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INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any
attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i
s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as
treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.
The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . except where. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. But not merely is it.with th is proviso. on the one hand.. on the other. At such a stage it is not yet mind. which is potentially all things. matter is regarded as something true. and. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. where the othe . and not as the immediate or natural individual. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. perhaps.e. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. whereas the 'vital' matter. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. a nd the soul remains the pervading. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. These 'imponderables' . has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. The usual answer. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. have still. i. and so the self-externalism. Mind. li ght. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. etc. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. which is the fund amental feature of matter. but soul. not merely lacks gravity. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. as absolute negativity. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. thus come into being. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. as such a result.the truth that matter itself has no truth. to which they might perhaps add space and time. even the capacity of offering resistance. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. its simple 'ideal' life. indeed.the passive of Aristotle. There.SUB-SECTION A. and mind conceived as a thin g. however. ANTHROPOLOGY. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. Wherever there is Nature. identical ideality of it all. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. however. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. It is otherwise with Mind. like heat. in a sense. the soul is only the sleep of mind . which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and.
a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. feels the difference of climates. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul.r is not . based upon participation in the common life of nature. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. Hence. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. etc. Spinoza. and the periods of the day. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. as so often is done. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. the changes of the seasons. on the contrary.e. But either this identity. when it presents itself as a single soul. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. into the absolute syllogism. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. T hus. even these few and slight susceptibilities. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend.or corporeity . any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets.whence Epicurus. its immediate being .e. so holding. as an anima mundi. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. Descartes. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. These have. as in the case of Spinoza. described. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. not. with Leibniz. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. (b) Secondly. they are natural objects for consciousness. and. or.the natural soul. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold.is moulded into it. Animals and pl ants. it is a soul which feels. as in the case of Lei bniz. and. is too abstract. remain for ever subject to such influences. which only is. sidereal. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. (c) Thirdly. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions.(a) In its immediate natural mode . (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. disappear. In nations less intellectually emancipated. as individualized. in the modes of that being. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. . and does not rise or develop into system. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. upon it. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. re tains an abstract independence. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. it may be. just in proportion to his civilization. and always more or less. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. and telluri c life of man. in many case s completely. a world-soul. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. there philosophers took God. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. so to speak. Malebranche. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy.
Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. on its one side. the one permanent subject. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. He begins with Childhood . on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). we find it as the special temperament. of families or single individuals. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. and as stages in its development.mind wrapped up in itself. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. shows an active half. as it exists. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. or artistic.on a ph ysical basis. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). we see man in his true relation to his environment. on the whole. This . fancies. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. The contrast between the earth's poles. and on the other. hopes. shows. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . we find its diversities. in purposes political. Thirdly. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. widely distant from each other. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. bodily structure and disposit ion.the sexual relation . a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. as alterations in it. And that individuality marks both the world which.a worl d no longer incomplete. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. character. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. physiognomy. and the position of the individual himself. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. scientific. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. talent . fails to meet his ideal requirements. carrying out these universa .
not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. i n an unintelligent way. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness.not as a merely negative rest from it. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. which are often addressed to philosophy: . The characterization given in the section is abstract. sleep.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. as they may be called. as already noted. viz. . or self-centralized being. . for example.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. (c) Sensibility(3) . only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. distinguishes itself from its mere being.The waking is not merely for the observer. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. . in the first instance.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. as before explained . b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. although.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity .Napoleon. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. put this question to the class of ideology. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. each point. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . but as a return back from the world of specialization. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact.
set over against consciousness. murder . One. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. are found by the waking soul. etc. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. mora l. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness.identity of our self-centred being. evil. adultery. This should hardly need enforcing. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). not mere alterations. and to be as if found. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. etc. on one hand. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). and the character. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. and religious. blasphemy. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. moral. true. and is so felt. are in order to be felt. its natural peculiarity.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. the fact is a mode of my individuality.g. Another. just. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. ho wever. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. But if put in the feelin g. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. On the other hand and conversely. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. it is true. etc. the naturally immedi ate. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. primarily. is what we call sensibility. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. in the feeling. The fact that these particulars. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. the inarticulate bre athing. invested with cor poreity. which. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. for itself. fornication. and . godless. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. but treated as bel onging to its most special.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. in its own self. be it noted. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. belonging as it does to natural. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. mean. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. are our very own.. the conscience. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring.
laughter. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent.the senses of definite light. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. following the special character of the mental mode. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. is to raise its substantiality. i ts merely virtual filling-up. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. for example. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . set in its self-centred life. i. just because they are immediate and are found existing. in a special system of bodily organs. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . ¤ 402 Sensations. (¤¤ 321. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. What it has to do.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . (b) THE FEELING SOUL . (¤ 317) .(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. (¤ 300). a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality.it is a soul which feels. to realize its mastery over its own.e.a psychical physiology. 322). But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves.g. . of self. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. the immediacy of mode in feeling . as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). especially the passions or emotions. the centre of the 'sensible' system. smells. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . and their corporization. with which that substance is one. sighs.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. (c) the sense of solid reality. works itself out. the blood. distinction appears as mere variety .in the system of the senses. e. with its varieties of language.because in it. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. tones. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. to take possessi on of it. the 'irritable' system. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. and voice in general. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. therefore. but an inward. of heavy matter. As sentient.it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . to the character of subjectivity. We should have.and of sound. o f colours. are formed from their mental source.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. In the usage of ordinary language.
As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. Thus in the body it is one simple. so far as that is. the content is its particular world. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. etc. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. As sentient. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). it brings within itself. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. which is disease. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. By itself. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. thoughts. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. to which the soul.that world being included in it and filling it up. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. secondly. the corporeity. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. At the present stage this singleness is. first.as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. may again sink down. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. prima rily. in whi ch all this is stored up.. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. to be defined as one of feeling . In the present stage we must treat. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. although it does not exist. acquired lore. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. in an implicit mode. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. ideas and information. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . where the real is put past . once mor e come to light. and to that world it stands but as to itself. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. They were not in our possession. in sickness. but a negation. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. virtually retained. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. ideas. which is at the same time its predicate. a deep featureless characterless mine. This substance i s still the content of its natural life.the existent spe culative principle. it implies a want of adaptation. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. the s oul is characterized as immediate. Some times. etc. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. without existing. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). but only to his im plicit self. omnipresent unity. ¤ 404 As individual. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession.
Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. not as a mere possibility. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. tal ent. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. controlling genius thereof. say between friends. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood..a substance. and is therefore passive. it is. The moth er is the genius of the child. etc. and reasonable. incl inations. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. self-possessed. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. not yet as its self. injuries. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. the psychical relationship. placenta. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. as yet nothing impenetrable. or capac ity. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. Here are two individuals. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. the single self of the two. and of character. By the self-hood of the latter it . and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. because immediate. whose decision is ul . etc. self-conscious. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . character. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. as it has existence of its own.. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. idiosyncrasies. of the mother. but as efficiency and realized activity. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. his secular ideas. congenital disposit ion and temperament. temper. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. etc. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. not a true subject reflected int o itself.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. is visibly present as another and a different individual. or virtuality. of life. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. developed interests. fortunes. intellige nt. which.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena).is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. etc. as concrete subject ivity.
This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states.to show. This totality forms his actual ity. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. in which the individual here appears innnersed. intentions. self-possessed human being is a disease. on the cont rary. it might seem. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. means. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. first of all call for verificati on. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. in other words. is. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . which are also means and ends to each other. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. on the other hand. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. it must be added. that it is in harmony wi th the facts. To that end the phenomena. The facts. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world.to be mere deception and impo sture. it has already been call ed his genius.his fun damental interests.timate whatever may be the show of reasons.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. At the same tim e. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . But such a verification would. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. educated. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives .
ca pable of conveying general truths. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. external one to another. the magnetizer. and c ontinues to be. . is under a veil. and to know which. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. tastes. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. or at the approach of death. in whom it sees. is this. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. f riends. and the like. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. the selfless individual. subje ctive reason. (Thus Cato. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. but it is empty. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. after the downfall of the Roman republic.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. his own and that of the magnetize . the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. that it is a state of passivity. subject to the power of another person. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance.). in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. like that of the child in the womb.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. which.) Compare h ome-sickness. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. which lead up to the result . The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. for example. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. on those left behind. When the substance of both is thus made one. and other diseases. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. in its sober moods. not on the spot. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. formed.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. And because it is the adult. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. reads. not really a 'person'. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. etc. But such clairvoyance . and character. in catalepsy. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. however. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. etc. unless by the aid of religion. exist for it as an outward objectivity.a genius which beh olds itself. smells. But.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. wh en it is healthy and awake. those c onnected with female development. . .As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. and hears.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. etc. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. then. a formal vision and awareness. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality .
etc. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. which. between intelligent personality and objective world. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. i. as in other cases. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. is without any definite points of attachment . or med icines for them. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. receives. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank.fe eling. beholds. one sees and hears with the fingers. which still marks the self-feeling. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. though all-embracing. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. e. in its capacity as individual. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. etc. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. reasons. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. for example. so long as we assume independent personalities. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. the 'common sense'. which is no less a world of law. The purely sensitive life. and at the same time. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. it is still susceptible of disease. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling.r. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. as in the morbid state alluded to. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. anticipate the full-grown an . independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . causality. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. and hence. in this nominal perception. i s just this form of immediacy. In this way it is self. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. In considering insanity we must. on the contrary. is impossible. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness.
just as physical disease is not an abstract. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement.. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement).e. And so too the particularity is. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. may. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. In the concrete. but only derangement. as something natural and existent. presupposes the patient's rationality. A violent. passions. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. etc.. etc. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization.e. as a thing. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. desire. earthly elements are set fr ee . instincts. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. as it aris es. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. idea. . i. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. moral and theoretical. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. however. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. is undistinguis hed from them. and so also may the cure.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. is diseased. this life of feeling. and so makes part of the actual self. i. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy.feeling. and their gratification). which is there also.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. loss of health (if it were that. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). is relaxed.d intelligent conscious subject. i. and also desires. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling.fan cies and hopes . in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. Mind as such is fr ee. This particular being of the soul is t . the. equally formal. mere and total.that evil which is always latent in the heart. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires.merely personal love and hatred. as now regarded. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y.e. and the rest of the passions . pride. This humane treatment. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. and be a realized u niversality. it would be death). but a contr adiction in it. the self is to be stamped upon. and made appear in. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. so as to insert them in their proper place. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. inclination. that it is liable to insanity . When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. and it is only as a thing. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . such as vanity. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul.
is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . empty space and empty time.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. The natural qualities and alterations of age. and that as a barrier for it. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. Habit is rightly called a second nature. a pure act of intuition. therefore. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. And consciousness it becomes. will. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. but the basis of consciousness. nature. when the co rporcity. as. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. For. and the generation o f habit as practice. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. That is to say. the one and the same. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. and the mere substance. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. of which it is the subjective substance. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. nor is absorbed in the m. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject.itself a simple being . as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul.he factor of its corporeity. of it. The soul is freed from them. but has them and moves in them. sleep. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. even in being affected by them. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. or dependent in regard to it. lacking consciou sness. weariness o . heat. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175).e. et c. are only subjectiv e forms. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. has been absorbed by it. on the contrary. a second nature. so is that pure being (which. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. and for that reason n ot free. and so no longer interested. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. i. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. Habit like memory. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. but still free. is reduced to unity. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such.. and which still continues to exist. dist inguishing it from itself . partly only relative. occupied.and becoming the 'ideal'. su bjective substantiality of it . this being of the soul. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged .
In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened..e. so that when the conception (e. . Habit on an ampler scale. too. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. and thus to enable the soul. and especially so in the specific bodily part. consciousness. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. Thinking. that although the frost. like any other. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. etc. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. etc. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. reflection. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. is recollection and memory. and it is habit of living which brings on death. viz. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. and particul ar.. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. nor a transient emotion or idea. like their satisfaction.enabling the matter of consciousness. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. and the self-feeling as such. i. and no other. etc. to be made a power in the bodily part. a particular organ of i ts organic system). moral. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. cut off from action and reality.is felt. but part and parcel of his being. habit is usually passed over - . re ligious. whereof we sha ll speak later. And it is true that the form of habit. The most ext ernal of them. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. or. if quite abstract. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. intuition. etc. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. an 'ideality' of soul . or skill. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. without an express adjustment.).f the limbs. to be his as this self.g.. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. the spatial direction of an individual. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. sweet tastes. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. Even here. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. habit diminishes this feeling. and any other purp oses and activity.concentration. etc. has been by will made a habit . consciousness. made into an instrum ent. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. nor are they in conce ption rational. casual. a series of musical notes) is in me. this soul.or the misfortune . want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. which make it up. nor an abstrac t inwardness. and that they. under its volitional and conceptual characters. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. acquires a strength which consists in this. his upright pos ture. to exist as substance in its corporeity. are no longer bothered with it.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. This is the rational liberation from them. intelligence. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) .
Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. for example. and inexpressible a modific ation. 'The autho . 5.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it.laughter. 1. 71). in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. in being related to which. The soul. while language is its perfect expressi on. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . This note is so slight. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. it is related to itself. represents not itself. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. the upright figure in general. unable to represent it in its actual universality. of the mouth . In this identity of interior and exterior. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. Empfindung. 3. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. still vainer than a signatura rerum. or the 'immediacy' of mind. for the soul. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. 2. and the formation of the limbs. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. a world external to it . cuts itself off from its immediate being. finds itself there a single subject. etc. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. 4.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. And the human figure. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. but the soul. Seen from the animal world.either as something contemptible . who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. absorbing it. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. and i s infinite self-relation. or abstract universality. Naturliche Qualitaten. This externality. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance.. of which it is the sign. in other words. Under the head of human expression are included. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. Die fuhlende Seele. weeping. the latter subject to the former. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. in its concentrated self. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. especially the hand. Naturliche Seele. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. indefinite. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. and making it its own. as the absolut e instrument. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own.
now. The mind as ego is essence.it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . which manifests itself and something else too . Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity.e. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious).the light. as this absolute negativity. Selbstgefuhl. thus first made explicit as the Ego. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. is only its abstract formal ideality. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. but since reality. 7. something dark and beyond it. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. not to the wisdom. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. but is implicit. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. and . the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. seem to be its own activity. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm).r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. It is of this latter.the soul's natural life . Gewohnheit. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. does not. and as such it is C onsciousness. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. 6. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). as external to it. i. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. but to the foolishness of man.to an equal freedom as an independent object. Ego. as subjective reflection in itself. but when he receives the inspired word. in the sphere of essence. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. like reciprocal dependence in general. to it. Hence consciousness. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. 8. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one.
This is sense-consciousness. and that the philosophy. an existent. and so on. reflected in itself. The object similarl y. It appears as wealth iest in matter. first. As against Spinozism. etc. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. the subject of consciousness. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. an intuitive intellect. with an object set against it. in other words.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. but as poorest in thought. i. Consciousness . T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. what makes the object the subject's own. has emerged from Spinoz ism. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). for which ego is the object. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. again.e. is further characterized a s immediately singular. the substantial and qu alitative. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. the notion of mind. immediate consciousness.e. being immediate. which is not as its own. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. a thing-in-itself. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. to raise its self-certainty to truth. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . a something. and puts it first under the category of being. and underived certainty of it. and even t he Idea of Nature. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. an existing thing.as a case of correlation . Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. but only as it is in reference to something else. Spatial and temporal Singularn . or mere c ertainty.to the ego it seems an alteration of the object. i. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. a singular. Ego. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. (b) self-consciou sness. as Reason. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415).a subject-objectivity.. t heir absolute interdependence.
in that manner. reflected in itself.bet ween the individuality of a thing which. is sense-perception. has many properties. however. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . and universal. so constr uing the object. wants to take the object i n its truth.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. and am aware'. . free from this negative l ink and from one another. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). and. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . lies im mediately in the other. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. what it is in truth. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. Thi s inward. or the distinction which is none. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. reflectional attributes. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . the distinction on its own part. as we called it. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. viz. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. i.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which.a copy of the phenomenon. as not externally different from the other. p. taken in its concrete content. the one of the terms. an abstract identity: on the other hand. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth.a variety of relations. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. a something external to it. having passed beyond the sensible. which form the alleged ground of general experience.). its necessity on its own part. permanent term s.e. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . to describe the sensible. on one hand. has. the thing. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . of the thing is. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. but as mediated. but brought to rest and universality. experiences. ¤ 423 The law. i. 73). reflected upon. or as being beside and out of itself. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. in this case by t he Ego. by being regarded in their bearings. not as merely immediate. and sensuous consciousness. and not yet as external on its own part.e. But in this manner the interior distinction is. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness.ess. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. and more or less by the sciences. however. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. it is related. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. to which. and universalities.
knows itself implicit in the object. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. The two processes are one and the same. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss.With this new form-characteristic. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. with the nega tion of it. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. implicit in it. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. is a singular. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. and thus in it I am aware of me.as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. this identity comes to be for the ego. The certitude of one's self. and a desire (appetite) . and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. On the external side it conti nues. or implicitly. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. primarily describable as an individual. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. the latter. on the whole. in this return upon itself. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. on the contrary . and ma intains itself as such. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. can make no resistance: the dialectic. To this activity the object. nominally. pure 'Ideality'. there is strictly speaking no object. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. and itself made actual. therefore. being merely consumed. or. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. its satisfaction realized. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. therefore. in its immediacy.
the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. and formation of it. which falls on another. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. Thus the death of one. ¤ 434 This status. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. This other.t he process of recognition. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. therefore rude. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. ¤ 435 But secondly. preservation. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. we see. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. Force. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. is yet. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. the slave. retains his single self-consciousness. Thus arises the status of master and slave. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. and incurs a like peril for its own . which is the basis of this phenomenon. must likewise be kept in life. when we look to the distinction of the two. then. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. While the one com batant prefers life. f rom the essential point of view (i. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. and the means for entering into relation with them. negati on of immediacy.for the means of mastery. at first immedi ately. the outward and visible recognition). a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. as the existence of hi s freedom. in the service of the master. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. as one of two things for another. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . In that other as ego I behold myself. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. though by the abstract. from one point of view. a suppression. however. Force. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. not their underlying and essential principle. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . and thus give existence to my freedom. and its being for others.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. w hich however is also still outside it. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. works off his individualist self-will. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. it. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. the slave.e consciousness of a 'free' object. in the first place. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. solves the contradiction. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. however. on the ir phenomenal side.but only p eril. and to exist as such for the other: .e. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite.
is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . 5. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. whilst it signifies that the object.f wisdom' .the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal .in family. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . Wahrnehmung 3. is now itself universal. valour. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . idle fame. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. the self-centred pure notion. fatherland.consciousness. Selbstbewu§tsein. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. friendship. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein.the passage to universal self. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. honour. so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. ego. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. Die Begierde 6. Truth. fame. Reason. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. and of all virtues. The uni versality of reason.which is Reason. For truth here has. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . state. is Reason. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. etc. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. 4. or determinations of the very being of things. bu t the truth that knows it. love. 1. as its peculiar mode and immanent form.or rather it is a difference which is none. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. than they are its own thoug hts. Der Verstand. is mind (spirit). Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . therefore. . aware of what it is. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other.
therefore. however. ideation. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . as its concept has just shown. what is the same thing. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. i. though it no longer has an object. remembering. it is finite by means of its immediacy.mental vision. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. And it is a matter of no consequence. restricted by that content. This. in so far as it has an object. SUB-SECTION C.in one word. and which as the reality of that notion.. which is defined as it s notion. in thinking also and in desire and will. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. like consciousness. Cons ciousness is finite. above the material. the latter now an infinite form which is not. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. and above the complication with an external object . and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason.e. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. in the soul as a physical mode. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. or. neit her subjective nor objective. viz. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. PSYCHOLOGY. Mind. etc.. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object.7.the former a simple immediate totality. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. then its reality is that reason. etc. Die Vernunft. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion.apart b oth from the content. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. it has a mode in its knowledge. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. Mind is finite. in so far as . Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . etc. desires.
and is even there a return into itself. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. of comprehending itself. that aspect is twofold . if we consider the initial aspect of mind. forces. k nowledge. and make the affection subjective. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. When the affection has been rendered its own. Thus. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. equally. viz. in freedom. Similarly. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. and being a rational knowledge. the na tural soul (¤ 413). ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. i. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. As the theory o f Condillac states it. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. viz. is misconceived and overlooked.reality of its reason. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection.e. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. so far. and to liberate itself to its elf. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. or. and the negative aspect of mental activity. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. and are the mind's own. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. to reach and get hold of itself. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation.as being and as its own: by the one. that is. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. it is .e. i. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. in so far as its existent phase.e. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. and its activity can only have itself as aim. the mind finds in itself something which is. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation.
is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. in the theoretical range. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. as it is said. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. for which it gains the form of universality. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. and of the heart without the intellect . It is still extremely ill off. to get at the notion and the truth.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. Ou twards.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. and therefore a restricted content. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. which is only certitude. Its activity has to do with the empty form .(b) Will: practical mind. and heartless intellects .. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. but) enjoyment. to definite and conceptual knowledge. and is immediately willed. elevates itself. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. while it has to do with autonomous products. The nominal knowledge. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. as r eason is concrete. both for the mind as such. wi th a material which is its own. This activity is cognition. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. and that in its empirical condition. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. the word. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside.i.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. which it and the content virtually is. is thus also a reality . The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. like logic. its content is at first only its own. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. just as they are given. etc. and gains abstract auton omy within. Psychology.e. Inwards .take the worthless fo r the essential nature. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. along with which the content is realized as rational. which in the first place is likewise formal . mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology.g. e. This position of psychology. But as knowledge. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. belong to a point of view utt . (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. merely as facts. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. has a material which is only nominally such. while the practical.
conception. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. imagination. If they are isolated. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. it is admitted.e. as non-intelligent).is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. note). imagines. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. intelligen ce. remembrance.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . etc.besides which it al so intuits. etc. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). just so far as it realizes itself. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. conceives. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . that intuition. conception. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. intuition. however. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. viz. Faculty. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. by rational conception. must lead to abandoning the effort. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form.in a word . are not isolated. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. It is true that even as isolated (i.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. But c ognition is genuine. is bro ught into mind. But the true satisfaction. memory. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. remembers. etc. like power or force.its out-of-selfness . as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. cognitive conception. as it is by the same method brought into nature. it . Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. etc. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. if answered in the negative. etc. by cognitive intuition. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge). or mind.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other .whi ch. imagination. or makes the concept its own. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. conceived as reflected into self. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained.
whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content.his private and p articular self. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . in t he truth of mind.t he factor of fixing it as our own. this mode is simple. may just as likely be narrow and poor. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . external or internal. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. Hence feeling. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. as it were the closes t. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever.the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. Feeling is the immediate. projects it into time and space. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. but rather as subject ive and private. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things.to the generalit ies of common sense . with the character of something existent. has the form of casual particularity .but to his feeling. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence.is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. in content and value entirely contingent.an active self-collection .one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. or at least to reasons . that is t o say. 254). even should its import be most sterl ing and true. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. the mere consciousness point of view. Now the material. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. With us. is swallowed up. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. a . . a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind.
is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. though intrinsically concrete. no longer needs to find the content. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. from the external place. a rec ollection of itself. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. isolated. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought.in a space and a time of its own. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. . or. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. which makes it its own. The representation is the property of intelligence.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. as it at first recollects the intuition. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. the germ as affirmatively containing. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. as tho ught. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. and is arbitrary or contingent. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. with a preponderating subjectivity. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. i. which. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. its when and where. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . t ime. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. in virtual possibility. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient.the germ of the fruit. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. in the way we treat. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine.e. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. and inwardly divest itself of it. and received into the universality o f the ego. however. we may say. yet without being in consciousnes s. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . for example. but stored up out of consciousness. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. still continues simple. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own.
Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property.in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. . the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . that it finds its material. notion. has been broken up. In the first place. whatever be its content (from image. see Introduction to the Logic.these modes of relation are not laws.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. by which it is authenticated. where it is treasured up. as a matter of fa ct. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. or ide a). Secondly. being and universality. though belonging to intelligence. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. reason and consequence. comes actually into its possession. but a being of its own institution. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . and an out-put from its universal m ine. But it is solely in the conscious subject. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. wherea s the idea (representation). which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject.e. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. The image. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. where. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . under the representation (idea) with the same content. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. as a unit of intuition. has always the peculiarity. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. now that it has been endued with externality. present also a distinction in content. The content reproduced. the matter is entirely pictorial. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. to be so and so. as of all intelligence. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. i. The images are in the first instance referred to this external.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest.. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. at first only in space and time. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. or an intell ectual category.Image and Idea. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. ¤ 20 note. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. if it is to exist.viz. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . such as likeness and contrast.) . which is now the power over them. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above.
e. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. to universalize it. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. are unifications of t he same factors. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. is reason. Another point calling for special notice is that. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). are completely welded into one. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. it is self-uttering. As reason. This force is really intelligence itself . it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. but they are 'syntheses'. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite. for its ideal import is its elf. this form of being. . individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. which forms their connecting link. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition.Imagination. when regarded as the agency of this unification. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . some latent concept or Ideal principle. or poetical imagination . derived from some interest. . recollection. and in mechanical memory it completes. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. These more or less concrete. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . or something of the sort. and becomes an i ndividuality. i.still lacks the side o f existence. etc. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445.symbolic. Acting on this view. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. but only a nominal reason. is derived from the data of intuition. 435). a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition.Abstraction. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. Such is creative imagination(7) . because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. allegoric. so far a s it is concerned. a concrete subjectivity. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. In other words.. one's own and what is picked up. internal and external.
and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. something accepted. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. its system. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. and the connotation of which it is a sign.. ¤ 459 The intuition . This intuition is the Sign. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property.there have been collected more than a hundred such words. etc. and even with conception and imagination. its institution by intelligence.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. With regard to the elementary material of language. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . in the first instance.). representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness.R auschen. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence .gives to sensations. The sign is some immediate intuition. But in the fusion of the two elements. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. but as representative of something else.in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. Knarren. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. language . on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . intuitions. when employed as a sign.now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. somewhat immediate or given (for example. and where it is conserved. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . e tc. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. Such is the negativity of intelligence. since memory. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . It is a n image.speech and. strictly so-called.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . out of which it forms i deas . the colour of the cockade. has always to do with signs only.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. have nothing to do with each oth er. whereas in the sign. In logic and psychology. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e.th at of vocal objects.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. . which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). the matter of the latter is. conception s. Sausen. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed.
In particular. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. if it be not altogether extinguished. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. as in our signs for the numbers. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. The study of languages still in their original state. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. W.e. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. instead of n ames proper. the chemical elements. their signs in vocal language. As to the formal elem ent. are frequently changed.e. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. on the other hand.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. palate. viz. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. tongue in each) and for their combinations. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. i. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. (Cf. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. i. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. the planets . in chemistry and mineralogy. and still takes place in Canton . as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. . we may touch. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. i. etc. and only get signification as signs. they are reduced to signs. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. again. and now that. . only in pas sing. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. alphabetical writing. which severally receive designation. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. as regards signs for mental objects.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language.). for example. as many as ten a .Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. on anthropological articulation. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs.e. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. but.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. as. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. It is only a stationary civ ilization. it depends. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. the denomination. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. like the Chinese. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity.
Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. in the interest o f vision. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. as it does. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . is still for the mind simple in the name). and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. or simple logical terms.e. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. of uttering its ideas most worthily . which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. so that. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. while (with the facu . Thus. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. like alphabetic writing.is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection.the mode. it is analysed.the name. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. . so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. i. the simple plain idea. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. in the case of the Chinese Koua. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. learn ing to speak Chinese. This feature of hieroglyphic . in speaking. just as in modern times (as already noted. however ample a connotation it may include. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. Both alike require such signs. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. the simple straight stroke. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. The European. by speaking low and soft or crying out. Hieroglyphics. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. peculiar to the intellect. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name.nd twenty. Engaging the attention of intelligence. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound.
lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,
but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you
ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.
¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex
The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. in its objectivity and truth. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. bad. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. Delight.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . when thought.retain a speciality of their own . for the latter. and thought. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. and to discus s their content. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. is the same content as the good practical feeling has.indeed infinitely so. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. we have this immanen . grief. in feeling. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . can also be felt. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. heart. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). repentance. wha t is the same thing. namely God.. is precisely what constitutes. On the other hand. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. joy. and evil. and duty.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. and precisely in that way d o they . etc. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. in their universality and necessity. it is because of their quality or co ntent . But where the objects sought are thus casual. and still more in mind. and will. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. contentment. in which these facts. Thus it is. But as both. etc. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. right. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. we have only to deal with the selfish.. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. the truth and. lack objective determin ation. but presented in its universality and necessity. on the one hand. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. in their immediacy. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world.but only in antithesis to the latter . volition. may be placed. shame. Whereas in life. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. law and morality. If feelings are of the right sort.
and their truth. character.Up to what degree the good continue good. are infected with contingency. as r egards the form of its content. indeed. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . it is pa ssion. their mutual connect ions. subjectivity . But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. however.his inte rests of intellect. In what way have they. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. and something inappropriate to it. be the value of tha t mode what it may. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. finds in the conformity . enjoyment .natural impulse and inclination. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. Which are good and bad? . the question is directly raised. What are the good and rational propensiti es. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . It is this objectification which evinces their real value. on one hand. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. each with its private range).on one aim and object. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. is at first still a natural will. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. first of all. therefore. each being always in conflict to another.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. Thus. but to ge t realized. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . they are based on the rational nature of the mind. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. . And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. The will. they. Should. But with regard to the inclinations. passion is neither good no r bad. In consequence of this formalism. ego. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. It is on ly a dead. If the will is to satisfy itself. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity.an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. being all in one subjec t and hardly all. as experience shows. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. too often. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. on the other. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. talent.a development in which the content of autonomous . which is essentially self-d etermination. The answer to the question. while. as rights and duties. admitting of gratification.and (as there are ma ny. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . Will. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities.
are reduced to a m ere negative. without end. is his interest and . However. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest.and one satisfaction. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. where the subject is made to close with itself. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. by another. as thinking and implicitly free. on the whole to their disadvantage. An action is an aim of the subject.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . They are somet imes contrasted. It is thus 'reflecting' will. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. Their mutual limitation. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. either alto gether or in part. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. so far as their particularity goes.e. ¤ 476 The will. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. and social duties. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. As thus contradictory. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. the free gift of nature. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand.action loses its contingency and optionality. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. unless he had an interest in it. and is option or choice. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. which is just as much no satisfacti on. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. an inactive thing. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. it is on them that the decision turns. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. which as such is the universal. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. inclinations. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. this is wh at is called the interest. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. moral. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. there would be no action at all. the impulses. as the content.his passion. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. which reflection and comparison have educed. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. on one hand. i. . But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . that finds its actualizing in the agent. of a universal sa tisfaction.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . The morality concerns the content of the aim. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action.
education. is actu ality. or implicit Idea. and object . the will is an actually free will. as the substance of the state. still this very I . i.a universality which only ought to be. so that in this sphere of particular existence. and of which it is only t he formal activity. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . an Athenian or Spartan citizen). it is existent only in the immedi ate will . in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. only so far as it thinks itself . the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. On the contrary. have never had this Idea.e. its very au tonomy or freedom.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. and is will as free intelligence. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. the divine min d present with him. for example. or by s trength of character. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. and the abstract singleness. and are without it still. with freedom itself. as realizing the idea. As abstract Idea again. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. or philosophy (. etc. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. he is actually free. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. i. Plat o and Aristotle. According to Christianity. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. fortuitousness . destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. which i s pure and concrete at once. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. of present sensati on and volition. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. of the family. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. aim. he h as also. Whole continents. just because it is the very essence of mind. which realizes its own freedom of will. that is. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. Africa and the East. knows this its concept.e. now that the formalism.freedom itself. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty.e. in religion as such . and are constituted after its measure.e . The Greeks and Romans. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . that men are aware of freedom as their essence. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . did not have it.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. If to be aware of the Idea . the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss.is matter of speculation. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. and that as its very actuality. however. is in the first instance the rational will in general.it is the existential side of reason . If the will. ambiguous. i. and have God's mind d welling in him: i.an individuality. even the Stoics. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. If.sired . It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. therefore.to be aware.
into legal. but which they are.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. 14. Die Intelligenz. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. is itself only a notion . SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . 4. Der freie Geist. Auswendiges. 7. moral. 11. Die Erinnerung 6. 15. 10. 16. religious. But this freedom. Das Denken. Der Geist 2. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. as men. 1. Der praktische Geist 13.dea itself is the actuality of men . 3. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction.not something which they have. 5. Das praktische Gefuhl.a principle of the mind and heart. and not less into scientific actuality. not with laws or court s of justice. 12. but the pe rmanent character . 9. which the content and aim of freedom has. Phantasie 8. if they are made slaves. Gedachtnis. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. Vorstellung. Die Gluckseligkeit. Inwendiges. Anschauung. Die Einbildungskraft.
although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. But in this individualist moral sphere. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. and is the vi rtual universal. Liberty.. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. but in its universality. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. where they. and character. where free will has existence. are no less its duties to punish. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. private an d personal needs). i. or legal possession. in these externally objective aspects. These conditi ons. is a duty. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. to be as a person. my right to a thing is not merely possession. and it is a duty to possess things as property. are its Duties. anthropological data (i.e. being universal. so as to become its habit. which in it is thus at home with itself. military service. and what is a duty. but as possession by a person it is property. etc. etc. The penal judicature of a government.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. are duties . in general. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. which splits up into different heads: viz. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess.e. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. is also a right. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. What is a right is also a duty. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. it is a Law. and brings into existence i n these several wills.at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. But. viz. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority.and aim. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. For a mode of existence is a right. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. Liberty. in the light of the concept.(1) When. In the morality of the conscience. it exists as manner and custom. its rights of admi nistration. in relation to the subjective will. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. relation to another person . as the services of the members of the State in dues. is the Law (Right ) . duty in general is in me a free subject . These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. on the other hand. or Usage. their absolute unity. to administer. receives the form of Necessity.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual.. not in the form of impulse. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. temper. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. or instituted as an authoritative power. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. etc..
but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. it may be. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. and State. Sitte A. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. at first in the outward appropriation.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. as something devoid of will. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. But the set of adjustments. As so characterized. (B) When the will is reflected into self. or by the formatio n of the thing or. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . This thing. it is the right of the subjective will. These extremes are the persons who. are simultaneously mutually independent. on its own account me rely 'practical'. as in itself still abstract and empty. which is thus mutual. and the I in it is abstractly external. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. but on an external thi ng. possession is property. morality of the individual conscience. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. civil society. though it remains in trinsically the same. is an individual.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. the infinite self-rela tion. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. . abstract right. the external sphere of its liberty . has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. so as to have its existence inside it. Gesetz 2. But this predicate. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. but as existence of the personality is an end. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. in the knowledge of their identity as free. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals.possession. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. which as possession is a means. 1. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. by mere designation of it. and hence as a single being . The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I.
The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . but which. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . willed. the only diversity lies in this. is disinterested. universal thing or commodi ty. as the judgement of the intrinsically right.Contract. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. in that case. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. and its acceptance by the other will. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. which thus becomes wicked. which. But so far as my will lies in a thing. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. ¤ 495 The contract. produces a wrong: by which. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . This is naiv e.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. I can just as well put it in it as not . non-malicious wrong. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). because they face each other. labour. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . is affirmed. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. and. however. expressing the civil suit. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons.). 493 seqq. and recogniz ed. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. and time. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement.the full and complete deed. its changing hands. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement.just as well with draw it as not. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. then the external rec .
and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. and while the former only is respected.in this case the apparent recognition. and can be seized only in t his quarter. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right.compulsion against the thing. and commits a crime. is at the same time only a new outrage. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. This progression. To display the nullity of such an act. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will.punishment. by the n otion. i. is a matter of chance). is the work of Revenge. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality.is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. In it the agent. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. The phrase 'Law of Nature'.where the nominal relation is retained. or right as governed by the nature of things. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. as a volitional and intelligent being. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. sets up a law . the latter is violated. This gives the wrong of fraud . abolishes itself in a thir d judgement.e. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. on .the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. As such it is mo rality(2) proper.a law. The social state.) Thus the will is violently wicked. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. an d so on without end. The 'reality' of right. or in corporeity. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. which is nominal and recognized by him only . from life. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. b ut the sterling value is let slip. like the last.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. such an action is essentially and actually null. But more than possible compulsion is not. being conformable to the right. The law of nature . that of the judge. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . even from the range of all existen ce. in revenge. i. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. But revenge.a universal which holds good for him.on self-determination or autonom y. The former used to be the common meaning. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right.e. Conversel y.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. and not merely the particular mode .st rictly so called . howe ver. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. which is disinterested . The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . in which the law of nature should hold sway. or Natural Right.
While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. counts only as a person. etc. and willed by it. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. Moralitat 3.and also moral wickedness. 1. B. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. This is the right of intention.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. recognition. is now chara cterized as a subject . Now. is its deed. In point of form. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof.a will reflected into itself so that. my part in i t is to this extent formal. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. it thus includes purpose and intention . conscience. so far as these features are it s inward institution. or even justification in his h eart. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. 2. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. its own. so much as it has consciously willed. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. an d allows to be imputed to it. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. intelligence. but have their assent. though any alteration as such. the reason of the will. embracing these individual point s. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. Naturrecht. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act .the other hand. in mere law. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. be its affection w hat it may. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. sentiment. Das Recht. The subjective will is morally free. the will is at the same time made a particular. which was its purpose.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. and thus comes into relationship with the former. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. who.
the essential and actual good. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. is not something external to him. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. as in happiness (¤ 479). sup erseding this absolute claim of each. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent.g. can be wicked. as individual and universal. And yet they ought to harmonize. This is the right to well-being. whether the . who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. constitute h is well-being. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. At the same time because good is one. will . make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which.e. and yet each of them. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . on account of that existent sphere of liberty. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. is as g ood and as duty absolute.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty.and thus including in it particularity . On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. is always fundamentally one identity. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. though it is a particular duty.that it contains his needs. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. in point of its matter. but is a particul arity of his own . (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good.a universal determined in its elf . interests. These aims. and aims. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. his interest and welfare must. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. they ought to stand in harmony. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. because the agent.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. a good intention in case of a crime. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. essential and actual. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. it is always something particular. constitutes a peculiar world of its own .ion.being only in this.
as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. expressed by this repeated ought. and of the good. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. Moralitat 2. The subjectivity. rising to its pitch. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision.the standpoint of the ought. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. 6.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. which is the good. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. the unutterable. Wickedness. Handlung.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . on its negative side. in something external therefore. The for mer is the will of goodness. Das Gute und das Bose C. is only the infinite form. The result. which would only be abstract. Die Absicht und das Wohl. is abandoned. in the notion.good is realized. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . no more exist than not. non-universal. THE MORAL LIFE.the utterly abstract semblance . nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. which actualizes and dev elops it. an aim essentially and actually null. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . Der Vorsatz 3. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. to be carried out in it.of Conscience and Wickedness. which has no objectivity. right .to a goodness. is. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. That.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. 1. the truth of this semblance. 5. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . and we have passed into the field of ethical life. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. and refuse it to the wicked. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. On the affirmative side. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. th e essential thing. and duty. i . with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . good. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. in this its identity with the good. and the wicked. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. The failure of the latter consists . but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. 4. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. This pure self-certitude. its deepest descent into itself. but is only sure of i tself.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself.
th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality.the Political Constitution. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. i. i. temperament. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. mind ap pears as feeling.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . is virtue. has actuality as the spirit of a nation.the Family. however. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n .Marriage.e . virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. . Thus. in its immediacy.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. This is the sexual tie. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. as deliberate work for the community.monog . in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. But the person. The ethical personality. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. that it is. to a spiritual significance.yet somewhat which without all question is.Civil Society. In the latter sphere. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal.n a thing . etc. manner and cu stom . the individuality expres ses its special character.the genuine ethical temper. whose independence it. . feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . without any selective refl ection. in its ki nd. to the total of ethical actuality. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. controls and entirely dominates from within. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. makes this union an ethical tie . When these two impe rfections are suppressed. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. is confidence (trust) .e. to destiny. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. In the shape of the family. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. elevated. however. as personal virtues. it exists as confidence. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. as an intelligent being. as against the univers al. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. as the mind developed to an organic actuality .
Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. or nominal culture in general. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. and thus produce more unconditional . of legal regulation. destined. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. acquire an existence of their own. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. or state external. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. as do also its industry. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. into families or individuals.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. thus invested with independence. being an intelligent substance. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . of the possessor's will. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. In virtue of such for tuitousness. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. constitutes the general stock. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. on the o ther hand. however. on one hand. originally foreign to it.in educating them to independent personality. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. learning. ¤ 522 (3) The children. labour. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. This instrument. to found anew such an actual family. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. information. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. who exist independent and free. and care for the future. as private persons. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. while.
the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. and in it they have their social moralit y. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. at every point. The second. Hence. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. and like the first a certain subsistence. and a corresponding mode of labour.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). or could be. It is a futile perfectionism to have . like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. intelligence. as vital. and with it the State. and of means for satisfying them.. is developed i n detail. Where civil society. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself.the Law.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . option. on the side of external existence. certain. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. determined through reason or legal intelligence. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. also of aims and interests. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. ten thalers. to be. 2 4/5 years. The third. they have their actual existence. talent.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. be the righ t and just thing. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent.dependence on the social system. their recognition and their honour. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. and an ensemble of contingencies. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'. and so on ad infinitum. and industry. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. this analysis. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. skill. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. of the legal relationships of individual s to them.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. or only 2 * . But when right.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . which is honesty. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . of needs. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. its action gets direction and content through natural features. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. and accident. 2 3/4 .which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. in the course of definite manifestation. Their content per se may be reasonable . however. Thus whether three years.and ye t it should be decided. as well as of mental culture and habit . though of course only at the final points of deci ding. which as existence is essentially a particular. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . of mere agents. exists. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it.
however. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. recognized. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. and t hus become authoritative . and in particular transforms this existence . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. whic h are only internally in these objects.as proven: . not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. constit . is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. general laws. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice.to be promulgated and made known as laws . which discovers new distinctions. as in the mental ima ges of space. first really de serving the name of laws. . The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith .and th e cattle too .vi z.even as his law can only be a just law. not for them. to which objective existence determines i tself.in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. But there is a contrary case. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. even the admiration. hereditary divinity or nobility. with the advance in multitude.the ne ed.e. as the genuine order of life.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis . like improvements on a f loor or a door.to the individualized right . .as this exists as revenge . the need of a simpler code . These people forget that the stars . i. inasmuch as. at the same time an externally objective existence.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. as universal authority and necessity. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. The comparison of the two species.laws. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. of his countrymen. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. by faith and trust. being laws o f strict right. which again make new decisions necessary. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known.into punishment (¤ 500). in the judicial system. are not a new hou se. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused .a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. This subjective existence. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. there arises. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws .(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. they touch only the abstract will . To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws.are governed and well governed too by laws.which though something new. within the house . but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. as it is a known law.
from the c onnections between nation and nation. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. and worked from that point of view.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. shou ld. appears as state.and that. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. In so far. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. so as to secure this satisfaction. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. in a uniform gen eral way. It results also from circumstances of locality. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. as at bottom different sides. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. because it is only one factor. and their variable ingredients. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. . Such an order acts with the power of an external state.'poli . and to maint ain that end in them and against them. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state.viz. then. the position of an external un iversality. be exercised as different functions. So far as concerns them.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end.as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. which. . ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. No doubt this factor is incomplete. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. because it is man's want. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. mere circumstantial evidence. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. to the concrete of civil society. Conversely. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. and the judgement as application of the law to it.
and self-develop ed . The cons titution is existent justice . (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. they are re strictions. continually produce it as their result. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. but.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . is its essence. (c) THE STATE. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals .the reasonable spirit of will. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. Secondly.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual.in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . then it promotes their welfare. and not left to perish. the state only is as an organized whole. it carries back both. and . Thirdly. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . as self-knowing and self-actualizing. in this direction . receiving. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality. The same unity.as an actuality . but which has a thoroughly general side. First it maintains them as persons.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. however. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality.ce'. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. through the action of the government and its several branches. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. s heer subjectivity. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . Thus we have the corpora tion.international (outer-state) law. with all its evolution in detail. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . It provides for the reasonable will . and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. which each originally takes care of for himself. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. it protects the family and guides civil society. differentiated in to particular agencies. self-originated. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. and. ¤ 539 As a living mind. First.into the life of the universal substance. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. also for that will being put in actuality. which. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . This universal principle. .one individual. On the other hand. to the immediate agent. his independent self-will and particular interest.which volition is thereby free . secondly.co nsists in a double function. But.
presuppos e unequal conditions. town . etc. that the laws rule. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. etc. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. With the state there ari ses inequality. the familiar proposition. without further specification and development. etc. logically carried ou t. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. It is important therefore to study them closer. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. the difference of governing powers and of governed. Rome. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. the citizens . first. etc. eligibili ty to office. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). on the contrary. The laws themselve s. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. that it should be man (and not as in Greece.pleasure an d self-will. But. as it ha ppens. etc. The principle of equality. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. is so little by nature. on the contrary. private as well as public rights of a nation. were called its 'liberties'. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial.e. On the contrary. and that the laws are restrict ions. or even in crime. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. But that this freedom should e xist. military service. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. is abstract subjectivity. physical strength.only it can make them . Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. Formerl y the legally defined rights. as regards the concrete. otherwise have in property. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind.equal in the concrete. magistracies . As regards. However true this is.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state.as regards taxation. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction.punishment. All men are by nature equ al. i.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: .Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. directories. it embodies a liberty. Really. Nothing has become. or destroy them. which it can without incompatibility allow. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. As regards Liberty. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. age. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. the current notions of l . To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . . This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. rejects all differences. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions).besides their personalit y . etc. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. in other words. authorities. skill. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . as it exists as s uch. But the notion of liberty.. talent. Equality.
Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions.e . i. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. If .as sec urity of property. however. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. as a state without a constitution. has an insight and conviction of his own .just because of this inseparability . as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution.a thing that has nev er happened in history. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society.iberty only carry us back to equality. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. The question . in other words continuall . of others. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. be it added. . because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. and must deal with them as it ca n. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. and the organization of the actualization of them.that which preserves. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. is .e. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. in which this is not formally done. of liberties in general. ¤ 541 The really living totality . with its insatiate vanity. with this development of particularity. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. self-w ill and self-conceit. just as little as the making of a code of laws. and to regard a state. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. not merely with regard to the naturalness. and thus gains moral independence. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . But the more we fortify liberty. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. The term political liberty. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults.) But the guara ntee lies also. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions.
the all-sustaining.regarded as organic totality . In the perfect form of the state. is the government. but an actual indiv idual . as in a democratic constitution. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. Only through t he government.y produces the state in general and its constitution. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. as always. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . (A mistake still greater. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. is the self-redintegrating notion. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . as in the patri archal society . i.e.impugns the principle of the division of powers. equally disorganizes actuality.su bject always. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct.e. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion.monarchy. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. and the government be merely executive and dependent . The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. ¤ 542 In the government . .in a state of society. . The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . the participation of all i n all affairs . and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'.to make it the first power. i. is the state one. all-decreeing will of the state. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. in other words. of the family and of civil society. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. however. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function.or. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. These.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'.the will of a decreeing individual. which includes an already existing development of differences. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. which taken apart is also particular).
aptitude.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills.as also feudal monarchy. there arises the participation of several in state-business. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. administration and police.such as ochlocracy. Two points only are all-important. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices.'ideal' unity. Thus. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . being simple self-relation. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . . and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. civil society. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. to subjectivity. possess independence of a ction.. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. personal interference and action of th e State as one man.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . The division of constitutions into democracy. Secon dly. which having their busin ess appointed by law.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. and are to that degree private person s. too. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. lik e peace and war. and above all personal liberty. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing .oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy .the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person.are. and with earlier transition-forms.in short. That subjectivity . first. essentially. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). with their general opinion. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. and then of nature . By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. legislative power. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. it may be . liberty of property. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. as it were.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. i. These principles are those expounded earlier. in the history of the State. admini stration of justice or judicial power.partly.e. The pure forms . to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused. and skill for such ends. especially in legislation . an actual existence. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. aristocracy and monarchy. participate in the governmental power. involve the. etc. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. with its industry and i ts communities. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . For it is as private persons t .viz. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. to that end and for that reason.
and form a particular kind . not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . as such an aggregate. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power.as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. inorganic shape.a spiritual element . as estates. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. ever newly recurring. moreover. which. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. If the main part of the requirement were . in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. elemental sea. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. is no t self-destructive. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. indeed the whole. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. The des irability of such participation. be they treated as mere individuals. Take the case of England which. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. however. range of the extern al means of government. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. to power and act ion. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. or in its 'reflectional' universality.as it very likely is . wild. that t hey enter upon that participation. and therefore more urgent. in the general sense of embracing a wide. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. s ense of general wants. however.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. in the law and liberty of property. so far as they form only one branch of that power . Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. i. blind force. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. In a civilized state. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. like that of the stormy.would be.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. it is not a brutish mass. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation.e. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . but as organic factors. as the nation . and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. Experience s hows that that country .the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . demoralization. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts.regard ed as permanent.the contrary must be the case .which should be presupposed. ¤ 529 note). By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. The so-called financial law. in arrangements for art and science.
A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal.. afresh. but only parties. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. In their mutual relations. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other .e. of the whole of the finances.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. in which there would no longer be a government. and not to be made yearly. and thus. waywardness and chance have a place. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . e.so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. In one case the . in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. or every few years. when it makes a decree about finance. i. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. and not actually existent. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute.as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state.g. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other. as content o f a true law. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power.is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. a state of war. Then again.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake.i.e. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . is really engaged with strict executive business. and becomes the estate of bravery.
it. That history. however. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. especially on the philological side. is called an a prio ri view of it. In general. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. it passes int o universal world-history. each of which. in short. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. as it is a history. both this general recognition.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations.of sacerdotal races . where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. a history of its own. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. and in Germany more than in France and England. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. internat ional law rests on social usage. As this development is in time and in real existence. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions.a world-mind. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. when we come to minutiae. etc. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. is appointed to occupy only one grade. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. of a Roman epic.the plan of Provide nce. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. there is Reason in history. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. On th is point. this note must go into further deta il. Fictions. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . It is in time. in defiance of . in short. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. and then in history.. are settled and fixed. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. and as regards its range and scope. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. an d the special claims of nations on one another. first in general.and. and on history-writing in general. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance.the judgement of the world. that. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. and above all universal history. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. which actually is and will be realized in it . It has.
and rejects both ki nds of interest. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. etc. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. a nation. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. a word. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. or. Ay. no history . even such singularities as a petty occurrence. is not only against taste and judgement. e.). such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions.e. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. but violates th e principles of objective truth. What happens to a nation . by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. but an age. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it.like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. But. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. and takes place within it.g. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. state. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties.the best-accredited history. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. on the other hand. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. not as good as a fairy tale.to say a word on that here . Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. strictly s peaking. The point of interest of Biography . It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose.appears to run . in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. as in the romance. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. i. in the interest of so-called truth. a civilization. or if he declined to judge at all. Rome and its fortunes. in striking portraiture and brevity. has. express not a subjective particularity. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. and an exclusive interest in justice. and. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. if he had not an interest. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. and criticize events.
as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. and their subjectivity. and the business of so doing. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. etc.e. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . i. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. i. are instruments. i. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. the consciousness of it. Only therefore through their relationship to it. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth.or in other words that Reason is in history . The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. if Rome or the German empire. and its content is prese .Fame. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. have they their value and even their existence. has another ground and interest than his tory. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. really. to the history of religion. 550). i. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action.e. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. the absolute L aw. in this case. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. The mere play of sentiment. as over a special grade. liberty. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. But biography too has for its background the historical world. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. which all alik e have no stuff in them. which is what is pe culiar to them. first in general. But. truth. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549.will be par tly at least a plausible faith.e. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. potentially infinite. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. on the contary. is the empty form of activity. is the supreme right. these individuals.an accurate report of externals. only opinions and mere ideas. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. a development determined by the notion of spirit. and are all treated as indifferent. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. and of its essence. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. and secondly. we may add.e. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . the freak of humour. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim.admitting. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. For Spirit is consciousn ess. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. and there fore as a work of individuals. etc. which is their reward. while it inheres in them. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . Such a doctrine .directly counter to any universal scope and aim.
stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions.Liberty. from which the start is now made. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. is the real ethical self. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. is the purification. This factor.e. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality.a mere 'ought' . and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. forme rly noticed. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. For that st arting. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. as true in the world of free will. especially ¤ 51. the idea of God it kn . the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. But .e. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. note).e. ¤ 204 not e). The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free.as is the case with all speculative process . as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. The spirit. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. i. i. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. and that on the religious. actually accomplished in the ethical world. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. As regards the 'mediation' which. however.e. Th e finite. Such apprehension. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind.consciousn ess. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. as law and duty. i.is the peculiar perversity. now gets its most concrete interpretation. in the system of laws and usages. But the spirit which think s in universal history. that elevation to God really involves. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. lays hold of its concr ete universality. i. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. At this rat e. cf. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth.
one religious and an other ethical. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality.e. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. for thought and knowledge .partly as mere moving of the lips. It lea ds to a laity.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) .of bondage. springing from some force and power. in its faith and in its con science. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. B . and law and justice. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root.addressing his devotion to miracle. first of all. i. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has.the body of religious truth. religion was a late r addition.as the one religion which secures the stability of governments.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. then there may be created. the host as such is not at first consecrated.logi cally enough . i.e. (In the Lutheran Church. i. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . but in the moment of enjoymen t. even to bones. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life.e. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth.working images. non-spirituality. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. to justification by external wo rks. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . i. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. But in poin t of form.or it may be.ows must be the true and real. differing from the former in body and value of truth. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. and superstition. And. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. in the annihilation of its externality. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. but purely subjective in individuals: . and in the act of faith. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. in point of form.e. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. on the contr ary. It leads. and ex pecting miracles from them. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. and even as mutually indifferent. morality and conscience. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. and prays others to pray . even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. and these applications of it in the religious life. generally. a condition of spiritual sla very.
and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. And instead of the vow of obe dience. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. because the state is a self-possessed. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. . and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. Instead of the vow of chastity. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. leads it into the rea l world. and. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. So long as t he form. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty.of honesty in commercial dealing. moral life in the state.in short. Let us suppose even that. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. i. the wisdom of the world. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. therefore. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality.e. which does not rise in hostility against them. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. i.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. and in a special sense Philosophy. i. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. can law and morality exist. The precept of religion. and political institutions deduced from them must be. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. Thus set free.an obedience which is itself the true freedom. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. self-realizing reason . if taken alone. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. . marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. founded on principles of reason. sti . Thus. lacked liberty. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own.e.e. our consciousness and subjectivity. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. so to speak a priori. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. unte nable. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. no matter how. and thus only. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. and in the use of property . But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). a code of law should arise. .the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence.
e. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. This additional 'individuality' . we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth .could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. etc.to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. from those deeper requirements which. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. (cf. thus surmountin . as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane.. when specially set in relief as genus. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form.ll. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . on one hand. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit.to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide.among which laws these guarantees are included. so-called 'chambers'. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. however sound their provisions may be. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness.is just this . as the universal in a mental concept or idea. on the other hand. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking.is the intellectual and thinking self.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . to put it simply. Such laws.g. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. thus founder on the conscience. that the Idea must be regent. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. and the power given them to fix the budget. or. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . At best it is only a temporary expedient . Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. . This absolute nucleus of man . ¤ 544 note).mi nd intrinsically concrete .the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists .
lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. etc. however. which still escaped his intelligence. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . But even religion. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. But thought always .through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . or essential being). the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. but earlier than philosophy. As it left therefore behind. and so also one-sided phase. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. Hence religion as such. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. ¤ 513.was that creative imagination. so .). which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. which is awa re of its own essence. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. he. exhibits the one-sidedness. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. as demoralization.so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. earlier than it does as philosophy. is implicitly in absolute liberty.the form which ph ilosophy attacked .). wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. in its philosophic phase.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. the subjectivity of mind. should knit it together and control it. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. Political power.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. religion. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . Plato. The form in its infinite tru th. intuition. is after all only in one of its form s. in its f irst immediate. on its own s howing.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. fall feeling. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. from religion. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. Religion may. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . pictorial representation. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. which is developed similarly. of philosophy. or rather must. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality.the idea of the substantial moral life. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. His state is therefore. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. Only in the principle of mind.and th at on account of this very principle . broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . for th ese reasons. Under the subjective form. as it grows and expands.
discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. Gesetz. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. Religion. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. Weltweisheit. Das aussere Staatsrecht. the constitut ion and the code. but rather to a sort of knowledge. Die Polizei und die Corporation. as always. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. Inneres Staatsrecht. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. 4. 2.e. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. i. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. In the Protestant state. 7. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth.in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. 1. 9. 6. That here. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. of God's indwelling in us. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community.as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). 8. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. while it is self-centred identity. Die Rechtspflege 5. Die Weltgeschichte 10. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. 3. Die Sittlichkeit. for which it is as substance. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. Das System der Bedurfnisse. Thus ul timately. as well as their several applications.
at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. ¤ 411). the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. the actuality of the spirit. c an. viz. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. as superseded in spirit.for the expression of spiritual truth . or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit.the form of immediacy as such . like the material which it uses to work in. In this ideal. or the idea. With the essential restrictedness of its content. On one hand. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract .He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. so that the thought embodied. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. which is only a sign of the Idea. 1. but .hence not the sp iritual unity. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. . Art requires not only an external given material . A. aware. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. reconciliation. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. But. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art.the shape or form of Beauty. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity.e. its n atural immediacy.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y.i. into the subject which produces that work. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. on the other hand.in other words. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . that is.something formal.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. has in devotion . as it is. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. and of gaining its concrete determination.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. Belief. Der absolute Geist.
and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal.stil l this art is defective. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. . Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. and of its constitution.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. and th e artist is the master of the God. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. or an effor t towards him . Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. subjectivity. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. the principle of its law. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. is not yet known. and that is where the infinite form.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. but as only finding himself in himself. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. but its inmost depth. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it.in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. not yet conscious of itself.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. assumes fuller and firmer features.can try to bring itself to consciousness. is not yet absolute. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. the artist's enthusiasm. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . as well as of its art and science. though concrete and intrinsically free. that one spirit creates and informs them.symbolic art. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. of its actual liberty. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. known as the Absolute. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. as free spi rit.
spectator find themselves at home. the theme and c entre of religion. unbeautiful sensuo usness. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical.the religion i. and brilliancy. The old conception . At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. with their perso nal sense and feeling. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'.e. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit .ent in it. from it s side. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . we see that the advent of art.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. B. shows that such religion is on the decline. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. . The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . expression. is first generated. .into revelation. Beautiful art.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. in which he had not revealed himse lf.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull.The genuine objectivity. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit.it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. and j ust for that reason. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. The older religion in which the need of fine art. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. has its future in true reli gion. revealed by God. not the supreme liberation itself. then the only thing left to constitute His nat .is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. which is only in the medi um of thought .that it be revealed. dashing t o pieces everything high and great .of Nemesis. like the religion peculiar to it. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . whose con tent is absolute mind . and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. and. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion.due to a one-sided survey of human life . has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. . Beautiful art. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. But with a further and deeper study.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. what is more. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. as infinite self-realizing form . and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. still more in that external. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. it is from Him. on the contrary.
(c) as infinite return. the spirit. but afterwards. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . it is. But. as the extreme of inherent negativity.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. first of all. abiding sel f-centred. a separate being. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. to specul ative comprehension. even in its manifestation. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. further. of the world it gave away . as in duty bound. To know what God as spirit is . (a) as eternal content.. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. by C. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. directed towards the Eternal. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. which proceeds to man's self. or of judgement. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. which is at fir st the presupposed principle.: Berlin 1829. and. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. making them presuppositions towards each other. That spirit. on one hand. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. not. Yet.just as.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. ¤ 566 In this separating. it implies the revelation of Him. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself..divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. in it s forefront. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. F. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . and phenomena which succeed each other. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. On one hand is heaven and earth.on the other hand. only standing to it in an external connection.1. G . amid that natural ness. it may almost create surprise that so many. he still remains in original identity . ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded.requires careful and thorough speculation. . however. Go d is.knowledge in God. on the other hand. which therefore is finite. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. It includes. . staying aloof and inert.of the only Son . it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. and reconciliation with the eternal being. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. again. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . the elemental and the concrete nature . in point of content. for that reas on. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. with whom. though.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection.is the Spirit. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. while in point of form he is. though different. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality .it is therefore the absolute spirit.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . when it thinks.
but even to thought. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. In this form of truth. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. If the result . and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . Irony. Die geoffenbarte Religion. Thinking. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. Further.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. eternal. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . which can make every objective r eality nought and vain.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . an object of contemplating vi sion . has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. keeps himself unchanged.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. C. gives itself direction and con tent. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. external in point of form.is taken in a merely formal. after the example of his truth. is itself the emptiness and vanity. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. in which he. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free.but the vision of implicit truth. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. his natur al man and self-will. but alive and present in the world. 1. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. Whereas the vision-method of Art. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . truth is the object of philoso phy. who as such is identified with the essence .then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. which from itself. remains master over it. and eternal spirit in itself. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding.Irony. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. From this its separation into p arts. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . on account of his immediate nature. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. he. simple. This individual. th e self-centred manifestation. and thus sensuous. contentless sense. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. so far. But. through which witness of the spirit in him. as infinite subjectivi ty. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute .and. this immediate. is not bound by it . with a temporal and external sequence. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . secondly. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. and thus. .is transplanted into the world of time.
It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. with its separ ation into parts. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . and against philosophy in general .takes. This does not prevent the spirit. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought.leaving out. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs.i. when driven to expound itself. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. finds itself already accompl ished. only looks back on its knowledge. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories.the underlying essence in all humanity . The charge of Atheism. which philosophy is. and mediates what is thus open ed out. remains identical with it. which determines itself to content. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. elevation of them into the absolute form. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. and acts inconsistently towards them. This movement. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. and s o religious. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. immediate vision and its poetry. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity.e. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality.on the other hand. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. too much for the latter. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy.('Rationalism') . a nd of logic in particular. and whereas Religion. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . of course. as also of the necessity in the two forms . and particularly of the logical form.stantial content into many separate shapes. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith.it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason.from these forms. but also criticized it. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God).which may be in both the same . By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. to be more precise still.on one hand. or. when at the close it seizes its own notion . This witness . which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy .and from a pithless orthodoxy. and this necessary as free. opens it out in mental picture.
as the most authentic statement accessible . and so .that of the Hindu to ass es. that it is treated not so much as an imputation.Everything is . it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. Amongst the abundant resources.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. every kind of piety (¤ 72) . whether higher or lower in the scale. are) . It is only his own stupidity. cows . that it has too much of him: . which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. open to our disposal on this topic. also contains the generic abs tract. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God.that of the Egyptians to the ox .each and every secular thing is God. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality.is always adora tion of an object which.all possess substantia lity. or Pantheism. It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e.which therefore it does not disparage. exclusi ve. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical.the Bhagavat-Gita. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf.of the new piety and new theology. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. from which all definite quality is excluded. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. I select . it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. its grossest shape. that. without distinction. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . most sublime. does not comprehend itself. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: .thus he understands philosophy . prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: .g. some of the most telling passage . But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. with all its absurdities.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it.(empirical things. If this theory needs no more than such a God.in the wanton assertion. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. fulfilled notion of God. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. as it stands. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact.so much so. On such a presuppo sition.or to dalai-lamas . and is therefore. God in General. we must. and amongst it s effusions. or if you will. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. in particular. are unable and unwilling to see this . but as a proved fact. if we believe them.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . or any one man. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. Piety. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism .so much so.of Pantheism. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. and form all that is definite in the divine universality. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion .that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. Without interest of its own for the concrete. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . as is well known. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. This new theology. the secularity of th ings. ¤ 71 note).
This everything. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. with a monstrous incons istency. But so little concrete is this divine unity . . is also the maddest of polytheisms. unessential existences. . but only . . The undiscerning ones. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be .' This 'All'. . Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. nothing independent]. . Hinduism.. . Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. passion. I am the taste in water. .. . the One which. . . . I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. all this is woven upon me. . 7 seqq. . is not. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. .the most excellent of everything. melt into the one Krishna. . Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. as different from that accidental. . grip.so powerless its. called Gods. . 'At the end of many lives. has the higher conception of Brahma. and the moon among the lunar mansions. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. and end of living things. which he is. but having its truth in the substance.s. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . the Everything. goodness. without essential being of its very own. and the Spinozan Substance. which Krishna calls himself. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. . and one essential amongst them. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is.that Hinduism. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). still God. . . (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. I am also the strength o f the strong. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. pp. or Indra. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. however. than which there is nothing higher. There is nothing else higher than myself. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. . from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. vanish. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. at the beginning of the pass age. . I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone.spiritual as its idea of God i s . developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. . Indra. t he pure unity of thought in itself. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me.' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. . And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. he is said to be the beginning. . even Siva.). . . is alo ne the divine and God. . I am the spring amo ng the seasons. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. . any more than the Eleatic One.'I am the self. I am life in all beings. . Even when. Among letters I am the letter A. etc. . Meru among the high-topped mountains. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. as he said before he was S iva. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . but defin ed as the 'accidental'.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. seated in the hearts of all beings. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . . besides Krishna. . everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. p. or a God besides. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. middle. . to a poly theism. . . rather. as also those proximate substantialities.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. so to speak . where the empirical everything of the world. . the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures.not everything..
after this partition. outside it . or other creature. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. when he adores the ape. the Eleatic. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. But. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. to was . The clo se of philosophy is not the place. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. whether they spring from heart. It is only the picture . even in a general exoteric discussion. on the contrary. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. and that unity described as love. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. and God everything.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. on one hand. But to go back again to the question of fact.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. and.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular. as it says. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. empirical indivi duals . in relation to the popular idea of the world. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. the all. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. and on the other. For that unity. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. That pantheism indeed . tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. as infinite from the finite.floating in the indefinite blue . e. ac osmical. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic...of the world as one thing. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. Of the oriental. If.keep its independence. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. the finite to the infinite. he is as essence parted from appearance. is identical with the world. is discarded and absor bed. we must consult th e Mohammedans.ndu. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . and of empirical secular spirit. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. especially the Mohammedan. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism.on the shallow conception of it . The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . which. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. Hin du monotheism. secondl y. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. but . to which everything is God. of the relationship of God and the world. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50.in its finest purity and sublimity. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. or Spinozist. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular.g. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. imagination or speculation. as the endless lot of empirical existence. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. and so on . But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. moreover. or. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. modes of envisaging God. as everything.
Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. the most external and the worst.g. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. a nd assert . Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism.and relation i pso facto implies unity . where they are utterly unknown. omnipresence.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. with indefinite ideas. and lose sight of the chief point of interest .and s till less take trouble about it . But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception.falsely as a fact . That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. i.that. inorganic and living . as in the physical field the physicist.and that the factor of indet erminateness . mere ide ntity.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. providence.is identity.g. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. e. and which they ascribe to philosophy. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject.te a word on what a 'notion' means. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . and that hence. it is not. in the pores of th e physicists .that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. but only the one factor of this category of relation . so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. and the empty absolute. with God's omnipresence. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity.the world as much as Go d . they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. as Epicu rus does. is what one expect s. And as in their judgement either of the two . Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest.has the same solid substantiality as the other. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters .e. the notion and content of philosophy. etc. . not the concrete unity. they import them into philosophy. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . but with concrete unity (the notion). in matters admitted to be of superior. if not even of supreme interest. I n the philosophical field they proceed. with abstract unity. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. but rather its reverse. composition. and that amongst the m there is great variety. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. But they show so little acquaintance with them . Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. however. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. when they hear of unity . depend solely on the different modes of this unity. viz.said pores being the negative. But the question is. they have laid hands on. and that it is the system of identity. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem.
shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. then. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. standing between the Mind and its essence. nor itself to something away from them and independen t .it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. i. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. which has self. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. which causes the movement and development. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . but the many-shaped modes specified. an All-one doctrine. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition.e. y . which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. on the shoulders of philosophy.their everything. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. and which is itself the way to produce it.knowing reaso n. a system of identity. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. which . making the former its presupposition. The esoteric study of God and identity. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) .the logical system. and as implicitly the Idea. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. for its middle term: a middle.by which notions are perverted into their opposite. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. sunders itself. But in ascribing to God. of which liberty is the aim. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. as of cognitions. Nature . But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. in his relation to the world. is philosophy itself. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. If statements as to facts are put forward. On account of this chorus of assertions.as the mediating agent in th e process . The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement.which. and the latter its universal extreme. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . the notion. But to put that sort of thing. as other than they.ity . so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. and notions . or as prevaricating for a purpose. the absolutely universal.it is the nature of the fact. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. not abstract unity. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. which divides itself into Mind and Nature.
. in f ull fruition of its essence. eternally sets itself to work. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind.et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. The eternal Idea.
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