status of master and slave. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. however. While the one com batant prefers life. and its being for others. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states.but only p eril. as one of two things for another. we see. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. w hich however is also still outside it. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. it. retains his single self-consciousness. Force. Force. This other. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. then. when we look to the distinction of the two. preservation. therefore rude. at first immedi ately. In that other as ego I behold myself. Thus the death of one.for the means of mastery. and incurs a like peril for its own . and formation of it. in the first place. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. from one point of view. ¤ 434 This status. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. negati on of immediacy. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. the outward and visible recognition). and the means for entering into relation with them. is yet. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. a suppression. not their underlying and essential principle.e consciousness of a 'free' object. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. and thus give existence to my freedom. ¤ 435 But secondly. solves the contradiction. works off his individualist self-will. the slave. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o .e. however.t he process of recognition. which is the basis of this phenomenon. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. f rom the essential point of view (i. the slave. on the ir phenomenal side. which falls on another.

The uni versality of the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . is now itself universal. or determinations of the very being of things.f wisdom' . is Reason. . each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. state. fatherland. love. 4.or rather it is a difference which is family. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. valour. bu t the truth that knows it.the passage to universal self. For truth here has. Wahrnehmung 3. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. as its peculiar mode and immanent form.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . fame. and of all virtues. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. is mind (spirit). and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. than they are its own thoug hts. etc. Truth.consciousness. 5. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. therefore. Selbstbewu§tsein. whilst it signifies that the object. 1. the self-centred pure notion. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . Die Begierde 6. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. friendship. idle fame. Reason. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour.which is Reason. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. ego. honour. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. Der Verstand. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. aware of what it is. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2.

neit her subjective nor objective. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. Mind is finite. restricted by that content. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. or. PSYCHOLOGY. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. etc. the latter now an infinite form which is not.mental vision. what is the same one word. though it no longer has an object. etc. desires. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. viz. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. This. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts.apart b oth from the content. like consciousness. in so far as it has an object. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . And it is a matter of no consequence. remembering. i. then its reality is that reason. however. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. etc.7. and above the complication with an external object . which is defined as it s notion. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. in the soul as a physical mode. above the material.the former a simple immediate totality. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. as its concept has just shown.. it is finite by means of its immediacy. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. therefore. in so far as .. and which as the reality of that notion. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. Cons ciousness is finite. SUB-SECTION C. Mind.e. Die Vernunft. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. it has a mode in its knowledge. ideation. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. in thinking also and in desire and will.

in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. and is even there a return into itself. that aspect is twofold . i. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. the mind finds in itself something which is. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. When the affection has been rendered its own. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. of comprehending itself. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. to reach and get hold of being and as its own: by the one. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). it thereby reduces itself to finitude. viz. and its activity can only have itself as aim. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. so far. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. and are the mind's own. forces.e. k nowledge. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. and being a rational knowledge.e. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). As the theory o f Condillac states it. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. Similarly.reality of its reason. is misconceived and overlooked. equally. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom.e. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. and to liberate itself to its elf. in so far as its existent phase. Thus. and make the affection subjective. viz. and the negative aspect of mental activity. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. or. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. the na tural soul (¤ 413). by the other it affirms it to be only its own. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. i. that is. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. it is . Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. in freedom. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them.

as r eason is concrete. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. to get at the notion and the truth. Its activity has to do with the empty form . which is only certitude. and gains abstract auton omy within. and heartless intellects . in the theoretical range. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. along with which the content is realized as rational. its content is at first only its own. and of the heart without the intellect . and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. merely as facts. But as knowledge. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. like logic. the word. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect.(b) Will: practical mind. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. has a material which is only nominally such.e. elevates itself. for which it gains the form of universality.g. to definite and conceptual knowledge. as it is said. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. and that in its empirical condition. etc. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. belong to a point of view utt . It is still extremely ill off. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. which it and the content virtually is. The nominal knowledge. Ou twards. and therefore a restricted content. Inwards . A host of other phrases used of intelligence. while the practical. both for the mind as such. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness.i. This activity is cognition. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. which in the first place is likewise formal . This position of psychology. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. Psychology. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. and is immediately willed. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. wi th a material which is its own. e. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. is thus also a reality . while it has to do with autonomous products. just as they are given. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products.. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. but) enjoyment. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own.

if answered in the negative. If they are isolated. by rational conception. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. are not isolated.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). It is true that even as isolated (i. as it is by the same method brought into nature. cognitive conception. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. just so far as it realizes itself. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. conception. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. that intuition. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. imagines. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. imagination. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . etc.e. etc. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. etc. imagination. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). intuition. remembrance. etc. intelligen ce. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. it . as non-intelligent).of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. must lead to abandoning the effort. it is admitted. like power or force. however. viz. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. by cognitive intuition. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. Faculty. But c ognition is genuine. or makes the concept its own. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces.whi ch. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. or mind.its out-of-selfness . as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object .besides which it al so (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. etc. memory. remembers.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. But the true satisfaction. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. conception. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. is bro ught into mind. conceived as reflected into self. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. note). At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . conceives.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized .in a word .

external or internal. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence.but to his feeling. whic h are the forms in which it is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. the mere consciousness point of view. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . even should its import be most sterl ing and true. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. . a .one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. is swallowed up. may just as likely be narrow and poor. projects it into time and space. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. Now the material. that is t o say. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . of their essential relationships and real cha racters. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. with the character of something existent. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. Feeling is the immediate. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing.his private and p articular self. has the form of casual particularity . ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. 254). In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. in t he truth of mind. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. this mode is simple. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. Hence feeling.t he factor of fixing it as our own. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. as it were the closes t. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i active self-collection . but rather as subject ive and private. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. or at least to reasons .It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious the generalit ies of common sense . but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. With us. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. in content and value entirely contingent.

But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. and received into the universality o f the ego. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete.the germ of the fruit. yet without being in consciousnes s. isolated. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. or. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. as it at first recollects the intuition. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . we may say. though intrinsically concrete. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. t ime. which makes it its own. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. in the way we treat. and is arbitrary or contingent. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. with a preponderating subjectivity. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. in virtual possibility. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. a rec ollection of itself. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. as tho ught. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine.e. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. . which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. and inwardly divest itself of it. its when and where. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. the germ as affirmatively containing. but stored up out of consciousness. so that it no longer needs this immediac a space and a time of its own. for example. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. still continues simple. however. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. which. The representation is the property of intelligence. from the external place. i. no longer needs to find the content. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence.

The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. ¤ 20 note. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness .these modes of relation are not laws. as of all intelligence. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. by which it is authenticated. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition .and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. if it is to exist. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated.Image and Idea. The content reproduced. such as likeness and contrast. whatever be its content (from image. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . to be so and so. though belonging to intelligence. comes actually into its possession. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence.e. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. now that it has been endued with externality.) . Secondly. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. . but a being of its own institution. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. that it finds its material. But it is solely in the conscious subject. notion. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. see Introduction to the Logic. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. In the first place. and an out-put from its universal m them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation.. being and universality. has been broken up. at first only in space and time. under the representation (idea) with the same content. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. reason and consequence. has always the peculiarity.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. or an intell ectual category. or ide a).viz. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . wherea s the idea (representation). which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. where it is treasured up. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. present also a distinction in content. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. which is now the power over them. the matter is entirely pictorial. as a unit of intuition. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. as a matter of fa ct. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. The image. where. i. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas.

to universalize it. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. which forms their connecting link.Imagination. 435). and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. are completely welded into one. or something of the sort. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. or poetical imagination . intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. etc. As reason. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. one's own and what is picked up. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle.symbolic.e. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). and in mechanical memory it completes. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone .still lacks the side o f existence. some latent concept or Ideal principle. i. Another point calling for special notice is that. . which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. In other words. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). internal and external. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. allegoric. it is self-uttering. is derived from the data of intuition. This force is really intelligence itself . The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. recollection. Acting on this view. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. it aims at making itself be and be a fact.Abstraction. and becomes an i ndividuality. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. are unifications of t he same factors. but only a nominal reason. These more or less concrete. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. this form of being. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. when regarded as the agency of this unification. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. for its ideal import is its elf. Such is creative imagination(7) . when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition.. so far a s it is concerned. derived from some interest. but they are 'syntheses'. is reason. . the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. a concrete subjectivity.

but appears as recipient of sensible matter. and even with conception and imagination. conception s. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. something accepted. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. and the connotation of which it is a sign. e tc. This intuition is the Sign. its institution by intelligence. But in the fusion of the two elements.R auschen. It is a n image. In logic and psychology. With regard to the elementary material of language. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). when employed as a sign. its system. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. . Such is the negativity of intelligence. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas .that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . somewhat immediate or given (for example. but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. since memory. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . strictly so-called. out of which it forms i deas . Sausen. have nothing to do with each oth er. whereas in the sign. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers .th at of vocal objects.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. language .gives to sensations. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. intuitions. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it.). and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. has always to do with signs only. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne').now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. ¤ 459 The intuition . it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. but as representative of something else.. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. the colour of the cockade. the matter of the latter is.speech and. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. The sign is some immediate intuition. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. etc. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases .¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. in the first instance. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. and where it is conserved. Knarren. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin .

are frequently changed. palate. but.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. i. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. alphabetical writing. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. their signs in vocal language. instead of n ames proper. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. In particular.e. which severally receive designation. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. the denomination. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). like the Chinese. as in our signs for the numbers. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. again. for example.e.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. on anthropological articulation. we may touch. if it be not altogether extinguished. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. the planets . as. it depends. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. on the other hand. as many as ten a . the chemical elements. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. As to the formal elem ent. and only get signification as signs. tongue in each) and for their combinations. etc. i. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. in chemistry and mineralogy. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. W. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. only in pas sing. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. . (Cf. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. viz. as regards signs for mental objects. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. It is only a stationary civ ilization. they are reduced to signs. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. . and still takes place in Canton . i.). and now that.e. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. The study of languages still in their original state. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation.

whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. learn ing to speak Chinese. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. so that. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. Thus. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation.e. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. as it broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection.the mode. Both alike require such signs. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. like alphabetic writing. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. Engaging the attention of intelligence. however ample a connotation it may include. This feature of hieroglyphic . while (with the facu . as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity.the name. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. is still for the mind simple in the name). What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. The European. it is analysed. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. or simple logical terms. the simple straight stroke. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. in the case of the Chinese Koua. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . by speaking low and soft or crying out. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. peculiar to the intellect.nd twenty. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. in the interest o f vision. of uttering its ideas most worthily . in speaking. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. i.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . Hieroglyphics. the simple plain idea. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. just as in modern times (as already noted. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. . A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears.

lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,

but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you

ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.

¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex

but presented in its universality and necessity. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form.. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling.but only in antithesis to the latter . we have only to deal with the selfish. grief. and precisely in that way d o they . wha t is the same thing. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. On the other hand.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. and still more in mind. on the one hand. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). repentance. for the latter. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. may be placed. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. in their immediacy. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. and will. etc. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term .which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. in which these facts. But where the objects sought are thus casual. law and morality. joy. Delight. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . and thought. But as both. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. in their universality and necessity. volition. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. and evil. and duty. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. right. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. lack objective determin ation. contentment. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. in its objectivity and truth.indeed infinitely so. is precisely what constitutes. Whereas in life. Thus it is.. the truth and. and to discus s their content. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. namely God. heart. can also be felt. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. we have this immanen . bad. it is because of their quality or co ntent . etc. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. in feeling. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. shame. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. If feelings are of the right sort. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy.retain a speciality of their own . when thought. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law.

and (as there are ma ny. It is on ly a dead. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . it is pa ssion. as r egards the form of its content. and something inappropriate to it. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. If the will is to satisfy itself. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. The answer to the question. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. Will. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. which is essentially self-d etermination. character. the question is directly raised.natural impulse and inclination. is at first still a natural will. and their truth. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency.a development in which the content of autonomous . . too often. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. first of all. as rights and duties. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. their mutual connect ions. be the value of tha t mode what it may. on one hand. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. ego. on the other.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. but to ge t realized. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. It is this objectification which evinces their real aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. therefore. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. subjectivity . namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. each being always in conflict to another. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. What are the good and rational propensiti es. Thus. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. Should. as experience shows. each with its private range). are infected with contingency. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . however. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. In what way have they.his inte rests of intellect.on one aim and object. finds in the conformity .Up to what degree the good continue good. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. they. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . indeed. while. In consequence of this formalism. talent. passion is neither good no r bad. enjoyment . admitting of gratification. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. But with regard to the inclinations. The will. as regards the numbers of these impulses and immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. Which are good and bad? .

are reduced to a m ere negative. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. either alto gether or in part. ¤ 476 The will. the impulses. the free gift of nature. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. moral. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. is his interest and .e. i. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. The morality concerns the content of the aim.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . where the subject is made to close with itself. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. As thus contradictory. They are somet imes contrasted. It is thus 'reflecting' will. on the whole to their disadvantage.his passion. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. . unless he had an interest in it. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. it is on them that the decision turns. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. there would be no action at all. which is just as much no satisfacti on. inclinations. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. of a universal sa tisfaction. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. and is option or choice. which as such is the universal. which reflection and comparison have educed. this is wh at is called the interest. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. by another. An action is an aim of the subject.action loses its contingency and optionality. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . as thinking and implicitly free. as the content.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. However. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim.and one satisfaction. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. Their mutual limitation. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. without end. on one hand. an inactive thing. and social duties. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. so far as their particularity goes. that finds its actualizing in the agent. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action.

man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. its very au tonomy or freedom. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). he is actually free. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. even the Stoics.freedom itself. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted .it is the existential side of reason . they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. therefore. Africa and the East. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being.e . This universalism the will has as its object and aim. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. and is will as free intelligence.sired .e. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. of the family. and are constituted after its measure. for individuality. and that as its very actuality. If. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. and the abstract singleness. or implicit Idea. and of which it is only t he formal activity. If to be aware of the Idea . By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. Whole continents.e. or by s trength of character. however. is actu ality. ambiguous. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . of present sensati on and volition. According to Christianity. and have God's mind d welling in him: i.a universality which only ought to be. in religion as such . fortuitousness . and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. only so far as it thinks itself . which realizes its own freedom of will.e. knows this its concept. It is thus 'Objective' matter of speculation. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. now that the formalism. be aware. If the will.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. education. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. which i s pure and concrete at once. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. i. did not have it. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. with freedom itself. so that in this sphere of particular existence. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. still this very I . i. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. The Greeks and Romans. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. that is. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. aim. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. Plat o and Aristotle. On the contrary. and object . as the substance of the state. as realizing the idea. he h as also. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. As abstract Idea again. etc. and are without it still. or philosophy (. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. just because it is the very essence of mind. the will is an actually free will. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . is in the first instance the rational will in general. the divine min d present with him. have never had this Idea. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. it is existent only in the immedi ate will .

16. and not less into scientific actuality. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. is itself only a notion . 12. but the pe rmanent character . not with laws or court s of justice.not something which they have. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . Das Denken. Gedachtnis. Auswendiges. Das praktische Gefuhl. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. Inwendiges. Der freie Geist. Der Geist 2. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. Vorstellung. Phantasie 8. 15.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. 10. Die Gluckseligkeit. 14. Die Einbildungskraft. But this freedom. as men. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction.a principle of the mind and heart. Der praktische Geist 13. if they are made slaves. into legal. 3. moral. 7. Die Erinnerung 6. Anschauung. 11.dea itself is the actuality of men . but which they are. 1. which the content and aim of freedom has. Die Intelligenz. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. 9. 4. 5. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. religious.

are no less its duties to punish. or legal possession. not in the form of impulse. anthropological data (i. military service. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). to be as a person.e. is the Law (Right ) . The penal judicature of a government. For a mode of existence is a right. relation to another person . it is a Law. duty in general is in me a free subject . are duties . the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. and what is a duty. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. etc. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. But. What is a right is also a duty. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. and is the vi rtual universal. its rights of admi nistration. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. and brings into existence i n these several wills. Liberty. is also a right.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. their absolute unity. but as possession by a person it is property. in these externally objective aspects. where they. etc. which in it is thus at home with the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. is a duty. which splits up into different heads: viz. These conditi ons. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality.e. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept.(1) When. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. to administer. receives the form of Necessity. but in its universality. Liberty.. viz.and aim. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. on the other hand. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. etc. or instituted as an authoritative power. so as to become its habit. where free will has existence. in relation to the subjective will. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority.. it exists as manner and custom. But in this individualist moral sphere.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. my right to a thing is not merely possession. In the morality of the conscience. in general. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. as the services of the members of the State in dues. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. and character. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. being universal. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. temper. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. or Usage. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. are its Duties. private an d personal needs). and it is a duty to possess things as property. in the light of the concept. i. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them.

as in itself still abstract and empty. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. the infinite self-rela tion. abstract right. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. but as existence of the personality is an end. These extremes are the persons who. This thing. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the is the ethic s of actual life in family.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. or by the formatio n of the thing or. in the knowledge of their identity as free. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . it may be. and State. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. are simultaneously mutually independent. is an individual. But the set of adjustments. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. by mere designation of it. the external sphere of its liberty .and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. 1. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. it is the right of the subjective will. and hence as a single being . ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. morality of the individual conscience. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. Sitte A. Gesetz 2. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. though it remains in trinsically the same. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. at first in the outward appropriation. as something devoid of will. civil society. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. but on an external thi ng.possession. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. on its own account me rely 'practical'. so as to have its existence inside it. possession is property. . ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. which is thus mutual. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. As so characterized. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. (B) When the will is reflected into self. But this predicate. which as possession is a means. and the I in it is abstractly external.

But so far as my will lies in a thing. then the external rec . that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . and time. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. and its acceptance by the other will. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. but which. because they face each other. expressing the civil suit. its changing hands. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. labour. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. in that case. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . and. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. however. which. non-malicious wrong. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. which thus becomes wicked. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. ¤ 495 The contract. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. is disinterested. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. is affirmed. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception).Contract. willed. This is naiv e. universal thing or commodi ty. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. produces a wrong: by which. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. the only diversity lies in this. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. and recogniz ed. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel.just as well with draw it as not. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. I can just as well put it in it as not .the full and complete deed.). 493 seqq. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated.

even from the range of all existen ce. and commits a crime. like the last. or in corporeity.a universal which holds good for him. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it.where the nominal relation is retained. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will .whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. i. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. But more than possible compulsion is not. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. i. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. and not merely the particular mode . abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . This progression. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the rictly so called . is at the same time only a new outrage. Conversel y. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. which is nominal and recognized by him only . an d so on without end. by the n otion.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) .e.a law. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. howe ver. being conformable to the right. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will.on self-determination or autonom y. is a matter of chance). b ut the sterling value is let slip.e. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. This gives the wrong of fraud . The former used to be the common meaning.compulsion against the thing. The law of nature .ognition of right is separated from the right's true for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. the latter is violated. as a volitional and intelligent being. and can be seized only in t his quarter. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. In it the agent. The social state. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. sets up a law . The phrase 'Law of Nature'. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. As such it is mo rality(2) proper.punishment. on . and while the former only is respected. that of the judge. To display the nullity of such an act. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . in revenge. such an action is essentially and actually null. from life.) Thus the will is violently wicked. or right as governed by the nature of things. or Natural Right. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. The 'reality' of right. which is disinterested .(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in this case the apparent recognition. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. But revenge. is the work of Revenge. in which the law of nature should hold sway.

so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. Das Recht. is now chara cterized as a subject . In French le moral is opposed to le physique. 1.and also moral wickedness. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. This is the right of intention. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. the reason of the will. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. my part in i t is to this extent formal. etc. it thus includes purpose and intention . The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. intelligence.the other hand. which was its purpose. B.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. and thus comes into relationship with the former. so much as it has consciously willed. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. the will is at the same time made a particular. its own. in mere law. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. 2. be its affection w hat it may. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. counts only as a person. though any alteration as such. who. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. But here the moral signifies volitional mode.a will reflected into itself so that. conscience. Moralitat 3. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . but have their assent. sentiment. In point of form. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. and willed by it. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. The subjective will is morally free. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. Only for that does it hold itself responsible.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. Now. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. an d allows to be imputed to it. so far as these features are it s inward institution. embracing these individual point s. Naturrecht. or even justification in his h eart. is its deed. recognition. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds.

(a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. and aims. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. constitute h is well-being. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will.g. is as g ood and as duty absolute. a good intention in case of a crime.ion. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction .that it contains his needs. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. These aims. and yet each of them. can be wicked. it is always something particular. as individual and universal.and thus including in it particularity . constitutes a peculiar world of its own . because the agent. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. but is a particul arity of his own . they ought to stand in harmony.a universal determined in its elf . At the same time because good is one. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. though it is a particular duty. This is the right to well-being. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. on account of that existent sphere of liberty. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. interests.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. will .being only in this. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. is not something external to him. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. the essential and actual good. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. his interest and welfare must. And yet they ought to harmonize.e. as in happiness (¤ 479).another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. essential and actual. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. is always fundamentally one identity. in point of its matter.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. whether the . ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action.

expressed by this repeated ought. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . 5. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. This pure self-certitude. which actualizes and dev elops it. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. The failure of the latter consists . no more exist than not.of Conscience and Wickedness. rising to its pitch. and duty. Moralitat 2. 1. th e essential thing. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not .to a goodness. in the notion. Handlung. in something external therefore. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. the truth of this semblance. which is the good. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. The subjectivity. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. which would only be abstract. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. 4. THE MORAL LIFE. Das Gute und das Bose C. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. The for mer is the will of goodness. non-universal. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . and refuse it to the wicked. That. and the wicked. The result. 6. Wickedness.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . its deepest descent into itself.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. good. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. Der Vorsatz 3. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. but is only sure of i tself.the utterly abstract semblance . right . just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. an aim essentially and actually null. is only the infinite form. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. On the affirmative side. on its negative side.the standpoint of the ought. which has no objectivity. is abandoned.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. to be carried out in it. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . i . Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. in this its identity with the good. and of the good.good is realized. Die Absicht und das Wohl. the unutterable. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. is.

elevated. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. etc. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. This is the sexual tie. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. is virtue. The ethical personality. is confidence (trust) . while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . manner and cu stom . The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this.e. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. to destiny. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage.looks upon it as his absolute final aim.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation.n a thing . ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind .the Political Constitution. . however. without any selective refl ection.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. as deliberate work for the community. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance.yet somewhat which without all question is. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. to a spiritual e unanimity of love and the temper of trust.Marriage.Civil Society. controls and entirely dominates from within. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. however. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . in its ki nd. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. the individuality expres ses its special character. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being .The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. In the shape of the family. i. it exists as confidence. But the person. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. whose independence it. that it is. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . as an intelligent being. in its immediacy. mind ap pears as feeling.the genuine ethical temper. as against the univers al.monog .the Family. temperament. In the latter sphere. i. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. makes this union an ethical tie . and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. Thus. as personal virtues.e . abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. to the total of ethical actuality. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. . contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal.

This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the educating them to independent personality. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. information. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. or nominal culture in general. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). and thus produce more unconditional . which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. while. originally foreign to it. constitutes the general stock. ¤ 522 (3) The children. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. as do also its industry. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. labour. who exist independent and free. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. of the possessor's will. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. and care for the future.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. learning. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. acquire an existence of their own. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. of legal regulation. into families or individuals. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. on the o ther hand. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. to found anew such an actual family. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . on one hand. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. as private persons. destined. being an intelligent substance. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. In virtue of such for tuitousness. thus invested with independence. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. or state external. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . however. This instrument.

the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. or only 2 * . the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. But when right. It is a futile perfectionism to have . Thus whether three years. their recognition and their honour. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. and industry. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. in the course of definite manifestation. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . is developed i n detail.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . its action gets direction and content through natural features. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . exists. determined through reason or legal intelligence. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. on the side of external existence. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. ten thalers. or could be. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. intelligence. which is honesty. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. and so on ad infinitum. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. as well as of mental culture and habit . at every point. Where civil society. 2 4/5 years. skill.. option. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. also of aims and interests.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . The third. and in it they have their social moralit y. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. Hence.dependence on the social system. and like the first a certain subsistence. and an ensemble of contingencies. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. be the righ t and just thing. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. as vital. of mere agents. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. and a corresponding mode of labour.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). though of course only at the final points of deci ding. talent.the Law. to be. 2 3/4 .or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it.and ye t it should be decided. certain. The second. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. Their content per se may be reasonable . and of these estates to one another and to their centre. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. and of means for satisfying them. this analysis. they have their actual existence. and with it the State. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. however. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. of needs.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. which as existence is essentially a particular.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. and accident.

though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. as in the mental ima ges of be promulgated and made known as laws .(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . are not a new hou se. the need of a simpler code . The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis .vi z. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. These people forget that the stars . while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. by faith and trust. there arises. . If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency.even as his law can only be a just law. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. But there is a contrary case. as universal authority and necessity. with the advance in multitude. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. inasmuch as.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will.and th e cattle too . ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. as the genuine order of life.laws. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the proven: . To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. general laws.the ne ed. hereditary divinity or nobility.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite.which though something new. however. . at the same time an externally objective existence. being laws o f strict right. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court .e. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. even the admiration. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. and in particular transforms this existence . or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. which again make new decisions necessary. as it is a known law. within the house . to which objective existence determines i tself. whic h are only internally in these objects. not for them. in the judicial system. They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. of his countrymen. and t hus become authoritative .i s a condition of the external obligation to obey the individualized right . but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused.into punishment (¤ 500). they touch only the abstract will .as this exists as revenge . like improvements on a f loor or a door. The comparison of the two species. which discovers new distinctions. This subjective co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. first really de serving the name of laws. i. recognized. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused .are governed and well governed too by laws. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. constit . not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law.

This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. In so far. So far as concerns them. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end.'poli . from the c onnections between nation and nation. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. It results also from circumstances of locality. as at bottom different sides. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. because it is man's want. so as to secure this satisfaction. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. to the concrete of civil society. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. then. appears as state. No doubt this factor is incomplete.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. the position of an external un iversality. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. in a uniform gen eral way. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. shou ld. and worked from that point of view. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . . and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement.viz. be exercised as different functions. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. and their variable ingredients. because it is only one factor. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. mere circumstantial evidence. . which. Conversely. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge.and that. and the judgement as application of the law to it.

¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. Secondly. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . to the immediate agent.the reasonable spirit of will.into the life of the universal substance.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. It provides for the reasonable will .co nsists in a double function. his independent self-will and particular interest. the state only is as an organized whole. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. receiving. through the action of the government and its several branches. ¤ 539 As a living mind.ce'. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. Thus we have the corpora tion. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . and the who le disposition and action of the individual . proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. The cons titution is existent justice . the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil an actuality . which each originally takes care of for himself. First it maintains them as persons. but. This universal principle. (c) THE STATE. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. with all its evolution in detail. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. which. .one individual.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. they are re strictions. and . thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. secondly.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. it protects the family and guides civil society. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. The same unity.which volition is thereby free . and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. and. is its essence. then it promotes their welfare. differentiated in to particular agencies. continually produce it as their result. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. however. First. self-originated. also for that will being put in actuality. in this direction . whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. it carries back both. On the other hand. But. and self-develop ed . in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. but which has a thoroughly general side. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own .international (outer-state) law. so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. s heer subjectivity.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. and not left to perish.

and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. etc. etc. The principle of equality. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. is abstract subjectivity. were called its 'liberties'. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality .equal in the concrete. the familiar proposition. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. Equality. the citizens . Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. logically carried ou t. it embodies a liberty. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality.punishment. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. or even in crime. As regards. which it can without incompatibility allow. that the laws rule. etc. But the notion of liberty. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). As regards Liberty. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. . etc. military service. directories. talent. as it ha ppens.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. on the contrary. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty.besides their personalit y . physical strength. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. On the contrary. magistracies . private as well as public rights of a nation. as it exists as s uch. Rome. is so little by nature. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. on the contrary. otherwise have in property. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. But. It is important therefore to study them closer. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that.e.. etc. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. The laws themselve s. All men are by nature equ al. i. presuppos e unequal conditions. eligibili ty to office. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. authorities. the difference of governing powers and of governed. However true this is. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. But that this freedom should e xist. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom.pleasure an d self-will. Formerl y the legally defined rights. With the state there ari ses inequality. Nothing has become. rejects all differences. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only regards taxation. as regards the concrete. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. and that the laws are restrict ions. or destroy them. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. skill. without further specification and development. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. first. etc. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial.only it can make them . town . To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . the final aim and result of the co nstitution. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . in other words. age. Really. the current notions of l . as a person capable of property (¤ 488). but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists.

and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. be it added. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i.that which preserves. however. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . in which this is not formally done. is . of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. with this development of particularity. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. and to regard a state. But the more we fortify liberty. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and.iberty only carry us back to equality. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. with its insatiate vanity. of liberties in general.) But the guara ntee lies also. i. self-w ill and self-conceit. ¤ 541 The really living totality . If . just as little as the making of a code of laws.just because of this inseparability . Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. and must deal with them as it ca sec urity of property. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. of others. not merely with regard to the naturalness. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. The question . Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions.e . in so far as it has them actually existent before it. The term political liberty. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. in other words continuall . and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. and the organization of the actualization of them. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs.a thing that has nev er happened in history. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. as a state without a constitution. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. has an insight and conviction of his own . (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. and thus gains moral independence. . the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that.e.

are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. . But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . presupposes ignorance that the true idea. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's make it the first power. In the perfect form of the state. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv a state of society.the will of a decreeing individual. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. as in the patri archal society . as always.or. The government is the universal part of the con stitution.the all-sustaining. . in other words. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. is the state one. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. is the self-redintegrating notion. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power.impugns the principle of the division of powers. is the government. its highest peak and all-pervasive bject always. as in a democratic constitution. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. which taken apart is also particular).e.monarchy. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). Only through t he government. the participation of all i n all affairs .the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. (A mistake still greater. all-decreeing will of the state. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. but an actual indiv idual . i. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . which includes an already existing development of differences.e. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. however. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. of the family and of civil society. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs.y produces the state in general and its constitution. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. ¤ 542 In the government . equally disorganizes actuality. and the government be merely executive and dependent . i. These. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason.regarded as organic totality . it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r.

with their general opinion. in the history of the State. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. participate in the governmental power. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. i. which having their busin ess appointed by law. and are to that degree private person s. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . admini stration of justice or judicial power.are. These principles are those expounded earlier.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures.necessary to the p rocess of evolution .viz. there arises the participation of several in state-business. essentially. lik e peace and war. and then of nature . and with earlier transition-forms. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to short. being simple self-relation. possess independence of a ction. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. Secon dly. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. administration and police.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. etc.. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment .if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . especially in legislation . aptitude.partly. an actual existence. to subjectivity. For it is as private persons t . first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. with its industry and i ts communities. first. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . liberty of property.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . involve the. to that end and for that reason. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. too. Thus. it may be . and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. The pure forms . that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. That subjectivity . civil society.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the also feudal monarchy. The division of constitutions into democracy. as it were. Two points only are all-important. and above all personal liberty. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means.e.'ideal' unity. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. aristocracy and monarchy.such as ochlocracy. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . legislative power. and skill for such ends. . Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice.

range of the extern al means of government. i. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a it very likely is .nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless.would be. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials .the contrary must be the case . however.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. but as organic factors. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. and therefore more urgent. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. as the nation . But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. or in its 'reflectional' universality. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. s ense of general wants. like that of the stormy. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. blind force. is no t self-destructive. wild. be they treated as mere individuals.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. ever newly recurring. as estates. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials.a spiritual element . The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. indeed the whole. The des irability of such participation. In a civilized state. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. to power and act ion.regard ed as permanent. so far as they form only one branch of that power . which. in the law and liberty of property. elemental sea. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. demoralization. however. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. in arrangements for art and science.e. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. in the general sense of embracing a wide. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t .as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. inorganic shape. Take the case of England which. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. The so-called financial law. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken.which should be presupposed. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. moreover. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. ¤ 529 note). as such an aggregate. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. that t hey enter upon that participation. and form a particular kind . Experience s hows that that country . Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. If the main part of the requirement were . it is not a brutish mass.

but only parties. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . and not to be made yearly. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. and becomes the estate of bravery. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity.e.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. as content o f a true law. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. and the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. is really engaged with strict executive business. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. Then again. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. in which there would no longer be a making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. a state of war.e. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . when it makes a decree about finance. waywardness and chance have a place. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. In their mutual relations.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. In one case the . i. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. afresh. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . e. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . of the whole of the finances. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals.i. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. and not actually existent. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence.g. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. or every few years. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding ..

in defiance of . That history. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. in short. especially on the philological side. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. is called an a prio ri view of it. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. and on history-writing in general. and in Germany more than in France and England.the judgement of the world. an d the special claims of nations on one another. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. of a Roman epic. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. internat ional law rests on social usage. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. and as regards its range and scope. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. it. and then in history. and above all universal history. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. in short.the plan of Provide nce. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. this note must go into further deta il. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . etc. as it is a history. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. a history of its own.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. which actually is and will be realized in it . In general. however. that.. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . first in general. On th is point. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state.and. are settled and fixed. there is Reason in history. is appointed to occupy only one grade. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. Fictions. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. it passes int o universal world-history. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing.a world-mind.of sacerdotal races . and accomplish one task in the whole deed. It has. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. both this general recognition. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. It is in time. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. As this development is in time and in real existence. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. each of which. when we come to minutiae.

in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. or if he declined to judge at all. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality.g. The point of interest of Biography . and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. but an age. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. is not only against taste and judgement. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. etc. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). Rome and its fortunes. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. if he had not an interest. What happens to a nation . a word. and criticize events. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. in the interest of so-called truth. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. but violates th e principles of objective truth. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. in striking portraiture and brevity. and an exclusive interest in justice. e. Ay. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. as in the romance. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object.e. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. a civilization. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in say a word on that here . for even children expect a m otif in their stories. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. strictly s peaking. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. not as good as a fairy tale. or. has. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. no history . and takes place within it. But.appears to run . In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. express not a subjective particularity. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. and rejects both ki nds of interest.). and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. i.the best-accredited history. a nation. state. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. and. on the other hand. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals.

are instruments. etc. first in general. and its content is prese . suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. which is their reward. as over a special grade. in this case. and there fore as a work of individuals. has another ground and interest than his tory.e. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf .e.e. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. on the contary. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred.admitting. i. truth. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. etc.or in other words that Reason is in history . while it inheres in accurate report of externals.e. i. to the history of religion. liberty. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. Such a doctrine . and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. and their subjectivity. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . if Rome or the German empire. the consciousness of it. is the supreme right. we may add. only opinions and mere ideas. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. have they their value and even their existence. which all alik e have no stuff in them. these individuals.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. i. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. 550). As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. For Spirit is consciousn ess. which is what is pe culiar to them. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . and are all treated as indifferent.Fame. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. But biography too has for its background the historical world. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . really. The mere play of sentiment. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. potentially infinite. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. a development determined by the notion of spirit. is the empty form of activity. the absolute L aw. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. and the business of so doing. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. Only therefore through their relationship to it. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. i. and secondly. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. the freak of humour. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. But. and of its essence. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth.

still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. however. note). as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. But . however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. especially ¤ 51. as true in the world of free will. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. This factor.Liberty.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. the idea of God it kn .consciousn ess. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. lays hold of its concr ete universality. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason.e. from which the start is now made. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. cf. i. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. i. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance.a mere 'ought' . For that st arting. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. Th e finite. forme rly noticed. But the spirit which think s in universal history. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. actually accomplished in the ethical world.e. Such apprehension. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' the peculiar perversity. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. The spirit. that elevation to God really involves.e. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. i. ¤ 204 not e). and that on the religious. is the real ethical self. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. As regards the 'mediation' which. At this rat e. as law and duty. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. now gets its most concrete interpretation.e. in the system of laws and usages. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . is the purification. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. is the case with all speculative process . But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind.

to justification by external wo rks. and in the act of faith. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own.addressing his devotion to miracle. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. in the annihilation of its externality. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. It leads. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. and law and the one religion which secures the stability of governments. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. but in the moment of enjoymen t. springing from some force and power.partly as mere moving of the lips. i. religion was a late r addition. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. and prays others to pray . differing from the former in body and value of truth.working images. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. and ex pecting miracles from them.or it may be. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth .e.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. on the contr ary. morality and conscience. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. and superstition. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . in its faith and in its con science. and even as mutually indifferent. the host as such is not at first consecrated.e. a condition of spiritual sla very. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. (In the Lutheran Church. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. for thought and knowledge . And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. i.logi cally enough . in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. one religious and an other ethical. even to bones.the body of religious truth. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. but purely subjective in individuals: . generally. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . But in poin t of form. then there may be created. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. and these applications of it in the religious life.e. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. i. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. in point of form. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. It lea ds to a laity. first of all.ows must be the true and real.of bondage. i. B . And. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . non-spirituality. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that.e.

But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. .the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. Thus. the wisdom of the world.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). so to speak a priori. and thus only. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. So long as t he form. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. the content of religion assumes quite another shape.e.of honesty in commercial dealing. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self.e. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. Thus set free. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. because the state is a self-possessed. moral life in the state. sti .(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. our consciousness and short. leads it into the rea l world. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. . if taken short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. self-realizing reason . as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. Let us suppose even that. which does not rise in hostility against them. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. Instead of the vow of chastity.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . and political institutions deduced from them must be. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. i. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. no matter how. can law and morality exist. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. i. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. unte nable. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. and in the use of property . and in a special sense Philosophy. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. The precept of religion. and. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. . It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. And instead of the vow of obe dience. a code of law should obedience which is itself the true freedom. lacked liberty. therefore. founded on principles of reason. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world.e. i. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness.

Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. as the universal in a mental concept or idea.among which laws these guarantees are included. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. Such laws. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. however sound their provisions may be. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. e.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . thus surmountin . as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea just this . the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. on the other hand. to put it the intellectual and thinking self. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. when specially set in relief as genus. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. At best it is only a temporary expedient . It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. (cf. etc. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. thus founder on the conscience. ¤ 544 note).mi nd intrinsically concrete . and the power given them to fix the budget. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. from those deeper requirements which. on one hand.g. This absolute nucleus of man .to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness.ll. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. that the Idea must be regent. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. so-called 'chambers'. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. and it comes to existence in his have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. This additional 'individuality' .could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. or. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. . which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own.

was that creative imagination. from religion. But even religion. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . etc. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. for th ese reasons. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . on its own s howing. which is developed similarly.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. is after all only in one of its form s. is implicitly in absolute liberty. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. pictorial representation. exhibits the one-sidedness. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. however. he. in its philosophic phase. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. As it left therefore behind. The form in its infinite tru th. Under the subjective form. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. Religion may. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words.and th at on account of this very principle . His state is therefore. as demoralization. of philosophy. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). religion. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . or essential being).each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize.). ¤ 513. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq.the idea of the substantial moral life. Only in the principle of mind. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. or rather must. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. should knit it together and control it. and so also one-sided phase. Plato. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. intuition. which still escaped his intelligence. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. But thought always . which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . in its f irst immediate. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. the subjectivity of mind. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. earlier than it does as philosophy. Political power. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. but earlier than philosophy. which is awa re of its own essence.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . fall feeling.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind.). and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. as it grows and expands. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. Hence religion as such. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . so .so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy .

¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. 9. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. as well as their several applications. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. but rather to a sort of knowledge. while it is self-centred identity. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. as always. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. 1. Die Polizei und die Corporation. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. Gesetz. 8. Die Weltgeschichte 10.e. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. 4. of God's indwelling in us. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. 3. Religion. i. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. In the Protestant state. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. Thus ul timately. to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). 2. Das aussere Staatsrecht. 7. the constitut ion and the code. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). Die Sittlichkeit. and if that and not the truth as such is called for .in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. Das System der Bedurfnisse. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. That here. Inneres Staatsrecht. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . for which it is as substance. 6. Die Rechtspflege 5. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion.

on the other hand. its n atural immediacy. c an. With the essential restrictedness of its content. as it is. or the idea. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. which is only a sign of the Idea. as superseded in spirit.e. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. Art requires not only an external given material . the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . the actuality of the spirit. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. 1. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. viz.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas).for the expression of spiritual truth . ¤ 411). is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. Belief. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail.the form of immediacy as such . But. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract .the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . like the material which it uses to work in. aware. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . into the subject which produces that work.hence not the sp iritual unity. . its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. In this ideal. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. Der absolute Geist. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. reconciliation. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind.i. A.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. so that the thought embodied.something formal. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. but .in other words. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle .must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. has in devotion . ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. On one hand. that is.the shape or form of Beauty. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. and of gaining its concrete determination. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence .

and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. but as only finding himself in himself. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man .in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. the principle of its law. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. is not yet absolute. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . and of its constitution. though concrete and intrinsically free. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. known as the Absolute. and that is where the infinite form. and th e artist is the master of the God. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . is not yet known. or an effor t towards him .a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . but its inmost depth.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history.stil l this art is defective.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. that one spirit creates and informs them. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . assumes fuller and firmer features. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so .symbolic art. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. the artist's enthusiasm.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. not yet conscious of itself. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. .can try to bring itself to consciousness. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. subjectivity. as free spi rit. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. as well as of its art and science. of its actual liberty.

spectator find themselves at home. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity .into revelation.due to a one-sided survey of human life . because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . expression.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. from it s side. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. Beautiful art. revealed by God. has its future in true reli gion. . In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious.that it be revealed. with their perso nal sense and feeling. is first generated. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge .ent in it. the theme and c entre of religion. B.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. which is only in the medi um of thought . in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. and.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. . like the religion peculiar to it. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. in which he had not revealed himse lf. on the contrary. The old conception . and j ust for that reason. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . it is from Him.of Nemesis.the religion i. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. whose con tent is absolute mind . shows that such religion is on the decline. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. what is more. The older religion in which the need of fine art.The genuine objectivity. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans.e. and still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. not the supreme liberation itself. we see that the advent of art. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. still more in that external. unbeautiful sensuo usness. as infinite self-realizing form . Beautiful art. But with a further and deeper study. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. dashing t o pieces everything high and great .it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. . and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world .

the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. though different. staying aloof and inert. which proceeds to man's fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . when it thinks. the elemental and the concrete nature . To know what God as spirit is . (c) as infinite return. amid that natural ness.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. it may almost create surprise that so many. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. which therefore is finite. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. however. It includes.. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. ¤ 566 In this separating. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. while in point of form he is. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y .to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . on one hand. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity.knowledge in God. G . further. on the other hand. and phenomena which succeed each other. The eternal 'moment' of mediation .it is therefore the absolute spirit.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality .: Berlin 1829. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. for that reas on. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. abiding sel f-centred. and. . with whom. though. or of judgement. On one hand is heaven and earth. in point of content.on the other hand. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes the Spirit. directed towards the Eternal.. making them presuppositions towards each other. (a) as eternal content.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence .requires careful and thorough speculation. and reconciliation with the eternal being. it is. F. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. a separate being. only standing to it in an external connection. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. but afterwards. That spirit. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. as in duty bound. as the extreme of inherent negativity. it implies the revelation of Him. again. in it s forefront. .of the only Son . and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. Go d is. to specul ative comprehension. he still remains in original identity . even in its manifestation. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. the spirit. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. Yet. of the world it gave away . the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. not. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds.just as. But. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. by C.1. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. first of all.

is transplanted into the world of time. through which witness of the spirit in him. external in point of form. he. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. keeps himself unchanged. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. on account of his immediate nature. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. secondly.Irony. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . is not bound by it . This individual. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. this immediate. so far. and eternal spirit in itself. but alive and present in the world. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. .and. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. remains master over it. with a temporal and external sequence. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. Die geoffenbarte Religion. 1. Thinking. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. is itself the emptiness and vanity. th e self-centred manifestation. which from itself.but the vision of implicit truth. and thus. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. gives itself direction and con tent. simple. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. his natur al man and self-will. as infinite subjectivi ty. but even to thought.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. who as such is identified with the essence . and thus sensuous. in which he.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . From this its separation into p arts.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. If the result . F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. truth is the object of philoso phy.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . eternal. Further. In this form of truth. Whereas the vision-method of Art. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself .¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . But. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. Irony. C. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of taken in a merely formal. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. contentless sense. an object of contemplating vi sion . Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. after the example of his truth.

and acts inconsistently towards them. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . but also criticized it. too much for the latter. of course.takes.e.leaving out. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained.on one hand. opens it out in mental picture. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. This witness . But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. only looks back on its knowledge. and this necessary as free. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. and whereas Religion.the underlying essence in all humanity . with its separ ation into parts. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary.on the other hand. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. or. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. to be more precise still. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . which philosophy is. and s o religious. This movement. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . when at the close it seizes its own notion . its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. when driven to expound itself. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion.('Rationalism') . a nd of logic in particular. remains identical with it. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. elevation of them into the absolute form. as also of the necessity in the two forms . immediate vision and its poetry. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. The charge of Atheism. finds itself already accompl ished.from these forms. and particularly of the logical form. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. and mediates what is thus open ed out. which determines itself to content. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . first the subjectiv e retreat inwards.which may be in both the same . from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought.and from a pithless orthodoxy. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. and against philosophy in general . which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason.i. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. This does not prevent the spirit. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms .stantial content into many separate shapes.

prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being.all possess substantia lity. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. also contains the generic abs tract. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. exclusi ve.of Pantheism. but as a proved fact.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph always adora tion of an object which. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in much so. and so . or any one man. if we believe them.Everything is .that of the Egyptians to the ox . On such a presuppo sition. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. most sublime. I select . and form all that is definite in the divine universality. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse .(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. Amongst the abundant resources. that it has too much of him: . thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality.thus he understands philosophy . or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . from which all definite quality is excluded. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . as is well known. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. are unable and unwilling to see this . and amongst it s effusions. as it stands. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. and is therefore. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: .of the new piety and new theology. whether higher or lower in the scale. that. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact.or to dalai-lamas .in the wanton assertion. Piety. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. or Pantheism. open to our disposal on this topic. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. or if you will. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . some of the most telling passage . and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. God in General. the secularity of th ings.that of the Hindu to ass much so. are) . fulfilled notion of God. Without interest of its own for the concrete. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. ¤ 71 note). Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism.g. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. without distinction. cows . goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . with all its the most authentic statement accessible .which therefore it does not disparage. This new theology. If this theory needs no more than such a God.the Bhagavat-Gita.each and every secular thing is God.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. It is only his own stupidity. in particular. does not comprehend itself. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. we must. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God.(empirical things. its grossest shape.

is not. . like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. This everything. and end of living things. the One which. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . the Everything. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. I am "Om" in all the Vedas.. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. is also the maddest of polytheisms. . the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. . . rather. . everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. pp. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe .not everything. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. . . which Krishna calls himself. besides Krishna. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. . not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. . . I am the spring amo ng the seasons. with a monstrous incons istency. . Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. Meru among the high-topped mountains. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . still God. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . I am the taste in water. . nothing independent]. . goodness. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. called Gods. . I am the discernment of the discerning ones.. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. passion. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. as also those proximate substantialities. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). . Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable.' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. . p. or a God besides. Hinduism. which he is. . and one essential amongst them. all this is woven upon me. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. has the higher conception of Brahma.. .' This 'All'. .that Hinduism. etc. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. melt into the one Krishna. . . any more than the Eleatic One. without essential being of its very own. . That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. and the Spinozan Substance.). vanish. and the moon among the lunar mansions. seated in the hearts of all beings. . . . as different from that accidental. grip. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. . the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. The undiscerning ones. . .spiritual as its idea of God i s . Indra. 7 seqq. where the empirical everything of the world. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. . at the beginning of the pass age. I am also the strength o f the strong. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. . he is said to be the beginning. or Indra. . In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. I am life in all beings. But so little concrete is this divine unity .'I am the self. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. but having its truth in the substance. t he pure unity of thought in itself. as he said before he was S iva. Among letters I am the letter A. to a poly theism.s. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. unessential existences. . Even when. .' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple powerless its. even Siva. middle. than which there is nothing higher. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . but only . There is nothing else higher than myself. however. . developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. so to speak .the most excellent of everything. . (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. is alo ne the divine and God. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. . 'At the end of many lives. .

floating in the indefinite blue . outside it . the finite to the infinite. and so on . Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. Of the oriental. especially the Mohammedan. and of empirical secular spirit. on one hand. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. modes of envisaging God. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One .keep its independence. and. which. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. the Eleatic. when he adores the its finest purity and sublimity. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature.of the world as one thing. and on the other. It is only the picture . moreover. and God everything. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic..and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. e. and that unity described as love. whether they spring from heart.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. If. even in a general exoteric discussion. in relation to the popular idea of the world. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. or Spinozist. That pantheism indeed . then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. is discarded and absor bed. as the endless lot of empirical existence.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. or other creature. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. the all. we must consult th e Mohammedans. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes.on the shallow conception of it . to was . which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences.. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. after this partition. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. but . as infinite from the it as a lot of Gods or as secular. secondl y. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. Hin du monotheism. But. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. as everything. ac osmical. But to go back again to the question of fact.g. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. imagination or speculation. on the contrary. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. to which everything is God. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. as it says. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. is identical with the world. or. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. For that unity.ndu.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. he is as essence parted from appearance. empirical indivi duals . of the relationship of God and the world. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism.

and the empty absolute. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. is what one expect s. they import them into philosophy. and which they ascribe to philosophy.e. with God's omnipresence.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. but rather its reverse. composition. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories.g. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. but with concrete unity (the notion). in the pores of th e physicists . it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. omnipresence. but only the one factor of this category of relation . as in the physical field the physicist. when they hear of unity . and lose sight of the chief point of interest . But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. if not even of supreme interest.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one.said pores being the negative. But they show so little acquaintance with them . Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. the notion and content of philosophy. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. and that hence. with abstract unity. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. mere ide ntity.g.and s till less take trouble about it . . where they are utterly unknown. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. and that amongst the m there is great variety. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. the most external and the worst.and that the factor of indet erminateness . a nd assert . they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. and that it is the system of identity.falsely as a fact . I n the philosophical field they proceed. inorganic and living .is identity. etc. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. as Epicu rus does. in matters admitted to be of superior. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . And as in their judgement either of the two . If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. But the question is.that. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. e. viz. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. however. not the concrete unity. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. i. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes.the world as much as Go d . they have laid hands on. with indefinite ideas.has the same solid substantiality as the other.te a word on what a 'notion' means. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. providence.and relation i pso facto implies unity . it is not.

which causes the movement and development. of which liberty is the aim. as of cognitions.the logical system. If statements as to facts are put forward. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . in his relation to the world. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. on the shoulders of philosophy.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . y .presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. as other than they. standing between the Mind and its essence. sunders itself. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. and notions . The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. the absolutely universal. then. The esoteric study of God and identity. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. and which is itself the way to produce it. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. a system of identity. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. But in ascribing to God. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. for its middle term: a middle.e. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. the notion. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . and as implicitly the Idea. an All-one doctrine. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: .their everything. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. this stale gossip of oneness or is the nature of the fact. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . is philosophy itself. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in the mediating agent in th e process . as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. and the latter its universal extreme. but the many-shaped modes specified. or as prevaricating for a purpose. which .which. On account of this chorus of assertions. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. But to put that sort of thing. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. making the former its presupposition. not abstract which notions are perverted into their opposite. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. which has self. Nature . shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. i. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded.knowing reaso n.ity .

The eternal Idea. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. eternally sets itself to work. in f ull fruition of its this same movement is equally the action of cognition. .

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