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INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any
attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i
s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as
treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.
and the only problem was how to comprehend it. and so the self-externalism. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought.the passive of Aristotle. ANTHROPOLOGY. whereas the 'vital' matter. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism.e. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. on the one hand. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. i. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. and not as the immediate or natural individual. to which they might perhaps add space and time. but soul. which is potentially all things. like heat. as absolute negativity. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. Wherever there is Nature. its simple 'ideal' life. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. identical ideality of it all. It is otherwise with Mind. not merely lacks gravity.SUB-SECTION A. matter is regarded as something true. which is the fund amental feature of matter. li ght. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . the sou l is its universal immaterialism. the soul is only the sleep of mind . This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. a nd the soul remains the pervading. however.with th is proviso. in a sense. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. perhaps. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. There. These 'imponderables' . The usual answer. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. where the othe . was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. But not merely is it. etc. and. however. At such a stage it is not yet mind. thus come into being. except where.the truth that matter itself has no truth. indeed. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. even the capacity of offering resistance. Mind. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature.. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. as such a result. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. and mind conceived as a thin g. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. have still. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. on the other.
as in the case of Lei bniz. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. they are natural objects for consciousness. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. even these few and slight susceptibilities. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. its immediate being . and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. . m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. re tains an abstract independence. into the absolute syllogism. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. etc. based upon participation in the common life of nature. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. Descartes. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). as individualized.r is not . (c) Thirdly.e. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. sidereal. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. a world-soul. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. T hus. and the periods of the day. Malebranche.e.whence Epicurus. disappear. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement.or corporeity . but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. Hence. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects.the natural soul. In nations less intellectually emancipated. when it presents itself as a single soul. so holding. and. there philosophers took God. is too abstract. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. merely as another word for the incomprehensible.(a) In its immediate natural mode . and always more or less.is moulded into it. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. so to speak. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. or. and telluri c life of man. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. in many case s completely. on the contrary. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. with Leibniz. and. as an anima mundi. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. the changes of the seasons. not. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. Spinoza. Animals and pl ants. upon it. which only is. (b) Secondly. in the modes of that being. just in proportion to his civilization. remain for ever subject to such influences. But either this identity. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. and does not rise or develop into system. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . as so often is done. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. as in the case of Spinoza. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. These have. described. it is a soul which feels. feels the difference of climates. it may be.
Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna.mind wrapped up in itself. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age).¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. and as stages in its development. scientific. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. Thirdly. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. fancies. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. carrying out these universa .on a ph ysical basis. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . on the whole. The contrast between the earth's poles.the sexual relation . or artistic. physiognomy. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). And that individuality marks both the world which. hopes. as alterations in it. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea.a worl d no longer incomplete. the one permanent subject. widely distant from each other. we see man in his true relation to his environment. shows. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. This . and the position of the individual himself. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. character. fails to meet his ideal requirements. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. in purposes political. talent . By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. and on the other. as it exists. on its one side. bodily structure and disposit ion. we find its diversities. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. He begins with Childhood . ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. we find it as the special temperament. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. of families or single individuals. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. shows an active half. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood).
from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff .Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . . i n an unintelligent way. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. which are often addressed to philosophy: .not as a merely negative rest from it. as already noted. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. viz. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. or self-centralized being. although. . The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. distinguishes itself from its mere being. . The characterization given in the section is abstract. (c) Sensibility(3) . each point. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. on a v isit to the University of Pavia.The waking is not merely for the observer. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. for example.Napoleon. as before explained . But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. in the first instance. but as a return back from the world of specialization. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. put this question to the class of ideology. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. as they may be called. sleep.
¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. and is so felt. etc. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us.identity of our self-centred being.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. mean. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. it is true. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. in its own self. This should hardly need enforcing. primarily. in the feeling. but treated as bel onging to its most special.set over against consciousness. are in order to be felt. ho wever. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. adultery. The fact that these particulars. true. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. etc. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. the conscience. just. not mere alterations. is what we call sensibility. the naturally immedi ate. moral. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. One. Another.g. mora l. be it noted. evil. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. where they are impl icitly as in their substance.. which. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. and . where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. belonging as it does to natural.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. are our very own. godless. invested with cor poreity. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. etc. blasphemy. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. fornication. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. the fact is a mode of my individuality. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. and the character. on one hand. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. and to be as if found. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). murder . It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . On the other hand and conversely. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. the inarticulate bre athing. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). and religious. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. But if put in the feelin g. are found by the waking soul. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. for itself. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. its natural peculiarity. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. as 'ideally' in it and made its own.
of self. the blood. to take possessi on of it. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. following the special character of the mental mode. o f colours. In the usage of ordinary language. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations .it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . (b) THE FEELING SOUL . are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . What it has to do. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. to the character of subjectivity.g. to realize its mastery over its own. (¤ 317) . works itself out. and their corporization.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. tones. smells. with which that substance is one. e. As sentient. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. are formed from their mental source. in a special system of bodily organs. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head.it is a soul which feels. (¤¤ 321. distinction appears as mere variety . for example. with its varieties of language. (c) the sense of solid reality.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications.the senses of definite light. of heavy matter. (¤ 300). sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling.e. sighs. just because they are immediate and are found existing. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation .in the system of the senses. ¤ 402 Sensations. 322). set in its self-centred life.because in it. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. laughter. i ts merely virtual filling-up. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. . the soul is no longe r a mere natural. the 'irritable' system. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. especially the passions or emotions. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. and voice in general. We should have. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states.and of sound.a psychical physiology. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. is to raise its substantiality. the centre of the 'sensible' system. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. i. but an inward. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. therefore. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. the immediacy of mode in feeling .(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation.
and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). once mor e come to light. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. etc. thoughts.that world being included in it and filling it up. the s oul is characterized as immediate. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . in an implicit mode.as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. but a negation. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. in sickness. the corporeity. which is disease. In the present stage we must treat. in whi ch all this is stored up. By itself. It is only when I call to mind an id ea.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it..the existent spe culative principle. As sentient. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. to which the soul. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). ideas and information. it brings within itself. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. so far as that is. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. but only to his im plicit self. it implies a want of adaptation. which is at the same time its predicate. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. Some times. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. secondly. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. ideas. virtually retained. ¤ 404 As individual. acquired lore. may again sink down. without existing. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. Thus in the body it is one simple. omnipresent unity. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. first. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. although it does not exist. At the present stage this singleness is. They were not in our possession. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . yet as the soul is in that content still particular . the content is its particular world. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. prima rily. and to that world it stands but as to itself. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. to be defined as one of feeling . the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. where the real is put past . etc. a deep featureless characterless mine. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world .
and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. injuries. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. intellige nt. as yet nothing impenetrable. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. character. Here are two individuals. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. and of character. because immediate. incl inations.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. say between friends. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. the psychical relationship. of the mother. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. as concrete subject ivity. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material.is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. his secular ideas. not a true subject reflected int o itself. self-conscious. fortunes. developed interests.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual.a substance. self-possessed. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. tal ent. not as a mere possibility. and is therefore passive. which. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. By the self-hood of the latter it . it is. of life. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: .a subject which may even exist as another individu al. The moth er is the genius of the child.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. etc. placenta. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. the single self of the two. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . controlling genius thereof. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. and reasonable. but as efficiency and realized activity. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. etc. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. as it has existence of its own.. is visibly present as another and a different individual. or capac ity. or virtuality. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. congenital disposit ion and temperament. temper. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena).. whose decision is ul . Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. etc. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . not yet as its self. idiosyncrasies. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. etc.
be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. But such a verification would. This totality forms his actual ity. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . it must be added.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. it might seem. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. means. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. At the same tim e.his fun damental interests. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. first of all call for verificati on. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. is. To that end the phenomena. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. educated. in which the individual here appears innnersed. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. intentions. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. on the other hand. on the cont rary. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. it has already been call ed his genius. self-possessed human being is a disease.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. in other words. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. that it is in harmony wi th the facts.to show.to be mere deception and impo sture. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. The facts. which are also means and ends to each other.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it.
on those left behind. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other.a genius which beh olds itself. or at the approach of death. But such clairvoyance . external one to another. etc. tastes. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. and character. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. in catalepsy. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. exist for it as an outward objectivity. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. then.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. And because it is the adult. for example. unless by the aid of religion. after the downfall of the Roman republic.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. in whom it sees. formed. and the like. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents.). and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. not really a 'person'. f riends. But. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. . a formal vision and awareness. (Thus Cato. wh en it is healthy and awake. reads. subject to the power of another person. and c ontinues to be. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. and other diseases. like that of the child in the womb. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. not on the spot. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. the selfless individual. but it is empty. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . etc. etc. those c onnected with female development. the magnetizer. subje ctive reason. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. When the substance of both is thus made one.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . . and to know which. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. ca pable of conveying general truths. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. which lead up to the result . smells. is this. in its sober moods. his own and that of the magnetize .not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. and hears. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep.) Compare h ome-sickness. that it is a state of passivity. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. is under a veil. however. . then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. which.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state.
and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. In this way it is self. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. for example. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. i. as in the morbid state alluded to. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. though all-embracing. in its capacity as individual. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. and hence. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. etc. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . between intelligent personality and objective world. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. In considering insanity we must. the 'common sense'. one sees and hears with the fingers.fe eling. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. is without any definite points of attachment . causality. it is still susceptible of disease. which. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. beholds. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. on the contrary. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. e. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. i s just this form of immediacy. and at the same time. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. anticipate the full-grown an . in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. or med icines for them. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. is impossible. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. receives. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy.r. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. in this nominal perception. so long as we assume independent personalities. which still marks the self-feeling. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. which is no less a world of law. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. as in other cases.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. etc.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. The purely sensitive life. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. reasons. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life.
only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side .. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. earthly elements are set fr ee . is undistinguis hed from them. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. as now regarded. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. This humane treatment. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish.merely personal love and hatred. and the rest of the passions . presupposes the patient's rationality. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement).e. loss of health (if it were that. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). And so too the particularity is. Mind as such is fr ee. may. pride.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. the self is to be stamped upon. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. In the concrete. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. i. A violent.feeling. and made appear in. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness.. as a thing.e. i. and be a realized u niversality. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. i.fan cies and hopes . but only derangement. and so also may the cure. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. mere and total. etc. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. such as vanity. moral and theoretical.just as physical disease is not an abstract. desire. it would be death). idea.that evil which is always latent in the heart.e. equally formal. the. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. is diseased. This particular being of the soul is t . is relaxed. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. however. which is there also. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. but a contr adiction in it. and so makes part of the actual self. passions. as it aris es.d intelligent conscious subject. so as to insert them in their proper place. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. etc. and their gratification). Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. as something natural and existent. this life of feeling. and also desires. that it is liable to insanity . but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. . what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. instincts. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. inclination. and it is only as a thing.
if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. when the co rporcity. of it. of which it is the subjective substance. a pure act of intuition. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. And consciousness it becomes. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. weariness o . empty space and empty time. and that as a barrier for it. nor is absorbed in the m. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. The soul is freed from them. but the basis of consciousness. heat. will. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. or dependent in regard to it. For. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. has been absorbed by it.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. i. dist inguishing it from itself . One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. and for that reason n ot free. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . here we have it breaking with this corporeity. Habit is rightly called a second nature. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). and so no longer interested. even in being affected by them. That is to say. are only subjectiv e forms. this being of the soul.e. lacking consciou sness. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. the one and the same. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . partly only relative. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. and the mere substance. and the generation o f habit as practice. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent.he factor of its corporeity. but still free. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings.itself a simple being . and which still continues to exist. therefore. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. Habit like memory. is reduced to unity. so is that pure being (which. a second nature. on the contrary. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. but has them and moves in them.. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them.and becoming the 'ideal'. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. occupied. et c. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). without feeling or consciousness of the fact. sleep. su bjective substantiality of it . as. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. The natural qualities and alterations of age. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. nature.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. or of the immediate corpo reity as such.
combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. or skill. acquires a strength which consists in this. intuition.f the limbs. sweet tastes. and it is habit of living which brings on death. whereof we sha ll speak later. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. too.is felt. nor a transient emotion or idea. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. or.g. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude.. his upright pos ture. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). so that when the conception (e. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. etc. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. are no longer bothered with it. And it is true that the form of habit. The most ext ernal of them. Habit on an ampler scale. the spatial direction of an individual.enabling the matter of consciousness. if quite abstract. etc. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. an 'ideality' of soul . consciousness. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. to be his as this self. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. reflection. and particul ar. nor are they in conce ption rational. and the self-feeling as such. which make it up. and no other. .. consciousness. Thinking. habit is usually passed over - . viz. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. to exist as substance in its corporeity. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. and thus to enable the soul.). is recollection and memory.e. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. that although the frost.or the misfortune . t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. under its volitional and conceptual characters. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. re ligious. a particular organ of i ts organic system). i. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. but part and parcel of his being. nor an abstrac t inwardness. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. intelligence. to be made a power in the bodily part. cut off from action and reality. this soul. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. made into an instrum ent. like any other. and any other purp oses and activity. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. habit diminishes this feeling.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. casual. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. and that they. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. a series of musical notes) is in me. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. etc. moral. without an express adjustment. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. like their satisfaction. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. has been by will made a habit .concentration. etc.. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. This is the rational liberation from them. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. and especially so in the specific bodily part. Even here. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. etc.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness .
and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. indefinite..laughter. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. 4. still vainer than a signatura rerum. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. the upright figure in general. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. and making it its own. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. Naturliche Qualitaten. And the human figure. In this identity of interior and exterior. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. Seen from the animal world. as the absolut e instrument. for example. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. or abstract universality. but the soul. 1. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. a world external to it . and inexpressible a modific ation. for the soul. especially the hand. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. and the formation of the limbs. 5. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. 3. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. The soul. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. and i s infinite self-relation. in being related to which. Under the head of human expression are included. Naturliche Seele. in its concentrated self. in other words. Empfindung. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. of which it is the sign.either as something contemptible . finds itself there a single subject. 71). placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. This externality. represents not itself. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. Die fuhlende Seele. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. unable to represent it in its actual universality. weeping. absorbing it. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. 'The autho . thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. the latter subject to the former. it is related to itself. This note is so slight. etc.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. cuts itself off from its immediate being. or the 'immediacy' of mind. of the mouth . 2. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. while language is its perfect expressi on.
Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. seem to be its own activity. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. Selbstgefuhl. The mind as ego is essence. as this absolute negativity.it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. and . PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. but is implicit. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. as external to it. Hence consciousness. to it. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. It is of this latter. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm).the light. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. but when he receives the inspired word. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. in the sphere of essence. is only its abstract formal ideality. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . as subjective reflection in itself. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. but since reality. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. thus first made explicit as the Ego. which manifests itself and something else too . not to the wisdom. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind.e. does not. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . but to the foolishness of man. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. 6.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. and as such it is C onsciousness. like reciprocal dependence in general. Gewohnheit. i. 8. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams).to an equal freedom as an independent object. now. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. 7. something dark and beyond it. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. Ego.the soul's natural life . As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality.
is further characterized a s immediately singular. what makes the object the subject's own. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. and even t he Idea of Nature. a thing-in-itself. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness.e. immediate consciousness. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . a singular. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). and puts it first under the category of being. an existing thing..as a case of correlation . still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. Ego. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce.e. but only as it is in reference to something else. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. This is sense-consciousness. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. a something. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. i. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. the substantial and qu alitative. the subject of consciousness. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. the notion of mind.a subject-objectivity. or mere c ertainty. (b) self-consciou sness. Consciousness .comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. etc. in other words. As against Spinozism. with an object set against it. i. but as poorest in thought. for which ego is the object. It appears as wealth iest in matter. t heir absolute interdependence. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. an intuitive intellect. as Reason. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. which is not as its own. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. an existent. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). Spatial and temporal Singularn . has emerged from Spinoz ism.to the ego it seems an alteration of the object. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. and underived certainty of it. being immediate. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. The object similarl y. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. reflected in itself. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). The object is only abstractly characterized as its. and that the philosophy. and so on. to raise its self-certainty to truth. first. again.
). is sense-perception. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. to which. and. reflected in itself. experiences. but as mediated. to describe the sensible. or the distinction which is none. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. a something external to it.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. not as merely immediate. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). has. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . p. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. the distinction on its own part. ¤ 423 The law. permanent term s. which form the alleged ground of general experience. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. .the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. however. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . however.e. it is related. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. has many properties. an abstract identity: on the other hand. so constr uing the object. viz.ess. the one of the terms. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. by being regarded in their bearings. as we called it. having passed beyond the sensible. reflectional attributes. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. and not yet as external on its own part. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. and universal. lies im mediately in the other. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. and more or less by the sciences. what it is in truth. Thi s inward. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. wants to take the object i n its truth. in this case by t he Ego. reflected upon. on one hand. and am aware'. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. 73). free from this negative l ink and from one another. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. or as being beside and out of itself. but brought to rest and universality. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . in that manner. of the thing is. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground .a copy of the phenomenon.bet ween the individuality of a thing which. its necessity on its own part. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . and sensuous consciousness. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena .a variety of relations. i. But in this manner the interior distinction is. i.e. taken in its concrete content. the thing. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. as not externally different from the other. and universalities.
as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. this identity comes to be for the ego. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. or implicitly. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. The two processes are one and the same. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. in its immediacy. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. the latter.With this new form-characteristic. and ma intains itself as such. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. in this return upon itself. or. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . On the external side it conti nues. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. there is strictly speaking no object. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. on the contrary . therefore. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. and itself made actual. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. pure 'Ideality'. and thus in it I am aware of me. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. can make no resistance: the dialectic. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. being merely consumed. its satisfaction realized. with the nega tion of it. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. primarily describable as an individual. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. implicit in it.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. therefore. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. The certitude of one's self. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. is a singular. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. and a desire (appetite) . pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. knows itself implicit in the object. To this activity the object. nominally. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. on the whole. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness.
though by the abstract. This other. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. not their underlying and essential principle. at first immedi ately. f rom the essential point of view (i. In that other as ego I behold myself. and formation of it. solves the contradiction. must likewise be kept in life. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. it. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. Thus arises the status of master and slave. on the ir phenomenal side. ¤ 434 This status. when we look to the distinction of the two. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. as the existence of hi s freedom. and the means for entering into relation with them.e consciousness of a 'free' object. as one of two things for another.e. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. preservation. and its being for others. which falls on another. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. then. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. is yet. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual.but only p eril. the slave.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. Thus the death of one. and thus give existence to my freedom. in the service of the master. Force. and to exist as such for the other: .t he process of recognition. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. and incurs a like peril for its own . w hich however is also still outside it. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. we see. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. however. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. however. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . While the one com batant prefers life. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. Force. therefore rude. in the first place. ¤ 435 But secondly. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. negati on of immediacy. a suppression. which is the basis of this phenomenon. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. the slave. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. retains his single self-consciousness.for the means of mastery. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. from one point of view. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. the outward and visible recognition). works off his individualist self-will. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states.
the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. love. whilst it signifies that the object. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. fatherland. bu t the truth that knows it. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. as its peculiar mode and immanent form. . Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. friendship. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. For truth here has. than they are its own thoug hts. valour. ego. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. Der Verstand. 5. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. Truth. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. idle fame.which is Reason. and of all virtues. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . the self-centred pure notion.the passage to universal self.f wisdom' . so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. honour. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness.is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . or determinations of the very being of things. Reason. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity.in family. Selbstbewu§tsein.or rather it is a difference which is none. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. state. therefore. fame.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . Die Begierde 6. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. Wahrnehmung 3. is mind (spirit). aware of what it is. 1.consciousness. is Reason. is now itself universal. 4. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. etc. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . The uni versality of reason.
then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features.7. the latter now an infinite form which is not. in the soul as a physical mode. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. PSYCHOLOGY. i. SUB-SECTION C.in one word. and which as the reality of that notion. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. however. desires. or. in so far as it has an object. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. neit her subjective nor objective. This..apart b oth from the content. and above the complication with an external object . though it no longer has an object. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. what is the same thing. in so far as . and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . Mind is finite. remembering. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. restricted by that content. as its concept has just shown. etc. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. Mind. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. Die Vernunft. And it is a matter of no consequence. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. above the material. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. therefore. ideation. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . which is defined as it s notion. in thinking also and in desire and will. etc. Cons ciousness is finite. like consciousness.mental vision. it is finite by means of its immediacy.. then its reality is that reason. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. viz. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. etc.e. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. it has a mode in its knowledge. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C.the former a simple immediate totality. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason.
In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. that aspect is twofold . as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. i. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. in so far as its existent phase. to reach and get hold of itself. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. viz. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. the mind finds in itself something which is. and the negative aspect of mental activity. so far. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. the na tural soul (¤ 413). and to liberate itself to its elf. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment.as being and as its own: by the one. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). by the other it affirms it to be only its own. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent.e. and make the affection subjective.e. forces. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities.e. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. When the affection has been rendered its own. equally. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. and being a rational knowledge. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. and its activity can only have itself as aim. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. i. k nowledge. or. and is even there a return into itself. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. viz. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. As the theory o f Condillac states it. it is . Similarly.reality of its reason. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. that is. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. and are the mind's own. of comprehending itself. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. in freedom. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. is misconceived and overlooked. Thus.
Its activity has to do with the empty form . e. and therefore a restricted content. belong to a point of view utt . The course of this elev ation is itself rational. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. while it has to do with autonomous products. has a material which is only nominally such. and that in its empirical condition. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it.g.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. Inwards . elevates itself. but) enjoyment. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. But as knowledge. wi th a material which is its own. is thus also a reality . its content is at first only its own. The nominal knowledge. which in the first place is likewise formal . while the practical. along with which the content is realized as rational. for which it gains the form of universality.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. as it is said. It is still extremely ill off. like logic. This position of psychology. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. both for the mind as such. This activity is cognition.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. which it and the content virtually is. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason.. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. to definite and conceptual knowledge. Ou twards.i. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. and heartless intellects . mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. as r eason is concrete. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action.(b) Will: practical mind. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. to get at the notion and the truth.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. and of the heart without the intellect . which is only certitude. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. and gains abstract auton omy within. etc. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. and is immediately willed. in the theoretical range. merely as facts. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world.e. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. the word. just as they are given. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. Psychology.
by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . Faculty. or mind.e. viz. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. remembers. etc. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. by cognitive intuition. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. are not isolated. it is admitted. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . intuition. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. imagination. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. If they are isolated. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. or makes the concept its own.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object .whi ch. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . etc. conception.in a word . like power or force. But the true satisfaction. by rational conception. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . that intuition. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. cognitive conception. it . etc. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). however. conceived as reflected into self. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. as non-intelligent). Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows .its out-of-selfness . if answered in the negative. just so far as it realizes itself. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. But c ognition is genuine. imagines.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. intelligen ce. as it is by the same method brought into nature. note). as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . etc. is bro ught into mind. conception. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. It is true that even as isolated (i. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself.is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. memory. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. imagination. must lead to abandoning the effort. remembrance. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. etc. conceives.besides which it al so intuits. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul.
and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective.is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity.one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. projects it into time and space. in t he truth of mind. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. may just as likely be narrow and poor. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object.but to his feeling. in content and value entirely contingent. With us. the mere consciousness point of view. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas.his private and p articular self. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . a . that is t o say. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. has the form of casual particularity . is swallowed up. Hence feeling. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. as it were the closes t. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . 254). external or internal. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally.an active self-collection . but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. we have the one fa ctor in Attention .to the generalit ies of common sense . contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. with the character of something existent. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have .It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. . as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. Feeling is the immediate. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. but rather as subject ive and private. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling.t he factor of fixing it as our own. this mode is simple. Now the material. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. or at least to reasons .
though intrinsically concrete. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things.e. yet without being in consciousnes s. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . which. isolated. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. in virtual possibility. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. with a preponderating subjectivity. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. and is arbitrary or contingent. its when and where. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. but stored up out of consciousness. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. still continues simple. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . i. and received into the universality o f the ego. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. the germ as affirmatively containing. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. The representation is the property of intelligence. a rec ollection of itself. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition.the germ of the fruit. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. in the way we treat.in a space and a time of its own. for example. as tho ught. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. we may say. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. and inwardly divest itself of it. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. from the external place. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. however. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. . as it at first recollects the intuition. t ime. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. or. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. which makes it its own. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. no longer needs to find the content. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition.
But it is solely in the conscious subject.Image and Idea.in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. present also a distinction in content. notion. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. under the representation (idea) with the same content. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . whatever be its content (from image. In the first place. . The image.viz.these modes of relation are not laws. which is now the power over them. if it is to exist. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. ¤ 20 note. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. but a being of its own institution. Secondly. i. though belonging to intelligence. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. such as likeness and contrast.) . where it is treasured up. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it.. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. as a unit of intuition. to be so and so. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. now that it has been endued with externality. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . comes actually into its possession. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. as of all intelligence. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. wherea s the idea (representation). The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. being and universality. reason and consequence. by which it is authenticated. where. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. at first only in space and time. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. and an out-put from its universal m ine. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. has always the peculiarity. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. The content reproduced. the matter is entirely pictorial. that it finds its material.e. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. has been broken up. or an intell ectual category. see Introduction to the Logic.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. or ide a). Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. as a matter of fa ct. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate.
T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . internal and external. are unifications of t he same factors. . Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. are completely welded into one. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal.still lacks the side o f existence. and becomes an i ndividuality. 435). this form of being. i. one's own and what is picked up. which forms their connecting link. In other words. etc. Such is creative imagination(7) . for its ideal import is its elf. a concrete subjectivity. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. or poetical imagination . allegoric. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. This force is really intelligence itself .Imagination.symbolic. is derived from the data of intuition.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . . when regarded as the agency of this unification. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. Another point calling for special notice is that. but only a nominal reason. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. Acting on this view. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. and in mechanical memory it completes. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed .Abstraction. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. some latent concept or Ideal principle. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. so far a s it is concerned.e. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. These more or less concrete.. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. recollection. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. but they are 'syntheses'. is reason. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. or something of the sort. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. to universalize it. As reason. it is self-uttering. derived from some interest.
strictly so-called. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. With regard to the elementary material of language. and even with conception and imagination. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical.. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. Such is the negativity of intelligence. The sign is some immediate intuition. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . whereas in the sign. in the first instance. the colour of the cockade.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . something accepted.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . its institution by intelligence.R auschen. its system. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401).there have been collected more than a hundred such words. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers .now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. Knarren. Sausen. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared.th at of vocal objects. conception s. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. somewhat immediate or given (for example.).that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds .speech and.in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. In logic and psychology. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. the matter of the latter is. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. It is a n image.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. But in the fusion of the two elements. and the connotation of which it is a sign. since memory. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. etc. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. . out of which it forms i deas . and where it is conserved. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . ¤ 459 The intuition . when employed as a sign. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). but as representative of something else.gives to sensations. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . This intuition is the Sign. intuitions. language . has always to do with signs only. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. have nothing to do with each oth er. e tc. but appears as recipient of sensible matter.
e. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. we may touch. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements.).The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. on anthropological articulation. only in pas sing. and now that. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. palate. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. etc. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. like the Chinese. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. instead of n ames proper. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. but. they are reduced to signs.e. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. on the other hand. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. and still takes place in Canton . It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. their signs in vocal language. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. viz. the denomination. and only get signification as signs. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. are frequently changed. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. for example. which severally receive designation. W. It is only a stationary civ ilization. if it be not altogether extinguished. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. The study of languages still in their original state. the chemical elements. alphabetical writing. in chemistry and mineralogy. i. it depends. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. . as in our signs for the numbers. as many as ten a . upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. again. i. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. As to the formal elem ent.e.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. In particular. . people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. tongue in each) and for their combinations. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. as. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). the planets . hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. i. (Cf. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. as regards signs for mental objects. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization.
The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word .the name. Engaging the attention of intelligence. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. by speaking low and soft or crying out. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. the simple straight stroke. or simple logical terms. just as in modern times (as already noted. Thus. Hieroglyphics. in the case of the Chinese Koua. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. is still for the mind simple in the name). and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. Both alike require such signs. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. however ample a connotation it may include.nd twenty. so that.the mode. peculiar to the intellect. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. while (with the facu . the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears.e. in the interest o f vision. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. like alphabetic writing. as it does. This feature of hieroglyphic . it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. the simple plain idea. The European. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. learn ing to speak Chinese. it is analysed. i. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. . It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. of uttering its ideas most worthily . Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. in speaking.is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection.
lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,
but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you
ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.
¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex
the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. Whereas in life. but presented in its universality and necessity. But where the objects sought are thus casual. joy. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. But as both. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact .indeed infinitely so. On the other hand. it is because of their quality or co ntent . The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. can also be felt.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. grief. Delight. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). and still more in mind. in its objectivity and truth. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. repentance. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially.. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth.. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. in their immediacy. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. the truth and. shame. wha t is the same thing. and to discus s their content. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. etc. in which these facts. contentment. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. and duty. If feelings are of the right sort. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. may be placed. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. volition. and precisely in that way d o they . Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. and evil. on the one hand. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . and will. we have this immanen . The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. is precisely what constitutes. namely God. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. heart. in feeling. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. lack objective determin ation. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. Thus it is. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. bad. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. in their universality and necessity.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. right. when thought. we have only to deal with the selfish. etc.retain a speciality of their own . for the latter. law and morality. and thought.but only in antithesis to the latter .
The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. as rights and duties. The answer to the question. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit.on one aim and object. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. passion is neither good no r bad.and (as there are ma ny. subjectivity . as experience shows. as r egards the form of its content. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. But with regard to the inclinations. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . finds in the conformity . The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. each with its private range). to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. however.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity.an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. on the other. and their truth. talent. are infected with contingency. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . and something inappropriate to it.Up to what degree the good continue good. while. too often.his inte rests of intellect. If the will is to satisfy itself. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. . therefore. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement.a development in which the content of autonomous . Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. character. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. The will. Will. In consequence of this formalism. which is essentially self-d etermination. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. admitting of gratification. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. be the value of tha t mode what it may. each being always in conflict to another. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. What are the good and rational propensiti es. the question is directly raised. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. they. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. In what way have they. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment.natural impulse and inclination. It is on ly a dead. Which are good and bad? . ego. Should. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. Thus. enjoyment . and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. first of all. indeed. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. but to ge t realized.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. on one hand. their mutual connect ions. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. it is pa ssion. is at first still a natural will.
and is option or choice.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness.action loses its contingency and optionality. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. The morality concerns the content of the aim. on the whole to their disadvantage.his passion. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. i. ¤ 476 The will. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. which is just as much no satisfacti on. there would be no action at all. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. which reflection and comparison have educed. of a universal sa tisfaction. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. either alto gether or in part. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. where the subject is made to close with itself. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . and social duties. It is thus 'reflecting' will. that finds its actualizing in the agent. on one hand. the impulses. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. are reduced to a m ere negative. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . an act of (at least) formal r ationality. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. is his interest and . it is on them that the decision turns. this is wh at is called the interest. . I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. As thus contradictory. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements.e. However. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. the free gift of nature. Their mutual limitation. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. moral. An action is an aim of the subject. inclinations. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. as the content. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. as thinking and implicitly free. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . which as such is the universal. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. so far as their particularity goes. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. without end. unless he had an interest in it. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim.and one satisfaction. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. They are somet imes contrasted. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. by another. an inactive thing.
even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. for example. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. and are constituted after its measure. and is will as free intelligence. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit.an individuality. of the family. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. If. or philosophy (. is in the first instance the rational will in general. or by s trength of character. the divine min d present with him. On the contrary. Whole continents. i. that will is also the act of developing the Idea.is matter of speculation. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. the will is an actually free will.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. and the abstract singleness. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . an Athenian or Spartan citizen). Remembering that free mind is actual mind. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. ambiguous. is actu ality. Africa and the East. and of which it is only t he formal activity. still this very I . If the will. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. aim. with freedom itself. so that in this sphere of particular existence. As abstract Idea again. and that as its very actuality. If to be aware of the Idea . now that the formalism. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. as realizing the idea. have never had this Idea. did not have it. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss.e. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will .e. It is thus 'Objective' Mind.e . etc. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. of present sensati on and volition. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. which i s pure and concrete at once. however.freedom itself. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. only so far as it thinks itself . ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. This universalism the will has as its object and aim.e. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. which has its true being for characteristic and aim.to be aware. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. The Greeks and Romans. and are without it still. therefore. fortuitousness . i.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim.sired . it is existent only in the immedi ate will . he is actually free.a universality which only ought to be. that is. knows this its concept. even the Stoics. he h as also. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. as the substance of the state. According to Christianity. its very au tonomy or freedom. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . and object . find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. or implicit Idea. in religion as such . man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. Plat o and Aristotle. which realizes its own freedom of will. education. i.it is the existential side of reason . in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. just because it is the very essence of mind. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite.
Das Denken. 12. if they are made slaves. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . Der Geist 2. Auswendiges.a principle of the mind and heart. 7. Inwendiges. 15. Der freie Geist. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. Gedachtnis. 10. but which they are. but the pe rmanent character . Der praktische Geist 13. which the content and aim of freedom has. religious. Anschauung.dea itself is the actuality of men . moral. 3.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. Das praktische Gefuhl. is itself only a notion . 16. Phantasie 8.not something which they have. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. 14. Die Erinnerung 6. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. 4. as men. Die Gluckseligkeit. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. But this freedom. into legal. Vorstellung. 9. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. 1. Die Intelligenz. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. Die Einbildungskraft. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. and not less into scientific actuality. 5. not with laws or court s of justice. 11. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will.
and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. private an d personal needs). the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. but in its universality. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty.e. duty in general is in me a free subject . It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. and brings into existence i n these several wills. it exists as manner and custom. But in this individualist moral sphere. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. In the morality of the conscience.. anthropological data (i. or legal possession. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. its rights of admi nistration. are its Duties.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. and is the vi rtual universal. military service. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. are no less its duties to punish. For a mode of existence is a right. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. receives the form of Necessity. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. to administer. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p.. which in it is thus at home with itself. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. as the services of the members of the State in dues. is a duty. Liberty.e. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. relation to another person .. i. etc. or Usage. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. so as to become its habit.and aim. or instituted as an authoritative power. etc. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. not in the form of impulse. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. temper. on the other hand. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. to be as a person.(1) When. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. but as possession by a person it is property. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. being universal. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. where free will has existence. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. it is a Law. in general. where they. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. and what is a duty. their absolute unity.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. But. which splits up into different heads: viz. in relation to the subjective will.at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. is also a right. These conditi ons. and character. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. in these externally objective aspects. are duties . in the light of the concept.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. Liberty. my right to a thing is not merely possession. viz. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. is the Law (Right ) . etc. The penal judicature of a government. What is a right is also a duty. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. and it is a duty to possess things as property. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer.
b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. is an individual. are simultaneously mutually independent. 1. This thing. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . as in itself still abstract and empty. and State. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. which is thus mutual. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. which as possession is a means. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. it may be. civil society. and hence as a single being . possession is property. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. or by the formatio n of the thing or. the infinite self-rela tion. but on an external thi ng. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. These extremes are the persons who. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. though it remains in trinsically the same. But the set of adjustments. it is the right of the subjective will. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. in the knowledge of their identity as free. But this predicate. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. abstract right. so as to have its existence inside it.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. by mere designation of it. and the I in it is abstractly external. Gesetz 2. the external sphere of its liberty . ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. . (C) When the free will is the substantial will. but as existence of the personality is an end. at first in the outward appropriation. As so characterized. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself.possession. Sitte A. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. morality of the individual conscience. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. (B) When the will is reflected into self. as something devoid of will. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. on its own account me rely 'practical'.
it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. and its acceptance by the other will. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . but which.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. I can just as well put it in it as not . because they face each other. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). and recogniz ed. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. which thus becomes wicked. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. ¤ 495 The contract.the full and complete deed. produces a wrong: by which. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. then the external rec . which is broug ht down to a mere sequel.just as well with draw it as not. 493 seqq. expressing the civil suit.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. non-malicious wrong. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. labour. is disinterested. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other.Contract. its changing hands. willed. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will.). against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. in that case. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. But so far as my will lies in a thing. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . This is naiv e. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. and time. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . the only diversity lies in this. universal thing or commodi ty. however. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. which. and. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. is affirmed.
in revenge. an d so on without end.on self-determination or autonom y. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . and can be seized only in t his quarter. by the n otion.is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance.where the nominal relation is retained. The former used to be the common meaning. But more than possible compulsion is not. even from the range of all existen ce.punishment.a universal which holds good for him. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. ¤ 499 (3) Finally.e. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action.) Thus the will is violently wicked. The law of nature . which is disinterested .e. is a matter of chance). or right as governed by the nature of things. is the work of Revenge. is at the same time only a new outrage. such an action is essentially and actually null.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. To display the nullity of such an act. the latter is violated.in this case the apparent recognition. howe ver. i. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. This progression. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. being conformable to the right.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. in which the law of nature should hold sway. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. and commits a crime. b ut the sterling value is let slip. on .the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) .st rictly so called . ¤ 500 As an outrage on right.a law. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise.compulsion against the thing. as a volitional and intelligent being. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. from life. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. or in corporeity. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. Conversel y.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. In it the agent. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. The 'reality' of right. The social state. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. like the last. and not merely the particular mode . that of the judge. or Natural Right. This gives the wrong of fraud . abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. But revenge. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. sets up a law . i. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. and while the former only is respected. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . which is nominal and recognized by him only . It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope .
but have their assent. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. though any alteration as such. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. embracing these individual point s. The subjective will is morally free. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. etc. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. so much as it has consciously willed. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. 2. B. Now. conscience. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. which was its purpose.a will reflected into itself so that. Moralitat 3. counts only as a person. the reason of the will. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. the will is at the same time made a particular. Das Recht. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. and willed by it. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. its own. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. my part in i t is to this extent formal. so far as these features are it s inward institution. This is the right of intention. Naturrecht. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. in mere law. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. be its affection w hat it may. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. who. recognition. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. is its deed. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. In point of form. 1. it thus includes purpose and intention . is now chara cterized as a subject . or even justification in his h eart. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. an d allows to be imputed to it. Only for that does it hold itself responsible.and also moral wickedness. sentiment.the other hand. intelligence. and thus comes into relationship with the former. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing.
and aims. This is the right to well-being. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . will .being only in this. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. they ought to stand in harmony. And yet they ought to harmonize. and yet each of them. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. a good intention in case of a crime. his interest and welfare must. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. is as g ood and as duty absolute. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. as in happiness (¤ 479). These aims. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . sup erseding this absolute claim of each. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. is not something external to him. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. essential and actual.and thus including in it particularity . which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. is always fundamentally one identity. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. it is always something particular. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. because the agent. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal.g. constitute h is well-being. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. but is a particul arity of his own . At the same time because good is one.that it contains his needs. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. can be wicked. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. in point of its matter.e. as individual and universal. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. whether the . the essential and actual good. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. though it is a particular duty. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. interests. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision.ion.a universal determined in its elf . on account of that existent sphere of liberty. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination.
In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . and the wicked. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . and we have passed into the field of ethical life. The subjectivity. The failure of the latter consists . on its negative side. non-universal. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. to be carried out in it. good.of Conscience and Wickedness.the utterly abstract semblance . th e essential thing. right . Der Vorsatz 3.the standpoint of the ought. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. 5. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. is abandoned.good is realized. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. in something external therefore. i . is. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. That. expressed by this repeated ought. its deepest descent into itself. On the affirmative side. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. which actualizes and dev elops it. The for mer is the will of goodness. which is the good. Wickedness. the truth of this semblance. THE MORAL LIFE. Moralitat 2. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . and refuse it to the wicked. Das Gute und das Bose C. the unutterable. and duty. The result. no more exist than not. is only the infinite form. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. 1. in this its identity with the good. an aim essentially and actually null. 6. 4.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity .to a goodness. which has no objectivity. rising to its pitch. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. in the notion. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. Die Absicht und das Wohl. This pure self-certitude. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. but is only sure of i tself. and of the good. which would only be abstract. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. Handlung.
In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. without any selective refl ection. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. In the latter sphere.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. however. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. controls and entirely dominates from within. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. it exists as confidence. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. in its immediacy. in its ki nd. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. mind ap pears as feeling. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. This is the sexual tie. however.the genuine ethical temper. to a spiritual significance. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. i. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . i. as against the univers al. etc.monog . is virtue.the Family. is confidence (trust) . in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'.the Political Constitution. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . The ethical personality. In the shape of the family. Thus.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. elevated. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom.Marriage. . contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal.e . and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . as deliberate work for the community. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. whose independence it.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. But the person.e. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this.th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. as an intelligent being. that it is. the individuality expres ses its special character. as personal virtues. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. manner and cu stom .Civil Society. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. temperament. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . as the mind developed to an organic actuality . the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. makes this union an ethical tie . .n a thing .where self-conscious liberty has become nature. to the total of ethical actuality. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is.yet somewhat which without all question is. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. to destiny.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity.
in educating them to independent personality. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. being an intelligent substance. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . and care for the future. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. to found anew such an actual family. into families or individuals. ¤ 522 (3) The children. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. learning. as do also its industry. or state external. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. destined. who exist independent and free. on the o ther hand. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. and thus produce more unconditional . of the possessor's will. as private persons. In virtue of such for tuitousness. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. thus invested with independence. however. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. constitutes the general stock. originally foreign to it. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. or nominal culture in general. acquire an existence of their own. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. information. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. This instrument. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. while. labour. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. on one hand. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). of legal regulation. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance.
and in it they have their social moralit y.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. 2 3/4 . of needs. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. be the righ t and just thing. talent. exists.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . its action gets direction and content through natural features. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. Thus whether three years. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . and industry. 2 4/5 years. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. and like the first a certain subsistence. Where civil society. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. to be. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. certain. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. this analysis. and so on ad infinitum. or could be.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. is developed i n detail.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. which as existence is essentially a particular. and an ensemble of contingencies. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. ten thalers. on the side of external existence. determined through reason or legal intelligence. It is a futile perfectionism to have . at every point. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. The second. which is honesty.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . or only 2 * . But when right. and of means for satisfying them. Their content per se may be reasonable . ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates.dependence on the social system. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. as well as of mental culture and habit .which is also a general business (of the whole society) . can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . of mere agents.and ye t it should be decided. their recognition and their honour. as vital. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. option. they have their actual existence. intelligence.the Law. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . The third. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. however. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. Hence. in the course of definite manifestation. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. and with it the State. though of course only at the final points of deci ding.. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. and a corresponding mode of labour. skill. also of aims and interests. and accident.
and t hus become authoritative . or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements.vi z. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . to which objective existence determines i tself. constit . or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity.e.to be promulgated and made known as laws . which again make new decisions necessary. These people forget that the stars . has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. This subjective existence.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. the need of a simpler code . . The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such.into punishment (¤ 500). In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. which discovers new distinctions.are governed and well governed too by laws. The comparison of the two species.the ne ed. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. But there is a contrary case.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. with the advance in multitude. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. hereditary divinity or nobility. even the admiration. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. not for them. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. of his countrymen. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . general laws. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number.as proven: . by faith and trust. being laws o f strict right. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused .in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. recognized. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency.and th e cattle too .as this exists as revenge . To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. whic h are only internally in these objects. inasmuch as. as it is a known law.to the individualized right . as the genuine order of life. like improvements on a f loor or a door. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known.laws.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court .even as his law can only be a just law. however. and in particular transforms this existence . are not a new hou se.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. as universal authority and necessity. in the judicial system. they touch only the abstract will . within the house . i. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis .which though something new.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. as in the mental ima ges of space. there arises.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. at the same time an externally objective existence. first really de serving the name of laws.
viz. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. because it is man's want. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. and worked from that point of view. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. so as to secure this satisfaction. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. . and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. So far as concerns them. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. appears as state. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. as at bottom different sides. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. It results also from circumstances of locality. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. be exercised as different functions. In so far. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . shou ld. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. then. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. in a uniform gen eral way.'poli . because it is only one factor. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. which.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. and to maint ain that end in them and against them.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. to the concrete of civil society. and their variable ingredients. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. mere circumstantial evidence. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. No doubt this factor is incomplete. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. . as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. and the judgement as application of the law to it. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. from the c onnections between nation and nation. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. Conversely. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession.and that. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal.as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. the position of an external un iversality.
(a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. First. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. continually produce it as their result. secondly. with all its evolution in detail.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. is its essence. which. the state only is as an organized whole.co nsists in a double function.which volition is thereby free . Thus we have the corpora tion. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . It provides for the reasonable will . and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals.in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. in this direction . and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . ¤ 539 As a living mind. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. and .coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. The same unity. and self-develop ed .one individual. s heer subjectivity. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. This universal principle. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. it protects the family and guides civil society. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. it carries back both. his independent self-will and particular interest. . (c) THE STATE. which each originally takes care of for himself. through the action of the government and its several branches. but. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests.ce'. receiving.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. On the other hand. self-originated. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. they are re strictions. then it promotes their welfare. First it maintains them as persons.the reasonable spirit of will. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. to the immediate agent. Secondly.as an actuality . and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals .international (outer-state) law. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . and not left to perish. The cons titution is existent justice .into the life of the universal substance. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. however. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. differentiated in to particular agencies. But. but which has a thoroughly general side. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. and.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. also for that will being put in actuality. Thirdly.
and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. as it exists as s uch. But. eligibili ty to office. which it can without incompatibility allow. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. private as well as public rights of a nation. as regards the concrete. logically carried ou t. i. As regards Liberty. etc. etc. rejects all differences. as it ha ppens. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions).Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle.e. On the contrary. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. Equality. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. the citizens .punishment. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. were called its 'liberties'. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. without further specification and development. physical strength. the difference of governing powers and of governed. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). Really. otherwise have in property. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. it embodies a liberty. Nothing has become.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. talent. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. With the state there ari ses inequality. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. age. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. Rome. is abstract subjectivity.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. in other words. etc.besides their personalit y .. As regards. is so little by nature. military service. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. skill. But that this freedom should e xist. town . directories. magistracies . The principle of equality. All men are by nature equ al. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. etc. The laws themselve s. But the notion of liberty.equal in the concrete. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: .pleasure an d self-will. on the contrary. first. Formerl y the legally defined rights. presuppos e unequal conditions. .only it can make them . that it should be man (and not as in Greece. authorities. etc. and that the laws are restrict ions. It is important therefore to study them closer. the familiar proposition. that the laws rule. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. However true this is. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. on the contrary. etc. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form.as regards taxation. or even in crime. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. or destroy them. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. the current notions of l . or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that.
the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions.that which preserves. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that.e .just because of this inseparability . in which this is not formally done. i. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. The term political liberty. as a state without a constitution. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . has an insight and conviction of his own . is . A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it.as sec urity of property. not merely with regard to the naturalness. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality.a thing that has nev er happened in history. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. The question . it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education.iberty only carry us back to equality. But the more we fortify liberty. and to regard a state. and must deal with them as it ca n. be it added. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. just as little as the making of a code of laws.) But the guara ntee lies also. of liberties in general. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. and the organization of the actualization of them. with its insatiate vanity. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. ¤ 541 The really living totality .To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. with this development of particularity. self-w ill and self-conceit. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. and thus gains moral independence. of others. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. however. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and.e. If . . in other words continuall . and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les.
this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'.y produces the state in general and its constitution.su bject always.e. Only through t he government. . which includes an already existing development of differences. all-decreeing will of the state. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. i. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. . it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. ¤ 542 In the government . the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. as in a democratic constitution. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. and the government be merely executive and dependent . and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. the participation of all i n all affairs . These. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'.the will of a decreeing individual. however. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. which taken apart is also particular). is the self-redintegrating notion. of the family and of civil society. equally disorganizes actuality. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. but an actual indiv idual .regarded as organic totality . But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . as in the patri archal society . meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . The government is the universal part of the con stitution. (A mistake still greater. is the state one. is the government. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence.or. i. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence.impugns the principle of the division of powers.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion.monarchy. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . presupposes ignorance that the true idea.the all-sustaining. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence.in a state of society. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. as always. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein.e. in other words. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason.to make it the first power. In the perfect form of the state.
The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. as it were.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance.. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. civil society. etc. lik e peace and war. The division of constitutions into democracy.as also feudal monarchy. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing .partly.such as ochlocracy. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. and above all personal liberty. to subjectivity. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. .the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. For it is as private persons t .in short. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment .if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . and skill for such ends. aristocracy and monarchy. and are to that degree private person s. which having their busin ess appointed by law. administration and police. Thus.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . to that end and for that reason. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). personal interference and action of th e State as one man. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. first. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. in the history of the State. These principles are those expounded earlier. too. aptitude. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. there arises the participation of several in state-business. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. That subjectivity . the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. Two points only are all-important. and then of nature . These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures.e. essentially. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. possess independence of a ction. an actual existence. legislative power.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . especially in legislation . and with earlier transition-forms.'ideal' unity. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . with its industry and i ts communities.viz. The pure forms . with their general opinion. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. i.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills.are. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. admini stration of justice or judicial power. liberty of property. participate in the governmental power. Secon dly. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. being simple self-relation. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. involve the. in so far as they are finite and in course of change.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . it may be .
is no t self-destructive. wild. ¤ 529 note). in arrangements for art and science. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. The so-called financial law. like that of the stormy.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. In a civilized state. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers.would be. however. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. elemental sea. indeed the whole. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs.e. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . in the general sense of embracing a wide. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. and form a particular kind . which. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. If the main part of the requirement were .the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election).regard ed as permanent. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. as such an aggregate. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. in the law and liberty of property. that t hey enter upon that participation.the contrary must be the case . or in its 'reflectional' universality. be they treated as mere individuals. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. it is not a brutish mass. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. moreover. inorganic shape. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. i. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. so far as they form only one branch of that power . or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete.as it very likely is . The des irability of such participation.a spiritual element . ever newly recurring. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. Take the case of England which. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. however. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t .a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. range of the extern al means of government. s ense of general wants. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. as the nation . and therefore more urgent. demoralization. as estates. Experience s hows that that country . but as organic factors.as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. to power and act ion. blind force. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts.which should be presupposed. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials .
as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. of the whole of the finances.is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. as content o f a true law. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce.g. but only parties. in which there would no longer be a government. and becomes the estate of bravery. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. and thus. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence .with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive .. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. i. In their mutual relations. waywardness and chance have a place. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. a state of war. is really engaged with strict executive business. afresh.e. In one case the . to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. or every few years. when it makes a decree about finance. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled.so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. Then again.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. and not to be made yearly. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. and not actually existent. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions.e.i. e. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion.
and as regards its range and scope. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. In general. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. it passes int o universal world-history. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. which actually is and will be realized in it . It is in time. and on history-writing in general. each of which. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character.of sacerdotal races . ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. first in general. is called an a prio ri view of it. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . both this general recognition. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. etc. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. that. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. especially on the philological side. It has. and above all universal history. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law.. in short. a history of its own. it. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. are settled and fixed. That history. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. however. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. of a Roman epic. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it.a world-mind. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. as it is a history.the judgement of the world. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. As this development is in time and in real existence. this note must go into further deta il. in defiance of . is founded on an essential an d actual aim. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. Fictions. and in Germany more than in France and England.the plan of Provide nce. internat ional law rests on social usage. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. On th is point. when we come to minutiae.and. an d the special claims of nations on one another. is appointed to occupy only one grade. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. in short. there is Reason in history. and then in history. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state.
It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. state.appears to run . Ay. has. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. no history . A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties.). even such singularities as a petty occurrence.the best-accredited history.to say a word on that here .g. and takes place within it. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. a word. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. e. on the other hand. express not a subjective particularity. etc. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. is not only against taste and judgement. not as good as a fairy tale. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian.e. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. and rejects both ki nds of interest. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. i.like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. but violates th e principles of objective truth. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. and. What happens to a nation . But. The point of interest of Biography . Rome and its fortunes. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. in the interest of so-called truth. in striking portraiture and brevity. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. if he had not an interest. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. a nation. or. and criticize events. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. strictly s peaking. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. a civilization. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. but an age. and an exclusive interest in justice. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. or if he declined to judge at all. as in the romance.
the absolute L aw. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. in this case. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition.or in other words that Reason is in history . as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. really. and the business of so doing.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. only opinions and mere ideas. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. are instruments. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . a development determined by the notion of spirit. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit.e. is the supreme right. which is what is pe culiar to them. if Rome or the German empire. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. i. to the history of religion. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . is the empty form of activity. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. the freak of humour. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. The mere play of sentiment. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. Only therefore through their relationship to it. which all alik e have no stuff in them. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. and its content is prese . i. first in general. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . potentially infinite. For Spirit is consciousn ess. i. the consciousness of it. and secondly. as over a special grade. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. But biography too has for its background the historical world. etc.an accurate report of externals. truth. and their subjectivity. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim.admitting. and are all treated as indifferent. But. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . i. and of its essence. and there fore as a work of individuals.e.Fame. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. we may add. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. these individuals. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. has another ground and interest than his tory. have they their value and even their existence. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . liberty. 550). and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. etc. which is their reward. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. on the contary. while it inheres in them.e. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. Such a doctrine .e. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will.
that elevation to God really involves. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom.e. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. i. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. as true in the world of free will.e.a mere 'ought' . Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. ¤ 204 not e). For that st arting. note). But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. forme rly noticed. i.e. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. At this rat e. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit.is the peculiar perversity.as is the case with all speculative process . as it has been already shown (¤ 192. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. i. the idea of God it kn . as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. This factor. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. as law and duty. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. however. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation.e. actually accomplished in the ethical world. now gets its most concrete interpretation.Liberty. especially ¤ 51. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. and that on the religious. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. from which the start is now made. Such apprehension. cf. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. But . As regards the 'mediation' which. is the purification. lays hold of its concr ete universality. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. But the spirit which think s in universal history.consciousn ess. Th e finite.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. i. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. The spirit. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. in the system of laws and usages. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. is the real ethical self.
i.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. and in the act of faith. i.as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. first of all. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own.e. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. and ex pecting miracles from them. the host as such is not at first consecrated. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . differing from the former in body and value of truth. but purely subjective in individuals: . But if this present self-consciousness is la cking.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth .or it may be. and superstition. It leads. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. B . as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts.partly as mere moving of the lips. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. religion was a late r addition. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. but in the moment of enjoymen t. non-spirituality.e. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . generally. and even as mutually indifferent. (In the Lutheran Church.ows must be the true and real. And. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. on the contr ary. in point of form. i. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. then there may be created.addressing his devotion to miracle. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root.logi cally enough . even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. and law and justice. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. to justification by external wo rks. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. It lea ds to a laity.e. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. and these applications of it in the religious life. morality and conscience. and prays others to pray . As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated.e. in the annihilation of its externality. a condition of spiritual sla very. for thought and knowledge . The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source.the body of religious truth. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order .) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. even to bones. in its faith and in its con science. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. i. one religious and an other ethical. But in poin t of form. springing from some force and power.working images.of bondage. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state.
Thus. lacked liberty. and. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality.in short. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. unte nable. founded on principles of reason. i. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry.an obedience which is itself the true freedom.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . i. if taken alone. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. Let us suppose even that. which does not rise in hostility against them. Instead of the vow of chastity. Thus set free. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. a code of law should arise. and in the use of property . moral life in the state. so to speak a priori. and political institutions deduced from them must be. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. The precept of religion.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). because the state is a self-possessed. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. and in a special sense Philosophy. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. So long as t he form. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. And instead of the vow of obe dience.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible.of honesty in commercial dealing. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. can law and morality exist. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. . the wisdom of the world. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. .e. therefore. self-realizing reason . it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. leads it into the rea l world. no matter how.e. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. and thus only. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. i.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. sti . marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. . It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it.e. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. our consciousness and subjectivity. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own.
on the other hand. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. when specially set in relief as genus. to put it simply. the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. e. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws .mi nd intrinsically concrete . however sound their provisions may be. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets.is the intellectual and thinking self. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. This absolute nucleus of man . that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. . What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. At best it is only a temporary expedient . In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. or. etc. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit.to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion.is just this . which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own.ll. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness.to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. thus founder on the conscience. Such laws.among which laws these guarantees are included. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. and the power given them to fix the budget. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. This additional 'individuality' . on one hand. (cf. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. so-called 'chambers'. ¤ 544 note). that the Idea must be regent. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. thus surmountin . from those deeper requirements which..g. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane.
or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . on its own s howing. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. as demoralization. and so also one-sided phase. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . ¤ 513. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . As it left therefore behind. however. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. The form in its infinite tru th. of philosophy. from religion. religion. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. pictorial representation. which is developed similarly. is after all only in one of its form s.the idea of the substantial moral life. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea.was that creative imagination. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. But thought always . as it grows and expands.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. but earlier than philosophy. he. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . or rather must. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation.). Political power. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . should knit it together and control it. which is awa re of its own essence. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality.and th at on account of this very principle . The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. Hence religion as such. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. His state is therefore.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. But even religion. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. for th ese reasons. Plato. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. is implicitly in absolute liberty. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. in its f irst immediate. Under the subjective form.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. Only in the principle of mind. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. which still escaped his intelligence. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. the subjectivity of mind. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. exhibits the one-sidedness. in its philosophic phase. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content.so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. so . intuition. fall feeling. earlier than it does as philosophy. etc. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. Religion may. or essential being).). does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion).
That here. as always. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). Die Weltgeschichte 10. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. of God's indwelling in us. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . Religion. 1. the constitut ion and the code. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. Die Polizei und die Corporation. 4. 9. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. 8. Gesetz. but rather to a sort of knowledge. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. Thus ul timately. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual.as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). Weltweisheit. 7. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. Inneres Staatsrecht. Das aussere Staatsrecht.e. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject.in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. Die Rechtspflege 5. In the Protestant state. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. Die Sittlichkeit. for which it is as substance. while it is self-centred identity. 2. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. i. 3. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. 6. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. as well as their several applications. Das System der Bedurfnisse.
Der absolute Geist. With the essential restrictedness of its content. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. on the other hand.in other words. so that the thought embodied. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience.something formal.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence .the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) .for the expression of spiritual truth .(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. as it is. Art requires not only an external given material . into the subject which produces that work. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. like the material which it uses to work in. which is only a sign of the Idea. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract .n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. . It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. ¤ 411). its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. its n atural immediacy.the form of immediacy as such . 1. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. c an. the actuality of the spirit.e. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. A. has in devotion . Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle .He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. viz. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. In this ideal. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation.the shape or form of Beauty.hence not the sp iritual unity. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. but . at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . and of gaining its concrete determination. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. or the idea. that is. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. reconciliation. Belief. as superseded in spirit. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. But. On one hand. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce.i. aware.
without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. . the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . as free spi rit. but its inmost depth. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. but as only finding himself in himself. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies.can try to bring itself to consciousness.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. and of its constitution. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought.in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. the artist's enthusiasm. the principle of its law. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . and that is where the infinite form. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter.stil l this art is defective. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. or an effor t towards him . though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. assumes fuller and firmer features. of its actual liberty. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. subjectivity. and th e artist is the master of the God. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. as well as of its art and science. is not yet absolute. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. known as the Absolute.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . that one spirit creates and informs them. though concrete and intrinsically free. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . is not yet known. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content .symbolic art. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. not yet conscious of itself.
and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. unbeautiful sensuo usness. whose con tent is absolute mind . At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. The older religion in which the need of fine art. Beautiful art. B. and brilliancy. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. like the religion peculiar to it. and j ust for that reason.ent in it. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'.that it be revealed. has its future in true reli gion. expression. from it s side. which is only in the medi um of thought . satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. on the contrary. .due to a one-sided survey of human life .into revelation.the religion i. shows that such religion is on the decline.The genuine objectivity. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. still more in that external. spectator find themselves at home. not the supreme liberation itself. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power.is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . with their perso nal sense and feeling. Beautiful art. in which he had not revealed himse lf. The old conception . as infinite self-realizing form . REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . then the only thing left to constitute His nat .e. But with a further and deeper study. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God.of Nemesis.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. it is from Him. dashing t o pieces everything high and great . The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. revealed by God. what is more. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge .the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. . which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical.it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. and. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. is first generated. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . we see that the advent of art. the theme and c entre of religion. .the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity .
. for that reas on. while in point of form he is. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. staying aloof and inert.: Berlin 1829. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. That spirit. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . on one hand. ¤ 566 In this separating. it is.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . and phenomena which succeed each other. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. Go d is. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it.knowledge in God. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. again. he still remains in original identity . a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. in it s forefront.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing.of the only Son . which proceeds to man's self. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. It includes. But. with whom. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. even in its manifestation. a separate being. it implies the revelation of Him.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. . amid that natural ness. to specul ative comprehension. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories.1. as in duty bound. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. . (c) as infinite return. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. as the extreme of inherent negativity. and.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . it may almost create surprise that so many. On one hand is heaven and earth. by C. and reconciliation with the eternal being. directed towards the Eternal. To know what God as spirit is .is the Spirit. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. which therefore is finite. but afterwards. Yet. in point of content.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. though. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . the elemental and the concrete nature .divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. not. however. the spirit. first of all.just as.. of the world it gave away . when it thinks. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . abiding sel f-centred.requires careful and thorough speculation. or of judgement.it is therefore the absolute spirit. only standing to it in an external connection. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship.on the other hand. further. making them presuppositions towards each other. F. (a) as eternal content. on the other hand. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. G . in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. though different.
the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . and thus sensuous. he. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content.but the vision of implicit truth. but alive and present in the world. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. gives itself direction and con tent. remains master over it. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. is itself the emptiness and vanity. truth is the object of philoso phy. In this form of truth. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. keeps himself unchanged. external in point of form. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. C. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. 1. Irony. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. but even to thought.Irony. But. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. contentless sense. This individual. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. is not bound by it . through which witness of the spirit in him.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . an object of contemplating vi sion .(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit.is transplanted into the world of time. secondly. and thus.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . If the result . which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. Thinking. who as such is identified with the essence . to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. Die geoffenbarte Religion.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. which from itself. as infinite subjectivi ty. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. his natur al man and self-will. From this its separation into p arts. th e self-centred manifestation. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject.is taken in a merely formal. . simple. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. on account of his immediate nature. in which he.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. eternal. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. Further. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance.and.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. this immediate. after the example of his truth. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. with a temporal and external sequence. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. Whereas the vision-method of Art. so far. and eternal spirit in itself.
elevation of them into the absolute form.on one hand. finds itself already accompl ished. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit.('Rationalism') . and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . and mediates what is thus open ed out. but also criticized it. when at the close it seizes its own notion . only looks back on its knowledge. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. and this necessary as free.the underlying essence in all humanity . It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. This movement. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. This witness . just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . and whereas Religion. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. The charge of Atheism. as also of the necessity in the two forms . It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained.takes. immediate vision and its poetry. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. too much for the latter.from these forms. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects.on the other hand.it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. and acts inconsistently towards them.and from a pithless orthodoxy. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought.which may be in both the same . which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. when driven to expound itself. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. with its separ ation into parts. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. which determines itself to content.e. which philosophy is. remains identical with it. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason.i. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. and particularly of the logical form. of course.leaving out. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. opens it out in mental picture. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. and s o religious. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. or.stantial content into many separate shapes. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. and against philosophy in general . a nd of logic in particular. This does not prevent the spirit. to be more precise still. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God).
As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. If this theory needs no more than such a God. are unable and unwilling to see this . its grossest shape.which therefore it does not disparage. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. we must. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. are) . He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. if we believe them. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. Without interest of its own for the concrete. that it has too much of him: .so much so. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism.thus he understands philosophy . every kind of piety (¤ 72) . But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. fulfilled notion of God. in particular. from which all definite quality is excluded.as the most authentic statement accessible .that of the Hindu to ass es.Everything is . The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God.all possess substantia lity. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . Piety. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality.g.the Bhagavat-Gita. and is therefore.(empirical things. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. whether higher or lower in the scale. This new theology. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. most sublime.that of the Egyptians to the ox . or Pantheism. God in General. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . and form all that is definite in the divine universality. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. open to our disposal on this topic. some of the most telling passage . exclusi ve. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. also contains the generic abs tract. or any one man. does not comprehend itself. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. with all its absurdities. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. It is only his own stupidity. as is well known. as it stands. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness.is always adora tion of an object which.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. On such a presuppo sition.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse .of the new piety and new theology. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. but as a proved fact. and amongst it s effusions. Amongst the abundant resources. ¤ 71 note). thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . or if you will. the secularity of th ings. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. and so . The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. cows . goes hand in hand with empty rationalism .or to dalai-lamas . which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. I select . Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. that. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical.in the wanton assertion.of Pantheism. without distinction.each and every secular thing is God.so much so.
. . goodness. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . is not. the One which. . I am also the strength o f the strong. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence.so powerless its. . Meru among the high-topped mountains. I am life in all beings. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. rather. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be .that Hinduism. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . but having its truth in the substance. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . Among letters I am the letter A. Hinduism. or Indra. unessential existences. Even when. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. still God. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. .. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. . passion. . and one essential amongst them.'I am the self. . 'At the end of many lives. which he is.the most excellent of everything. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. . however. and end of living things. has the higher conception of Brahma. . like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. p.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. . . 7 seqq. t he pure unity of thought in itself. but only . I am the discernment of the discerning ones. at the beginning of the pass age. This everything. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. But so little concrete is this divine unity . . And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. . middle. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. as he said before he was S iva. . That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. is also the maddest of polytheisms. with a monstrous incons istency. . . grip. . than which there is nothing higher. . seated in the hearts of all beings. . everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences.s.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. to a poly theism. There is nothing else higher than myself. vanish. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. besides Krishna. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. which Krishna calls himself. where the empirical everything of the world.). . he is said to be the beginning. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . the Everything. .' This 'All'. . all this is woven upon me. . and the Spinozan Substance. . pp. .. so to speak . Among beasts I am the lord of beasts.not everything. as different from that accidental. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism.. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. . . Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. . . . or a God besides. nothing independent]. as also those proximate substantialities. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . without essential being of its very own. and the moon among the lunar mansions. called Gods. The undiscerning ones. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone.spiritual as its idea of God i s . . etc. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. .' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. . even Siva. is alo ne the divine and God. . . developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. melt into the one Krishna. . Indra. any more than the Eleatic One. I am the taste in water. but defin ed as the 'accidental'.
the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. imagination or speculation. secondl y. is identical with the world. on one hand. But to go back again to the question of fact. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty..ndu. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. empirical indivi duals . These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. on the contrary.on the shallow conception of it . as the endless lot of empirical existence.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. and so on . The clo se of philosophy is not the place. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. or Spinozist. as everything. or. the Eleatic. especially the Mohammedan. even in a general exoteric discussion. in relation to the popular idea of the world. the finite to the infinite. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. Of the oriental.of the world as one thing. If. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. the all. That pantheism indeed .. we must consult th e Mohammedans. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. Hin du monotheism. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. and on the other. after this partition. as infinite from the finite. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. e. But.g. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One .floating in the indefinite blue . and God everything. ac osmical. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. outside it . express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. as it says.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. or other creature. of the relationship of God and the world. whether they spring from heart. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. to was . that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind .might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. when he adores the ape. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. to which everything is God. moreover. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. which. is discarded and absor bed. modes of envisaging God. he is as essence parted from appearance. For that unity. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God.keep its independence. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance.in its finest purity and sublimity. and of empirical secular spirit. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. and. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. It is only the picture . then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. and that unity described as love. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. but .
in matters admitted to be of superior. with abstract unity. But the question is. where they are utterly unknown. e. it is not. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. as Epicu rus does. and that it is the system of identity. if not even of supreme interest.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. inorganic and living .e. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. viz.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. and the empty absolute. something supposed to exist beside the material reality.te a word on what a 'notion' means. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. the notion and content of philosophy.the world as much as Go d . mere ide ntity. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. but rather its reverse. in the pores of th e physicists . But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. I n the philosophical field they proceed. but with concrete unity (the notion). but only the one factor of this category of relation .g.falsely as a fact . and that amongst the m there is great variety.has the same solid substantiality as the other. providence. composition. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. they have laid hands on. and that hence.and s till less take trouble about it . Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. and which they ascribe to philosophy. omnipresence.that. the most external and the worst. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. . however. etc. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. i. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. when they hear of unity . so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . is what one expect s. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. with indefinite ideas. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity.and relation i pso facto implies unity .is identity. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. But they show so little acquaintance with them . who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. as in the physical field the physicist. And as in their judgement either of the two . Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. with God's omnipresence.g.and that the factor of indet erminateness . they import them into philosophy. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things.said pores being the negative.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. not the concrete unity. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. a nd assert .
the absolutely universal. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . for its middle term: a middle. then. y . they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality.e. as other than they. or as prevaricating for a purpose. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . an All-one doctrine.their everything.which. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. But in ascribing to God. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. standing between the Mind and its essence. is philosophy itself. not abstract unity.it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. a system of identity. and which is itself the way to produce it. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. If statements as to facts are put forward. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. which causes the movement and development. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . the notion. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. but the many-shaped modes specified. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it.knowing reaso n. i. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. sunders itself. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. of which liberty is the aim.ity . in his relation to the world.as the mediating agent in th e process . which . and as implicitly the Idea. which has self. making the former its presupposition. The esoteric study of God and identity. on the shoulders of philosophy.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. and the latter its universal extreme. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. Nature .it is the nature of the fact.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . this stale gossip of oneness or identity. But to put that sort of thing. On account of this chorus of assertions. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself.by which notions are perverted into their opposite. and notions . In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment.the logical system. as of cognitions. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point.
The eternal Idea. . engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind.et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. eternally sets itself to work. in f ull fruition of its essence.
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