INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any

attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i

s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as

treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.

where the othe . like heat. and. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. The usual answer. etc. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. Wherever there is Nature. in a sense. matter is regarded as something true. li ght.SUB-SECTION A. not merely lacks gravity. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. except where. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. thus come into being. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. i. have still. however. on the other. and so the self-externalism. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. the soul is only the sleep of mind . Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. It is otherwise with Mind.. and not as the immediate or natural individual. to which they might perhaps add space and time.e. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. These 'imponderables' . as such a result. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. At such a stage it is not yet mind. on the one hand. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body.the truth that matter itself has no truth. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. There. and mind conceived as a thin g. perhaps. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life .the passive of Aristotle. ANTHROPOLOGY.with th is proviso. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. however. whereas the 'vital' matter. which is potentially all things. as absolute negativity. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. which is the fund amental feature of matter. But not merely is it. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. a nd the soul remains the pervading. Mind. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. but soul. indeed. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. even the capacity of offering resistance. identical ideality of it all. its simple 'ideal' life.

there philosophers took God. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. on the contrary. just in proportion to his civilization. and always more or less. Animals and pl ants. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. even these few and slight moulded into it. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. when it presents itself as a single soul. not. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. and the periods of the day. which only is. re tains an abstract independence. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. in the modes of that being. upon it.(a) In its immediate natural mode . (b) Secondly. based upon participation in the common life of nature. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. (c) Thirdly. as in the case of Spinoza. as so often is done. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. so to speak. remain for ever subject to such influences. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. Hence. Descartes. they are natural objects for consciousness.e. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. into the absolute syllogism. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. the changes of the seasons. and. T hus. as an anima mundi. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system.the natural soul. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. and does not rise or develop into system. etc. as in the case of Lei bniz. But either this identity. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. These have. In nations less intellectually emancipated. so holding. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i.r is not . a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. as individualized.whence Epicurus. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. it is a soul which feels. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. Malebranche. in many case s completely. a world-soul. described. disappear. it may be.or corporeity . . In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. sidereal. its immediate being . But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. or. and telluri c life of man. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. feels the difference of climates. Spinoza. is too abstract. with Leibniz. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression.e. and. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood.

¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. the one permanent subject. and the position of the individual himself. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. on the whole. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities.on a ph ysical basis. bodily structure and disposit ion.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. as it exists. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. on its one side. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. This . Thirdly. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). or artistic. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). He begins with Childhood . recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. talent . we find its diversities. we find it as the special temperament. And that individuality marks both the world which. character. widely distant from each other. shows an active half. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. carrying out these universa . a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. in purposes political. and as stages in its development. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. of families or single individuals. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. shows.the sexual relation . fails to meet his ideal requirements. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. The contrast between the earth's poles. physiognomy. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. scientific. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. as alterations in it. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). fancies.a worl d no longer incomplete. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points.mind wrapped up in itself. we see man in his true relation to his environment. and on the other. hopes.

b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. as before explained . The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. distinguishes itself from its mere being. for example.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. but as a return back from the world of specialization. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality.The waking is not merely for the observer.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact.Napoleon. . But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. i n an unintelligent way. as they may be called. put this question to the class of ideology. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul .l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. . we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. viz. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. or self-centralized being. which are often addressed to philosophy: . by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. as already noted. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). . on a v isit to the University of Pavia. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. The characterization given in the section is abstract.not as a merely negative rest from it. (c) Sensibility(3) . The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. each point. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. sleep. in the first instance. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. although. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness.

etc. its natural peculiarity. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). But if put in the feelin g. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. it is true. The fact that these particulars. which. murder . the fact is a mode of my individuality. are found by the waking soul. This should hardly need enforcing. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us.set over against consciousness. the conscience. mean. fornication. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. just. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. One. etc. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. true. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. and . ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. Another. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward.g. and the character.identity of our self-centred being. godless. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. blasphemy. moral. on one hand.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. and religious. invested with cor poreity. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. etc. and to be as if found. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. primarily. evil. mora l. in the feeling. are in order to be felt. for itself. the naturally immedi ate. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . not mere alterations. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. be it noted. is what we call sensibility.. the inarticulate bre athing. ho wever. are our very own. but treated as bel onging to its most special. in its own self. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). On the other hand and conversely. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . adultery. and is so felt. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. belonging as it does to natural. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad.

in a special system of bodily organs. following the special character of the mental mode. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. (c) the sense of solid reality. is to raise its substantiality. (¤ 300).e. e. to the character of subjectivity. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel.and of sound. .because in it. laughter. 322). sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. works itself out.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of is a soul which feels. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . As sentient. but an inward. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. o f colours. the centre of the 'sensible' system. i ts merely virtual filling-up. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. especially the passions or emotions. for example. are formed from their mental source. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. (¤ 317) . as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation .alterations in the substantiality of the soul. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is .in the system of the senses. to take possessi on of it. smells. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. (¤¤ 321. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. of heavy matter.the senses of definite light. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. the 'irritable' system.g. ¤ 402 Sensations. the immediacy of mode in feeling . with its varieties of language. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. of self. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). i. therefore. and voice in general. just because they are immediate and are found existing. sighs. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. the blood. We should have. tones. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. What it has to do. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. with which that substance is one. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations .a psychical physiology. distinction appears as mere variety . set in its self-centred life. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . In the usage of ordinary language. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. to realize its mastery over its own. and their corporization.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight.

Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it.. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. in sickness. secondly. which is at the same time its predicate. ¤ 404 As individual. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). By itself. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. but a negation. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. ideas and information. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. virtually retained. and to that world it stands but as to itself. it implies a want of adaptation. etc. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. Some times. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. a deep featureless characterless mine. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. it brings within itself. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. first. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. Thus in the body it is one simple. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. to which the soul. without existing. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. prima rily. As sentient. the content is its particular world. so far as that is. may again sink down. thoughts. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. to be defined as one of feeling . which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. In the present stage we must treat. acquired lore. the corporeity. although it does not embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . once mor e come to light. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . etc. ideas. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. in an implicit mode. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. but only to his im plicit self. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. At the present stage this singleness is. in whi ch all this is stored up.the existent spe culative principle. They were not in our possession. omnipresent unity. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. the s oul is characterized as immediate.that world being included in it and filling it up. which is disease. where the real is put past . As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness.

or capac ity. etc. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . as concrete subject ivity. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. character. incl inations. principles-everything in short belonging to the character.a substance. and is therefore passive. then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. is visibly present as another and a different individual. injuries. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. self-possessed. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. of the mother. and reasonable. as yet nothing impenetrable. or virtuality. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . not as a mere possibility. developed interests. idiosyncrasies.. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. The moth er is the genius of the child. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. but as efficiency and realized activity. intellige nt. controlling genius thereof. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. because immediate. as it has existence of its own. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. Here are two individuals. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. the single self of the two. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. etc.. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . etc. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . of life. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. congenital disposit ion and temperament. tal ent.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. By the self-hood of the latter it . placenta. self-conscious. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. which. temper. say between friends. and of character. the psychical relationship. etc. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). his secular ideas. it is.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. whose decision is ul .externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. not a true subject reflected int o itself. not yet as its self. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature.

This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. To that end the phenomena. is. This totality forms his actual be mere deception and impo sture. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. it must be added. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. self-possessed human being is a disease. on the other hand.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . which are also means and ends to each other. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. intentions. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. first of all call for verificati on. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. But such a verification would. At the same tim e.his fun damental interests. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. in which the individual here appears innnersed. educated. on the cont rary. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. that it is in harmony wi th the facts.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. means. in other words. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. it might seem.timate whatever may be the show of show. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. The facts. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . it has already been call ed his genius. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man.

unless by the aid of religion. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions.). then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. or at the approach of death. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. . and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. on those left behind. the selfless individual. a formal vision and awareness. which. but it is empty. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. and to know which. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. f riends. which lead up to the result . The patient in this condition is accordingly made. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. after the downfall of the Roman republic. and c ontinues to be. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. however. tastes. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. is under a veil. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. subje ctive reason. When the substance of both is thus made one. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity.a genius which beh olds for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. like that of the child in the womb. external one to another. subject to the power of another person. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. the magnetizer. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. his own and that of the magnetize . in its sober moods. smells. exist for it as an outward objectivity. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. reads. that it is a state of passivity. and hears. formed. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. wh en it is healthy and awake. And because it is the adult. in catalepsy. ca pable of conveying general truths. But. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. etc.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. etc. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. . for example. not on the spot. not really a 'person'. and character. (Thus Cato.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality .But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. is this. and the like. in whom it sees. etc. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. those c onnected with female development. . not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other.) Compare h ome-sickness. But such clairvoyance . and other diseases. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. then.

and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. which is no less a world of law. one sees and hears with the fingers. In this way it is self. receives. the 'common sense'. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. i s just this form of immediacy. This is Insanity or mental D discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . as in other cases. and hence. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. beholds. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. is impossible. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. e. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. which still marks the self-feeling. The purely sensitive life. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. etc. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is.fe eling. causality. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. In considering insanity we must. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. it is still susceptible of disease. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. i. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. on the contrary. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. reasons. or med icines for them. and at the same time. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared.r. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. etc. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. which. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . as in the morbid state alluded to. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. between intelligent personality and objective world. for example. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. is without any definite points of attachment . anticipate the full-grown an . though all-embracing. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. in this nominal perception. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. so long as we assume independent personalities. in its capacity as individual. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er.

however. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. but only derangement. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. And so too the particularity is. loss of health (if it were that. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. that it is liable to insanity . such as vanity. is relaxed. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. i.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. the self is to be stamped upon. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. desire. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. i. and so makes part of the actual self. moral and theoretical. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. and made appear in. the. as it aris es.e. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other.merely personal love and hatred. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. which is there also. as now regarded. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. may.that evil which is always latent in the heart. and so also may the cure. This particular being of the soul is t . and therefore not susceptible of this malady.just as physical disease is not an abstract.. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side .the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. . But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. and it is only as a thing. and also desires. as a thing. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. passions. pride. This humane treatment. inclination. is diseased. and their gratification). yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. instincts.. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. i. A violent.d intelligent conscious subject. so as to insert them in their proper place. equally formal. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of cies and hopes .e. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling.e. etc. as something natural and existent. Mind as such is fr ee. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. this life of feeling. and the rest of the passions . and be a realized u niversality. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. idea. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). In the concrete. but a contr adiction in it. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. is undistinguis hed from them. presupposes the patient's rationality.feeling. it would be death). only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. mere and total. etc. earthly elements are set fr ee . because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish.

the one and the same. will. Habit like memory. and so no longer interested. su bjective substantiality of it . and the mere substance. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. That is to say. even in being affected by them. because it is an immed iate being of the soul.. i. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. has been absorbed by it.he factor of its corporeity. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. on the contrary. as. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. therefore. sleep. a pure act of intuition. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. The soul is freed from them. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. this being of the soul. dist inguishing it from itself . nor is absorbed in the m. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. Habit is rightly called a second nature. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty.itself a simple being . and the generation o f habit as practice. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. et c. of it. a second nature. weariness o . nature. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it.and becoming the 'ideal'. when the co rporcity. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance.e. but the basis of consciousness. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. or dependent in regard to it. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. The natural qualities and alterations of age. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). lacking consciou sness. And consciousness it becomes. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . are only subjectiv e forms. heat. of which it is the subjective substance. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. and that as a barrier for it. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. but still free. is reduced to unity. and which still continues to exist. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. For. empty space and empty time. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. partly only relative. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. occupied. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. but has them and moves in them. so is that pure being (which. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. and for that reason n ot free.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general.

. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . cut off from action and reality. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. like their satisfaction.f the limbs. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. to be made a power in the bodily part. Thinking. acquires a strength which consists in this. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. an 'ideality' of soul . is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. if quite abstract. etc. consciousness. and thus to enable the soul. has been by will made a habit . the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. habit diminishes this feeling. whereof we sha ll speak later. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. and it is habit of living which brings on death.g. This is the rational liberation from them. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. that although the frost.enabling the matter of consciousness. too. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. Even here. and any other purp oses and activity. habit is usually passed over - . are no longer bothered with it. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. reflection.. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. so that when the conception (e. or. . Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. and especially so in the specific bodily part. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. this soul. i. and that they. moral. without an express adjustment. to be his as this self. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. a series of musical notes) is in me. made into an instrum ent. nor are they in conce ption rational. and particul ar..or the misfortune . fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. like any other. etc.e. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. etc. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. and no other. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. viz. consciousness. which make it up. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. And it is true that the form of habit. but part and parcel of his being. and the self-feeling as such. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. etc. Habit on an ampler scale. The most ext ernal of them. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. re ligious. his upright pos ture. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. sweet tastes. is recollection and memory. nor an abstrac t inwardness. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. under its volitional and conceptual characters. or skill. casual. a particular organ of i ts organic system). nor a transient emotion or idea. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. to exist as substance in its corporeity.). want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache).concentration. intelligence. felt. intuition. the spatial direction of an individual. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim.

or the 'immediacy' of mind. This note is so slight. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. in being related to which. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. of the mouth .but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns.. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. This externality. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance.laughter. for example. the upright figure in general.either as something contemptible . The soul. 'The autho . of which it is the sign. indefinite. it is related to itself. and i s infinite self-relation. 4. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. 3. etc. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. Under the head of human expression are included. for the soul. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. absorbing it. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. but the soul. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. Naturliche Seele. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. And the human figure. 1. still vainer than a signatura rerum. the latter subject to the former. and the formation of the limbs. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. and inexpressible a modific ation. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. Die fuhlende Seele. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. a world external to it . represents not itself. in its concentrated self.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. Seen from the animal world. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. 2. cuts itself off from its immediate being. and making it its own. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. as the absolut e instrument.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. 5. In this identity of interior and exterior. especially the hand. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . or abstract universality. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. Naturliche Qualitaten. 71). while language is its perfect expressi on. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. weeping. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. finds itself there a single subject. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. unable to represent it in its actual universality. Empfindung. in other words.

it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. in the sphere of essence. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. not to the wisdom. seem to be its own activity.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. The mind as ego is essence. as subjective reflection in itself. as this absolute negativity. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. and as such it is C onsciousness. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . thus first made explicit as the Ego. to it.e. something dark and beyond it. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. but is implicit. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. does not. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. Selbstgefuhl. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. but since reality. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. 7. as external to it. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. and .it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . but to the foolishness of man. 8. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. which manifests itself and something else too . i. 6. now. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious).the light. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. like reciprocal dependence in general. Gewohnheit. is only its abstract formal ideality. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. It is of this latter. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. but when he receives the inspired word.the soul's natural life .to an equal freedom as an independent object. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). Hence consciousness. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. Ego. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) .

. first. i. what makes the object the subject's own. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content.a subject-objectivity. which is not as its own. with an object set against it. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. Ego. for which ego is the object. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. in other words. being immediate.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. an existent. etc.e. The object similarl y. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. This is sense-consciousness. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. a something. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself.e. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. and underived certainty of it. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. reflected in itself. t heir absolute interdependence. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. and puts it first under the category of being. the notion of the ego it seems an alteration of the object. and so on. or mere c ertainty. to raise its self-certainty to truth. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. and that the philosophy. i. a singular. an intuitive intellect. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. the substantial and qu alitative. the subject of consciousness. has emerged from Spinoz ism. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. a a case of correlation . Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. is further characterized a s immediately singular. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. Spatial and temporal Singularn . The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). again. as Reason. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. immediate consciousness. an existing thing. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). but only as it is in reference to something else. As against Spinozism. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. It appears as wealth iest in matter. (b) self-consciou sness. but as poorest in thought. and even t he Idea of Nature. Consciousness . and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness.

the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . and am aware'. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. and not yet as external on its own part. ween the individuality of a thing which. permanent term s. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq.a variety of relations. is sense-perception. i.a copy of the phenomenon. and. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. or as being beside and out of itself. to describe the sensible. ¤ 423 The law. free from this negative l ink and from one another. but as mediated. viz. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii .e. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. which form the alleged ground of general experience. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . 73). in so far as its distinction is the inward one. or the distinction which is none. a something external to it. But in this manner the interior distinction is. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. by being regarded in their bearings. it is related. reflected in itself. in this case by t he Ego. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. has. not as merely immediate. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. to which. i. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . and more or less by the sciences. taken in its concrete content. p.e. and universalities. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. the one of the terms. as not externally different from the other. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. having passed beyond the sensible. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. on one hand. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . Thi s inward. the distinction on its own part. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. what it is in truth. reflected upon. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. of the thing is. in that manner. so constr uing the object. an abstract identity: on the other hand. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. its necessity on its own part. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . and sensuous consciousness. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. lies im mediately in the other. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). reflectional attributes. the thing. as we called it. has many properties. but brought to rest and universality. experiences. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . wants to take the object i n its truth. and universal. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. . however.).ess. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal.

On the external side it conti nues. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. is a singular. its satisfaction realized. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . or. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. being merely consumed. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. nominally. pure 'Ideality'. there is strictly speaking no object. on the contrary . and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. the latter. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. in this return upon itself. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. implicit in it. or implicitly. knows itself implicit in the object. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. and ma intains itself as such. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . therefore. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. on the negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. primarily describable as an individual. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. and a desire (appetite) . this identity comes to be for the ego. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. with the nega tion of it. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. in its immediacy. therefore. To this activity the object. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite.With this new form-characteristic. can make no resistance: the dialectic. and itself made actual. and thus in it I am aware of me. The two processes are one and the same. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. The certitude of one's self.

for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. w hich however is also still outside it. the slave. solves the contradiction. preservation. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. which falls on another. a suppression. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. works off his individualist self-will. Force. as the existence of hi s freedom. and the means for entering into relation with them.for the means of mastery. the slave. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. ¤ 431 The process is a battle.e. retains his single self-consciousness. not their underlying and essential principle. which is the basis of this phenomenon. Force. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. though by the abstract. however. Thus arises the status of master and slave. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. as one of two things for another.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. in the first place.e consciousness of a 'free' object. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. and formation of it. the outward and visible recognition). a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. Thus the death of one. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. This other. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. In that other as ego I behold myself. on the ir phenomenal side.but only p eril. therefore rude. and its being for others. at first immedi ately. from one point of view. ¤ 434 This status. must likewise be kept in life. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. and to exist as such for the other: . ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. in the service of the master. however. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. and incurs a like peril for its own . and thus give existence to my freedom. is yet. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. While the one com batant prefers life. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. when we look to the distinction of the two. f rom the essential point of view (i. negati on of immediacy.t he process of recognition. then. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. it. we see. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . ¤ 435 But secondly. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness.

the passage to universal self. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . and of all virtues. bu t the truth that knows it. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. ego. honour. than they are its own thoug hts. Der Verstand. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. therefore.or rather it is a difference which is none. Die Begierde 6. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. The uni versality of reason. the self-centred pure notion. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . Selbstbewu§tsein. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. Truth. fame. . is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. idle fame.consciousness. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. friendship. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . love. whilst it signifies that the object. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. state. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. or determinations of the very being of things. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . 4. etc. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. 5. is mind (spirit). as its peculiar mode and immanent form. fatherland. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. valour. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. Wahrnehmung 3. aware of what it is.which is Reason. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. 1. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. For truth here has. is Reason. is now itself universal.f wisdom' . so far as each knows itself recognized in the other family. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective .

in the soul as a physical mode.7. like consciousness. And it is a matter of no consequence. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. ideation.e.the former a simple immediate totality. in thinking also and in desire and will. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full .. etc.apart b oth from the content. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . in so far as . and which as the reality of that notion. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. above the material. Cons ciousness is finite. viz. in so far as it has an object. This. Die Vernunft. Mind is finite. as its concept has just shown. PSYCHOLOGY. i. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. it has a mode in its knowledge. etc. etc. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. SUB-SECTION C. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. therefore. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. neit her subjective nor objective. desires. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the one word. and above the complication with an external object . which is defined as it s notion. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist.mental vision. the latter now an infinite form which is not. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. though it no longer has an object. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . or. Mind. what is the same thing. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. restricted by that content. remembering. then its reality is that reason. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. it is finite by means of its immediacy. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. however.

equally. in so far as its existent phase. the na tural soul (¤ 413). So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. k nowledge. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. Thus. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. and make the affection subjective. forces. When the affection has been rendered its own. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. and the negative aspect of mental activity. in freedom. that is. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. that aspect is twofold . And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. and its activity can only have itself as aim. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. the mind finds in itself something which is. and to liberate itself to its elf. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. viz. i. Similarly. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it.e. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them.e. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. and is even there a return into itself. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). viz. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. and are the mind's own. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. to reach and get hold of itself. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i.e. i. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. of comprehending being and as its own: by the one. it is .reality of its reason. or. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. so far. is misconceived and overlooked. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. As the theory o f Condillac states it. and being a rational knowledge. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness.

The course of this elev ation is itself rational. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. The nominal knowledge. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. wi th a material which is its own. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. to definite and conceptual knowledge. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. which is only certitude. but) enjoyment. in the theoretical range.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. elevates itself. to get at the notion and the truth.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason.g.i. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. But as knowledge. while it has to do with autonomous products. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. Psychology. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. and of the heart without the intellect . and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. is thus also a reality . the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. as r eason is concrete. and that in its empirical condition. Inwards . The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own.e. e. and heartless intellects . which it and the content virtually is. just as they are given. which in the first place is likewise formal . A host of other phrases used of intelligence. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. This activity is cognition. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. for which it gains the form of universality.(b) Will: practical mind. and gains abstract auton omy within. Ou twards. the word. has a material which is only nominally such. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. and therefore a restricted content. along with which the content is realized as rational. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. Its activity has to do with the empty form ..the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. its content is at first only its own. This position of psychology. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. both for the mind as such. and is immediately willed. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. belong to a point of view utt . so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. merely as facts. like logic. as it is said. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. while the practical. It is still extremely ill off.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. etc.

The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. conception. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. like power or force.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . are not isolated. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. But c ognition is genuine. it . intelligen ce. by rational conception. memory. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. as it is by the same method brought into nature.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. If they are isolated. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . remembers.whi ch. or makes the concept its own. just so far as it realizes itself. if answered in the negative. But the true satisfaction. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . It is true that even as isolated (i. Faculty. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . must lead to abandoning the effort. imagines. cognitive conception. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject.besides which it al so intuits. conceives. that intuition.e. conceived as reflected into self. imagination. intuition. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. note). ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . remembrance. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. etc. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . by cognitive intuition. viz.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. etc. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. etc. imagination. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. is bro ught into mind. etc. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. however. conception. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. etc. or mind. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident.its out-of-selfness .: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). is the fixed quality of any object of thought. it is admitted. as non-intelligent). To take up such a position is i n the first instance. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and a word . The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge).is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul.

when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized the generalit ies of common sense . With us. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. projects it into time and active self-collection . . Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. external or internal. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. that is t o say. Now the material. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. in t he truth of mind. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity .the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. with the character of something existent. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. is swallowed up. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. a . wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. has the form of casual particularity . But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . even should its import be most sterl ing and true.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue.t he factor of fixing it as our own. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. may just as likely be narrow and poor. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind.but to his feeling. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. 254). Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. in content and value entirely contingent. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. as it were the closes t. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . this mode is simple. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. the mere consciousness point of view. but rather as subject ive and private. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind.his private and p articular self. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. Hence feeling. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. Feeling is the immediate. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. or at least to reasons .

and the representation cannot as it stands be said to a space and a time of its own. i. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. The representation is the property of intelligence. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. as it at first recollects the intuition. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. and is arbitrary or contingent. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine.e. with a preponderating subjectivity. still continues simple. no longer needs to find the content. we may say. in virtual possibility. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. a rec ollection of itself. but stored up out of consciousness. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . which. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. in the way we treat. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. and inwardly divest itself of it. its when and where. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . t ime. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. as tho ught. and received into the universality o f the ego. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. or. from the external place. for example. isolated. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom.the germ of the fruit. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. . and immediate context in which the intuition stood. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. yet without being in consciousnes s. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. however. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. though intrinsically concrete. which makes it its own. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. the germ as affirmatively containing. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself.

and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. i. Secondly. though belonging to intelligence. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. (On the distinction of representa tions and them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. but a being of its own institution. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. which is now the power over them. The content reproduced. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. present also a distinction in content. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. by which it is authenticated. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. if it is to exist.viz. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . and an out-put from its universal m ine. as of all intelligence. at first only in space and time. as a unit of intuition. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition .. see Introduction to the Logic. In the first place. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. being and universality. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. to be so and so. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject.these modes of relation are not laws. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. where it is treasured up. or ide a). such as likeness and contrast. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being.) . The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. as a matter of fa ct.Image and Idea. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. ¤ 20 note. . whatever be its content (from image. that it finds its material. the matter is entirely pictorial. wherea s the idea (representation). which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. The image. But it is solely in the conscious subject. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. or an intell ectual category. notion. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. has always the peculiarity. comes actually into its possession. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . under the representation (idea) with the same content. has been broken up. now that it has been endued with externality. where. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it.e. reason and consequence. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial.

when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. etc.. . This force is really intelligence itself . are unifications of t he same factors. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. or something of the sort. derived from some interest. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. is reason. 435). so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such.still lacks the side o f existence. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445.e. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. internal and external. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. and in mechanical memory it completes. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. is derived from the data of intuition. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. These more or less concrete. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. when regarded as the agency of this unification. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. it is self-uttering. or poetical imagination . but only a nominal reason. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . some latent concept or Ideal principle.Imagination. recollection. so far a s it is concerned. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . . As reason. a concrete subjectivity. Acting on this view. i. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being.Abstraction. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. Another point calling for special notice is that. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. this form of being. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. but they are 'syntheses'. to universalize it. allegoric. are completely welded into one. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . one's own and what is picked up.symbolic. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. Such is creative imagination(7) . which forms their connecting link. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. and becomes an i ndividuality. In other words. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. for its ideal import is its elf.

which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). Such is the negativity of intelligence.. This intuition is the Sign. language . signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. its system. and even with conception and imagination. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. but as representative of something else. Sausen. something accepted. since memory. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin .¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. In logic and psychology. in the first instance. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . etc. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. .now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. the matter of the latter is. has always to do with signs only. e tc. out of which it forms i deas . the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. intuitions. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence .th at of vocal objects. have nothing to do with each oth er. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. conception s. Knarren. whereas in the sign.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . and the connotation of which it is a sign.).speech and. But in the fusion of the two elements. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. ¤ 459 The intuition . a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. somewhat immediate or given (for example. strictly so-called.R auschen.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. its institution by to sensations. but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). and where it is conserved. With regard to the elementary material of language. It is a n image.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. the colour of the cockade. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). The sign is some immediate intuition. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. when employed as a sign. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated.

i. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. but. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. again. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. etc. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. In particular. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. W. they are reduced to signs. as in our signs for the numbers. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. it depends.e. as many as ten a . we may touch. It is only a stationary civ ilization. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. in chemistry and mineralogy. as regards signs for mental objects.e. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. The study of languages still in their original state. i. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. tongue in each) and for their combinations. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. the chemical elements. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . the denomination. viz. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. only in pas sing. alphabetical writing. instead of n ames proper.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. and now that. for example. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. . externalities which of themselve s have no sense. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. and still takes place in Canton . As to the formal elem ent. .e. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. their signs in vocal language. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. which severally receive designation. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. as. palate.). if it be not altogether extinguished. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. on anthropological articulation. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. like the Chinese. i. are frequently changed. the planets . (Cf. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. and only get signification as signs. on the other hand.

so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . so that. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. i.e.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. the simple straight stroke. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. just as in modern times (as already noted. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. like alphabetic writing. in the case of the Chinese Koua. while (with the facu . the simple plain idea. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. The European. Engaging the attention of intelligence. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. in speaking. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. of uttering its ideas most worthily . Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word .the name. Both alike require such signs. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. or simple logical terms. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. learn ing to speak Chinese. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs.nd twenty. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. in the interest o f vision. Hieroglyphics. . This feature of hieroglyphic . at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. is still for the mind simple in the name). that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. it is analysed. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. Thus. peculiar to the intellect. by speaking low and soft or crying out. as it does. however ample a connotation it may include. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything.the mode.

lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,

but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you

ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.

¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex

for the latter. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. heart. the truth and. law and morality. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. etc.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. we have only to deal with the selfish. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. namely God. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. is precisely what constitutes. in their immediacy.retain a speciality of their own . we have this immanen .but only in antithesis to the latter . The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. volition. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. joy. shame. and duty. in their universality and necessity. If feelings are of the right sort. may be placed. contentment. But where the objects sought are thus casual. it is because of their quality or co ntent . bad. but presented in its universality and necessity. when thought. Thus it is. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. But as both. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . on the one hand. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. and evil. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. and still more in mind. On the other hand. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. in which these facts. wha t is the same thing. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. lack objective determin ation. and precisely in that way d o they . 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . etc. in its objectivity and truth. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. right. Whereas in life. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. and thought. grief.indeed infinitely so. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. repentance. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. can also be felt.. and will. Delight. and to discus s their content. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason.. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. in feeling. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them.

Will. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. . and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. The will. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such.Up to what degree the good continue good.and (as there are ma ny. are infected with contingency. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. passion is neither good no r bad.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. their mutual connect ions. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. the question is directly raised. It is on ly a dead. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. talent. and their truth. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. on the other. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. as experience shows. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. Which are good and bad? . they. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. ego. character. which is essentially self-d etermination. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . In what way have they. each with its private range). they are based on the rational nature of the mind. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged.a development in which the content of autonomous . and something inappropriate to it. therefore. admitting of gratification.natural impulse and inclination. on one hand. But with regard to the inclinations. be the value of tha t mode what it immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. as rights and aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. In consequence of this formalism. however. Should. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. too often. What are the good and rational propensiti es. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. The answer to the question. each being always in conflict to another. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. If the will is to satisfy itself. enjoyment . It is this objectification which evinces their real value. as r egards the form of its content. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling.his inte rests of intellect. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. subjectivity .on one aim and object. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. Thus. first of all. it is pa ssion. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . is at first still a natural will. indeed. finds in the conformity . (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. but to ge t realized. while.

are reduced to a m ere negative. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. which is just as much no satisfacti on. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. on the whole to their disadvantage. as thinking and implicitly free.e. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness.and one satisfaction. The morality concerns the content of the aim. where the subject is made to close with itself. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. It is thus 'reflecting' will. this is wh at is called the interest. is his interest and .should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. which as such is the universal. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. as the content. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. without end. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. moral. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . there would be no action at all. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. However. ¤ 476 The will. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. that finds its actualizing in the agent. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. on one hand. and is option or choice. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. inclinations. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. Their mutual limitation. As thus contradictory. . proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . of a universal sa tisfaction. by another. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. and social duties. the free gift of nature. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality.his passion. An action is an aim of the subject. so far as their particularity goes. it is on them that the decision turns. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. They are somet imes contrasted. an inactive thing.action loses its contingency and optionality. unless he had an interest in it. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. i. which reflection and comparison have educed. either alto gether or in part. the impulses.

e. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. did not have it. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. i. knows this its concept. just because it is the very essence of mind. Whole continents. as the substance of the state. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. or philosophy (. On the contrary. with freedom itself. that is.e. of present sensati on and volition. now that the formalism. etc. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. which i s pure and concrete at once. and that as its very actuality. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). however. for example. is in the first instance the rational will in general. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. and is will as free intelligence. in religion as such . he is actually free.e. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. its very au tonomy or freedom.e . fortuitousness . and are constituted after its measure. It is thus 'Objective' matter of speculation. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. the will is an actually free will. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. aim. education. ambiguous. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. According to Christianity. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. which has its true being for characteristic and individuality. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. he h as also. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . still this very I . When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. or implicit is the existential side of reason . which realizes its own freedom of will. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. If the will. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. and object .a universality which only ought to be aware. The Greeks and Romans. i.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free.freedom itself. If to be aware of the Idea . and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. therefore. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . Plat o and Aristotle. so that in this sphere of particular existence. or by s trength of character. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. Africa and the East. As abstract Idea again. the divine min d present with him. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. even the Stoics. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence.sired . they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. have never had this Idea. as realizing the idea. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. and of which it is only t he formal activity. only so far as it thinks itself . whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. i. If. of the family. and the abstract singleness. and are without it still. is actu ality. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one.

if they are made slaves. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . Der freie Geist. but the pe rmanent character . Die Intelligenz. 3. Das praktische Gefuhl.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. 12. Auswendiges. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will.dea itself is the actuality of men . as men. But this freedom. 1. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. not with laws or court s of justice. 16. 9. 15. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. 14. is itself only a notion . Die Erinnerung 6. Die Einbildungskraft. Die Gluckseligkeit. but which they are.not something which they have. 11. which the content and aim of freedom has. 10. into legal. Phantasie 8. Der Geist 2.a principle of the mind and heart. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. Vorstellung. and not less into scientific actuality. 5. 7. moral. Der praktische Geist 13. Inwendiges. Gedachtnis. Das Denken. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. 4. Anschauung. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. religious.

not in the form of impulse. etc. receives the form of Necessity. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. relation to another person . external things of nature which exist for consciousness. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. which in it is thus at home with itself. Liberty. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. is also a right. etc. anthropological data (i. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. as the services of the members of the State in dues. But. to be as a person.. is a duty. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. and character. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. in these externally objective aspects. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners.. or instituted as an authoritative power.. What is a right is also a duty. in relation to the subjective will. so as to become its habit. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity.e. private an d personal needs). but as possession by a person it is property. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess.e. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. are no less its duties to punish. The penal judicature of a government. to administer. is the Law (Right ) . and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention).and aim. its rights of admi nistration. their absolute unity. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. in general. i. but in its universality.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. etc. where free will has existence. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. it exists as manner and custom. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. For a mode of existence is a right. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. But in this individualist moral sphere. temper. are its Duties. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. which splits up into different heads: viz. In the morality of the conscience. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. viz. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. on the other hand. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. or Usage.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. where they. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. and what is a duty. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. my right to a thing is not merely possession. and it is a duty to possess things as property. These conditi ons. being universal. military service. duty in general is in me a free subject . are duties . it is a Law. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. or legal possession. and is the vi rtual universal.(1) When. and brings into existence i n these several wills. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. in the light of the concept. Liberty.

and the I in it is abstractly external. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that is the ethic s of actual life in family. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. at first in the outward appropriation. and State. But this predicate. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. are simultaneously mutually independent. But the set of adjustments. These extremes are the persons who. in the knowledge of their identity as free. and hence as a single being . b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. as something devoid of will. which is thus mutual. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. it is the right of the subjective will. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. it may be. as in itself still abstract and empty. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. (B) When the will is reflected into self. which as possession is a means. is an individual. possession is property. This thing. 1. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. by mere designation of it. though it remains in trinsically the same. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. but on an external thi ng. . abstract right. the infinite self-rela tion. so as to have its existence inside it. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. on its own account me rely 'practical'. morality of the individual conscience. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. Sitte A. Gesetz 2. or by the formatio n of the thing or. the external sphere of its liberty . civil society. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. but as existence of the personality is an end.possession. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. As so characterized.

To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. and its acceptance by the other will. is affirmed. the only diversity lies in this. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. which. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. 493 seqq. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value.Contract.). sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. willed. I can just as well put it in it as not . ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. but which. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. then the external rec . This is naiv e. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. universal thing or commodi ty. and. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . in that case. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. and time. its changing hands. which thus becomes wicked. produces a wrong: by which. is disinterested. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . however. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other.the full and complete deed. and recogniz ed. non-malicious wrong.just as well with draw it as not. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. expressing the civil suit. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. because they face each other.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. labour. But so far as my will lies in a thing. ¤ 495 The contract. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong.

and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise.where the nominal relation is retained. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. But more than possible compulsion is not. the latter is violated. The law of nature . It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. by the n this case the apparent recognition. in which the law of nature should hold sway. or in corporeity. is a matter of chance). or Natural Right. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. In it the agent. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. and can be seized only in t his quarter. as a volitional and intelligent being. an d so on without end. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. The 'reality' of right. This gives the wrong of fraud .) Thus the will is violently wicked. which is disinterested . of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. on . As such it is mo rality(2) proper. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. is the work of Revenge.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . which is nominal and recognized by him only . i. sets up a law .a law. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. in revenge.e. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement.e. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. from life. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. is at the same time only a new outrage. like the last. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. howe ver. and while the former only is respected. even from the range of all existen ce.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. This progression. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. i. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. being conformable to the right. b ut the sterling value is let slip.punishment.a universal which holds good for him. Conversel y. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. To display the nullity of such an act. But revenge. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. or right as governed by the nature of things. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. The social state.on self-determination or autonom y. such an action is essentially and actually rictly so called . and commits a crime. The former used to be the common meaning. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will .compulsion against the thing. that of the judge.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. and not merely the particular mode .

so much as it has consciously willed. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. its own. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. Das Recht. is its deed. Now. Moralitat 3. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. my part in i t is to this extent formal. In point of form. but have their assent. 1. which was its purpose. 2. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. conscience. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. an d allows to be imputed to it. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. and thus comes into relationship with the former. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. so far as these features are it s inward institution. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. and willed by it. who.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action.a will reflected into itself so that. recognition. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. counts only as a person. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. This is the right of intention. B. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. it thus includes purpose and intention . which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. Naturrecht. is now chara cterized as a subject . intelligence. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. though any alteration as such. embracing these individual point s. The subjective will is morally free. in mere law. etc. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . or even justification in his h eart.and also moral wickedness. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. sentiment.the other hand. the reason of the will. the will is at the same time made a particular. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. be its affection w hat it may.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. and means the m ental or intellectual in general.

whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. is always fundamentally one identity. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. because the agent. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. when similarly comprehended in a single aim.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . as in happiness (¤ 479). in point of its matter. can be wicked. will . and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. and yet each of them. they ought to stand in harmony. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. though it is a particular duty. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence.a universal determined in its elf . concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. This is the right to well-being. is not something external to him. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. there awakes here the deepest contradiction.and thus including in it particularity . And yet they ought to harmonize.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. the essential and actual good. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. it is always something particular.g. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. interests. but is a particul arity of his own . ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. on account of that existent sphere of liberty. his interest and welfare must. a good intention in case of a crime. is as g ood and as duty absolute. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. essential and actual.that it contains his needs. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. and aims. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. constitute h is well-being.being only in this. These aims. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it.ion. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. as individual and universal. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it.e. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. At the same time because good is one. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. whether the . and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance.

4. an aim essentially and actually null. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . in something external therefore. and duty. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. The failure of the latter consists . expressed by this repeated ought. The subjectivity. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides .the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. 5. which actualizes and dev elops it. on its negative side.of Conscience and Wickedness. The for mer is the will of goodness.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. in this its identity with the good. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. 1. Die Absicht und das Wohl. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. which has no objectivity. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. the truth of this semblance. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. th e essential thing. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. The result. in the notion. which would only be abstract. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . Wickedness. is only the infinite form. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective.the utterly abstract semblance .the standpoint of the ought.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. That. the unutterable. and refuse it to the wicked. Der Vorsatz 3. On the affirmative a goodness. rising to its pitch. good. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy.good is realized.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . no more exist than not. which is the good. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. but is only sure of i tself. is. non-universal. its deepest descent into itself. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. Das Gute und das Bose C. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. is abandoned. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . to be carried out in it. Handlung. This pure self-certitude. Moralitat 2. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. THE MORAL LIFE. and of the good. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. i . right . ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . 6. and the wicked.

and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity.the Political Constitution. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. is virtue. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. makes this union an ethical tie . abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. as the mind developed to an organic actuality .n a thing . the individuality expres ses its special character. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind .e . as against the univers al. . to the total of ethical actuality.Civil Society. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. etc. controls and entirely dominates from within. without any selective refl ection.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance.the Family.yet somewhat which without all question is.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. in its immediacy. it exists as confidence.Marriage. manner and cu stom . i. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. . ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. however.the genuine ethical temper. as deliberate work for the community. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. however. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. is confidence (trust) . virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. i.monog . while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. Thus. temperament. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. In the latter sphere.e. as personal virtues. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . that it is. The ethical personality. whose independence it. to destiny. in its ki nd. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. But the person. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. to a spiritual significance. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . elevated. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. mind ap pears as feeling. as an intelligent being. This is the sexual tie. In the shape of the family. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. When these two impe rfections are suppressed.

being an intelligent substance. or state external. or nominal culture in general. labour. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . constitutes the general stock. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. thus invested with independence. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. This instrument. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. ¤ 522 (3) The children. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . as do also its industry.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. on one hand. on the o ther hand. while. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined educating them to independent personality. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . information. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. acquire an existence of their own. In virtue of such for tuitousness. to found anew such an actual family. who exist independent and free. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. learning. as private persons. of the possessor's will. and thus produce more unconditional . into families or individuals. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. originally foreign to it. of legal regulation. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. destined. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. however. and care for the future.

however. The second. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. Hence. or could be.dependence on the social system. at every point. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. which is honesty.. as vital. But when right. 2 3/4 . Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . as well as of mental culture and habit . its action gets direction and content through natural features. and so on ad infinitum. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. Where civil society. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). be the righ t and just thing. and accident. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. also of aims and interests. and a corresponding mode of labour. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. and an ensemble of contingencies. which as existence is essentially a particular. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . this analysis. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. or only 2 * . where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. determined through reason or legal intelligence. of needs. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. Thus whether three years. certain. talent. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. skill. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . option. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. intelligence. and like the first a certain subsistence. and in it they have their social moralit y. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour .(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority .masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. ten thalers. their recognition and their honour. 2 4/5 years. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. to be. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. and of means for satisfying them. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. Their content per se may be reasonable . in the course of definite manifestation. and industry. and with it the State. they have their actual existence. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. on the side of external existence. though of course only at the final points of deci ding.the Law.and ye t it should be decided. It is a futile perfectionism to have . that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . is developed i n detail. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. of mere agents. The third. exists.

general laws. not for them. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. hereditary divinity or nobility. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. These people forget that the stars .itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws .in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. there arises. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency.the ne be promulgated and made known as laws . which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such.into punishment (¤ 500). like improvements on a f loor or a door.laws. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. . to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. inasmuch as.even as his law can only be a just law. of his countrymen. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural proven: . while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. . in the judicial system. being laws o f strict right. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. who has by so doing gained the gratitude.which though something new. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. This subjective existence. the need of a simpler code . The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. and in particular transforms this existence . and t hus become authoritative .and th e cattle too . The comparison of the two species. i. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. with the advance in multitude. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. constit .(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . recognized.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. are not a new hou se. at the same time an externally objective existence. as the genuine order of life.are governed and well governed too by laws. even the admiration. They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. first really de serving the name of laws.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. as it is a known law. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis . bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . within the house . whic h are only internally in these the individualized right .or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith .vi z.e. But there is a contrary case. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. which discovers new distinctions. however. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general this exists as revenge . by faith and trust. as universal authority and necessity. to which objective existence determines i tself. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . they touch only the abstract will . as in the mental ima ges of space. which again make new decisions necessary.

because it is only one factor. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. and the judgement as application of the law to it. the position of an external un iversality. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. then. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. and their variable ingredients. appears as state. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. to the concrete of civil society. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want .as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. So far as concerns them. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. and to maint ain that end in them and against them.and that. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. shou ld.'poli . mere circumstantial evidence. .It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. from the c onnections between nation and nation. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . It results also from circumstances of locality. and worked from that point of view. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. . because it is man's want. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. be exercised as different functions.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. No doubt this factor is incomplete. so as to secure this satisfaction. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. as at bottom different sides. which. Conversely.viz. in a uniform gen eral way. In so far. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . This is due to the variability of the wants themselves.

and. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. continually produce it as their result. First it maintains them as persons. secondly. they are re strictions. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. it protects the family and guides civil an actuality .in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . The same unity.into the life of the universal substance. in this direction . (c) THE STATE. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . then it promotes their welfare. his independent self-will and particular interest. which. ¤ 539 As a living mind.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own .const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. On the other hand. but which has a thoroughly general side. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . This universal principle. Thus we have the corpora tion. differentiated in to particular individual. and not left to perish. it carries back both. s heer subjectivity. Secondly.which volition is thereby free . which is in the famil y as a feeling of love.ce'.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. First. nsists in a double function. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. but.the reasonable spirit of will. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. It provides for the reasonable will . they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. and self-develop ed . ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. self-originated. to the immediate agent. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. The cons titution is existent justice . and .international (outer-state) law. . is its essence. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. the state only is as an organized whole. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. which each originally takes care of for himself. receiving. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. however. with all its evolution in detail. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. But. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. through the action of the government and its several branches. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. also for that will being put in actuality.

and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. But that this freedom should e xist. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. in other words. as it exists as s uch. Formerl y the legally defined rights. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. the final aim and result of the co nstitution.only it can make them . every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. As regards Liberty. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. as it ha ppens. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. the familiar proposition. which it can without incompatibility allow. on the contrary. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). town . it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. etc. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. Nothing has become. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. on the contrary. the current notions of l . partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. With the state there ari ses inequality. etc. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist.e. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) regards taxation. magistracies . As regards. presuppos e unequal conditions. Rome. The principle of equality. rejects all differences. is so little by nature. etc. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. etc. It is important therefore to study them closer. etc. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). talent.. Equality. otherwise have in property. age.equal in the concrete. authorities. or even in crime. On the contrary. the difference of governing powers and of governed. Really. etc. directories. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. The laws themselve s. logically carried ou t. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. But the notion of liberty. skill.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. is abstract subjectivity. i. or destroy them. as regards the concrete. eligibili ty to office. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. military service. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good .punishment. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. it embodies a liberty. first. However true this is.besides their personalit y . that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. But. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. were called its 'liberties'. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings.pleasure an d self-will. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. the citizens . that the laws rule. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . All men are by nature equ al. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. private as well as public rights of a nation. without further specification and development. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. physical strength. . and that the laws are restrict ions.

with its insatiate vanity. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. in other words continuall . and thus gains moral independence. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity.) But the guara ntee lies also. with this development of particularity. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. The question . and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. But the more we fortify liberty. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. and the organization of the actualization of them. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. and must deal with them as it ca n.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. however. just as little as the making of a code of laws. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution.iberty only carry us back to equality. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. The term political liberty.that which preserves. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . as a state without a constitution. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. and to regard a state. ¤ 541 The really living totality . ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. of sec urity of property. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities.e. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and.a thing that has nev er happened in history. i. self-w ill and self-conceit. has an insight and conviction of his own . and of the difficulty of satisfying them.just because of this inseparability . (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. is . If . and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. be it added. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. . in which this is not formally done. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. not merely with regard to the naturalness. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults.e . and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. of liberties in general.

The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'.in a state of society. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. as in the patri archal society . in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. i. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. These. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. is the government. i. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. the participation of all i n all affairs . Only through t he government. ¤ 542 In the government .e. which taken apart is also particular). this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. and the government be merely executive and dependent . . with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. equally disorganizes make it the first power. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business.the will of a decreeing individual. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence).e.monarchy. as in a democratic constitution. is the state one. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial bject always. however. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. is the self-redintegrating notion. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. of the family and of civil society.the all-sustaining. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason.impugns the principle of the division of powers. in other words.regarded as organic totality . if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . but an actual indiv idual .the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. all-decreeing will of the state. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . (A mistake still greater. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation.y produces the state in general and its constitution. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . which includes an already existing development of differences. In the perfect form of the state. as always.or. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . .

The division of constitutions into democracy. in the history of the State. and skill for such short. to that end and for that reason.'ideal' unity. too. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. there arises the participation of several in state-business.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance.partly. liberty of property. possess independence of a ction. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. and above all personal liberty. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. admini stration of justice or judicial power. and then of nature .e. i. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power.viz. lik e peace and war.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. legislative power.are.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. with their general opinion. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. especially in legislation . involve the. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. to subjectivity. The pure forms .. civil society. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. and are to that degree private person s. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. Secon dly. it may be . and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . personal interference and action of th e State as one man. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. being simple self-relation. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. That subjectivity . All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . conjoined both with forms of their degeneration .being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . aptitude. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. participate in the governmental power.such as also feudal monarchy. These principles are those expounded earlier. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. aristocracy and monarchy. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. essentially.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. For it is as private persons t . . and with earlier transition-forms.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. administration and police. etc. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. first. with its industry and i ts communities. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). Two points only are all-important. as it were. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. which having their busin ess appointed by law.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . Thus.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . an actual existence.

In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. inorganic shape. like that of the stormy.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. but as organic factors. so far as they form only one branch of that power . By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen.a spiritual element . If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. and therefore more urgent. in the law and liberty of property. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials .would be. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. blind force. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. ever newly recurring. s ense of general wants. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will.e. The so-called financial law. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. be they treated as mere individuals. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. i. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. or in its 'reflectional' universality.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. range of the extern al means of government. wild. Experience s hows that that country .as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. moreover. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. to power and act ion. as the nation . indeed the whole. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. elemental it very likely is . and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. Take the case of England which. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. it is not a brutish mass.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. In a civilized state. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. in arrangements for art and science. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns.the contrary must be the case . because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs.which should be presupposed. however. demoralization. that t hey enter upon that participation. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. is no t self-destructive. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. ¤ 529 note). Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. as estates. If the main part of the requirement were . however. The des irability of such participation. and form a particular kind . which. in the general sense of embracing a wide. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality.regard ed as permanent. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. as such an aggregate.

with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government.e. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. and not actually existent. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal.e. In one case the .this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. and thus. as content o f a true law. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. in which there would no longer be a government. but only parties. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. i. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. when it makes a decree about finance. waywardness and chance have a place. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . a state of war.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. or every few years. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. and becomes the estate of making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it.. In their mutual relations. Then again. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. is really engaged with strict executive business. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. e. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence .as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . of the whole of the finances. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. afresh. and not to be made yearly. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding .g.

a history of its own. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary.the judgement of the world. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. It has. etc. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. in short. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. first in general. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted.the plan of Provide nce. there is Reason in history. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. are settled and fixed. each of which. and on history-writing in general. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. internat ional law rests on social usage. is founded on an essential an d actual aim.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. both this general recognition. As this development is in time and in real existence. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . and then in history. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. is appointed to occupy only one grade. this note must go into further deta il. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts.. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. however. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. and in Germany more than in France and England. especially on the philological side.a world-mind. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. when we come to minutiae. it passes int o universal world-history. On th is point. It is in time. That history. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. and as regards its range and scope. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. is called an a prio ri view of it. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. it. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. as it is a history. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities.of sacerdotal races . Fictions. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness.and. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. in short. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. that. of a Roman epic. and above all universal history. in defiance of . which actually is and will be realized in it . In general. an d the special claims of nations on one another.

or. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object.). and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. has. i. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. but an age. But. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances.appears to run . on the other hand. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. is not only against taste and judgement. express not a subjective particularity. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. a civilization. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass.g. What happens to a nation . weave them into the pictur e of general interests. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. Rome and its fortunes. if he had not an interest. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. or if he declined to judge at all. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. and criticize events. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. The point of interest of Biography . in striking portraiture and brevity. state. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. and an exclusive interest in justice. no history . or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. strictly s peaking. Ay. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. a word. and takes place within it. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it.the best-accredited history. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. in the interest of so-called truth. and rejects both ki nds of interest.e. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective say a word on that here . the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. but violates th e principles of objective truth. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. and. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. as in the romance. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. not as good as a fairy tale. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. a nation. e. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation).

if Rome or the German empire. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. 550). we may add. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549.e. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. these individuals. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. on the contary.e. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . i. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . i. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. has another ground and interest than his tory. is the supreme right. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). and of its essence. etc. first in general. The mere play of sentiment. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. and are all treated as indifferent.or in other words that Reason is in history . so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. For Spirit is consciousn ess. really. i. and the business of so doing. while it inheres in them. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. Such a doctrine . ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . and there fore as a work of individuals. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit.Fame. which is what is pe culiar to them. liberty. etc. in this case. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. are instruments. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. only opinions and mere ideas. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. the consciousness of it. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. But biography too has for its background the historical world. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. the freak of accurate report of externals. which all alik e have no stuff in them. and its content is prese . ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. But. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also .e. and secondly. have they their value and even their existence.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. which is their reward. i. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . Only therefore through their relationship to it. potentially infinite.e. to the history of religion. the absolute L aw. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. is the empty form of activity. as over a special grade. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. a development determined by the notion of spirit. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. truth.admitting. and their subjectivity. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme.

e. especially ¤ 51. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. ¤ 204 not e). As regards the 'mediation' which. cf. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. At this rat e. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. from which the start is now made. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. and that on the religious. the state rests on the ethical sentiment.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. Th e finite. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. But . still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. however. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. is the purification. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. now gets its most concrete interpretation. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. the idea of God it kn .as is the case with all speculative process . As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. The spirit. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. i.Liberty. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom.a mere 'ought' . i. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . For that st arting. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to the peculiar perversity. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. actually accomplished in the ethical world. forme rly noticed. But the spirit which think s in universal history.e. note). lays hold of its concr ete universality. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason.e.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. This factor.e. that elevation to God really involves. as law and duty. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. i. as true in the world of free will. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. in the system of laws and usages.consciousn ess. is the real ethical self. Such apprehension. i. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind.

as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. but in the moment of enjoymen t. But in poin t of form. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. and ex pecting miracles from them.ows must be the true and real. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. i. generally. for thought and knowledge . in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has.of bondage. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. B . but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. It leads. morality and conscience. and even as mutually indifferent. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . receiving its knowledge of divine truth. to justification by external wo rks. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. and in the act of faith. and law and justice. but purely subjective in individuals: . non-spirituality.addressing his devotion to miracle. and superstition. i. the host as such is not at first consecrated. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth .the body of religious truth. then there may be created. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. even to bones. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality.partly as mere moving of the lips. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. and prays others to pray .working images.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others.or it may be. one religious and an other ethical. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. and these applications of it in the religious life.e. i.logi cally enough . responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. differing from the former in body and value of truth. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. It lea ds to a laity. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. i. in the annihilation of its externality. in its faith and in its con science.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. in point of form. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. first of all. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. springing from some force and power. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) .e. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. religion was a late r addition.e. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. And. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. on the contr ary. (In the Lutheran Church. a condition of spiritual sla very. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing.e. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying .

ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). and in a special sense Philosophy. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. leads it into the rea l world. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. i. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. i. founded on principles of reason. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. . Instead of the vow of chastity. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. no matter how. Let us suppose even that.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . Thus. Thus set free. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. sti . and in the use of property . if taken alone. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. can law and morality exist. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. lacked liberty. because the state is a self-possessed. therefore. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible.of honesty in commercial dealing. unte nable. and thus only. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. i. .an obedience which is itself the true short. and political institutions deduced from them must be. and. a code of law should arise. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. so to speak a priori. And instead of the vow of obe dience.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. moral life in the state. the wisdom of the world. So long as t he form.e. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion.e. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. which does not rise in hostility against them. . so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. our consciousness and subjectivity. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. self-realizing reason . The precept of religion.

Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide.mi nd intrinsically concrete .could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. (cf. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. on one hand. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. ¤ 544 note). when specially set in relief as genus.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. thus surmountin .which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . Such laws. etc. . we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. so-called 'chambers'. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. This absolute nucleus of man . as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government.among which laws these guarantees are included. and the power given them to fix the budget. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the the intellectual and thinking just this . from those deeper requirements which. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. At best it is only a temporary expedient . This additional 'individuality' . if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . however sound their provisions may be. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. to put it simply. thus founder on the conscience. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. e.g. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. on the other hand.. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. that the Idea must be regent.ll. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. or.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit.

the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. As it left therefore behind. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. ¤ 513. Under the subjective form. in common with all his thinking contemporaries.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. which is developed similarly. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. in its philosophic phase. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . But thought always .).each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. or essential being). is implicitly in absolute liberty. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy .was that creative imagination. exhibits the one-sidedness. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. of philosophy. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . etc. but earlier than philosophy. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . for th ese reasons. so . fall feeling.the idea of the substantial moral life. on its own s howing. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. earlier than it does as philosophy. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself .the form which ph ilosophy attacked . from religion. Plato.and th at on account of this very principle . and so also one-sided phase. in its f irst immediate. which still escaped his intelligence. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. as demoralization. The form in its infinite tru th. pictorial representation. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. however. he. Political power. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. as it grows and expands. But even religion. is after all only in one of its form s. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. Religion may. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. should knit it together and control it. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. the subjectivity of mind. Only in the principle of mind. which is awa re of its own essence. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. or rather long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. religion. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. intuition. Hence religion as such.). a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. His state is therefore.

Die Sittlichkeit. Das System der Bedurfnisse. Weltweisheit. as always. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. Die Weltgeschichte 10. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. 3.e. of God's indwelling in us. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. 6. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. Religion. In the Protestant state. 2. while it is self-centred identity. Inneres Staatsrecht. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note).as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). That here. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. Thus ul timately. as well as their several applications. Gesetz. Die Rechtspflege 5. Die Polizei und die Corporation. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. 9. but rather to a sort of knowledge. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. i. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. for which it is as substance. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. 7. the constitut ion and the this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. Das aussere Staatsrecht. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. 4. 1. 8. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. ¤ 554 The absolute mind.

without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation.the form of immediacy as such . of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . Belief. . as it is. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. With the essential restrictedness of its content. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: .in other words.i. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. that is. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. On one hand. the actuality of the spirit. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life.for the expression of spiritual truth .(under which are also included subjective images and ideas).hence not the sp iritual unity. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. 1. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. A. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract .must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. and t he subject which contemplates and worships the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . or the idea. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit .the shape or form of Beauty.e. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. viz. and of gaining its concrete determination. has in devotion .something formal. into the subject which produces that work. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. as superseded in spirit. aware. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. like the material which it uses to work in. but . at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. ¤ 411). In this ideal. so that the thought embodied. on the other hand. which is only a sign of the Idea. c an. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . reconciliation. its n atural immediacy. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. Art requires not only an external given material . Der absolute Geist. But.

but as only finding himself in himself. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the short how the nature of a nation's moral life. and of its constitution. though concrete and intrinsically free. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. of its actual liberty. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. as free spi rit. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. assumes fuller and firmer features. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. . is not yet known.symbolic art. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. is not yet absolute. the artist's enthusiasm. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world.stil l this art is defective. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. not yet conscious of itself. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . known as the Absolute. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. but its inmost depth. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . that one spirit creates and informs them. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. as well as of its art and science. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. and that is where the infinite form.can try to bring itself to consciousness. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . and th e artist is the master of the God. or an effor t towards him .and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. subjectivity. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. the principle of its law. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form.

The older religion in which the need of fine art. it is from Him. like the religion peculiar to it. not the supreme liberation itself. dashing t o pieces everything high and great .e.ent in it. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. as infinite self-realizing form . in which he had not revealed himse lf. B. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. whose con tent is absolute mind . and brilliancy.The genuine still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. with their perso nal sense and feeling. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. . into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. and.due to a one-sided survey of human life . which is only in the medi um of thought . REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of therefore is manifestation out a nd out. what is more. is first generated. still more in that external. . and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. expression. .of Nemesis. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world .the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. has its future in true reli gion. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . and j ust for that reason. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. Beautiful art. shows that such religion is on the decline. on the contrary. The old conception .the religion i. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . we see that the advent of art. But with a further and deeper study. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. unbeautiful sensuo usness. Beautiful art.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the.that it be revealed. from it s side. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit .the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. the theme and c entre of religion. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. revealed by God. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art.into revelation.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. spectator find themselves at home.

just as. and. as in duty bound. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. he still remains in original identity . (a) as eternal content. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. in it s forefront. though different.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. But. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought .knowledge in God. Yet. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. on one hand. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. Go d is.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . the elemental and the concrete nature . in point of content. by C. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is.. which is at fir st the presupposed principle.1.on the other hand. not. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . staying aloof and inert. while in point of form he is. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. It includes.of the only Son . have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof.requires careful and thorough speculation. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . On one hand is heaven and earth. for that reas on.: Berlin 1829. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. it implies the revelation of Him. . To know what God as spirit is . and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. F. That spirit. directed towards the Eternal. and phenomena which succeed each other. with whom. abiding sel f-centred. it may almost create surprise that so many. the spirit. . and reconciliation with the eternal being. making them presuppositions towards each other. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. on the other hand. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. amid that natural ness. when it thinks. as the extreme of inherent negativity. a separate being. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. though. (c) as infinite return.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. to specul ative comprehension. which therefore is the Spirit. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. only standing to it in an external connection. it apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts .it is therefore the absolute spirit. however. even in its manifestation. further. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. G . first of all. again. or of judgement. of the world it gave away . this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. but afterwards. which proceeds to man's self. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness.. ¤ 566 In this separating.

is itself the emptiness and vanity.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. with a temporal and external sequence. eternal. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . keeps himself unchanged.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. as infinite subjectivi ty. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all.Irony. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. 1. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. remains master over it. on account of his immediate nature. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. If the result . Die geoffenbarte Religion. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. In this form of truth.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . but alive and present in the world. through which witness of the spirit in him. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. But. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. secondly. external in point of form. and thus sensuous. gives itself direction and con tent. truth is the object of philoso phy. This individual. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . but even to thought. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. th e self-centred manifestation. . which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. Thinking. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. an object of contemplating vi sion . and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. Whereas the vision-method of Art. Further.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . after the example of his truth. and thus. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute transplanted into the world of time. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. his natur al man and self-will. C. and eternal spirit in itself. this immediate. Irony.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness.but the vision of implicit truth. he.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. so far.and.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. simple. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. From this its separation into p arts. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. is not bound by it . and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. who as such is identified with the essence . in which he. contentless sense. which from itself. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in taken in a merely formal.

But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. and against philosophy in general . and mediates what is thus open ed out. and acts inconsistently towards them.from these forms. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. This movement. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought.i.which may be in both the same . By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. and particularly of the logical form. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. and this necessary as free. and whereas Religion. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. and s o religious. immediate vision and its poetry. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. too much for the latter. a nd of logic in particular. This does not prevent the spirit. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence.and from a pithless orthodoxy. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. remains identical with it.takes. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party.the underlying essence in all humanity . Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. when at the close it seizes its own notion . but also criticized it. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . elevation of them into the absolute form. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . only looks back on its knowledge. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect.e. as also of the necessity in the two forms . It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. The charge of Atheism. which philosophy is. when driven to expound itself. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God).on the other hand.('Rationalism') . to be more precise still. with its separ ation into parts. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. or. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . opens it out in mental picture. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. This witness . finds itself already accompl ished.leaving out. of course.on one hand. which determines itself to content. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them.stantial content into many separate shapes. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary.

which therefore it does not disparage. Amongst the abundant resources. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics.each and every secular thing is God. does not comprehend itself. It is only his own stupidity. God in General. most sublime. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real always adora tion of an object which. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . On such a presuppo sition. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . in particular. also contains the generic abs tract.(empirical things. we must.thus he understands philosophy . its grossest shape.the Bhagavat-Gita. without distinction. Piety. from which all definite quality is much so. that it has too much of him: . If this theory needs no more than such a God.of Pantheism. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. whether higher or lower in the scale.g. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. and so . as is well known. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. the secularity of th ings. This new the wanton assertion. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. ¤ 71 note).or to dalai-lamas . thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. and amongst it s much so. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. or if you will. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality.all possess substantia lity. I select . fulfilled notion of God. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. cows .for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. exclusi ve. with all its absurdities. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. Without interest of its own for the concrete. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. some of the most telling passage . consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. as it stands. and is therefore. if we believe them.that of the Hindu to ass es. open to our disposal on this topic. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion.of the new piety and new the most authentic statement accessible . The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. are unable and unwilling to see this .that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) .(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy.Everything is . and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. or any one man. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. that. are) . and form all that is definite in the divine universality. or Pantheism.that of the Egyptians to the ox . all such definiteness is only the non-divine. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . but as a proved fact.

has the higher conception of Brahma. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. . 7 seqq. and one essential amongst them. 'At the end of many lives. . all this is woven upon me. the Everything. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . or a God besides. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. nothing independent]. at the beginning of the pass age. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. But so little concrete is this divine unity . Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings.' This 'All'. Indra. which he is. and the Spinozan Substance. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. . . I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. . vanish. . than which there is nothing higher. he is said to be the beginning. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. the One which.. where the empirical everything of the world. The undiscerning ones. as also those proximate substantialities.). . any more than the Eleatic One. . .that Hinduism.s. middle. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. called Gods. . But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . . I am the spring amo ng the seasons. t he pure unity of thought in itself. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. Hinduism. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. . .so powerless its. is not. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . which Krishna calls himself. . to a poly theism. pp.the most excellent of everything.. . . but only . . without essential being of its very own.' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. seated in the hearts of all beings. This everything. and end of living things. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. besides Krishna. . the man possessed of knowledge approaches me.. unessential existences. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . p. . There is nothing else higher than myself. passion. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. even Siva. . . . the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). rather. Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. . Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. Meru among the high-topped mountains. etc. . . In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. as different from that accidental. I am life in all beings.spiritual as its idea of God i s . . . (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. but having its truth in the substance. . . everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) .' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. .not everything. with a monstrous incons istency. is also the maddest of polytheisms. . . I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. . still God. so to speak . not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. or Indra.'I am the self. . . . Even when. and the moon among the lunar mansions. grip. however. melt into the one Krishna.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. is alo ne the divine and God. goodness. Among letters I am the letter A. . I am the taste in water. I am also the strength o f the strong. as he said before he was S iva. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be .

the Eleatic. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence.on the shallow conception of it .(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic.ndu. which. Of the oriental. as everything. outside it .keep its independence. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. we must consult th e Mohammedans. even in a general exoteric discussion.g. If. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. is identical with the world. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. to which everything is God. imagination or speculation. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. It is only the picture . The clo se of philosophy is not the place. is discarded and absor its finest purity and sublimity. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. as the endless lot of empirical existence. of the relationship of God and the world. or. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. But. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. modes of envisaging God. secondl y. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. and on the other. in relation to the popular idea of the world. to was . if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in it as a lot of Gods or as secular.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. as infinite from the finite. whether they spring from heart. empirical indivi duals . when he adores the ape. For that unity. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. ac osmical. or other creature. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. e. Hin du monotheism. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. after this partition. as it says.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is.of the world as one thing. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. and.floating in the indefinite blue .might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. he is as essence parted from appearance. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. but . but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. and God everything. moreover. the finite to the infinite. the all. on the contrary. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50.. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. But to go back again to the question of fact.. and that unity described as love. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. especially the Mohammedan. or Spinozist. and so on . and of empirical secular spirit. on one hand.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. That pantheism indeed .

they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. omnipresence. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. in the pores of th e physicists . But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. and that amongst the m there is great variety. however.and relation i pso facto implies unity . the most external and the worst.g. and that hence. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . viz. with abstract unity. with God's omnipresence. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. when they hear of unity . composition.and s till less take trouble about it .g. as in the physical field the physicist. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. if not even of supreme identity. in matters admitted to be of superior.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. And as in their judgement either of the two . so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. perhaps under the more familiar names of e.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. something supposed to exist beside the material reality.e. But the question is. but only the one factor of this category of relation .or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. . e. the notion and content of philosophy. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. a nd assert . they import them into philosophy. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. it is not. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. not the concrete unity. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else.the world as much as Go d . with indefinite ideas.that. inorganic and living . mere ide ntity. I n the philosophical field they proceed. i. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. and that it is the system of identity. but rather its reverse. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures.falsely as a fact . who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . and the empty absolute. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. etc. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. but with concrete unity (the notion). it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject.said pores being the negative.and that the factor of indet erminateness . they have laid hands on. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. providence. is what one expect s. as Epicu rus does. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things.has the same solid substantiality as the other.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world.te a word on what a 'notion' means. where they are utterly unknown. But they show so little acquaintance with them . we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. and which they ascribe to philosophy. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many.

They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. then. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . which divides itself into Mind and Nature. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. in his relation to the world. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . i. Nature . only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. and the latter its universal extreme. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. not abstract unity. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. which . y . a system of identity. which causes the movement and development. which has self. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. The esoteric study of God and identity.knowing reaso n. sunders itself. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. On account of this chorus of assertions. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. standing between the Mind and its essence. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: .as the mediating agent in th e process . but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. the absolutely universal. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. of which liberty is the aim. the notion.which.ity . I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . on the shoulders of philosophy. an All-one doctrine. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. is philosophy itself. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . but the many-shaped modes specified. But in ascribing to God.their everything.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical is the nature of the fact.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there .by which notions are perverted into their opposite. as of cognitions. But to put that sort of thing.the logical system. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. making the former its presupposition. If statements as to facts are put forward. or as prevaricating for a purpose. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity.e. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. and which is itself the way to produce has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. and as implicitly the Idea. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. as other than they. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. and notions . it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. for its middle term: a middle.

et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. . in f ull fruition of its essence. eternally sets itself to work. The eternal Idea. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind.

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