INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any

attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i

s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as

treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.

as absolute negativity. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. to which they might perhaps add space and time. indeed. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. whereas the 'vital' matter. which is potentially all things. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. and mind conceived as a thin g. Mind. a nd the soul remains the pervading. etc. The usual answer. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . i. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. perhaps. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . thus come into being. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought.e. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. the soul is only the sleep of mind . Wherever there is Nature.. however. identical ideality of it all. except where. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. however. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. li ght. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. At such a stage it is not yet mind. on the one hand. but soul. in a sense. not merely lacks gravity. ANTHROPOLOGY. These 'imponderables' . as such a result. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. which is the fund amental feature of matter. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. and. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. on the other.with th is proviso. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. have still.SUB-SECTION A. where the othe . a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. But not merely is it. even the capacity of offering resistance. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. There.the truth that matter itself has no truth. and so the self-externalism. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. its simple 'ideal' life. matter is regarded as something true. and not as the immediate or natural individual.the passive of Aristotle. like heat. It is otherwise with Mind.

even these few and slight susceptibilities. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. and does not rise or develop into system. and telluri c life of man. disappear. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. These have. described. as an anima mundi. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life.whence Epicurus. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. into the absolute syllogism. or. (c) Thirdly. sidereal. in the modes of that being. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. (b) Secondly. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. on the contrary.or corporeity . it is a soul which feels. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. and the periods of the day. the changes of the seasons. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. etc. when it presents itself as a single soul. . Spinoza. Animals and pl ants. In nations less intellectually emancipated. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. Descartes. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. and. and. not. its immediate being . which therefore live more in harmony with nature. it may be.(a) In its immediate natural mode . They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. as so often is done. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. re tains an abstract independence. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. there philosophers took God. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material).is moulded into it. Hence. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. they are natural objects for consciousness. as in the case of Spinoza. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. based upon participation in the common life of nature.r is not . with Leibniz. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. remain for ever subject to such influences. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. feels the difference of climates.e. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. as in the case of Lei bniz. so holding. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. a world-soul. in many case s completely. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. T hus. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. Malebranche. as individualized. just in proportion to his civilization. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . which only is. But either this identity. and always more or less. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. so to speak. is too abstract. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life.e.the natural soul. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. upon it. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i.

widely distant from each other. character. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. of families or single individuals. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. And that individuality marks both the world which. the one permanent subject. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. and the position of the individual himself. on its one side. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. shows. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. Thirdly. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. The contrast between the earth's poles. bodily structure and disposit ion.a worl d no longer incomplete. we find its diversities. or artistic. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. hopes. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. scientific. This . we see man in his true relation to his environment. as alterations in it. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. and on the other. as it exists. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points.mind wrapped up in itself.the sexual relation . while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology.on a ph ysical basis. in purposes political. physiognomy. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. fancies. talent . He begins with Childhood . but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. shows an active half. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. we find it as the special temperament. carrying out these universa . Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. on the whole. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. fails to meet his ideal requirements. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). and as stages in its development.

Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. as already noted. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. for example. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same).which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. . from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . but as a return back from the world of specialization. put this question to the class of ideology. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. viz. . containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own.The waking is not merely for the observer. each point. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. or self-centralized being. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. sleep. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . (c) Sensibility(3) . and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. The characterization given in the section is abstract. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. . i n an unintelligent way.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. as before explained .Napoleon. distinguishes itself from its mere being. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. as they may be called. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived.not as a merely negative rest from it. although. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. which are often addressed to philosophy: . in the first instance. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self.

But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. its natural peculiarity. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. But if put in the feelin g. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. are found by the waking soul. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. murder . where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. as 'ideally' in it and made its own.set over against consciousness. and religious. are in order to be felt. mora l. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. the fact is a mode of my individuality. blasphemy. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. primarily. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. in the feeling. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. just. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. it is true. be it noted. but treated as bel onging to its most special. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). and is so felt. the inarticulate bre athing. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. is what we call sensibility. adultery. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. evil. The fact that these particulars. which. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . invested with cor poreity. and . What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. On the other hand and conversely. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. in its own self. and to be as if found. are our very own. the conscience.. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. One.identity of our self-centred being. Another. godless.g. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. ho wever. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. This should hardly need enforcing. moral. the naturally immedi ate.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. on one hand. etc. not mere alterations. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. true. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. for itself. and the character. fornication. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. etc. belonging as it does to natural. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . etc. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). where they are impl icitly as in their substance. mean. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self.

in the system of the senses. (c) the sense of solid reality.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. the centre of the 'sensible' is a soul which feels. following the special character of the mental mode. are formed from their mental feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . (¤ 317) . But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . for example. o f colours. 322). with which that substance is one. of heavy matter.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. e. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. (b) THE FEELING SOUL .whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel.the senses of definite light. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . with its varieties of language. the 'irritable' system. sighs. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. in a special system of bodily organs.because in it. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. tones. (¤ 300). and voice in general. therefore. ¤ 402 Sensations. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). to the character of subjectivity. works itself out. laughter. is to raise its substantiality. set in its self-centred life. As sentient. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. to realize its mastery over its own. i. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. the immediacy of mode in feeling . But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. but an inward.a psychical physiology. i ts merely virtual filling-up.and of sound. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. and their corporization.g. distinction appears as mere variety . and in this way they get quite another interpretation.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. of self. In the usage of ordinary language. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. smells. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. . especially the passions or emotions. (¤¤ 321. We should have. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life .e. to take possessi on of it. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. the blood. just because they are immediate and are found existing. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. What it has to do. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears.

ideas and information. They were not in our possession. to be defined as one of feeling . and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. but a negation. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. etc. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject.that world being included in it and filling it up. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. etc. and to that world it stands but as to itself. In the present stage we must treat.. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. Some times. may again sink down. but only to his im plicit self. prima rily. acquired lore. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. although it does not exist. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. By itself. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. without existing. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . once mor e come to light. ideas. ¤ 404 As individual. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). supposed to have been forgotten years ago. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. secondly. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . virtually retained. where the real is put past . first. which is disease. a deep featureless characterless mine. it implies a want of adaptation. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. so far as that is. thoughts. which is at the same time its predicate. omnipresent unity. in whi ch all this is stored up. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380).the existent spe culative principle. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. to which the soul. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. Thus in the body it is one simple. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. in an implicit mode. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. the s oul is characterized as immediate. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. the content is its particular world. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. in sickness. it brings within itself. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). the corporeity. As sentient. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . At the present stage this singleness is. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul.

tal ent. it is..a substance. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. etc. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. not a true subject reflected int o itself. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. or virtuality. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. idiosyncrasies. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . developed interests. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. not as a mere possibility. is visibly present as another and a different individual. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. incl inations. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. intellige nt. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. whose decision is ul . etc. as concrete subject ivity. placenta. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. character.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. Here are two individuals. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. self-conscious. congenital disposit ion and temperament. but as efficiency and realized activity. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. the psychical relationship. fortunes. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. self-possessed. and of character. The moth er is the genius of the child. his secular ideas. which. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. By the self-hood of the latter it . for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. because immediate. not yet as its self. etc. as it has existence of its own. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. of the mother. temper. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. injuries. etc. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. say between friends. of life. or capac ity. as yet nothing impenetrable. and reasonable. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord.a subject which may even exist as another individu al..externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. the single self of the two. and is therefore passive. controlling genius thereof. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it .

in other words. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. This totality forms his actual ity. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. it has already been call ed his show. in which the individual here appears innnersed. But such a verification would. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. means. educated. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. intentions. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . on the other hand. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. is. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . self-possessed human being is a disease. To that end the phenomena. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. At the same tim e.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . on the cont rary. it must be added. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. The facts. that it is in harmony wi th the facts.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . it might seem. first of all call for verificati on. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in be mere deception and impo sture. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. which are also means and ends to each other. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling.his fun damental interests. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world.

that it is a state of passivity. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. external one to another. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. on those left behind. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. the selfless individual. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. is this. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. is under a veil. f riends. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. When the substance of both is thus made one. which lead up to the result . then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e.a genius which beh olds itself. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. etc. but it is empty. subject to the power of another person. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. and hears. The patient in this condition is accordingly made.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. ca pable of conveying general truths. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. or at the approach of death. subje ctive reason. unless by the aid of religion. for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. and to know which. then. after the downfall of the Roman republic.). like that of the child in the womb. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. formed. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. in whom it sees. wh en it is healthy and awake. . This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. and c ontinues to be. a formal vision and awareness. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . not on the spot. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. smells. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. And because it is the is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. reads. in its sober moods. which. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. etc. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. tastes. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius.) Compare h ome-sickness. for example. in catalepsy. and character. etc. his own and that of the magnetize . exist for it as an outward objectivity. . But such clairvoyance . (Thus Cato.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . the magnetizer. But. not really a 'person'. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. and the like. those c onnected with female development. . and other diseases.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state.

in compliance with the laws and relations of the long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. and at the same time. In this way it is self. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. for example. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. which. as in other cases. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. causality. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. In considering insanity we must.r. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns.fe eling. is without any definite points of attachment . The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. anticipate the full-grown an . and hence. between intelligent personality and objective world. the 'common sense'. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. beholds. i s just this form of immediacy. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. receives. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. which still marks the self-feeling. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. one sees and hears with the fingers. in this nominal perception. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. in its capacity as individual. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. though all-embracing. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. etc. so long as we assume independent personalities. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. as in the morbid state alluded to. e. reasons. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. it is still susceptible of disease. which is no less a world of law. etc. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. is impossible. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. The purely sensitive life. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. on the contrary. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. or med icines for them. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life.

When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. i. mere and total. may. and the rest of the passions . yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. instincts. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. passions. this life of feeling. as now regarded. cies and hopes . And so too the particularity is. it would be death). Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. as it aris es. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. and also desires.e. . i.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish.merely personal love and hatred. and their gratification). immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. is undistinguis hed from them.just as physical disease is not an abstract. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. etc. inclination. In the concrete. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. and so makes part of the actual self. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. equally formal. presupposes the patient's rationality. such as vanity. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. and be a realized u niversality. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. desire. as a thing. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. that it is liable to insanity . loss of health (if it were that. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. but a contr adiction in it. This humane treatment. Mind as such is fr ee. the. i. as something natural and existent. A violent. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. and made appear in. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. earthly elements are set fr ee .. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. and so also may the cure. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . is relaxed. which is there also. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling.e.feeling. is diseased. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. etc. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. the self is to be stamped upon. moral and theoretical. idea.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other.d intelligent conscious subject. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. however.. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). but only derangement. so as to insert them in their proper place. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). and it is only as a thing.that evil which is always latent in the heart. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization.e. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. This particular being of the soul is t .

but the basis of consciousness. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. as. is reduced to unity. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession.and becoming the 'ideal'. but still free. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. lacking consciou sness. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. a pure act of intuition. and that as a barrier for it. even in being affected by them. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. su bjective substantiality of it . has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. when the co rporcity. And consciousness it becomes. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. weariness o .not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. occupied. Habit is rightly called a second nature. and the generation o f habit as practice. therefore. nature. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. heat. and which still continues to exist. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. That is to say.he factor of its corporeity. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. For. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. but has them and moves in them. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. has been absorbed by it. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. partly only relative. and for that reason n ot free. this being of the soul. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. nor is absorbed in the m. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. i.. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged .just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. et c. because it is an immed iate being of the soul.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. of which it is the subjective substance. Habit like memory. sleep. The natural qualities and alterations of age. dist inguishing it from itself . on the contrary. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self .itself a simple being . It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. or dependent in regard to it. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. are only subjectiv e forms. and so no longer interested. of it. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). The soul is freed from them. so is that pure being (which. will. empty space and empty time.e. the one and the same. and the mere substance. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. a second nature. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them.

or the misfortune . habit diminishes this feeling. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. which make it up. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness.). etc.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. etc. too. nor are they in conce ption rational. and no other. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. acquires a strength which consists in this. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). etc. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. has been by will made a habit . or. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. this soul. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. Thinking. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. and it is habit of living which brings on death.. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. his upright pos ture. casual. without an express adjustment. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. to be made a power in the bodily part. intelligence. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. The most ext ernal of them.concentration. This is the rational liberation from them. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. is recollection and memory. a series of musical notes) is in me. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. under its volitional and conceptual characters.g. are no longer bothered with it. if quite abstract. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. etc. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. viz.. and the self-feeling as such. but part and parcel of his being.e. Even here. reflection. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. and especially so in the specific bodily part. a particular organ of i ts organic system). re ligious. habit is usually passed over - .f the limbs. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. whereof we sha ll speak later. an 'ideality' of soul . nor a transient emotion or idea. the spatial direction of an individual. i. that although the frost. cut off from action and reality. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. or skill. like any other. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. And it is true that the form of habit. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility.. and that they. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. intuition. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes.enabling the matter of consciousness. Habit on an ampler scale. consciousness. so that when the conception (e. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. like their satisfaction. and any other purp oses and activity. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) .is felt. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. nor an abstrac t inwardness. moral. etc. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. to exist as substance in its corporeity. . sweet tastes. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. consciousness. and thus to enable the soul. to be his as this self. made into an instrum ent. and particul ar.

especially the hand. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. the upright figure in general. This externality. and making it its own. and the formation of the limbs. And the human figure. etc. 5. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. while language is its perfect expressi on. finds itself there a single subject. it is related to itself.. unable to represent it in its actual universality. as the absolut e instrument. or the 'immediacy' of mind. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. absorbing it.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. Naturliche Seele. in other words. The soul. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. of which it is the sign. 71). for example. Seen from the animal world. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. In this identity of interior and exterior. 1. in being related to which. 'The autho . who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. 4. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. 3. in its concentrated self. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. indefinite. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. and inexpressible a modific ation. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own.either as something contemptible . This note is so slight. still vainer than a signatura rerum. Under the head of human expression are included. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. weeping. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt.laughter. a world external to it . 2. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. the latter subject to the former. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. Empfindung. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. of the mouth . but the soul. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. Naturliche Qualitaten.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. represents not itself. or abstract universality. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. Die fuhlende Seele. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. and i s infinite self-relation. for the soul. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. cuts itself off from its immediate being.

Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. Hence consciousness. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. 8. but is implicit. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind.the light. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. seem to be its own activity. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. 7. Gewohnheit. not to the wisdom. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. Ego. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. as subjective reflection in itself.the soul's natural life . CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. but when he receives the inspired word. but to the foolishness of man. is only its abstract formal ideality.e. as external to it. It is of this latter.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. in the sphere of an equal freedom as an independent object. does not. now. like reciprocal dependence in general. Selbstgefuhl. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . but since reality. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. i. The mind as ego is essence. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). something dark and beyond it. and . and as such it is C onsciousness. to it. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. thus first made explicit as the Ego. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. 6. which manifests itself and something else too . and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). as this absolute is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities .

an intuitive intellect. i. or mere c ertainty. as the ego it seems an alteration of the object. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). This is sense-consciousness. the subject of consciousness.e. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. (b) self-consciou sness. an existing thing. the substantial and qu alitative. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). a singular. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. immediate consciousness. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. which is not as its own. The object is only abstractly characterized as its.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. i. The object similarl y. is further characterized a s immediately singular. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. has emerged from Spinoz ism. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance.. an existent. to raise its self-certainty to truth. for which ego is the a case of correlation . but only as it is in reference to something else. but as poorest in thought. reflected in itself. and so on. the notion of mind. and even t he Idea of Nature. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate.e. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f.a subject-objectivity. and underived certainty of it. Ego. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . in other words. with an object set against it. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. a thing-in-itself. etc. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. Consciousness . to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. again. and that the philosophy. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). a something. and puts it first under the category of being. t heir absolute interdependence. first. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. what makes the object the subject's own. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. being immediate. As against Spinozism. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. It appears as wealth iest in matter. Spatial and temporal Singularn . only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce.

reflected in itself. wants to take the object i n its truth. taken in its concrete content. and universalities. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. reflectional attributes. in this case by t he Ego. and more or less by the ween the individuality of a thing which. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. in so far as its distinction is the inward one.e. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. has many properties. but brought to rest and universality.a variety of relations. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. has. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . reflected upon.e. or the distinction which is none. so constr uing the object. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. but as mediated. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. however. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. permanent term s.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. experiences. as we called it. viz. its necessity on its own part. of the thing is. 73). which form the alleged ground of general experience. and not yet as external on its own part. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. a something external to it. having passed beyond the sensible. lies im mediately in the other. Thi s inward. it is related. the distinction on its own part. the one of the terms. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. . and universal. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). and. to describe the sensible. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. as not externally different from the other. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . what it is in truth.). ¤ 423 The law. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. an abstract identity: on the other hand. on one hand. not as merely immediate. p. i. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . i. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth.a copy of the phenomenon. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. free from this negative l ink and from one another. is sense-perception. the thing. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. however. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. But in this manner the interior distinction is. and am aware'. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground .ess. in that manner. and sensuous consciousness. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. or as being beside and out of itself. by being regarded in their bearings. to which.

Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. there is strictly speaking no object. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. knows itself implicit in the object. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. this identity comes to be for the ego. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. therefore. therefore. implicit in it. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. On the external side it conti nues. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. on the contrary .as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. nominally. being merely consumed. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. primarily describable as an individual. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. on the whole.With this new form-characteristic. with the nega tion of it. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. its satisfaction realized. and ma intains itself as such. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. The two processes are one and the same. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. the latter. and itself made actual. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. is a singular. pure 'Ideality'. in this return upon itself. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. or. and a desire (appetite) . to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. or implicitly. can make no resistance: the dialectic. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. The certitude of one's self. and thus in it I am aware of me. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. To this activity the object. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. in its immediacy. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself.

Thus arises the status of master and slave. While the one com batant prefers life. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. Force. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. solves the contradiction. when we look to the distinction of the two. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction .t he process of recognition. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. which falls on another. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. preservation. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. and to exist as such for the other: .e.but only p eril. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. ¤ 434 This status. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. negati on of immediacy. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. Force. which is the basis of this phenomenon. Thus the death of one. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. though by the abstract. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. in the service of the master. works off his individualist self-will. and incurs a like peril for its own . In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. the outward and visible recognition). at first immedi ately. and the means for entering into relation with them. and formation of it. f rom the essential point of view (i. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. This other.for the means of mastery. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. as the existence of hi s freedom. not their underlying and essential principle. In that other as ego I behold myself. and its being for others. however. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. in the first place. we see. as one of two things for another. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. the slave. ¤ 435 But secondly. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. therefore rude. it.e consciousness of a 'free' object. is yet. however. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. must likewise be kept in life. w hich however is also still outside it. a suppression. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. from one point of view. and thus give existence to my freedom. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. on the ir phenomenal side. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. the slave. retains his single self-consciousness. then. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states.

the passage to universal self. or determinations of the very being of things. valour. bu t the truth that knows it. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness .which is Reason. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. aware of what it is.or rather it is a difference which is none. Reason. 4. state. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears.consciousness. Selbstbewu§tsein. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. etc. honour. friendship. Wahrnehmung 3. fatherland. is now itself universal. and of all virtues. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. is Reason. Die Begierde 6. For truth here has. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. fame. Truth. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. as its peculiar mode and immanent form. love. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity .in family. 5. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . the self-centred pure notion. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. than they are its own thoug hts. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. The uni versality of reason. .the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal .is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . is mind (spirit). (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. 1. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. ego. Der Verstand. therefore. idle fame. whilst it signifies that the object.f wisdom' .

above the material. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. etc.apart b oth from the content. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . and which as the reality of that notion. in so far as it has an object. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object.e. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. desires. in the soul as a physical mode. ideation. the latter now an infinite form which is not. what is the same thing. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. etc. therefore. it has a mode in its knowledge. This. PSYCHOLOGY. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. so far as its features are immediate or connatural.7. which is defined as it s notion. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own one word. in so far as . as its concept has just shown. though it no longer has an object. then its reality is that reason.the former a simple immediate totality. in thinking also and in desire and will.mental vision. Die Vernunft. And it is a matter of no consequence. like consciousness. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. restricted by that content. Mind. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. Cons ciousness is finite. it is finite by means of its immediacy. and above the complication with an external object . by being subjectiv e or only a notion. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . neit her subjective nor objective. remembering. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. viz. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. i.. Mind is finite. etc. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. however. or. SUB-SECTION C. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason.

whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415).as being and as its own: by the one. Thus. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. is misconceived and overlooked. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. When the affection has been rendered its own. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. and the negative aspect of mental activity. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. As the theory o f Condillac states it. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. that aspect is twofold . and being a rational knowledge. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. so far. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. that is. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. and to liberate itself to its elf. or. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). and its activity can only have itself as aim.e. and is even there a return into itself. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. Similarly. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. equally.e. the mind finds in itself something which is.reality of its reason. i. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. to reach and get hold of itself. and are the mind's own. viz. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. in so far as its existent phase. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. viz.e. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. i. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. forces. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). of comprehending itself. it is . the na tural soul (¤ 413). and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. and make the affection subjective. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. k nowledge. in freedom. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. by the other it affirms it to be only its own.

belong to a point of view utt . the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. or the activity of intelligence could be without will.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. the word. and therefore a restricted content. its content is at first only its own. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. and gains abstract auton omy within.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. The nominal knowledge. to definite and conceptual knowledge. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. wi th a material which is its own.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. It is still extremely ill off.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products.g. Psychology. merely as facts. and heartless intellects . This position of psychology. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. which it and the content virtually is.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. But as knowledge. and of the heart without the intellect . The course of this elev ation is itself rational. to get at the notion and the truth. Ou twards. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that.e. elevates itself. which in the first place is likewise formal . so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. has a material which is only nominally such. but) enjoyment. and is immediately willed. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. while it has to do with autonomous products. and that in its empirical condition. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. etc. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. as r eason is concrete. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. which is only certitude. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. is thus also a reality . This activity is cognition. like logic. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. just as they are given. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world.(b) Will: practical mind. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. along with which the content is realized as rational. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . which is the one-sided form o f its contents. e. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. in the theoretical range. Inwards .. as it is said.i. Its activity has to do with the empty form . both for the mind as such. for which it gains the form of universality. while the practical.

remembers. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. conception. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself.its out-of-selfness . as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. or makes the concept its own. imagination. conceives. as non-intelligent). but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. or mind.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). conceived as reflected into self. just so far as it realizes itself. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. imagination. etc. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. is bro ught into mind. if answered in the negative. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. it . This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. etc. note). cognitive conception.e. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. Faculty. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. viz. etc.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . conception. by cognitive intuition. however. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. remembrance. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . must lead to abandoning the effort. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge).whi (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. intelligen ce. are not isolated. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge.besides which it al so intuits. memory. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. If they are isolated. like power or force.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. etc. imagines. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent a word .exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. But the true satisfaction. intuition. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. etc. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. as it is by the same method brought into nature. It is true that even as isolated (i. it is admitted.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. But c ognition is genuine. that intuition. by rational conception. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate.

as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence.but to his feeling. the mere consciousness point of view. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. or at least to reasons . and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . in t he truth of mind.his private and p articular self. a . Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. in content and value entirely contingent. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. Now the material. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. Hence feeling. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. is swallowed up. .not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. may just as likely be narrow and active self-collection . If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. With us. has the form of casual particularity . with the character of something existent. as it were the closes t. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. 254). we have the one fa ctor in Attention . even should its import be most sterl ing and true. external or internal. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. of their essential relationships and real cha the generalit ies of common sense . Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. Feeling is the immediate. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. projects it into time and space. but rather as subject ive and private. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. this mode is simple. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. that is t o in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle.t he factor of fixing it as our own. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings.

but stored up out of consciousness. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. still continues simple. we may say. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. and received into the universality o f the ego. a rec ollection of itself. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. and inwardly divest itself of it. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness.the germ of the fruit. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. its when and where. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. with a preponderating subjectivity. in virtual possibility. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. however. in the way we treat. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. or. no longer needs to find the content. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. i. though intrinsically concrete. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. from the external place. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. t ime. which. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity.e. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. The representation is the property of intelligence. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. the germ as affirmatively a space and a time of its own. yet without being in consciousnes s. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. isolated. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. which makes it its own. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. as tho ught. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. . for example. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. as it at first recollects the intuition. and is arbitrary or contingent. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine.

and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. and an out-put from its universal m ine. where. has been broken up. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . In the first place. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts.Image and Idea. comes actually into its possession. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. being and universality. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. The image.viz. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. where it is treasured up. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . to be so and so. . if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. which is now the power over them. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. Secondly.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. has always the peculiarity. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. present also a distinction in content.these modes of relation are not laws. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy.. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. as of all intelligence. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. under the representation (idea) with the same content. though belonging to intelligence. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. wherea s the idea (representation). which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. by which it is authenticated. at first only in space and time. such as likeness and contrast. ¤ 20 note. or an intell ectual them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. the matter is entirely pictorial. But it is solely in the conscious subject. as a unit of intuition. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. but a being of its own institution. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. or ide a). i. whatever be its content (from image. as a matter of fa ct. reason and consequence. now that it has been endued with externality. if it is to exist.e. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial.) . It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. see Introduction to the Logic. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. The content reproduced. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . notion. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. that it finds its material.

because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. is reason. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. 435).still lacks the side o f existence.Abstraction. Such is creative imagination(7) . is derived from the data of intuition. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. so far a s it is concerned.e. when regarded as the agency of this unification. one's own and what is picked up. which forms their connecting link. are completely welded into one. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. recollection. allegoric. This force is really intelligence itself . are unifications of t he same factors. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. and in mechanical memory it completes. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). some latent concept or Ideal principle. internal and external. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. and becomes an i ndividuality.symbolic. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. but they are 'syntheses'. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. As reason. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. Another point calling for special notice is that. it is self-uttering. i. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. but only a nominal reason. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. derived from some interest. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. to universalize it.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. a concrete subjectivity. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. . concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition.. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. or something of the sort. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. . or poetical imagination . this form of being. for its ideal import is its elf. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. etc. These more or less concrete. In other words. Acting on this view. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). a force of attraction in like images must be assumed .Imagination.

treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence .. but appears as recipient of sensible matter.speech and. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l.). The sign is some immediate intuition. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). its institution by intelligence. Knarren. in the first instance. It is a n image. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . ¤ 459 The intuition . e tc. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external to sensations.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . whereas in the sign. since memory. has always to do with signs only. strictly so-called. Sausen. Such is the negativity of gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . its at of vocal objects. the colour of the cockade. when employed as a sign. . language . This intuition is the Sign. intuitions. but as representative of something else. the matter of the latter is.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. somewhat immediate or given (for example.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. and the connotation of which it is a sign. But in the fusion of the two elements. have nothing to do with each oth er. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). conception s. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. In logic and psychology. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. With regard to the elementary material of language. and even with conception and imagination. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth .in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . etc. and where it is conserved. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it.R auschen. out of which it forms i deas . and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. something accepted.

the chemical elements. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations.). i.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. instead of n ames proper.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. they are reduced to signs. palate. In particular. tongue in each) and for their combinations. (Cf. as. on anthropological articulation. but. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . as in our signs for the numbers. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. we may touch. if it be not altogether extinguished. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. for example. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. the denomination. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. as many as ten a . etc. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. and now that. it depends.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. as regards signs for mental objects.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). W.e.e. again.e. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. As to the formal elem ent. viz. which severally receive designation. i. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. and still takes place in Canton . The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. like the Chinese. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. The study of languages still in their original state. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. alphabetical writing. are frequently changed. . would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. in chemistry and mineralogy. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. i. . But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. the planets . Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. on the other hand. and only get signification as signs. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. It is only a stationary civ ilization. only in pas sing. their signs in vocal language. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language.

and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. in the interest o f vision. in the case of the Chinese Koua. This feature of hieroglyphic .nd twenty. however ample a connotation it may include. as it does. the simple plain idea. just as in modern times (as already noted.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . like alphabetic writing. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. in broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. peculiar to the intellect. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. so that. Both alike require such signs. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. the simple straight stroke. or simple logical terms. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. Engaging the attention of intelligence. Hieroglyphics.the name. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. is still for the mind simple in the name). that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. of uttering its ideas most worthily . It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . s imple in respect of their meaning: signs.e. while (with the facu . whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound.the mode. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. i. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. learn ing to speak Chinese. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. Thus. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. by speaking low and soft or crying out. The European. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. it is analysed. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. . What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as.

lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,

but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you

ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.

¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex

The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. on the one hand. the truth and. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. joy. in its objectivity and truth. etc. and duty. and precisely in that way d o they . in which these facts. and will. when thought. and evil.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. Delight. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. and still more in mind. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. heart. bad. but presented in its universality and necessity. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. we have this immanen . is precisely what constitutes. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. shame. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. right. Whereas in life. for the latter. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling.retain a speciality of their own . contentment. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. On the other hand. But where the objects sought are thus casual. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . namely God. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. it is because of their quality or co ntent . we have only to deal with the selfish. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. repentance. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. and thought. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). may be placed. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general.but only in antithesis to the latter . grief. in their immediacy. If feelings are of the right sort. But as both. Thus it is.. volition. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. etc. in feeling. in their universality and necessity. and to discus s their content. can also be felt. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t..which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. lack objective determin ation. wha t is the same thing.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. law and morality. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject.indeed infinitely so.

natural impulse and inclination. while. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. It is on ly a dead. and their truth.his inte rests of intellect. ego. subjectivity . but to ge t realized. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. which is essentially self-d etermination. their mutual connect immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice.Up to what degree the good continue good. But with regard to the inclinations. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. and something inappropriate to it. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. be the value of tha t mode what it may. the question is directly raised.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. each being always in conflict to another. it is pa ssion. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. Which are good and bad? .a development in which the content of autonomous . therefore. they. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. on the other. The will. on one hand. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. character. as experience shows. as r egards the form of its aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. If the will is to satisfy itself. finds in the conformity . Should. Thus. passion is neither good no r bad. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. indeed. enjoyment . being all in one subjec t and hardly all. however. The answer to the question. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. first of all. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. as rights and duties. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. too often. Will. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. . In what way have they. are infected with contingency. In consequence of this formalism.and (as there are ma ny. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. is at first still a natural will. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. talent. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. each with its private range). The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. What are the good and rational propensiti es.on one aim and object. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . admitting of gratification. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse.

which as such is the universal. moral. by another.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. which reflection and comparison have educed. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. an inactive thing.his passion. are reduced to a m ere negative. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. either alto gether or in part. inclinations. Their mutual limitation. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. and social duties. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. without end. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. is his interest and . and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. . It is thus 'reflecting' will. the impulses. that finds its actualizing in the agent. i. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. The morality concerns the content of the aim. as the content. of a universal sa tisfaction. on the whole to their disadvantage. An action is an aim of the subject. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. ¤ 476 The will. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. there would be no action at all. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. so far as their particularity goes.and one satisfaction. However. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. and is option or choice. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. which is just as much no satisfacti on.e. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. as thinking and implicitly free. where the subject is made to close with itself. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. As thus contradictory. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . this is wh at is called the interest. the free gift of nature.action loses its contingency and optionality. They are somet imes contrasted. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. unless he had an interest in it. on one hand. it is on them that the decision turns.

and are constituted after its measure. i. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). the divine min d present with him. fortuitousness . Plat o and Aristotle. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love.a universality which only ought to is the existential side of reason . By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. of present sensati on and volition. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. have never had this Idea. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. still this very I . as realizing the idea. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . As abstract Idea again. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. its very au tonomy or freedom. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. or philosophy (. therefore. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. for example. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. and of which it is only t he formal activity. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. The Greeks and Romans. just because it is the very essence of mind. individuality. is in the first instance the rational will in general. as the substance of the state.e. which realizes its own freedom of will. the will is an actually free will. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. or by s trength of character. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. knows this its concept. of the be aware. did not have it. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. and that as its very actuality. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. even the Stoics. with freedom itself.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. so that in this sphere of particular existence. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one.e. This universalism the will has as its object and aim.e. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. If. ambiguous. in religion as such .is matter of speculation. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which.sired . If the will.e . he is actually free. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . he h as also. which i s pure and concrete at once. On the contrary.freedom itself. only so far as it thinks itself . man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. i. and object . and is will as free intelligence. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. now that the formalism. that is. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. Whole continents. aim. and are without it still. i. According to Christianity. education. and the abstract singleness. If to be aware of the Idea . When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. is actu ality. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. or implicit Idea. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. however. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. Africa and the East. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished.

Das praktische Gefuhl. moral. Der freie Geist. 14. Phantasie 8. 3. Die Erinnerung 6. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. 7. Das Denken. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. 4.dea itself is the actuality of men .the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. Inwendiges. 9. Der Geist 2. they would find the very substance of their life outraged.a principle of the mind and heart. But this freedom. Anschauung. if they are made slaves. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. Die Gluckseligkeit. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . which the content and aim of freedom has. as men. Vorstellung. 15. 1. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. Der praktische Geist 13. 10. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. is itself only a notion . but which they are. into legal. Die Einbildungskraft. 5. but the pe rmanent character . 16. Gedachtnis. and not less into scientific actuality. Auswendiges.not something which they have. not with laws or court s of justice. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. religious. Die Intelligenz. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. 12. 11. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction.

my right to a thing is not merely possession. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. in the light of the concept. it exists as manner and custom. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity.e. being universal. Liberty. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. on the other hand. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. For a mode of existence is a right.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. are its Duties. and is the vi rtual universal. to administer. What is a right is also a duty. as the services of the members of the State in dues. duty in general is in me a free subject . when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. in these externally objective aspects. These conditi ons. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. is a duty. its rights of admi nistration. and it is a duty to possess things as property. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. and brings into existence i n these several wills. or Usage.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. i. The penal judicature of a government. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. In the phenomenal range right and duty are the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. anthropological data (i. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. or legal possession.e. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. or instituted as an authoritative power. private an d personal needs). in relation to the subjective will.. is the Law (Right ) . receives the form of Necessity. which splits up into different heads: viz. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. their absolute unity. but as possession by a person it is property. where free will has existence. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. etc. so as to become its habit. are duties . attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. where they. are no less its duties to punish. temper.(1) When. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. etc. and character. it is a Law. which in it is thus at home with itself. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom.. is also a right. not in the form of impulse. and what is a duty. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality.and aim. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. viz. military service. But. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. etc. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. in general. to be as a person. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality.. In the morality of the conscience. But in this individualist moral sphere. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. relation to another person . whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. Liberty. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. but in its universality.

and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. possession is property. the infinite self-rela tion. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. civil society. As so characterized. or by the formatio n of the thing or. it is the right of the subjective will. which is thus mutual. But the set of adjustments. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a is the ethic s of actual life in family. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. abstract right. it may be. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. by mere designation of it.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. so as to have its existence inside it. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. This thing. Sitte A. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. are simultaneously mutually independent. as something devoid of will. . has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. and hence as a single being . p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. the external sphere of its liberty . ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. which as possession is a means.possession. at first in the outward appropriation. on its own account me rely 'practical'. and the I in it is abstractly external. but as existence of the personality is an end. These extremes are the persons who. but on an external thi ng. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. though it remains in trinsically the same. (B) When the will is reflected into self. 1. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. But this predicate. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. Gesetz 2. is an individual. and State. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. in the knowledge of their identity as free.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. as in itself still abstract and empty. morality of the individual conscience. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. But the thing is an abstractly external thing.

the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. and its acceptance by the other will. and recogniz ed. its changing hands. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. willed. is affirmed. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. which. non-malicious wrong. and time. the only diversity lies in this. produces a wrong: by which. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. ¤ 495 The contract. But so far as my will lies in a thing. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. as the judgement of the intrinsically right.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) .¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary.). of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. but which. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. which thus becomes wicked. This is naiv e. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. in that case. however. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. labour. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated.just as well with draw it as not. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. universal thing or commodi ty. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). 493 seqq. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so .Contract. because they face each other. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will.the full and complete deed. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. expressing the civil suit. I can just as well put it in it as not . eac h and all are invested with a show of right. then the external rec . and. is disinterested.

i. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. from life. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. and commits a crime. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. In it the agent. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. even from the range of all existen ce. i.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. such an action is essentially and actually null. This gives the wrong of fraud . accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. on . so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. is a matter of chance). howe ver. the latter is violated. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as rictly so called .on self-determination or autonom y. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. The 'reality' of right.e. The law of nature .in this case the apparent recognition. or in corporeity.) Thus the will is violently for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. sets up a law .punishment. is the work of Revenge. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. ¤ 499 (3) Finally.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. that of the judge. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. being conformable to the right. an d so on without end.compulsion against the thing. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will .a universal which holds good for him. This progression. in revenge. like the last. in which the law of nature should hold sway. as a volitional and intelligent being. which is nominal and recognized by him only . abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. or right as governed by the nature of things. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. But more than possible compulsion is not.where the nominal relation is retained.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) .whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. is at the same time only a new outrage. But revenge. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. As such it is mo rality(2) proper.e. b ut the sterling value is let slip. and not merely the particular mode . to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. and while the former only is respected. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . which is disinterested . The social state. Conversel y. To display the nullity of such an act. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. The former used to be the common meaning. and can be seized only in t his quarter. or Natural Right. by the n otion.a law.

2. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. But here the moral signifies volitional mode.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed.the other hand. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. and thus comes into relationship with the former. In point of form.and also moral wickedness. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. though any alteration as such. The subjective will is morally free. recognition. B. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. sentiment. or even justification in his h eart. embracing these individual point s. is its deed. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. so much as it has consciously willed. counts only as a person. intelligence. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. This is the right of intention. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. who. be its affection w hat it may. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . so far as these features are it s inward institution. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. its own. 1. the reason of the will.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. but have their assent. conscience. Moralitat 3. and willed by it. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. is now chara cterized as a subject . the will is at the same time made a particular. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. which was its purpose. my part in i t is to this extent formal.a will reflected into itself so that. it thus includes purpose and intention . Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. Das Recht. an d allows to be imputed to it. etc. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. in mere law. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. Now. Naturrecht.

¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . a good intention in case of a crime. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. This is the right to well-being. constitute h is well-being.e. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. his interest and welfare must. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent.being only in this.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition.ion. These aims. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. as individual and universal. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. and yet each of them.and thus including in it particularity . but is a particul arity of his own .still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. can be wicked.a universal determined in its elf . it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. the essential and actual good. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. in point of its matter.that it contains his needs. it is always something particular. And yet they ought to harmonize. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. as in happiness (¤ 479). on account of that existent sphere of liberty. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. though it is a particular duty. whether the . which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. is as g ood and as duty absolute. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. they ought to stand in harmony. is not something external to him. because the agent. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest.g. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). will . is always fundamentally one identity. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. and aims. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. At the same time because good is one. interests.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. essential and actual. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence.

expressed by this repeated ought. The for mer is the will of goodness. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. Moralitat 2.the standpoint of the ought. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. and the wicked. the truth of this semblance. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . Der Vorsatz 3. right . nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing.the utterly abstract semblance . non-universal. an aim essentially and actually null. in this its identity with the good. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. Wickedness. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will .sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . which has no objectivity.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. and of the good. THE MORAL LIFE.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. is abandoned. That. in something external therefore. Die Absicht und das Wohl. On the affirmative side. 6. which actualizes and dev elops it. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and a goodness. The subjectivity. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . the unutterable. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. This pure self-certitude. Das Gute und das Bose C. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. which would only be abstract. 5. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. is only the infinite form. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. to be carried out in it. The result. is.good is realized. 4. good. but is only sure of i tself. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. and refuse it to the wicked. Handlung. and duty.of Conscience and Wickedness. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. 1. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. its deepest descent into itself. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . no more exist than not. on its negative side. which is the good. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. The failure of the latter consists . in the notion. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. rising to its pitch. i . th e essential thing.

looks upon it as his absolute final aim. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. makes this union an ethical tie .ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons.the Political Constitution.the Family. controls and entirely dominates from within. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. When these two impe rfections are suppressed.the genuine ethical temper. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al.n a thing . however. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation.monog .Civil Society. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. i. to destiny. as deliberate work for the community. to the total of ethical actuality. as an intelligent being. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being.e. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . But the person. This is the sexual tie. is confidence (trust) . and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . that it is. to a spiritual significance. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. The ethical personality. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. In the latter sphere. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . temperament. without any selective refl ection.yet somewhat which without all question is. is virtue. elevated. in its ki nd. in its immediacy. mind ap pears as feeling. Thus. . whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. In the shape of the family. it exists as confidence.Marriage. etc. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . .e . which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. as against the univers al. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. the individuality expres ses its special character. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. manner and cu stom . however. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. as personal virtues. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. whose independence it.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. i. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance.

originally foreign to it. labour. on the o ther hand. of the possessor's will. who exist independent and free.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. learning. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. and care for the future. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. being an intelligent substance. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in educating them to independent personality. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. information. into families or individuals. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. constitutes the general stock. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. This instrument. however. to found anew such an actual family. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . while. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. ¤ 522 (3) The children. as private persons. or nominal culture in general. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. and thus produce more unconditional . acquire an existence of their own. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. as do also its industry. thus invested with independence. destined. In virtue of such for tuitousness. on one hand. of legal regulation. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. or state external. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest.

and in it they have their social moralit y. talent. Where civil society. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. in the course of definite manifestation. on the side of external existence. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. its action gets direction and content through natural features. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. 2 4/5 years.the Law. their recognition and their honour. is developed i n detail.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . of needs. and accident. and with it the State. 2 3/4 . (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. and so on ad infinitum. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. Hence. also of aims and interests. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. certain. at every point.and ye t it should be decided. they have their actual existence. It is a futile perfectionism to have . option. determined through reason or legal intelligence. Thus whether three years. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. ten thalers. Their content per se may be reasonable .or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . and of means for satisfying them. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. which is honesty. and an ensemble of contingencies. skill. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. The third. though of course only at the final points of deci ding. intelligence. or could be. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. or only 2 * . be the righ t and just thing.. and a corresponding mode of labour. which as existence is essentially a particular.which is also a general business (of the whole society) .masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. this analysis. But when right. as vital. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . and of these estates to one another and to their centre. exists. The second. and like the first a certain subsistence.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. as well as of mental culture and habit . the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society.dependence on the social system. however.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. to be. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. and industry. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. of mere agents. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital.

or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . the individualized right .though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis . Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. they touch only the abstract will .gets its universal guarantee through formalities. at the same time an externally objective existence. within the house .are governed and well governed too by laws. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. being laws o f strict right. But there is a contrary case. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. who has by so doing gained the proven: . bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements.even as his law can only be a just law. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. the need of a simpler code . to which objective existence determines i be promulgated and made known as laws .the ne ed. . not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. The comparison of the two z.laws. as the genuine order of life. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. there arises. however. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. whic h are only internally in these objects. which discovers new distinctions. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. first really de serving the name of laws. inasmuch as.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . of his countrymen. This subjective existence.which though something new. are not a new hou se. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. general laws. constit . These people forget that the stars . In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions this exists as revenge . and t hus become authoritative . as it is a known law. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . which again make new decisions necessary. . as universal authority and necessity. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith .itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. hereditary divinity or nobility.e. not for them. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws .and th e cattle too . has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. by faith and trust. recognized. like improvements on a f loor or a door.into punishment (¤ 500). and in particular transforms this existence . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. as in the mental ima ges of space. in the judicial system. with the advance in multitude. even the admiration.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite.

since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. because it is man's want. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. so as to secure this satisfaction. So far as concerns also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. and their variable ingredients. to the concrete of civil society. . and worked from that point of view. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it .It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. which. be exercised as different functions. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . Such an order acts with the power of an external state.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. Conversely. from the c onnections between nation and nation. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. . It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. No doubt this factor is incomplete. in a uniform gen eral way. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. because it is only one factor. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. the position of an external un iversality. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. It results also from circumstances of locality. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. appears as state.'poli . then. In so far. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. as at bottom different sides. shou ld. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. and the judgement as application of the law to it.and that.viz. mere circumstantial evidence.

secondly. with all its evolution in detail. but which has a thoroughly general so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . ¤ 539 As a living mind. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal an actuality . continually produce it as their result. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. (c) THE STATE. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private (outer-state) law. First it maintains them as persons.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . receiving. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. his independent self-will and particular interest. is its essence. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. and. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. through the action of the government and its several branches. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. But. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . It provides for the reasonable will . they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing.the reasonable spirit of will. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. it carries back both. and not left to perish.ce'. s heer subjectivity. which each originally takes care of for himself.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own .which volition is thereby free . it protects the family and guides civil society. Thirdly. self-originated. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. then it promotes their welfare. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social individual. The cons titution is existent justice .coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. First. and self-develop ed . also for that will being put in nsists in a double function. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. to the immediate agent. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. but. in this direction . . and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. This universal principle. differentiated in to particular agencies. which. Thus we have the corpora tion.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom.into the life of the universal substance. the state only is as an organized whole. Secondly. they are re strictions. and . The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. however. The same unity. On the other hand. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society.

Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. in other words. Rome. etc. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. Nothing has become. etc. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality .pleasure an d self-will. military service. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. logically carried ou t. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they.besides their personalit y . as regards the concrete. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. . skill. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. is so little by nature. as it exists as s uch. However true this is. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). It is important therefore to study them closer. authorities. which it can without incompatibility regards taxation. All men are by nature equ al. were called its 'liberties'. the familiar proposition. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind.. magistracies . But. etc. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. it embodies a liberty. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. talent. The laws themselve s. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). i. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while.only it can make them . and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. directories. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. the difference of governing powers and of governed. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. The principle of equality. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. But the notion of liberty. As regards Liberty. eligibili ty to office. As regards.e. the current notions of l . private as well as public rights of a nation. On the contrary. town . presuppos e unequal conditions. Formerl y the legally defined rights. is abstract subjectivity. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. etc. as it ha ppens.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. otherwise have in property.equal in the concrete. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. Really. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. physical strength. etc. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. But that this freedom should e xist. and that the laws are restrict ions. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . on the contrary. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. first. rejects all differences. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. With the state there ari ses inequality.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. etc.punishment. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. age. without further specification and development. that the laws rule. or destroy them. or even in crime. Equality. on the contrary. the citizens .

but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants.e . and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. is . But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. however. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. The term political liberty. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing.that which preserves. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. of liberties in general. If . as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. in which this is not formally done. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. The question . of others. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and.) But the guara ntee lies also. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. self-w ill and self-conceit. But the more we fortify liberty. ¤ 541 The really living totality . as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles.e.just because of this inseparability . The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective sec urity of property. and the organization of the actualization of them. with its insatiate vanity. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. as a state without a constitution. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. be it added. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. . i. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. just as little as the making of a code of laws. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. and must deal with them as it ca n. not merely with regard to the naturalness. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. Of it the following paragraphs will speak.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. with this development of particularity.iberty only carry us back to equality. has an insight and conviction of his own . in other words continuall . and to regard a state. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. and thus gains moral independence.a thing that has nev er happened in history. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction.

this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. as in a democratic constitution.e. Only through t he government. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. (A mistake still greater. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle.y produces the state in general and its constitution. in other words. i. is the self-redintegrating notion. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. equally disorganizes actuality. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. as in the patri archal society .monarchy.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil a state of society. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. .the will of a decreeing individual. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. the participation of all i n all affairs . however. as always. ¤ 542 In the government . yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). and the government be merely executive and dependent . What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. bject always. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. These. is the government. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. of the family and of civil society. . presupposes ignorance that the true idea.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation.or.impugns the principle of the division of powers. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. which includes an already existing development of differences. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein.regarded as organic totality .the all-sustaining. is the state make it the first power. but an actual indiv idual . and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . In the perfect form of the state. all-decreeing will of the state. which taken apart is also particular).e. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'.

e. with its industry and i ts communities. possess independence of a ction. and are to that degree private person s. civil society. lik e peace and war. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. . i. The division of constitutions into democracy.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . it may be . who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular short. to that end and for that reason. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. admini stration of justice or judicial power. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . legislative power.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. That subjectivity .. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. and with earlier transition-forms. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. as it were. first. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. with their general opinion. essentially.'ideal' unity. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . The pure forms . the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). especially in legislation .a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. liberty of property. involve the. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. there arises the participation of several in state-business. and above all personal liberty. an actual existence. participate in the governmental power. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . Two points only are all-important. aristocracy and monarchy. Secon dly. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. and then of nature . which having their busin ess appointed by law. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty.are. being simple self-relation. too. administration and police. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. in the history of the State. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power.partly.such as ochlocracy. etc. For it is as private persons t .partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. Thus.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general .as also feudal monarchy. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. and skill for such ends.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . aptitude. These principles are those expounded earlier.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . to subjectivity.viz. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing .

The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. i. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. in arrangements for art and science. be they treated as mere individuals. indeed the whole. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . blind force. that t hey enter upon that participation. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. in the general sense of embracing a wide. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. and form a particular kind . even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. as such an aggregate.would be. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. or in its 'reflectional' universality. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. range of the extern al means of compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. ¤ 529 note). so far as they form only one branch of that power . because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. elemental sea. however. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. and therefore more urgent. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the it very likely is . wild. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf.which should be presupposed. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. In a civilized state. Take the case of England which. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. The des irability of such participation. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. The so-called financial law. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. however. s ense of general wants.regard ed as permanent. to power and act ion. demoralization. which. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. like that of the stormy. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. Experience s hows that that country . is no t self-destructive. as estates. but as organic factors.a spiritual element . ever newly recurring. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . in the law and liberty of property.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. inorganic shape. moreover. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws.e. it is not a brutish mass.the contrary must be the case . brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. as the nation . If the main part of the requirement were .

. a state of war. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. or every few years. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . and becomes the estate of bravery. when it makes a decree about finance. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive .e. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. Then making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. e. in which there would no longer be a government. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . as content o f a true law. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled.e. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. i.i. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . waywardness and chance have a place. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. afresh. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. but only parties. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. is really engaged with strict executive business. In one case the .is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. and thus. of the whole of the finances.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. and not to be made yearly. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. In their mutual relations.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. and not actually existent. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'.g. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es.

is called an a prio ri view of it.. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. especially on the philological side. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. a history of its own. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing.of sacerdotal races . On th is point. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. is appointed to occupy only one grade. as it is a history. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. That history. it passes int o universal world-history. there is Reason in history. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. and in Germany more than in France and England. and then in history. are settled and fixed. It has. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds.a world-mind. it. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties.the plan of Provide nce. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . As this development is in time and in real existence. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. this note must go into further deta il. that. first in general. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. when we come to minutiae. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. in defiance of . in short. It is in time. In general. both this general recognition. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. and as regards its range and scope. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. in short. which actually is and will be realized in it . For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. etc. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. internat ional law rests on social usage. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome.the judgement of the world. of a Roman epic. and on history-writing in general. and above all universal history. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness.and. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. an d the special claims of nations on one another. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. however. each of which. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. Fictions.

The point of interest of Biography . a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. and rejects both ki nds of interest.appears to run . This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. in striking portraiture and brevity. and.). This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality.the best-accredited history. if he had not an interest. but an age.e. on the other hand. is not only against taste and the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. strictly s peaking. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. express not a subjective particularity. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. as in the romance.g. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. a word. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. e. or if he declined to judge at all. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). and criticize events. Rome and its fortunes. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. and an exclusive interest in justice. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. no history . their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. a civilization. What happens to a nation . state. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. i. But. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. etc. and takes place within it. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. a nation. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. Ay. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. but violates th e principles of objective truth. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. in the interest of so-called truth. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of say a word on that here . or. has. not as good as a fairy tale.

in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. and are all treated as indifferent. truth. The mere play of sentiment. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. which is their reward. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. and the business of so doing. the freak of humour.directly counter to any universal scope and aim.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. has another ground and interest than his tory. are instruments. etc. and their subjectivity. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition.e. i. But. the consciousness of it. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. i. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. is the empty form of activity. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. potentially infinite. and there fore as a work of individuals. these individuals. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. 550). and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. and its content is prese . not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. i. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . Such a doctrine . as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. Only therefore through their relationship to it.e. is the supreme right. But biography too has for its background the historical world. if Rome or the German empire. and of its essence. while it inheres in them. which is what is pe culiar to them.or in other words that Reason is in history . then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. to the history of religion. which all alik e have no stuff in them. i. first in general. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also .admitting. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. on the contary. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. liberty. as over a special grade. really. only opinions and mere ideas. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit.e. For Spirit is consciousn ess. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. a development determined by the notion of spirit. in this case. etc.e. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. and accurate report of externals. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. have they their value and even their existence. we may add. the absolute L aw.Fame. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion.

whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. i. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. is the purification. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. especially ¤ 51. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. forme rly noticed. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. i. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason.Liberty. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. as true in the world of free will. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. the state rests on the ethical sentiment.a mere 'ought' . is the real ethical self. now gets its most concrete is the case with all speculative process . however.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. But the spirit which think s in universal history.consciousn ess. from which the start is now made. For that st arting. actually accomplished in the ethical world. Such apprehension. This factor. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . in the system of laws and usages. But . i. The spirit. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. then perforce religion must have the genuine content.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. lays hold of its concr ete universality. and that on the the peculiar perversity. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. At this rat e. that elevation to God really involves. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. the idea of God it kn . and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. ¤ 204 not e). the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason.e. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. i. cf. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. Th e finite. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. As regards the 'mediation' which. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. note). as law and duty. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate .e.e.e.

e. for thought and knowledge . even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own.e. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. first of all.of bondage. one religious and an other ethical. and law and justice. and in the act of faith. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. to justification by external wo rks.e. But in poin t of form. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme the one religion which secures the stability of governments. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . then there may be created. B . Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . It leads. a condition of spiritual sla very. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. generally. and superstition.or it may be.working images. in the annihilation of its externality. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. springing from some force and power. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. religion was a late r addition.partly as mere moving of the lips. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . and even as mutually indifferent. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. but purely subjective in individuals: . The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. i.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. on the contr ary. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion.ows must be the true and real.addressing his devotion to miracle. i. And. (In the Lutheran Church. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. but in the moment of enjoymen t. even to bones. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life.e. differing from the former in body and value of truth. the host as such is not at first consecrated. It lea ds to a laity. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. non-spirituality. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. in point of form. i. morality and conscience. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. and prays others to pray . and these applications of it in the religious life.the body of religious truth. and ex pecting miracles from them. in its faith and in its con science.logi cally enough . This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. i.

.in short. no matter how. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. i. self-realizing reason . therefore. can law and morality exist. i. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. lacked liberty. a code of law should arise. . 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. Instead of the vow of chastity. moral life in the state. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. and political institutions deduced from them must be.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. leads it into the rea l world. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence.e. i. The precept of religion. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness.e.e. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. and in a special sense Philosophy. our consciousness and subjectivity. and. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. Thus. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. so to speak a priori.of honesty in commercial dealing. sti . ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. which does not rise in hostility against them. and in the use of property . Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. And instead of the vow of obe dience. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. because the state is a self-possessed. founded on principles of reason. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. Thus set free. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. . true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state .ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). and it carr ies the terms of its own obedience which is itself the true freedom. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. the wisdom of the world. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. and thus only. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. if taken alone. So long as t he form. Let us suppose even that. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. unte nable. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom.

What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . thus surmountin . t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. At best it is only a temporary expedient . Such laws. e. that the Idea must be regent. from those deeper requirements which. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane.g. (cf. when specially set in relief as genus. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. . and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its just this .to make a revolution without having made a reforma the intellectual and thinking self. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness.. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. however sound their provisions may be. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. etc. ¤ 544 note). to put it simply. and the power given them to fix the budget. thus founder on the conscience. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy.among which laws these guarantees are included. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies.mi nd intrinsically concrete . so-called 'chambers'. This additional 'individuality' . and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. on the other hand. This absolute nucleus of man . or. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced.ll. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. on one hand. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind.

exhibits the one-sidedness. which is awa re of its own essence. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy .and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. pictorial representation. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . of philosophy. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. and so also one-sided phase. etc. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. in its f irst immediate. which is developed similarly.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations.was that creative imagination. Political power. which still escaped his intelligence. intuition. on its own s howing. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. but earlier than philosophy. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. the subjectivity of mind. should knit it together and control it. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. so . is implicitly in absolute liberty. or essential being). fall feeling.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality.). religion. Religion may. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. is after all only in one of its form s. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . for th ese reasons. earlier than it does as philosophy. Under the subjective form.the idea of the substantial moral life. Plato. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. As it left therefore behind. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle .and th at on account of this very principle . he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. from religion. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. But even religion. long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. he. in its philosophic phase. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state .). Only in the principle of mind. But thought always . and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. His state is therefore. as it grows and expands.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. ¤ 513. or rather must. The form in its infinite tru th. as demoralization. Hence religion as such.

of God's indwelling in us. Gesetz. Die Weltgeschichte 10. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. i. That here. the constitut ion and the code. 3. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. Die Sittlichkeit. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. for which it is as substance. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). while it is self-centred identity. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. Inneres Staatsrecht. as always. 2. 8. Die Polizei und die Corporation. 1. Religion. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. but rather to a sort of knowledge. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. Die Rechtspflege 5. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. Das aussere Staatsrecht. 4. 6. 9. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. as well as their several applications. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. Das System der to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. Thus ul timately. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. 7. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. Weltweisheit. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. In the Protestant state.

so that the thought embodied.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . on the other hand. as superseded in spirit. Belief. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. With the essential restrictedness of its content. But. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas).i. ¤ 411). It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. In this ideal. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty.something formal. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . that the figure shows it and it alo ne: .e. Der absolute Geist. 1. A. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle .hence not the sp iritual unity. the actuality of the spirit.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . its n atural immediacy. so long as the natural is only taken in its external other words. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. and of gaining its concrete determination. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. which is only a sign of the Idea. as it is. reconciliation. has in devotion .He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. like the material which it uses to work in. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. viz.the shape or form of Beauty. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. c an. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. that is. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. . or the idea. Art requires not only an external given material . but . ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. into the subject which produces that work. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form .for the expression of spiritual truth . aware. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful.the form of immediacy as such . On one hand.

e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. is not yet absolute. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. and th e artist is the master of the God.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . as well as of its art and science. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. or an effor t towards him . that one spirit creates and informs them. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow short how the nature of a nation's moral life. though concrete and intrinsically free. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. the artist's enthusiasm. the principle of its law. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . and that is where the infinite form. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. .and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. not yet conscious of itself.can try to bring itself to consciousness. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. assumes fuller and firmer features. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. subjectivity. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. of its actual liberty. as free spi rit. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. and of its constitution. is not yet known.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion.symbolic art. but as only finding himself in himself. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. known as the Absolute. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness.stil l this art is defective. but its inmost depth. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality.

dashing t o pieces everything high and great .The genuine objectivity.that it be revealed. .the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. still more in that external.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. unbeautiful sensuo usness. B. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. is first generated. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. and j ust for that reason. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. in which he had not revealed himse lf.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. not the supreme liberation itself. on the contrary.ent in it. revealed by God. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . from it s side. with their perso nal sense and feeling. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. . and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . and. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed.e.due to a one-sided survey of human life . has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. The old conception .the religion i. whose con tent is absolute mind . we see that the advent of art. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. The older religion in which the need of fine still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. as infinite self-realizing form . like the religion peculiar to it. it is from Him. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity .of Nemesis. and brilliancy. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . But with a further and deeper study. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. shows that such religion is on the decline. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. the theme and c entre of religion. Beautiful art. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. therefore is manifestation out a nd out. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him.into revelation. what is more. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. spectator find themselves at home. . Beautiful art. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. has its future in true reli gion. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. which is only in the medi um of thought .

¤ 566 In this separating. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. further.of the only Son . ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. and. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. it is. to specul ative comprehension.. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. for that reas on.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. it implies the revelation of Him. he still remains in original identity . directed towards the Eternal. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. when it thinks. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes is therefore the absolute spirit. F. of the world it gave away . and reconciliation with the eternal being.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. on one hand. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. as in duty bound.1. G . ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. amid that natural ness. It includes. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. which therefore is finite.knowledge in God. though. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. however. on the other hand. a separate being. in it s forefront. To know what God as spirit is . the elemental and the concrete nature . through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. even in its manifestation. or of judgement.just as. . the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. though different. which proceeds to man's self. abiding sel f-centred.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . with whom. That spirit. but afterwards. while in point of form he is.. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. and phenomena which succeed each other. only standing to it in an external connection.: Berlin 1829. But.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. the spirit.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y .is the Spirit. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. in point of content. Go d is. (c) as infinite return. . by C. staying aloof and inert. (a) as eternal content. not. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. again. it may almost create surprise that so many. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. first of all. as the extreme of inherent negativity.on the other hand. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. Yet. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God.requires careful and thorough apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . making them presuppositions towards each other. On one hand is heaven and earth.

has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. truth is the object of philoso phy. keeps himself unchanged. which from itself. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. after the example of his truth. who as such is identified with the essence . he. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. secondly. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. and thus sensuous. is not bound by it . in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. on account of his immediate nature.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. contentless sense.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. and eternal spirit in itself. Irony. remains master over it. and thus.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . but alive and present in the world. . From this its separation into p arts. th e self-centred manifestation.and. his natur al man and self-will. Whereas the vision-method of Art. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. But. an object of contemplating vi sion . through which witness of the spirit in transplanted into the world of time. so far. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. Die geoffenbarte Religion.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. taken in a merely formal. is itself the emptiness and vanity. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. as infinite subjectivi ty.but the vision of implicit truth. Further. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness.Irony. simple. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . with a temporal and external sequence. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. Thinking. 1. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. eternal. in which he. gives itself direction and con tent. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness .not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. This individual. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. external in point of form. but even to thought.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. In this form of truth. If the result . existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. this immediate.

or. opens it out in mental picture.takes. too much for the latter. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . finds itself already accompl ished. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. only looks back on its knowledge. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . of course. immediate vision and its poetry. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy .e.on one hand. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought.from these forms.stantial content into many separate shapes. as also of the necessity in the two forms . which determines itself to content. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. and acts inconsistently towards them. This witness . which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. which philosophy is. but also criticized it. This movement. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . remains identical with it. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. and this necessary as free. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. and against philosophy in general .leaving out. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. and s o religious.i. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. and mediates what is thus open ed out. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories.('Rationalism') . and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form.which may be in both the same .the underlying essence in all humanity . It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . when driven to expound strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought.on the other hand. a nd of logic in particular. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion.and from a pithless orthodoxy. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. with its separ ation into parts. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. to be more precise still. and particularly of the logical form. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. The charge of Atheism. This does not prevent the spirit. and whereas Religion. when at the close it seizes its own notion . Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . elevation of them into the absolute form.

It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. Amongst the abundant resources. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. On such a presuppo sition. I select .Everything is . though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . but as a proved fact. or any one man. cows . we must. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. also contains the generic abs tract. most sublime.of the new piety and new theology. This new theology. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof.the Bhagavat-Gita. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. the secularity of th much so. that. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . from which all definite quality is excluded. are unable and unwilling to see this . and form all that is definite in the divine universality.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness.which therefore it does not disparage. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. that it is treated not so much as an imputation.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics.all possess substantia lity. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. It is only his own stupidity. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . exclusi ve.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph the wanton assertion. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: .thus he understands philosophy . as it stands. fulfilled notion of God. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. If this theory needs no more than such a God. or Pantheism. some of the most telling passage . though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. if we believe them. and so . or if you will.or to dalai-lamas .as the most authentic statement accessible . This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. all such definiteness is only the non-divine.each and every secular thing is God. are) .that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. in particular. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism.that of the Egyptians to the ox .(empirical things. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. that it has too much of him: . Without interest of its own for the concrete. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . Piety. its grossest shape. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e.that of the Hindu to ass es. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. ¤ 71 note). and is always adora tion of an object which.of Pantheism. with all its absurdities. as is well known. without distinction. God in General. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. and amongst it s effusions. open to our disposal on this topic. whether higher or lower in the much so. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical.g. does not comprehend itself. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind .

. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . But so little concrete is this divine unity . . as also those proximate substantialities. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . . all this is woven upon me. . the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). . is alo ne the divine and God. . darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. Meru among the high-topped mountains. with a monstrous incons istency.spiritual as its idea of God i s . I am the light of th e sun and the moon. . . nothing independent]. powerless its. This everything. . .. Indra. .' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. to a poly theism. Even when. where the empirical everything of the world. which he is. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences.'I am the self. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. and the Spinozan Substance. Among letters I am the letter A. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. 'At the end of many lives. as different from that accidental.' This 'All'. and one essential amongst them. rather. as he said before he was S iva. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. . so to speak . etc. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. There is nothing else higher than myself. . I am also the strength o f the strong. . or a God besides. t he pure unity of thought in itself. than which there is nothing higher. the Everything. . the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures.' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. unessential existences. and end of living things. pp. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. . . besides Krishna. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . . . In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel.s. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . . the One which. however. . melt into the one Krishna. he is said to be the beginning. I am the taste in water. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. has the higher conception of Brahma. .. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. even Siva. goodness. . . But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. The undiscerning ones. . . passion.. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. . still God. but only . . developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. .the most excellent of everything. seated in the hearts of all beings.). . middle.that Hinduism.not everything. at the beginning of the pass age. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. is also the maddest of polytheisms. Hinduism. any more than the Eleatic One. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. . but having its truth in the substance. 7 seqq. I am life in all beings. and the moon among the lunar mansions. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. without essential being of its very own. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. . called Gods. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. p. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . . is not. .' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. which Krishna calls himself. . vanish. or Indra. . .

then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. as infinite from the finite.on the shallow conception of it . the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . after this partition. as everything. to was . the all. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar.ndu. That pantheism indeed . which. whether they spring from heart. he is as essence parted from appearance. we must consult th e Mohammedans. outside it .) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. the finite to the infinite. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. and of empirical secular spirit. But. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. especially the Mohammedan. is identical with the world. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. Hin du monotheism. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. or other creature. in relation to the popular idea of the world. even in a general exoteric discussion. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism.of the world as one thing. and so on . or Spinozist.keep its independence. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. and.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. when he adores the ape. the Eleatic. imagination or speculation. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic..and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. secondl y. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . If. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. ac osmical. as the endless lot of empirical existence. of the relationship of God and the world. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore its finest purity and sublimity. and on the other. modes of envisaging God. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. or. Of the oriental. For that unity. to which everything is God. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. e. as it says. is discarded and absor bed. and that unity described as love. empirical indivi duals . The clo se of philosophy is not the place. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair it as a lot of Gods or as secular. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. and God everything. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. but . But to go back again to the question of fact. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. moreover.. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. on one hand. on the contrary. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality.floating in the indefinite blue . in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m.g. It is only the picture .

that. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else.g. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world.has the same solid substantiality as the other. with God's omnipresence.the world as much as Go d . etc.g. as Epicu rus does. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. mere ide ntity. is what one expect s. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. in the pores of th e physicists . so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. I n the philosophical field they proceed. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on.and that the factor of indet erminateness . they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. they import them into philosophy. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. But the question is. viz. e. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. with abstract unity. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. a nd assert . not the concrete unity. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . the most external and the worst. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem.said pores being the negative. in matters admitted to be of superior. where they are utterly unknown. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. as in the physical field the physicist. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. i. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. inorganic and living . something supposed to exist beside the material reality. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . and the empty absolute. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception.e. with indefinite ideas. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. providence. And as in their judgement either of the two . applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. it is not. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. if not even of supreme interest. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. however. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. when they hear of unity . the notion and content of philosophy. but rather its reverse. omnipresence. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. and which they ascribe to philosophy.and relation i pso facto implies unity .that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity.falsely as a fact . Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. composition. but only the one factor of this category of relation . and that hence. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject.and s till less take trouble about it . but with concrete unity (the notion).or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) .is identity. they have laid hands on.te a word on what a 'notion' means. and that amongst the m there is great variety. and that it is the system of identity. .they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. But they show so little acquaintance with them . Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result.

If statements as to facts are put forward. But to put that sort of thing. which causes the movement and development. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: .as the mediating agent in th e process . The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. i.their everything. for its middle term: a middle. which has self. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. as other than they. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . sunders itself. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy.ity . ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. making the former its presupposition. but the many-shaped modes specified. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. or as prevaricating for a purpose. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. standing between the Mind and its essence. The esoteric study of God and identity. and the latter its universal extreme. on the shoulders of philosophy. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. as of cognitions. the notion.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium.e. an All-one doctrine. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. then. y . an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. On account of this chorus of assertions. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. which . The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. in his relation to the world. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. But in ascribing to God. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation.which. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. and notions . with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. is philosophy itself. and which is itself the way to produce is the nature of the fact. the absolutely universal. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions.the logical system. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. a system of which notions are perverted into their opposite. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. of which liberty is the aim. and as implicitly the Idea. not abstract unity. Nature .knowing reaso n. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment.

eternally sets itself to work. . in f ull fruition of its essence. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute this same movement is equally the action of cognition. The eternal Idea.

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