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INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any
attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i
s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as
treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.
however. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. li ght. in a sense.the passive of Aristotle. as such a result. These 'imponderables' .SUB-SECTION A. its simple 'ideal' life. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. a nd the soul remains the pervading. on the one hand. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and.the truth that matter itself has no truth. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity.with th is proviso. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. on the other. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. and not as the immediate or natural individual. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. which is potentially all things. and mind conceived as a thin g. Wherever there is Nature. and. i. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. and so the self-externalism. indeed. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. but soul. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. as absolute negativity. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. Mind. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. identical ideality of it all. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. the soul is only the sleep of mind . means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. where the othe . have still. whereas the 'vital' matter.. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. which is the fund amental feature of matter. however. perhaps. except where. etc. to which they might perhaps add space and time. ANTHROPOLOGY. even the capacity of offering resistance. It is otherwise with Mind. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. But not merely is it. matter is regarded as something true. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. The usual answer. not merely lacks gravity. At such a stage it is not yet mind. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself.e. like heat. There. thus come into being. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly.
e. etc. as in the case of Lei bniz. which only is. Spinoza. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. disappear. and always more or less. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. just in proportion to his civilization. even these few and slight susceptibilities. But either this identity. on the contrary. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. in the modes of that being.r is not . and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. and. Hence. (b) Secondly. when it presents itself as a single soul. and. with Leibniz. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . merely as another word for the incomprehensible. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. as individualized. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. .(a) In its immediate natural mode . Animals and pl ants. the changes of the seasons. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. as in the case of Spinoza. These have.is moulded into it. not. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. re tains an abstract independence. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system.whence Epicurus. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. feels the difference of climates. based upon participation in the common life of nature. they are natural objects for consciousness. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. described. it may be.e. its immediate being . In nations less intellectually emancipated. into the absolute syllogism. remain for ever subject to such influences. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. a world-soul. Descartes. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. or. in many case s completely. so to speak. sidereal. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. Malebranche.the natural soul. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. and telluri c life of man. as so often is done. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. is too abstract. it is a soul which feels. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. upon it. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. T hus. (c) Thirdly. so holding. and the periods of the day.or corporeity . (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. there philosophers took God. as an anima mundi. and does not rise or develop into system.
¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. And that individuality marks both the world which. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. character. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject.the sexual relation . His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. as it exists. bodily structure and disposit ion. on the whole. fails to meet his ideal requirements. as alterations in it. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. scientific.mind wrapped up in itself. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. of families or single individuals. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. This .a worl d no longer incomplete. we see man in his true relation to his environment. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. and as stages in its development. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. carrying out these universa . on its one side. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. and the position of the individual himself. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. shows. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . The contrast between the earth's poles. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. we find its diversities. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love.on a ph ysical basis. He begins with Childhood . physiognomy. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). fancies. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. or artistic. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. the one permanent subject. Thirdly. shows an active half. we find it as the special temperament. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. hopes. and on the other. widely distant from each other. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). talent . while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. in purposes political. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities.
which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. as already noted. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. . (c) Sensibility(3) . The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. distinguishes itself from its mere being. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). on a v isit to the University of Pavia. put this question to the class of ideology. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness.Napoleon. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. each point. sleep. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. for example. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence.not as a merely negative rest from it. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. but as a return back from the world of specialization. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. The characterization given in the section is abstract. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. . as before explained . The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . as they may be called.The waking is not merely for the observer. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. i n an unintelligent way. although. . we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. which are often addressed to philosophy: . or self-centralized being.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. viz. in the first instance. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence.
in its own self. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . In this way we have two spheres of feeling. for itself. which.g. it is true. fornication. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . the inarticulate bre athing. This should hardly need enforcing. are our very own. and is so felt. mean. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). and . true.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. But if put in the feelin g. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. is what we call sensibility. on one hand. etc.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. just. evil. and to be as if found. but treated as bel onging to its most special. One. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. Another. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. belonging as it does to natural.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. mora l. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. blasphemy. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. ho wever. in the feeling. the naturally immedi ate. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. etc. are in order to be felt. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life.identity of our self-centred being. etc. the conscience. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. murder . of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. adultery. its natural peculiarity. invested with cor poreity. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts.. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. be it noted. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. primarily. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. moral. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. The fact that these particulars. not mere alterations. the fact is a mode of my individuality. On the other hand and conversely. godless. are found by the waking soul. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. and religious.set over against consciousness. and the character. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad.
are formed from their mental source. and their corporization. therefore. of self. to take possessi on of it.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . sighs. works itself out. set in its self-centred life.a psychical physiology. for example. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . As sentient.because in it. distinction appears as mere variety .whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. (¤¤ 321. In the usage of ordinary language.e. the immediacy of mode in feeling . sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. in a special system of bodily organs. We should have. o f colours. to the character of subjectivity. is to raise its substantiality. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . (¤ 317) .(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. laughter.it is a soul which feels. tones.and of sound. the centre of the 'sensible' system. with which that substance is one. the 'irritable' system. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d.in the system of the senses. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. What it has to do. especially the passions or emotions. of heavy matter. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. e. the soul is no longe r a mere natural.it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . . But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . i. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. just because they are immediate and are found existing. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. smells. with its varieties of language. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y.the senses of definite light. to realize its mastery over its own. and voice in general. ¤ 402 Sensations. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. i ts merely virtual filling-up. but an inward. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. the blood. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation .g. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). (c) the sense of solid reality. 322). But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. (¤ 300). following the special character of the mental mode. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent.
of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. which is disease. By itself. ideas and information. They were not in our possession. etc. a deep featureless characterless mine. which is at the same time its predicate. without existing. ideas. in sickness. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory.the existent spe culative principle.that world being included in it and filling it up. the s oul is characterized as immediate. At the present stage this singleness is. but only to his im plicit self. prima rily.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. in an implicit mode. ¤ 404 As individual. to which the soul. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. omnipresent unity. acquired lore. first. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . which repre sents it as the negation of the real. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). but a negation. As sentient. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. it brings within itself. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. secondly. the corporeity. once mor e come to light. so far as that is. Some times. Thus in the body it is one simple. the content is its particular world. although it does not exist. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . where the real is put past . may again sink down. virtually retained. and to that world it stands but as to itself. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. In the present stage we must treat.as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. thoughts. to be defined as one of feeling . in whi ch all this is stored up. etc. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. it implies a want of adaptation. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal.. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one.
etc. self-possessed. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . say between friends. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. but as efficiency and realized activity. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. Here are two individuals. etc. and is therefore passive. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. of the mother. etc. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. which. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. incl inations. self-conscious. idiosyncrasies. or virtuality. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. temper. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. of life. congenital disposit ion and temperament. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. as it has existence of its own.a substance. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius.is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. character. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . the single self of the two. and of character.. his secular ideas.. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. not yet as its self. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. The moth er is the genius of the child. etc. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. or capac ity.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. it is.a subject which may even exist as another individu al.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. because immediate. not a true subject reflected int o itself. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . developed interests. whose decision is ul . is visibly present as another and a different individual. the psychical relationship. not as a mere possibility. as concrete subject ivity. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. fortunes. placenta. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. injuries. intellige nt. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. controlling genius thereof. tal ent. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. and reasonable. as yet nothing impenetrable. By the self-hood of the latter it .
timate whatever may be the show of reasons. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. in other words. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. But such a verification would. it might seem. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . self-possessed human being is a disease. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. means. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. intentions.to be mere deception and impo sture. which are also means and ends to each other. on the cont rary. The facts. first of all call for verificati on. To that end the phenomena.his fun damental interests. At the same tim e. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. This totality forms his actual ity. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. on the other hand. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. it must be added. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . educated. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . it has already been call ed his genius. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. in which the individual here appears innnersed. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. is. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that .to show. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. that it is in harmony wi th the facts. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling.
But. When the substance of both is thus made one. and to know which. formed.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. or at the approach of death. but it is empty. ca pable of conveying general truths. in catalepsy. which lead up to the result . . unless by the aid of religion. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. external one to another. and hears. and other diseases. on those left behind. etc.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. not really a 'person'. his own and that of the magnetize . and character. exist for it as an outward objectivity. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. a formal vision and awareness.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. And because it is the adult. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. not on the spot. then. . wh en it is healthy and awake. in its sober moods. But such clairvoyance . those c onnected with female development. etc. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. in whom it sees. smells. (Thus Cato. subje ctive reason.). shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. and c ontinues to be. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. for example. . however.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep.a genius which beh olds itself. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality .) Compare h ome-sickness. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. subject to the power of another person. reads. which.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. etc. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. is this. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. tastes. is under a veil.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. that it is a state of passivity. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. the magnetizer. the selfless individual. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. like that of the child in the womb. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. after the downfall of the Roman republic. and the like. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. f riends.
or med icines for them. one sees and hears with the fingers. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. which. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. The purely sensitive life. beholds. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. etc. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it.fe eling. which still marks the self-feeling. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. and hence. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. on the contrary. receives. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. is without any definite points of attachment . But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. it is still susceptible of disease. though all-embracing. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. e. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. as in the morbid state alluded to.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. reasons. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. the 'common sense'. in this nominal perception. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. between intelligent personality and objective world. as in other cases. which is no less a world of law. In considering insanity we must. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. so long as we assume independent personalities. In this way it is self. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. and especially with the pit of the stom ach.r. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. and at the same time. etc. i. for example. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. anticipate the full-grown an . essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. in its capacity as individual. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. is impossible. i s just this form of immediacy. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. causality. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective.
and so makes part of the actual self. and it is only as a thing. may. which is there also. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. the self is to be stamped upon.e. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. presupposes the patient's rationality. that it is liable to insanity . it would be death). etc. loss of health (if it were that.d intelligent conscious subject. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character.e. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. and also desires. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . pride. as a thing. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. . Mind as such is fr ee. i. In the concrete.feeling. but only derangement. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. and made appear in. This particular being of the soul is t . A violent.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. mere and total. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. is undistinguis hed from them. as something natural and existent.. inclination. as now regarded. moral and theoretical. passions. however.e. and be a realized u niversality. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. this life of feeling.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. as it aris es. earthly elements are set fr ee . a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. such as vanity. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. is diseased. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. etc. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. equally formal. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). This humane treatment. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. i. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. the. and their gratification). The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). And so too the particularity is. i. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. instincts.that evil which is always latent in the heart.just as physical disease is not an abstract. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former.. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. idea. is relaxed. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y.merely personal love and hatred. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. desire. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. and so also may the cure. so as to insert them in their proper place. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. but a contr adiction in it. and the rest of the passions .fan cies and hopes . B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred.
heat. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. dist inguishing it from itself . is reduced to unity. et c. The soul is freed from them. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. or dependent in regard to it. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. and so no longer interested. the one and the same. occupied. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such.e. lacking consciou sness. and the generation o f habit as practice. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. Habit is rightly called a second nature. but the basis of consciousness. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. are only subjectiv e forms. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. on the contrary. su bjective substantiality of it .and becoming the 'ideal'. a second nature. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. and the mere substance. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. For. sleep.he factor of its corporeity. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . i.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. but has them and moves in them. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. and that as a barrier for it. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings..itself a simple being .just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. weariness o . and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. of it. of which it is the subjective substance. this being of the soul. as. will. And consciousness it becomes. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. when the co rporcity. has been absorbed by it. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. partly only relative. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. The natural qualities and alterations of age. therefore. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. even in being affected by them. so is that pure being (which. and for that reason n ot free. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. Habit like memory. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. That is to say. a pure act of intuition. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . but still free. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. nor is absorbed in the m. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. and which still continues to exist. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). nature. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. empty space and empty time.
that although the frost. cut off from action and reality. consciousness. are no longer bothered with it. Habit on an ampler scale. is recollection and memory. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. nor an abstrac t inwardness. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. etc. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence.. too. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. a series of musical notes) is in me. And it is true that the form of habit. an 'ideality' of soul . re ligious. Thinking. to be made a power in the bodily part. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. and the self-feeling as such. like any other. etc.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. whereof we sha ll speak later.or the misfortune . habit diminishes this feeling. Even here.. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. his upright pos ture. and especially so in the specific bodily part. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought.is felt. and any other purp oses and activity.enabling the matter of consciousness. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure.f the limbs. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. reflection. habit is usually passed over - . the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. intuition. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless.concentration. sweet tastes. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. a particular organ of i ts organic system). It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. but part and parcel of his being. acquires a strength which consists in this. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). made into an instrum ent.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . under its volitional and conceptual characters. which make it up. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. without an express adjustment. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. This is the rational liberation from them. etc. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self.g. this soul. the spatial direction of an individual. and that they. like their satisfaction. so that when the conception (e. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. and it is habit of living which brings on death. intelligence. . fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. to be his as this self.. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. i. etc. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. casual. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. nor a transient emotion or idea. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. etc. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always.e. or skill. consciousness. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. or. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. viz.). if quite abstract. has been by will made a habit . and particul ar. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. moral. The most ext ernal of them. to exist as substance in its corporeity. nor are they in conce ption rational. and thus to enable the soul. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. and no other. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature.
is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. This note is so slight. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. for example.either as something contemptible . the upright figure in general. And the human figure. still vainer than a signatura rerum.. and i s infinite self-relation. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. represents not itself. in other words. especially the hand. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. Under the head of human expression are included. 71). and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. for the soul. it is related to itself. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. 1. The soul. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. 5. of which it is the sign. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. 2.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. as the absolut e instrument. indefinite. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. In this identity of interior and exterior. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. 4. and the formation of the limbs. Naturliche Qualitaten. Empfindung. unable to represent it in its actual universality. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . the latter subject to the former. finds itself there a single subject. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. in its concentrated self. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. absorbing it. Seen from the animal world. Naturliche Seele. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. Plato says in the Timaeus (p.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. but the soul. cuts itself off from its immediate being. of the mouth . 3.laughter. etc. and inexpressible a modific ation. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. a world external to it . or abstract universality. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. in being related to which. 'The autho . (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. This externality. weeping. while language is its perfect expressi on. Die fuhlende Seele. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. or the 'immediacy' of mind. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. and making it its own.
the light.the soul's natural life . seem to be its own activity. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). is only its abstract formal ideality. like reciprocal dependence in general. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. Gewohnheit. but to the foolishness of man. but when he receives the inspired word. does not. i. 7. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. 6. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. now. Hence consciousness. which manifests itself and something else too . for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. as external to it. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. The mind as ego is essence. 8. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. in the sphere of essence. something dark and beyond it. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities .' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. not to the wisdom. but is implicit. Selbstgefuhl. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. and .to an equal freedom as an independent object.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. as this absolute negativity. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'.e.it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . but since reality. as subjective reflection in itself. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. and as such it is C onsciousness. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. to it. Ego. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . It is of this latter. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). thus first made explicit as the Ego.
and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. the substantial and qu alitative. i. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414).to the ego it seems an alteration of the object.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. an existent. As against Spinozism. immediate consciousness. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . as Reason. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. but as poorest in thought. Spatial and temporal Singularn . what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. an intuitive intellect. and puts it first under the category of being. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. what makes the object the subject's own. and so on. with an object set against it. etc. a something. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. is further characterized a s immediately singular. a singular. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is.as a case of correlation . ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. (b) self-consciou sness. Ego. i. or mere c ertainty. being immediate. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. an existing thing. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is.e. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. the notion of mind. the subject of consciousness. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). first. but only as it is in reference to something else. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). reflected in itself. This is sense-consciousness. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple.a subject-objectivity. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. in other words. to raise its self-certainty to truth. Consciousness . and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). The object is only abstractly characterized as its. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. again. The object similarl y. and even t he Idea of Nature. has emerged from Spinoz ism. and that the philosophy. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. t heir absolute interdependence. It appears as wealth iest in matter. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. and underived certainty of it.e.. for which ego is the object. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. a thing-in-itself. which is not as its own.
as not externally different from the other. as we called it. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. however. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. and not yet as external on its own part. has many properties.a copy of the phenomenon. or as being beside and out of itself. so constr uing the object. i. . and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground .the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. ¤ 423 The law. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. lies im mediately in the other. what it is in truth. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. and more or less by the sciences. a something external to it. wants to take the object i n its truth. not as merely immediate. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. taken in its concrete content. and. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . on one hand. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. reflected in itself. the thing. in that manner. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . and universalities. an abstract identity: on the other hand.). and universal. by being regarded in their bearings. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. it is related. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . but as mediated. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. in this case by t he Ego. however. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. is sense-perception. or the distinction which is none. and sensuous consciousness. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. of the thing is. the distinction on its own part. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness.ess.e. but brought to rest and universality. to which.bet ween the individuality of a thing which.e.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. reflected upon. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . which form the alleged ground of general experience. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . its necessity on its own part.a variety of relations. permanent term s. free from this negative l ink and from one another. to describe the sensible. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. and am aware'. reflectional attributes. the one of the terms. having passed beyond the sensible. p. has. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. i. 73). But in this manner the interior distinction is. experiences. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. Thi s inward. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. viz.
Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. with the nega tion of it. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. or. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. and a desire (appetite) . nominally. To this activity the object. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. On the external side it conti nues. pure 'Ideality'. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. in this return upon itself. in its immediacy. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. and itself made actual. is a singular. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. knows itself implicit in the object. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. The two processes are one and the same. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. on the contrary . therefore. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. and ma intains itself as such. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality.as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. there is strictly speaking no object. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. this identity comes to be for the ego. on the whole.With this new form-characteristic. or implicitly. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. therefore. the latter. implicit in it.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. can make no resistance: the dialectic. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. primarily describable as an individual. and thus in it I am aware of me. being merely consumed. The certitude of one's self. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. its satisfaction realized.
and formation of it. must likewise be kept in life. the slave. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. solves the contradiction.for the means of mastery. however. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. in the service of the master. a suppression. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. it. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. as one of two things for another. as the existence of hi s freedom. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union.e consciousness of a 'free' object. negati on of immediacy. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. ¤ 434 This status. f rom the essential point of view (i. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. Thus arises the status of master and slave. though by the abstract. and thus give existence to my freedom. the outward and visible recognition). we see. and to exist as such for the other: . preservation. and incurs a like peril for its own . in which ego is aware of itself as an ego.t he process of recognition. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. however. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. ¤ 435 But secondly. works off his individualist self-will.e. then. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. at first immedi ately. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. retains his single self-consciousness. the slave. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction .) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. on the ir phenomenal side. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. which falls on another. not their underlying and essential principle. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. and its being for others. While the one com batant prefers life. from one point of view. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. and the means for entering into relation with them. Force. which is the basis of this phenomenon. This other. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . Force. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. in the first place. w hich however is also still outside it.but only p eril. Thus the death of one. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. when we look to the distinction of the two. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. therefore rude. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. In that other as ego I behold myself. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. is yet. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood.
5. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness.or rather it is a difference which is none. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. For truth here has. Reason. Wahrnehmung 3. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. as its peculiar mode and immanent form. etc. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. than they are its own thoug hts. therefore. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. 1. Der Verstand. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. aware of what it is. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. 4.which is Reason. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness .the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. is mind (spirit). idle fame. the self-centred pure notion. The uni versality of reason. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. love. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness.is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . ego. . which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. Truth. friendship.f wisdom' . Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. bu t the truth that knows it. Selbstbewu§tsein. state. valour. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . fatherland. and of all virtues. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free.consciousness.the passage to universal self. is Reason.in family. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. is now itself universal. whilst it signifies that the object. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. or determinations of the very being of things. Die Begierde 6. fame. honour. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears.
is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist.the former a simple immediate totality. Die Vernunft. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. This. etc. or. restricted by that content. it has a mode in its knowledge. SUB-SECTION C.. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . but is an awareness of this substantial totality. ideation. then its reality is that reason. in the soul as a physical mode.in one word. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . as its concept has just shown. viz. i. PSYCHOLOGY.mental vision.e. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. in thinking also and in desire and will. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. though it no longer has an object. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . ¤ 441 The soul is finite. what is the same thing. and which as the reality of that notion. neit her subjective nor objective. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason.7. in so far as it has an object. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason.. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. And it is a matter of no consequence. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. remembering. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. Cons ciousness is finite. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. etc. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. Mind is finite. it is finite by means of its immediacy. therefore. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. above the material. the latter now an infinite form which is not. etc.apart b oth from the content. however. desires. which is defined as it s notion. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. like consciousness. Mind. and above the complication with an external object . in so far as .
it thereby reduces itself to finitude. or. to reach and get hold of itself. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. of comprehending itself. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. k nowledge.e. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. equally. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon.e. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development.e. it is . viz. in freedom. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. and being a rational knowledge. so far. Thus. viz. and make the affection subjective. forces. in so far as its existent phase. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. and are the mind's own. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. As the theory o f Condillac states it. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. i. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. that aspect is twofold . the na tural soul (¤ 413). as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415).as being and as its own: by the one. the mind finds in itself something which is. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it.reality of its reason. When the affection has been rendered its own. Similarly. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. is misconceived and overlooked. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. and to liberate itself to its elf. and its activity can only have itself as aim. that is. i. and the negative aspect of mental activity. and is even there a return into itself.
and is immediately willed. has a material which is only nominally such. and gains abstract auton omy within.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. which in the first place is likewise formal . that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. while the practical. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . and heartless intellects .g. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. This activity is cognition.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. Inwards . This position of psychology. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. The nominal knowledge. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. its content is at first only its own. like logic. in the theoretical range. but) enjoyment.i.e. It is still extremely ill off. is thus also a reality . merely as facts. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world.. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. both for the mind as such. wi th a material which is its own. and therefore a restricted content. elevates itself. just as they are given. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. while it has to do with autonomous products.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. and of the heart without the intellect . to get at the notion and the truth. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. But as knowledge. etc. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. belong to a point of view utt . as it is said. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. Ou twards. e. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. the word. for which it gains the form of universality. as r eason is concrete. to definite and conceptual knowledge. and that in its empirical condition. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. along with which the content is realized as rational. Psychology. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. Its activity has to do with the empty form .(b) Will: practical mind. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. which is only certitude. which it and the content virtually is. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity.
etc. if answered in the negative. remembers. conception. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. are not isolated. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. If they are isolated. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. by rational conception. just so far as it realizes itself. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. imagines. conceived as reflected into self. memory. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself.whi ch. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . imagination. or mind.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act.e. It is true that even as isolated (i.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . like power or force. But c ognition is genuine. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. etc. remembrance. etc. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. intelligen ce. But the true satisfaction. must lead to abandoning the effort. as it is by the same method brought into nature. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. Faculty. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. that intuition. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection.in a word . conceives. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. conception. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. cognitive conception. by cognitive intuition.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. viz. as non-intelligent). is bro ught into mind. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. it is admitted. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. imagination.besides which it al so intuits. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality .is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. or makes the concept its own.its out-of-selfness . it . however. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. etc. etc. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned .: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. To take up such a position is i n the first instance.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. note). intuition.
a . the mere consciousness point of view. this mode is simple. may just as likely be narrow and poor. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. . as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. has the form of casual particularity . which the mind as it fe els is to itself. in content and value entirely contingent. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. Feeling is the immediate. in t he truth of mind.his private and p articular self. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. projects it into time and space. with the character of something existent.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. 254). If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. external or internal. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247.to the generalit ies of common sense . wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. or at least to reasons .the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. Now the material. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. but rather as subject ive and private.one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . we have the one fa ctor in Attention . and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . of their essential relationships and real cha racters.is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever.an active self-collection . as it were the closes t. that is t o say. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things.t he factor of fixing it as our own. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. With us.but to his feeling. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. Hence feeling. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. is swallowed up.
and is arbitrary or contingent. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. as tho ught.in a space and a time of its own. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. i. a rec ollection of itself. though intrinsically concrete. but stored up out of consciousness. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. or. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. however. The representation is the property of intelligence. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. the germ as affirmatively containing. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree.the germ of the fruit. and inwardly divest itself of it. its when and where. still continues simple. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. we may say. t ime. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. in virtual possibility. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. from the external place. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. yet without being in consciousnes s. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. which makes it its own. and received into the universality o f the ego. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. . and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. as it at first recollects the intuition. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. no longer needs to find the content. which. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. Inability to grasp a universal like t his.e. in the way we treat. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. isolated. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. for example. with a preponderating subjectivity. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition.
It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. ¤ 20 note. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. that it finds its material. wherea s the idea (representation). In the first place. i.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. by which it is authenticated. at first only in space and time. see Introduction to the Logic.e. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. . an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. Secondly. reason and consequence.viz. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. The image. if it is to exist. notion. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. where. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property.) . just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. now that it has been endued with externality. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. present also a distinction in content. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. the matter is entirely pictorial. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. but a being of its own institution.in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. has always the peculiarity. The content reproduced.these modes of relation are not laws. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. where it is treasured up. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. has been broken up. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. whatever be its content (from image.Image and Idea. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness .. though belonging to intelligence. to be so and so. which is now the power over them. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. But it is solely in the conscious subject. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. as a unit of intuition. or ide a). Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. comes actually into its possession. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. as of all intelligence. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. such as likeness and contrast. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. or an intell ectual category. and an out-put from its universal m ine. being and universality. under the representation (idea) with the same content. as a matter of fa ct.
Abstraction. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. it is self-uttering. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. and becomes an i ndividuality. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. a concrete subjectivity.still lacks the side o f existence.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. but only a nominal reason. one's own and what is picked up. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. Another point calling for special notice is that. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. etc. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. In other words. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. for its ideal import is its elf. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. is derived from the data of intuition.Imagination. i. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. or something of the sort. This force is really intelligence itself . This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). As reason. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). 435). ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. so far a s it is concerned. allegoric. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. . and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments.e. Such is creative imagination(7) . internal and external. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. when regarded as the agency of this unification. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. are completely welded into one. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. and in mechanical memory it completes. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. These more or less concrete. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization.. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. this form of being. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. .where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . a force of attraction in like images must be assumed .symbolic. is reason. recollection. which forms their connecting link. some latent concept or Ideal principle. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. are unifications of t he same factors. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. but they are 'syntheses'. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. Acting on this view. derived from some interest. to universalize it. or poetical imagination .
in the first instance. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence .gives to sensations. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. somewhat immediate or given (for example. In logic and psychology. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . have nothing to do with each oth er. The sign is some immediate intuition. when employed as a sign.. and the connotation of which it is a sign. intuitions. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence.in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. With regard to the elementary material of language. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. has always to do with signs only. the matter of the latter is.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). This institution of the natura l is the vocal note.). language . and even with conception and imagination. Sausen.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. This intuition is the Sign. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. whereas in the sign. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. but as representative of something else. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. and where it is conserved. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. . The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas .there have been collected more than a hundred such words. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). since memory. etc.th at of vocal objects. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. its institution by intelligence. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). its system.now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. out of which it forms i deas . but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection).R auschen. Such is the negativity of intelligence. e tc. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . But in the fusion of the two elements.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. strictly so-called. ¤ 459 The intuition .speech and. It is a n image. conception s. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . Knarren. something accepted. the colour of the cockade.
uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. alphabetical writing. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. . Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. W. and now that. the denomination. which severally receive designation. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization.e.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. but. and only get signification as signs.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. on anthropological articulation. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. like the Chinese. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. we may touch. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. as many as ten a . as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. if it be not altogether extinguished. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. It is only a stationary civ ilization. i. again. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. the planets . as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. etc. tongue in each) and for their combinations. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. . The study of languages still in their original state. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. As to the formal elem ent. i. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. for example. instead of n ames proper. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. In particular.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. as regards signs for mental objects. the chemical elements. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. they are reduced to signs. are frequently changed. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. (Cf. as in our signs for the numbers.). The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. it depends. palate. in chemistry and mineralogy.e. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. as. only in pas sing.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. and still takes place in Canton .e. viz. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). on the other hand. i. their signs in vocal language. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas.
the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. the simple straight stroke.the name. in speaking.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. of uttering its ideas most worthily . not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. just as in modern times (as already noted. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. or simple logical terms. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. however ample a connotation it may include. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. Hieroglyphics. This feature of hieroglyphic . in the case of the Chinese Koua. the simple plain idea. it is analysed. learn ing to speak Chinese. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . . A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. peculiar to the intellect. Engaging the attention of intelligence. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity.e. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. Both alike require such signs. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. i. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. Thus. by speaking low and soft or crying out.the mode. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. in the interest o f vision. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. like alphabetic writing. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. is still for the mind simple in the name). so that.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements.nd twenty. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. as it does. The European. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound.is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. while (with the facu . and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition.
lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,
but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you
ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.
¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex
The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. it is because of their quality or co ntent . and precisely in that way d o they . the truth and. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. in feeling. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. Delight. etc. joy. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. we have only to deal with the selfish. shame. But as both. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law.but only in antithesis to the latter . right. namely God. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. may be placed. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. and evil. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. but presented in its universality and necessity. is precisely what constitutes. and to discus s their content. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. lack objective determin ation. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself).. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . Whereas in life. and duty. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . when thought. On the other hand. bad.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general.. heart. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. repentance. we have this immanen . evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. in which these facts. and still more in mind. in its objectivity and truth. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. wha t is the same thing.retain a speciality of their own . and will. If feelings are of the right sort. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. etc. on the one hand. Thus it is. can also be felt. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. contentment. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. in their immediacy. in their universality and necessity. volition. and thought.indeed infinitely so. law and morality. for the latter. But where the objects sought are thus casual. grief.
Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . What are the good and rational propensiti es. passion is neither good no r bad. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. Which are good and bad? . .natural impulse and inclination. on the other. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. Thus. each being always in conflict to another. first of all.Up to what degree the good continue good. Should.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. but to ge t realized. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. are infected with contingency.a development in which the content of autonomous . Will. The answer to the question. they. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. ego. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. which is essentially self-d etermination. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. subjectivity . Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. The will. while. finds in the conformity .an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. talent. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. and something inappropriate to it. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. In what way have they. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. it is pa ssion. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. on one hand. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul .and (as there are ma ny. and their truth. But with regard to the inclinations.on one aim and object. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . too often. is at first still a natural will. character. the question is directly raised. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. as experience shows. be the value of tha t mode what it may.his inte rests of intellect. In consequence of this formalism. as r egards the form of its content. indeed. If the will is to satisfy itself. their mutual connect ions. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . therefore. as rights and duties. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. It is on ly a dead. enjoyment . the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. however. admitting of gratification. each with its private range). But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such.
and one satisfaction. ¤ 476 The will. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. It is thus 'reflecting' will. on one hand. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. and social duties. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. where the subject is made to close with itself. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. which reflection and comparison have educed. As thus contradictory.action loses its contingency and optionality. The morality concerns the content of the aim. is his interest and . moral. without end. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. They are somet imes contrasted. of a universal sa tisfaction. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. there would be no action at all. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. an inactive thing. unless he had an interest in it. by another.his passion. and is option or choice. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. either alto gether or in part. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. Their mutual limitation. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. that finds its actualizing in the agent. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. it is on them that the decision turns. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . as thinking and implicitly free. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. .e. this is wh at is called the interest. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . However. so far as their particularity goes. An action is an aim of the subject. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. as the content. which as such is the universal. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. inclinations.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. which is just as much no satisfacti on. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. i. the impulses. on the whole to their disadvantage. are reduced to a m ere negative. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. the free gift of nature.
Africa and the East. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. Plat o and Aristotle.e . of present sensati on and volition.e. aim. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. education. which i s pure and concrete at once. and that as its very actuality. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . If the will. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. still this very I . with freedom itself.e.an individuality. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world.sired . did not have it. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. etc. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted .freedom itself. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. which realizes its own freedom of will. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. of the family. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. Whole continents. he is actually free. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. its very au tonomy or freedom. and the abstract singleness. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. is actu ality. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object.is matter of speculation. is in the first instance the rational will in general. the divine min d present with him. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. On the contrary. as realizing the idea. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will .e. and of which it is only t he formal activity. and are constituted after its measure. that is. have never had this Idea. According to Christianity. knows this its concept. i. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. i. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. just because it is the very essence of mind. therefore. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. fortuitousness . No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. ambiguous. so that in this sphere of particular existence.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim.a universality which only ought to be. or by s trength of character. i. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. as the substance of the state. and object . in religion as such . that men are aware of freedom as their essence. he h as also. now that the formalism. the will is an actually free will. even the Stoics. for example. an Athenian or Spartan citizen).to be aware. and is will as free intelligence. or implicit Idea. only so far as it thinks itself .it is the existential side of reason . and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. If. however. If to be aware of the Idea . But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. and are without it still. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. or philosophy (. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. As abstract Idea again. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. The Greeks and Romans.
1. 3. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. Die Intelligenz. Die Einbildungskraft. Der freie Geist. Das Denken. 4. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. into legal. Der Geist 2.dea itself is the actuality of men . its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. as men. moral. is itself only a notion . Die Erinnerung 6. which the content and aim of freedom has. Auswendiges. but the pe rmanent character . Vorstellung. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. Das praktische Gefuhl. 16. Anschauung. 7. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves.a principle of the mind and heart. if they are made slaves. religious. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . 5. 12. Der praktische Geist 13. Phantasie 8. but which they are.not something which they have. Inwendiges. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. 10. 9. Gedachtnis. not with laws or court s of justice. they would find the very substance of their life outraged.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. 15. 11. and not less into scientific actuality. 14. Die Gluckseligkeit. But this freedom.
the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. are no less its duties to punish. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom.e. temper. not in the form of impulse. or instituted as an authoritative power. In the morality of the conscience. i. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. so as to become its habit. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity.(1) When. and brings into existence i n these several wills. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. Liberty. where free will has existence. viz. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. in relation to the subjective will. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. But. is also a right.at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. receives the form of Necessity. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. which splits up into different heads: viz. or Usage. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. anthropological data (i. duty in general is in me a free subject . when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. These conditi ons. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. What is a right is also a duty. where they. and is the vi rtual universal. military service. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. which in it is thus at home with itself. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. being universal. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. in these externally objective aspects. but as possession by a person it is property. and what is a duty. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners.. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. The penal judicature of a government. Liberty. are duties . is a duty.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. and it is a duty to possess things as property. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. to be as a person. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them.. on the other hand. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. to administer. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. etc. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. But in this individualist moral sphere. it exists as manner and custom. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. in the light of the concept. or legal possession. as the services of the members of the State in dues. its rights of admi nistration. my right to a thing is not merely possession.. their absolute unity. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. but in its universality. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). in general. private an d personal needs).and aim. relation to another person . These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will.e. For a mode of existence is a right. are its Duties. is the Law (Right ) . etc. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. it is a Law. and character. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. etc. ought to h ave and can only have their existence.
at first in the outward appropriation. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. it is the right of the subjective will. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. as something devoid of will. though it remains in trinsically the same. as in itself still abstract and empty. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. civil society. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. Sitte A. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. As so characterized.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. the infinite self-rela tion. but as existence of the personality is an end. (B) When the will is reflected into self. possession is property. which as possession is a means. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. But the set of adjustments. and the I in it is abstractly external. These extremes are the persons who. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself.possession. which is thus mutual. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. in the knowledge of their identity as free. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. . But this predicate. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. the external sphere of its liberty . are simultaneously mutually independent. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. so as to have its existence inside it. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. 1. Gesetz 2. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. or by the formatio n of the thing or. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . morality of the individual conscience. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. and hence as a single being . abstract right. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. but on an external thi ng. This thing. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. by mere designation of it. and State. it may be. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. is an individual. on its own account me rely 'practical'.
This is naiv e. is affirmed. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . universal thing or commodi ty.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive.just as well with draw it as not. willed. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). 493 seqq. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. then the external rec . breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. in that case. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. because they face each other.Contract. is disinterested. ¤ 495 The contract. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. I can just as well put it in it as not . the only diversity lies in this. its changing hands. But so far as my will lies in a thing. expressing the civil suit. however. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . and the will refers only to the e xternal thing.the full and complete deed. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. and recogniz ed. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. and. non-malicious wrong. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement.). but which. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. and its acceptance by the other will. which thus becomes wicked. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. and time. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. which. labour. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . produces a wrong: by which. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. eac h and all are invested with a show of right.
which is nominal and recognized by him only .st rictly so called . the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. and commits a crime. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. is at the same time only a new outrage. such an action is essentially and actually null.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. or right as governed by the nature of things. In it the agent. But more than possible compulsion is not. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. from life. Conversel y. as a volitional and intelligent being. This gives the wrong of fraud . The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone .on self-determination or autonom y. b ut the sterling value is let slip. and not merely the particular mode .e.compulsion against the thing. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. by the n otion.e.a universal which holds good for him.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. which is disinterested . is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . howe ver. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will.is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. The law of nature . in which the law of nature should hold sway. As such it is mo rality(2) proper.in this case the apparent recognition.where the nominal relation is retained. and while the former only is respected. being conformable to the right.) Thus the will is violently wicked. i. or in corporeity. The 'reality' of right. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. is a matter of chance). the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. like the last. an d so on without end. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. This progression. is the work of Revenge. or Natural Right. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. on . which is the very contrary of determination by nature. The social state. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. The former used to be the common meaning. i. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature.punishment. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . sets up a law . and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . To display the nullity of such an act. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. in revenge. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. even from the range of all existen ce. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. and can be seized only in t his quarter. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll.a law. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. that of the judge. the latter is violated. But revenge.
and means the m ental or intellectual in general. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. and thus comes into relationship with the former. Moralitat 3. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. etc. so much as it has consciously willed. who. B. is now chara cterized as a subject .(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . my part in i t is to this extent formal. an d allows to be imputed to it. be its affection w hat it may. The subjective will is morally free. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. intelligence. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. but have their assent. the will is at the same time made a particular. in mere law. it thus includes purpose and intention . intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. conscience. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. Das Recht. recognition. sentiment. In point of form. though any alteration as such. is its deed. and willed by it. or even justification in his h eart. embracing these individual point s. This is the right of intention. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed.the other hand. Naturrecht. 1.and also moral wickedness. 2. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing.a will reflected into itself so that. its own. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. counts only as a person. so far as these features are it s inward institution. which was its purpose. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. Now. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. the reason of the will.
the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. At the same time because good is one. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. on account of that existent sphere of liberty.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. a good intention in case of a crime. in point of its matter. when similarly comprehended in a single aim.g. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. and yet each of them. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. and aims.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. These aims. interests. as in happiness (¤ 479). is not something external to him. it is always something particular. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction .and thus including in it particularity . Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. as individual and universal. though it is a particular duty. And yet they ought to harmonize. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. they ought to stand in harmony. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. but is a particul arity of his own . is always fundamentally one identity. This is the right to well-being. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. But at the same time in aim ing at the good.that it contains his needs.e. can be wicked.a universal determined in its elf . because the agent. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. will . the essential and actual good. his interest and welfare must.being only in this.ion. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. whether the . it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . is as g ood and as duty absolute. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. constitute h is well-being. essential and actual. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality.
appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. 6. 5. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. and refuse it to the wicked. On the affirmative side. an aim essentially and actually null. rising to its pitch. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. its deepest descent into itself. Handlung. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. th e essential thing. Die Absicht und das Wohl. in the notion. and of the good. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . expressed by this repeated ought. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . is. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. Der Vorsatz 3. 1. which would only be abstract. which has no objectivity. on its negative side. in something external therefore. The subjectivity.of Conscience and Wickedness. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: .sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. which actualizes and dev elops it. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. The result. in this its identity with the good. to be carried out in it. That.good is realized. non-universal. is only the infinite form. but is only sure of i tself. The failure of the latter consists . Das Gute und das Bose C. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. and duty. Moralitat 2. good. which is the good. THE MORAL LIFE.the utterly abstract semblance . Wickedness. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. This pure self-certitude. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. i . right .the standpoint of the ought. no more exist than not.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. is abandoned. and the wicked. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will.to a goodness. the truth of this semblance. 4. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. The for mer is the will of goodness. the unutterable.
(c) Th e self-conscious substance. it exists as confidence.e . whose independence it. without any selective refl ection.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. to a spiritual significance. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . as against the univers al. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. that it is. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. mind ap pears as feeling. Thus. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. makes this union an ethical tie . abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. But the person. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. In the shape of the family. in its immediacy. In the latter sphere. etc. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n .yet somewhat which without all question is.e. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. This is the sexual tie. to the total of ethical actuality. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. controls and entirely dominates from within. as an intelligent being. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject.the Political Constitution.Marriage. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . in its ki nd.the genuine ethical temper. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. is virtue.Civil Society. however. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. however. i. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. is confidence (trust) . ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. elevated. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. . i. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance.monog . as deliberate work for the community. temperament. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. to destiny. the individuality expres ses its special character. as personal virtues. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists.th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal.n a thing . and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. manner and cu stom .ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it .the Family. The ethical personality. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. .
and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. of legal regulation. on the o ther hand. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . however. thus invested with independence. as private persons. or nominal culture in general. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. as do also its industry. while. being an intelligent substance. This instrument. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. of the possessor's will. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. originally foreign to it. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. learning. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction.in educating them to independent personality. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. ¤ 522 (3) The children. to found anew such an actual family. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. destined. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. labour. constitutes the general stock. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. who exist independent and free. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. acquire an existence of their own. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . into families or individuals. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. and thus produce more unconditional . ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. information. In virtue of such for tuitousness. or state external. and care for the future. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. on one hand.
on the side of external existence. But when right. in the course of definite manifestation. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l.dependence on the social system. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. It is a futile perfectionism to have . and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. The third. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. 2 4/5 years.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . and industry. skill. also of aims and interests. of needs. its action gets direction and content through natural features. and like the first a certain subsistence. Where civil society. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. and with it the State. which is honesty. which as existence is essentially a particular. and so on ad infinitum.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. and of means for satisfying them.. as vital. however.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. Their content per se may be reasonable . determined through reason or legal intelligence. 2 3/4 . of the legal relationships of individual s to them. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. or could be.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. The second. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. option. or only 2 * . the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. to be. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. intelligence. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. Hence.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. is developed i n detail. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. exists. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. at every point.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . they have their actual existence. their recognition and their honour. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. as well as of mental culture and habit . ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . this analysis. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it.and ye t it should be decided.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. and an ensemble of contingencies. talent. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . Thus whether three years. and accident. be the righ t and just thing. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . certain. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. ten thalers.the Law. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . of mere agents. though of course only at the final points of deci ding. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. and a corresponding mode of labour. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. and in it they have their social moralit y. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital.
If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. hereditary divinity or nobility. constit . which discovers new distinctions. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. within the house . to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. the need of a simpler code . there arises. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law .even as his law can only be a just law. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . to which objective existence determines i tself. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . .though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. and in particular transforms this existence .to be promulgated and made known as laws .to the individualized right . which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. as it is a known law. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity.laws.vi z. which again make new decisions necessary. and t hus become authoritative .which though something new. even the admiration. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . are not a new hou se. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. i.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect.as proven: . has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel.into punishment (¤ 500). of his countrymen. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. The comparison of the two species. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis . whic h are only internally in these objects.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features.in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. being laws o f strict right. not for them. with the advance in multitude. like improvements on a f loor or a door.e. . This subjective existence.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right.as this exists as revenge . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. recognized. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. inasmuch as. general laws. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. they touch only the abstract will . These people forget that the stars . at the same time an externally objective existence. however. as in the mental ima ges of space. first really de serving the name of laws. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. But there is a contrary case. as the genuine order of life. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements.are governed and well governed too by laws. in the judicial system. as universal authority and necessity. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion.the ne ed. by faith and trust.and th e cattle too .gets its universal guarantee through formalities.
Such an order acts with the power of an external state. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition.'poli . but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. Conversely. in a uniform gen eral way. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective.as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. It results also from circumstances of locality.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement.and that. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. . if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. and the judgement as application of the law to it. In so far. to the concrete of civil society. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. No doubt this factor is incomplete. as at bottom different sides. so as to secure this satisfaction. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. and their variable ingredients. the position of an external un iversality. . because it is only one factor. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. So far as concerns them. from the c onnections between nation and nation.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. and worked from that point of view. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . and to maint ain that end in them and against them. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. shou ld. which.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. be exercised as different functions. mere circumstantial evidence. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. because it is man's want. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. then.viz. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. appears as state.
First it maintains them as persons. differentiated in to particular agencies. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. Secondly. Thus we have the corpora tion. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. This universal principle. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . in this direction . receiving. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals.international (outer-state) law. and. The cons titution is existent justice .one individual. they are re strictions. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. The same unity. through the action of the government and its several branches. . which each originally takes care of for himself. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . then it promotes their welfare. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests.which volition is thereby free . also for that will being put in actuality. his independent self-will and particular interest.ce'. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. and not left to perish. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. But. self-originated. however. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. is its essence. the state only is as an organized whole. continually produce it as their result. ¤ 539 As a living mind.as an actuality .co nsists in a double function. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . Thirdly. it carries back both.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. On the other hand. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. which. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals.the reasonable spirit of will.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . (c) THE STATE.into the life of the universal substance. secondly. with all its evolution in detail. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. and self-develop ed . First. to the immediate agent. but. s heer subjectivity. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals .in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . and .const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. It provides for the reasonable will .the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. it protects the family and guides civil society. but which has a thoroughly general side.
partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom.besides their personalit y . rejects all differences. etc. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. . etc. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. But. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. is abstract subjectivity. military service. or destroy them. the citizens . Formerl y the legally defined rights. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . i. But the notion of liberty. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. is so little by nature. However true this is. magistracies . first.only it can make them . or even in crime. eligibili ty to office. authorities. presuppos e unequal conditions. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. the difference of governing powers and of governed. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. private as well as public rights of a nation. With the state there ari ses inequality. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. which it can without incompatibility allow. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person.equal in the concrete.e. On the contrary.. logically carried ou t. The laws themselve s. It is important therefore to study them closer. talent. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. As regards Liberty. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. that the laws rule. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form.pleasure an d self-will. on the contrary. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. the final aim and result of the co nstitution.punishment. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. directories. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. as it ha ppens.as regards taxation. etc. etc. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. were called its 'liberties'. and that the laws are restrict ions. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. Rome. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. it embodies a liberty. the familiar proposition. Really. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. otherwise have in property. skill. on the contrary. As regards. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). physical strength. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. etc. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. the current notions of l . in other words. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. etc. as regards the concrete. without further specification and development. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. Equality. All men are by nature equ al. Nothing has become. as it exists as s uch. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. The principle of equality. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . age. town . But that this freedom should e xist. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they.
On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. and thus gains moral independence. with this development of particularity. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. i. in which this is not formally done. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. and the organization of the actualization of them. The term political liberty.a thing that has nev er happened in history. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that.) But the guara ntee lies also. in other words continuall . The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality.e . . is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. has an insight and conviction of his own . The question . and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants.iberty only carry us back to equality. is . and must deal with them as it ca n. with its insatiate vanity.as sec urity of property. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side.that which preserves. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. of liberties in general. But the more we fortify liberty. If . as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles.just because of this inseparability . ¤ 541 The really living totality . not merely with regard to the naturalness. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. and to regard a state. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. self-w ill and self-conceit.e. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. just as little as the making of a code of laws. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. however. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. as a state without a constitution. be it added. and of the difficulty of satisfying them.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. of others. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality.
e. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. ¤ 542 In the government . as in the patri archal society . equally disorganizes actuality. is the government. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein.y produces the state in general and its constitution. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. which includes an already existing development of differences. . but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers.monarchy. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . however. in other words. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. but an actual indiv idual .the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business.the all-sustaining. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. In the perfect form of the state. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. . of the family and of civil society. as in a democratic constitution. and the government be merely executive and dependent . the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . i. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'.or. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al.to make it the first power. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. as always.in a state of society. (A mistake still greater. the participation of all i n all affairs . to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. is the state one. Only through t he government. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. These. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . presupposes ignorance that the true idea. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality.the will of a decreeing individual. is the self-redintegrating notion. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. all-decreeing will of the state.e. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. which taken apart is also particular). if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make .su bject always.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization.impugns the principle of the division of powers. i. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'.regarded as organic totality .
The division of constitutions into democracy. and then of nature .'ideal' unity. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . first. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something.are. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. and skill for such ends.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. possess independence of a ction.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . with its industry and i ts communities.viz. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. Thus. involve the. aristocracy and monarchy. too. administration and police.. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. which having their busin ess appointed by law. lik e peace and war. admini stration of justice or judicial power. For it is as private persons t . with their general opinion.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. and above all personal liberty. That subjectivity .whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. legislative power. The pure forms . such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not.in short. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. liberty of property. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . and with earlier transition-forms. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. there arises the participation of several in state-business. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training.partly. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. essentially.necessary to the p rocess of evolution .if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . participate in the governmental power. civil society. especially in legislation .such as ochlocracy. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. as it were. . it may be . and are to that degree private person s. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . etc. aptitude. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. Secon dly. These principles are those expounded earlier.e. being simple self-relation. to subjectivity.as also feudal monarchy. i. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. in the history of the State. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . to that end and for that reason. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. Two points only are all-important.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. an actual existence.
which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. ever newly recurring. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. as estates. but as organic factors. which. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. or in its 'reflectional' universality. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. inorganic shape. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. The so-called financial law. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best.as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . however. Take the case of England which. The des irability of such participation. blind force. in arrangements for art and science. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. that t hey enter upon that participation. i. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. Experience s hows that that country . or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. range of the extern al means of government. moreover. s ense of general wants. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation.e. ¤ 529 note).as it very likely is . wild. in the law and liberty of property. so far as they form only one branch of that power . By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. be they treated as mere individuals. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion.would be. elemental sea. If the main part of the requirement were . as the nation . indeed the whole. is no t self-destructive.the contrary must be the case . acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. like that of the stormy. and form a particular kind . 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness.regard ed as permanent. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. to power and act ion. In a civilized state. as such an aggregate. demoralization. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs.which should be presupposed. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws.a spiritual element . however. in the general sense of embracing a wide. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. and therefore more urgent. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. it is not a brutish mass. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527.
for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. Then again. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other.i.is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. and thus. is really engaged with strict executive business. waywardness and chance have a place. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute.. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. and not actually existent. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. when it makes a decree about finance. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . afresh. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. and becomes the estate of bravery. i.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce.e.o be a law it would have to be made once for all.e. but only parties. in which there would no longer be a government. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances.as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. of the whole of the finances. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. In one case the . as content o f a true law. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. e. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real.so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it.g. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . or every few years. and not to be made yearly.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . In their mutual relations. a state of war. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce.
each of which. are settled and fixed. Fictions. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. is appointed to occupy only one grade. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. in short. As this development is in time and in real existence.. That history. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome.and. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. in short. first in general. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. On th is point. and as regards its range and scope. and above all universal history. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state.of sacerdotal races . Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. that. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing.the plan of Provide nce. and on history-writing in general. which actually is and will be realized in it . is called an a prio ri view of it. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . however. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. there is Reason in history. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. It is in time. In general. etc. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. a history of its own. and then in history. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . and in Germany more than in France and England. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. both this general recognition. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. in defiance of . of a Roman epic. when we come to minutiae. an d the special claims of nations on one another. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. it passes int o universal world-history.a world-mind. internat ional law rests on social usage. It has. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. especially on the philological side. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character.the judgement of the world. this note must go into further deta il. it. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. as it is a history. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day.
This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. and rejects both ki nds of interest. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation.e. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. has. etc. Rome and its fortunes. in striking portraiture and brevity. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy.the best-accredited history. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. as in the romance. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. or if he declined to judge at all. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. and. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. no history . or. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. e. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice.). a word. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. Ay. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. express not a subjective particularity. The point of interest of Biography . a nation. is not only against taste and judgement. not as good as a fairy tale. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. on the other hand. but an age. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. state. strictly s peaking. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. in the interest of so-called truth. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. and an exclusive interest in justice. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events.like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. and takes place within it.appears to run . if he had not an interest. and criticize events. a civilization. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation.to say a word on that here .g. But. What happens to a nation . by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. i. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. but violates th e principles of objective truth.
the absolute L aw. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. i. potentially infinite. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. if Rome or the German empire. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. and their subjectivity. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion.admitting. etc. only opinions and mere ideas. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events.an accurate report of externals. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. a development determined by the notion of spirit. which all alik e have no stuff in them. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. really. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). i. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind.e.e. is the empty form of activity.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. and there fore as a work of individuals. are instruments. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. Only therefore through their relationship to it. these individuals. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. as over a special grade. But. Such a doctrine .Fame.or in other words that Reason is in history .e. and the business of so doing. has another ground and interest than his tory. the freak of humour. have they their value and even their existence. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. and of its essence. i. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. we may add. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. which is their reward. and are all treated as indifferent. i. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . truth. first in general. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. The mere play of sentiment. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. is the supreme right. on the contary. 550). through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. etc. in this case.e. But biography too has for its background the historical world. which is what is pe culiar to them. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. while it inheres in them. For Spirit is consciousn ess. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. the consciousness of it. and secondly. to the history of religion. liberty. and its content is prese . on its subjective side it labours under contin gency.
Th e finite. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit.e. and that on the religious. But the spirit which think s in universal history. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. is the purification. note).point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. But . i. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. lays hold of its concr ete universality. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence.e. as law and duty. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free.a mere 'ought' . as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. especially ¤ 51.e. Such apprehension. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. is the real ethical self. ¤ 204 not e). of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth.is the peculiar perversity. that elevation to God really involves. This factor. For that st arting. from which the start is now made. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. As regards the 'mediation' which.Liberty. forme rly noticed. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. cf. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. however. actually accomplished in the ethical world. now gets its most concrete interpretation. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic.as is the case with all speculative process . i. in the system of laws and usages. At this rat e.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. i. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . abstract in the formal treatment of logic. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. as true in the world of free will. then perforce religion must have the genuine content.consciousn ess. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. The spirit. i.e. the idea of God it kn .
in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. (In the Lutheran Church. but purely subjective in individuals: . even to bones. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. non-spirituality. It lea ds to a laity. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. in the annihilation of its externality. a condition of spiritual sla very. the host as such is not at first consecrated.the body of religious truth. But in poin t of form. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion.e. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality.ows must be the true and real. differing from the former in body and value of truth. and prays others to pray . a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. but in the moment of enjoymen t. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. and law and justice. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only.or it may be. for thought and knowledge . and in the act of faith. B . on the contr ary. and superstition. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage.as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. i. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. and ex pecting miracles from them. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. And. and even as mutually indifferent. i. i. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. to justification by external wo rks. morality and conscience. i.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. It leads.of bondage. in point of form. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others.e. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state.e. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . generally. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another.logi cally enough .partly as mere moving of the lips.e. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. and these applications of it in the religious life. religion was a late r addition. springing from some force and power. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members.addressing his devotion to miracle. one religious and an other ethical. first of all. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth.working images. then there may be created. in its faith and in its con science. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality.
self-realizing reason . leads it into the rea l world.in short. .(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present.e. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. can law and morality exist. and in the use of property . i. so to speak a priori. sti .of honesty in commercial dealing. if taken alone. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. our consciousness and subjectivity.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. and political institutions deduced from them must be. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. i. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible.an obedience which is itself the true freedom. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. therefore. So long as t he form. Let us suppose even that. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. Instead of the vow of chastity. moral life in the state. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. which does not rise in hostility against them. because the state is a self-possessed. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. the wisdom of the world. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. Thus set free. no matter how. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. founded on principles of reason. and. The precept of religion. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. i. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness.e. unte nable. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. . . then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. lacked liberty.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. Thus. and thus only. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor.e. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. And instead of the vow of obe dience. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. a code of law should arise. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. and in a special sense Philosophy. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry.
on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution.to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. when specially set in relief as genus. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. and the power given them to fix the budget. the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion.mi nd intrinsically concrete . that the Idea must be regent. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. (cf. to put it simply. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . so-called 'chambers'. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. from those deeper requirements which. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them.is just this . and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. At best it is only a temporary expedient .is the intellectual and thinking self.. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. This additional 'individuality' . on the other hand.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth .among which laws these guarantees are included. thus founder on the conscience. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . Such laws.ll. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. however sound their provisions may be.g. ¤ 544 note). and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. or. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. on one hand.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. thus surmountin . . In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. e. This absolute nucleus of man .could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought.to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. etc. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form.
got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism.and th at on account of this very principle . in common with all his thinking contemporaries. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words.the form which ph ilosophy attacked .was that creative imagination. and so also one-sided phase. for th ese reasons.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. of philosophy. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . in its f irst immediate. exhibits the one-sidedness. is implicitly in absolute liberty. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . so . the subjectivity of mind. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. however.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. from religion. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. etc. is after all only in one of its form s. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). but earlier than philosophy. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. pictorial representation. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. ¤ 513. should knit it together and control it. in its philosophic phase. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne.the idea of the substantial moral life. Hence religion as such. or rather must. The form in its infinite tru th. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . which is developed similarly.). Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. But even religion. or essential being). Only in the principle of mind. he. fall feeling. religion. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. earlier than it does as philosophy. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. which still escaped his intelligence. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. Religion may.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . Plato. which is awa re of its own essence. on its own s howing. Under the subjective form. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. As it left therefore behind. Political power. But thought always . and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. as demoralization. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. intuition.so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. His state is therefore. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. as it grows and expands.).and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind.
The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. and if that and not the truth as such is called for .e. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. while it is self-centred identity. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. 9. as well as their several applications. Thus ul timately. 1. In the Protestant state. Das System der Bedurfnisse. 2. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. Die Sittlichkeit. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. 4. 8. 7. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. the constitut ion and the code. Inneres Staatsrecht. 3. Das aussere Staatsrecht. Die Rechtspflege 5. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. for which it is as substance.as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength.in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. but rather to a sort of knowledge. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. of God's indwelling in us. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. Religion. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . as always. Weltweisheit. i. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. That here. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. 6. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. Die Weltgeschichte 10. Gesetz. Die Polizei und die Corporation.
hence not the sp iritual unity. that is. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape.the form of immediacy as such .n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. viz. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. With the essential restrictedness of its content.i. 1.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . into the subject which produces that work. and of gaining its concrete determination. c an. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true.in other words. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. or the idea. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. But. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . has in devotion . aware. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). as it is. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. Belief. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. its n atural immediacy.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. but . so that the thought embodied. reconciliation. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. on the other hand. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression.e.the shape or form of Beauty. ¤ 411).something formal. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . Der absolute Geist. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life.for the expression of spiritual truth . the actuality of the spirit. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. as superseded in spirit. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . Art requires not only an external given material . . like the material which it uses to work in. On one hand. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . In this ideal. which is only a sign of the Idea. A. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle .
a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. but as only finding himself in himself.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . but its inmost depth. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. and that is where the infinite form. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . is not yet known. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world.can try to bring itself to consciousness. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. that one spirit creates and informs them. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. is not yet absolute. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. and of its constitution. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . the artist's enthusiasm. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. assumes fuller and firmer features. the principle of its law. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. though concrete and intrinsically free. as well as of its art and science. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . known as the Absolute. and th e artist is the master of the God.symbolic art. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer.stil l this art is defective.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. not yet conscious of itself. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. or an effor t towards him . the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. as free spi rit. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. . The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form.in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. subjectivity. of its actual liberty.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness.
we see that the advent of art. which is only in the medi um of thought . whose con tent is absolute mind . expression. . the theme and c entre of religion.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . on the contrary. B. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. and j ust for that reason.ent in it. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. Beautiful art.it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge .that it be revealed. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity .the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. what is more. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . . still more in that external. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. and. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. But with a further and deeper study. from it s side.due to a one-sided survey of human life . Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation.of Nemesis. unbeautiful sensuo usness. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form.into revelation. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. in which he had not revealed himse lf. not the supreme liberation itself. like the religion peculiar to it. has its future in true reli gion. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . revealed by God. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence .the religion i.The genuine objectivity. with their perso nal sense and feeling. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. spectator find themselves at home. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. it is from Him.e. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. dashing t o pieces everything high and great . as infinite self-realizing form . for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. and brilliancy. The older religion in which the need of fine art.is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. The old conception .the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. . shows that such religion is on the decline. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. Beautiful art. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. is first generated.
ure would be to ascribe envy to Him.requires careful and thorough speculation.knowledge in God. but afterwards. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. again. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. That spirit. to specul ative comprehension. while in point of form he is. G . this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. first of all. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. a separate being. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. in it s forefront. in point of content. It includes. when it thinks. and reconciliation with the eternal being. . On one hand is heaven and earth. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. he still remains in original identity . presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. as the extreme of inherent negativity. further. which therefore is finite. amid that natural ness. the spirit. even in its manifestation. . and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. and. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality .the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence .divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. (c) as infinite return. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. Go d is. by C.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts .. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y .is the Spirit. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. To know what God as spirit is . as in duty bound.just as. for that reas on. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content.. it implies the revelation of Him. with whom. staying aloof and inert. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. however. it may almost create surprise that so many. on one hand. (a) as eternal content.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. which proceeds to man's self.of the only Son .1.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . on the other hand. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself.it is therefore the absolute spirit. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. or of judgement. abiding sel f-centred. and phenomena which succeed each other. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed.: Berlin 1829. making them presuppositions towards each other. Yet. the elemental and the concrete nature .on the other hand. of the world it gave away . it is. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. But. though. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. though different. F. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. only standing to it in an external connection. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. not. ¤ 566 In this separating. directed towards the Eternal. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness.
the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. Thinking. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. through which witness of the spirit in him.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . But. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. after the example of his truth. external in point of form. remains master over it. is not bound by it . throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought.and. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. as infinite subjectivi ty. is itself the emptiness and vanity. but even to thought. his natur al man and self-will. Whereas the vision-method of Art.is transplanted into the world of time.is taken in a merely formal.of subjectivity and the no tion itself.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. gives itself direction and con tent.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . C. Irony. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. in which he. and eternal spirit in itself. contentless sense. but alive and present in the world. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. this immediate. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. with a temporal and external sequence. . secondly. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. on account of his immediate nature.where the spirit closes in unity with itself .then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. This individual. an object of contemplating vi sion . Further. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. and thus sensuous. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. who as such is identified with the essence . Die geoffenbarte Religion.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . th e self-centred manifestation. truth is the object of philoso phy. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. so far. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. From this its separation into p arts. simple. 1. keeps himself unchanged. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . eternal. and thus. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. In this form of truth.but the vision of implicit truth. which from itself. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. he. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . If the result .Irony. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked.
and particularly of the logical form. as also of the necessity in the two forms . Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . of course. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). first the subjectiv e retreat inwards.from these forms. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. and mediates what is thus open ed out. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . which philosophy is. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. and acts inconsistently towards them. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary.('Rationalism') . It had t oo little of God in it for the former. This witness .and from a pithless orthodoxy. opens it out in mental picture.the underlying essence in all humanity .i. but also criticized it.stantial content into many separate shapes. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. and whereas Religion. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . only looks back on its knowledge.which may be in both the same . and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. a nd of logic in particular. finds itself already accompl ished. to be more precise still. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general.leaving out. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. and against philosophy in general . its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. The charge of Atheism. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. with its separ ation into parts. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . which determines itself to content. immediate vision and its poetry.on the other hand. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. This does not prevent the spirit. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . elevation of them into the absolute form. when at the close it seizes its own notion . If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. too much for the latter. when driven to expound itself. remains identical with it.takes. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories.it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. and s o religious. or. and this necessary as free. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion.on one hand. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative.e. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . This movement.
almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. This new theology. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. and so . most sublime. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. whether higher or lower in the scale.as the most authentic statement accessible . the secularity of th ings. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. in particular.which therefore it does not disparage. as it stands. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God.g. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . as is well known. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. or Pantheism. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. exclusi ve.(empirical things. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . from which all definite quality is excluded. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached.or to dalai-lamas . open to our disposal on this topic.is always adora tion of an object which. Without interest of its own for the concrete.Everything is .thus he understands philosophy . or any one man. I select . thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. and form all that is definite in the divine universality.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . fulfilled notion of God. but as a proved fact. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism.so much so. are unable and unwilling to see this . and amongst it s effusions. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf.in the wanton assertion. some of the most telling passage . it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. It is only his own stupidity. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. with all its absurdities.so much so. does not comprehend itself. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . and is therefore.that of the Hindu to ass es. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality.all possess substantia lity. are) . so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. also contains the generic abs tract. God in General. On such a presuppo sition. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion .the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. its grossest shape.the Bhagavat-Gita. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions.each and every secular thing is God. ¤ 71 note). Piety.that of the Egyptians to the ox . we must. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . every kind of piety (¤ 72) . and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. Amongst the abundant resources. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. without distinction. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. that it has too much of him: . cows . which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. If this theory needs no more than such a God. that. or if you will. if we believe them.of Pantheism. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself.of the new piety and new theology.
not everything.). the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). 'At the end of many lives. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. goodness. and one essential amongst them. however. . . . But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. melt into the one Krishna. Meru among the high-topped mountains. . or a God besides. . .' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. t he pure unity of thought in itself. as he said before he was S iva. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. or Indra. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. which he is. I am life in all beings. 7 seqq. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. as also those proximate substantialities. This everything. . I am the light of th e sun and the moon.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel.spiritual as its idea of God i s . besides Krishna. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. passion.so powerless its. has the higher conception of Brahma. and the Spinozan Substance. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. than which there is nothing higher. . . the Everything. nothing independent]. without essential being of its very own. The undiscerning ones. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. so to speak . . Among letters I am the letter A. but having its truth in the substance. . everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. . . Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. but only . Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . unessential existences. is also the maddest of polytheisms. . is not. . . pp. . . . which Krishna calls himself. grip. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. . and the moon among the lunar mansions. . Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. .'I am the self.. is alo ne the divine and God. Indra. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. middle. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. and end of living things. . I am the discernment of the discerning ones. But so little concrete is this divine unity . to a poly theism.' This 'All'.s. seated in the hearts of all beings. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. Even when. as different from that accidental. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . I am also the strength o f the strong. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . still God. he is said to be the beginning. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. . the One which.' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. rather.that Hinduism. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. .. Hinduism. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is.. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . . at the beginning of the pass age.the most excellent of everything. vanish. . all this is woven upon me. called Gods. I am the taste in water. etc. with a monstrous incons istency. . even Siva. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. p. . this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. There is nothing else higher than myself. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. where the empirical everything of the world. . . . any more than the Eleatic One. . . This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. . But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . . .
we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. when he adores the ape.on the shallow conception of it . even in a general exoteric discussion. and that unity described as love. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . ac osmical. But to go back again to the question of fact. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. imagination or speculation. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. moreover. secondl y.ndu. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. after this partition. modes of envisaging God. he is as essence parted from appearance. but . is discarded and absor bed. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. the all. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. Of the oriental. of the relationship of God and the world. which. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. on the contrary. e. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself.in its finest purity and sublimity.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. or other creature. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. If. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. and of empirical secular spirit.of the world as one thing.g. or Spinozist.floating in the indefinite blue . especially the Mohammedan. is identical with the world. on one hand. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular. and. whether they spring from heart. to was .keep its independence. For that unity. to which everything is God. But. as everything. as it says.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. That pantheism indeed . If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . as the endless lot of empirical existence. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. Hin du monotheism. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. and on the other. and so on .. and God everything. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. as infinite from the finite. It is only the picture . the finite to the infinite. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. the Eleatic. in relation to the popular idea of the world. outside it . (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld..not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. empirical indivi duals . we must consult th e Mohammedans. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. or.
composition.g. providence. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. however. etc.the world as much as Go d . the notion and content of philosophy.e. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. and that hence. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. omnipresence. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. viz. in the pores of th e physicists . but rather its reverse. i.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. And as in their judgement either of the two .or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. when they hear of unity . with abstract unity. is what one expect s. with indefinite ideas.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. if not even of supreme interest. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable.and relation i pso facto implies unity . with God's omnipresence. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. I n the philosophical field they proceed. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem.te a word on what a 'notion' means. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. in matters admitted to be of superior. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest.is identity. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . a nd assert . But the question is. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. and the empty absolute. but with concrete unity (the notion).and that the factor of indet erminateness . .that. inorganic and living .has the same solid substantiality as the other. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. they import them into philosophy. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. not the concrete unity. and that amongst the m there is great variety. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories.said pores being the negative. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. the most external and the worst.falsely as a fact . they have laid hands on. as Epicu rus does. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. But they show so little acquaintance with them . Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. e. and that it is the system of identity.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it.and s till less take trouble about it . Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. as in the physical field the physicist. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. mere ide ntity. where they are utterly unknown. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . and which they ascribe to philosophy. but only the one factor of this category of relation .they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things.g. it is not. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction.
presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. which has self. on the shoulders of philosophy. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. of which liberty is the aim. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. standing between the Mind and its essence. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. is philosophy itself. the notion.e. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . sunders itself. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. for its middle term: a middle. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. y .knowing reaso n. not abstract unity. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself.ity . so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. On account of this chorus of assertions. If statements as to facts are put forward. i.as the mediating agent in th e process . The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. in his relation to the world. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. and which is itself the way to produce it. a system of identity. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . this stale gossip of oneness or identity. and the latter its universal extreme. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. which causes the movement and development. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. Nature . the absolutely universal. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. But to put that sort of thing. making the former its presupposition. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. as other than they. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded.by which notions are perverted into their opposite. and as implicitly the Idea.it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. The esoteric study of God and identity. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. as of cognitions. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . an All-one doctrine. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. which . or as prevaricating for a purpose. then. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. and notions . as process of the I dea's subjective activity. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world.it is the nature of the fact. But in ascribing to God. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition.the logical system.their everything.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . but the many-shaped modes specified.which.
eternally sets itself to work. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. . The eternal Idea.et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. in f ull fruition of its essence.
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