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INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any
attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i
s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as
treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.
but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material.the truth that matter itself has no truth. But not merely is it. These 'imponderables' . where the othe . but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. i.the passive of Aristotle. the soul is only the sleep of mind . that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. etc. perhaps. which is the fund amental feature of matter. except where. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. matter is regarded as something true. even the capacity of offering resistance. Mind. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. a nd the soul remains the pervading. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. and not as the immediate or natural individual. have still. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. as absolute negativity. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. At such a stage it is not yet mind. li ght. on the other. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. identical ideality of it all. It is otherwise with Mind. indeed. and. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . the sou l is its universal immaterialism. as such a result.e. but soul. on the one hand. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. and so the self-externalism. however. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. like heat. to which they might perhaps add space and time. Wherever there is Nature. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized.SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. There. thus come into being. The usual answer. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. which is potentially all things. in a sense. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . and mind conceived as a thin g. however. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. whereas the 'vital' matter. its simple 'ideal' life.. not merely lacks gravity. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought.with th is proviso.
and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. the changes of the seasons. and. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood.e. disappear. These have. not. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. as an anima mundi.is moulded into it. there philosophers took God. when it presents itself as a single soul. a world-soul. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. Animals and pl ants.the natural soul. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. Spinoza. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. in many case s completely. and. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system.(a) In its immediate natural mode . In nations less intellectually emancipated. and always more or less. as individualized. as so often is done. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. remain for ever subject to such influences. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. which only is.whence Epicurus. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. it is a soul which feels. so holding. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s.r is not . re tains an abstract independence. it may be. upon it. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. sidereal. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. they are natural objects for consciousness. . just in proportion to his civilization. T hus. and does not rise or develop into system. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. (b) Secondly. Malebranche. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. into the absolute syllogism. based upon participation in the common life of nature. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. on the contrary. feels the difference of climates.or corporeity . Descartes. merely as another word for the incomprehensible.e. as in the case of Lei bniz. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. in the modes of that being. or. (c) Thirdly. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . and telluri c life of man. so to speak. as in the case of Spinoza. Hence. with Leibniz. described. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. its immediate being . even these few and slight susceptibilities. is too abstract. and the periods of the day. etc. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). But either this identity. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom.
we see man in his true relation to his environment. we find it as the special temperament. we find its diversities. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). Thirdly. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. on the whole. physiognomy.a worl d no longer incomplete. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit.the sexual relation . Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. bodily structure and disposit ion. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. talent . the one permanent subject. widely distant from each other. shows an active half. This . but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. And that individuality marks both the world which. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. as it exists. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. hopes. carrying out these universa . He begins with Childhood .mind wrapped up in itself. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). of families or single individuals. The contrast between the earth's poles. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. and the position of the individual himself. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. as alterations in it. or artistic.on a ph ysical basis. in purposes political. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. fails to meet his ideal requirements. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. character. shows. and on the other. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. on its one side. scientific. and as stages in its development. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). fancies.
The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. distinguishes itself from its mere being. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. put this question to the class of ideology.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises.The waking is not merely for the observer. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. in the first instance. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. . which are often addressed to philosophy: . as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). but as a return back from the world of specialization. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. .Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . sleep. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. as before explained . on a v isit to the University of Pavia. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. (c) Sensibility(3) . only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. i n an unintelligent way. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . . takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. for example. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. each point. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. although. as they may be called.not as a merely negative rest from it. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. as already noted.Napoleon. viz.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. or self-centralized being. The characterization given in the section is abstract.
just. The fact that these particulars. Another. But if put in the feelin g. belonging as it does to natural.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. adultery. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. be it noted.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. This should hardly need enforcing. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. mora l. moral. mean. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. fornication. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will.g. not mere alterations. On the other hand and conversely. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good.. etc. and is so felt. on one hand. true. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. for itself. the fact is a mode of my individuality. and religious. and the character. in the feeling. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . are found by the waking soul. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. are our very own. the inarticulate bre athing. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. and to be as if found. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. blasphemy. ho wever. etc. and . everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. its natural peculiarity. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. murder . so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). godless. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it.set over against consciousness. invested with cor poreity. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. the naturally immedi ate. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. which. it is true. the conscience. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . but treated as bel onging to its most special. are in order to be felt. is what we call sensibility. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. etc. One. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. evil. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life.identity of our self-centred being. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . in its own self. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. primarily. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring.
the soul is no longe r a mere natural. the blood. especially the passions or emotions. ¤ 402 Sensations. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. of heavy matter.a psychical physiology. (¤ 300). tones. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. (¤¤ 321. 322). (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . (¤ 317) . We should have. but an inward. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). (c) the sense of solid reality. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. to take possessi on of it. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. to the character of subjectivity.e.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. and voice in general. to realize its mastery over its own. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . In the usage of ordinary language. sighs. the centre of the 'sensible' system. distinction appears as mere variety . just because they are immediate and are found existing. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. smells. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. the 'irritable' system. and their corporization. with which that substance is one. i. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel.the senses of definite light. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. of self.it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . for example. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . What it has to do. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . following the special character of the mental mode. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part.in the system of the senses. i ts merely virtual filling-up. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. o f colours. e. set in its self-centred life.g. are formed from their mental source. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. the immediacy of mode in feeling . is to raise its substantiality. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. with its varieties of language. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications.it is a soul which feels. in a special system of bodily organs. laughter. (b) THE FEELING SOUL .because in it. As sentient. therefore. works itself out. . just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head.and of sound. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations .
because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. but a negation. may again sink down. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. the content is its particular world. where the real is put past . and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. thoughts. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . They were not in our possession. In the present stage we must treat.. and to that world it stands but as to itself. it implies a want of adaptation. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. but only to his im plicit self. to be defined as one of feeling . As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. prima rily.as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. virtually retained. in whi ch all this is stored up. in an implicit mode. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. once mor e come to light. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). This substance i s still the content of its natural life. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. without existing. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). ¤ 404 As individual. ideas. ideas and information. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. to which the soul. the corporeity. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). secondly. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. Thus in the body it is one simple. which is at the same time its predicate. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. which is disease.that world being included in it and filling it up. etc. acquired lore. As sentient. the s oul is characterized as immediate. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. first. although it does not exist. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. At the present stage this singleness is. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one.the existent spe culative principle. Some times. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. it brings within itself. omnipresent unity. so far as that is. By itself. etc. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. in sickness. a deep featureless characterless mine. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it.
a subject which may even exist as another individu al. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. or capac ity. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. as concrete subject ivity. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. injuries. etc. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. but as efficiency and realized activity. placenta. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. say between friends. etc. as it has existence of its own. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. not yet as its self. it is. is visibly present as another and a different individual. and of character. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. of the mother. etc. congenital disposit ion and temperament. controlling genius thereof. which. and is therefore passive.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . temper. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. Here are two individuals. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: .a substance. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. as yet nothing impenetrable. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. and reasonable. By the self-hood of the latter it . If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . tal ent. self-conscious. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. incl inations. or virtuality. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. self-possessed.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. intellige nt.. not as a mere possibility. the psychical relationship.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. the single self of the two.is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. not a true subject reflected int o itself. his secular ideas. whose decision is ul . of life. character. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. The moth er is the genius of the child. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. etc. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. developed interests. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. between husband and wife and between members of the same family.. fortunes. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. idiosyncrasies. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. because immediate. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena).
that it is in harmony wi th the facts. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. To that end the phenomena. on the other hand. in which the individual here appears innnersed.his fun damental interests. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind.to be mere deception and impo sture. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. intentions. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. first of all call for verificati on. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . means. it must be added. on the cont rary. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. it has already been call ed his genius. it might seem. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. This totality forms his actual ity. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. At the same tim e. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . in other words. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. The facts. which are also means and ends to each other. educated. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes.to show. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. self-possessed human being is a disease. But such a verification would. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. is.timate whatever may be the show of reasons.
formed. reads. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. in catalepsy. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. and to know which. smells. and character. and the like. And because it is the adult. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. is this. which lead up to the result . the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. etc. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. not really a 'person'. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. ca pable of conveying general truths. his own and that of the magnetize . but it is empty. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. a formal vision and awareness. on those left behind. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. When the substance of both is thus made one. But such clairvoyance . and other diseases. unless by the aid of religion. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. tastes. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. the magnetizer. . in whom it sees. after the downfall of the Roman republic. wh en it is healthy and awake. and hears. like that of the child in the womb. or at the approach of death.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . is under a veil. the selfless individual.). It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. etc. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. . The patient in this condition is accordingly made. f riends. (Thus Cato. that it is a state of passivity. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. however.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity.a genius which beh olds itself. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . in its sober moods. . for example. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. then. etc.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. not on the spot. But. and c ontinues to be. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. subje ctive reason. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. subject to the power of another person. which. exist for it as an outward objectivity.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. external one to another. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. those c onnected with female development.) Compare h ome-sickness. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions.
Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. so long as we assume independent personalities. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. reasons. and at the same time. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. the 'common sense'. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. in this nominal perception. as in the morbid state alluded to. or med icines for them. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. which still marks the self-feeling. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. one sees and hears with the fingers. anticipate the full-grown an . and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. which is no less a world of law. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. causality. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. though all-embracing. In considering insanity we must. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity.fe eling. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. and hence. it is still susceptible of disease. i. beholds. on the contrary. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. between intelligent personality and objective world. The purely sensitive life. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. In this way it is self. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. e. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared.r. for example. is impossible. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. is without any definite points of attachment . and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. i s just this form of immediacy. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. which. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . etc. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. in its capacity as individual. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. etc. as in other cases. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. receives. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect.
that it is liable to insanity .fan cies and hopes . but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part.d intelligent conscious subject. idea. and their gratification). yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. is diseased. i. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. and be a realized u niversality. and it is only as a thing.. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. is undistinguis hed from them. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. passions. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. and so also may the cure. is relaxed. This particular being of the soul is t . as now regarded. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. presupposes the patient's rationality. which is there also. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason.e. pride. the. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits.e. and therefore not susceptible of this malady.e. as something natural and existent. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. A violent.feeling. desire.that evil which is always latent in the heart. etc. i. Mind as such is fr ee. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. and also desires. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. earthly elements are set fr ee . equally formal. it would be death).merely personal love and hatred. but a contr adiction in it. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. as it aris es. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. instincts. loss of health (if it were that. however. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. such as vanity. as a thing. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. The mind which is in a condition of mere being.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. mere and total. . and made appear in. In the concrete. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. and the rest of the passions . may. but only derangement.. so as to insert them in their proper place. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. And so too the particularity is. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. and so makes part of the actual self. This humane treatment. inclination.just as physical disease is not an abstract. i. this life of feeling. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. the self is to be stamped upon. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. etc. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. moral and theoretical. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement).
i. and the generation o f habit as practice. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted.and becoming the 'ideal'. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. and that as a barrier for it. weariness o . or of the immediate corpo reity as such. of which it is the subjective substance. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. The soul is freed from them. nor is absorbed in the m. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged .. has been absorbed by it. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings.itself a simple being . su bjective substantiality of it . is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. and for that reason n ot free. nature. The natural qualities and alterations of age. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. and which still continues to exist. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. dist inguishing it from itself . therefore.e. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. when the co rporcity. et c. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. or dependent in regard to it. and the mere substance. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. are only subjectiv e forms. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. but the basis of consciousness. as. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. but still free. empty space and empty time. will. and so no longer interested. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. And consciousness it becomes. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. Habit is rightly called a second nature. but has them and moves in them. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. a pure act of intuition. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. For. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. a second nature. on the contrary. of it. this being of the soul. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. occupied. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. is reduced to unity.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. That is to say. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. the one and the same. lacking consciou sness.he factor of its corporeity. heat. partly only relative. so is that pure being (which. sleep. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. even in being affected by them. Habit like memory.
which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. like any other.. or skill. etc. too. his upright pos ture. and especially so in the specific bodily part. has been by will made a habit . Thinking. this soul. casual. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). habit diminishes this feeling. Even here. . reflection. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will.enabling the matter of consciousness. i. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. if quite abstract. and that they. which make it up. consciousness. etc. the spatial direction of an individual. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. a series of musical notes) is in me. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. And it is true that the form of habit. but part and parcel of his being. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. moral. so that when the conception (e. is recollection and memory. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. sweet tastes. This is the rational liberation from them. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. etc.concentration. to be made a power in the bodily part. that although the frost. nor are they in conce ption rational. and the self-feeling as such. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which.. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. made into an instrum ent.. an 'ideality' of soul . re ligious. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). consciousness. and thus to enable the soul. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. cut off from action and reality.). whereof we sha ll speak later. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) .or the misfortune . etc. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. nor an abstrac t inwardness.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. to exist as substance in its corporeity. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. and any other purp oses and activity. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. nor a transient emotion or idea. etc. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation.f the limbs. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. intelligence. The most ext ernal of them. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. intuition. viz. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious.e. habit is usually passed over - . and it is habit of living which brings on death. to be his as this self. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. or. are no longer bothered with it. and no other. Habit on an ampler scale. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy.is felt. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. like their satisfaction. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. under its volitional and conceptual characters.g. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. and particul ar. a particular organ of i ts organic system). Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. without an express adjustment. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. acquires a strength which consists in this. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier.
This note is so slight. in other words. Die fuhlende Seele. Empfindung. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. 4. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. or the 'immediacy' of mind. In this identity of interior and exterior.. 3. And the human figure. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. The soul. This externality. absorbing it. Under the head of human expression are included. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. of the mouth . has lost the meaning of mere so ul. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. unable to represent it in its actual universality. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. or abstract universality. Naturliche Seele. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. 1. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. in being related to which. but the soul. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. 'The autho . has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. etc. and the formation of the limbs. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. and inexpressible a modific ation. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. the latter subject to the former. as the absolut e instrument. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. Naturliche Qualitaten. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. especially the hand. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. and i s infinite self-relation. and making it its own. indefinite. 2. a world external to it . weeping. for the soul. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape.laughter.either as something contemptible . ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. in its concentrated self.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. the upright figure in general. for example. it is related to itself. 5. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. finds itself there a single subject. 71). still vainer than a signatura rerum. of which it is the sign. while language is its perfect expressi on. represents not itself. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . Seen from the animal world. cuts itself off from its immediate being.
and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). something dark and beyond it. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. as external to it. The mind as ego is essence. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). but when he receives the inspired word. 7. Ego. i. as subjective reflection in itself. but to the foolishness of man. Gewohnheit. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. like reciprocal dependence in general. and as such it is C onsciousness. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. but is implicit. Selbstgefuhl. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. It is of this latter. as this absolute negativity. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. 8. now. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. seem to be its own activity. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. 6. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. does not. thus first made explicit as the Ego. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty.it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . is only its abstract formal ideality. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind.the soul's natural life .e. and .r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. in the sphere of essence.to an equal freedom as an independent object. Hence consciousness. but since reality. to it. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'.the light. which manifests itself and something else too . is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. not to the wisdom.
being immediate.to the ego it seems an alteration of the object. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object.. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind .as a case of correlation . The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. again. an existent. and so on. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. an intuitive intellect. etc. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. is further characterized a s immediately singular.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. and puts it first under the category of being. Ego. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). the subject of consciousness. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. i. but as poorest in thought. reflected in itself. for which ego is the object. Spatial and temporal Singularn . Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. It appears as wealth iest in matter. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. first. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. Consciousness . The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. as Reason. i. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. has emerged from Spinoz ism. and that the philosophy. the notion of mind. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. (b) self-consciou sness. The object similarl y. in other words. a something. a thing-in-itself. and even t he Idea of Nature. an existing thing. the substantial and qu alitative. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. or mere c ertainty. a singular. As against Spinozism. but only as it is in reference to something else. with an object set against it. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. what makes the object the subject's own. t heir absolute interdependence. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. which is not as its own. immediate consciousness.e. to raise its self-certainty to truth.e. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. and underived certainty of it. This is sense-consciousness.a subject-objectivity.
free from this negative l ink and from one another.e. reflectional attributes.). At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. of the thing is. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. and universal. and more or less by the sciences. Thi s inward. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. but as mediated. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. it is related. an abstract identity: on the other hand. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. in that manner. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. its necessity on its own part. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. reflected in itself. and. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. which form the alleged ground of general experience. as not externally different from the other. has many properties. ¤ 423 The law.bet ween the individuality of a thing which. i. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. experiences. in this case by t he Ego. the thing. however. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . on one hand. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . and sensuous consciousness. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. the one of the terms. and universalities. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. permanent term s. has. lies im mediately in the other. the distinction on its own part.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal.a variety of relations. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground .e. by being regarded in their bearings. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . to describe the sensible. 73). to which.ess. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . but brought to rest and universality. having passed beyond the sensible. is sense-perception. taken in its concrete content. however. and not yet as external on its own part.a copy of the phenomenon. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. and am aware'. reflected upon. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. viz. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. i. what it is in truth. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . or the distinction which is none. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. p. as we called it. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. wants to take the object i n its truth. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. a something external to it. But in this manner the interior distinction is. . so constr uing the object. or as being beside and out of itself. not as merely immediate.
and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. primarily describable as an individual.as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. this identity comes to be for the ego. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. can make no resistance: the dialectic. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. is a singular. or implicitly. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. and itself made actual. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . pure 'Ideality'. and ma intains itself as such. or. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. in this return upon itself. and a desire (appetite) . towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. its satisfaction realized. there is strictly speaking no object. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. implicit in it. therefore. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. on the whole. nominally. knows itself implicit in the object. The certitude of one's self. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself.With this new form-characteristic. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. in its immediacy. The two processes are one and the same. On the external side it conti nues. being merely consumed. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. the latter. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. therefore. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. with the nega tion of it. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. on the contrary . and thus in it I am aware of me. To this activity the object. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. ¤ 429 But on the inner side.
Force. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. as one of two things for another. which falls on another. then. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. solves the contradiction. when we look to the distinction of the two. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. and its being for others. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. however. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . on the ir phenomenal side. which is the basis of this phenomenon. in the service of the master. and the means for entering into relation with them. the outward and visible recognition). must likewise be kept in life.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self.but only p eril. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. works off his individualist self-will. negati on of immediacy. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual.for the means of mastery. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. w hich however is also still outside it. and incurs a like peril for its own . is not on that acc ount a basis of right. though by the abstract. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. the slave. from one point of view. at first immedi ately. f rom the essential point of view (i. and to exist as such for the other: . Force. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. a suppression. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. the slave. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. Thus the death of one. however. While the one com batant prefers life. it. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. Thus arises the status of master and slave. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. therefore rude. we see. and thus give existence to my freedom. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. ¤ 435 But secondly. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. as the existence of hi s freedom. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. ¤ 434 This status. retains his single self-consciousness.e consciousness of a 'free' object. This other. not their underlying and essential principle.t he process of recognition. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. preservation. is yet. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. and formation of it.e. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. in the first place. In that other as ego I behold myself.
¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other.is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality.consciousness. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. honour.in family. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. friendship. is mind (spirit).f wisdom' . and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. Selbstbewu§tsein.or rather it is a difference which is none. is Reason. etc. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. aware of what it is. Der Verstand. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. and of all virtues. ego.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. Wahrnehmung 3. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. whilst it signifies that the object. valour. or determinations of the very being of things. fatherland. therefore. 1. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. permeatin g and encompassing the ego.which is Reason. is now itself universal.the passage to universal self. Die Begierde 6. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. For truth here has. state. idle fame. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. fame. The uni versality of reason. 5. Reason. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. 4. bu t the truth that knows it. than they are its own thoug hts. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. love. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. Truth. the self-centred pure notion. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. . also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. as its peculiar mode and immanent form. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence.
the latter now an infinite form which is not. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. what is the same thing. in so far as it has an object. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. etc. it is finite by means of its immediacy. or.mental vision.the former a simple immediate totality. neit her subjective nor objective. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. Cons ciousness is finite. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason.in one word. Die Vernunft. restricted by that content. it has a mode in its knowledge. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. This. above the material. and which as the reality of that notion. like consciousness. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom.7. however. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . ideation. viz. etc. remembering. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. as its concept has just shown. i. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. though it no longer has an object. etc. therefore. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . in thinking also and in desire and will. in so far as . And it is a matter of no consequence. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. Mind is finite. but is an awareness of this substantial totality.. which is defined as it s notion. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. Mind. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. SUB-SECTION C.apart b oth from the content. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. then its reality is that reason. in the soul as a physical mode. and above the complication with an external object . desires.e. PSYCHOLOGY..
and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection.e. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. that aspect is twofold . ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. and make the affection subjective. the na tural soul (¤ 413). viz. i. k nowledge. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. it is . involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. or.as being and as its own: by the one. so far. in so far as its existent phase. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. and to liberate itself to its elf. to reach and get hold of itself. and being a rational knowledge. and is even there a return into itself. and are the mind's own. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations.reality of its reason. of comprehending itself. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. in freedom. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible.e. When the affection has been rendered its own. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent.e. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. i. the mind finds in itself something which is. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. As the theory o f Condillac states it. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. viz. Thus. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. and its activity can only have itself as aim. and the negative aspect of mental activity. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. forces. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. that is. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. equally. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. is misconceived and overlooked. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. Similarly. it thereby reduces itself to finitude.
Inwards . is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. but) enjoyment. which in the first place is likewise formal . and gains abstract auton omy within. and is immediately willed. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. its content is at first only its own. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. the word. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. to get at the notion and the truth. But as knowledge. as it is said. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. while it has to do with autonomous products. Ou twards. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. Its activity has to do with the empty form . and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another.e.(b) Will: practical mind. both for the mind as such. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. e. to definite and conceptual knowledge. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. in the theoretical range.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. and that in its empirical condition. which it and the content virtually is. while the practical. This activity is cognition. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. and therefore a restricted content.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. for which it gains the form of universality.i. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. is thus also a reality .only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. The nominal knowledge. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. etc. which is only certitude. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. wi th a material which is its own. has a material which is only nominally such. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth .g. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. belong to a point of view utt . Psychology. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. just as they are given. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. It is still extremely ill off. along with which the content is realized as rational. elevates itself. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. like logic. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. merely as facts. and of the heart without the intellect .. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. This position of psychology. and heartless intellects . been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. as r eason is concrete.
just so far as it realizes itself. as it is by the same method brought into nature. Faculty. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence.in a word . conceived as reflected into self. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. if answered in the negative. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). imagination. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. etc. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . If they are isolated.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. cognitive conception. remembrance. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality .e. must lead to abandoning the effort. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. by cognitive intuition. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . or makes the concept its own. it . treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. intelligen ce.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. remembers.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . imagines. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. imagination. is the fixed quality of any object of thought.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). like power or force. as non-intelligent). conception.whi ch. But c ognition is genuine. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition.its out-of-selfness . or mind. conception. etc. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . is bro ught into mind. however. etc.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . by rational conception. It is true that even as isolated (i. conceives. But the true satisfaction. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question.is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. intuition. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul.besides which it al so intuits. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. memory. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. it is admitted. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . are not isolated. viz.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. etc. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. that intuition. etc. note). the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained.
But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . the mere consciousness point of view. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. Feeling is the immediate.an active self-collection . It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . has the form of casual particularity .It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. but rather as subject ive and private. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. Hence feeling. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity .his private and p articular self. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. in content and value entirely contingent. . which the mind as it fe els is to itself. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. is swallowed up. a . a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. in t he truth of mind. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence.one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. as it were the closes t. external or internal. projects it into time and space. may just as likely be narrow and poor. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements.is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. 254). with the character of something existent. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . of their essential relationships and real cha racters. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. or at least to reasons .to the generalit ies of common sense . whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. Now the material.t he factor of fixing it as our own. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. that is t o say. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. With us. this mode is simple. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'.but to his feeling. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive.
(aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. however. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. we may say. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. which. yet without being in consciousnes s. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. as it at first recollects the intuition.e. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. . but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. no longer needs to find the content. and inwardly divest itself of it. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. which makes it its own.the germ of the fruit. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. as tho ught. its when and where. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. still continues simple. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. i. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. from the external place. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. a rec ollection of itself. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. in the way we treat. The representation is the property of intelligence. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. and is arbitrary or contingent. with a preponderating subjectivity. though intrinsically concrete. for example. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. or. and received into the universality o f the ego. isolated. t ime. but stored up out of consciousness. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. the germ as affirmatively containing. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition.in a space and a time of its own. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. in virtual possibility.
and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. Secondly. The content reproduced.viz. But it is solely in the conscious subject. or ide a). or an intell ectual category.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. if it is to exist. now that it has been endued with externality. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. The image. as of all intelligence. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . . whatever be its content (from image. comes actually into its possession. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. by which it is authenticated. present also a distinction in content. has always the peculiarity. such as likeness and contrast.. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. ¤ 20 note. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. as a unit of intuition. notion. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. has been broken up.in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition.Image and Idea. under the representation (idea) with the same content.these modes of relation are not laws. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. as a matter of fa ct. though belonging to intelligence. i. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence.) . where. the matter is entirely pictorial. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. to be so and so. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. In the first place. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. at first only in space and time. where it is treasured up. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. being and universality. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. wherea s the idea (representation). but a being of its own institution. see Introduction to the Logic.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. which is now the power over them. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property.e. that it finds its material. and an out-put from its universal m ine. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. reason and consequence.
it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. for its ideal import is its elf. which forms their connecting link. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. are unifications of t he same factors. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. is reason.Abstraction.Imagination. derived from some interest. Another point calling for special notice is that. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). internal and external. it is self-uttering. but only a nominal reason. to universalize it. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. and becomes an i ndividuality. or poetical imagination . This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. recollection. but they are 'syntheses'. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. As reason. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. allegoric. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. . 435).. i. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference.e. one's own and what is picked up. is derived from the data of intuition. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. These more or less concrete. In other words. some latent concept or Ideal principle. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. so far a s it is concerned. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. or something of the sort. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. Such is creative imagination(7) .symbolic. . The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. when regarded as the agency of this unification. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. this form of being.still lacks the side o f existence. etc. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. This force is really intelligence itself . and in mechanical memory it completes. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. a concrete subjectivity. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. Acting on this view. are completely welded into one. it aims at making itself be and be a fact.
the matter of the latter is. something accepted. e tc. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. in the first instance. language . But in the fusion of the two elements.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. ¤ 459 The intuition . but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). the natural attributes of the intuit ion. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical.now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself.. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas .invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). somewhat immediate or given (for example. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. and where it is conserved. This intuition is the Sign. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. since memory. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. .which as intuiting generates the form of time and space.gives to sensations. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. strictly so-called. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. but as representative of something else. intuitions. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . out of which it forms i deas . whereas in the sign. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. and even with conception and imagination. Sausen. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). Knarren. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition.R auschen. conception s. In logic and psychology.th at of vocal objects.). when employed as a sign. With regard to the elementary material of language. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess .speech and.in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. and the connotation of which it is a sign. the colour of the cockade. has always to do with signs only. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. The sign is some immediate intuition. have nothing to do with each oth er. It is a n image. etc. its institution by intelligence. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. Such is the negativity of intelligence. its system.
e. . as regards signs for mental objects. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. and only get signification as signs. i. The study of languages still in their original state. it depends.e. (Cf.). people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. W. on the other hand. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. As to the formal elem ent. as in our signs for the numbers. the denomination.e. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. the chemical elements. i.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. we may touch. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. In particular. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. as. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. like the Chinese. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. instead of n ames proper. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. for example. alphabetical writing. and now that. . which severally receive designation. in chemistry and mineralogy. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454).the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. and still takes place in Canton .The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. as many as ten a . Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . again. etc. are frequently changed. on anthropological articulation. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. palate. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. It is only a stationary civ ilization.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. the planets . only in pas sing. i. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. tongue in each) and for their combinations. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. their signs in vocal language. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. if it be not altogether extinguished.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. viz. they are reduced to signs. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. but.
as it does. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. while (with the facu . instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. in the case of the Chinese Koua. in the interest o f vision. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. so that. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. like alphabetic writing. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . Both alike require such signs. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character.e. This feature of hieroglyphic . The European. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker.is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. by speaking low and soft or crying out. Engaging the attention of intelligence. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. however ample a connotation it may include. is still for the mind simple in the name). of uttering its ideas most worthily . learn ing to speak Chinese.the mode. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. just as in modern times (as already noted. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones.the name. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. in speaking. the simple plain idea. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. Thus. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. Hieroglyphics.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. . i. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. or simple logical terms. the simple straight stroke. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality.nd twenty. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. peculiar to the intellect. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. it is analysed.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese.
lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,
but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you
ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.
¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex
which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. and will.but only in antithesis to the latter . it is because of their quality or co ntent . 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. But as both. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. etc. when thought.indeed infinitely so. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general.. wha t is the same thing. If feelings are of the right sort. may be placed. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. in their universality and necessity. bad. and to discus s their content. but presented in its universality and necessity. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. in its objectivity and truth. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. and thought.retain a speciality of their own . grief. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. etc. shame. But where the objects sought are thus casual. repentance. and evil. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. lack objective determin ation. in which these facts. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. is precisely what constitutes. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. and duty. in feeling. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. namely God. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. volition. and still more in mind. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. we have only to deal with the selfish. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. for the latter. we have this immanen . the truth and. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. Whereas in life. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. contentment. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. right. and precisely in that way d o they . heart.. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. on the one hand. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. Thus it is. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. joy. in their immediacy. law and morality. Delight. On the other hand. can also be felt. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact .
enjoyment . If the will is to satisfy itself.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. Which are good and bad? . In consequence of this formalism. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. they are based on the rational nature of the mind.his inte rests of intellect. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. each being always in conflict to another. The will. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. But with regard to the inclinations. while. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. on one hand. their mutual connect ions. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. What are the good and rational propensiti es. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts.natural impulse and inclination. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . Should. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . therefore. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. they. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. finds in the conformity . It is on ly a dead. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life.on one aim and object. admitting of gratification.a development in which the content of autonomous . . first of all. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. it is pa ssion. Thus. talent.Up to what degree the good continue good. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. but to ge t realized. subjectivity . the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. each with its private range). and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. as r egards the form of its content.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. as rights and duties. as experience shows. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. however. which is essentially self-d etermination. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. and something inappropriate to it. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. In what way have they.and (as there are ma ny. is at first still a natural will. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution.an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. the question is directly raised. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. indeed. character. and their truth. The answer to the question. Will. ego. on the other. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. too often. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . passion is neither good no r bad. are infected with contingency. be the value of tha t mode what it may. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized.
which as such is the universal. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. this is wh at is called the interest. and is option or choice. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. An action is an aim of the subject. However. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. there would be no action at all. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. on the whole to their disadvantage. on one hand. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. without end. so far as their particularity goes. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. an inactive thing. It rea lizes itself in a particularity.and one satisfaction. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. and social duties. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. Their mutual limitation.e. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . . the free gift of nature. moral. are reduced to a m ere negative. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. the impulses. as thinking and implicitly free.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. As thus contradictory. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. which reflection and comparison have educed. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. by another.action loses its contingency and optionality. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. It is thus 'reflecting' will. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. of a universal sa tisfaction. ¤ 476 The will. The morality concerns the content of the aim. inclinations. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. They are somet imes contrasted. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. i.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another .his passion. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. which is just as much no satisfacti on. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . that finds its actualizing in the agent. unless he had an interest in it. it is on them that the decision turns. is his interest and . either alto gether or in part. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. as the content. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. where the subject is made to close with itself.
the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. As abstract Idea again.to be aware. have never had this Idea.freedom itself. or by s trength of character. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. aim. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . just because it is the very essence of mind. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . i. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. the divine min d present with him. knows this its concept. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. and is will as free intelligence. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual.e. even the Stoics. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. Africa and the East.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. for example. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. i. with freedom itself. On the contrary. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice.sired . Remembering that free mind is actual mind. and object . or implicit Idea. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. therefore.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom.e . is actu ality. and are constituted after its measure. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. According to Christianity. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. If. Plat o and Aristotle. he is actually free. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. in religion as such . did not have it. however. or philosophy (. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. now that the formalism. which i s pure and concrete at once. the will is an actually free will. education.it is the existential side of reason . he h as also. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. is in the first instance the rational will in general.an individuality. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. of the family.e. etc. which realizes its own freedom of will. that is. as realizing the idea. ambiguous. and of which it is only t he formal activity. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength.is matter of speculation. as the substance of the state. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. of present sensati on and volition. If the will. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. Whole continents. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . its very au tonomy or freedom. i. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. only so far as it thinks itself .e. and the abstract singleness. The Greeks and Romans. so that in this sphere of particular existence. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world.a universality which only ought to be. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. still this very I . and are without it still. fortuitousness . When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. and that as its very actuality. If to be aware of the Idea .
The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . as men. not with laws or court s of justice. Das praktische Gefuhl. religious. Vorstellung. Der freie Geist. 3. Die Einbildungskraft.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. 1.dea itself is the actuality of men . Das Denken. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. 5. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. Gedachtnis. and not less into scientific actuality. 7. Phantasie 8. Der Geist 2. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. Der praktische Geist 13. 4. Inwendiges. Die Gluckseligkeit. 16. is itself only a notion . 12. 10. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. 11. Die Erinnerung 6. Die Intelligenz. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency.not something which they have. if they are made slaves. 9. into legal. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. moral. which the content and aim of freedom has. but the pe rmanent character . but which they are.a principle of the mind and heart. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. Anschauung. But this freedom. 14. Auswendiges. 15. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude.
When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness.e. not in the form of impulse. where they.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. and character. private an d personal needs). and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. is the Law (Right ) .and aim. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. What is a right is also a duty. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. on the other hand. The penal judicature of a government. in relation to the subjective will. in the light of the concept. and what is a duty. being universal. and is the vi rtual universal. to be as a person. external things of nature which exist for consciousness.(1) When. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. in general. are its Duties. ought to h ave and can only have their existence.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. are duties . attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. so as to become its habit. in these externally objective aspects. Liberty. is also a right.. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. its rights of admi nistration. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. my right to a thing is not merely possession. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. which splits up into different heads: viz. i. it exists as manner and custom. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. temper. duty in general is in me a free subject . but in its universality. viz. etc. In the morality of the conscience. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. it is a Law. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. and it is a duty to possess things as property. anthropological data (i. For a mode of existence is a right. or legal possession.. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. but as possession by a person it is property. their absolute unity. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. These conditi ons. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. But. is a duty. where free will has existence. and brings into existence i n these several wills.e. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. etc. receives the form of Necessity. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept.. or Usage. which in it is thus at home with itself. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. or instituted as an authoritative power. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. Liberty. But in this individualist moral sphere. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. etc. to administer.at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. relation to another person . there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. military service. are no less its duties to punish. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. as the services of the members of the State in dues.
the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. which as possession is a means. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. morality of the individual conscience.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. it is the right of the subjective will. Sitte A. Gesetz 2. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. . it may be. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. possession is property. but on an external thi ng. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. As so characterized. This thing. the infinite self-rela tion. as in itself still abstract and empty. but as existence of the personality is an end. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. as something devoid of will. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. at first in the outward appropriation. and hence as a single being . in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. is an individual. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. civil society. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. on its own account me rely 'practical'. the external sphere of its liberty . 1. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. are simultaneously mutually independent. (B) When the will is reflected into self. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. which is thus mutual. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. But this predicate. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. abstract right. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. or by the formatio n of the thing or. But the set of adjustments. so as to have its existence inside it.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. and State. and the I in it is abstractly external. These extremes are the persons who. by mere designation of it. though it remains in trinsically the same.possession. in the knowledge of their identity as free.
and. produces a wrong: by which. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. This is naiv e. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. its changing hands. I can just as well put it in it as not . labour. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so .otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. but which. then the external rec . which. the only diversity lies in this. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. universal thing or commodi ty. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. and time. which thus becomes wicked. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. non-malicious wrong. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. is affirmed. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . because they face each other. expressing the civil suit. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous.the full and complete deed. and recogniz ed. But so far as my will lies in a thing. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right.). which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). however. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. and its acceptance by the other will. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. 493 seqq. willed. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. in that case. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. ¤ 495 The contract. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . is disinterested.just as well with draw it as not.Contract. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing.
is the work of Revenge. or right as governed by the nature of things. howe ver. by the n otion.a universal which holds good for him. Conversel y. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. b ut the sterling value is let slip. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him.e. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will.compulsion against the thing. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. But revenge.on self-determination or autonom y.is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. The former used to be the common meaning. This gives the wrong of fraud . such an action is essentially and actually null. i. like the last. or Natural Right. is at the same time only a new outrage. or in corporeity. But more than possible compulsion is not. in revenge. that of the judge. i. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. in which the law of nature should hold sway. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . the latter is violated. The social state.) Thus the will is violently wicked. being conformable to the right. even from the range of all existen ce. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. which is disinterested .the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) .in this case the apparent recognition. is a matter of chance). and not merely the particular mode . and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. This progression. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. The law of nature .a law.st rictly so called .e. and can be seized only in t his quarter. The 'reality' of right.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. on . To display the nullity of such an act. sets up a law . which is the very contrary of determination by nature. In it the agent. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. and while the former only is respected. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. as a volitional and intelligent being. an d so on without end. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. and commits a crime. ¤ 499 (3) Finally.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value.where the nominal relation is retained. which is nominal and recognized by him only . and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal.punishment. from life. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll.
This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. This is the right of intention. Now. Moralitat 3.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. Das Recht. so far as these features are it s inward institution. embracing these individual point s. recognition.a will reflected into itself so that. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. B. which was its purpose. In point of form. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. Naturrecht. and means the m ental or intellectual in general.the other hand. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. The subjective will is morally free. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. its own. so much as it has consciously willed. though any alteration as such. or even justification in his h eart. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. etc. 1. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature.and also moral wickedness. but have their assent. the reason of the will. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. intelligence. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. the will is at the same time made a particular. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. in mere law. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. who.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. be its affection w hat it may. sentiment. counts only as a person. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. and thus comes into relationship with the former. an d allows to be imputed to it. and willed by it. is now chara cterized as a subject . it thus includes purpose and intention . my part in i t is to this extent formal. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. conscience. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. 2. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. is its deed.
g. interests. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. and yet each of them.that it contains his needs. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality.being only in this.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. his interest and welfare must. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. as individual and universal. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. in point of its matter. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. it is always something particular. constitute h is well-being. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it.a universal determined in its elf . It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. is as g ood and as duty absolute. though it is a particular duty. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. And yet they ought to harmonize. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. can be wicked. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. is always fundamentally one identity. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. whether the . it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. because the agent. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action.ion. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification.and thus including in it particularity . essential and actual. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. the essential and actual good. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. on account of that existent sphere of liberty. a good intention in case of a crime. These aims. and aims.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. but is a particul arity of his own . But at the same time in aim ing at the good. will . At the same time because good is one. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. This is the right to well-being. is not something external to him. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. they ought to stand in harmony. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent.e. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . as in happiness (¤ 479).
partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. in this its identity with the good. but is only sure of i tself. and the wicked. no more exist than not. which actualizes and dev elops it. right . 5. Das Gute und das Bose C. expressed by this repeated ought. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. That. th e essential thing. 4.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . is only the infinite form. i . The result. which would only be abstract. non-universal. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. which has no objectivity. Wickedness. is abandoned.the standpoint of the ought. On the affirmative side. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . in something external therefore. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . and duty. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction.to a goodness. This pure self-certitude. its deepest descent into itself.of Conscience and Wickedness.the utterly abstract semblance .sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . the unutterable. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. which is the good. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. and of the good. Der Vorsatz 3. to be carried out in it. Moralitat 2. the truth of this semblance. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. Die Absicht und das Wohl. Handlung. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . The failure of the latter consists .the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. in the notion. 6. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good.good is realized. good. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. THE MORAL LIFE. an aim essentially and actually null. rising to its pitch. is. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. The subjectivity. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. and refuse it to the wicked. 1. The for mer is the will of goodness. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. on its negative side.
n a thing .the genuine ethical temper.where self-conscious liberty has become nature.th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust.the Political Constitution. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . however. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. without any selective refl ection. makes this union an ethical tie . elevated. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. however. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. as deliberate work for the community. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. as an intelligent being. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. Thus. is confidence (trust) . to destiny. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . in its immediacy. is virtue. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance.e . it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. i. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity.Marriage. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. But the person. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. to the total of ethical actuality. In the shape of the family. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . temperament. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation.yet somewhat which without all question is. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type.Civil Society. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. controls and entirely dominates from within. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. whose independence it. that it is. mind ap pears as feeling. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. This is the sexual tie. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. as against the univers al.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. it exists as confidence. to a spiritual significance. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom.monog . The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . . in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. i. manner and cu stom . as personal virtues. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. In the latter sphere. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. etc. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. . In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists.the Family. the individuality expres ses its special character.e. The ethical personality.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. in its ki nd.
constitutes the general stock. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. as do also its industry. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. information. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. however. This instrument. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. while. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. who exist independent and free. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. and care for the future. to found anew such an actual family. learning.in educating them to independent personality. of legal regulation. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. originally foreign to it. into families or individuals. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. on one hand. thus invested with independence. as private persons.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. ¤ 522 (3) The children. being an intelligent substance. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. or state external. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. and thus produce more unconditional . In virtue of such for tuitousness. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . labour. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. destined. acquire an existence of their own. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric .amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. on the o ther hand. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. or nominal culture in general. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. of the possessor's will. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren .
this analysis. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. and a corresponding mode of labour. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. be the righ t and just thing. b ecause of the finitude of its materials.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. The second. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. ten thalers. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. or only 2 * . the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. of mere agents. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. and like the first a certain subsistence. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . is developed i n detail. and accident.and ye t it should be decided. 2 3/4 . and of these estates to one another and to their centre. certain. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. as vital. or could be. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. It is a futile perfectionism to have . also of aims and interests.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. Their content per se may be reasonable . their recognition and their honour. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). of needs.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . at every point.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. and in it they have their social moralit y. intelligence. Thus whether three years. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. in the course of definite manifestation. The third. talent. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. on the side of external existence. and with it the State. though of course only at the final points of deci ding.the Law. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. Hence. skill. its action gets direction and content through natural features.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . which is honesty. But when right. however. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. Where civil society. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance.dependence on the social system. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. determined through reason or legal intelligence. which as existence is essentially a particular.. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . and an ensemble of contingencies. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . they have their actual existence. and of means for satisfying them. option. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. and so on ad infinitum. to be. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . exists. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. as well as of mental culture and habit . and industry. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. 2 4/5 years.
deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused .laws.which though something new. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. But there is a contrary case. by faith and trust. there arises. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law.into punishment (¤ 500). as in the mental ima ges of space.the ne ed. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. they touch only the abstract will . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'.e. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. however. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws .vi z.and th e cattle too . or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. the need of a simpler code . ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity.in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. This subjective existence.are governed and well governed too by laws. hereditary divinity or nobility. The comparison of the two species. at the same time an externally objective existence. like improvements on a f loor or a door. as universal authority and necessity. as the genuine order of life. being laws o f strict right. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail.as proven: .itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . as it is a known law.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. of his countrymen. and t hus become authoritative . within the house . even the admiration. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. are not a new hou se. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. and in particular transforms this existence . which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis .as this exists as revenge . constit .to be promulgated and made known as laws . To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. which again make new decisions necessary. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. i.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . not for them. general laws. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . in the judicial system.even as his law can only be a just law.to the individualized right .gets its universal guarantee through formalities. with the advance in multitude. whic h are only internally in these objects. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. inasmuch as. first really de serving the name of laws. recognized. which discovers new distinctions. . . There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. These people forget that the stars . to which objective existence determines i tself.
utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. So far as concerns them. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. to the concrete of civil society.'poli . and worked from that point of view. in a uniform gen eral way. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. from the c onnections between nation and nation. appears as state. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. It results also from circumstances of locality. as at bottom different sides. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. and their variable ingredients. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. In so far. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. . but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . so as to secure this satisfaction. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. because it is man's want. . (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. which.and that.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement.viz. be exercised as different functions. then. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. mere circumstantial evidence. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. because it is only one factor. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions.as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. and the judgement as application of the law to it. shou ld. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. the position of an external un iversality. No doubt this factor is incomplete. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. Conversely. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it .
The cons titution is existent justice . ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . First it maintains them as persons. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. ¤ 539 As a living mind. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. and not left to perish. however. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will.co nsists in a double function. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. and self-develop ed . Thirdly.into the life of the universal substance. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. in this direction . It provides for the reasonable will . differentiated in to particular agencies. his independent self-will and particular interest.as an actuality . at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. self-originated.ce'.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance.which volition is thereby free . (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. First. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. Secondly. with all its evolution in detail. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. (c) THE STATE. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. Thus we have the corpora tion. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. but which has a thoroughly general side.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. s heer subjectivity.in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . receiving. which. but. secondly. the state only is as an organized whole. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. continually produce it as their result. On the other hand. and . But.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . they are re strictions. then it promotes their welfare. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. it carries back both. to the immediate agent. which each originally takes care of for himself. and. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals .international (outer-state) law. is its essence.one individual. it protects the family and guides civil society.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. The same unity. This universal principle. .the reasonable spirit of will. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. through the action of the government and its several branches. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. also for that will being put in actuality.
Nothing has become.only it can make them . presuppos e unequal conditions. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist.. i. without further specification and development. eligibili ty to office. directories. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. But the notion of liberty. which it can without incompatibility allow. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. military service. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). and that the laws are restrict ions. On the contrary. skill. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. first. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. the difference of governing powers and of governed. is abstract subjectivity. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. etc. town . the current notions of l . It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. The principle of equality. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. age. the familiar proposition.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. Equality. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. With the state there ari ses inequality. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. It is important therefore to study them closer. in other words. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. etc. Really. is so little by nature.equal in the concrete. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. that it should be man (and not as in Greece.pleasure an d self-will. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. magistracies . it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. as it ha ppens. As regards. But. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. as it exists as s uch.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. etc. etc. rejects all differences. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. physical strength. on the contrary. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). were called its 'liberties'. authorities. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. logically carried ou t. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. etc. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. . the citizens . private as well as public rights of a nation.punishment. All men are by nature equ al. The laws themselve s. However true this is.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. etc.as regards taxation. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. that the laws rule. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. Rome. But that this freedom should e xist. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . or destroy them. or even in crime. Formerl y the legally defined rights. As regards Liberty.besides their personalit y .e. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . otherwise have in property. it embodies a liberty. on the contrary. as regards the concrete. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. talent.
not merely with regard to the naturalness. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. as a state without a constitution. in other words continuall . as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. is . and must deal with them as it ca n. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. with this development of particularity. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs.) But the guara ntee lies also. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. . and of the difficulty of satisfying them.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. The question . and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. But the more we fortify liberty. of liberties in general. however.just because of this inseparability . The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. just as little as the making of a code of laws. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. of others.that which preserves. and the organization of the actualization of them. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. If .e . be it added. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality.a thing that has nev er happened in history. has an insight and conviction of his own . self-w ill and self-conceit. and to regard a state. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions.e. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. ¤ 541 The really living totality . Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions.iberty only carry us back to equality. in which this is not formally done. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. with its insatiate vanity.as sec urity of property. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. i. and thus gains moral independence. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. The term political liberty. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made.
impugns the principle of the division of powers.e. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. These. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. as always. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. as in a democratic constitution. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. i. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . is the state one. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. Only through t he government. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. in other words. and the government be merely executive and dependent . the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments.monarchy. which taken apart is also particular).the all-sustaining. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . is the government. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein.y produces the state in general and its constitution. equally disorganizes actuality. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. is the self-redintegrating notion. The government is the universal part of the con stitution.regarded as organic totality . but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. all-decreeing will of the state. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. which includes an already existing development of differences. the participation of all i n all affairs . In the perfect form of the state. . and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business.the will of a decreeing individual. i. but an actual indiv idual .to make it the first power. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). . ¤ 542 In the government .su bject always. (A mistake still greater. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium.in a state of society.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. as in the patri archal society .e. however. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. of the family and of civil society. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power.or. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence.
and with earlier transition-forms. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'.in short. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . first. The pure forms . administration and police. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. and then of nature . and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. civil society. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . That subjectivity . and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . with its industry and i ts communities.as also feudal monarchy. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. For it is as private persons t . without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. which having their busin ess appointed by law. especially in legislation .necessary to the p rocess of evolution . can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. legislative power. and are to that degree private person s. too. essentially. as it were. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy .e. there arises the participation of several in state-business.viz. and above all personal liberty. The division of constitutions into democracy. aristocracy and monarchy. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. being simple self-relation. admini stration of justice or judicial power. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. it may be . personal interference and action of th e State as one man. . conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . i. involve the.partly. and skill for such ends. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit .'ideal' unity. lik e peace and war.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing .such as ochlocracy. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. to that end and for that reason.are. Two points only are all-important.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state .the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. with their general opinion. possess independence of a ction. liberty of property. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. to subjectivity. an actual existence. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. participate in the governmental power. etc. Secon dly..partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. Thus. These principles are those expounded earlier. aptitude. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. in the history of the State.
s ense of general wants. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. which. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n.a spiritual element .hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). The des irability of such participation. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials.regard ed as permanent. i. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . ever newly recurring.as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. Experience s hows that that country . Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. Take the case of England which. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. so far as they form only one branch of that power . range of the extern al means of government. it is not a brutish mass. in arrangements for art and science. moreover. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates.which should be presupposed. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. elemental sea.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. as such an aggregate. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless.the contrary must be the case . and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen.would be. is no t self-destructive. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. but as organic factors. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. that t hey enter upon that participation. or in its 'reflectional' universality. ¤ 529 note). legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. however. in the general sense of embracing a wide. The so-called financial law. In a civilized state. wild.e. as the nation . The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. and therefore more urgent. to power and act ion. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. inorganic shape. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists .as it very likely is . be they treated as mere individuals. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. in the law and liberty of property. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. blind force. however. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. like that of the stormy. If the main part of the requirement were . indeed the whole. and form a particular kind . and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. demoralization. as estates. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns.
is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. i. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . e. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. In their mutual relations.as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . and not to be made yearly. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. waywardness and chance have a place. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. and thus.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. is really engaged with strict executive business. or every few years. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. in which there would no longer be a government. afresh. a state of war. and becomes the estate of bravery. when it makes a decree about finance. and not actually existent. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce.e..g. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. but only parties. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other.i. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were.so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. of the whole of the finances. In one case the .e. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. Then again. as content o f a true law. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals.
On th is point.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever.the plan of Provide nce. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. in short. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. it passes int o universal world-history.of sacerdotal races .a world-mind.. and as regards its range and scope. first in general. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. a history of its own. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character.and. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing.the judgement of the world. this note must go into further deta il. in defiance of . that. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. As this development is in time and in real existence. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. each of which. of a Roman epic. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. however. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. and on history-writing in general. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. are settled and fixed. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. in short. an d the special claims of nations on one another. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. is appointed to occupy only one grade. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. as it is a history. there is Reason in history. it. etc. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. Fictions. and in Germany more than in France and England. That history. It has. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. which actually is and will be realized in it . For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. It is in time. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. when we come to minutiae. and then in history. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. In general. both this general recognition. internat ional law rests on social usage. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . especially on the philological side. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. is called an a prio ri view of it. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. and above all universal history.
like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. i. no history . Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. Rome and its fortunes. etc. or. e. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. state. Ay. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. or if he declined to judge at all. and an exclusive interest in justice. but an age. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. and. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. as in the romance. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. But.the best-accredited history. What happens to a nation . This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. has. is not only against taste and judgement. if he had not an interest. The point of interest of Biography . we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose.to say a word on that here . a word. and criticize events. on the other hand. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. strictly s peaking. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. not as good as a fairy tale.e. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions.appears to run . and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. and takes place within it. express not a subjective particularity.). The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. a nation. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). weave them into the pictur e of general interests. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. and rejects both ki nds of interest. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. in striking portraiture and brevity.g. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. but violates th e principles of objective truth. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. a civilization. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. in the interest of so-called truth.
Only therefore through their relationship to it. truth. which is their reward. For Spirit is consciousn ess. i. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action.e. the absolute L aw. and secondly. But biography too has for its background the historical world. really. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. i. which is what is pe culiar to them. The mere play of sentiment. and are all treated as indifferent. and their subjectivity. potentially infinite. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. to the history of religion. on the contary. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit.admitting. and there fore as a work of individuals. is the empty form of activity. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it.e. etc. the consciousness of it. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion.directly counter to any universal scope and aim.or in other words that Reason is in history . ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. i. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. liberty. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. are instruments. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). the freak of humour. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. and of its essence. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred.e. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages.Fame. and its content is prese .e. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. i. as over a special grade. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged.an accurate report of externals. and the business of so doing. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. a development determined by the notion of spirit. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. 550). But. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. if Rome or the German empire. we may add. while it inheres in them. Such a doctrine . first in general. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. etc. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. has another ground and interest than his tory. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. which all alik e have no stuff in them. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . in this case. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . is the supreme right. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. these individuals. only opinions and mere ideas. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. have they their value and even their existence.
point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation.e. is the purification. As regards the 'mediation' which. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h.e. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence.e.as is the case with all speculative process . the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. i. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. now gets its most concrete interpretation. Such apprehension. that elevation to God really involves. But . It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth.a mere 'ought' .nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. Th e finite. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. note). the state rests on the ethical sentiment. This factor. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. i. For that st arting. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think.is the peculiar perversity. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. forme rly noticed. as law and duty. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . in the system of laws and usages. especially ¤ 51. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel.consciousn ess.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. and that on the religious. as true in the world of free will. however. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. At this rat e. i. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. But the spirit which think s in universal history. the idea of God it kn . abstract in the formal treatment of logic. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. is the real ethical self.e. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. from which the start is now made. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life.Liberty. The spirit. lays hold of its concr ete universality. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. i. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. actually accomplished in the ethical world. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. ¤ 204 not e). whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. cf.
and superstition. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . and prays others to pray .addressing his devotion to miracle. on the contr ary. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. in its faith and in its con science. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free.the body of religious truth. and in the act of faith. It lea ds to a laity. to justification by external wo rks. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. in the annihilation of its externality. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state.e. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has.as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. for thought and knowledge .(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . first of all. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. generally.partly as mere moving of the lips. springing from some force and power. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. i.e. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth.working images.or it may be. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality.e. i. morality and conscience. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated.logi cally enough . religion was a late r addition. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. in point of form. i. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. one religious and an other ethical. and ex pecting miracles from them. But in poin t of form. even to bones. It leads. and law and justice. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. a condition of spiritual sla very. and even as mutually indifferent.ows must be the true and real. then there may be created. but in the moment of enjoymen t.of bondage. (In the Lutheran Church. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . non-spirituality. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. i. differing from the former in body and value of truth.e. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. but purely subjective in individuals: . And.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. and these applications of it in the religious life. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . the host as such is not at first consecrated. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. B . a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members.
therefore. Instead of the vow of chastity. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. self-realizing reason . so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. Let us suppose even that. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. leads it into the rea l world. and thus only. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life.in short.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. and political institutions deduced from them must be. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. Thus set free. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self.of honesty in commercial dealing. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. So long as t he form.e. unte nable. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. i. lacked liberty. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. which does not rise in hostility against them.e.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. because the state is a self-possessed. Thus. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. And instead of the vow of obe dience. sti . But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality.e. . if taken alone. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. our consciousness and subjectivity. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. a code of law should arise. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . i. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation.an obedience which is itself the true freedom. moral life in the state. so to speak a priori.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. . The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. and. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. no matter how. and in the use of property . Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. i. and in a special sense Philosophy. the wisdom of the world. . can law and morality exist. founded on principles of reason. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. The precept of religion. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society.
if the distre ss of nations is to see its end.to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. thus surmountin . ¤ 544 note). however sound their provisions may be. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought.g. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . to put it simply. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. or. on one hand. e. This additional 'individuality' . and of the various classes of the administrative personnel.among which laws these guarantees are included. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. At best it is only a temporary expedient . and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. (cf. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion.to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. . whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. and the power given them to fix the budget.mi nd intrinsically concrete . to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. etc. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. on the other hand.. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. so-called 'chambers'. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide.is just this .ll. that the Idea must be regent. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. from those deeper requirements which. thus founder on the conscience. Such laws. when specially set in relief as genus.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. This absolute nucleus of man .is the intellectual and thinking self. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea .
which still escaped his intelligence. Political power.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. in its philosophic phase. as it grows and expands.was that creative imagination.and th at on account of this very principle .and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. in its f irst immediate. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. Under the subjective form. so .each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note.the idea of the substantial moral life. But even religion. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. earlier than it does as philosophy. As it left therefore behind. His state is therefore. The form in its infinite tru th. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. pictorial representation. he. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion.). and so also one-sided phase. as demoralization. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . Plato. or essential being). and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. which is awa re of its own essence. which is developed similarly. Hence religion as such. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . in common with all his thinking contemporaries. Religion may. Only in the principle of mind. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. is implicitly in absolute liberty. religion. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. ¤ 513. But thought always . appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. however. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations.). It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). fall feeling. should knit it together and control it. but earlier than philosophy. for th ese reasons. etc. intuition. on its own s howing. from religion. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. exhibits the one-sidedness. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . the subjectivity of mind. is after all only in one of its form s. or rather must. of philosophy. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state.so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'.
in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. Die Rechtspflege 5. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. as well as their several applications. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. 3. 1. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. 9. 7. for which it is as substance. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. Die Weltgeschichte 10. Inneres Staatsrecht. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. Die Sittlichkeit. In the Protestant state. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. Religion. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind.as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). Weltweisheit. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . Das System der Bedurfnisse. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. of God's indwelling in us. 2. the constitut ion and the code. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. as always. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. That here. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. and if that and not the truth as such is called for .e. 6. while it is self-centred identity. but rather to a sort of knowledge. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. Die Polizei und die Corporation. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. 8. 4. Das aussere Staatsrecht. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. i. Thus ul timately. Gesetz. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity.
the form of immediacy as such . it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. 1.in other words. Belief. ¤ 411). ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . into the subject which produces that work. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . Art requires not only an external given material . or the idea. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . Der absolute Geist.e. A. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. . has in devotion .(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). With the essential restrictedness of its content. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. that is. reconciliation. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea.something formal. as superseded in spirit. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. and of gaining its concrete determination. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. which is only a sign of the Idea. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. its n atural immediacy. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. c an.the shape or form of Beauty. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. so that the thought embodied. aware. In this ideal. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. viz. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. the actuality of the spirit. On one hand. on the other hand. as it is. But. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form .hence not the sp iritual unity.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . the subject's liberty is only a manner of life.i. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. but . ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. like the material which it uses to work in. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life.for the expression of spiritual truth .must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf.
is not yet known. and of its constitution. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist .for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. and that is where the infinite form.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. but as only finding himself in himself. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. . as well as of its art and science. the artist's enthusiasm. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. is not yet absolute. or an effor t towards him .a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity .in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality.stil l this art is defective. the principle of its law.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. known as the Absolute. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. as free spi rit. assumes fuller and firmer features. but its inmost depth. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. of its actual liberty. and th e artist is the master of the God. subjectivity. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. not yet conscious of itself. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form.symbolic art. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . that one spirit creates and informs them. though concrete and intrinsically free. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance.can try to bring itself to consciousness.
into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . dashing t o pieces everything high and great . not the supreme liberation itself. whose con tent is absolute mind . The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit.is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. and j ust for that reason. . and. Beautiful art. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art.due to a one-sided survey of human life . like the religion peculiar to it. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. . The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality.of Nemesis. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. Beautiful art. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. unbeautiful sensuo usness. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. which is only in the medi um of thought .was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. revealed by God. has its future in true reli gion. But with a further and deeper study. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . still more in that external. . has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. shows that such religion is on the decline. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. what is more. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself.the religion i. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . in which he had not revealed himse lf.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. on the contrary.into revelation. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. B. from it s side. is first generated. expression. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God.that it be revealed.The genuine objectivity. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . the theme and c entre of religion. it is from Him.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. The older religion in which the need of fine art. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit.e. spectator find themselves at home.ent in it. as infinite self-realizing form . for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. The old conception . with their perso nal sense and feeling. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. and brilliancy. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . we see that the advent of art.it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him.
to specul ative comprehension. G . while in point of form he is. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. That spirit.is the Spirit. but afterwards. in it s forefront. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. F. staying aloof and inert.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. or of judgement. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. even in its manifestation. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . (c) as infinite return. Yet. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content.. (a) as eternal content. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. Go d is. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is.: Berlin 1829. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. in point of content. On one hand is heaven and earth. amid that natural ness. however. It includes. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. which therefore is finite.. . through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on.knowledge in God. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence .just as.it is therefore the absolute spirit. though different. the spirit. on the other hand.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. ¤ 566 In this separating. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. which is at fir st the presupposed principle.of the only Son . and phenomena which succeed each other. which proceeds to man's self. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. it implies the revelation of Him. The eternal 'moment' of mediation .ure would be to ascribe envy to Him.on the other hand. it is. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality .the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. a separate being. . and reconciliation with the eternal being. with whom. only standing to it in an external connection. first of all. To know what God as spirit is . the elemental and the concrete nature . again.requires careful and thorough speculation. on one hand. and. of the world it gave away . though. abiding sel f-centred.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. it may almost create surprise that so many.1. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . directed towards the Eternal. for that reas on. not. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. making them presuppositions towards each other. But. as the extreme of inherent negativity. by C. when it thinks. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. as in duty bound. further. he still remains in original identity .
are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity.is taken in a merely formal. with a temporal and external sequence. so far. his natur al man and self-will. external in point of form. he. But. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. Die geoffenbarte Religion.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. 1. and eternal spirit in itself. . is not bound by it . is itself the emptiness and vanity. secondly. but even to thought. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. contentless sense. remains master over it.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. Irony. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. Whereas the vision-method of Art.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. which from itself. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . keeps himself unchanged. and thus sensuous.and. as infinite subjectivi ty. in which he. C. In this form of truth. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. simple. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . who as such is identified with the essence . Further. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . on account of his immediate nature. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. Thinking. If the result . knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . after the example of his truth.but the vision of implicit truth. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain.Irony. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. and thus. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. th e self-centred manifestation. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. eternal.is transplanted into the world of time. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. From this its separation into p arts. through which witness of the spirit in him. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. this immediate. This individual. gives itself direction and con tent. truth is the object of philoso phy. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. an object of contemplating vi sion . and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. but alive and present in the world.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself .
Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation .leaving out. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. and mediates what is thus open ed out. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. and particularly of the logical form. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea.from these forms. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. This movement. This does not prevent the spirit. to be more precise still. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. and against philosophy in general .i. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. too much for the latter. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity.stantial content into many separate shapes. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. of course. elevation of them into the absolute form. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. and this necessary as free. when driven to expound itself. or.and from a pithless orthodoxy. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. remains identical with it. finds itself already accompl ished. immediate vision and its poetry. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. and whereas Religion. opens it out in mental picture.which may be in both the same . a nd of logic in particular. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. which philosophy is. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . The charge of Atheism. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. and s o religious. with its separ ation into parts. when at the close it seizes its own notion . just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy .('Rationalism') . and acts inconsistently towards them.e. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs.it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. This witness . only looks back on its knowledge. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. as also of the necessity in the two forms .the underlying essence in all humanity .takes. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . but also criticized it.on the other hand. which determines itself to content. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary.on one hand. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence.
Everything is . Piety. that.each and every secular thing is God. and so . This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. without distinction. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself.or to dalai-lamas . which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. exclusi ve.as the most authentic statement accessible . or Pantheism. fulfilled notion of God. in particular.that of the Egyptians to the ox . it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality.that of the Hindu to ass es. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. that it has too much of him: .the Bhagavat-Gita. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. also contains the generic abs tract. are) . and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. or if you will. ¤ 71 note). the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. Without interest of its own for the concrete. the secularity of th ings. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. whether higher or lower in the scale.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. most sublime. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . from which all definite quality is excluded. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . If this theory needs no more than such a God. It is only his own stupidity. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . or a sheer fact which needs no p roof.g. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . On such a presuppo sition. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse .that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. are unable and unwilling to see this . even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . that it is treated not so much as an imputation.is always adora tion of an object which. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature.of Pantheism. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. if we believe them. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . as is well known. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. and form all that is definite in the divine universality. cows . which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. some of the most telling passage . This new theology. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. as it stands.which therefore it does not disparage. but as a proved fact.all possess substantia lity.thus he understands philosophy . I select . and is therefore.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it.so much so.so much so. and amongst it s effusions. Amongst the abundant resources. does not comprehend itself.(empirical things.of the new piety and new theology. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. its grossest shape. open to our disposal on this topic.in the wanton assertion. we must. with all its absurdities. God in General. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. or any one man.
. ... (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. as also those proximate substantialities.). etc. he is said to be the beginning. . . And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. I am also the strength o f the strong. . rather. but only . or Indra. is not. and the moon among the lunar mansions. . . Meru among the high-topped mountains. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. pp.that Hinduism. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. is alo ne the divine and God. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. all this is woven upon me. . from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me.the most excellent of everything. . But so little concrete is this divine unity .' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. There is nothing else higher than myself. everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. as he said before he was S iva.'I am the self. p. vanish. or a God besides. . . . . . not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. . besides Krishna. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). . . . which Krishna calls himself. . 7 seqq. Indra.spiritual as its idea of God i s . the Everything. as different from that accidental. 'At the end of many lives. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures.not everything. any more than the Eleatic One. the One which. seated in the hearts of all beings.' This 'All'. passion. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . . . goodness. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. . Even when. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. at the beginning of the pass age. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. called Gods.so powerless its. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. even Siva.s. with a monstrous incons istency. however. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. . . . grip. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. .. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. The undiscerning ones. where the empirical everything of the world. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. . and one essential amongst them. has the higher conception of Brahma. . . But the idolatry of the wretched Hi .' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. . This everything. without essential being of its very own. . I am life in all beings. . Among letters I am the letter A. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. I am the taste in water. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. . which he is. . . Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his.' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. and end of living things. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. unessential existences. . . t he pure unity of thought in itself. middle. is also the maddest of polytheisms. melt into the one Krishna. still God. but having its truth in the substance. to a poly theism. Hinduism. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. nothing independent]. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . so to speak . I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . and the Spinozan Substance. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . than which there is nothing higher. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson.
no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te.. or other creature. is discarded and absor bed. to which everything is God. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. as it says.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. But. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. Of the oriental. That pantheism indeed . e.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception.on the shallow conception of it . For that unity. secondl y. as the endless lot of empirical existence. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. especially the Mohammedan. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. or Spinozist.. Hin du monotheism. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . on one hand. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. If. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. the all.keep its independence. and on the other. or.ndu. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. we must consult th e Mohammedans. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. moreover.floating in the indefinite blue . this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. which. after this partition. in relation to the popular idea of the world.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. empirical indivi duals . ac osmical. But to go back again to the question of fact.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual.g. outside it . Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. the finite to the infinite.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. as everything. to was .in its finest purity and sublimity. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. of the relationship of God and the world. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. and. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . and that unity described as love. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. he is as essence parted from appearance. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular. and God everything. even in a general exoteric discussion.of the world as one thing. whether they spring from heart. when he adores the ape. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. and so on . modes of envisaging God. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. is identical with the world. the Eleatic. but . as infinite from the finite. imagination or speculation. and of empirical secular spirit. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. It is only the picture . on the contrary. The clo se of philosophy is not the place.
.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes.te a word on what a 'notion' means. But they show so little acquaintance with them . inorganic and living . Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. the notion and content of philosophy.said pores being the negative.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. it is not. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. and which they ascribe to philosophy.g. is what one expect s. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. not the concrete unity. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. But the question is. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. and the empty absolute. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea.falsely as a fact . but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. with abstract unity. omnipresence. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . but rather its reverse.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. I n the philosophical field they proceed. a nd assert . depend solely on the different modes of this unity. they import them into philosophy. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. when they hear of unity . and lose sight of the chief point of interest . which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. and that hence. as Epicu rus does. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction.e. and that amongst the m there is great variety. however.g. mere ide ntity.that. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. where they are utterly unknown. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. etc.is identity. the most external and the worst. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world.the world as much as Go d . in matters admitted to be of superior. in the pores of th e physicists . and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. And as in their judgement either of the two . But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. e. but only the one factor of this category of relation . if not even of supreme interest. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world.and relation i pso facto implies unity . but with concrete unity (the notion). with God's omnipresence. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. they have laid hands on. i.and that the factor of indet erminateness . composition.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. with indefinite ideas. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result.and s till less take trouble about it . it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. viz. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. as in the physical field the physicist. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things.has the same solid substantiality as the other. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. providence. and that it is the system of identity.
nor itself to something away from them and independen t . but the many-shaped modes specified. on the shoulders of philosophy. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . in his relation to the world. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. the absolutely universal. which . with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor.ity . now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism.the logical system. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . which has self. If statements as to facts are put forward.knowing reaso n. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. as other than they.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. not abstract unity. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism.it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. sunders itself. is philosophy itself. The esoteric study of God and identity. y . It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement.their everything. or as prevaricating for a purpose. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it.which. for its middle term: a middle. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. an All-one doctrine.by which notions are perverted into their opposite. standing between the Mind and its essence. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. i. of which liberty is the aim. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. and the latter its universal extreme.it is the nature of the fact. a system of identity.e. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning.as the mediating agent in th e process . I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . and as implicitly the Idea. But in ascribing to God. making the former its presupposition. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . then. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. But to put that sort of thing. and notions . and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. On account of this chorus of assertions. Nature . as of cognitions. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. the notion. which causes the movement and development. and which is itself the way to produce it. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions.
The eternal Idea. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. . in f ull fruition of its essence. eternally sets itself to work.et this same movement is equally the action of cognition.
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