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INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any
attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i
s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as
treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.
ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. not merely lacks gravity. the soul is only the sleep of mind . But not merely is it. but soul. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. There. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. on the one hand. perhaps. as absolute negativity. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. and not as the immediate or natural individual. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. whereas the 'vital' matter. which is potentially all things. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. a nd the soul remains the pervading. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. and. like heat. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. however. and so the self-externalism. where the othe . i. except where. thus come into being. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. its simple 'ideal' life. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. indeed.e. in a sense.with th is proviso. ANTHROPOLOGY. etc. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery.the truth that matter itself has no truth. to which they might perhaps add space and time. and mind conceived as a thin g. identical ideality of it all. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. which is the fund amental feature of matter. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. even the capacity of offering resistance. It is otherwise with Mind. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another.SUB-SECTION A. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. as such a result. however. which may also be f ound enumerated among them.the passive of Aristotle. have still. These 'imponderables' . matter is regarded as something true. Wherever there is Nature. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. on the other. Mind. The usual answer. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. At such a stage it is not yet mind. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. li ght. and the only problem was how to comprehend it..
though his Monad of monads brings things into being. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets.the natural soul. and the periods of the day.e.e. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions.or corporeity . In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. as in the case of Spinoza. in many case s completely. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. sidereal. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. into the absolute syllogism. there philosophers took God. and does not rise or develop into system.(a) In its immediate natural mode . and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. Malebranche. In nations less intellectually emancipated. based upon participation in the common life of nature. or. as individualized. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. even these few and slight susceptibilities.is moulded into it. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. Hence. when it presents itself as a single soul. it may be. Spinoza. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. and always more or less. and. disappear. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. they are natural objects for consciousness. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. These have. and. feels the difference of climates. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. (c) Thirdly. a world-soul. described. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. just in proportion to his civilization. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. with Leibniz. and telluri c life of man. as an anima mundi. . its immediate being . Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. T hus. on the contrary. the changes of the seasons. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. remain for ever subject to such influences. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. (b) Secondly. as so often is done.whence Epicurus. Descartes. not. upon it. But either this identity. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. in the modes of that being. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. Animals and pl ants.r is not . behind it s ideality a free existence: i. so to speak. re tains an abstract independence. etc. so holding. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). it is a soul which feels. is too abstract. which only is. as in the case of Lei bniz.
hopes. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. scientific. talent . a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. fails to meet his ideal requirements. This . or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. we find its diversities. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. and the position of the individual himself. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. we see man in his true relation to his environment. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity.the sexual relation . bodily structure and disposit ion. widely distant from each other. as it exists. He begins with Childhood . the one permanent subject.on a ph ysical basis. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. fancies.mind wrapped up in itself. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. and on the other. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. shows. physiognomy. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. and as stages in its development. character. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. of families or single individuals. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. or artistic. as alterations in it.a worl d no longer incomplete. shows an active half. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood).¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. we find it as the special temperament. carrying out these universa . who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. Thirdly. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. And that individuality marks both the world which. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. in purposes political. The contrast between the earth's poles. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. on the whole. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . on its one side. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual.
distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. as already noted. each point. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. although. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . but as a return back from the world of specialization.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. distinguishes itself from its mere being. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. The characterization given in the section is abstract.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. . but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. in the first instance. for example. or self-centralized being. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work.not as a merely negative rest from it. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. . it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact.The waking is not merely for the observer. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. as before explained . But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. put this question to the class of ideology. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. as they may be called. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. sleep. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . viz.Napoleon. (c) Sensibility(3) . The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. . ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. which are often addressed to philosophy: . i n an unintelligent way. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence.
memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. be it noted. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. it is true. the conscience. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. fornication. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad.g. but treated as bel onging to its most special. and religious. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. in its own self.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. On the other hand and conversely. true. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. etc. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . on one hand.identity of our self-centred being. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. mean. and . and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. and to be as if found. primarily. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. not mere alterations. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation.set over against consciousness. the naturally immedi ate. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. is what we call sensibility. belonging as it does to natural. are our very own. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. and is so felt. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. and the character. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. which. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. etc. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. for itself. blasphemy. are in order to be felt. invested with cor poreity. But if put in the feelin g. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . are found by the waking soul. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. the fact is a mode of my individuality. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. One. etc. just. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. mora l. This should hardly need enforcing. moral. The fact that these particulars. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. the inarticulate bre athing..¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. its natural peculiarity. ho wever. evil. Another. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. in the feeling. godless. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . murder . adultery.
are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . of heavy matter.it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . i. tones. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . with its varieties of language. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. with which that substance is one.in the system of the senses. smells.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. . to the character of subjectivity. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. to take possessi on of it. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. In the usage of ordinary language. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. in a special system of bodily organs. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . We should have. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. therefore. sighs. but an inward. As sentient. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. the centre of the 'sensible' system. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations.it is a soul which feels. the 'irritable' system. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. (¤ 300). Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. (c) the sense of solid reality. laughter. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two .a psychical physiology. just because they are immediate and are found existing. especially the passions or emotions. (¤ 317) .alterations in the substantiality of the soul.because in it. i ts merely virtual filling-up. 322). o f colours. and their corporization. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. and voice in general. of self. distinction appears as mere variety . (¤¤ 321. ¤ 402 Sensations. for example. What it has to do. is to raise its substantiality. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. the immediacy of mode in feeling . are formed from their mental source. set in its self-centred life. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears.the senses of definite light. the blood. works itself out.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. e. to realize its mastery over its own.e.and of sound. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. following the special character of the mental mode.g.
and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. They were not in our possession. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. which is disease. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. the content is its particular world. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. Some times. so far as that is. but only to his im plicit self. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. the corporeity. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. first. without existing. ideas and information. acquired lore. etc. which is at the same time its predicate. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. ¤ 404 As individual. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . in whi ch all this is stored up. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. etc.that world being included in it and filling it up. to be defined as one of feeling . prima rily. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. once mor e come to light. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. where the real is put past . the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. but a negation. thoughts. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). supposed to have been forgotten years ago. in sickness. By itself. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. it brings within itself. to which the soul. This substance i s still the content of its natural life.as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). a deep featureless characterless mine. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality.. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. and to that world it stands but as to itself. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. virtually retained. may again sink down. omnipresent unity. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. At the present stage this singleness is.the existent spe culative principle. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . secondly. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. ideas. in an implicit mode. although it does not exist. As sentient. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. In the present stage we must treat. the s oul is characterized as immediate. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). it implies a want of adaptation. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. Thus in the body it is one simple. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it.
but as efficiency and realized activity. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. etc. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. of the mother. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. etc. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. Here are two individuals.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). which. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . placenta. incl inations. developed interests. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . congenital disposit ion and temperament. etc. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. as yet nothing impenetrable. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions.is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. temper.a substance. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. not as a mere possibility. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. not yet as its self. not a true subject reflected int o itself. idiosyncrasies. self-possessed. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. the psychical relationship. etc. or capac ity. it is. or virtuality. By the self-hood of the latter it . as it has existence of its own. character. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. between husband and wife and between members of the same family... fortunes. tal ent. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. his secular ideas. and reasonable. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. self-conscious. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. injuries. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. because immediate. and is therefore passive. the single self of the two. of life.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. and of character. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . controlling genius thereof. whose decision is ul . is visibly present as another and a different individual. intellige nt. as concrete subject ivity. The moth er is the genius of the child. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. say between friends.
on the other hand. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. The facts. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . on the cont rary. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another.his fun damental interests. means. At the same tim e. But such a verification would.to be mere deception and impo sture. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. self-possessed human being is a disease. it might seem. educated. is. first of all call for verificati on. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. that it is in harmony wi th the facts. it must be added. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. which are also means and ends to each other. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. in which the individual here appears innnersed. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound.to show. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. intentions. in other words. To that end the phenomena. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self .timate whatever may be the show of reasons. it has already been call ed his genius. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. This totality forms his actual ity. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us.
external one to another. for example.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. and the like. etc. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. in its sober moods. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. the magnetizer. not really a 'person'. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. The patient in this condition is accordingly made.). then.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. etc. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. his own and that of the magnetize .But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. however. But such clairvoyance . (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. When the substance of both is thus made one. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. tastes. But. but it is empty. the selfless individual. that it is a state of passivity. is under a veil. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. smells. formed. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . like that of the child in the womb. and to know which. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. not on the spot. which lead up to the result . in whom it sees. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. subject to the power of another person. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. (Thus Cato. exist for it as an outward objectivity. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. subje ctive reason. which. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them.) Compare h ome-sickness. . wh en it is healthy and awake. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. unless by the aid of religion. is this. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. after the downfall of the Roman republic. and other diseases. reads.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. f riends.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. a formal vision and awareness. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. and hears. or at the approach of death. And because it is the adult. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. . It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. those c onnected with female development. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas.a genius which beh olds itself. and character. in catalepsy. ca pable of conveying general truths. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. . on those left behind.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. etc. and c ontinues to be.
In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. etc. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. so long as we assume independent personalities. i. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. e. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. is impossible. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. it is still susceptible of disease. In considering insanity we must. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. receives. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness.fe eling. The purely sensitive life. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. anticipate the full-grown an . This is Insanity or mental D erangement. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. as in other cases. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. In this way it is self. though all-embracing. i s just this form of immediacy. reasons. and hence. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. for example.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. between intelligent personality and objective world. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. which is no less a world of law. in this nominal perception. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . on the contrary. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. which. the 'common sense'. beholds. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. which still marks the self-feeling. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. in its capacity as individual. as in the morbid state alluded to.r. etc. and at the same time. or med icines for them. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. causality. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. one sees and hears with the fingers. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. is without any definite points of attachment . To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends .
. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. and also desires. instincts. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. and so makes part of the actual self.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. This particular being of the soul is t . Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. presupposes the patient's rationality. i. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits.. as a thing. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details.feeling. Mind as such is fr ee. it would be death).e. i. the. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy.just as physical disease is not an abstract. passions. In the concrete. earthly elements are set fr ee . which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. etc. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. such as vanity. etc. and their gratification). so as to insert them in their proper place. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. may. the self is to be stamped upon. this life of feeling. that it is liable to insanity . Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. but only derangement. as something natural and existent. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which.e. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . and the rest of the passions . and made appear in. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. and be a realized u niversality. and it is only as a thing. inclination. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. mere and total. pride. but a contr adiction in it. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. moral and theoretical. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. as it aris es.e. is undistinguis hed from them.that evil which is always latent in the heart. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. however. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). as now regarded. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. is relaxed. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. which is there also.d intelligent conscious subject. is diseased. and so also may the cure. equally formal. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. . loss of health (if it were that.merely personal love and hatred. desire. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. This humane treatment. And so too the particularity is. idea. i. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. A violent.fan cies and hopes . He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal.
therefore. will. nor is absorbed in the m. but still free. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. are only subjectiv e forms. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. this being of the soul. sleep. nature. i.itself a simple being . because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. weariness o . when the co rporcity. For. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). su bjective substantiality of it . the one and the same. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. and that as a barrier for it. That is to say. but has them and moves in them. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. and the mere substance. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance.. Habit is rightly called a second nature. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. heat. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. as. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. lacking consciou sness. empty space and empty time. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. And consciousness it becomes.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. and which still continues to exist. and for that reason n ot free.and becoming the 'ideal'. Habit like memory. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. a second nature. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. so is that pure being (which. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). and so no longer interested. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more.e.he factor of its corporeity. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. The soul is freed from them. even in being affected by them. occupied.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. is reduced to unity. or dependent in regard to it. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. on the contrary. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. The natural qualities and alterations of age. of it. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. and the generation o f habit as practice. of which it is the subjective substance. partly only relative. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . dist inguishing it from itself . but the basis of consciousness. a pure act of intuition. has been absorbed by it. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. et c.
and the self-feeling as such. nor a transient emotion or idea. etc. to exist as substance in its corporeity. a particular organ of i ts organic system). etc.e. re ligious. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. an 'ideality' of soul .g. habit is usually passed over - . sweet tastes.. has been by will made a habit . this soul. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. like any other. Even here. but part and parcel of his being. is recollection and memory. moral. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. the spatial direction of an individual. are no longer bothered with it.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . is open to anything w e chance to put into it. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). and no other. to be made a power in the bodily part. consciousness. or skill. habit diminishes this feeling.f the limbs. and thus to enable the soul. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it.is felt. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. and especially so in the specific bodily part. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. without an express adjustment. if quite abstract. etc. nor are they in conce ption rational. i. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . and that they. viz. under its volitional and conceptual characters. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. so that when the conception (e. This is the rational liberation from them. and it is habit of living which brings on death. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. his upright pos ture. acquires a strength which consists in this. cut off from action and reality. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened.. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. reflection. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. etc.concentration.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. too. consciousness. to be his as this self. Habit on an ampler scale. .or the misfortune . or. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless.enabling the matter of consciousness. intelligence. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. etc. The most ext ernal of them. And it is true that the form of habit. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. Thinking. whereof we sha ll speak later. intuition. made into an instrum ent. and particul ar. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. and any other purp oses and activity. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. nor an abstrac t inwardness. casual.. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual.). which make it up. like their satisfaction. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. a series of musical notes) is in me. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. that although the frost. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache).
the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities.laughter. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. the latter subject to the former. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. still vainer than a signatura rerum.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. it is related to itself. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. unable to represent it in its actual universality. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. in being related to which. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. Naturliche Seele. cuts itself off from its immediate being. while language is its perfect expressi on. but the soul. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression.. Under the head of human expression are included. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. as the absolut e instrument. 2. 1. or the 'immediacy' of mind. and i s infinite self-relation.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. 4. and making it its own. This note is so slight. indefinite. The soul. or abstract universality. This externality. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. of which it is the sign. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. the upright figure in general. 71). in other words. weeping. and the formation of the limbs. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. 3. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. especially the hand. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. for the soul. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. and inexpressible a modific ation. 'The autho . But for the mind it is only its first appearance. of the mouth . Die fuhlende Seele. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. a world external to it . in its concentrated self. And the human figure.either as something contemptible . Seen from the animal world. absorbing it. for example. represents not itself. Naturliche Qualitaten. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. 5.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. In this identity of interior and exterior. Empfindung. etc. finds itself there a single subject.
¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality.the soul's natural life . PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. which manifests itself and something else too . and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. but since reality. as subjective reflection in itself. It is of this latter. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. Selbstgefuhl. something dark and beyond it. i.it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. seem to be its own activity. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. Gewohnheit. Ego. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. but when he receives the inspired word. thus first made explicit as the Ego.to an equal freedom as an independent object. and . 7. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). but is implicit. as external to it. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. as this absolute negativity. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams.the light.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. and as such it is C onsciousness. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. now. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. like reciprocal dependence in general. not to the wisdom.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. The mind as ego is essence. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. Hence consciousness. 8. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one.e. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). does not. 6. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. but to the foolishness of man. to it. is only its abstract formal ideality. in the sphere of essence. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) .
is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. i. The object similarl y.to the ego it seems an alteration of the object. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. an existent. again. Consciousness . as Reason.as a case of correlation . what makes the object the subject's own. a thing-in-itself. and even t he Idea of Nature. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce.e. and so on. but only as it is in reference to something else. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. etc. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple.. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general.e. It appears as wealth iest in matter. first. and that the philosophy. t heir absolute interdependence. an existing thing. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. is further characterized a s immediately singular. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. immediate consciousness. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. a something. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . but as poorest in thought. This is sense-consciousness. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. the substantial and qu alitative. and puts it first under the category of being. has emerged from Spinoz ism. reflected in itself. or mere c ertainty. in other words. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). the subject of consciousness. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). (b) self-consciou sness. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. As against Spinozism. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. the notion of mind. with an object set against it. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). for which ego is the object. being immediate. which is not as its own. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). an intuitive intellect. to raise its self-certainty to truth. and underived certainty of it.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. Spatial and temporal Singularn . Ego.a subject-objectivity. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). i. a singular.
This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. and more or less by the sciences. the distinction on its own part. lies im mediately in the other.e. in this case by t he Ego.). of the thing is. 73). Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. a something external to it. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. in that manner. experiences. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. but as mediated.bet ween the individuality of a thing which.ess. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible.a variety of relations. has many properties. as not externally different from the other. it is related. or the distinction which is none. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . has. reflected in itself. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. and universal. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . which form the alleged ground of general experience. and. viz. by being regarded in their bearings. taken in its concrete content. and not yet as external on its own part. having passed beyond the sensible. the one of the terms. permanent term s. so constr uing the object. But in this manner the interior distinction is. reflectional attributes. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. wants to take the object i n its truth. the thing. but brought to rest and universality.a copy of the phenomenon. as we called it. i. free from this negative l ink and from one another. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. on one hand. or as being beside and out of itself. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. and sensuous consciousness. reflected upon. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. . its necessity on its own part. ¤ 423 The law. what it is in truth. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. is sense-perception. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. and am aware'.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. Thi s inward. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object.e. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. and universalities. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. i.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. p. an abstract identity: on the other hand. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. however. to describe the sensible. to which. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). not as merely immediate. however.
its satisfaction realized. there is strictly speaking no object. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. or implicitly. being merely consumed. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. on the whole. the latter. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. in its immediacy. pure 'Ideality'. and a desire (appetite) . and thus in it I am aware of me. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. can make no resistance: the dialectic. nominally. and itself made actual. The two processes are one and the same. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness.With this new form-characteristic.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . on the contrary . is a singular. primarily describable as an individual. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. with the nega tion of it. therefore. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego.as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. The certitude of one's self. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. in this return upon itself. knows itself implicit in the object. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. implicit in it. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. On the external side it conti nues. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. this identity comes to be for the ego. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. therefore. To this activity the object. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. or. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. and ma intains itself as such. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness .
¤ 435 But secondly. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. and to exist as such for the other: . negati on of immediacy. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . the slave. ¤ 434 This status. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. however. works off his individualist self-will. as one of two things for another. Thus arises the status of master and slave. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. Force. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. w hich however is also still outside it. preservation. In that other as ego I behold myself. and its being for others. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. we see. must likewise be kept in life. which is the basis of this phenomenon. at first immedi ately. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. solves the contradiction. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular.for the means of mastery. in the first place. from one point of view. and formation of it. the slave. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life.but only p eril. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. it. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. however. and incurs a like peril for its own . Thus the death of one. a suppression. and the means for entering into relation with them. though by the abstract. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. While the one com batant prefers life.e consciousness of a 'free' object. f rom the essential point of view (i. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. therefore rude. when we look to the distinction of the two. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. as the existence of hi s freedom. is yet. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. This other. in the service of the master. and thus give existence to my freedom. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. not their underlying and essential principle. retains his single self-consciousness. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate.t he process of recognition. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other.e. then. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. which falls on another. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. Force. on the ir phenomenal side. the outward and visible recognition).) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together.
which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance.in family. as its peculiar mode and immanent form.consciousness. the self-centred pure notion. is Reason.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . bu t the truth that knows it. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . is mind (spirit). also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. ego. than they are its own thoug hts. is now itself universal. state. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. For truth here has. Selbstbewu§tsein. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. 5. fatherland. honour. Wahrnehmung 3. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. Reason. or determinations of the very being of things. therefore. Die Begierde 6. friendship. whilst it signifies that the object. 4. and of all virtues. idle fame. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. . Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. fame.which is Reason. The uni versality of reason. 1. Truth. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman.the passage to universal self. aware of what it is. valour. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. etc.f wisdom' . ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . Der Verstand.is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life .or rather it is a difference which is none. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. love. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears.
by being subjectiv e or only a notion. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. in so far as it has an object.mental vision. Mind is finite. and which as the reality of that notion. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . ideation. viz. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. though it no longer has an object. in so far as .7. in the soul as a physical mode. so far as its features are immediate or connatural.the former a simple immediate totality. etc. Cons ciousness is finite. as its concept has just shown.apart b oth from the content. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. the latter now an infinite form which is not. i. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full .. Die Vernunft. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. desires. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. And it is a matter of no consequence. in thinking also and in desire and will. however. remembering. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. or. This.e. it is finite by means of its immediacy. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. etc.in one word. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. PSYCHOLOGY. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . etc. restricted by that content. Mind. SUB-SECTION C. and above the complication with an external object . above the material. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. it has a mode in its knowledge. therefore. like consciousness.. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. neit her subjective nor objective. what is the same thing. then its reality is that reason. which is defined as it s notion. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason.
and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. i. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. and make the affection subjective. or. and being a rational knowledge. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. i. viz. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge.e. and the negative aspect of mental activity. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. k nowledge. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. so far. When the affection has been rendered its own. in so far as its existent phase. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. the mind finds in itself something which is. that aspect is twofold . Similarly. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. As the theory o f Condillac states it. forces. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. of comprehending itself. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. is misconceived and overlooked.e. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. it is . by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. and its activity can only have itself as aim. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. in freedom.as being and as its own: by the one. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. and is even there a return into itself. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation.reality of its reason. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. and to liberate itself to its elf. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. the na tural soul (¤ 413).e. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. viz. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. and are the mind's own. that is. equally. to reach and get hold of itself. Thus. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy.
Psychology. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. for which it gains the form of universality. both for the mind as such. which it and the content virtually is. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. and is immediately willed. like logic. while it has to do with autonomous products. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . as it is said. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. the word. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. wi th a material which is its own. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. along with which the content is realized as rational. Its activity has to do with the empty form .. to get at the notion and the truth. elevates itself. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. etc. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. but) enjoyment. and therefore a restricted content.g. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. and heartless intellects . so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. and gains abstract auton omy within. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. e. But as knowledge. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. Ou twards. and that in its empirical condition. Inwards .the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. in the theoretical range. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. its content is at first only its own. and of the heart without the intellect .of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. to definite and conceptual knowledge. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. merely as facts. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. The course of this elev ation is itself rational.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. It is still extremely ill off. The nominal knowledge. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. as r eason is concrete. while the practical. which in the first place is likewise formal . This activity is cognition. just as they are given. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. belong to a point of view utt . The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. which is only certitude. is thus also a reality . and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. has a material which is only nominally such.i.e.(b) Will: practical mind. This position of psychology. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive.
is bro ught into mind. or makes the concept its own. remembrance. conceives. Faculty. cognitive conception.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. note). conception. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. remembers. as non-intelligent). This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. imagination.besides which it al so intuits. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . But c ognition is genuine. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . conception.in a word . it . (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . like power or force. intelligen ce. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence.whi ch. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. however. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition.is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. But the true satisfaction. must lead to abandoning the effort. etc.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). if answered in the negative. It is true that even as isolated (i. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge.e.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. memory. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. are not isolated. just so far as it realizes itself. imagines. viz. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. etc. it is admitted. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. by rational conception. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . If they are isolated. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. conceived as reflected into self. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. etc. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. by cognitive intuition. as it is by the same method brought into nature. intuition. or mind. imagination. that intuition. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. etc.its out-of-selfness . It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. etc.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other .
this mode is simple. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. the mere consciousness point of view. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. projects it into time and space. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. is swallowed up. has the form of casual particularity . Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself.one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. with the character of something existent. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. as it were the closes t. or at least to reasons . we have the one fa ctor in Attention . external or internal. . 254). Feeling is the immediate. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. but rather as subject ive and private. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. a .is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity .his private and p articular self. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements.but to his feeling. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling.to the generalit ies of common sense . Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. With us. that is t o say.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. in content and value entirely contingent. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. Hence feeling. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness.an active self-collection . hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever.t he factor of fixing it as our own. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. Now the material. may just as likely be narrow and poor. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . in t he truth of mind. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne.
in the way we treat. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. however. which makes it its own. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. isolated. i. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. from the external place. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. and inwardly divest itself of it. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . in virtual possibility. for example. yet without being in consciousnes s. which. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. and received into the universality o f the ego. The representation is the property of intelligence.in a space and a time of its own. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. as it at first recollects the intuition. the germ as affirmatively containing. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. still continues simple. we may say. . though intrinsically concrete. or. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. its when and where. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. no longer needs to find the content. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. with a preponderating subjectivity. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. t ime. but stored up out of consciousness. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. Inability to grasp a universal like t his.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. a rec ollection of itself. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. as tho ught.the germ of the fruit. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . and is arbitrary or contingent.e. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree.
whatever be its content (from image. if it is to exist. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. such as likeness and contrast. Secondly. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. see Introduction to the Logic. . The content reproduced. as of all intelligence. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. reason and consequence. has always the peculiarity.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation.e. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law.. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. but a being of its own institution. where it is treasured up. the matter is entirely pictorial. notion. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. now that it has been endued with externality. has been broken up. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. or an intell ectual category. But it is solely in the conscious subject. i. wherea s the idea (representation). comes actually into its possession. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition .¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. which is now the power over them.these modes of relation are not laws. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. In the first place. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. where. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. The image. to be so and so. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. as a unit of intuition. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. ¤ 20 note.in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. that it finds its material.viz. under the representation (idea) with the same content. at first only in space and time. present also a distinction in content. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . as a matter of fa ct. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness .) . though belonging to intelligence. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. being and universality. and an out-put from its universal m ine. or ide a). by which it is authenticated. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence.Image and Idea.
Another point calling for special notice is that. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence.Imagination. is reason. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). some latent concept or Ideal principle. to universalize it. This force is really intelligence itself . As reason. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. but only a nominal reason. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. . which forms their connecting link. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy.still lacks the side o f existence. i. recollection. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. and in mechanical memory it completes. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. . so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. are unifications of t he same factors.. a concrete subjectivity. Acting on this view.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. derived from some interest. 435). so far a s it is concerned. and becomes an i ndividuality. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being.symbolic. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). Such is creative imagination(7) . This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . this form of being. one's own and what is picked up.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . internal and external. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own.e. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. etc. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. it is self-uttering. for its ideal import is its elf. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. or something of the sort. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. are completely welded into one.Abstraction. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. allegoric. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. when regarded as the agency of this unification. is derived from the data of intuition. In other words. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. but they are 'syntheses'. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. or poetical imagination . These more or less concrete.
. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . its institution by intelligence. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection).in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. and even with conception and imagination. ¤ 459 The intuition .there have been collected more than a hundred such words. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. something accepted. With regard to the elementary material of language. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. conception s. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. in the first instance. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. Sausen. has always to do with signs only. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). its system. somewhat immediate or given (for example.). signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. This intuition is the Sign. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . have nothing to do with each oth er. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. whereas in the sign. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. Knarren. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. e tc. but as representative of something else. when employed as a sign. language .R auschen. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. It is a n image. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness.th at of vocal objects. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . But in the fusion of the two elements. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). since memory.speech and. . Such is the negativity of intelligence. the colour of the cockade. The sign is some immediate intuition. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. strictly so-called. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium.now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). and where it is conserved. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . intuitions.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. the matter of the latter is. and the connotation of which it is a sign. out of which it forms i deas .gives to sensations. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. In logic and psychology. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . etc. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l.
the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454).see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. the planets . and still takes place in Canton . Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . in chemistry and mineralogy. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. As to the formal elem ent. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. their signs in vocal language. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. The study of languages still in their original state.e. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. and only get signification as signs. again. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. are frequently changed. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. but. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. as regards signs for mental objects.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. i. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. palate. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. alphabetical writing. (Cf.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture.e. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. the chemical elements. and now that. as many as ten a . it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. . they are reduced to signs.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. for example. . it depends.). and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. we may touch. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. In particular. W. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas.e. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. etc. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. as. tongue in each) and for their combinations. i. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. on the other hand. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. if it be not altogether extinguished. the denomination. only in pas sing. i. on anthropological articulation. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. which severally receive designation. like the Chinese. It is only a stationary civ ilization. as in our signs for the numbers. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. viz. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. instead of n ames proper.
it is analysed. peculiar to the intellect. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea.nd twenty. just as in modern times (as already noted.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. so that. in the case of the Chinese Koua. This feature of hieroglyphic . by speaking low and soft or crying out. Both alike require such signs. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. Hieroglyphics. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. Thus. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. or simple logical terms. like alphabetic writing. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. as it does.e. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. of uttering its ideas most worthily . we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. the simple plain idea. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. Engaging the attention of intelligence. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them.the name. the simple straight stroke. .the mode. however ample a connotation it may include. in speaking. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. in the interest o f vision. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. learn ing to speak Chinese. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word .is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. i. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. The European. is still for the mind simple in the name). so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. while (with the facu . it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us.
lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,
but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you
ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.
¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex
Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. Delight. If feelings are of the right sort. may be placed. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. when thought. and precisely in that way d o they . silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. right. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. in feeling. in which these facts. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. heart. etc. in their universality and necessity. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. and evil. joy. shame. we have only to deal with the selfish. and to discus s their content. But where the objects sought are thus casual. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . On the other hand. bad. on the one hand. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. in its objectivity and truth. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. Whereas in life. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. contentment. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. etc. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t.indeed infinitely so. wha t is the same thing. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. and thought. repentance. Thus it is. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. can also be felt. it is because of their quality or co ntent . But as both. is precisely what constitutes. in their immediacy.but only in antithesis to the latter . the truth and. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. lack objective determin ation. volition. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. for the latter. but presented in its universality and necessity. law and morality. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. grief. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. namely God..which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. and still more in mind. is the same content as the good practical feeling has..retain a speciality of their own . and will. we have this immanen . and duty.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought.
the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. on one hand. Will. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy.and (as there are ma ny. finds in the conformity . ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. Should. enjoyment . an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. ego.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. be the value of tha t mode what it may. The answer to the question. first of all. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. But with regard to the inclinations. . In consequence of this formalism. subjectivity . the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. as rights and duties. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. character. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. however. on the other. is at first still a natural will.a development in which the content of autonomous . which is essentially self-d etermination. it is pa ssion. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. admitting of gratification. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. as r egards the form of its content. they. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged.his inte rests of intellect. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. while. What are the good and rational propensiti es.on one aim and object. The will. It is on ly a dead. If the will is to satisfy itself. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . as experience shows. and something inappropriate to it. passion is neither good no r bad. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. their mutual connect ions. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. the question is directly raised. each with its private range). Which are good and bad? . to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. but to ge t realized. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. freedom are the principles of evil and pain.natural impulse and inclination. and their truth. too often. In what way have they.Up to what degree the good continue good. indeed. Thus.an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. each being always in conflict to another. are infected with contingency. therefore. talent. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment.
of a universal sa tisfaction.and one satisfaction. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. this is wh at is called the interest. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. An action is an aim of the subject. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. i. as the content. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. without end. as thinking and implicitly free. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. are reduced to a m ere negative. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. an inactive thing.action loses its contingency and optionality. unless he had an interest in it. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. . the free gift of nature. which reflection and comparison have educed. on one hand. ¤ 476 The will. which as such is the universal. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. by another. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. on the whole to their disadvantage. is his interest and . As thus contradictory. where the subject is made to close with itself. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. it is on them that the decision turns. and social duties. The morality concerns the content of the aim. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . However. Their mutual limitation. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. They are somet imes contrasted.e. either alto gether or in part. inclinations.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. so far as their particularity goes. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. which is just as much no satisfacti on. there would be no action at all. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . moral. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. and is option or choice. It is thus 'reflecting' will. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. the impulses. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. that finds its actualizing in the agent.his passion.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity .
did not have it. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. aim. and are constituted after its measure. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom.e. which i s pure and concrete at once. have never had this Idea. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. for example. education. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. of present sensati on and volition. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. knows this its concept. Africa and the East. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself.freedom itself. just because it is the very essence of mind. i.e. As abstract Idea again. now that the formalism. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. and that as its very actuality. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. The Greeks and Romans. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. which realizes its own freedom of will. Plat o and Aristotle. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. If to be aware of the Idea . This universalism the will has as its object and aim.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free.it is the existential side of reason . as realizing the idea.an individuality. and of which it is only t he formal activity. the divine min d present with him. so that in this sphere of particular existence. with freedom itself. is actu ality. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. that is. even the Stoics. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. and are without it still.e. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. and is will as free intelligence. On the contrary. its very au tonomy or freedom. therefore. fortuitousness . and the abstract singleness. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. still this very I . whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. i. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. According to Christianity. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . If the will. etc. he h as also. however. i. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. in religion as such . it is existent only in the immedi ate will . is in the first instance the rational will in general. If. ambiguous. he is actually free. Whole continents.sired . of the family.is matter of speculation. It is thus 'Objective' Mind.to be aware. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. as the substance of the state. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. or philosophy (. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded.e . the will is an actually free will. only so far as it thinks itself . the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love.a universality which only ought to be. or implicit Idea. and object . and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. or by s trength of character.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning.
Das praktische Gefuhl. Die Erinnerung 6.dea itself is the actuality of men . Anschauung. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. 10. 15. 14.not something which they have. Die Intelligenz. which the content and aim of freedom has. 7. 3. but which they are. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. but the pe rmanent character . Die Gluckseligkeit.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. Vorstellung. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves.a principle of the mind and heart. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . if they are made slaves. is itself only a notion . 5. 4. Der freie Geist. Das Denken. religious. 1. moral. But this freedom. Der praktische Geist 13. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. Phantasie 8. as men. Gedachtnis. Der Geist 2. and not less into scientific actuality. 16. 12. 11. 9. Die Einbildungskraft. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. Auswendiges. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. into legal. Inwendiges. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. not with laws or court s of justice.
only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. But in this individualist moral sphere. which splits up into different heads: viz. its rights of admi nistration. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. is also a right. For a mode of existence is a right. receives the form of Necessity. The penal judicature of a government. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. In the morality of the conscience. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. in these externally objective aspects. But.e.at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. which in it is thus at home with itself. my right to a thing is not merely possession. viz. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. Liberty. in the light of the concept. to be as a person. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. not in the form of impulse. being universal. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties.and aim. etc. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. temper. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. or legal possession. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. in relation to the subjective will. are duties . it exists as manner and custom. etc. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. their absolute unity. are its Duties.. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. is the Law (Right ) .e.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. as the services of the members of the State in dues.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. so as to become its habit. duty in general is in me a free subject .. relation to another person . or instituted as an authoritative power. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. it is a Law. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. These conditi ons. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. What is a right is also a duty. in general. are no less its duties to punish. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity.(1) When. or Usage. Liberty. and is the vi rtual universal. and what is a duty.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. where free will has existence. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). where they. and it is a duty to possess things as property. but as possession by a person it is property. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. i. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. and brings into existence i n these several wills. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess.. etc. and character. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. is a duty. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. anthropological data (i. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. military service. private an d personal needs). to administer. but in its universality. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. on the other hand. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. external things of nature which exist for consciousness.
and hence as a single being . Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. possession is property. (B) When the will is reflected into self.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. as something devoid of will. in the knowledge of their identity as free. which as possession is a means. as in itself still abstract and empty. are simultaneously mutually independent. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. by mere designation of it. This thing. civil society. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. abstract right. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. Sitte A. is an individual. it is the right of the subjective will. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. on its own account me rely 'practical'. and the I in it is abstractly external. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. though it remains in trinsically the same. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. which is thus mutual. the infinite self-rela tion. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. at first in the outward appropriation. or by the formatio n of the thing or. morality of the individual conscience. it may be. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. Gesetz 2. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. the external sphere of its liberty . am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. but on an external thi ng. As so characterized.possession. . but as existence of the personality is an end. and State. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. so as to have its existence inside it. But this predicate. But the set of adjustments. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. 1. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. These extremes are the persons who. The Right as Right (la w) is formal.
eac h and all are invested with a show of right. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. and recogniz ed. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . non-malicious wrong. its changing hands. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. willed. expressing the civil suit. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). the only diversity lies in this. because they face each other. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. ¤ 495 The contract. 493 seqq. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) .). the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. is affirmed. in that case. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. and. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right.just as well with draw it as not. however. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. then the external rec . produces a wrong: by which. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. is disinterested. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will.Contract. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. I can just as well put it in it as not . The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so .¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. But so far as my will lies in a thing. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. labour.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. universal thing or commodi ty. which. and time. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. This is naiv e. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated.the full and complete deed. and its acceptance by the other will. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. but which. which thus becomes wicked.
so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. and while the former only is respected. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. is the work of Revenge. The former used to be the common meaning. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. in revenge. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. from life. as a volitional and intelligent being. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . i. This gives the wrong of fraud . in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . howe ver.in this case the apparent recognition. To display the nullity of such an act.e. that of the judge.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . The social state. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him.compulsion against the thing.st rictly so called . and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. But more than possible compulsion is not. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal.is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. on .) Thus the will is violently wicked. b ut the sterling value is let slip. which is disinterested . Conversel y. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. or in corporeity. sets up a law .(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. which is nominal and recognized by him only . and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. by the n otion. or Natural Right. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. In it the agent. or right as governed by the nature of things. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. The law of nature . and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. and can be seized only in t his quarter. and not merely the particular mode . ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. an d so on without end. even from the range of all existen ce. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . like the last. is a matter of chance).whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. But revenge.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. and commits a crime. The phrase 'Law of Nature'.on self-determination or autonom y. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. i.a universal which holds good for him.punishment. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. in which the law of nature should hold sway. such an action is essentially and actually null.where the nominal relation is retained. being conformable to the right.a law.e. This progression. The 'reality' of right. is at the same time only a new outrage. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. the latter is violated.
recognition. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. B. 2. This is the right of intention. the will is at the same time made a particular. though any alteration as such. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. and willed by it. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. the reason of the will. so much as it has consciously willed. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . or even justification in his h eart. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. The subjective will is morally free. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. Naturrecht. is now chara cterized as a subject . in mere law. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. sentiment. so far as these features are it s inward institution. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. is its deed. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. and thus comes into relationship with the former. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. my part in i t is to this extent formal. it thus includes purpose and intention . counts only as a person.and also moral wickedness.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. its own. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof.the other hand. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. Das Recht. but have their assent. an d allows to be imputed to it. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed.a will reflected into itself so that. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. which was its purpose. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. In point of form. embracing these individual point s. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. Now. intelligence. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. 1. Moralitat 3. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. be its affection w hat it may. conscience. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. who. etc.
the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. will . when similarly comprehended in a single aim. it is always something particular. This is the right to well-being.a universal determined in its elf . The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. and yet each of them. as in happiness (¤ 479). on account of that existent sphere of liberty. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. These aims. is not something external to him. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. is always fundamentally one identity. the essential and actual good. And yet they ought to harmonize. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. whether the . (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. but is a particul arity of his own . Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. a good intention in case of a crime. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. and aims. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. essential and actual.ion. as individual and universal. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503).that it contains his needs.and thus including in it particularity .g. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. can be wicked. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. constitute h is well-being. they ought to stand in harmony.being only in this. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. his interest and welfare must. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . though it is a particular duty. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality.e. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will .the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. because the agent. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. interests.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. At the same time because good is one. in point of its matter. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. is as g ood and as duty absolute. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good.
its deepest descent into itself. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. th e essential thing. to be carried out in it. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. the truth of this semblance. good. Die Absicht und das Wohl. This pure self-certitude. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . non-universal.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. and the wicked. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . The failure of the latter consists .good is realized. on its negative side. is. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. and refuse it to the wicked. right . just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. Wickedness. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. expressed by this repeated ought. The subjectivity. is abandoned. rising to its pitch. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. and duty. which is the good. in this its identity with the good. 6.the utterly abstract semblance . in the notion. The for mer is the will of goodness. which has no objectivity. i . in something external therefore. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest.the standpoint of the ought. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. an aim essentially and actually null. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . 1. Moralitat 2. the unutterable. Handlung. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. which would only be abstract. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides .of Conscience and Wickedness. THE MORAL LIFE. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. and of the good. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. 5. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. On the affirmative side. is only the infinite form. but is only sure of i tself. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. That. Der Vorsatz 3. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: .to a goodness. The result. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. Das Gute und das Bose C.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. no more exist than not.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . 4. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . which actualizes and dev elops it. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision.
however. as deliberate work for the community. it exists as confidence.Civil Society.the genuine ethical temper.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. controls and entirely dominates from within. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. i. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. i.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom.th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. elevated. is confidence (trust) . that it is. In the latter sphere. is virtue. etc. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . has actuality as the spirit of a nation. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . . and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. in its immediacy. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. But the person.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being.Marriage. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. In the shape of the family. The ethical personality. to destiny. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal.monog . the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . to a spiritual significance. to the total of ethical actuality. temperament. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. This is the sexual tie. whose independence it. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al.yet somewhat which without all question is. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. as an intelligent being.the Political Constitution. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. however. the individuality expres ses its special character. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being .the Family. as personal virtues.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. manner and cu stom . ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. Thus.e. mind ap pears as feeling. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'.e . subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. without any selective refl ection.n a thing . as against the univers al. in its ki nd. makes this union an ethical tie . .
destined. as do also its industry. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. acquire an existence of their own. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. learning. as private persons. or state external. on one hand. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. of legal regulation. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. originally foreign to it.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. however. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. while. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. labour. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. information. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. thus invested with independence. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. In virtue of such for tuitousness. to found anew such an actual family. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. and care for the future. and thus produce more unconditional . A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . of the possessor's will. This instrument. on the o ther hand. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. constitutes the general stock. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. ¤ 522 (3) The children. who exist independent and free. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. or nominal culture in general. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere.in educating them to independent personality. into families or individuals. being an intelligent substance.
of the legal relationships of individual s to them. ten thalers. to be. Where civil society. is developed i n detail. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere.and ye t it should be decided. or only 2 * . Hence. or could be. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness.dependence on the social system. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. in the course of definite manifestation. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. The third. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. skill. though of course only at the final points of deci ding.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. talent. and an ensemble of contingencies.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. and a corresponding mode of labour. 2 4/5 years. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. intelligence. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. Thus whether three years. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. and accident. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. the medium created by t he action of middlemen.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . and so on ad infinitum. this analysis. and like the first a certain subsistence. Their content per se may be reasonable . of needs. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. certain. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . option. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. their recognition and their honour. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. as well as of mental culture and habit . and of means for satisfying them. But when right. and in it they have their social moralit y. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . The second.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. exists. 2 3/4 . the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. which as existence is essentially a particular. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness.. determined through reason or legal intelligence. as vital. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. and with it the State. It is a futile perfectionism to have . on the side of external existence. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. be the righ t and just thing. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . its action gets direction and content through natural features. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . at every point. of mere agents. however. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. they have their actual existence. and industry.the Law. which is honesty. also of aims and interests.
they touch only the abstract will .gets its universal guarantee through formalities.as this exists as revenge . But there is a contrary case. at the same time an externally objective existence.even as his law can only be a just law. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. the need of a simpler code . who has by so doing gained the gratitude. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right.which though something new.the ne ed. as universal authority and necessity.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. The comparison of the two species. to which objective existence determines i tself. They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'.are governed and well governed too by laws. as in the mental ima ges of space. being laws o f strict right. with the advance in multitude. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity.as proven: . has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. of his countrymen. . which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws .vi z. . This subjective existence. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. i. These people forget that the stars .to the individualized right .in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. hereditary divinity or nobility. inasmuch as. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . general laws.into punishment (¤ 500). not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. like improvements on a f loor or a door. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis . The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. by faith and trust.and th e cattle too . even the admiration. are not a new hou se. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. constit . but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. as the genuine order of life. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law .or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. however. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. which again make new decisions necessary. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. as it is a known law. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. first really de serving the name of laws. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. not for them. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion.to be promulgated and made known as laws . in the judicial system. within the house .laws. whic h are only internally in these objects. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features.e. and t hus become authoritative . and in particular transforms this existence .itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. there arises. which discovers new distinctions. recognized.
This is due to the variability of the wants themselves.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. because it is man's want. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. and the judgement as application of the law to it. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. because it is only one factor. . The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. be exercised as different functions. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken .as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. . ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. the judgement as t o the state of the fact.and that.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. and worked from that point of view. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. Conversely. In so far. the position of an external un iversality. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. as at bottom different sides.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. So far as concerns them. so as to secure this satisfaction. It results also from circumstances of locality. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end.'poli .viz. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . from the c onnections between nation and nation. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. in a uniform gen eral way. mere circumstantial evidence. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. then. No doubt this factor is incomplete. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. to the concrete of civil society. and their variable ingredients. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. which. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. appears as state. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. shou ld. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. and to maint ain that end in them and against them.
which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. it protects the family and guides civil society. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. Thus we have the corpora tion. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . through the action of the government and its several branches. to the immediate agent. s heer subjectivity. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . . but which has a thoroughly general side.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. On the other hand.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. Secondly.into the life of the universal substance. secondly.ce'. and.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. but. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . It provides for the reasonable will . also for that will being put in actuality. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. which each originally takes care of for himself. with all its evolution in detail. First it maintains them as persons. receiving. in this direction . (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. But.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. differentiated in to particular agencies. which.one individual. they are re strictions. self-originated. (c) THE STATE. The same unity. Thirdly. and not left to perish. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. ¤ 539 As a living mind. continually produce it as their result.co nsists in a double function.international (outer-state) law. is its essence. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. the state only is as an organized whole. and self-develop ed .const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness.as an actuality . however. This universal principle. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. and .in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . it carries back both. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. First.which volition is thereby free . and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. The cons titution is existent justice . then it promotes their welfare. his independent self-will and particular interest.the reasonable spirit of will.
some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. without further specification and development. As regards Liberty. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. authorities. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. etc. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. were called its 'liberties'. presuppos e unequal conditions. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . on the contrary. Really. The principle of equality. and that the laws are restrict ions. is abstract subjectivity. military service. it embodies a liberty. etc. town . it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. . private as well as public rights of a nation. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. etc. Formerl y the legally defined rights. On the contrary. otherwise have in property. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. or destroy them. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. the current notions of l . As regards. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: .which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. the difference of governing powers and of governed. etc. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. talent. the familiar proposition. as regards the concrete. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. Rome. age. However true this is. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. etc. magistracies . Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. The laws themselve s. physical strength. which it can without incompatibility allow. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. on the contrary. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. the citizens .equal in the concrete. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings.pleasure an d self-will. first. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. skill. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. as it ha ppens. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). It is important therefore to study them closer.only it can make them ..besides their personalit y . But that this freedom should e xist. etc. Nothing has become. But. in other words. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. that the laws rule. rejects all differences. is so little by nature. as it exists as s uch. But the notion of liberty. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction.as regards taxation. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth.punishment. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. or even in crime.e. i. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . directories. eligibili ty to office. All men are by nature equ al. Equality. logically carried ou t. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. With the state there ari ses inequality.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law.
e. just as little as the making of a code of laws. in which this is not formally done. ¤ 541 The really living totality . not merely with regard to the naturalness. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. i. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. If . and thus gains moral independence. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. with its insatiate vanity. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. The question . the necessity that the laws be reasona ble.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . in other words continuall .To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults.iberty only carry us back to equality.e . there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. self-w ill and self-conceit. The term political liberty. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. is . and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. of others. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. But the more we fortify liberty. of liberties in general. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. . And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. and must deal with them as it ca n. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it.) But the guara ntee lies also. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. as a state without a constitution. and to regard a state. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. and the organization of the actualization of them. be it added.as sec urity of property. with this development of particularity. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. however. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions.that which preserves. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. has an insight and conviction of his own .just because of this inseparability .a thing that has nev er happened in history. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing.
yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. These. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. ¤ 542 In the government . it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion.y produces the state in general and its constitution. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. which includes an already existing development of differences. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. Only through t he government. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality.monarchy.e.su bject always.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization.to make it the first power. the participation of all i n all affairs . as in a democratic constitution. but an actual indiv idual . presupposes ignorance that the true idea. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. (A mistake still greater.or. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). is the self-redintegrating notion. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. which taken apart is also particular). But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . is the government. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence .the all-sustaining. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. all-decreeing will of the state. and the government be merely executive and dependent . and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality.in a state of society.impugns the principle of the division of powers. . .regarded as organic totality . as always. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. of the family and of civil society. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . in other words. as in the patri archal society . with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'.the will of a decreeing individual. i. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. is the state one. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. In the perfect form of the state. i. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. equally disorganizes actuality.e. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. however. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'.
to that end and for that reason. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. involve the. and are to that degree private person s. admini stration of justice or judicial power. The pure forms . The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment .partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. i. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . liberty of property. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . etc. Thus. and skill for such ends. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . first. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. civil society. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. and above all personal liberty.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . possess independence of a ction. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures.in short. aristocracy and monarchy. with their general opinion.e. with its industry and i ts communities.. essentially.'ideal' unity. in the history of the State. . without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. and with earlier transition-forms. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing .whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. participate in the governmental power. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. administration and police. The division of constitutions into democracy.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. aptitude. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. being simple self-relation. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. lik e peace and war.such as ochlocracy.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. and then of nature .are. as it were. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. For it is as private persons t . ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. too. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. especially in legislation . which having their busin ess appointed by law. Secon dly. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . there arises the participation of several in state-business. That subjectivity . It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. it may be . These principles are those expounded earlier.partly. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. legislative power. Two points only are all-important. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. an actual existence.viz.as also feudal monarchy. to subjectivity.
or in its 'reflectional' universality. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists .the contrary must be the case . indeed the whole. like that of the stormy. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. ¤ 529 note). is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. as the nation . which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. to power and act ion. In a civilized state. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. as such an aggregate.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. in the law and liberty of property. Take the case of England which. The des irability of such participation. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. moreover. The so-called financial law. and therefore more urgent. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality.a spiritual element . which. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. that t hey enter upon that participation. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. however.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. inorganic shape. elemental sea.which should be presupposed.regard ed as permanent. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. as estates. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. is no t self-destructive. If the main part of the requirement were . so far as they form only one branch of that power . in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. i. in the general sense of embracing a wide. be they treated as mere individuals. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. and form a particular kind . and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf.as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. Experience s hows that that country . however. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen.would be.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. it is not a brutish mass. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. wild. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. ever newly recurring. blind force. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. in arrangements for art and science.as it very likely is . but as organic factors. s ense of general wants. demoralization. range of the extern al means of government. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws.e.
This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. and thus.e. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. In their mutual relations. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. afresh. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs.so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. or every few years. is really engaged with strict executive business.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'.is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. when it makes a decree about finance.g. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. Then again. i. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence .i.. a state of war. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. of the whole of the finances. in which there would no longer be a government. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. as content o f a true law. and becomes the estate of bravery. but only parties. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es.as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled.e. In one case the . (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . e.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. waywardness and chance have a place. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. and not actually existent. and not to be made yearly. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely.
this note must go into further deta il. That history. a history of its own. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing.of sacerdotal races . both this general recognition. however. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical.. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. and then in history. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . which actually is and will be realized in it . and accomplish one task in the whole deed. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. that. and above all universal history. in short. In general. Fictions. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds.and.the plan of Provide nce. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. in defiance of . is founded on an essential an d actual aim. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing.a world-mind.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. are settled and fixed. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. in short. On th is point. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. an d the special claims of nations on one another. each of which. and on history-writing in general. especially on the philological side. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . and as regards its range and scope. it. as it is a history. is called an a prio ri view of it. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. when we come to minutiae. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. As this development is in time and in real existence. there is Reason in history. of a Roman epic. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. it passes int o universal world-history. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. and in Germany more than in France and England. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. It has. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. is appointed to occupy only one grade.the judgement of the world. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. internat ional law rests on social usage. It is in time. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. etc. first in general.
or if he declined to judge at all. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. and rejects both ki nds of interest. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. a civilization. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. But. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). Rome and its fortunes. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. and an exclusive interest in justice. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass.e. but violates th e principles of objective truth. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. no history . e. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. has. if he had not an interest. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. a nation. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. not as good as a fairy tale. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. on the other hand. etc.the best-accredited history. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. but an age.like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. weave them into the pictur e of general interests.g. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. as in the romance. a word. strictly s peaking. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. and. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours.appears to run .to say a word on that here . The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. and criticize events. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. The point of interest of Biography . and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. express not a subjective particularity.). in the interest of so-called truth. in striking portraiture and brevity. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. or. What happens to a nation . state. and takes place within it. Ay. i. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. is not only against taste and judgement. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation.
is the empty form of activity. potentially infinite. and its content is prese . i. i. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. is the supreme right. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth.Fame. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. which is their reward. For Spirit is consciousn ess.admitting. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. has another ground and interest than his tory. and of its essence. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. But biography too has for its background the historical world. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . and their subjectivity. i. But. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. and secondly.e. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. to the history of religion. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. and are all treated as indifferent. etc. Such a doctrine . as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). and the business of so doing.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. while it inheres in them. which all alik e have no stuff in them.e. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. are instruments. the consciousness of it. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. only opinions and mere ideas. truth. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. and there fore as a work of individuals. Only therefore through their relationship to it. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. if Rome or the German empire. The mere play of sentiment. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. first in general.or in other words that Reason is in history . liberty. i. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. on the contary.e.an accurate report of externals. we may add. these individuals. etc. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. the absolute L aw. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea .e. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. in this case. as over a special grade. really. which is what is pe culiar to them. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. the freak of humour. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . have they their value and even their existence. a development determined by the notion of spirit. 550).
as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. At this rat e. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. As regards the 'mediation' which. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. i. actually accomplished in the ethical world. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel.consciousn ess. But . now gets its most concrete interpretation. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. i. as true in the world of free will. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. Th e finite. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. from which the start is now made. however.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by.as is the case with all speculative process . is the real ethical self.e. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free.a mere 'ought' . while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour.is the peculiar perversity. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf.e. note). Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. as law and duty. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. in the system of laws and usages. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. cf. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. is the purification. For that st arting. forme rly noticed. that elevation to God really involves. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. The spirit. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . especially ¤ 51. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. lays hold of its concr ete universality.Liberty. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. the state rests on the ethical sentiment.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. i. i. and that on the religious. the idea of God it kn . This factor.e. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. ¤ 204 not e). Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct.e. Such apprehension. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. But the spirit which think s in universal history. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. abstract in the formal treatment of logic.
) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . religion was a late r addition. and these applications of it in the religious life. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. differing from the former in body and value of truth. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others.ows must be the true and real. and even as mutually indifferent. It lea ds to a laity. springing from some force and power. But in poin t of form. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root.partly as mere moving of the lips. i. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. in its faith and in its con science. And. even to bones. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself.e. one religious and an other ethical. (In the Lutheran Church. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. the host as such is not at first consecrated.logi cally enough .the body of religious truth.e. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . morality and conscience. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. but in the moment of enjoymen t.addressing his devotion to miracle. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . a condition of spiritual sla very. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. in the annihilation of its externality.as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. then there may be created. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another.or it may be. but purely subjective in individuals: .which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. B . only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. non-spirituality. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. and superstition. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. first of all. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. and law and justice. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. i. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. It leads. on the contr ary. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. and in the act of faith.working images.of bondage. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. i. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . in point of form. for thought and knowledge . The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience.e. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts.e. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. generally. to justification by external wo rks. and ex pecting miracles from them. and prays others to pray . i.
self-realizing reason . and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. and political institutions deduced from them must be. The precept of religion. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. a code of law should arise. therefore. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. And instead of the vow of obe dience. i. and in the use of property .of honesty in commercial dealing. no matter how. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. So long as t he form. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. the wisdom of the world. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . so to speak a priori. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion.e. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. which does not rise in hostility against them. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. sti . can law and morality exist. and thus only. because the state is a self-possessed.in short. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. unte nable. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. .(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. i. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. Thus. lacked liberty. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. .e. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. our consciousness and subjectivity. and in a special sense Philosophy. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. Thus set free. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. founded on principles of reason. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. leads it into the rea l world. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible.an obedience which is itself the true freedom. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. . moral life in the state. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. if taken alone. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. Instead of the vow of chastity. and. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality.e. Let us suppose even that. i.
and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. that the Idea must be regent. thus founder on the conscience. ¤ 544 note). The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution.. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. etc. (cf. thus surmountin . and the power given them to fix the budget. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea .which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . however sound their provisions may be. . To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. At best it is only a temporary expedient . and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. e. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. to put it simply. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own.mi nd intrinsically concrete .ll.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. from those deeper requirements which. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. on one hand.is just this . we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. on the other hand. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. when specially set in relief as genus. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. so-called 'chambers'. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. This absolute nucleus of man . and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit.to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . This additional 'individuality' .g. or. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form.to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. Such laws.among which laws these guarantees are included.is the intellectual and thinking self.
Plato. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. etc. His state is therefore. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. and so also one-sided phase. which still escaped his intelligence. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy .through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . is after all only in one of its form s. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. from religion. ¤ 513. he. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power.was that creative imagination. But thought always . Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness.the idea of the substantial moral life. in its f irst immediate. however. which is developed similarly.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. in its philosophic phase. as it grows and expands. Hence religion as such. or essential being). and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . Only in the principle of mind. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. pictorial representation. of philosophy. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. intuition. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. is implicitly in absolute liberty. exhibits the one-sidedness. the subjectivity of mind.). wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. which is awa re of its own essence. but earlier than philosophy. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state.so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content.and th at on account of this very principle . as demoralization. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states.). fall feeling. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. earlier than it does as philosophy. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth.g the Platonic Idea (the genus.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. Under the subjective form. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. As it left therefore behind. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. or rather must. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. religion. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . for th ese reasons. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. Political power. on its own s howing. The form in its infinite tru th. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . should knit it together and control it. But even religion.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . Religion may. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . so .
If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft.e. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . 8. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. Das aussere Staatsrecht. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. Religion. Thus ul timately. Weltweisheit. Das System der Bedurfnisse. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. 6. 9.as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community.in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. Gesetz. Die Polizei und die Corporation. but rather to a sort of knowledge. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. of God's indwelling in us. as always. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. 7. 4. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. as well as their several applications. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . Die Sittlichkeit. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. 2. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. for which it is as substance. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. the constitut ion and the code. That here. Inneres Staatsrecht. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. 1. Die Weltgeschichte 10. 3. i. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. Die Rechtspflege 5. In the Protestant state. while it is self-centred identity.
as superseded in spirit. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. so that the thought embodied. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. ¤ 411). A.i.the shape or form of Beauty.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence .must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. reconciliation. . and t he subject which contemplates and worships it.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . c an. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. into the subject which produces that work. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. Der absolute Geist. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . on the other hand. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. and of gaining its concrete determination. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. or the idea.in other words. But.e. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. 1.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). On one hand. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth.for the expression of spiritual truth . Belief. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. as it is. but . ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. viz. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. its n atural immediacy. has in devotion .the form of immediacy as such . of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. With the essential restrictedness of its content. aware. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art.hence not the sp iritual unity. In this ideal. the actuality of the spirit. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. Art requires not only an external given material .something formal. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . like the material which it uses to work in. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. which is only a sign of the Idea. that is. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation.
Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. and that is where the infinite form. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. that one spirit creates and informs them. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. . it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . known as the Absolute. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. but its inmost depth. of its actual liberty. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. as well as of its art and science.stil l this art is defective. not yet conscious of itself. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . though concrete and intrinsically free. subjectivity. the principle of its law. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. assumes fuller and firmer features.in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . and th e artist is the master of the God.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. but as only finding himself in himself. as free spi rit.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. the artist's enthusiasm. or an effor t towards him . is not yet known.can try to bring itself to consciousness. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. is not yet absolute.symbolic art. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. and of its constitution.
Beautiful art. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. . has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. then the only thing left to constitute His nat .of Nemesis.it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. we see that the advent of art.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. . The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. not the supreme liberation itself. The old conception . as infinite self-realizing form . These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. has its future in true reli gion. still more in that external. what is more.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God.the religion i. is first generated.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit.is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. B. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. The older religion in which the need of fine art.due to a one-sided survey of human life .ent in it. revealed by God. and j ust for that reason. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . it is from Him.into revelation. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed.that it be revealed.The genuine objectivity. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. which is only in the medi um of thought . on the contrary. from it s side. the theme and c entre of religion. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. shows that such religion is on the decline. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. Beautiful art. whose con tent is absolute mind . The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. But with a further and deeper study. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape .for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . expression. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification.e. . If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. like the religion peculiar to it. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. and. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. spectator find themselves at home. and brilliancy. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. dashing t o pieces everything high and great . in which he had not revealed himse lf. with their perso nal sense and feeling. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. unbeautiful sensuo usness.
(a) as eternal content. But. It includes. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . . F. he still remains in original identity . or of judgement. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. by C. first of all. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought .on the other hand. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. it is. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. to specul ative comprehension. G .See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. though. staying aloof and inert. it implies the revelation of Him.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. To know what God as spirit is . amid that natural ness. a separate being. ¤ 566 In this separating.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world.. the elemental and the concrete nature .the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence .is the Spirit. Go d is. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y .requires careful and thorough speculation.1. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. though different. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. (c) as infinite return. which proceeds to man's self. not. in it s forefront. in point of content. further. making them presuppositions towards each other. but afterwards. which therefore is finite. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. That spirit. Yet. as the extreme of inherent negativity.of the only Son .: Berlin 1829. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. and reconciliation with the eternal being. with whom. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters.it is therefore the absolute spirit.. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. standing in action an d reaction with such nature.just as. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. while in point of form he is. even in its manifestation. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship.knowledge in God. . their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. for that reas on. as in duty bound. however. when it thinks. on the other hand.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. On one hand is heaven and earth. and. only standing to it in an external connection. it may almost create surprise that so many. directed towards the Eternal. the spirit. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. on one hand. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. of the world it gave away . The eternal 'moment' of mediation . and phenomena which succeed each other. again. abiding sel f-centred.
to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. 1. and thus sensuous. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. Thinking.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. is itself the emptiness and vanity. simple.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. he. In this form of truth. after the example of his truth. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. which from itself. who as such is identified with the essence . ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result .the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . knowi ng itself in itself as absolute .Irony. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. remains master over it. truth is the object of philoso phy. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. From this its separation into p arts. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. This individual. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. contentless sense. external in point of form. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. Whereas the vision-method of Art. secondly.but the vision of implicit truth. his natur al man and self-will. as infinite subjectivi ty.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. on account of his immediate nature.and.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . this immediate. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. C. gives itself direction and con tent. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. so far. but even to thought. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. If the result . keeps himself unchanged. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. th e self-centred manifestation.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . Die geoffenbarte Religion. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. Irony. Further. in which he. . eternal. with a temporal and external sequence. and thus. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. an object of contemplating vi sion . constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. is not bound by it .is transplanted into the world of time. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal.is taken in a merely formal. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . and eternal spirit in itself. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. through which witness of the spirit in him. but alive and present in the world. But. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked.
leaving out.it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. which philosophy is.and from a pithless orthodoxy. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . But it is the whole cycle of philosophy.stantial content into many separate shapes. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. of course. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . a nd of logic in particular. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. only looks back on its knowledge. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. This movement. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. and against philosophy in general . as also of the necessity in the two forms . or. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. when at the close it seizes its own notion . just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . too much for the latter. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. which determines itself to content. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories.the underlying essence in all humanity . it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . and mediates what is thus open ed out. elevation of them into the absolute form. and s o religious. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God).on the other hand. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. with its separ ation into parts. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained.takes. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs.e. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. and whereas Religion. and this necessary as free. The charge of Atheism. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man.('Rationalism') .on one hand. when driven to expound itself. immediate vision and its poetry. remains identical with it. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. and acts inconsistently towards them.from these forms. opens it out in mental picture. and particularly of the logical form. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. but also criticized it.which may be in both the same . finds itself already accompl ished. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. This witness . first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. to be more precise still.i. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. This does not prevent the spirit. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion.
The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. or if you will. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. but as a proved fact. from which all definite quality is excluded. its grossest shape. and amongst it s effusions. I select .for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: .in the wanton assertion. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . or Pantheism.that of the Hindu to ass es. or any one man. as it stands. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. are) . which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: .(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. does not comprehend itself.thus he understands philosophy . though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . exclusi ve. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. with all its absurdities. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. If this theory needs no more than such a God.which therefore it does not disparage. This new theology. cows . ¤ 71 note). It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e.that of the Egyptians to the ox . the secularity of th ings. if we believe them. also contains the generic abs tract.the Bhagavat-Gita. as is well known. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. Without interest of its own for the concrete. that it has too much of him: .as the most authentic statement accessible . Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness.of the new piety and new theology. God in General. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical.(empirical things. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact.Everything is . and form all that is definite in the divine universality.all possess substantia lity. without distinction. that it is treated not so much as an imputation.of Pantheism. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . so as to fi nd God in everything called religion.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. It is only his own stupidity. we must. On such a presuppo sition. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. that.so much so. open to our disposal on this topic. and is therefore. in particular. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. Piety. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . whether higher or lower in the scale. fulfilled notion of God. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. most sublime.is always adora tion of an object which.so much so.or to dalai-lamas . Amongst the abundant resources.each and every secular thing is God. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. and so . some of the most telling passage .g.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. are unable and unwilling to see this . it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy.
developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. all this is woven upon me. with a monstrous incons istency. unessential existences. has the higher conception of Brahma. middle. goodness.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression..that Hinduism. . I am "Om" in all the Vedas. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. . even Siva. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. etc. he is said to be the beginning. which he is. I am also the strength o f the strong. . Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. is also the maddest of polytheisms. . but only . The undiscerning ones. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . .so powerless its. and end of living things. where the empirical everything of the world. pp. . . . Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities .not everything. . . I am life in all beings. as also those proximate substantialities.s. than which there is nothing higher. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. as different from that accidental. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. rather. . .. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. . without essential being of its very own. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . nothing independent]. besides Krishna. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. . and one essential amongst them. This everything. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. Even when.). or a God besides. or Indra. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. But so little concrete is this divine unity . I am the light of th e sun and the moon. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). at the beginning of the pass age. is alo ne the divine and God. Among letters I am the letter A. . I am the discernment of the discerning ones. and the Spinozan Substance. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. . But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . seated in the hearts of all beings. . . not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. vanish.' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. however. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. the One which. . . Hinduism.' This 'All'. as he said before he was S iva. . . . 7 seqq. . I am the taste in water. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. to a poly theism.spiritual as its idea of God i s . . so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . any more than the Eleatic One. so to speak . this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. . . And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. . t he pure unity of thought in itself. which Krishna calls himself.the most excellent of everything.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. and the moon among the lunar mansions. grip. . Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . There is nothing else higher than myself. called Gods.. Indra. the Everything. p. melt into the one Krishna. still God. Meru among the high-topped mountains. everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. passion. .'I am the self. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. but having its truth in the substance. . the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. is not. . . Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. . 'At the end of many lives. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. . . from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. . darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his.
(In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. For that unity. even in a general exoteric discussion. secondl y.of the world as one thing. and so on . modes of envisaging God. on the contrary. to which everything is God. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. which. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. we must consult th e Mohammedans.. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. and. the all. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. on one hand.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. is discarded and absor bed.floating in the indefinite blue . and of empirical secular spirit. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . as infinite from the finite.g. e. But to go back again to the question of fact. in relation to the popular idea of the world. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. whether they spring from heart.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular. especially the Mohammedan. but .keep its independence. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God.in its finest purity and sublimity. outside it . it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. ac osmical. Hin du monotheism. is identical with the world. and God everything. and on the other. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. imagination or speculation. Of the oriental.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. of the relationship of God and the world.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. as it says. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God.. That pantheism indeed . the Eleatic. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. to was . empirical indivi duals . which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. or Spinozist. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. If.ndu. The clo se of philosophy is not the place.on the shallow conception of it . as everything. moreover.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. as the endless lot of empirical existence. after this partition. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. or other creature. he is as essence parted from appearance. the finite to the infinite. But. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. It is only the picture .) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. or. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. and that unity described as love. when he adores the ape.
in matters admitted to be of superior. but rather its reverse.and relation i pso facto implies unity . Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. when they hear of unity . they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. as Epicu rus does. and that hence.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. with indefinite ideas.te a word on what a 'notion' means. they have laid hands on. but only the one factor of this category of relation . if not even of supreme interest. the most external and the worst. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. . it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject.and s till less take trouble about it . depend solely on the different modes of this unity. inorganic and living . at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. i. viz. and which they ascribe to philosophy.g.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. e.said pores being the negative.and that the factor of indet erminateness . Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. But the question is. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. omnipresence. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. with God's omnipresence.g.is identity.falsely as a fact . But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. as in the physical field the physicist. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. and the empty absolute. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. But they show so little acquaintance with them . they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. in the pores of th e physicists . I n the philosophical field they proceed. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. composition.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . however. not the concrete unity. mere ide ntity. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. and that amongst the m there is great variety. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general.the world as much as Go d . and that it is the system of identity. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . but with concrete unity (the notion). but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d.has the same solid substantiality as the other.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. with abstract unity. providence. where they are utterly unknown. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial .that. etc. they import them into philosophy. And as in their judgement either of the two .e. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. it is not. is what one expect s. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. the notion and content of philosophy. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. a nd assert . or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. and lose sight of the chief point of interest .
and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. but the many-shaped modes specified.their everything.by which notions are perverted into their opposite. which causes the movement and development. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. sunders itself. making the former its presupposition. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . in his relation to the world. for its middle term: a middle. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. as of cognitions. But in ascribing to God.as the mediating agent in th e process . They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine.the logical system.it is the nature of the fact.knowing reaso n. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. the absolutely universal. a system of identity. as other than they. of which liberty is the aim. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . this stale gossip of oneness or identity. not abstract unity. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. If statements as to facts are put forward. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. on the shoulders of philosophy. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement.e. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. i. an All-one doctrine. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. and which is itself the way to produce it. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. On account of this chorus of assertions.which. or as prevaricating for a purpose. and as implicitly the Idea. and notions . which has self. then. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . the notion. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. and the latter its universal extreme. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. is philosophy itself. The esoteric study of God and identity. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning.it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. standing between the Mind and its essence. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. which .and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . y . But to put that sort of thing. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. Nature . as process of the I dea's subjective activity.ity .
eternally sets itself to work. in f ull fruition of its essence. The eternal Idea.et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. . engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind.
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