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INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any
attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i
s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as
treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.
which is potentially all things. have still. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom.the truth that matter itself has no truth. even the capacity of offering resistance. the soul is only the sleep of mind . which is the fund amental feature of matter. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. identical ideality of it all. like heat. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. ANTHROPOLOGY. as absolute negativity. except where.e. matter is regarded as something true. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. perhaps. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. not merely lacks gravity.the passive of Aristotle. thus come into being. and not as the immediate or natural individual. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. Mind. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. on the other. At such a stage it is not yet mind.SUB-SECTION A. its simple 'ideal' life. on the one hand. But not merely is it..with th is proviso. li ght. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. etc. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. It is otherwise with Mind. to which they might perhaps add space and time. however. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . where the othe . whereas the 'vital' matter. The usual answer. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. indeed. as such a result. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. but soul. Wherever there is Nature. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. These 'imponderables' . ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. and mind conceived as a thin g. There. however. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. in a sense. and. and so the self-externalism. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. a nd the soul remains the pervading. i. and the only problem was how to comprehend it.
These have. Spinoza. Animals and pl ants. the changes of the seasons.e. Malebranche.whence Epicurus.(a) In its immediate natural mode . as an anima mundi. on the contrary. and telluri c life of man.the natural soul. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. there philosophers took God. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. etc. re tains an abstract independence. as in the case of Lei bniz.e. in many case s completely. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. described. is too abstract. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. when it presents itself as a single soul. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. (b) Secondly. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. Hence. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. it is a soul which feels. not. But either this identity.is moulded into it. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. and. so to speak. into the absolute syllogism. and does not rise or develop into system. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. it may be. Descartes. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. which only is. upon it. and always more or less. as so often is done. as in the case of Spinoza. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. (c) Thirdly. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. so holding. just in proportion to his civilization. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. sidereal.r is not . remain for ever subject to such influences.or corporeity . even these few and slight susceptibilities. feels the difference of climates. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. or. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. in the modes of that being. based upon participation in the common life of nature. they are natural objects for consciousness. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. with Leibniz. and the periods of the day. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. T hus. a world-soul. In nations less intellectually emancipated. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. as individualized. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. disappear. its immediate being . . we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. and. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system.
that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. widely distant from each other. shows an active half. on its one side. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. hopes. and on the other. physiognomy. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. we see man in his true relation to his environment. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. on the whole. as alterations in it. or artistic. talent . fails to meet his ideal requirements. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world).on a ph ysical basis. of families or single individuals. This .a worl d no longer incomplete. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . He begins with Childhood .mind wrapped up in itself. we find its diversities. The contrast between the earth's poles. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. shows. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. and as stages in its development. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). in purposes political. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. bodily structure and disposit ion. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. And that individuality marks both the world which. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. as it exists. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject.the sexual relation . Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. we find it as the special temperament. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. scientific. character. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. the one permanent subject. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. carrying out these universa . fancies. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. Thirdly. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). and the position of the individual himself.
which are often addressed to philosophy: . on a v isit to the University of Pavia. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. but as a return back from the world of specialization. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. as already noted. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. . an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. as they may be called. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. as before explained . . Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. for example. sleep. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). although. The characterization given in the section is abstract. put this question to the class of ideology.not as a merely negative rest from it.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. or self-centralized being.Napoleon. viz. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. each point.The waking is not merely for the observer.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. i n an unintelligent way. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. (c) Sensibility(3) . distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. distinguishes itself from its mere being. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . in the first instance. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. . this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul.
in the feeling. One. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . This should hardly need enforcing. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. etc. invested with cor poreity. and religious. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. etc.set over against consciousness. on one hand. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. it is true. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. the conscience. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. godless. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . Another. and . and to be as if found. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. the naturally immedi ate. which. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. adultery. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. the inarticulate bre athing. are found by the waking soul. On the other hand and conversely. but treated as bel onging to its most special. evil. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. mora l. fornication. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . as 'ideally' in it and made its own. in its own self. are our very own. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. for itself.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). and the character. the fact is a mode of my individuality. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. murder . But if put in the feelin g. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. belonging as it does to natural. blasphemy. etc. mean. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. be it noted.identity of our self-centred being. moral.. is what we call sensibility.g. its natural peculiarity. not mere alterations. are in order to be felt. The fact that these particulars. true. and is so felt. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). just. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. primarily. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. ho wever.
smells. the immediacy of mode in feeling . the centre of the 'sensible' system. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. works itself out. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. especially the passions or emotions. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . and voice in general.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . We should have.in the system of the senses.it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is .g. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. to the character of subjectivity.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. of self. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). but an inward. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. (c) the sense of solid reality. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. are formed from their mental source. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . i.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. the blood. tones. and their corporization. for example. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head.because in it. distinction appears as mere variety . sighs. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. 322). (¤ 317) . are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . e.the senses of definite light. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. (¤ 300). Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. As sentient. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. . But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . o f colours. with which that substance is one. is to raise its substantiality.it is a soul which feels. laughter. therefore. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. the 'irritable' system. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. to realize its mastery over its own. of heavy matter. What it has to do.e. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. in a special system of bodily organs. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. to take possessi on of it. with its varieties of language.and of sound. following the special character of the mental mode. ¤ 402 Sensations. i ts merely virtual filling-up. set in its self-centred life. (¤¤ 321.a psychical physiology. just because they are immediate and are found existing. In the usage of ordinary language.
(a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . ¤ 404 As individual. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. ideas. By itself. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. etc. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. to which the soul. in whi ch all this is stored up. the content is its particular world. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. but a negation. but only to his im plicit self. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. At the present stage this singleness is. prima rily. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. As sentient. the corporeity. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). a deep featureless characterless mine. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. etc. which is at the same time its predicate. They were not in our possession. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. Some times. Thus in the body it is one simple. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. without existing. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . to be defined as one of feeling . so far as that is. although it does not exist. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. It is only when I call to mind an id ea.as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. where the real is put past . virtually retained. acquired lore. it brings within itself. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). In the present stage we must treat. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. omnipresent unity. which is disease. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. the s oul is characterized as immediate. it implies a want of adaptation. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. in sickness. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). which repre sents it as the negation of the real. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. ideas and information. once mor e come to light. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. first. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego.the existent spe culative principle.. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. thoughts. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . in an implicit mode. may again sink down. secondly.that world being included in it and filling it up. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. and to that world it stands but as to itself.
and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. not a true subject reflected int o itself. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. Here are two individuals. etc. self-possessed. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . as concrete subject ivity. which. the single self of the two. or capac ity. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. tal ent. say between friends. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. or virtuality. developed interests. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. as yet nothing impenetrable. and of character. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. placenta.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. and is therefore passive. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. not yet as its self. of life. intellige nt. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. congenital disposit ion and temperament. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. The moth er is the genius of the child. because immediate. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. not as a mere possibility. incl inations. but as efficiency and realized activity. of the mother. whose decision is ul . controlling genius thereof. etc. temper. character. self-conscious.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. his secular ideas. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius.. it is. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. and reasonable. as it has existence of its own. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness.is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. fortunes. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. etc. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. idiosyncrasies. etc. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. injuries. is visibly present as another and a different individual. By the self-hood of the latter it .a substance. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. the psychical relationship. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence..
to be mere deception and impo sture. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . self-possessed human being is a disease.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. it must be added. on the cont rary. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . which are also means and ends to each other. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. At the same tim e. But such a verification would. The facts. on the other hand. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. first of all call for verificati on. To that end the phenomena. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . is. means. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. educated. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. it has already been call ed his genius. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil .infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . This totality forms his actual ity. in which the individual here appears innnersed. that it is in harmony wi th the facts.to show. it might seem. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect.his fun damental interests. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. intentions. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. in other words.
but it is empty. that it is a state of passivity. his own and that of the magnetize . The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. . This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. wh en it is healthy and awake. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. ca pable of conveying general truths. and c ontinues to be. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. etc. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. f riends. and character. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world.a genius which beh olds itself.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. reads. and to know which. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. not on the spot. those c onnected with female development. after the downfall of the Roman republic. on those left behind. not really a 'person'. tastes. etc. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . the magnetizer. however. for example. . It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. in catalepsy. external one to another. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. and other diseases. in its sober moods. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. etc. formed. . and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. in whom it sees. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other.). in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. (Thus Cato.) Compare h ome-sickness. smells. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. And because it is the adult. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. But. exist for it as an outward objectivity. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. which. and the like. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. is this. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. and hears. a formal vision and awareness. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. But such clairvoyance . unless by the aid of religion. subject to the power of another person.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. then. like that of the child in the womb.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. the selfless individual. which lead up to the result . or at the approach of death. When the substance of both is thus made one. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. is under a veil. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. subje ctive reason.
The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. or med icines for them. so long as we assume independent personalities. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. on the contrary. reasons. as in other cases. is without any definite points of attachment . which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. i s just this form of immediacy.fe eling. is impossible. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. i. in its capacity as individual. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. for example. The purely sensitive life. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. etc. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. and at the same time. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. beholds.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. one sees and hears with the fingers. receives. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . causality. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. and hence. between intelligent personality and objective world. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. e. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. In considering insanity we must. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. the 'common sense'. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. which is no less a world of law. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . which still marks the self-feeling. anticipate the full-grown an .r. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. it is still susceptible of disease. though all-embracing. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. which. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. as in the morbid state alluded to. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. in this nominal perception. etc. In this way it is self. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep.
which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. and the rest of the passions . as something natural and existent. so as to insert them in their proper place. And so too the particularity is. equally formal. In the concrete.fan cies and hopes . Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . but only derangement. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. and their gratification). is relaxed. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits.. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. .d intelligent conscious subject. the self is to be stamped upon.. Mind as such is fr ee. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. and also desires. loss of health (if it were that. it would be death). The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. i. as now regarded. desire. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. which is there also. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. i. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. such as vanity. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. etc. and so makes part of the actual self. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. as a thing.e. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. is diseased. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires.that evil which is always latent in the heart. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. however. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. presupposes the patient's rationality. as it aris es. and made appear in. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. This particular being of the soul is t . A violent. idea. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness.feeling. pride.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health.merely personal love and hatred. This humane treatment. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). may. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling.e. earthly elements are set fr ee . yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. is undistinguis hed from them. and be a realized u niversality. and it is only as a thing. etc. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. inclination. but a contr adiction in it. and so also may the cure. the. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. that it is liable to insanity . instincts.just as physical disease is not an abstract. i. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. this life of feeling. passions. mere and total. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. moral and theoretical.e. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former.
impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). nature. and the mere substance. of it. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost.. And consciousness it becomes. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. Habit is rightly called a second nature. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). as. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. sleep. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. of which it is the subjective substance. heat. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. a pure act of intuition.he factor of its corporeity.and becoming the 'ideal'. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. Habit like memory. i. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. lacking consciou sness. and that as a barrier for it. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. on the contrary. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. a second nature. or dependent in regard to it.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. but the basis of consciousness. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. here we have it breaking with this corporeity.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. occupied. will. so is that pure being (which. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. et c. without feeling or consciousness of the fact.e. and which still continues to exist. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. and the generation o f habit as practice. and so no longer interested. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. The soul is freed from them. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. therefore. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. dist inguishing it from itself . and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. and for that reason n ot free. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . For. has been absorbed by it. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. partly only relative. is reduced to unity. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. That is to say. weariness o . empty space and empty time. The natural qualities and alterations of age. nor is absorbed in the m. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. the one and the same. when the co rporcity. but still free. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. are only subjectiv e forms. but has them and moves in them.itself a simple being . su bjective substantiality of it . even in being affected by them. this being of the soul. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation.
if quite abstract. sweet tastes. and the self-feeling as such. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. Habit on an ampler scale. and especially so in the specific bodily part. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. This is the rational liberation from them. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. without an express adjustment. Thinking. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. acquires a strength which consists in this. his upright pos ture. this soul. a series of musical notes) is in me.. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy.enabling the matter of consciousness. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. to be made a power in the bodily part. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. which make it up. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. nor are they in conce ption rational. under its volitional and conceptual characters. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind.f the limbs. habit diminishes this feeling. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. habit is usually passed over - . etc. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. cut off from action and reality. nor a transient emotion or idea.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. i. so that when the conception (e.is felt. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. . that although the frost. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. Even here. intuition. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. etc. the spatial direction of an individual. and it is habit of living which brings on death. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. etc. are no longer bothered with it.. too. and particul ar. casual. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance.. but part and parcel of his being. and thus to enable the soul. viz. And it is true that the form of habit. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. intelligence. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. and no other. to be his as this self.e. etc. reflection. whereof we sha ll speak later.or the misfortune .a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . consciousness. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. made into an instrum ent. moral. and that they. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are.g. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which.concentration. has been by will made a habit . and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. is recollection and memory. etc. like any other. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. and any other purp oses and activity. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. like their satisfaction. consciousness. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened.). re ligious. to exist as substance in its corporeity. an 'ideality' of soul . The most ext ernal of them. a particular organ of i ts organic system). nor an abstrac t inwardness. or skill. or.
in being related to which.. This note is so slight. Under the head of human expression are included. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. and i s infinite self-relation. of which it is the sign. in its concentrated self. and making it its own. Seen from the animal world. The soul. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . but the soul.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. for example. 3. 5. This externality. Die fuhlende Seele. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. Empfindung. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. etc. Naturliche Qualitaten. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. finds itself there a single subject. 4. the upright figure in general. in other words. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. the latter subject to the former. while language is its perfect expressi on. absorbing it. cuts itself off from its immediate being. and inexpressible a modific ation. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. and the formation of the limbs. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. or abstract universality. for the soul. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression.either as something contemptible . (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. And the human figure. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. still vainer than a signatura rerum. especially the hand. as the absolut e instrument. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. 2. unable to represent it in its actual universality. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. it is related to itself. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. or the 'immediacy' of mind. indefinite. a world external to it .laughter. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. of the mouth . Plato says in the Timaeus (p. 71). In this identity of interior and exterior. weeping. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. 1. represents not itself. Naturliche Seele. 'The autho .or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology.
the soul's natural life . the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. and as such it is C onsciousness. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. not to the wisdom. The mind as ego is essence. Hence consciousness. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND.e. It is of this latter. is only its abstract formal ideality. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. in the sphere of essence. 7. as this absolute negativity. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. something dark and beyond it. 6.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. thus first made explicit as the Ego. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality.the light. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. but to the foolishness of man. as subjective reflection in itself. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'.to an equal freedom as an independent object. seem to be its own activity. does not. like reciprocal dependence in general. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. but is implicit.it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . 8. Ego. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. i. as external to it. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). and . which manifests itself and something else too . it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. but since reality. to it. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. Selbstgefuhl. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. Gewohnheit. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. but when he receives the inspired word. now. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious).
The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). for which ego is the object. but only as it is in reference to something else. The object similarl y. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. This is sense-consciousness. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. but as poorest in thought. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. Consciousness . an existing thing. and so on. a thing-in-itself. again. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. as Reason. an existent. to raise its self-certainty to truth. the subject of consciousness. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is.to the ego it seems an alteration of the object.e. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. (b) self-consciou sness. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. a singular. a something. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. t heir absolute interdependence. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. and even t he Idea of Nature. i. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. in other words. the notion of mind. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate.a subject-objectivity. and puts it first under the category of being. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. reflected in itself. and underived certainty of it. i. It appears as wealth iest in matter. Spatial and temporal Singularn . immediate consciousness. an intuitive intellect. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind..comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. As against Spinozism.e. first. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. which is not as its own. is further characterized a s immediately singular. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. and that the philosophy. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). being immediate. with an object set against it. the substantial and qu alitative.as a case of correlation . what makes the object the subject's own. or mere c ertainty. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. has emerged from Spinoz ism. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. etc. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. Ego.
At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. i. an abstract identity: on the other hand.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. but as mediated. as we called it. reflected in itself. its necessity on its own part. a something external to it. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object.e. so constr uing the object. in this case by t he Ego. and universal. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . the one of the terms. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. wants to take the object i n its truth. and more or less by the sciences. taken in its concrete content. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. however. the distinction on its own part. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. reflectional attributes.). which form the alleged ground of general experience. on one hand. and universalities. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. of the thing is. has many properties. the thing.bet ween the individuality of a thing which. not as merely immediate. has. having passed beyond the sensible. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. to describe the sensible. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . by being regarded in their bearings. to which. and. in that manner. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates.ess.a variety of relations. it is related. ¤ 423 The law. or the distinction which is none. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. 73). and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . permanent term s. and not yet as external on its own part. p. as not externally different from the other. however. reflected upon. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . but as a n interior 'simple' difference. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. or as being beside and out of itself. i. but brought to rest and universality. lies im mediately in the other. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which.a copy of the phenomenon. and sensuous consciousness. But in this manner the interior distinction is. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. and am aware'. experiences. what it is in truth. Thi s inward. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness .e. free from this negative l ink and from one another. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. viz. . Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. is sense-perception. are independent universal matters (¤ 123).
(a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. therefore. and a desire (appetite) . ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. and ma intains itself as such. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. pure 'Ideality'. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. this identity comes to be for the ego. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. on the contrary . pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. is a singular. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. being merely consumed. the latter. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . implicit in it. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. there is strictly speaking no object. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. The certitude of one's self. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. can make no resistance: the dialectic. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature.as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. in this return upon itself. primarily describable as an individual. nominally. and thus in it I am aware of me. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. The two processes are one and the same. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. or implicitly. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality.With this new form-characteristic. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. therefore. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. in its immediacy. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . its satisfaction realized. knows itself implicit in the object. To this activity the object. on the whole. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. and itself made actual. or. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. On the external side it conti nues. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . with the nega tion of it.
w hich however is also still outside it.for the means of mastery. in the first place. which is the basis of this phenomenon. which falls on another.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. however. ¤ 434 This status. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. from one point of view. a suppression. and thus give existence to my freedom. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . Thus arises the status of master and slave. and formation of it. the outward and visible recognition). not their underlying and essential principle. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. then. the slave. Thus the death of one.e consciousness of a 'free' object. is yet. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. Force. and to exist as such for the other: . a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other.e. negati on of immediacy. works off his individualist self-will. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . solves the contradiction. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. however. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. it. and its being for others. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. and the means for entering into relation with them. Force. therefore rude. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality.t he process of recognition. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. though by the abstract. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. at first immedi ately. While the one com batant prefers life. as one of two things for another. the slave. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. ¤ 435 But secondly. as the existence of hi s freedom. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. on the ir phenomenal side. This other. in the service of the master. preservation. and incurs a like peril for its own . In that other as ego I behold myself. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. f rom the essential point of view (i. when we look to the distinction of the two. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. we see. retains his single self-consciousness.but only p eril. must likewise be kept in life. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression.
But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . For truth here has. 4. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. idle fame. 1. Selbstbewu§tsein. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . or determinations of the very being of things. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . therefore. is Reason. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free.which is Reason. fame.or rather it is a difference which is none. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. bu t the truth that knows it. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. is mind (spirit). (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. valour. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. Wahrnehmung 3. ego.is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . state. honour. fatherland. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. . each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. etc. love.in family.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal .consciousness. Die Begierde 6. the self-centred pure notion. is now itself universal. aware of what it is. 5. Der Verstand. whilst it signifies that the object. as its peculiar mode and immanent form. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. than they are its own thoug hts. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it.the passage to universal self.f wisdom' . The uni versality of reason. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . friendship. Reason. Truth. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. and of all virtues. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other.
e. etc. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. neit her subjective nor objective. what is the same thing. Mind. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. desires. therefore. though it no longer has an object. i. viz. SUB-SECTION C. the latter now an infinite form which is not. in so far as it has an object. above the material. like consciousness. Cons ciousness is finite. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. etc.. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . in the soul as a physical mode. in so far as .the former a simple immediate totality. restricted by that content. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. and which as the reality of that notion. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. remembering. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. and above the complication with an external object . ideation. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist.apart b oth from the content. PSYCHOLOGY.7. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. however. as its concept has just shown. it has a mode in its knowledge. in thinking also and in desire and will. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . Die Vernunft. And it is a matter of no consequence. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. This. Mind is finite. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom.. then its reality is that reason. which is defined as it s notion. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. etc.in one word. or.mental vision. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. it is finite by means of its immediacy. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness.
i. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. As the theory o f Condillac states it. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom.e. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. that is. the na tural soul (¤ 413). Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. k nowledge. i. is misconceived and overlooked. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. that aspect is twofold . in freedom. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). equally. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). and is even there a return into itself. Similarly. forces. of comprehending itself. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. in so far as its existent phase. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. and the negative aspect of mental activity. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. to reach and get hold of itself. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. viz. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. Thus. viz. and being a rational knowledge. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. or. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. and make the affection subjective.reality of its reason. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. and its activity can only have itself as aim. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. the mind finds in itself something which is. it is .as being and as its own: by the one. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal.e. so far. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. When the affection has been rendered its own. by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible.e. and to liberate itself to its elf. and are the mind's own. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development.
and that in its empirical condition. and of the heart without the intellect . But as knowledge. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. while the practical. merely as facts.e. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. and heartless intellects . as if volition could be wi thout intelligence.take the worthless fo r the essential nature.(b) Will: practical mind. to definite and conceptual knowledge. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. wi th a material which is its own. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. its content is at first only its own. This position of psychology. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. etc. as r eason is concrete. while it has to do with autonomous products. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. and therefore a restricted content. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. e. This activity is cognition. elevates itself. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. Its activity has to do with the empty form .a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products.i. has a material which is only nominally such. the word. The nominal knowledge. just as they are given. and is immediately willed. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. Inwards . the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. is thus also a reality . which it and the content virtually is. to get at the notion and the truth. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. both for the mind as such..the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. Ou twards. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. belong to a point of view utt . for which it gains the form of universality. as it is said. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. It is still extremely ill off. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. Psychology.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. and gains abstract auton omy within.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . or the activity of intelligence could be without will. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics.g. like logic. which in the first place is likewise formal . The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. but) enjoyment. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. which is only certitude. in the theoretical range. along with which the content is realized as rational. The course of this elev ation is itself rational.
as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. etc. are not isolated. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. imagines. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. If they are isolated. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured.in a word . But c ognition is genuine. memory.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . conception. cognitive conception. as non-intelligent).: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. it is admitted. note). (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. conceives. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. or mind. etc. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . it . by rational conception. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . intuition. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . must lead to abandoning the effort. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. however. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. It is true that even as isolated (i.is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe.its out-of-selfness .of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . But the true satisfaction. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. remembers. as it is by the same method brought into nature. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . conception. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas .that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. etc. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. remembrance. intelligen ce. is bro ught into mind. imagination. viz. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it.whi ch. that intuition. imagination. if answered in the negative. Faculty. etc.besides which it al so intuits.e. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. conceived as reflected into self. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. by cognitive intuition. like power or force. etc. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. just so far as it realizes itself. or makes the concept its own.
is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. may just as likely be narrow and poor.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. Now the material. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. in t he truth of mind. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind.to the generalit ies of common sense . in content and value entirely contingent. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. a . because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors.an active self-collection . whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. as it were the closes t. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. Feeling is the immediate. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing.one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle.but to his feeling. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. . ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. even should its import be most sterl ing and true.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. has the form of casual particularity . Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. the mere consciousness point of view.his private and p articular self. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind.t he factor of fixing it as our own. external or internal. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. projects it into time and space. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. this mode is simple.is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. 254). is swallowed up. With us. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . that is t o say. with the character of something existent. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. or at least to reasons . but rather as subject ive and private. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. Hence feeling. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint.
Inability to grasp a universal like t his. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition.the germ of the fruit. from the external place. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. with a preponderating subjectivity. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. but stored up out of consciousness. as it at first recollects the intuition. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. t ime. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. no longer needs to find the content. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. in the way we treat.in a space and a time of its own. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. which makes it its own. and received into the universality o f the ego. The representation is the property of intelligence. and inwardly divest itself of it. a rec ollection of itself. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . however. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. though intrinsically concrete. as tho ught. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. i. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. . as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. its when and where.e. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. or. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. for example. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. still continues simple. the germ as affirmatively containing. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. yet without being in consciousnes s. and is arbitrary or contingent. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. isolated. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . in virtual possibility. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. we may say. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. which. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be.
Secondly. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence.) . The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. such as likeness and contrast. now that it has been endued with externality. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. wherea s the idea (representation). It is still true of this idea or repre sentation.e. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. to be so and so. though belonging to intelligence. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. The images are in the first instance referred to this external.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. under the representation (idea) with the same content. or ide a). and an out-put from its universal m ine. notion. . has always the peculiarity. In the first place. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. where. as a matter of fa ct. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. but a being of its own institution. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. see Introduction to the Logic.viz. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. The content reproduced. But it is solely in the conscious subject. being and universality. i.. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated.in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. comes actually into its possession. The image. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. has been broken up. as a unit of intuition. or an intell ectual category. ¤ 20 note. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. which is now the power over them. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. present also a distinction in content.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. whatever be its content (from image. at first only in space and time. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . as of all intelligence. the matter is entirely pictorial. reason and consequence. if it is to exist. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. by which it is authenticated. where it is treasured up. that it finds its material.Image and Idea.these modes of relation are not laws. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness .
but they are 'syntheses'. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. or something of the sort. it is self-uttering. some latent concept or Ideal principle. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it.e. . intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. are unifications of t he same factors. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. is derived from the data of intuition. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. .Abstraction.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. recollection. allegoric.symbolic. one's own and what is picked up. Another point calling for special notice is that. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. internal and external. or poetical imagination . Such is creative imagination(7) . derived from some interest. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. Acting on this view. but only a nominal reason. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. etc.Imagination. is reason. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. which forms their connecting link. and becomes an i ndividuality. when regarded as the agency of this unification. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. As reason. 435). concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. so far a s it is concerned.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. to universalize it. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. a concrete subjectivity. i.still lacks the side o f existence. and in mechanical memory it completes. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. In other words. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. This force is really intelligence itself . The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. are completely welded into one. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition.. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. These more or less concrete. this form of being. for its ideal import is its elf.
signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. etc.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . the colour of the cockade.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. its system. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth .speech and. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. strictly so-called. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. This intuition is the Sign.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. somewhat immediate or given (for example.th at of vocal objects.gives to sensations. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality.). where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. has always to do with signs only. but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. The sign is some immediate intuition. Knarren. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne').R auschen.. out of which it forms i deas . The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . In logic and psychology. in the first instance. conception s.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. and even with conception and imagination. language .in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . It is a n image. something accepted. ¤ 459 The intuition . But in the fusion of the two elements. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). and where it is conserved. since memory. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess .there have been collected more than a hundred such words. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. intuitions. the matter of the latter is. when employed as a sign. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . its institution by intelligence. Such is the negativity of intelligence. whereas in the sign. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. e tc. and the connotation of which it is a sign. have nothing to do with each oth er. . without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. With regard to the elementary material of language. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). Sausen. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). but as representative of something else.now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding.
formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. . and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. the denomination. as regards signs for mental objects. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. as in our signs for the numbers. on anthropological articulation. The study of languages still in their original state. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. the chemical elements. and now that. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. which severally receive designation. but. It is only a stationary civ ilization. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. again. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. as. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. and only get signification as signs. on the other hand. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. As to the formal elem ent. alphabetical writing. (Cf. like the Chinese. they are reduced to signs. for example. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. viz. it depends. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. we may touch. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. their signs in vocal language. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. etc. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. if it be not altogether extinguished. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties.e. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements.).e. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. i. as many as ten a . externalities which of themselve s have no sense. tongue in each) and for their combinations. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. only in pas sing. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. i. palate. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. are frequently changed.e.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. instead of n ames proper. . the planets . W. i. and still takes place in Canton . in chemistry and mineralogy. In particular.
while (with the facu . Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. or simple logical terms. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. of uttering its ideas most worthily . like alphabetic writing. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. is still for the mind simple in the name). instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. .What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. in speaking. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . as it does. in the interest o f vision. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. i.the name. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. however ample a connotation it may include. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. in the case of the Chinese Koua. it is analysed. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. the simple plain idea. This feature of hieroglyphic . A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. learn ing to speak Chinese. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. peculiar to the intellect. Hieroglyphics. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . Thus.is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. so that. The European.e. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such.nd twenty. the simple straight stroke. by speaking low and soft or crying out.the mode. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. Engaging the attention of intelligence. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. Both alike require such signs. just as in modern times (as already noted.
lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,
but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you
ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.
¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex
etc. and evil. and to discus s their content. etc. But as both. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. in their immediacy. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. and still more in mind. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. On the other hand.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. namely God. lack objective determin ation. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. is precisely what constitutes. bad. on the one hand. we have only to deal with the selfish. law and morality.. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. in its objectivity and truth. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. and duty.indeed infinitely so. we have this immanen . Delight. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. and will. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. and precisely in that way d o they .but only in antithesis to the latter . for the latter. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. shame.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. and thought. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. volition.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. in their universality and necessity. joy. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. If feelings are of the right sort. wha t is the same thing. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. Whereas in life. heart. repentance. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world.. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. in feeling. contentment. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. in which these facts. right. but presented in its universality and necessity. may be placed. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. Thus it is. it is because of their quality or co ntent . ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . when thought.retain a speciality of their own . can also be felt. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. the truth and. grief. But where the objects sought are thus casual.
The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . while. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. the question is directly raised. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. The answer to the question.an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. being all in one subjec t and hardly all.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. as r egards the form of its content. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity.on one aim and object. But with regard to the inclinations. enjoyment . And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. In consequence of this formalism. be the value of tha t mode what it may. Should. In what way have they. finds in the conformity . it is pa ssion.and (as there are ma ny. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. are infected with contingency. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. The will. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . each with its private range). It is this objectification which evinces their real value. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. indeed. they. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. passion is neither good no r bad. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. character. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. and something inappropriate to it. ego. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling.a development in which the content of autonomous . If the will is to satisfy itself. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. What are the good and rational propensiti es. their mutual connect ions. too often. however. but to ge t realized. as experience shows. and their truth. Which are good and bad? . But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. . each being always in conflict to another. subjectivity . It is on ly a dead. Thus. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. is at first still a natural will.natural impulse and inclination. on the other. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. Will. as rights and duties.his inte rests of intellect. first of all. admitting of gratification. talent. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. therefore. on one hand.Up to what degree the good continue good. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. which is essentially self-d etermination.
and one satisfaction. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . They are somet imes contrasted. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. and is option or choice. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. an inactive thing.his passion. It is thus 'reflecting' will. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. either alto gether or in part. as thinking and implicitly free. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. An action is an aim of the subject. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. are reduced to a m ere negative. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. As thus contradictory. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . on one hand. However. which reflection and comparison have educed. moral. Their mutual limitation. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. unless he had an interest in it. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. that finds its actualizing in the agent. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de .should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . i. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. without end. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. on the whole to their disadvantage.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. . this is wh at is called the interest. where the subject is made to close with itself. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. inclinations. the impulses. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. which as such is the universal. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. ¤ 476 The will.action loses its contingency and optionality. there would be no action at all.e. as the content. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. so far as their particularity goes. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. is his interest and . and social duties. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. The morality concerns the content of the aim. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. the free gift of nature. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. it is on them that the decision turns. which is just as much no satisfacti on. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. by another. of a universal sa tisfaction. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand.
If the will. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . did not have it. however. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. and the abstract singleness. the will is an actually free will. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. and object . it is existent only in the immedi ate will . still this very I . According to Christianity. i. Africa and the East. and is will as free intelligence. only so far as it thinks itself . have never had this Idea. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . aim. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. of the family.e. the divine min d present with him.it is the existential side of reason . etc. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will.an individuality. fortuitousness .e.a universality which only ought to be. If to be aware of the Idea . These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. and that as its very actuality.freedom itself. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. just because it is the very essence of mind. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. i. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. of present sensati on and volition. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. ambiguous. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). Remembering that free mind is actual mind. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself.to be aware. is actu ality. and are constituted after its measure. which i s pure and concrete at once. The Greeks and Romans. is in the first instance the rational will in general. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength.e. with freedom itself. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . in religion as such . as realizing the idea. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. or implicit Idea. therefore. which realizes its own freedom of will. as the substance of the state. or by s trength of character. he h as also. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. that is. On the contrary.sired . ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object.e . the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. and of which it is only t he formal activity. If. now that the formalism. As abstract Idea again. so that in this sphere of particular existence. and are without it still. or philosophy (. Whole continents. for example. education.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. Plat o and Aristotle. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. he is actually free. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. knows this its concept. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. its very au tonomy or freedom. even the Stoics. i.is matter of speculation.
7. Das Denken. and not less into scientific actuality. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. Der Geist 2.a principle of the mind and heart. not with laws or court s of justice. 14. Anschauung. Die Erinnerung 6. 1. 10. but which they are. Inwendiges. if they are made slaves. as men. but the pe rmanent character . religious. But this freedom. Phantasie 8. is itself only a notion .dea itself is the actuality of men . Die Intelligenz. Die Einbildungskraft. Gedachtnis. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. moral. 4. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. Die Gluckseligkeit. 15. 5.not something which they have. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. which the content and aim of freedom has. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. 3. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. Vorstellung. Das praktische Gefuhl. 12. 9. Auswendiges. 16. 11. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. Der freie Geist. into legal. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. Der praktische Geist 13. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function .
their absolute unity. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. in relation to the subjective will. etc. These conditi ons. it is a Law. in these externally objective aspects. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. where they. and it is a duty to possess things as property. viz.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right.(1) When. is also a right. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. in the light of the concept. are its Duties. etc. but as possession by a person it is property. is the Law (Right ) . attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. and what is a duty. so as to become its habit. etc. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. where free will has existence. which splits up into different heads: viz. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. relation to another person . to administer. i. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. Liberty. and is the vi rtual universal. But in this individualist moral sphere. as the services of the members of the State in dues. and brings into existence i n these several wills.e. For a mode of existence is a right. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. and character.e. What is a right is also a duty. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. my right to a thing is not merely possession. In the morality of the conscience. or Usage. are no less its duties to punish. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata.and aim.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. anthropological data (i.at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. military service. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. to be as a person. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. is a duty. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. The penal judicature of a government. But. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. private an d personal needs). locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom.. not in the form of impulse. but in its universality. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. it exists as manner and custom. in general. temper. or instituted as an authoritative power.. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. duty in general is in me a free subject . whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. receives the form of Necessity. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. or legal possession. Liberty. on the other hand. are duties . These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. which in it is thus at home with itself.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness.. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). its rights of admi nistration. being universal. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood.
All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. These extremes are the persons who. at first in the outward appropriation. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. is an individual. Sitte A. the infinite self-rela tion. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. on its own account me rely 'practical'. and State. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. it is the right of the subjective will. by mere designation of it. in the knowledge of their identity as free. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. it may be.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. or by the formatio n of the thing or. which as possession is a means. though it remains in trinsically the same. which is thus mutual. (B) When the will is reflected into self. as something devoid of will. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. But this predicate. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. and hence as a single being . but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. but on an external thi ng. possession is property. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. This thing. civil society. As so characterized. but as existence of the personality is an end. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty.possession. morality of the individual conscience. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. abstract right. and the I in it is abstractly external. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. as in itself still abstract and empty. so as to have its existence inside it. 1. the external sphere of its liberty . Gesetz 2. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. But the set of adjustments. . Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. are simultaneously mutually independent. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession.
expressing the civil suit. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . the only diversity lies in this. but which. is affirmed. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. and time. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. which.just as well with draw it as not. universal thing or commodi ty. then the external rec . But so far as my will lies in a thing. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right.). The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. and.the full and complete deed. however. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . eac h and all are invested with a show of right. This is naiv e. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. its changing hands. and its acceptance by the other will. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. I can just as well put it in it as not . labour. ¤ 495 The contract.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. in that case. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. produces a wrong: by which. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. willed.Contract.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. because they face each other. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. which thus becomes wicked. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. and recogniz ed. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. non-malicious wrong. 493 seqq. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. is disinterested. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another.
The phrase 'Law of Nature'. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . an d so on without end. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. The law of nature . on . which is disinterested . The social state.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. or Natural Right.on self-determination or autonom y. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will.e.a universal which holds good for him.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . such an action is essentially and actually null. Conversel y. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. i. and while the former only is respected. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance.in this case the apparent recognition. and commits a crime. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. The former used to be the common meaning. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . by the n otion. and not merely the particular mode . is the work of Revenge.st rictly so called . or in corporeity. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. is a matter of chance). like the last. To display the nullity of such an act. and can be seized only in t his quarter. that of the judge. sets up a law .where the nominal relation is retained. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. This progression. from life. But revenge. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. being conformable to the right.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. which is nominal and recognized by him only . ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature.is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. But more than possible compulsion is not. in which the law of nature should hold sway. is at the same time only a new outrage. This gives the wrong of fraud . has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action.compulsion against the thing.e. in revenge. howe ver. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. as a volitional and intelligent being. In it the agent. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it.a law. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. The 'reality' of right. i.) Thus the will is violently wicked. even from the range of all existen ce. b ut the sterling value is let slip. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it.punishment. or right as governed by the nature of things. the latter is violated. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right.
the reason of the will.a will reflected into itself so that. sentiment. or even justification in his h eart. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. recognition. In point of form. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. intelligence. The subjective will is morally free. This is the right of intention. it thus includes purpose and intention . In French le moral is opposed to le physique. my part in i t is to this extent formal. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. so much as it has consciously willed. and willed by it. but have their assent. its own. is its deed. etc. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. Now. Moralitat 3. so far as these features are it s inward institution. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. the will is at the same time made a particular. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . in the externality of which it only admits as its own. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. is now chara cterized as a subject . 2. which was its purpose. 1. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. who. Naturrecht. and thus comes into relationship with the former. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. though any alteration as such. conscience. in mere law. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. B. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general.the other hand. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. Das Recht. an d allows to be imputed to it. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. counts only as a person. be its affection w hat it may. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. embracing these individual point s.and also moral wickedness.
(a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. essential and actual.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. but is a particul arity of his own . Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. is always fundamentally one identity. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. on account of that existent sphere of liberty.g. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. and aims. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. his interest and welfare must. they ought to stand in harmony. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. a good intention in case of a crime. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. as in happiness (¤ 479). constitute h is well-being. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence.e. though it is a particular duty. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. whether the . is as g ood and as duty absolute. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it.and thus including in it particularity . can be wicked. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity.a universal determined in its elf . It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. And yet they ought to harmonize. sup erseding this absolute claim of each.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. is not something external to him. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which.ion. These aims. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal.that it contains his needs. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. and yet each of them. This is the right to well-being. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. will . it is always something particular. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. interests. because the agent. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. the essential and actual good. At the same time because good is one. as individual and universal. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction .still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance.being only in this. in point of its matter.
Das Gute und das Bose C. 4. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. the truth of this semblance. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. the unutterable. The subjectivity. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. and of the good. Moralitat 2.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . This pure self-certitude. which actualizes and dev elops it. Der Vorsatz 3. 1. which would only be abstract. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . in the notion. is abandoned. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. on its negative side. The result. i . good. THE MORAL LIFE.of Conscience and Wickedness. The for mer is the will of goodness.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. and duty. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. right . On the affirmative side. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. The failure of the latter consists . which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . its deepest descent into itself. and the wicked. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy.to a goodness. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. expressed by this repeated ought. in something external therefore. and refuse it to the wicked. Handlung. in this its identity with the good. non-universal. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void.good is realized.the utterly abstract semblance . appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . which is the good. rising to its pitch. Die Absicht und das Wohl. but is only sure of i tself. to be carried out in it. an aim essentially and actually null. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. 5. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . Wickedness. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. is only the infinite form. no more exist than not. th e essential thing. which has no objectivity. is. That.the standpoint of the ought. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. 6.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself.
feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . mind ap pears as feeling. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. This is the sexual tie. to destiny. elevated. to the total of ethical actuality. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. in its immediacy. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. In the shape of the family. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject.the Political Constitution. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . manner and cu stom .where self-conscious liberty has become nature. When these two impe rfections are suppressed.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . ¤ 514 The consciously free substance.yet somewhat which without all question is. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. without any selective refl ection. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. The ethical personality.Marriage. as against the univers al. in its ki nd.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance.th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. is virtue.the Family. . etc. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. Thus. i. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. as deliberate work for the community. i. however. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons.the genuine ethical temper. that it is. it exists as confidence. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. makes this union an ethical tie . . it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. In the latter sphere.e . it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. to a spiritual significance.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity.e. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . temperament.n a thing .looks upon it as his absolute final aim. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. however. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit.Civil Society. controls and entirely dominates from within. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. is confidence (trust) . as an intelligent being. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this.monog . as personal virtues. But the person. the individuality expres ses its special character. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. whose independence it. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind .
it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. constitutes the general stock. labour. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. and thus produce more unconditional . ¤ 522 (3) The children. acquire an existence of their own. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . on the o ther hand. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. of the possessor's will. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. originally foreign to it. to found anew such an actual family. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children.in educating them to independent personality.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. while. and care for the future. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. into families or individuals.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. who exist independent and free. on one hand. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. or state external. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. being an intelligent substance. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. destined. or nominal culture in general. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . learning. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). In virtue of such for tuitousness. information. of legal regulation. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. however. This instrument. as private persons. as do also its industry. thus invested with independence. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests.
intelligence. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. also of aims and interests. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. ten thalers. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. however. at every point. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. which is honesty. determined through reason or legal intelligence.the Law. The second. It is a futile perfectionism to have . and an ensemble of contingencies. Hence. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . and of means for satisfying them. be the righ t and just thing.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . 2 3/4 . and like the first a certain subsistence. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. and so on ad infinitum. or only 2 * . there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. The third. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. certain. and a corresponding mode of labour. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. and with it the State. exists. of needs. skill. and accident. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. as vital. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. on the side of external existence. which as existence is essentially a particular. option. Thus whether three years. they have their actual existence. and of these estates to one another and to their centre.. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . is developed i n detail. Their content per se may be reasonable .and ye t it should be decided. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. as well as of mental culture and habit . in the course of definite manifestation. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. their recognition and their honour. But when right.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. though of course only at the final points of deci ding. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. talent. and industry. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . to be.dependence on the social system. the medium created by t he action of middlemen.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. its action gets direction and content through natural features.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . or could be. and in it they have their social moralit y. this analysis. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . 2 4/5 years. Where civil society.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . b ecause of the finitude of its materials. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. of mere agents. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself.
or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. This subjective existence.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. as it is a known law.in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. . even the admiration. being laws o f strict right. as universal authority and necessity. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. . with the advance in multitude. These people forget that the stars . within the house . has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. are not a new hou se. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. and in particular transforms this existence . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right.vi z. which discovers new distinctions.even as his law can only be a just law. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. there arises.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. The comparison of the two species. which again make new decisions necessary. inasmuch as. not for them. as in the mental ima ges of space. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. to which objective existence determines i tself. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency.as proven: . by faith and trust. of his countrymen.which though something new. and t hus become authoritative . of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. But there is a contrary case. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable.e. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. at the same time an externally objective existence.laws. whic h are only internally in these objects. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis .a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right.are governed and well governed too by laws. they touch only the abstract will . first really de serving the name of laws. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice.to be promulgated and made known as laws . constit . i. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. the need of a simpler code .into punishment (¤ 500). general laws.and th e cattle too . recognized. as the genuine order of life. like improvements on a f loor or a door. in the judicial system. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws .the ne ed.to the individualized right . not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . hereditary divinity or nobility. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court .though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. however.as this exists as revenge . They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law .
In so far. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. and worked from that point of view. which. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. as at bottom different sides. from the c onnections between nation and nation. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. mere circumstantial evidence. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. in a uniform gen eral way. No doubt this factor is incomplete. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. to the concrete of civil society. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession.'poli . appears as state. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. So far as concerns them. be exercised as different functions. . from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . because it is only one factor. It results also from circumstances of locality.viz. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. shou ld. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. and the judgement as application of the law to it. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. the position of an external un iversality. . the judgement as t o the state of the fact. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession.as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. then. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. and their variable ingredients.and that. Conversely. so as to secure this satisfaction. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. because it is man's want.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions.
Secondly. it carries back both. it protects the family and guides civil society. his independent self-will and particular interest. and not left to perish. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. Thus we have the corpora tion. then it promotes their welfare. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . through the action of the government and its several branches. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. in this direction .whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . but. and self-develop ed .into the life of the universal substance. with all its evolution in detail.as an actuality . at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. Thirdly. The same unity. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. .co nsists in a double function. First. the state only is as an organized whole. The cons titution is existent justice . ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. which.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. and. receiving.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found.ce'. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. but which has a thoroughly general side.which volition is thereby free . they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals .international (outer-state) law. and . however.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . differentiated in to particular agencies. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals.in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. is its essence.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. (c) THE STATE. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. ¤ 539 As a living mind. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . self-originated. It provides for the reasonable will .the reasonable spirit of will. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. But.one individual. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. they are re strictions. This universal principle. secondly. to the immediate agent. s heer subjectivity. continually produce it as their result. which each originally takes care of for himself. On the other hand. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. also for that will being put in actuality. First it maintains them as persons. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom.
it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . talent.equal in the concrete. All men are by nature equ al. otherwise have in property. Rome. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. on the contrary.. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. age. that the laws rule. private as well as public rights of a nation. i. directories. on the contrary. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. The principle of equality. the difference of governing powers and of governed. Formerl y the legally defined rights. magistracies . As regards. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends.e. is abstract subjectivity. physical strength. logically carried ou t. However true this is. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. On the contrary. town .pleasure an d self-will. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. is so little by nature. etc. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. which it can without incompatibility allow.as regards taxation. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. first. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . the citizens . some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person.punishment. With the state there ari ses inequality. as regards the concrete. But. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. skill. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . the current notions of l . eligibili ty to office. without further specification and development. etc.only it can make them . the familiar proposition. etc. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. or even in crime. Equality. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. As regards Liberty. authorities. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. But the notion of liberty.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. military service. etc.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. were called its 'liberties'. it embodies a liberty. in other words.besides their personalit y . Really. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). the final aim and result of the co nstitution. But that this freedom should e xist. rejects all differences. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. etc. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. as it ha ppens. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. as it exists as s uch. It is important therefore to study them closer. . and that the laws are restrict ions. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. etc. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. or destroy them. presuppos e unequal conditions. The laws themselve s. Nothing has become. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom.
of liberties in general.) But the guara ntee lies also. and of the difficulty of satisfying them.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. and to regard a state.as sec urity of property. and the organization of the actualization of them. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. If . and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. self-w ill and self-conceit. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. . the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. however. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. Of it the following paragraphs will speak.e.that which preserves. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. and thus gains moral independence. has an insight and conviction of his own . and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. The question . an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. ¤ 541 The really living totality . The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit.just because of this inseparability . there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. But the more we fortify liberty. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n .e . i. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. The term political liberty. not merely with regard to the naturalness. with this development of particularity.a thing that has nev er happened in history. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. in which this is not formally done. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. in other words continuall . be it added. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. and must deal with them as it ca n. of others. is . and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. as a state without a constitution. just as little as the making of a code of laws. with its insatiate vanity.iberty only carry us back to equality.
But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power .y produces the state in general and its constitution. equally disorganizes actuality. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. ¤ 542 In the government . according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason.the will of a decreeing individual. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general.e. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein.regarded as organic totality .to make it the first power. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence .impugns the principle of the division of powers. is the state one. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. Only through t he government. which includes an already existing development of differences.the all-sustaining. however. but an actual indiv idual . if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. i. and the government be merely executive and dependent . . but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. as in a democratic constitution. all-decreeing will of the state. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. . As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. is the self-redintegrating notion. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. These. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence.in a state of society. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'.monarchy. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. which taken apart is also particular).) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization.su bject always. i.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. in other words. In the perfect form of the state. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . as always. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct.e. of the family and of civil society. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. the participation of all i n all affairs . yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. is the government. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal.or. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. (A mistake still greater. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. as in the patri archal society . as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality.
partly.. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. to subjectivity.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch .a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. especially in legislation . in so far as they are finite and in course of change. legislative power. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors.such as ochlocracy. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. and then of nature . which having their busin ess appointed by law. involve the. and above all personal liberty. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. etc. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. and skill for such ends. Secon dly.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . civil society. The division of constitutions into democracy. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. too. with its industry and i ts communities. possess independence of a ction. Thus. aptitude. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. Two points only are all-important. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. administration and police. . conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . in the history of the State. an actual existence. and with earlier transition-forms. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . and are to that degree private person s. The pure forms .'ideal' unity. to that end and for that reason. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'.in short. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. i.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. admini stration of justice or judicial power.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . participate in the governmental power. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. These principles are those expounded earlier.e. aristocracy and monarchy. lik e peace and war. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. That subjectivity .viz. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. first. it may be . By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . For it is as private persons t . and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. with their general opinion. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state .are. essentially. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. there arises the participation of several in state-business. being simple self-relation. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused.as also feudal monarchy. liberty of property. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment .partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. as it were.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance.
and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. ever newly recurring. and form a particular kind . Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. or in its 'reflectional' universality. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers.which should be presupposed. demoralization.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). If the main part of the requirement were . The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. that t hey enter upon that participation. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. elemental sea. to power and act ion. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. In a civilized state. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. The so-called financial law. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. however. in the general sense of embracing a wide. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. moreover. so far as they form only one branch of that power . Take the case of England which. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. and therefore more urgent. however. ¤ 529 note). which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. i. be they treated as mere individuals. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. is no t self-destructive. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n.as it very likely is . acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf.would be. as such an aggregate. inorganic shape. s ense of general wants.a spiritual element . as estates. in arrangements for art and science. which. blind force. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. wild. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions.the contrary must be the case . which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . but as organic factors. as the nation . But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. in the law and liberty of property.e.as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. it is not a brutish mass.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. indeed the whole. like that of the stormy. The des irability of such participation. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. range of the extern al means of government.regard ed as permanent. Experience s hows that that country .
by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. afresh. and becomes the estate of bravery. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. in which there would no longer be a government.so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely.as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . is really engaged with strict executive business. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence .. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real.i.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount.e. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. a state of war.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . and not actually existent. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were.g.e. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. and not to be made yearly. waywardness and chance have a place. In their mutual relations. Then again. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. or every few years. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many.is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. as content o f a true law. when it makes a decree about finance. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . and thus. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. of the whole of the finances. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. In one case the . It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. i. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . e. but only parties. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals.
in short.and.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit .of sacerdotal races . and above all universal history. it passes int o universal world-history. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. It is in time. both this general recognition.a world-mind. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. are settled and fixed. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. an d the special claims of nations on one another. however. and in Germany more than in France and England. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. that..the judgement of the world. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. of a Roman epic. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. a history of its own. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. It has. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . in defiance of . is founded on an essential an d actual aim. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. is appointed to occupy only one grade. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. etc. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. Fictions. this note must go into further deta il. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. and on history-writing in general. each of which. is called an a prio ri view of it. As this development is in time and in real existence. when we come to minutiae. first in general. and as regards its range and scope. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day.the plan of Provide nce. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. On th is point. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. That history. and then in history. there is Reason in history. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. especially on the philological side. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. it. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. which actually is and will be realized in it . in short. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. as it is a history. In general. internat ional law rests on social usage. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left.
or. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. or if he declined to judge at all. and. and takes place within it.e. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. express not a subjective particularity. Rome and its fortunes. a civilization. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. But. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. i.to say a word on that here . weave them into the pictur e of general interests. has. if he had not an interest. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events.g. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. in striking portraiture and brevity. and an exclusive interest in justice. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. What happens to a nation . and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. not as good as a fairy tale.the best-accredited history. on the other hand. no history . a nation. Ay. but violates th e principles of objective truth. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. a word. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance.like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). e. etc. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. and criticize events. state. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. is not only against taste and judgement. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. as in the romance. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. and rejects both ki nds of interest.). in the interest of so-called truth. strictly s peaking. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. but an age. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. The point of interest of Biography .appears to run . Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits.
The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. to the history of religion. has another ground and interest than his tory. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf .e. Only therefore through their relationship to it. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. and of its essence. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour.e. while it inheres in them. a development determined by the notion of spirit. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . and secondly. have they their value and even their existence. etc. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. which is what is pe culiar to them. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. etc. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). partly it is a cognition of philosophy. i. the freak of humour. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. these individuals. and are all treated as indifferent. in this case. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages.e. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. on the contary. is the empty form of activity. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. first in general. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness .Fame. the absolute L aw. and there fore as a work of individuals. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim.e. potentially infinite. Such a doctrine . i.or in other words that Reason is in history . is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. i. The mere play of sentiment. But biography too has for its background the historical world. if Rome or the German empire. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. as over a special grade. and their subjectivity. 550). are instruments. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. we may add. which is their reward. really. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. which all alik e have no stuff in them. i. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. truth. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. only opinions and mere ideas. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. and the business of so doing.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. the consciousness of it. For Spirit is consciousn ess. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. is the supreme right.admitting. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort.an accurate report of externals. liberty. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. But. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. and its content is prese .
this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. however. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. For that st arting. i. actually accomplished in the ethical world. as true in the world of free will. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. As regards the 'mediation' which. i. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. especially ¤ 51. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. This factor.a mere 'ought' . however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. is the real ethical self. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. i. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. now gets its most concrete interpretation. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free.e. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. Such apprehension. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. that elevation to God really involves. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. But the spirit which think s in universal history.is the peculiar perversity. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth.consciousn ess. is the purification. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. the idea of God it kn . then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. cf.as is the case with all speculative process . as law and duty. i. At this rat e. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. Th e finite. in the system of laws and usages. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . and that on the religious.e. The spirit.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. lays hold of its concr ete universality. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation.Liberty. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. forme rly noticed.e.e. ¤ 204 not e). from which the start is now made. But . as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. note).
first of all. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . i.e. It leads. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. morality and conscience. in its faith and in its con science. differing from the former in body and value of truth. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. And. and law and justice. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . to justification by external wo rks. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. B . but purely subjective in individuals: . one religious and an other ethical. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. and prays others to pray . even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. in the annihilation of its externality. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. i. but in the moment of enjoymen t.partly as mere moving of the lips. But in poin t of form. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. non-spirituality.working images. and these applications of it in the religious life.of bondage. then there may be created. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. generally. the host as such is not at first consecrated. and superstition. springing from some force and power. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free.logi cally enough . But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. It lea ds to a laity. (In the Lutheran Church. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. i. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own.as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised .the body of religious truth. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God.e. in point of form. even to bones. religion was a late r addition. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God.or it may be. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. for thought and knowledge .e. on the contr ary. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another.e. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks .(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) .) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . i. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. and even as mutually indifferent. and ex pecting miracles from them. and in the act of faith.addressing his devotion to miracle.ows must be the true and real. a condition of spiritual sla very. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality.
what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world.e. So long as t he form. i. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. therefore. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power.of honesty in commercial dealing.e. lacked liberty. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. . . the content of religion assumes quite another shape. the wisdom of the world. Let us suppose even that. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . Thus.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. so to speak a priori. can law and morality exist.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. Thus set free. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. which does not rise in hostility against them. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion.an obedience which is itself the true freedom. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. and political institutions deduced from them must be. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. The precept of religion. self-realizing reason . because the state is a self-possessed. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. And instead of the vow of obe dience. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. i. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. founded on principles of reason. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. unte nable. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. our consciousness and subjectivity. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. leads it into the rea l world. Instead of the vow of chastity.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty).in short. moral life in the state. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. and in a special sense Philosophy. sti . 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. and in the use of property . Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. . if taken alone. no matter how. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. and thus only. a code of law should arise. and. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it.e. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. i.
thus surmountin . so-called 'chambers'. however sound their provisions may be. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness.ll.is just this .mi nd intrinsically concrete . and of the various classes of the administrative personnel.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves.to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. and the power given them to fix the budget.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. that the Idea must be regent. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. etc. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. . In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. (cf. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end.to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. At best it is only a temporary expedient .the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists .among which laws these guarantees are included.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. from those deeper requirements which. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. e.is the intellectual and thinking self. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws .t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. when specially set in relief as genus. This additional 'individuality' . the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . ¤ 544 note). to put it simply. on the other hand. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. on one hand. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. or. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal.g. This absolute nucleus of man .which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . Such laws.. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. thus founder on the conscience. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution.
and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. in its f irst immediate. Plato. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . But thought always .through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle .and th at on account of this very principle . As it left therefore behind. His state is therefore. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content.so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . fall feeling. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. The form in its infinite tru th.). and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. from religion. as demoralization. or essential being).and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. religion.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . but earlier than philosophy. intuition. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. the subjectivity of mind.). wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. Hence religion as such.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. he. or rather must. pictorial representation. of philosophy. as it grows and expands. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. earlier than it does as philosophy. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq.the idea of the substantial moral life. is implicitly in absolute liberty. Only in the principle of mind. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. Under the subjective form. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). which still escaped his intelligence. is after all only in one of its form s. which is awa re of its own essence. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. in its philosophic phase. should knit it together and control it. Political power. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. which is developed similarly. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. etc. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. But even religion. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. so . on its own s howing.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. however. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. for th ese reasons.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states.was that creative imagination. ¤ 513. exhibits the one-sidedness. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. and so also one-sided phase. Religion may.
7. In the Protestant state. Gesetz. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual.as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. for which it is as substance. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. Religion. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. as well as their several applications. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. Das System der Bedurfnisse. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. Weltweisheit. while it is self-centred identity. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. Das aussere Staatsrecht. i.in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. 2. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. 4. Die Rechtspflege 5. Die Weltgeschichte 10. Die Sittlichkeit. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . Thus ul timately. but rather to a sort of knowledge. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. 9. 8. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. 1.e. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. 6. of God's indwelling in us. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. as always. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. Die Polizei und die Corporation. the constitut ion and the code. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. 3. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. That here. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). Inneres Staatsrecht.
the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) .the form of immediacy as such . Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . viz. like the material which it uses to work in. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. so that the thought embodied.in other words. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. or the idea.the shape or form of Beauty. but .passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. But.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. into the subject which produces that work. and of gaining its concrete determination. ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. c an. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. that is. On one hand. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. its n atural immediacy. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . aware. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. Belief. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. In this ideal. A. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. ¤ 411). has in devotion . reconciliation. Art requires not only an external given material . be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. With the essential restrictedness of its content.e. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. which is only a sign of the Idea. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it.for the expression of spiritual truth . ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . as superseded in spirit. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . as it is. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art.i. Der absolute Geist. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. on the other hand. . ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle .something formal.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. 1. the actuality of the spirit. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas).hence not the sp iritual unity. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea.
a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. not yet conscious of itself. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. that one spirit creates and informs them. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. . is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. is not yet absolute. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le.symbolic art. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. the principle of its law. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . but its inmost depth.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . as well as of its art and science.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. subjectivity. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. as free spi rit. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . of its actual liberty. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found.stil l this art is defective. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. is not yet known. or an effor t towards him . Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. the artist's enthusiasm. known as the Absolute. assumes fuller and firmer features. but as only finding himself in himself. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist .in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. and that is where the infinite form. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. though concrete and intrinsically free. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . and th e artist is the master of the God. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . and of its constitution.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies.can try to bring itself to consciousness.
of Nemesis. . as infinite self-realizing form . The old conception . from it s side.ent in it. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom.into revelation. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. in which he had not revealed himse lf. with their perso nal sense and feeling. But with a further and deeper study. Beautiful art. like the religion peculiar to it. B. still more in that external. whose con tent is absolute mind . shows that such religion is on the decline. The older religion in which the need of fine art. and j ust for that reason. dashing t o pieces everything high and great . and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the.The genuine objectivity. revealed by God. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . we see that the advent of art. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification.it therefore is manifestation out a nd out.e.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. it is from Him. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. Beautiful art.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. is first generated. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed.due to a one-sided survey of human life . what is more. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. has its future in true reli gion. and brilliancy. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. the theme and c entre of religion. and.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion.that it be revealed. spectator find themselves at home. expression. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. not the supreme liberation itself. . which is only in the medi um of thought . in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. . and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. unbeautiful sensuo usness.is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . on the contrary. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit.the religion i. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle.
it implies the revelation of Him. G .ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. and reconciliation with the eternal being. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. abiding sel f-centred. in it s forefront. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. and. it may almost create surprise that so many. which proceeds to man's self. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. as in duty bound. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. as the extreme of inherent negativity. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself.is the Spirit.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . he still remains in original identity .. (a) as eternal content. a separate being. on the other hand. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . even in its manifestation.it is therefore the absolute spirit.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts .on the other hand. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. further.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. while in point of form he is. though different. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. the spirit. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. first of all. it is. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. F. however.requires careful and thorough speculation.just as. To know what God as spirit is . making them presuppositions towards each other. in point of content.of the only Son . the elemental and the concrete nature . On one hand is heaven and earth. amid that natural ness. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. when it thinks. Go d is. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship.: Berlin 1829. of the world it gave away . (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. with whom. though.1.. Yet. directed towards the Eternal. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. staying aloof and inert.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. ¤ 566 In this separating. . . by C. But. on one hand. again. not. (c) as infinite return. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. or of judgement. for that reas on. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. That spirit. and phenomena which succeed each other. It includes. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . but afterwards. only standing to it in an external connection. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories.knowledge in God. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. which therefore is finite. to specul ative comprehension. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed.
then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. is not bound by it . ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . and thus. In this form of truth. but alive and present in the world. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. an object of contemplating vi sion . truth is the object of philoso phy. If the result . Irony. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. his natur al man and self-will. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness .of subjectivity and the no tion itself. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other.and. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . eternal. But. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content.but the vision of implicit truth. on account of his immediate nature. as infinite subjectivi ty. From this its separation into p arts. Thinking. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. Whereas the vision-method of Art.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . th e self-centred manifestation. 1. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. simple. keeps himself unchanged. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. Die geoffenbarte Religion.Irony. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. gives itself direction and con tent. but even to thought. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. with a temporal and external sequence.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . contentless sense. through which witness of the spirit in him. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. he. remains master over it. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. this immediate. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. C.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such .where the spirit closes in unity with itself . at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. . and thus sensuous. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness.is taken in a merely formal. secondly. and eternal spirit in itself. in which he. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality.is transplanted into the world of time. so far. after the example of his truth. which from itself. Further. who as such is identified with the essence . by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. This individual. external in point of form. is itself the emptiness and vanity. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject.
Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. and particularly of the logical form. of course. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence.on the other hand. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. This does not prevent the spirit.the underlying essence in all humanity . a nd of logic in particular.takes. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . or. and whereas Religion. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. with its separ ation into parts. too much for the latter. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. and against philosophy in general . but also criticized it. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . and mediates what is thus open ed out. and s o religious. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. and this necessary as free. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity.which may be in both the same . This movement.on one hand. only looks back on its knowledge.('Rationalism') . but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. and acts inconsistently towards them.i. which determines itself to content. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories.it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. as also of the necessity in the two forms . This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. immediate vision and its poetry. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards.leaving out. to be more precise still. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them.and from a pithless orthodoxy. opens it out in mental picture. when at the close it seizes its own notion . from failure to note the distinctio n of the content .from these forms. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. remains identical with it. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God).stantial content into many separate shapes. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. which philosophy is. elevation of them into the absolute form. when driven to expound itself. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. finds itself already accompl ished.e. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. The charge of Atheism. This witness . In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy .
or Pantheism. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. with all its absurdities. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . I select . This new theology. that it has too much of him: . But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. Piety. most sublime. and form all that is definite in the divine universality. fulfilled notion of God. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality.Everything is . and so . But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. exclusi ve. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. and is therefore. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) .all possess substantia lity. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. also contains the generic abs tract. some of the most telling passage .(empirical things. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. are unable and unwilling to see this . prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. open to our disposal on this topic. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. we must. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. It is only his own stupidity.or to dalai-lamas . that. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy.that of the Hindu to ass es. without distinction. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . are) . and amongst it s effusions. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. or if you will. does not comprehend itself.so much so.g. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . from which all definite quality is excluded. cows .of the new piety and new theology. if we believe them. as is well known. or any one man. as it stands.so much so.thus he understands philosophy .for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . On such a presuppo sition. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being.the Bhagavat-Gita.which therefore it does not disparage. Without interest of its own for the concrete. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. whether higher or lower in the scale.is always adora tion of an object which. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. but as a proved fact. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God.of Pantheism. Amongst the abundant resources. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. its grossest shape. If this theory needs no more than such a God. ¤ 71 note). consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism.as the most authentic statement accessible .each and every secular thing is God. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof.that of the Egyptians to the ox .in the wanton assertion. in particular. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. the secularity of th ings. God in General.
. grip. . like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. nothing independent].' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. . In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel.so powerless its. . But so little concrete is this divine unity . called Gods. . Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . . middle. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. . is not. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. vanish. melt into the one Krishna.). I am the spring amo ng the seasons. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. Hinduism. but having its truth in the substance. any more than the Eleatic One. rather. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. Among letters I am the letter A. . pp. or Indra. and the Spinozan Substance. as he said before he was S iva. the One which. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. . . . the Everything. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. 7 seqq. . This everything. I am the taste in water.s. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. at the beginning of the pass age. . This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson.that Hinduism. he is said to be the beginning. 'At the end of many lives. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. . I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . still God. Meru among the high-topped mountains. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. . . . and the moon among the lunar mansions. . . Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. . I am also the strength o f the strong. to a poly theism. . even Siva. .'I am the self. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. and one essential amongst them. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. unessential existences. . .. . .' This 'All'. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. however. . . without essential being of its very own. Even when. Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. . etc. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. is also the maddest of polytheisms. p. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. . the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. The undiscerning ones. so to speak . has the higher conception of Brahma. passion. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . There is nothing else higher than myself. and end of living things. I am life in all beings. . . developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. which he is. is alo ne the divine and God.. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras.spiritual as its idea of God i s . . all this is woven upon me.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. besides Krishna. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . which Krishna calls himself. as different from that accidental.the most excellent of everything. or a God besides. goodness. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. Indra. than which there is nothing higher. . t he pure unity of thought in itself. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. but only . . seated in the hearts of all beings. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . as also those proximate substantialities. with a monstrous incons istency. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. .. . where the empirical everything of the world.not everything.
when he adores the ape.on the shallow conception of it . if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. as it says. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. imagination or speculation. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. whether they spring from heart. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular.g. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. and of empirical secular spirit. even in a general exoteric discussion. after this partition. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . of the relationship of God and the world. on the contrary. outside it .in its finest purity and sublimity. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. to was . Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest.. as the endless lot of empirical existence.keep its independence. and. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity.of the world as one thing. Of the oriental. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. e. as infinite from the finite. especially the Mohammedan. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. or other creature. as everything. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. If. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. modes of envisaging God. moreover.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. But to go back again to the question of fact. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. For that unity. he is as essence parted from appearance. and that unity described as love. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. and God everything. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. is identical with the world. which. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. to which everything is God. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is.floating in the indefinite blue . secondl y. we must consult th e Mohammedans.. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind .ndu. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. Hin du monotheism. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular. in relation to the popular idea of the world. and so on . the all. or. But. is discarded and absor bed. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. on one hand. the finite to the infinite. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. It is only the picture . a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. the Eleatic. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. ac osmical. or Spinozist. That pantheism indeed . and on the other. but . empirical indivi duals .
they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . But the question is. and the empty absolute. and lose sight of the chief point of interest .the world as much as Go d . or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. and which they ascribe to philosophy. and that amongst the m there is great variety. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them.and that the factor of indet erminateness . but rather its reverse.is identity. as Epicu rus does. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. But they show so little acquaintance with them . as in the physical field the physicist. and that hence. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. not the concrete unity.that.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. I n the philosophical field they proceed. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. e.g. is what one expect s.and s till less take trouble about it . when they hear of unity . . Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism.te a word on what a 'notion' means. perhaps under the more familiar names of e.said pores being the negative.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. however. if not even of supreme interest. with God's omnipresence. with abstract unity. in the pores of th e physicists . in matters admitted to be of superior. but only the one factor of this category of relation . where they are utterly unknown.g. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. it is not. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . the most external and the worst.has the same solid substantiality as the other. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. a nd assert . omnipresence. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. inorganic and living . Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. mere ide ntity.falsely as a fact .e. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. i. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. they import them into philosophy.and relation i pso facto implies unity . composition. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. with indefinite ideas. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. providence. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. viz. and that it is the system of identity. they have laid hands on. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . And as in their judgement either of the two . etc. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. the notion and content of philosophy. but with concrete unity (the notion).
by which notions are perverted into their opposite.knowing reaso n. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. but the many-shaped modes specified. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. in his relation to the world. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. and as implicitly the Idea. The esoteric study of God and identity. the notion. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition.as the mediating agent in th e process . but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. which . sunders itself. and the latter its universal extreme. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. as other than they. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. not abstract unity. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. the absolutely universal. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it.their everything. standing between the Mind and its essence. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. y . ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. If statements as to facts are put forward. on the shoulders of philosophy.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. an All-one doctrine. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. which has self. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . this stale gossip of oneness or identity. then. i. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous.e. But in ascribing to God. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. for its middle term: a middle. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. or as prevaricating for a purpose. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . of which liberty is the aim. Nature .it is the nature of the fact. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. is philosophy itself. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate .the logical system. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine.which. and which is itself the way to produce it. which causes the movement and development. which divides itself into Mind and Nature.it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. a system of identity. On account of this chorus of assertions. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. and notions . making the former its presupposition. But to put that sort of thing. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. as of cognitions.ity . so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) .
et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. eternally sets itself to work. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. The eternal Idea. . in f ull fruition of its essence.
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