INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any

attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i

s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as

treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.

indeed. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. but soul. The usual answer. the soul is only the sleep of mind . But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. on the one hand. thus come into being.the truth that matter itself has no truth. however. even the capacity of offering resistance. however. i. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. as absolute negativity. its simple 'ideal' life. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. whereas the 'vital' matter. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. and so the self-externalism. where the othe . not merely lacks gravity. a nd the soul remains the pervading. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. have still. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity.with th is proviso. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. matter is regarded as something true. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. identical ideality of it all. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. which is potentially all things. and mind conceived as a thin g. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. to which they might perhaps add space and time. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. and. which may also be f ound enumerated among them.. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact.SUB-SECTION A. Wherever there is Nature. Mind. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. These 'imponderables' . But not merely is it. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. like heat. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. It is otherwise with Mind. li ght. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. on the other. as such a result. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. ANTHROPOLOGY. which is the fund amental feature of matter. except where. There. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. perhaps.e. etc. At such a stage it is not yet mind.the passive of Aristotle. and not as the immediate or natural individual. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. in a sense.

But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. the changes of the seasons. described. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. Animals and pl ants. they are natural objects for consciousness. into the absolute syllogism. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. disappear. as an anima mundi. is too abstract. even these few and slight susceptibilities. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. These have. as so often is done.whence Epicurus. But either this identity. and the periods of the day. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. Malebranche. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice.the natural soul. its immediate being . a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus.(a) In its immediate natural mode . bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. Spinoza. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. upon it. and does not rise or develop into system. in many case s completely. .is moulded into it. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. remain for ever subject to such influences. and telluri c life of man. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. feels the difference of climates. based upon participation in the common life of nature. as in the case of Lei bniz. as individualized. so to speak. when it presents itself as a single soul. not.e. and always more or less.r is not . etc. Hence. re tains an abstract independence. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. and.e. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. a world-soul. as in the case of Spinoza. In nations less intellectually emancipated. (c) Thirdly. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. which only is. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. it may be. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. (b) Secondly. sidereal. there philosophers took God. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. or. just in proportion to his civilization. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. T hus. and. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. so holding. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. Descartes. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. with Leibniz.or corporeity . it is a soul which feels. on the contrary. in the modes of that being.

leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. of families or single individuals. talent . who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). hopes. as it exists. Thirdly. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. widely distant from each other. shows. The contrast between the earth's poles. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. and the position of the individual himself. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. and as stages in its development. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. and on the other. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation.a worl d no longer incomplete. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. shows an active half. carrying out these universa . character. we find it as the special temperament. as alterations in it. bodily structure and disposit ion.on a ph ysical basis. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. scientific. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. fails to meet his ideal requirements. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . physiognomy. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. on the whole. or artistic.mind wrapped up in itself. the one permanent subject. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. in purposes political. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. we see man in his true relation to his environment. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. on its one side. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. we find its diversities. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. fancies.the sexual relation . This . And that individuality marks both the world which. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. He begins with Childhood . while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood).

as already noted. (c) Sensibility(3) . But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. . not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family.not as a merely negative rest from it. The characterization given in the section is abstract. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. in the first instance. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. .l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. put this question to the class of ideology. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. although. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex.Napoleon. or self-centralized being. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. but as a return back from the world of specialization. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff .The waking is not merely for the observer. as they may be called. . an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. each point. i n an unintelligent way. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. as before explained . viz. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. sleep. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . distinguishes itself from its mere being.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. which are often addressed to philosophy: . Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. for example. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises.

The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. are in order to be felt.. is what we call sensibility.identity of our self-centred being. it is true. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. its natural peculiarity. for itself. moral. and to be as if found. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. are our very own. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). Another. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. etc. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. One. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. This should hardly need enforcing. the inarticulate bre athing. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . and religious. just.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . mean. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. which. etc. The fact that these particulars. in its own self. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. But if put in the feelin g. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. the fact is a mode of my individuality. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. murder .set over against consciousness. belonging as it does to natural. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. are found by the waking soul. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. blasphemy. evil. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. godless. the naturally immedi ate. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. and is so felt. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. true. and the character. On the other hand and conversely. invested with cor poreity. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. but treated as bel onging to its most special. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. mora l. on one hand. in the feeling. primarily. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite.g. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). adultery. the conscience. and . be it noted. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. etc. ho wever. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. not mere alterations. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. fornication.

it is a soul which feels. to take possessi on of it. the immediacy of mode in feeling .g. especially the passions or emotions. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. therefore. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . and voice in general. distinction appears as mere variety . Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. of heavy matter. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. and their corporization. the blood.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. What it has to do. We should have. smells. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. set in its self-centred life. following the special character of the mental mode. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science .it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . with its varieties of language. the centre of the 'sensible' system. As the system of the senses. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. for example. is to raise its substantiality. works itself out. ¤ 402 Sensations. (¤¤ 321. sighs. 322). sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . with which that substance is one. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . (b) THE FEELING SOUL . individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. i.and of sound. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). In the usage of ordinary language. but an inward. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. in a special system of bodily organs. (c) the sense of solid reality. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. tones.a psychical physiology. i ts merely virtual filling-up.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. . The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. laughter. (¤ 317) . But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. just because they are immediate and are found existing. are formed from their mental source.because in it. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. o f colours. of self.alterations in the substantiality of the soul.e. to the character of subjectivity.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. to realize its mastery over its own. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. e. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears.the senses of definite light. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. the 'irritable' system. (¤ 300). Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy.

must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. and to that world it stands but as to itself. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence.that world being included in it and filling it up. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. in whi ch all this is stored up. thoughts. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. In the present stage we must treat. to be defined as one of feeling . and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. virtually retained. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. the s oul is characterized as immediate. Some times. where the real is put past . This substance i s still the content of its natural life. which is disease. it implies a want of adaptation. but only to his im plicit self. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. so far as that is. Thus in the body it is one simple. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. in sickness. ¤ 404 As individual. etc. As sentient. the content is its particular world. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. it brings within itself. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). secondly. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . without existing. first. a deep featureless characterless mine. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. to which the soul. once mor e come to light. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. in an implicit mode. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. omnipresent unity. the corporeity. At the present stage this singleness is. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. etc. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. acquired lore. of the abstract psychical modifications by embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . although it does not exist.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. may again sink down. ideas and information. but a negation.. By itself. prima rily. They were not in our possession. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness.the existent spe culative principle. ideas. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. which is at the same time its predicate.

as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . placenta. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. injuries.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. of the mother. By the self-hood of the latter it . the single self of the two. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject.. say between friends. whose decision is ul . as concrete subject ivity. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. developed interests. incl inations. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. of life. not as a mere possibility. character. etc. or capac ity. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. controlling genius thereof. and is therefore passive. intellige nt. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. the psychical relationship. Here are two individuals. tal ent. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. because immediate. which. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . and of character. as yet nothing impenetrable. it is. fortunes. etc. and reasonable.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. congenital disposit ion and temperament.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. etc. etc. temper. but as efficiency and realized activity. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated.. idiosyncrasies.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental.a substance. self-possessed. not yet as its self. as it has existence of its own. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. or virtuality. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. is visibly present as another and a different individual. not a true subject reflected int o itself. self-conscious. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. The moth er is the genius of the child. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. his secular ideas. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain.

whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. self-possessed human being is a disease. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual show. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio be mere deception and impo sture. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. is. which are also means and ends to each other. This totality forms his actual ity. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. it must be added.his fun damental interests. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. first of all call for verificati on. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. At the same tim e. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. it has already been call ed his genius. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . The facts. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. educated. But such a verification would. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism .infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . in other words. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. on the other hand. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. To that end the phenomena. intentions. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. that it is in harmony wi th the facts. on the cont rary.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. in which the individual here appears innnersed. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. it might seem. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. means. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence.

however. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. etc. his own and that of the magnetize . it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. When the substance of both is thus made one. is this. exist for it as an outward objectivity. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. and to know which. f riends. unless by the aid of religion. .). in its sober moods. and other diseases. is under a veil. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. formed. smells. then. . and character. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. those c onnected with female development. or at the approach of death. and the like. in whom it sees. not on the spot. tastes. etc. ca pable of conveying general truths. that it is a state of passivity. And because it is the adult. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. reads. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. wh en it is healthy and awake. subje ctive reason. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. the magnetizer. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. subject to the power of another person. after the downfall of the Roman republic. not really a 'person'. like that of the child in the womb. (Thus Cato. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. But such clairvoyance . for example. which. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. which lead up to the result . in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. in catalepsy. .) Compare h ome-sickness. etc. external one to another.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. but it is empty. and hears. the selfless individual. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. and c ontinues to be. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. But. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them.a genius which beh olds for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. a formal vision and awareness. on those left behind. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents.

etc. anticipate the full-grown an . But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. it is still susceptible of disease. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. so long as we assume independent personalities. is impossible. the 'common sense'. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. as in other cases. on the contrary. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. receives.fe eling. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. etc. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. for example. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. is without any definite points of attachment . The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. The purely sensitive life. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. which is no less a world of law. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness.r. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. as in the morbid state alluded to. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. In this way it is self. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. causality. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . reasons. in its capacity as individual. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. in this nominal perception. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. which still marks the self-feeling. i s just this form of immediacy. or med icines for them. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . In considering insanity we must. though all-embracing. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. and hence. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. one sees and hears with the fingers. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. e. and at the same time. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. beholds. i. between intelligent personality and objective world. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity.

that it is liable to insanity .. This humane treatment. and be a realized u niversality. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). and their gratification). and the rest of the passions . and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. and so makes part of the actual self. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles.e.e.merely personal love and hatred. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. idea. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. and so also may the cure. etc. the self is to be stamped upon. etc. Mind as such is fr ee.d intelligent conscious subject. may. so as to insert them in their proper place. as something natural and existent. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. is relaxed. mere and total. i. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. And so too the particularity is. desire. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. passions. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. but only derangement. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred.e. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. as it aris es.feeling. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. but a contr adiction in it. this life of feeling. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. instincts. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. moral and theoretical. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. the. pride. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. . A violent.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. presupposes the patient's rationality. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. such as vanity. it would be death). is undistinguis hed from them. as a thing. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. however. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. and made appear in. and also desires. and it is only as a thing. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization.just as physical disease is not an abstract. i. equally formal. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple cies and hopes . is diseased. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. earthly elements are set fr ee .. i.that evil which is always latent in the heart. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. which is there also. as now regarded. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. loss of health (if it were that. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. This particular being of the soul is t . inclination. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . In the concrete.

dist inguishing it from itself . It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. and the mere substance. and the generation o f habit as practice. and that as a barrier for it. and which still continues to exist. but still free. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . but has them and moves in them. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit.and becoming the 'ideal'. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. has been absorbed by it. The natural qualities and alterations of age. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. heat. That is to say. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. i. and for that reason n ot free.e. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. but the basis of consciousness. partly only relative. on the contrary. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. The soul is freed from them. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. when the co rporcity. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. Habit is rightly called a second nature. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated.he factor of its corporeity. this being of the soul. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. nor is absorbed in the m. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. of which it is the subjective substance. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. so is that pure being (which.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. empty space and empty time. is reduced to unity. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. sleep. therefore. a pure act of intuition.itself a simple being . The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. For. And consciousness it becomes. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. nature. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). are only subjectiv e forms. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. even in being affected by them. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). weariness o . occupied. a second nature.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. as. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. Habit like memory. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. the one and the same. or dependent in regard to it. et c.. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. lacking consciou sness. of it. and so no longer interested. will. su bjective substantiality of it .

reflection. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. but part and parcel of his being. etc.enabling the matter of consciousness. too. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. nor a transient emotion or idea. sweet tastes. or. which make it up. intuition. the spatial direction of an individual. The most ext ernal of them. and especially so in the specific bodily part. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. has been by will made a habit . to be his as this self.or the misfortune . It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened.g. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se.. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. without an express adjustment.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. This is the rational liberation from them. that although the frost. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. if quite abstract. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. etc. or skill. and thus to enable the soul. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. etc. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. re ligious. nor are they in conce ption rational. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. consciousness. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. etc.e. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. consciousness. to exist as substance in its corporeity. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. his upright pos ture. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. made into an instrum ent. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). like any other. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. And it is true that the form of habit. and the self-feeling as such. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). Thinking. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. so that when the conception (e. whereof we sha ll speak later. is recollection and memory. to be made a power in the bodily part. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul.f the limbs. Even felt. casual. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . moral. intelligence. an 'ideality' of soul . like their satisfaction. . and particul ar. etc. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. and that they. habit diminishes this feeling. and no other. Habit on an ampler scale. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. a series of musical notes) is in me. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. and it is habit of living which brings on death.).concentration. under its volitional and conceptual characters. and any other purp oses and activity. viz. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. habit is usually passed over - . acquires a strength which consists in this. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. nor an abstrac t inwardness.. i. a particular organ of i ts organic system). this soul. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. are no longer bothered with it. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. cut off from action and reality.

or abstract universality. indefinite. while language is its perfect expressi on. though the proximate phase of mind's existence.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. Seen from the animal world. 'The autho . unable to represent it in its actual universality. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. And the human figure. of which it is the sign. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. for example. the latter subject to the former. finds itself there a single subject. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. in other words.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. in its concentrated self. In this identity of interior and exterior. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. or the 'immediacy' of mind. 5. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it.. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. 71). Naturliche Seele. 3. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. Naturliche Qualitaten. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. Under the head of human expression are included. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. in being related to which. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. and the formation of the limbs. and inexpressible a modific ation. The soul. of the mouth .specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. a world external to it . 4. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. 1.laughter. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. This note is so slight. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. This externality. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. but the soul. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. absorbing it. as the absolut e instrument. the upright figure in general. and making it its own. represents not itself. 2. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own.either as something contemptible . for the soul. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. Die fuhlende Seele. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. cuts itself off from its immediate being. still vainer than a signatura rerum. it is related to itself. especially the hand. etc. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. weeping. Empfindung. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. and i s infinite self-relation.

that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). 6. The mind as ego is essence. It is of this latter. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. and as such it is C onsciousness.the light. but since reality. seem to be its own activity. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. something dark and beyond it. Ego. i. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. Gewohnheit. is only its abstract formal ideality. in the sphere of essence. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities .the soul's natural life . thus first made explicit as the Ego. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object.e. Hence consciousness. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. as this absolute negativity. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. and . which manifests itself and something else too . to it. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. but is is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship .r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. as external to it. an equal freedom as an independent object. now. 8. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. Selbstgefuhl.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. but to the foolishness of man. as subjective reflection in itself. like reciprocal dependence in general. but when he receives the inspired word. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. not to the wisdom. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. does not.

because it is merely a nominal self-relation. first. for which ego is the object. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). reflected in itself. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415).a subject-objectivity. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. This is sense-consciousness. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. in other words. an existent. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. a something. being immediate. with an object set against it. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. t heir absolute interdependence. an existing thing. immediate a case of correlation . The object similarl y. the subject of consciousness. which is not as its own.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. or mere c ertainty. (b) self-consciou sness. a singular. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. Consciousness .e. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. i. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. again. but only as it is in reference to something else. and underived certainty of it. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. as Reason. As against Spinozism. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). is further characterized a s immediately singular. to raise its self-certainty to truth. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. and that the philosophy.. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. a thing-in-itself. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. and puts it first under the category of being. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. and so on. but as poorest in thought. Spatial and temporal Singularn . It appears as wealth iest in matter. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. an intuitive intellect. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. etc. the notion of mind. and even t he Idea of Nature. Ego. has emerged from Spinoz ism. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). what makes the object the subject's own. the substantial and qu alitative. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen the ego it seems an alteration of the object. i.

Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. and universalities. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. a something external to it. having passed beyond the sensible. viz. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. taken in its concrete content. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions .e. has. in this case by t he Ego. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. reflectional ween the individuality of a thing which. But in this manner the interior distinction is. and sensuous consciousness. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. lies im mediately in the other.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. i. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. the distinction on its own part. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. as we called it.a variety of relations. permanent term s. has many properties. of the thing is. and. i. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal.ess. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . it is related. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. but brought to rest and universality. which form the alleged ground of general experience. and not yet as external on its own part. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). however. or as being beside and out of itself. and am aware'.e. to describe the sensible. but as mediated. in that manner. is sense-perception. p. experiences. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. what it is in truth. or the distinction which is none. by being regarded in their bearings. reflected in itself. free from this negative l ink and from one another.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. reflected upon. not as merely immediate.a copy of the phenomenon. the thing. ¤ 423 The law. as not externally different from the other. wants to take the object i n its truth. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. and universal. . and more or less by the sciences. to which. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. Thi s inward. however. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. so constr uing the object. the one of the terms. 73). The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. its necessity on its own part. on one hand. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object.). Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. an abstract identity: on the other hand.

to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. on the whole. therefore. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. and thus in it I am aware of me. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. or. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . The certitude of one's self. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. and itself made actual. the latter. knows itself implicit in the object. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. primarily describable as an individual. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. in its immediacy. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. its satisfaction realized. on the contrary . ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. being merely consumed. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. and a desire (appetite) . On the external side it conti nues. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. or implicitly. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. To this activity the object. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. there is strictly speaking no object. The two processes are one and the same. in this return upon itself. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. nominally. can make no resistance: the dialectic. this identity comes to be for the ego. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . is a singular. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. pure 'Ideality'. implicit in it. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness.With this new form-characteristic. and ma intains itself as such. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. with the nega tion of it. therefore.

¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. the outward and visible recognition). from one point of view. Force. the slave. as the existence of hi s freedom. This other. as one of two things for another. however. and its being for others. then. ¤ 435 But secondly. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. on the ir phenomenal side. Thus arises the status of master and slave. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . which is the basis of this phenomenon. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. a suppression. retains his single self-consciousness. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. it. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. we see. which falls on another. works off his individualist self-will. however. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. but surrenders his c laim for recognition.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. and the means for entering into relation with them. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. and thus give existence to my freedom. and incurs a like peril for its own . and to exist as such for the other: .t he process of recognition. Force. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. negati on of immediacy.for the means of mastery. In that other as ego I behold myself. in the service of the master. ¤ 434 This status. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. w hich however is also still outside it. not their underlying and essential principle.e consciousness of a 'free' object. the slave. solves the contradiction. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. in the first place. when we look to the distinction of the two. at first immedi ately. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . though by the abstract. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. and formation of it.e. therefore rude.but only p eril. preservation. is yet. must likewise be kept in life. f rom the essential point of view (i. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. Thus the death of one. While the one com batant prefers life.

therefore. . which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. fame. or determinations of the very being of things. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. 5. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. is now itself universal. 1. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. Selbstbewu§tsein. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. The uni versality of reason. love. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. For truth here has.which is Reason. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . friendship. the self-centred pure notion. is Reason. valour.f wisdom' .or rather it is a difference which is none. aware of what it is. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . Der Verstand. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. as its peculiar mode and immanent form. Die Begierde 6. Reason.consciousness. honour. and of all virtues. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. whilst it signifies that the object. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. ego. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . 4. Truth. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence.the passage to universal self. state. than they are its own thoug hts. which was o nly given in consciousness qua the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . Wahrnehmung 3. fatherland. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective .in family. bu t the truth that knows it. idle fame. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. etc. is mind (spirit).

Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. This. Die Vernunft. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. above the material.the former a simple immediate totality. And it is a matter of no consequence. or. it is finite by means of its immediacy. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. in so far as .apart b oth from the content. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . the latter now an infinite form which is not. what is the same thing. etc. Mind. therefore. viz. etc. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n.. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. PSYCHOLOGY. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. as its concept has just shown. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. ideation. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. etc. and above the complication with an external object . and which as the reality of that notion. remembering. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective one word. though it no longer has an object. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. SUB-SECTION C. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. which is defined as it s notion. neit her subjective nor objective. restricted by that content.e.mental vision. however. i. desires. Mind is finite. then its reality is that reason. in so far as it has an object.7. in thinking also and in desire and will.. Cons ciousness is finite. in the soul as a physical mode. like consciousness. it has a mode in its knowledge.

Thus. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. When the affection has been rendered its own.e. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. and being a rational knowledge. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. that aspect is twofold .reality of its reason. i. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. and is even there a return into itself. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: being and as its own: by the one. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). in so far as its existent phase. viz. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. and the negative aspect of mental activity. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. As the theory o f Condillac states it. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. in freedom. that is.e. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. and its activity can only have itself as aim. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). the mind finds in itself something which is.e. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. it is . equally. or. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. is misconceived and overlooked. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. Similarly. viz. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. to reach and get hold of itself. the na tural soul (¤ 413). involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. and are the mind's own. i. so far. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. and make the affection subjective. of comprehending itself. k nowledge. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. forces. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. and to liberate itself to its elf. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible.

They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. etc. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. The nominal knowledge. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. to definite and conceptual knowledge. e. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. while the practical. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. wi th a material which is its own. and that in its empirical condition. is thus also a reality . has a material which is only nominally such. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. its content is at first only its own. and gains abstract auton omy within. in the theoretical range. But as knowledge. and of the heart without the intellect . all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. to get at the notion and the truth.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. This activity is cognition.g. while it has to do with autonomous products. as r eason is concrete. the word. It is still extremely ill off. along with which the content is realized as rational.e. Ou twards. both for the mind as such. but) enjoyment. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness.. Its activity has to do with the empty form . starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. for which it gains the form of universality. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. merely as facts. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. and is immediately willed. This position of psychology. which in the first place is likewise formal . and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. Psychology. just as they are given.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. Inwards . ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. and heartless intellects . as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. which it and the content virtually is. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. like logic. belong to a point of view utt . that it receives and accepts impressions from outside.i. which is only certitude. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. as it is said. and therefore a restricted content.(b) Will: practical mind. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. elevates itself.

It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. Faculty.e. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . etc. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. it is admitted. imagination. remembrance. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. etc. It is true that even as isolated (i. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has a word . is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. remembers. imagination.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized .exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other .besides which it al so intuits. however. is bro ught into mind. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). imagines. are not isolated. etc. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. or mind. etc. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. it . memory. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not.whi ch. note). intelligen ce. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally.its out-of-selfness . by cognitive intuition.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. etc. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. as non-intelligent). But the true satisfaction. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. conception. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. must lead to abandoning the effort. conceived as reflected into self. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . if answered in the negative. by rational conception. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. viz. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. just so far as it realizes itself. like power or force. But c ognition is genuine. intuition. or makes the concept its own. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. as it is by the same method brought into nature.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. If they are isolated. conceives. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. that intuition. conception. cognitive conception. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned .

this mode is simple. as it were the closes t. with the character of something existent. is swallowed up. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. may just as likely be narrow and active self-collection . ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. projects it into time and space. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. that is t o say. in t he truth of mind. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. a . hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. external or internal. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. Feeling is the immediate. has the form of casual particularity .his private and p articular self. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . and in any case is the form of the particular and the generalit ies of common sense . in content and value entirely contingent. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. we have the one fa ctor in Attention .one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. Hence feeling.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality.but to his feeling. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. Now the material. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive.t he factor of fixing it as our own. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. 254). but rather as subject ive and private. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. . a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. or at least to reasons . as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. With us. the mere consciousness point of view. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'.is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings.

in virtual possibility. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. and is arbitrary or contingent. its when and where. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. i. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. as it at first recollects the intuition. The representation is the property of intelligence. and received into the universality o f the ego. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine.the germ of the fruit. which makes it its own. as tho ught. for example.e. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. but stored up out of consciousness. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. a rec ollection of itself. or. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . in the way we treat. with a preponderating subjectivity. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. isolated. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. and inwardly divest itself of it. . however. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and a space and a time of its own.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. though intrinsically concrete. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. which. yet without being in consciousnes s. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. the germ as affirmatively containing. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. we may say. t ime. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. still continues simple. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. from the external place. no longer needs to find the content. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition.

or ide a).and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. or an intell ectual category. that it finds its material.. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas.viz. by which it is authenticated. being and universality.) . belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence.e. as a matter of fa ct. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . see Introduction to the Logic. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. whatever be its content (from image. But it is solely in the conscious subject. has been broken up. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. which is now the power over them. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. under the representation (idea) with the same content. notion. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . . and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. but a being of its own institution. The content reproduced. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. present also a distinction in content. as a unit of intuition. The image. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. where. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. to be so and so. Secondly. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion.these modes of relation are not laws. and an out-put from its universal m ine.Image and Idea. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition .in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. if it is to exist. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. comes actually into its possession. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. In the first place. now that it has been endued with externality. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. has always the peculiarity. ¤ 20 note. though belonging to intelligence. i. as of all intelligence. at first only in space and time. wherea s the idea (representation).¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. reason and consequence. the matter is entirely pictorial. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. such as likeness and contrast. where it is treasured up. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above.

which forms their connecting link. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . and becomes an i ndividuality. but only a nominal reason. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. This force is really intelligence itself . Such is creative imagination(7) . and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. . derived from some interest. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. In other words. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. i. 435). its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. when regarded as the agency of this unification. one's own and what is picked up. internal and external. is derived from the data of intuition. or something of the sort. These more or less concrete. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence.Imagination.Abstraction. to universalize it. but they are 'syntheses'. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. recollection. are completely welded into one. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. for its ideal import is its elf. it is self-uttering. and in mechanical memory it completes. . whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content.symbolic.e. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own.. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite.still lacks the side o f existence.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. or poetical imagination . But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. allegoric. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . some latent concept or Ideal principle. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. Another point calling for special notice is that. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. is reason. As reason. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. etc. are unifications of t he same factors. this form of being. so far a s it is concerned. a concrete subjectivity. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. Acting on this view.

something accepted. etc. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. intuitions. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. out of which it forms i deas . treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. and where it is conserved. language . has always to do with signs only. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . and the connotation of which it is a sign.R auschen.. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . its institution by intelligence. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . but as representative of something its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne').invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. since memory. when employed as a sign. It is a n image. Such is the negativity of intelligence. e tc. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. and even with conception and imagination. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself.there have been collected more than a hundred such words.speech and. ¤ 459 The intuition . in the first instance. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. somewhat immediate or given (for example. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of to sensations. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). conception s. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). Sausen. . With regard to the elementary material of language. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. the matter of the latter is. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. its system. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . The sign is some immediate intuition. In logic and at of vocal objects. whereas in the sign.). But in the fusion of the two elements. Knarren. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. This intuition is the Sign. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. the colour of the cockade. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . have nothing to do with each oth er. strictly so-called. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix.

and still takes place in Canton . and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. tongue in each) and for their combinations. only in pas sing. alphabetical writing. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. etc. The study of languages still in their original state. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. which severally receive designation. and now that. W. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. (Cf. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. as in our signs for the numbers. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. on the other hand. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. again. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. i.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar.e. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. like the Chinese. as many as ten a . but. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. in chemistry and mineralogy. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. we may touch. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. instead of n ames proper. . hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. . if it be not altogether extinguished. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. i. the chemical elements. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. their signs in vocal language. as regards signs for mental objects.). As to the formal elem ent. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. as. the denomination. palate. It is only a stationary civ ilization.e.e. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. it depends. and only get signification as signs. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. i. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . In particular. are frequently changed. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. on anthropological articulation. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. the planets . which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. they are reduced to signs. viz.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. for example. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly.

instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. . and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. Hieroglyphics. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. the simple plain idea. in the case of the Chinese Koua. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality.the mode. as it does. peculiar to the intellect. by speaking low and soft or crying out. or simple logical terms. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. Thus. i. This feature of hieroglyphic . Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word .is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. Engaging the attention of intelligence. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. the simple straight stroke. in speaking. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. in the interest o f vision. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. like alphabetic writing. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. is still for the mind simple in the name). it is analysed. Both alike require such signs. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. so that. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity.the name. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. learn ing to speak Chinese. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. The European. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity.e. however ample a connotation it may include.nd twenty. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. of uttering its ideas most worthily . What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. while (with the facu . just as in modern times (as already noted.

lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,

but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you

ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.

¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex

Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. in its objectivity and truth. heart. we have only to deal with the selfish. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. when thought. but presented in its universality and necessity. is precisely what constitutes. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. contentment. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. joy. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. and thought. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. in which these facts. Thus it is.retain a speciality of their own . for the latter.. grief. But as both. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. and will. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. in their universality and necessity. etc. may be placed. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact .which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. and precisely in that way d o they .indeed infinitely so. shame. But where the objects sought are thus casual. Whereas in life. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice.. lack objective determin ation.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. etc. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. and to discus s their content. it is because of their quality or co ntent . volition. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. can also be felt. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. and evil. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. repentance.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim.but only in antithesis to the latter . law and morality. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. in their immediacy. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. namely God. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). and still more in mind. On the other hand. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. on the one hand. Delight. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. wha t is the same thing. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. the truth and. right. and duty. in feeling. we have this immanen . bad. If feelings are of the right sort. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form.

Up to what degree the good continue aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. subjectivity . as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. be the value of tha t mode what it may. the question is directly raised.and (as there are ma ny. as experience shows. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. ego. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. they. as rights and duties. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . Will. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. while. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind .on one aim and object. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. each with its private range).his inte rests of intellect.natural impulse and inclination. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. therefore. In consequence of this formalism. however. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. In what way have they. The answer to the question. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. is at first still a natural will. passion is neither good no r bad. and their truth. admitting of gratification. enjoyment . What are the good and rational propensiti es. If the will is to satisfy itself. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . are infected with contingency. . (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. too often. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. indeed. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. Thus. it is pa ssion. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. Should. which is essentially self-d etermination. each being always in conflict to another. as r egards the form of its content. The will. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. but to ge t realized. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. on the other. talent. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. But with regard to the inclinations. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. character. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse.a development in which the content of autonomous . first of all. and something inappropriate to it. finds in the conformity . their mutual connect ions. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. It is on ly a dead. on one hand. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. Which are good and bad? .

e. of a universal sa tisfaction. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . i. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. which is just as much no satisfacti on. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. by another. and is option or choice. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. this is wh at is called the interest. which reflection and comparison have educed. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. on one hand. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. is his interest and . it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. However. on the whole to their disadvantage. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. so far as their particularity goes. where the subject is made to close with itself. inclinations. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. that finds its actualizing in the agent. the impulses. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. which as such is the universal.his passion. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. unless he had an interest in it.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . are reduced to a m ere negative. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. as the content. without end. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand.and one satisfaction. As thus contradictory. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. Their mutual limitation. ¤ 476 The will. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. either alto gether or in part. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. moral. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. It is thus 'reflecting' will. it is on them that the decision turns. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. the free gift of nature. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. They are somet imes contrasted. and social duties. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness.action loses its contingency and optionality. . there would be no action at all. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. as thinking and implicitly free. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. an inactive thing. An action is an aim of the subject. The morality concerns the content of the aim. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own.

It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. so that in this sphere of particular existence. Whole continents. It is thus 'Objective' Mind.e. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. have never had this Idea. i.e. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. According to Christianity. fortuitousness . they saw tha t it is only by birth ( be aware. is in the first instance the rational will in general. knows this its concept. is actu ality. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable individuality. ambiguous. the divine min d present with him.e. The Greeks and Romans. or philosophy (. By superseding the adjustments of means therein matter of speculation. i. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. did not have it. that is. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. and that as its very actuality. and are constituted after its measure. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. Africa and the East. which realizes its own freedom of will. If the will.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim.e . If.sired . and is will as free intelligence. still this very I . he is actually free. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). of the family. its very au tonomy or freedom. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. and of which it is only t he formal activity. with freedom itself. just because it is the very essence of mind. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . in religion as such . however. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss.freedom itself. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. which i s pure and concrete at once. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. even the Stoics. as the substance of the state. As abstract Idea again. of present sensati on and volition. i. therefore. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. the will is an actually free will. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. etc. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. now that the formalism. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity.a universality which only ought to is the existential side of reason . also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. On the contrary. and are without it still. education. for example. only so far as it thinks itself . and object . the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . Remembering that free mind is actual mind. as realizing the idea. or implicit Idea. he h as also. Plat o and Aristotle. or by s trength of character. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. If to be aware of the Idea . and the abstract singleness. aim. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded.

as men. Die Intelligenz. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. Inwendiges. if they are made slaves. Der Geist 2. But this freedom. but which they are. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. into legal.not something which they have. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. but the pe rmanent character . Anschauung. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. 5. Das Denken. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. 1. 3. Phantasie 8. 16. religious.dea itself is the actuality of men . intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. Vorstellung. 7. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. Auswendiges. Die Einbildungskraft. Die Gluckseligkeit. Gedachtnis. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . 4. 11. not with laws or court s of justice. 10. and not less into scientific actuality. Das praktische Gefuhl. is itself only a notion . 12. 14. 15.a principle of the mind and heart. which the content and aim of freedom has. Der freie Geist. Der praktische Geist 13. Die Erinnerung 6. 9. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. moral.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e.

to be as a person. For a mode of existence is a right.e. shaped into the actuality of a w orld.(1) When. etc. etc. in relation to the subjective will. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. or instituted as an authoritative power. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition.. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. and what is a duty. in the light of the concept. and brings into existence i n these several wills. which in it is thus at home with itself. Liberty. in these externally objective aspects. is a duty. in general. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. it exists as manner and custom. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. is the Law (Right ) . being universal. are its Duties. i. as the services of the members of the State in dues. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty.e. are duties . ought to h ave and can only have their existence.and aim.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. to administer. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. But in this individualist moral sphere. These conditi ons. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. where free will has existence. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. In the morality of the conscience. not in the form of impulse. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. relation to another person . on the other hand. temper. but in its universality. and is the vi rtual universal. or Usage. What is a right is also a duty. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. its rights of admi nistration. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. But. duty in general is in me a free subject . Liberty. where they. military service. etc. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. but as possession by a person it is property. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. it is a Law. receives the form of Necessity. is also a right.. The penal judicature of a government. private an d personal needs). my right to a thing is not merely possession. and character. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. anthropological data (i. so as to become its habit. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. which splits up into different heads: viz. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. their absolute unity. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. viz. and it is a duty to possess things as property. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. are no less its duties to punish. or legal possession.

are simultaneously mutually independent. the infinite self-rela tion. As so characterized. so as to have its existence inside it. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. though it remains in trinsically the same. but as existence of the personality is an end. which is thus mutual. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. but on an external thi ng. at first in the outward appropriation. and the I in it is abstractly external. it is the right of the subjective will. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. and hence as a single being .it is the ethic s of actual life in family. in the knowledge of their identity as free. as in itself still abstract and empty. But the set of adjustments.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. These extremes are the persons who. Sitte A. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. is an individual. abstract right.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. This thing. by mere designation of it. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. and State. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. it may be. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. or by the formatio n of the thing or. on its own account me rely 'practical'. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. possession is property. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. the external sphere of its liberty . Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa.possession. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. (B) When the will is reflected into self. Gesetz 2. as something devoid of will. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. . But this predicate. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. morality of the individual conscience. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . which as possession is a means. civil society. 1.

and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. This is naiv e. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance.just as well with draw it as not. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. and its acceptance by the other will. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. produces a wrong: by which. and time. its changing hands. ¤ 495 The contract. however. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. the only diversity lies in this. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . universal thing or commodi ty. because they face each other. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. is disinterested. in that case.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. 493 seqq. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. then the external rec . This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . But so far as my will lies in a thing. willed. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. but which. expressing the civil suit. and. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. which thus becomes wicked. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception).). as the judgement of the intrinsically right. which. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. is affirmed. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive.the full and complete deed. and recogniz ed. labour. I can just as well put it in it as not .Contract. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . non-malicious wrong. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right.

It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . and while the former only is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of rictly so called . or right as governed by the nature of this case the apparent recognition. in which the law of nature should hold sway. The social state. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right.e. and can be seized only in t his quarter. which is disinterested .e. But more than possible compulsion is not. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . This progression. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. Conversel y. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. i. which is nominal and recognized by him only . in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. and not merely the particular mode . and commits a crime. This gives the wrong of fraud . In it the agent.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. that of the judge. is the work of Revenge. such an action is essentially and actually null. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. The 'reality' of right. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights.on self-determination or autonom y. from life.a universal which holds good for him. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will .a law. like the last. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. The law of nature .punishment.where the nominal relation is retained. or in corporeity. in revenge. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. i. which is the very contrary of determination by nature.compulsion against the thing. To display the nullity of such an act. on . (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. is at the same time only a new outrage. by the n otion. b ut the sterling value is let slip. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . the latter is violated. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. sets up a law . is a matter of chance). But revenge. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. even from the range of all existen ce. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. or Natural Right.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. howe ver. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. an d so on without end. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. as a volitional and intelligent being.) Thus the will is violently wicked. The former used to be the common meaning. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. being conformable to the right.

that external existence is also independent of the a gent. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. the reason of the will. is now chara cterized as a subject . which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. 1.and also moral wickedness. 2. it thus includes purpose and intention . intelligence. but have their assent. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. an d allows to be imputed to it. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. so much as it has consciously willed. Moralitat 3. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. though any alteration as such. In point of form. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. sentiment. or even justification in his h eart. and willed by it. conscience. Only for that does it hold itself responsible.a will reflected into itself so that. and thus comes into relationship with the former. The subjective will is morally free. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. so far as these features are it s inward institution. my part in i t is to this extent formal. Naturrecht. embracing these individual point s. B. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. its own. is its deed. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. recognition. Now. Das Recht.the other hand. This is the right of intention. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. which was its purpose. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. counts only as a person. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. in mere law. etc. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . who. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. the will is at the same time made a particular. be its affection w hat it may. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed.

an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. is always fundamentally one identity.g.and thus including in it particularity . they ought to stand in harmony. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. and aims. whether the . (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. But at the same time in aim ing at the good.a universal determined in its elf . constitute h is well-being. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. though it is a particular duty. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. These aims. is not something external to him. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. can be wicked. essential and actual. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. And yet they ought to harmonize. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. but is a particul arity of his own . At the same time because good is one.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision.that it contains his needs.being only in this. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. is as g ood and as duty absolute. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. as in happiness (¤ 479). because the agent. his interest and welfare must. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. and yet each of them. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. the essential and actual good. in point of its matter. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. This is the right to well-being. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). it is always something particular. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. interests.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. a good intention in case of a crime. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity.e. will .ion. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. as individual and universal. on account of that existent sphere of liberty. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good.

and duty. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. That. th e essential thing. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision.the standpoint of the ought. which would only be abstract. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. in this its identity with the good. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . Der Vorsatz 3. right . The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. good. Die Absicht und das Wohl. and of the good.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. Das Gute und das Bose C. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. non-universal. no more exist than not.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . The subjectivity. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. rising to its pitch. The failure of the latter consists . In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . on its negative side. which actualizes and dev elops it. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. a goodness. is only the infinite form. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . On the affirmative side. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. The result. its deepest descent into itself.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. 4. but is only sure of i tself. and the wicked. to be carried out in it. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness.of Conscience and Wickedness. i . This pure self-certitude. which has no objectivity. 5. and refuse it to the wicked. is. the truth of this semblance. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action.the utterly abstract semblance . and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. Handlung. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . The for mer is the will of goodness. Moralitat 2.good is realized. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. in something external therefore. is abandoned. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. THE MORAL LIFE. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. in the notion. an aim essentially and actually null. 6. 1. the unutterable. which is the good. expressed by this repeated ought.

( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. as against the univers al. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . as personal virtues. . ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life.Marriage.e . as an intelligent being. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. etc. is confidence (trust) .th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. When these two impe rfections are suppressed.yet somewhat which without all question is. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . i. In the shape of the family. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n .the genuine ethical temper. controls and entirely dominates from within. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. is virtue. This is the sexual tie. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. however. Thus. it exists as confidence. that it is. . ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. mind ap pears as feeling. In the latter sphere.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. in its ki nd. makes this union an ethical tie .e. whose independence it. however. as deliberate work for the community.looks upon it as his absolute final aim.Civil Society. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. in its immediacy.the Political Constitution.monog . In rel ation to the bare facts of external being.n a thing . and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. to the total of ethical actuality.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. manner and cu stom . feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . (c) Th e self-conscious substance. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. to a spiritual significance. But the person. to destiny. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. without any selective refl ection.the Family. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. The ethical personality. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . i. temperament. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. the individuality expres ses its special character. elevated. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'.

it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. as do also its industry. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. This instrument.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. constitutes the general stock. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. and thus produce more unconditional . ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. or state external. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. of legal regulation. on one hand. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. however.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. information. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa educating them to independent personality. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. ¤ 522 (3) The children. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. destined. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. or nominal culture in general. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. into families or individuals. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. to found anew such an actual family. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. labour. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. and care for the future. who exist independent and free. being an intelligent substance. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. originally foreign to it. learning. acquire an existence of their own. In virtue of such for tuitousness. thus invested with independence. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. while. on the o ther hand. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. as private persons. of the possessor's will. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay.

which as existence is essentially a particular. however. as well as of mental culture and habit . is developed i n detail.which is also a general business (of the whole society) .. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. Where civil society. certain. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. talent. which is honesty. and an ensemble of contingencies. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. and accident. intelligence. option. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. exists. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. It is a futile perfectionism to have . or only 2 * .constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks).which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it.and ye t it should be decided. and industry. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. be the righ t and just thing. Their content per se may be reasonable . of the legal relationships of individual s to them. skill. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. or could be. also of aims and interests. and in it they have their social moralit y. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds.the Law. of mere agents.dependence on the social system. their recognition and their honour. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion .(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . Thus whether three years. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. its action gets direction and content through natural features. and with it the State. at every point. to be. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. and so on ad infinitum. of needs. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. and of means for satisfying them. they have their actual existence. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . in the course of definite manifestation. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. this analysis. 2 4/5 years. determined through reason or legal intelligence. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. though of course only at the final points of deci ding. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. as vital. ten thalers. 2 3/4 . and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . and of these estates to one another and to their centre. and like the first a certain subsistence. on the side of external existence. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. and a corresponding mode of labour. The second. But when right. The third. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. Hence. the medium created by t he action of middlemen.

and th e cattle too .the ne ed. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. as in the mental ima ges of space.e. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic this exists as revenge . recognized. within the house . but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms.which though something new.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . . hereditary divinity or nobility. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. and t hus become authoritative . not for them. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis . deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. which again make new decisions necessary. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. This subjective co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. whic h are only internally in these objects. inasmuch as.are governed and well governed too by laws.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. even the admiration. as it is a known law.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. being laws o f strict right. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. These people forget that the stars . The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. with the advance in multitude. constit . by faith and trust. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. as the genuine order of life. first really de serving the name of laws. like improvements on a f loor or a door. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general the individualized right . are not a new hou se.laws. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. at the same time an externally objective existence. they touch only the abstract will . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. general laws. proven: . But there is a contrary z. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. The comparison of the two species. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel.gets its universal guarantee through formalities.into punishment (¤ 500). They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . there arises.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. which discovers new distinctions. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . of his countrymen. i.even as his law can only be a just law. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. to which objective existence determines i tself. in the judicial be promulgated and made known as laws . or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. as universal authority and necessity. the need of a simpler code . and in particular transforms this existence . .

It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. .as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. appears as state. be exercised as different functions. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . because it is only one factor. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. and worked from that point of view. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. which. from the c onnections between nation and nation. mere circumstantial evidence. because it is man's want. as at bottom different sides. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. then. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. in a uniform gen eral way. and the judgement as application of the law to it. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. shou ld. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition.and that. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. So far as concerns them. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . Conversely. the position of an external un iversality. so as to secure this satisfaction. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions.viz. In so far. to the concrete of civil society.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. . It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. No doubt this factor is incomplete. and their variable ingredients. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective.'poli . It results also from circumstances of locality. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted.

On the other hand. The same unity. First. It provides for the reasonable will . and .the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. secondly. the state only is as an organized whole. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. s heer subjectivity. (c) THE STATE. but. his independent self-will and particular an actuality . The cons titution is existent justice . and self-develop ed . proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. and. continually produce it as their (outer-state) law. and not left to perish.ce'. which. it protects the family and guides civil individual. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. but which has a thoroughly general side. self-originated. receiving. they are re strictions. Secondly. with all its evolution in detail. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . differentiated in to particular agencies.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . as self-knowing and self-actualizing.into the life of the universal substance. ¤ 539 As a living mind.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of nsists in a double function. to the immediate agent. Thirdly. This universal principle. which each originally takes care of for himself. But.which volition is thereby free . which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. First it maintains them as persons. in this direction . also for that will being put in actuality. then it promotes their welfare.the reasonable spirit of will. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. is its so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . Thus we have the corpora tion. it carries back both. . through the action of the government and its several branches. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. however. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance.

otherwise have in property. Equality. it embodies a liberty.punishment.pleasure an d self-will. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. physical strength. as a person capable of property (¤ 488).equal in the concrete. talent. age. as regards the concrete. On the contrary. logically carried ou t. on the contrary. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. i. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . which it can without incompatibility allow. military service. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. Really. etc. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. private as well as public rights of a nation. that the laws rule. or destroy them. Formerl y the legally defined rights. All men are by nature equ al. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. But the notion of liberty. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas.besides their personalit y . As regards. authorities. as it exists as s uch. town . every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. etc.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. the familiar proposition. and that the laws are restrict ions. But. were called its 'liberties'. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. first. Rome.e. It is important therefore to study them closer. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). etc.. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. Nothing has become. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. presuppos e unequal conditions. But that this freedom should e xist. or even in crime. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. eligibili ty to office. is so little by nature. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. magistracies . As regards Liberty. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. The laws themselve s. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. as it ha ppens. directories. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. . rejects all differences. the citizens . in other words. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . etc. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. the difference of governing powers and of governed. without further specification and development. etc. the current notions of l .are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the regards taxation. With the state there ari ses inequality. etc. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. on the contrary.only it can make them . To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . skill. However true this is. is abstract subjectivity. The principle of equality.

e. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. and to regard a state. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i.that which preserves. of liberties in general. Such a sphere is of course also the field of sec urity of property. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. with its insatiate vanity. But the more we fortify liberty. however. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. and the organization of the actualization of them. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. If .e . and must deal with them as it ca n. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. in other words continuall . self-w ill and self-conceit. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. The term political liberty. has an insight and conviction of his own . and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. i. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions.iberty only carry us back to equality. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. be it added. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. ¤ 541 The really living totality . as a state without a constitution. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. not merely with regard to the naturalness. with this development of particularity. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it.just because of this inseparability . and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. is . and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. .a thing that has nev er happened in history. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. just as little as the making of a code of laws. of others.) But the guara ntee lies also. in which this is not formally done. and thus gains moral independence. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. The question .

Only through t he government. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . the participation of all i n all affairs . equally disorganizes actuality.impugns the principle of the division of powers. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence .to make it the first power. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. however. . Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. in other words. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. i.e. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct.regarded as organic totality . with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. which taken apart is also particular). but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. as in a democratic constitution. These. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd a state of society. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence.the will of a decreeing individual. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. all-decreeing will of the state. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. as always. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. ¤ 542 In the government . What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business.or. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to .the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. is the government. In the perfect form of the bject always. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. which includes an already existing development of differences. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). as in the patri archal society . but an actual indiv idual . of the family and of civil society. is the state one.the all-sustaining. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion.y produces the state in general and its constitution. . i.monarchy. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . and the government be merely executive and dependent . The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. (A mistake still greater. is the self-redintegrating notion.

to subjectivity. Secon dly.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general .partly.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined).such as ochlocracy. and with earlier transition-forms. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. The pure forms . essentially. an actual existence. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. participate in the governmental power. civil society. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate also feudal monarchy. aptitude. admini stration of justice or judicial power. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. legislative power. etc.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. administration and police. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. especially in legislation . is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. Two points only are all-important. possess independence of a ction. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . first.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . involve the. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. being simple self-relation. aristocracy and monarchy.e. lik e peace and war. there arises the participation of several in state-business. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. and above all personal liberty. For it is as private persons t . That subjectivity . have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. too. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. which having their busin ess appointed by law. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. and are to that degree private person s.viz. .whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. with its industry and i ts communities. with their general opinion. The division of constitutions into democracy. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy .. liberty of property. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. to that end and for that reason. it may be . and secondly the form in which it is act ualized.are. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing .necessary to the p rocess of evolution . and skill for such ends. in the history of the State. Thus. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . and then of nature . the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. These principles are those expounded earlier. i. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do short. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. as it were.'ideal' unity. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices.

a spiritual element . and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. in arrangements for art and it very likely is . blind force. ¤ 529 note). demoralization. is no t self-destructive.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. in the law and liberty of property. i. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. s ense of general wants. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened.would be. which. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. but as organic factors. however. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527.the contrary must be the case .hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . it is not a brutish mass. however. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. that t hey enter upon that participation. indeed the whole. or in its 'reflectional' universality. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . to power and act ion. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. Experience s hows that that country . be they treated as mere individuals. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. range of the extern al means of government. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. like that of the stormy. In a civilized state. as such an aggregate. wild. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. Take the case of England which. ever newly recurring. as the nation . which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty.e. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness.regard ed as permanent. The so-called financial law. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. in the general sense of embracing a wide.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). so far as they form only one branch of that power . Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. The des irability of such participation. and form a particular kind . is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus.which should be presupposed. and therefore more urgent. as estates. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. If the main part of the requirement were . moreover. inorganic shape. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. elemental sea.

Then again. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity .this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. and not to be made yearly. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. In their mutual relations. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. a state of war. when it makes a decree about finance. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. or every few years. and can be subjected to a varying yearly the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . e. In one case the . for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. and not actually existent.e.e. is really engaged with strict executive business. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. of the whole of the finances. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. as content o f a true law. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. in which there would no longer be a government. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. i.g. but only making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. and thus.i. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. waywardness and chance have a place. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. and becomes the estate of bravery..

and on history-writing in general. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. As this development is in time and in real existence. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. is called an a prio ri view of it. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. it passes int o universal world-history. Fictions. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. of a Roman epic. It is in time. both this general recognition. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. That history. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . are settled and fixed. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. this note must go into further deta il. and in Germany more than in France and England. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. an d the special claims of nations on one another. when we come to minutiae. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions.. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character.of sacerdotal races . and then in history. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. it. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. in defiance of . etc. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. On th is point. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. in short. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. especially on the philological side.a world-mind. each of which. first in general. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. In general. and above all universal history.the plan of Provide nce. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . that. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. in short. It has. internat ional law rests on social usage. however. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. which actually is and will be realized in it .the judgement of the world. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . as it is a history.and. and as regards its range and scope. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. is appointed to occupy only one grade. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. there is Reason in history. a history of its own.

But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances.e. a nation. express not a subjective particularity. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation.g. has. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. or. and rejects both ki nds of interest. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. if he had not an interest. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. i. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. but violates th e principles of objective truth. no history . etc. not as good as a fairy tale. Ay. a civilization. The point of interest of Biography . but an age. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. for even children expect a m otif in their the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. is not only against taste and judgement. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. in the interest of so-called truth. strictly s peaking. and criticize events. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. and. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. on the other hand. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim.appears to run . and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy.). just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties.the best-accredited history. and takes place within it. But. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. in striking portraiture and brevity. What happens to a nation . The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. or if he declined to judge at all. state. as in the romance. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. a word. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. e. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. and an exclusive interest in say a word on that here . Rome and its fortunes.

I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. while it inheres in them. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. which all alik e have no stuff in them. on the contary.Fame. has another ground and interest than his tory.or in other words that Reason is in history . i. and there fore as a work of individuals. etc. really. only opinions and mere ideas. But biography too has for its background the historical world. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. and their subjectivity. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. and its content is prese .e. 550). notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. the consciousness of it. in this case. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . and are all treated as indifferent. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf .directly counter to any universal scope and aim. liberty. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . the freak of humour. potentially infinite. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. and the business of so doing. the absolute L aw. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. these individuals.e. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. For Spirit is consciousn ess. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. which is their reward. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. which is what is pe culiar to them. i.e. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. etc. and secondly. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it.e. we may add. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. i. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. and of its essence. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. is the empty form of activity. is the supreme right.admitting. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. are instruments. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. i. Only therefore through their relationship to it. as over a special grade. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. a development determined by the notion of accurate report of externals.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. The mere play of sentiment. if Rome or the German empire. to the history of religion. Such a doctrine . first in general. truth. But. have they their value and even their existence.

of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. The spirit. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. actually accomplished in the ethical is the case with all speculative process .this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. the idea of God it kn .e. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. that elevation to God really involves. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests.a mere 'ought' . abstract in the formal treatment of logic. now gets its most concrete the peculiar perversity. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. lays hold of its concr ete universality. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. in the system of laws and usages. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. and that on the religious. i. as law and duty. i. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. As regards the 'mediation' which. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. For that st arting. forme rly noticed. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate .nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. But . and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic.e. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. i. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. note). from which the start is now made. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . Th e finite. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. Such apprehension. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. cf. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. At this rat e. This factor. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity.consciousn ess. as true in the world of free will. i. But the spirit which think s in universal history.e. ¤ 204 not e). the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. however. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct.e. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. especially ¤ 51. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. is the purification.Liberty. is the real ethical self. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice.

and prays others to pray . its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. and the one religion which secures the stability of governments. springing from some force and power. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . and ex pecting miracles from them.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. but in the moment of enjoymen t. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. for thought and knowledge . i. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit.e.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience.e. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied.ows must be the true and real. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. differing from the former in body and value of truth. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. in the annihilation of its externality. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . then there may be created.the body of religious truth. in its faith and in its con science. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. but purely subjective in individuals: . a condition of spiritual sla very. and even as mutually indifferent. i. religion was a late r addition.or it may be. and in the act of faith. and law and justice. B . All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality.logi cally enough . on the contr ary. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order .e. morality and conscience. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. It leads. and these applications of it in the religious life. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing.addressing his devotion to miracle. generally. to justification by external wo rks. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. It lea ds to a laity. non-spirituality. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has.partly as mere moving of the lips. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. one religious and an other ethical. in point of form. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . i.of bondage. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others.working images. even to bones. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. (In the Lutheran Church. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth.e. i. And. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. But in poin t of form. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. the host as such is not at first consecrated. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . first of all.

the wisdom of the world. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. The precept of religion.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. i. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' obedience which is itself the true freedom.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. if taken alone. sti . unte nable. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . because the state is a self-possessed.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. i.e. Instead of the vow of chastity.of honesty in commercial dealing. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. . and political institutions deduced from them must be.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. self-realizing reason . With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. leads it into the rea l world. lacked short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. . Thus. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. moral life in the state.e. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. So long as t he form. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. and in a special sense Philosophy. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. therefore. i. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. so to speak a priori. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. a code of law should arise. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial.e. Thus set free. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. And instead of the vow of obe dience. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. no matter how. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. and thus only. and. founded on principles of reason. Let us suppose even that. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. our consciousness and subjectivity. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. which does not rise in hostility against them. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. . But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig short. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. can law and morality exist. and in the use of property . 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's.

the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . (cf. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. etc. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. that the Idea must be regent. thus founder on the conscience.ll. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. At best it is only a temporary expedient . The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . This absolute nucleus of man . if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . from those deeper requirements which. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. so-called 'chambers'.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. however sound their provisions may be. Such laws..among which laws these guarantees are included.mi nd intrinsically concrete .is the intellectual and thinking self. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. thus surmountin .is just this .which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . on one hand. e. This additional 'individuality' . on the other hand. or. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. ¤ 544 note).t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. and the power given them to fix the budget. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . to put it simply.g. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . when specially set in relief as genus. . and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness.

the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. religion.was that creative imagination. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. as demoralization. in its f irst immediate. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. in its philosophic phase.). on its own s howing. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. As it left therefore behind. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality.and th at on account of this very principle .so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. His state is therefore. is after all only in one of its form s. but earlier than philosophy. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. intuition.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. But thought always . a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. which still escaped his intelligence. which is awa re of its own essence. Religion may. should knit it together and control it.the idea of the substantial moral life. which is developed similarly. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. he. ¤ 513. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. Hence religion as such. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. Plato. Political power. fall feeling. Only in the principle of mind. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . and so also one-sided phase. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . etc. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . or essential being). Under the subjective form. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. however. earlier than it does as philosophy. so .g the Platonic Idea (the genus. is implicitly in absolute liberty.). for th ese reasons. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. as it grows and expands. exhibits the one-sidedness. or rather must. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. of philosophy.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. But even religion. the subjectivity of mind. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. pictorial representation. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. from religion. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. The form in its infinite tru th.

the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . as well as their several applications. Inneres Staatsrecht. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. Die Rechtspflege 5. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. the constitut ion and the code. 7. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. i. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. 9. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. of God's indwelling in us. this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. Das System der Bedurfnisse. for which it is as substance. as always. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion.e. while it is self-centred to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). Die Sittlichkeit. 3. Thus ul timately. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. 2. 8. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. Die Weltgeschichte 10. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. 6. but rather to a sort of knowledge. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. 1. Gesetz. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). Das aussere Staatsrecht. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. 4. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. That here. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. Religion. In the Protestant state. Die Polizei und die Corporation. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . ¤ 554 The absolute mind.

like the material which it uses to work in.the form of immediacy as such . it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. Der absolute Geist. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art.something formal. .in other words. or the idea. aware. reconciliation. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit .for the expression of spiritual truth . and of gaining its concrete determination. viz. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . on the other hand.the shape or form of Beauty. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. as superseded in spirit. that is. into the subject which produces that work. But.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . as it is.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. Belief. With the essential restrictedness of its content. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. which is only a sign of the Idea. A. has in devotion . c an. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity.hence not the sp iritual unity. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. the actuality of the spirit. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . Art requires not only an external given material . 1. its n atural the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. so that the thought embodied. ¤ 411). or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit.i. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. but . This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . In this ideal. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. On one hand.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle .e.

and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content .a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. and th e artist is the master of the God.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence.symbolic art. assumes fuller and firmer features. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. of its actual liberty. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a short how the nature of a nation's moral life. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. that one spirit creates and informs them. the principle of its law. known as the Absolute. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . but its inmost depth. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. the artist's enthusiasm. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. not yet conscious of itself.stil l this art is defective. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. and that is where the infinite form.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist.can try to bring itself to consciousness. is not yet absolute. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. subjectivity. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. . it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist .and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. but as only finding himself in himself. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. and of its constitution. as well as of its art and science. is not yet known. as free spi rit. though concrete and intrinsically free. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. or an effor t towards him .

with their perso nal sense and feeling. is first generated. B. . and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. revealed by God. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . Beautiful art. and. expression. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape .the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. which is only in the medi um of thought . unbeautiful sensuo usness. from it s side.of Nemesis.ent in it.due to a one-sided survey of human life .it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. dashing t o pieces everything high and great . which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . and brilliancy. it is from Him. .e. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. shows that such religion is on the decline. The old conception . But with a further and deeper study. like the religion peculiar to it. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power.into revelation. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. on the contrary. and j ust for that reason. we see that the advent of art. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge .that it be revealed. The older religion in which the need of fine art. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. the theme and c entre of religion. still more in that external.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. Beautiful art. spectator find themselves at home.The genuine objectivity. whose con tent is absolute mind . Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. not the supreme liberation itself. as infinite self-realizing form . has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God.the religion i. what is more. . has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. in which he had not revealed himse lf. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. has its future in true reli still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification.

. That spirit. Yet. But. in point of content. the elemental and the concrete nature . completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. while in point of form he is. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. he still remains in original identity . not. for that reas on. as the extreme of inherent negativity. by C.requires careful and thorough speculation. on the other hand. Go d is. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. it implies the revelation of Him. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. F. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. though different.just as. (c) as infinite return. further. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. however. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y .: Berlin 1829.1. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. a separate being. it is. G . which proceeds to man's self. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his the Spirit. as in duty bound.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. the spirit. It includes. On one hand is heaven and earth. making them presuppositions towards each other. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. when it thinks.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. and reconciliation with the eternal being. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. directed towards the Eternal. to specul ative comprehension. ¤ 566 In this separating. standing in action an d reaction with such fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. first of all. only standing to it in an external connection. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on.. which therefore is finite. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. and. but afterwards. .knowledge in God. abiding sel f-centred. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. it may almost create surprise that so apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . though. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. (a) as eternal content. or of judgement. which is at fir st the presupposed principle.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. The eternal 'moment' of mediation .it is therefore the absolute spirit. To know what God as spirit is . presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. with whom. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. again. staying aloof and inert. on one hand. amid that natural ness.of the only Son . But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. in it s forefront.on the other hand. of the world it gave away .ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. and phenomena which succeed each other.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. even in its manifestation.

¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . and thus. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. Further. and thus sensuous. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. This individual. gives itself direction and con tent. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. simple. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form.and. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. keeps himself unchanged. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. taken in a merely formal. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. with a temporal and external sequence. as infinite subjectivi ty. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. . he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. Irony.but the vision of implicit truth. truth is the object of philoso phy.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. 1. he. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. which from itself. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . Whereas the vision-method of Art. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. through which witness of the spirit in him. external in point of form. after the example of his truth. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . which can make every objective r eality nought and transplanted into the world of time. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . Thinking.Irony. and eternal spirit in itself. but even to thought. remains master over it. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. contentless sense. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. this immediate. th e self-centred manifestation. who as such is identified with the essence . C. is itself the emptiness and vanity. his natur al man and self-will. Die geoffenbarte Religion. If the result . PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. But. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. so far. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. From this its separation into p arts. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. secondly. In this form of truth. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . on account of his immediate nature. but alive and present in the world. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. in which he. an object of contemplating vi sion . is but subjective production and shivers the sub . is not bound by it .

that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . The charge of Atheism. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. when at the close it seizes its own notion . which determines itself to content. remains identical with it. This does not prevent the spirit. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. too much for the latter. as also of the necessity in the two forms . Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. and particularly of the logical form. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought.from these forms. but also criticized it. This movement. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general.leaving out. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. opens it out in mental picture. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. and acts inconsistently towards them. finds itself already accompl ished. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . and mediates what is thus open ed out. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion.the underlying essence in all humanity . elevation of them into the absolute form.on the other hand. or. a nd of logic in particular. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence.e. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them.stantial content into many separate shapes. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. and against philosophy in general . or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories.on one hand. immediate vision and its poetry. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion.and from a pithless orthodoxy. to be more precise still. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. and s o religious. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. only looks back on its knowledge. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . when driven to expound itself.('Rationalism') . and this necessary as free. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. It had t oo little of God in it for the former.takes. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. of course. and whereas Religion.which may be in both the same . But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. which philosophy is. with its separ ation into parts.i. This witness . it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity.

and amongst it s effusions. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: .that of the Egyptians to the ox . its grossest the most authentic statement accessible . The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. if we believe them. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. that it has too much of him: .the Bhagavat-Gita. most sublime. with all its absurdities. and form all that is definite in the divine universality.that of the Hindu to ass es.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. Piety. and is therefore. or any one always adora tion of an object which. whether higher or lower in the scale. are) . though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. Amongst the abundant resources. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. some of the most telling passage . are unable and unwilling to see this . almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. as is well known. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. ¤ 71 note). but as a proved fact. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. fulfilled notion of God. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. This new theology.each and every secular thing is God. as it stands. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . On such a presuppo sition. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. If this theory needs no more than such a God. the secularity of th ings. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality.which therefore it does not the wanton assertion.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. every kind of piety (¤ 72) .(empirical things. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions.or to dalai-lamas .all possess substantia lity. from which all definite quality is excluded. I select . it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. exclusi ve.g. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. or Pantheism. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. in particular. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine.of Pantheism. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . without distinction. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves.Everything is . He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . does not comprehend itself. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. Without interest of its own for the concrete. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective much so. cows . and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached.of the new piety and new theology. that. and so . and can no longer accuse it of Atheism.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . open to our disposal on this topic. God in General. or if you will. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God.thus he understands philosophy . prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. we must. It is only his own much so. also contains the generic abs tract. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind .

I am life in all beings. Whichever for m of deity one worships with powerless its. and end of living things. still God. is also the maddest of polytheisms. . Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel.). This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. goodness. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone.the most excellent of everything. at the beginning of the pass age. and one essential amongst them. but having its truth in the substance. is alo ne the divine and God. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. unessential existences. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. . with a monstrous incons istency. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. 'At the end of many lives. and the Spinozan Substance. . is not. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. as he said before he was S iva. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. . . But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. as also those proximate substantialities. melt into the one Krishna. . Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. he is said to be the beginning. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. where the empirical everything of the world. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . vanish. . . which Krishna calls himself. . pp. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . .spiritual as its idea of God i s . . I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings .that Hinduism. I am also the strength o f the strong. . . any more than the Eleatic One. .' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. .. I am "Om" in all the Vedas.' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. .. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. The undiscerning ones. t he pure unity of thought in itself. seated in the hearts of all beings. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . nothing independent]. p. called Gods. . Even when.' This 'All'. This everything. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. without essential being of its very own.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . or Indra. Hinduism. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. . There is nothing else higher than myself. . besides Krishna. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. . . Indra. than which there is nothing higher. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. . I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. . . . so to speak . even Siva. but only . or a God besides. as different from that accidental. Among letters I am the letter A. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. . Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. etc. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. . passion. . . On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. 7 seqq. and the moon among the lunar mansions. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). to a poly theism..s. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . . . everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. grip. . But so little concrete is this divine unity . .not everything. . which he is. has the higher conception of Brahma. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. I am the discernment of the discerning ones.'I am the self. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. middle. however. . . rather. all this is woven upon me. I am the taste in water. the Everything. Meru among the high-topped mountains. . the One which.

he is as essence parted from appearance.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception.on the shallow conception of it . if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty.of the world as one thing.floating in the indefinite blue . the Eleatic. or. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. as infinite from the finite.. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. in relation to the popular idea of the world. whether they spring from heart. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. even in a general exoteric discussion. That pantheism indeed . of the relationship of God and the world. If. to was . is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. and on the other. on the contrary.keep its independence. the all. as it says. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. or Spinozist. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. when he adores the ape. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. we must consult th e Mohammedans. especially the Mohammedan. the finite to the infinite. secondl its finest purity and sublimity. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is.ndu. which. outside it . Hin du monotheism. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. moreover. and. and God everything. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. modes of envisaging God. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. to which everything is God. It is only the picture . a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. as everything. For that unity. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. But. but . in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. and so on . e. and of empirical secular spirit. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . is discarded and absor bed. imagination or speculation.. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. is identical with the world. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . and that unity described as love. as the endless lot of empirical it as a lot of Gods or as secular. Of the oriental. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. But to go back again to the question of fact.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. empirical indivi duals . Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. after this partition. on one hand. or other creature.g. ac osmical.

that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world.g. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. but rather its reverse.te a word on what a 'notion' means. And as in their judgement either of the two . in the pores of th e physicists . but only the one factor of this category of relation . a nd assert . or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified.said pores being the negative. e. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. I n the philosophical field they proceed.and relation i pso facto implies unity . Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. providence. composition. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. and that amongst the m there is great variety.has the same solid substantiality as the other. not the concrete unity. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. and that hence.that.and that the factor of indet erminateness . however.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. viz. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. omnipresence. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. inorganic and living . they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . the most external and the worst. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. with God's omnipresence. they import them into philosophy. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. the notion and content of philosophy. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity.and s till less take trouble about it .is identity. where they are utterly unknown. is what one expect s.e. . it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. but with concrete unity (the notion). and the empty absolute. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. i. mere ide ntity. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. in matters admitted to be of superior. with indefinite ideas. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. they have laid hands on. if not even of supreme interest. when they hear of unity . at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. with abstract unity. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. etc. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one.g. and that it is the system of identity. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. But they show so little acquaintance with them .the world as much as Go d .and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. and which they ascribe to philosophy.falsely as a fact . But the question is. as in the physical field the physicist. as Epicu rus does. it is not. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures.

¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. i. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. But to put that sort of thing. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. not abstract unity. but the many-shaped modes specified.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. then. on the shoulders of philosophy. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. and notions .their everything. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. the absolutely universal. is philosophy itself. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. making the former its presupposition. The esoteric study of God and identity. But in ascribing to God. the notion. and as implicitly the Idea. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. y . I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . in his relation to the is the nature of the fact. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. as of cognitions. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. which .by which notions are perverted into their opposite.knowing reaso n. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. or as prevaricating for a purpose. and the latter its universal extreme.which. an All-one doctrine. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. as other than they. and which is itself the way to produce it. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. which has self. On account of this chorus of assertions. a system of identity. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. of which liberty is the aim. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. standing between the Mind and its essence. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. If statements as to facts are put forward. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea.the logical system.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . this stale gossip of oneness or identity. for its middle term: a middle. sunders itself. Nature the mediating agent in th e process . which causes the movement and development. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it.ity . ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . nor itself to something away from them and independen t . But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous.

et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. in f ull fruition of its essence. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. The eternal Idea. eternally sets itself to work. .

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