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INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any
attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i
s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as
treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.
means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. as such a result. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. which is the fund amental feature of matter. ANTHROPOLOGY. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. At such a stage it is not yet mind. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. identical ideality of it all. however. and mind conceived as a thin g. It is otherwise with Mind. which is potentially all things. There. The usual answer. thus come into being. and so the self-externalism. Wherever there is Nature. have still.. perhaps. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. on the other. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself.e. and. Mind. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality.with th is proviso. where the othe . and not as the immediate or natural individual. li ght. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. as absolute negativity. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. matter is regarded as something true. in a sense. however. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'.the truth that matter itself has no truth. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. not merely lacks gravity. These 'imponderables' . in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . even the capacity of offering resistance. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. its simple 'ideal' life. whereas the 'vital' matter. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . to which they might perhaps add space and time. the soul is only the sleep of mind . a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. etc. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. indeed. i. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and.the passive of Aristotle.SUB-SECTION A. but soul. a nd the soul remains the pervading. on the one hand. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. except where. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. But not merely is it. like heat. and the only problem was how to comprehend it.
A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. re tains an abstract independence.whence Epicurus. it is a soul which feels. etc. Spinoza. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. is too abstract. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. In nations less intellectually emancipated. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. (c) Thirdly. Descartes. as so often is done. so holding. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. into the absolute syllogism. . T hus. just in proportion to his civilization. the changes of the seasons. and the periods of the day. and. and telluri c life of man. in the modes of that being. behind it s ideality a free existence: i.r is not . Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. upon it. Animals and pl ants. (b) Secondly. though his Monad of monads brings things into being.e.e. sidereal.(a) In its immediate natural mode . This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. there philosophers took God. Malebranche. feels the difference of climates. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. based upon participation in the common life of nature. its immediate being . remain for ever subject to such influences. as individualized.the natural soul. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. Hence. as an anima mundi. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. and. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material).or corporeity . The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. and always more or less. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. it may be.is moulded into it. or. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . a world-soul. disappear. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. when it presents itself as a single soul. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. with Leibniz. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. they are natural objects for consciousness. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. as in the case of Lei bniz. not. even these few and slight susceptibilities. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. on the contrary. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. But either this identity. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. as in the case of Spinoza. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. These have. and does not rise or develop into system. so to speak. described. in many case s completely. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. which only is.
physiognomy. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . And that individuality marks both the world which. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). shows. The contrast between the earth's poles. on its one side. the one permanent subject. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. widely distant from each other. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual.on a ph ysical basis. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. of families or single individuals. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. and on the other. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. and as stages in its development. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. scientific.mind wrapped up in itself. as it exists.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. bodily structure and disposit ion. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. character. and the position of the individual himself. we find it as the special temperament. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. as alterations in it. we find its diversities. on the whole. This . shows an active half. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). fancies. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). carrying out these universa . hopes. He begins with Childhood . Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. talent .the sexual relation . while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. or artistic. Thirdly. we see man in his true relation to his environment. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. fails to meet his ideal requirements.a worl d no longer incomplete. in purposes political.
each point.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity .The waking is not merely for the observer. for example.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). sleep. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. as before explained . takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. which are often addressed to philosophy: . The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. The characterization given in the section is abstract. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. although. viz. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. i n an unintelligent way. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. or self-centralized being. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. . . in the first instance. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. as already noted. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. put this question to the class of ideology. but as a return back from the world of specialization.Napoleon. and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. distinguishes itself from its mere being. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. . The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. (c) Sensibility(3) . thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined.not as a merely negative rest from it. as they may be called.
In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. fornication.g. it is true. This should hardly need enforcing. are our very own. its natural peculiarity. and religious. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. adultery. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. but treated as bel onging to its most special. godless. Another. etc. and to be as if found. the inarticulate bre athing. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. murder . One. mora l. the conscience. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. ho wever. primarily. etc. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart.identity of our self-centred being. But if put in the feelin g. just. in the feeling. and the character. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. etc. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. invested with cor poreity. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. in its own self. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. are in order to be felt. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . and is so felt. the naturally immedi ate. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. The fact that these particulars. are found by the waking soul. is what we call sensibility. belonging as it does to natural. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. not mere alterations. be it noted. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. On the other hand and conversely. evil.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . the fact is a mode of my individuality. for itself. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. and .neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. moral.set over against consciousness. mean. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. on one hand.. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. which. blasphemy. true.
the blood. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. of self.g. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations .in the system of the senses. (¤¤ 321. i ts merely virtual filling-up. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . (c) the sense of solid reality. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . set in its self-centred life. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. for example. works itself out. the soul is no longe r a mere natural. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. therefore.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. just because they are immediate and are found existing. e.and of sound.it is a soul which feels. are formed from their mental source. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . following the special character of the mental mode.e. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. to take possessi on of it. o f colours. In the usage of ordinary language. the immediacy of mode in feeling . to the character of subjectivity. distinction appears as mere variety . is to raise its substantiality. tones. smells. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. laughter. especially the passions or emotions. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). What it has to do. the centre of the 'sensible' system. (¤ 300). We should have. (b) THE FEELING SOUL .it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. ¤ 402 Sensations. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications.a psychical physiology. (¤ 317) .the senses of definite light. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. but an inward. and their corporization.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head.because in it. with its varieties of language. As sentient. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. 322). . sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. in a special system of bodily organs. sighs. with which that substance is one.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. i. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . and in this way they get quite another interpretation. the 'irritable' system. and voice in general. to realize its mastery over its own. of heavy matter.
to be defined as one of feeling . but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . it implies a want of adaptation. without existing. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. the corporeity. but a negation. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. ¤ 404 As individual. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . etc. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. although it does not exist. In the present stage we must treat. a deep featureless characterless mine. in whi ch all this is stored up. Thus in the body it is one simple. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. once mor e come to light. prima rily. to which the soul. which is disease. Some times. omnipresent unity. may again sink down. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. They were not in our possession. first. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. the content is its particular world.the existent spe culative principle. and to that world it stands but as to itself. where the real is put past . But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. the s oul is characterized as immediate. virtually retained. in sickness. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. which is at the same time its predicate. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. ideas. etc. it brings within itself. ideas and information. which repre sents it as the negation of the real.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. acquired lore. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. but only to his im plicit self. so far as that is. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal.that world being included in it and filling it up. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. thoughts. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). secondly. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). By itself. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. yet as the soul is in that content still particular .. At the present stage this singleness is. As sentient. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him.as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. in an implicit mode. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it.
fortunes. The moth er is the genius of the child. the psychical relationship. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . or virtuality. character. etc. and of character. By the self-hood of the latter it . because immediate. tal ent. not yet as its self. injuries. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. say between friends. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. his secular ideas.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. incl inations. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. whose decision is ul . What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. developed interests. of life. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. Here are two individuals. self-possessed. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . which.is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. intellige nt. but as efficiency and realized activity. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. or capac ity. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . congenital disposit ion and temperament. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it.. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). placenta. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. as it has existence of its own. not a true subject reflected int o itself.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. etc.. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. and reasonable. the single self of the two. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. principles-everything in short belonging to the character.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. idiosyncrasies. it is. controlling genius thereof. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material.a substance. etc. etc. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. self-conscious. is visibly present as another and a different individual. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. as yet nothing impenetrable. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. of the mother. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. not as a mere possibility. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. temper. as concrete subject ivity. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. and is therefore passive.
the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. intentions. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. self-possessed human being is a disease. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state.to be mere deception and impo sture. on the cont rary. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. that it is in harmony wi th the facts. educated. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. first of all call for verificati on.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . means. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. on the other hand. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism .his fun damental interests. which are also means and ends to each other. in other words.to show. To that end the phenomena. it has already been call ed his genius. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. At the same tim e. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. in which the individual here appears innnersed. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. it must be added. The facts. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. This totality forms his actual ity. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. it might seem.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. But such a verification would. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. is.
wh en it is healthy and awake. those c onnected with female development. and other diseases. reads. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. not really a 'person'.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. etc. then. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. after the downfall of the Roman republic. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. not on the spot. in its sober moods. ca pable of conveying general truths. that it is a state of passivity. in catalepsy. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. the selfless individual. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. which lead up to the result . f riends. a formal vision and awareness. is this. . This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. and hears. but it is empty. But such clairvoyance . the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. But. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own.a genius which beh olds itself. which.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. external one to another. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. . . The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . or at the approach of death. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . and character. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. for example. formed. unless by the aid of religion. on those left behind.) Compare h ome-sickness. is under a veil. (Thus Cato. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. exist for it as an outward objectivity. When the substance of both is thus made one. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives.). subject to the power of another person. smells.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. his own and that of the magnetize . subje ctive reason. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. and c ontinues to be. etc. etc. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. and the like. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. like that of the child in the womb. in whom it sees. And because it is the adult. however. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. and to know which. the magnetizer. tastes. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of.
etc. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. In considering insanity we must. or med icines for them. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. as in the morbid state alluded to. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. though all-embracing. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. the 'common sense'. it is still susceptible of disease. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. one sees and hears with the fingers. on the contrary. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. which still marks the self-feeling. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. which is no less a world of law. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. In this way it is self. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. is without any definite points of attachment . is impossible. e. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. between intelligent personality and objective world. beholds.fe eling. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. in this nominal perception. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . The purely sensitive life. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. for example.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. reasons. and hence. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. so long as we assume independent personalities. causality. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. i s just this form of immediacy. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. in its capacity as individual.r. receives. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. which.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. anticipate the full-grown an . In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. as in other cases. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. i. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. and at the same time. etc.
feeling. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. and the rest of the passions . The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. A violent. etc. however. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. that it is liable to insanity . as now regarded. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. inclination. such as vanity. and so also may the cure. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred.e. and made appear in. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. In the concrete. the self is to be stamped upon. instincts. and be a realized u niversality. as it aris es. pride. Mind as such is fr ee. so as to insert them in their proper place. the. and so makes part of the actual self. is relaxed. and it is only as a thing. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. which is there also.fan cies and hopes . etc. is undistinguis hed from them. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles..e. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). may. as something natural and existent. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. equally formal. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. mere and total. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. This humane treatment. i. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. i. passions.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. but a contr adiction in it. this life of feeling. desire. presupposes the patient's rationality. is diseased. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. i. idea. loss of health (if it were that. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. and their gratification). moral and theoretical. but only derangement.that evil which is always latent in the heart. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness.merely personal love and hatred. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease.d intelligent conscious subject. And so too the particularity is. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. as a thing.just as physical disease is not an abstract. earthly elements are set fr ee . but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. and also desires. This particular being of the soul is t . .e.. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. it would be death). it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement.
and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t.. when the co rporcity. For. dist inguishing it from itself . but still free. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. and the generation o f habit as practice. And consciousness it becomes. has been absorbed by it.itself a simple being .say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. empty space and empty time. and which still continues to exist. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. therefore. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. sleep. is reduced to unity.and becoming the 'ideal'. even in being affected by them. but the basis of consciousness. nor is absorbed in the m. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). occupied. a pure act of intuition. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. a second nature. That is to say. et c. partly only relative. and the mere substance. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. and for that reason n ot free.he factor of its corporeity. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. on the contrary. as. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. and that as a barrier for it. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. and so no longer interested. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. or dependent in regard to it. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. this being of the soul. su bjective substantiality of it . The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. of which it is the subjective substance.e. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. nature. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. weariness o . i. are only subjectiv e forms. lacking consciou sness. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . The soul is freed from them. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. so is that pure being (which. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. but has them and moves in them. because it is an immed iate being of the soul.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). Habit is rightly called a second nature. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. the one and the same. of it. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. heat. The natural qualities and alterations of age. Habit like memory. will. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence.
and particul ar. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. or skill. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. intelligence. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. or. like any other. consciousness. casual. nor an abstrac t inwardness. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. and any other purp oses and activity. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. etc.. And it is true that the form of habit.g. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. the spatial direction of an individual. this soul. and that they. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. an 'ideality' of soul . moral.e. that although the frost. nor a transient emotion or idea. which make it up. to be his as this self. acquires a strength which consists in this. etc.f the limbs. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. a particular organ of i ts organic system). then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). nor are they in conce ption rational.. sweet tastes. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. and the self-feeling as such. Thinking. and it is habit of living which brings on death. to exist as substance in its corporeity. viz. intuition. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. reflection. without an express adjustment. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. under its volitional and conceptual characters. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. but part and parcel of his being. are no longer bothered with it. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. .or the misfortune .a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness .is felt. Habit on an ampler scale. and thus to enable the soul. consciousness. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature.concentration. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. too. habit diminishes this feeling. so that when the conception (e. etc. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. re ligious. The most ext ernal of them. habit is usually passed over - . The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action.). to be made a power in the bodily part. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. whereof we sha ll speak later.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. a series of musical notes) is in me.enabling the matter of consciousness. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. if quite abstract. and especially so in the specific bodily part. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. made into an instrum ent. Even here. This is the rational liberation from them. is recollection and memory. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. etc.. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. etc. like their satisfaction. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. has been by will made a habit . is open to anything w e chance to put into it. and no other. i. his upright pos ture. cut off from action and reality.
71). a world external to it . in being related to which. unable to represent it in its actual universality.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. 4. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. as the absolut e instrument. This externality. 5. especially the hand. represents not itself. Seen from the animal world. and inexpressible a modific ation.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. and the formation of the limbs. etc. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. Empfindung. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature.. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. the upright figure in general. weeping. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. or abstract universality. absorbing it. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. Naturliche Seele. in its concentrated self. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. 2. 3. Naturliche Qualitaten. in other words. The soul. for example. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . indefinite. for the soul. Under the head of human expression are included. or the 'immediacy' of mind. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it.either as something contemptible . Plato says in the Timaeus (p. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. 1. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. and making it its own. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. In this identity of interior and exterior. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. and i s infinite self-relation. but the soul. while language is its perfect expressi on. of which it is the sign. still vainer than a signatura rerum. finds itself there a single subject. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. Die fuhlende Seele. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. 'The autho . and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. the latter subject to the former. it is related to itself. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. cuts itself off from its immediate being.laughter. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. And the human figure. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. of the mouth . This note is so slight. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self.
but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. but since reality. thus first made explicit as the Ego. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. It is of this latter. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity.e. not to the wisdom. like reciprocal dependence in general. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. Ego. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. but is implicit. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. now. 7. seem to be its own activity. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. i. as subjective reflection in itself. does not. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. something dark and beyond it.the soul's natural life . Hence consciousness. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness.the light. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. The mind as ego is essence. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. as this absolute negativity. Selbstgefuhl. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . as external to it. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality.to an equal freedom as an independent object.it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). but when he receives the inspired word. but to the foolishness of man. 6. and as such it is C onsciousness. in the sphere of essence. and . The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . 8. to it. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. is only its abstract formal ideality. Gewohnheit. which manifests itself and something else too .
or mere c ertainty. i. reflected in itself. the subject of consciousness. Spatial and temporal Singularn .e. immediate consciousness. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. to raise its self-certainty to truth. i. and that the philosophy. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself).a subject-objectivity. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite. Consciousness . The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. which is not as its own. but as poorest in thought. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). Ego. It appears as wealth iest in matter. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. (b) self-consciou sness. As against Spinozism. a thing-in-itself. in other words. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. for which ego is the object. This is sense-consciousness. with an object set against it. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. what makes the object the subject's own. and so on. the notion of mind. etc. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. The object similarl y. t heir absolute interdependence. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. an intuitive intellect. a something. being immediate. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). has emerged from Spinoz ism. an existing thing.e.as a case of correlation . an existent. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. but only as it is in reference to something else. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). first. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. a singular. and even t he Idea of Nature.. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. is further characterized a s immediately singular.to the ego it seems an alteration of the object. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. as Reason. and underived certainty of it. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58). ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. the substantial and qu alitative. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. and puts it first under the category of being.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. again.
The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . free from this negative l ink and from one another. however.a variety of relations. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. or the distinction which is none. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. the thing. The consciousness of such an object is intellect.a copy of the phenomenon. and universalities. viz. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . as we called it.). a something external to it. having passed beyond the sensible. permanent term s. reflected upon. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. and sensuous consciousness. in that manner. by being regarded in their bearings. has many properties. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . and am aware'. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. and universal. what it is in truth. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance.bet ween the individuality of a thing which. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. experiences. or as being beside and out of itself. has. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. ¤ 423 The law. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. so constr uing the object.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. wants to take the object i n its truth. Thi s inward. taken in its concrete content. as not externally different from the other. its necessity on its own part. reflected in itself. . it is related. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . of the thing is. i. but as mediated. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. and. but brought to rest and universality. is sense-perception. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. i. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. which form the alleged ground of general experience. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . on one hand. reflectional attributes. not as merely immediate. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. and not yet as external on its own part. lies im mediately in the other. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. But in this manner the interior distinction is.e. to describe the sensible. and more or less by the sciences. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. an abstract identity: on the other hand.e.between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. p. the distinction on its own part. to which. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. however. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. the one of the terms. in this case by t he Ego. 73). The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena .ess. in so far as its distinction is the inward one.
because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. being merely consumed. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. The certitude of one's self.With this new form-characteristic. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. therefore. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . and thus in it I am aware of me. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness.as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. implicit in it. in its immediacy. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. can make no resistance: the dialectic. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. on the contrary . which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. or implicitly. there is strictly speaking no object. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. in this return upon itself. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. and a desire (appetite) . Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. its satisfaction realized. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. the latter. On the external side it conti nues. or. therefore. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. this identity comes to be for the ego. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. The two processes are one and the same. and ma intains itself as such. on the whole. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. pure 'Ideality'. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. knows itself implicit in the object. nominally. To this activity the object. with the nega tion of it.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. is a singular. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. primarily describable as an individual. and itself made actual. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself.
and formation of it. In that other as ego I behold myself. and incurs a like peril for its own . the slave. we see. as the existence of hi s freedom.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. as one of two things for another. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. preservation. it. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. the slave. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. then. f rom the essential point of view (i. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. at first immedi ately. and its being for others. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. retains his single self-consciousness. however. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. w hich however is also still outside it. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. While the one com batant prefers life. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . in the service of the master. Thus arises the status of master and slave. Force. is yet. ¤ 435 But secondly. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. from one point of view. when we look to the distinction of the two. though by the abstract.t he process of recognition. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. which is the basis of this phenomenon. In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular.e. and thus give existence to my freedom. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. a suppression. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. negati on of immediacy. and the means for entering into relation with them.e consciousness of a 'free' object. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. and to exist as such for the other: . however. This other. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. must likewise be kept in life. is not on that acc ount a basis of right.for the means of mastery. works off his individualist self-will. on the ir phenomenal side. Thus the death of one. which falls on another. ¤ 434 This status. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. the outward and visible recognition). (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. Force.but only p eril. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. solves the contradiction. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . not their underlying and essential principle. in the first place. therefore rude. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me.
so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. Der Verstand. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . ego. . state. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. fatherland. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. the self-centred pure notion. Truth.the passage to universal self. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears.which is Reason.in family. love. bu t the truth that knows it. Selbstbewu§tsein. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . etc. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. idle fame. honour.consciousness. fame. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. 1. and of all virtues. aware of what it is. valour. For truth here has. 5. than they are its own thoug hts. The uni versality of reason. therefore. Reason. is Reason.f wisdom' . is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. or determinations of the very being of things. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. 4. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. Die Begierde 6. friendship. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. is now itself universal. Wahrnehmung 3. is mind (spirit). as its peculiar mode and immanent form. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness .or rather it is a difference which is none. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour.is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . whilst it signifies that the object. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality.
remembering. i. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . then its reality is that reason. though it no longer has an object.. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. viz. and which as the reality of that notion.in one word. SUB-SECTION C. which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. in thinking also and in desire and will.. therefore. desires. etc. the latter now an infinite form which is not. Die Vernunft. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. as its concept has just shown. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts.e. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. however. what is the same thing. etc. which is defined as it s notion. ideation. Mind is finite. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. PSYCHOLOGY. And it is a matter of no consequence. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . Mind. like consciousness.7. etc. it is finite by means of its immediacy. neit her subjective nor objective. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. and above the complication with an external object . it has a mode in its knowledge. Cons ciousness is finite. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion.mental vision.the former a simple immediate totality. above the material. or. restricted by that content. This. in so far as . in the soul as a physical mode. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist.apart b oth from the content. in so far as it has an object.
that aspect is twofold . Thus. viz. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness.reality of its reason. and the negative aspect of mental activity. When the affection has been rendered its own. that is.e. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. so far. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. and being a rational knowledge. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. and its activity can only have itself as aim.e. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. the mind finds in itself something which is. if we consider the initial aspect of mind.e. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. i. in so far as its existent phase. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. and to liberate itself to its elf. viz. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. and is even there a return into itself.as being and as its own: by the one. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. As the theory o f Condillac states it. equally. and make the affection subjective. to reach and get hold of itself. or. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. the na tural soul (¤ 413). it thereby reduces itself to finitude. is misconceived and overlooked. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. and are the mind's own. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. it is . i. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. Similarly. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. of comprehending itself. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. in freedom. forces. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. k nowledge. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis.
and is immediately willed. which in the first place is likewise formal . as it is said. and of the heart without the intellect . Inwards . e. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity. as r eason is concrete. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. the word. to definite and conceptual knowledge.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. which it and the content virtually is. Ou twards. which is only certitude. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. merely as facts.i. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. has a material which is only nominally such. elevates itself. while it has to do with autonomous products. and heartless intellects . and therefore a restricted content. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. along with which the content is realized as rational. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness.e. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. is thus also a reality . while the practical. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. Psychology. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality.(b) Will: practical mind. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. which is the one-sided form o f its contents.g. But as knowledge. belong to a point of view utt . A host of other phrases used of intelligence. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. This position of psychology. both for the mind as such. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. for which it gains the form of universality. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. its content is at first only its own. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. This activity is cognition. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has.. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. etc. just as they are given. and gains abstract auton omy within. and that in its empirical condition. like logic. The nominal knowledge.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. in the theoretical range. Its activity has to do with the empty form . but) enjoyment. wi th a material which is its own. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. to get at the notion and the truth. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. It is still extremely ill off.
note). Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. just so far as it realizes itself. conception. viz. Faculty. etc. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. or mind. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. conceives. is bro ught into mind. is the fixed quality of any object of thought. imagination. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. But c ognition is genuine.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other .in a word . Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . it is admitted. as non-intelligent). must lead to abandoning the effort. is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. If they are isolated. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection.erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. etc. are not isolated. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. etc.e. etc. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. if answered in the negative. however. remembrance. remembers. intuition. as it is by the same method brought into nature.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). that intuition. it . This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. cognitive conception. or makes the concept its own. imagination. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . conceived as reflected into self. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition.its out-of-selfness . etc. It is true that even as isolated (i.whi ch.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. imagines. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. by rational conception. by cognitive intuition. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. memory. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces.is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. intelligen ce.besides which it al so intuits. like power or force. conception.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . But the true satisfaction. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge).
in content and value entirely contingent. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. may just as likely be narrow and poor. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind.is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. With us. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. but rather as subject ive and private. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself.one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle.to the generalit ies of common sense . whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. that is t o say. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have .not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. this mode is simple. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. is swallowed up. Now the material. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. has the form of casual particularity .t he factor of fixing it as our own. external or internal. .the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. the mere consciousness point of view. a . as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things.his private and p articular self. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. Feeling is the immediate. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. projects it into time and space. or at least to reasons . 254).but to his feeling. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. Hence feeling.an active self-collection . The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. in t he truth of mind. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. as it were the closes t. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. with the character of something existent.
and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. as it at first recollects the intuition.the germ of the fruit. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. or. we may say. t ime. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. still continues simple. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. and received into the universality o f the ego. from the external place.e. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. and inwardly divest itself of it. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. no longer needs to find the content. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. and is arbitrary or contingent. in the way we treat. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. The representation is the property of intelligence.in a space and a time of its own. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . but stored up out of consciousness. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. the germ as affirmatively containing. which makes it its own. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. however. though intrinsically concrete. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. its when and where. which. a rec ollection of itself.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. in virtual possibility. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. as tho ught. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. with a preponderating subjectivity. isolated. yet without being in consciousnes s. . In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. i. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. for example. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ .
Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . The content reproduced. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. present also a distinction in content. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. or ide a). (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts.viz. being and universality. Secondly. comes actually into its possession. that it finds its material. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego.) . This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. In the first place. to be so and so. such as likeness and contrast. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. notion. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. under the representation (idea) with the same content. or an intell ectual category. wherea s the idea (representation). which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. But it is solely in the conscious subject. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. as a matter of fa ct. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. and an out-put from its universal m ine. by which it is authenticated. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. as a unit of intuition. has been broken up. . immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . i. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. but a being of its own institution. see Introduction to the Logic.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence.Image and Idea. the matter is entirely pictorial. at first only in space and time. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. now that it has been endued with externality. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. whatever be its content (from image.e. where it is treasured up. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. if it is to exist. as of all intelligence. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. where.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. ¤ 20 note. reason and consequence.these modes of relation are not laws. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence.in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property.. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. The image. though belonging to intelligence. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. has always the peculiarity. which is now the power over them.
are unifications of t he same factors. Another point calling for special notice is that. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. derived from some interest. a concrete subjectivity. etc. some latent concept or Ideal principle.Abstraction. this form of being. recollection. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. and becomes an i ndividuality. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference.Imagination. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . Such is creative imagination(7) . and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. or something of the sort. i. As reason. In other words. . individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. and in mechanical memory it completes. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. it is self-uttering. is derived from the data of intuition.. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. but only a nominal reason.e.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . This force is really intelligence itself . If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. which forms their connecting link. or poetical imagination . when regarded as the agency of this unification. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. These more or less concrete. Acting on this view. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. but they are 'syntheses'. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content.still lacks the side o f existence. 435). is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy.symbolic. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . so far a s it is concerned. . it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. are completely welded into one. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. to universalize it. for its ideal import is its elf. internal and external. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. is reason. one's own and what is picked up. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. allegoric.
Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . intuitions. but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. its system. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. The sign is some immediate intuition. have nothing to do with each oth er.). and even with conception and imagination.now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. somewhat immediate or given (for example. In logic and psychology. language . Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . With regard to the elementary material of language. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. This intuition is the Sign. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . etc. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality.speech and.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. e tc. Knarren. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. something accepted. since memory. but as representative of something else. But in the fusion of the two elements. and the connotation of which it is a sign..R auschen. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). whereas in the sign. out of which it forms i deas . . in the first instance. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . the colour of the cockade. Sausen. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers .there have been collected more than a hundred such words. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). ¤ 459 The intuition . a second and higher existence than they naturally possess .invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. its institution by intelligence. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. the matter of the latter is. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). It is a n image. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself.gives to sensations. conception s.in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. Such is the negativity of intelligence. strictly so-called.th at of vocal objects. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. has always to do with signs only. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. when employed as a sign. and where it is conserved. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property.
As to the formal elem ent. as many as ten a . like the Chinese. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. alphabetical writing. The study of languages still in their original state. etc. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. again. the chemical elements. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. it depends. if it be not altogether extinguished. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. they are reduced to signs. which severally receive designation. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times.e. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. the planets . are frequently changed. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. on anthropological articulation. we may touch. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. as.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. and still takes place in Canton . as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. and now that. i. In particular. as in our signs for the numbers. as regards signs for mental objects. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. It is only a stationary civ ilization. the denomination. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). tongue in each) and for their combinations. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . but. their signs in vocal language. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. i. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. only in pas sing.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language.e. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. .e. .Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. (Cf. has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. for example. palate. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. instead of n ames proper. in chemistry and mineralogy. viz. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing.). upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. i.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. on the other hand. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. W. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. and only get signification as signs.
so that. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound.nd twenty. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. learn ing to speak Chinese. in the interest o f vision. or simple logical terms. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. i. just as in modern times (as already noted. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. it is analysed. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. The European. is still for the mind simple in the name). and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. Engaging the attention of intelligence. while (with the facu . and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. This feature of hieroglyphic . instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs.is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. by speaking low and soft or crying out. as it does. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. the simple plain idea. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. . even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. Both alike require such signs. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. in the case of the Chinese Koua. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us.the name. Thus. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. peculiar to the intellect. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. of uttering its ideas most worthily . that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. in speaking. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. like alphabetic writing. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. however ample a connotation it may include. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways. the simple straight stroke.e. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . Hieroglyphics. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which.the mode. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language .
lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,
but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you
ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.
¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex
it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. namely God. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. shame. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . contentment. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. for the latter. right. in their universality and necessity.indeed infinitely so. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. but presented in its universality and necessity. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. is precisely what constitutes. we have only to deal with the selfish. The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. and duty. But as both. On the other hand. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. on the one hand.. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. in which these facts. heart. when thought. volition. wha t is the same thing.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. and precisely in that way d o they . the truth and. in their immediacy.. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. lack objective determin ation. Thus it is. Delight. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. and to discus s their content. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. and still more in mind. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. Whereas in life. etc. in its objectivity and truth. in feeling. and will. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. If feelings are of the right sort. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . can also be felt. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. law and morality. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. and thought. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect.but only in antithesis to the latter . it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law.retain a speciality of their own . like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. etc. But where the objects sought are thus casual. repentance.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. joy.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. and evil. bad. grief. we have this immanen . it is because of their quality or co ntent . the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. may be placed.
being all in one subjec t and hardly all. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. character. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . on the other. Thus.Up to what degree the good continue good. But with regard to the inclinations. be the value of tha t mode what it may. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. enjoyment . passion is neither good no r bad. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. and their truth. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. therefore. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. on one hand. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. but to ge t realized. their mutual connect ions. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. too often.on one aim and object. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. Which are good and bad? . It is on ly a dead. . and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. finds in the conformity . as rights and duties. each with its private range). The answer to the question. are infected with contingency. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. however. What are the good and rational propensiti es.his inte rests of intellect. In consequence of this formalism. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. Will.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . while. freedom are the principles of evil and pain.natural impulse and inclination. Should. is at first still a natural will. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. The will. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs.a development in which the content of autonomous . each being always in conflict to another. If the will is to satisfy itself. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. which is essentially self-d etermination.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation.and (as there are ma ny. it is pa ssion. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. as r egards the form of its content. In what way have they. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. indeed. the question is directly raised. and something inappropriate to it. first of all. admitting of gratification. ego. they. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition.an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . talent. as experience shows. subjectivity .
which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim.e. inclinations. ¤ 476 The will. and is option or choice. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. Their mutual limitation. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. They are somet imes contrasted. It is thus 'reflecting' will. on the whole to their disadvantage. without end.action loses its contingency and optionality. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. As thus contradictory. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. An action is an aim of the subject. which is just as much no satisfacti on. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . an inactive thing. and social duties. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. it is on them that the decision turns. so far as their particularity goes. i. . as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. However. either alto gether or in part. moral. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. is his interest and .his passion. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. by another. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. there would be no action at all. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action.and one satisfaction. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. the impulses. are reduced to a m ere negative. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. of a universal sa tisfaction. the free gift of nature. that finds its actualizing in the agent. this is wh at is called the interest. as the content. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. The morality concerns the content of the aim. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. as thinking and implicitly free. which as such is the universal. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . which reflection and comparison have educed. unless he had an interest in it. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. partly sacrificed to that aim directly.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. where the subject is made to close with itself. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. on one hand. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. It rea lizes itself in a particularity.
for example. now that the formalism. he h as also. fortuitousness . (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . which has its true being for characteristic and aim. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. and are constituted after its measure. or implicit Idea.e. did not have it. the will is an actually free will. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. therefore. and of which it is only t he formal activity. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. which realizes its own freedom of will. etc. only so far as it thinks itself . there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. however. is in the first instance the rational will in general. Plat o and Aristotle. that is. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. On the contrary. its very au tonomy or freedom. of the family.is matter of speculation. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. even the Stoics.an individuality. ambiguous. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. the divine min d present with him. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. aim. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. or by s trength of character. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity.e.freedom itself. and that as its very actuality. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. so that in this sphere of particular existence. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted .to be aware. education. and are without it still. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded.e. i. just because it is the very essence of mind. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. i. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). and is will as free intelligence. The Greeks and Romans. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. is actu ality. knows this its concept. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. have never had this Idea. or philosophy (. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. As abstract Idea again. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. and the abstract singleness. i. of present sensati on and volition. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. Whole continents. in religion as such . If the will. which i s pure and concrete at once.a universality which only ought to be.e . as the substance of the state. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . Africa and the East. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. he is actually free. If to be aware of the Idea . and object .sired . According to Christianity. still this very I . with freedom itself. If.it is the existential side of reason .the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. as realizing the idea.
not with laws or court s of justice. Anschauung. its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. Die Einbildungskraft. 16. Das Denken. 15. into legal. 14. Gedachtnis. 10. Der Geist 2. they would find the very substance of their life outraged.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. Die Intelligenz. and not less into scientific actuality. 9. Die Gluckseligkeit. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. Das praktische Gefuhl. Der freie Geist. 5. Vorstellung. Der praktische Geist 13. which the content and aim of freedom has.not something which they have. 7. 1.dea itself is the actuality of men . Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. 4. Auswendiges. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. is itself only a notion . but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. religious. 11. if they are made slaves. moral. 12. Inwendiges. Die Erinnerung 6. but which they are. as men. 3. but the pe rmanent character . Phantasie 8.a principle of the mind and heart. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . But this freedom. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves.
But in this individualist moral sphere.e..and aim. i. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. ought to h ave and can only have their existence.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'.. receives the form of Necessity. my right to a thing is not merely possession. their absolute unity. is a duty. and character. viz. etc. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. What is a right is also a duty. in relation to the subjective will. in these externally objective aspects. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. temper. it is a Law. to be as a person. and brings into existence i n these several wills. it exists as manner and custom. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. which splits up into different heads: viz. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. These conditi ons. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. which in it is thus at home with itself.e.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. Liberty. or Usage. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. its rights of admi nistration. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. are duties . The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse.. In the morality of the conscience. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. relation to another person . Liberty. in general. military service. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. where they. The penal judicature of a government. are its Duties. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. to administer. but as possession by a person it is property.(1) When. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. or instituted as an authoritative power. But. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. or legal possession. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. etc. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. in the light of the concept. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. on the other hand. and what is a duty. is also a right. and it is a duty to possess things as property. but in its universality. For a mode of existence is a right. private an d personal needs). is the Law (Right ) . are no less its duties to punish. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. as the services of the members of the State in dues. where free will has existence. not in the form of impulse. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. so as to become its habit. being universal. duty in general is in me a free subject . and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. and is the vi rtual universal. anthropological data (i. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). etc.at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition.
morality of the individual conscience. 1. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. or by the formatio n of the thing or. abstract right. it is the right of the subjective will. it may be. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. but as existence of the personality is an end. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. though it remains in trinsically the same. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . This thing.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. as in itself still abstract and empty. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. But this predicate. the infinite self-rela tion. possession is property. (B) When the will is reflected into self. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. But the set of adjustments. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. but on an external thi ng. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. on its own account me rely 'practical'. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. as something devoid of will. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. in the knowledge of their identity as free. Sitte A. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. and the I in it is abstractly external. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. is an individual. by mere designation of it. which is thus mutual. and hence as a single being . are simultaneously mutually independent. . which as possession is a means.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. and State. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. As so characterized. at first in the outward appropriation. These extremes are the persons who. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession.possession. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. so as to have its existence inside it. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. civil society. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. Gesetz 2. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. the external sphere of its liberty .
which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. is affirmed. and its acceptance by the other will. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. universal thing or commodi ty. but which. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). This is naiv e. I can just as well put it in it as not . eac h and all are invested with a show of right. because they face each other. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . which thus becomes wicked. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. willed.Contract. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. the only diversity lies in this.the full and complete deed. expressing the civil suit.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary.just as well with draw it as not. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. is disinterested. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. however. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. 493 seqq. and recogniz ed. and time. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. produces a wrong: by which. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. But so far as my will lies in a thing. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . which. then the external rec . ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. in that case. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. non-malicious wrong. ¤ 495 The contract. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity.). The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. its changing hands. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) .otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. and. labour.
and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. or in corporeity.where the nominal relation is retained.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. is the work of Revenge. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it.a law. by the n otion. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will .e. an d so on without end. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. The 'reality' of right. the latter is violated.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . even from the range of all existen ce. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal.punishment. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. which is nominal and recognized by him only . and while the former only is respected. This gives the wrong of fraud . being conformable to the right. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. b ut the sterling value is let slip. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. i. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. or right as governed by the nature of things. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. as a volitional and intelligent being. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. This progression.in this case the apparent recognition. The law of nature . that of the judge. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. like the last. In it the agent. and not merely the particular mode . has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. The social state. on . and commits a crime. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. To display the nullity of such an act. But more than possible compulsion is not. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. howe ver.) Thus the will is violently wicked. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . and can be seized only in t his quarter.is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. such an action is essentially and actually null.on self-determination or autonom y. is at the same time only a new outrage. sets up a law .compulsion against the thing. which is disinterested .(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. from life. is a matter of chance). in revenge. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. The former used to be the common meaning.a universal which holds good for him. i.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. But revenge. or Natural Right. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope .e.st rictly so called . and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. Conversel y. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. in which the law of nature should hold sway. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it.
it thus includes purpose and intention . Moralitat 3.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. counts only as a person. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. In point of form. who. in mere law. its own. In French le moral is opposed to le physique.a will reflected into itself so that. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. the reason of the will. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. but have their assent. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. though any alteration as such. Das Recht. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. an d allows to be imputed to it. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. Naturrecht. or even justification in his h eart. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. sentiment. which was its purpose. etc. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. conscience.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . and thus comes into relationship with the former. be its affection w hat it may. The subjective will is morally free. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. so far as these features are it s inward institution. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. 2. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. the will is at the same time made a particular. is now chara cterized as a subject . the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual.the other hand. 1. in the externality of which it only admits as its own.and also moral wickedness. embracing these individual point s. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. so much as it has consciously willed. intelligence. and willed by it. B. is its deed. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. recognition. Now. my part in i t is to this extent formal. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. This is the right of intention.
that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. but is a particul arity of his own . is not something external to him.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. they ought to stand in harmony. his interest and welfare must.ion. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. in point of its matter. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. as in happiness (¤ 479). concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. is always fundamentally one identity. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. is as g ood and as duty absolute.being only in this. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. and yet each of them. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. At the same time because good is one. it is always something particular.a universal determined in its elf .e. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. and aims. a good intention in case of a crime. whether the . interests. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. This is the right to well-being. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent.g. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. though it is a particular duty. the essential and actual good. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. because the agent. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. essential and actual. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. And yet they ought to harmonize.that it contains his needs. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. when similarly comprehended in a single aim.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. will . constitutes a peculiar world of its own . can be wicked. as individual and universal.and thus including in it particularity . it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . constitute h is well-being. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. These aims. on account of that existent sphere of liberty. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive.
partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. which would only be abstract. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. good.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . and refuse it to the wicked. THE MORAL LIFE. and the wicked. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. 4. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. in this its identity with the good. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . and of the good. on its negative side. The failure of the latter consists . and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. an aim essentially and actually null. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . Der Vorsatz 3. is abandoned. is only the infinite form. in something external therefore. the truth of this semblance. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . its deepest descent into itself.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. Das Gute und das Bose C. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. Die Absicht und das Wohl. Wickedness. and duty. non-universal. th e essential thing. no more exist than not. to be carried out in it. which has no objectivity. but is only sure of i tself.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction.the utterly abstract semblance . in the notion. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness.of Conscience and Wickedness. The for mer is the will of goodness. That. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . rising to its pitch. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. 6. The result. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. 1. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. right . appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. i . which is the good. is. This pure self-certitude. 5. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. On the affirmative side. the unutterable. The subjectivity. which actualizes and dev elops it.good is realized. expressed by this repeated ought. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good.the standpoint of the ought. Moralitat 2. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. Handlung.to a goodness. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force.
This is the sexual tie.where self-conscious liberty has become nature.Civil Society. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. as personal virtues.the Political Constitution. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. mind ap pears as feeling. temperament. as against the univers al. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life.e . manner and cu stom .The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. Thus. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond . the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is.Marriage. to destiny. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. i. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. controls and entirely dominates from within. whose independence it. it exists as confidence. But the person. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. the individuality expres ses its special character. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. as deliberate work for the community. in its ki nd. . In the latter sphere.th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust.monog . b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. . is virtue.the genuine ethical temper.the Family. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al.e. i. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. without any selective refl ection.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. that it is. In the shape of the family. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. to a spiritual significance. elevated. makes this union an ethical tie . however.n a thing . ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom.yet somewhat which without all question is. in its immediacy. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. etc. is confidence (trust) . ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. as an intelligent being. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. The ethical personality.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . however. to the total of ethical actuality. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons.
is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . In virtue of such for tuitousness. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. and thus produce more unconditional . on one hand. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . originally foreign to it. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. information. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. thus invested with independence. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. labour. or state external. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. as do also its industry. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. of legal regulation. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . as private persons. destined. being an intelligent substance. acquire an existence of their own. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity.in educating them to independent personality. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. into families or individuals. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. and care for the future. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. learning. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. however. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). of the possessor's will. to found anew such an actual family. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. while. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. ¤ 522 (3) The children. on the o ther hand. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. who exist independent and free. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. or nominal culture in general. This instrument. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. constitutes the general stock. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns.
.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . and an ensemble of contingencies. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. skill. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. Thus whether three years. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. Where civil society. to be.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. Their content per se may be reasonable . which as existence is essentially a particular. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). this analysis. or could be. 2 3/4 . they have their actual existence. The third. and like the first a certain subsistence. intelligence. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'.dependence on the social system. option. though of course only at the final points of deci ding. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. or only 2 * .which is also a general business (of the whole society) .(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . ten thalers. as vital. and so on ad infinitum. b ecause of the finitude of its materials. and industry. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. however. which is honesty. and in it they have their social moralit y. The second. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . and accident. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. 2 4/5 years. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. its action gets direction and content through natural features. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere.and ye t it should be decided. is developed i n detail. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. and a corresponding mode of labour. It is a futile perfectionism to have . certain. Hence. their recognition and their honour. at every point. in the course of definite manifestation. on the side of external existence. of mere agents. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence. also of aims and interests. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. and with it the State.the Law. exists. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. as well as of mental culture and habit . of needs. determined through reason or legal intelligence. be the righ t and just thing. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. and of means for satisfying them. talent. But when right.
of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. like improvements on a f loor or a door. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith .laws.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. the need of a simpler code . . If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos.as proven: . inasmuch as. . as in the mental ima ges of space. hereditary divinity or nobility.to be promulgated and made known as laws . The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not.vi z. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. there arises. which discovers new distinctions.the ne ed.in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated. even the admiration. however. with the advance in multitude. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. This subjective existence. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. and in particular transforms this existence . in the judicial system. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. which again make new decisions necessary.and th e cattle too . whic h are only internally in these objects. and t hus become authoritative .i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . not for them. and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. The comparison of the two species. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. to which objective existence determines i tself. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. at the same time an externally objective existence.e. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis .are governed and well governed too by laws. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. constit . of his countrymen.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. general laws. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court .as this exists as revenge .into punishment (¤ 500). as universal authority and necessity. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . by faith and trust. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. But there is a contrary case. they touch only the abstract will . To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. as it is a known law. within the house .to the individualized right . as the genuine order of life. first really de serving the name of laws.even as his law can only be a just law.which though something new. recognized. i.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. These people forget that the stars .(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . are not a new hou se. being laws o f strict right. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency.
but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. No doubt this factor is incomplete. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. . (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance.as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. . and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. shou ld. which. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. and worked from that point of view.'poli . is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. in a uniform gen eral way. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . In so far. from the c onnections between nation and nation. because it is only one factor. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. then. because it is man's want. appears as state. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. as at bottom different sides. the position of an external un iversality. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken .It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. mere circumstantial evidence. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. and their variable ingredients. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. So far as concerns them. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. so as to secure this satisfaction. Conversely. It results also from circumstances of locality. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. be exercised as different functions.and that. and the judgement as application of the law to it. to the concrete of civil society. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end.viz.
the state only is as an organized whole.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. receiving.which volition is thereby free .ce'.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . they are re strictions. self-originated.international (outer-state) law. it protects the family and guides civil society. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. then it promotes their welfare. with all its evolution in detail. also for that will being put in actuality. but which has a thoroughly general side. which. . ¤ 539 As a living mind. On the other hand. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. to the immediate agent. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. Thirdly. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions.as an actuality . First. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. Thus we have the corpora tion. and self-develop ed . ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality.into the life of the universal substance.in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . But. through the action of the government and its several branches. The same unity.co nsists in a double function. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. It provides for the reasonable will . however. which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness.one individual. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals .and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. and. is its essence. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals. The cons titution is existent justice .coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. his independent self-will and particular interest. secondly. and . (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. and not left to perish. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. First it maintains them as persons. differentiated in to particular agencies. continually produce it as their result. which each originally takes care of for himself. This universal principle. Secondly. it carries back both. s heer subjectivity. (c) THE STATE. in this direction . they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. and the who le disposition and action of the individual .the reasonable spirit of will. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. but.
is abstract subjectivity. the current notions of l . It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. that the laws rule. The laws themselve s. All men are by nature equ al. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. it embodies a liberty. and that the laws are restrict ions. etc. Rome.besides their personalit y . and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'.. As regards. the citizens .pleasure an d self-will. It is important therefore to study them closer. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. or even in crime. eligibili ty to office. skill. etc. But.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. logically carried ou t.e. As regards Liberty. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. the difference of governing powers and of governed.equal in the concrete. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). that it should be man (and not as in Greece.only it can make them . The principle of equality. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. the final aim and result of the co nstitution. etc.punishment. But the notion of liberty. However true this is. on the contrary. On the contrary. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. as it ha ppens. etc. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good .as regards taxation. is so little by nature. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. Formerl y the legally defined rights. But that this freedom should e xist. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. authorities. directories. talent. i. age. were called its 'liberties'. in other words. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. Really. on the contrary. otherwise have in property. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. etc. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). military service. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. as regards the concrete. magistracies . which it can without incompatibility allow. first. as it exists as s uch. rejects all differences. With the state there ari ses inequality.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. Nothing has become. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. or destroy them. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. etc. the familiar proposition. without further specification and development. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. . private as well as public rights of a nation. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. town . can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . physical strength. Equality. presuppos e unequal conditions.
is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. as a state without a constitution. self-w ill and self-conceit. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. and must deal with them as it ca n. The term political liberty. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. with this development of particularity. not merely with regard to the naturalness. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. however. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. just as little as the making of a code of laws. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. . the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity.) But the guara ntee lies also. If . is . and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. of others. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. The question . with its insatiate vanity. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made.that which preserves. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. has an insight and conviction of his own . and to regard a state. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions.a thing that has nev er happened in history. be it added. of liberties in general.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. i. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. But the more we fortify liberty. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. in which this is not formally done.as sec urity of property.e . as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. in other words continuall . and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. ¤ 541 The really living totality .just because of this inseparability . but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty.e. and thus gains moral independence. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions.iberty only carry us back to equality. and the organization of the actualization of them. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights.
The government is the universal part of the con stitution. and the government be merely executive and dependent . In the perfect form of the state. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. (A mistake still greater.y produces the state in general and its constitution. which includes an already existing development of differences. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. as in a democratic constitution. is the self-redintegrating notion.regarded as organic totality . ¤ 542 In the government . The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . of the family and of civil society. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. These. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs.or. equally disorganizes actuality. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. which taken apart is also particular). but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. is the state one.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. all-decreeing will of the state.) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization.monarchy. as always. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity.e.the will of a decreeing individual.to make it the first power. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. . But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . but an actual indiv idual . presupposes ignorance that the true idea. in other words.su bject always.in a state of society. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. as in the patri archal society . is the government.e.the all-sustaining. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence.impugns the principle of the division of powers. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. i. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. i. . Only through t he government. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. the participation of all i n all affairs . however.
essentially. The division of constitutions into democracy. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. first. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. to that end and for that reason. involve the. aristocracy and monarchy. . can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . The pure forms . These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. legislative power. and then of nature . and secondly the form in which it is act ualized.in short.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . it may be . The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. Thus.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government. in the history of the State. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty. civil society.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. participate in the governmental power. with its industry and i ts communities.such as ochlocracy. which having their busin ess appointed by law. as it were.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general .e. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. Two points only are all-important. and skill for such ends. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. aptitude.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. and with earlier transition-forms. an actual existence.'ideal' unity. For it is as private persons t . to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused.partly. and above all personal liberty. and are to that degree private person s. especially in legislation . possess independence of a ction. That subjectivity . and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . to subjectivity. etc. Secon dly. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. with their general opinion. too. lik e peace and war.. the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined).oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . These principles are those expounded earlier. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit .as also feudal monarchy. being simple self-relation. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing .are. liberty of property. admini stration of justice or judicial power.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. there arises the participation of several in state-business. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. i.viz.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. administration and police. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors.
The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. in the law and liberty of property. like that of the stormy. indeed the whole. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. as the nation . is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. in the general sense of embracing a wide. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. is no t self-destructive. and therefore more urgent. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. but as organic factors. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. Take the case of England which.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. s ense of general wants. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. so far as they form only one branch of that power .e. The des irability of such participation. in arrangements for art and science. that t hey enter upon that participation. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. The so-called financial law. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. however. i.regard ed as permanent. moreover. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . as estates. to power and act ion. legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws.which should be presupposed. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. elemental sea. ¤ 529 note). has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). as such an aggregate. wild. inorganic shape. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. ever newly recurring. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. In a civilized state.as it very likely is .would be. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . demoralization. which. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. If the main part of the requirement were . who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights.the contrary must be the case . brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. or in its 'reflectional' universality. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. be they treated as mere individuals. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen. it is not a brutish mass. blind force. range of the extern al means of government. and form a particular kind .a spiritual element . Experience s hows that that country . acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. however.as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation.
To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other.g.i. In their mutual relations.as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. i..with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive .is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. Then again. in which there would no longer be a government. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. and thus. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. of the whole of the finances.so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . but only parties. waywardness and chance have a place. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. when it makes a decree about finance. and not actually existent. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. or every few years. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. In one case the . are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. and not to be made yearly. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. and becomes the estate of bravery. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. a state of war. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake.e. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely.e. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . afresh. e. as content o f a true law. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. is really engaged with strict executive business.
however. is called an a prio ri view of it. In general. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. As this development is in time and in real existence. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. of a Roman epic. That history. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted.and. in short. It is in time.a world-mind. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. On th is point. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. is appointed to occupy only one grade. in short. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. both this general recognition. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary.. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. internat ional law rests on social usage. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . It has. and in Germany more than in France and England. it. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. that. a history of its own. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . etc. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. Fictions. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. especially on the philological side. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. it passes int o universal world-history. as it is a history.the judgement of the world. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome.the plan of Provide nce. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. an d the special claims of nations on one another. and then in history.of sacerdotal races . the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. and as regards its range and scope. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. first in general. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. when we come to minutiae. and accomplish one task in the whole deed.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. which actually is and will be realized in it . the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. and above all universal history. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. and on history-writing in general. this note must go into further deta il. are settled and fixed. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. in defiance of . and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. each of which. there is Reason in history.
and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. or. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. The point of interest of Biography . if he had not an interest.). e. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions.like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. and takes place within it. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. a word. state. a civilization. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. Rome and its fortunes. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. and rejects both ki nds of interest. But. i.to say a word on that here . Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. has. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. on the other hand. Ay. in striking portraiture and brevity.appears to run . It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. not as good as a fairy tale. and an exclusive interest in justice. but an age. What happens to a nation . Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. but violates th e principles of objective truth. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. etc. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. and. strictly s peaking. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. and criticize events. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. no history . in the interest of so-called truth. even such singularities as a petty occurrence.g. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear.e. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. a nation. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. express not a subjective particularity. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. is not only against taste and judgement.the best-accredited history. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. or if he declined to judge at all. as in the romance. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance.
liberty. as over a special grade. which is their reward. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. while it inheres in them.admitting. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. really. if Rome or the German empire. in this case. But.e. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . For Spirit is consciousn ess. the consciousness of it. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme.e. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. which is what is pe culiar to them. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. The mere play of sentiment. i. and of its essence. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it.or in other words that Reason is in history . and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. the freak of humour. and secondly. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. first in general. have they their value and even their existence. has another ground and interest than his tory. potentially infinite.e. are instruments. to the history of religion. the absolute L aw. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. only opinions and mere ideas. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. But biography too has for its background the historical world. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages.e. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . etc. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. and its content is prese . As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. these individuals. etc. Only therefore through their relationship to it. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. and there fore as a work of individuals. a development determined by the notion of spirit. Such a doctrine . The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will.an accurate report of externals. on the contary. 550). and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. i. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . is the supreme right. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. is the empty form of activity. which all alik e have no stuff in them. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. and the business of so doing. i. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). i. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. we may add.Fame. truth. and their subjectivity. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. and are all treated as indifferent. partly it is a cognition of philosophy.
whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. now gets its most concrete interpretation. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence.is the peculiar perversity. as it has been already shown (¤ 192.e. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. as law and duty. however. and that on the religious. from which the start is now made. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate .e. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. i. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. cf. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. This factor.a mere 'ought' . ¤ 204 not e). At this rat e. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. as true in the world of free will. the idea of God it kn .e. forme rly noticed. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic.consciousn ess. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. But the spirit which think s in universal history. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. i. But . and here in mind is also kn own as its truth.Liberty. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. actually accomplished in the ethical world. Th e finite. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free.e. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . is the purification. i. is the real ethical self. Such apprehension. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. in the system of laws and usages. i. note). lays hold of its concr ete universality. As regards the 'mediation' which. For that st arting. The spirit. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. especially ¤ 51. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. that elevation to God really involves.as is the case with all speculative process .point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality.
Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised .of bondage. in point of form. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts.the body of religious truth. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. religion was a late r addition. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. on the contr ary. springing from some force and power. one religious and an other ethical.working images. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . then there may be created.as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. even to bones. first of all. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. i. generally. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. morality and conscience. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . But in poin t of form.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. and these applications of it in the religious life. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . i. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. and prays others to pray . and superstition. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. It leads. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. a condition of spiritual sla very. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another.or it may be.e. the host as such is not at first consecrated. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth.partly as mere moving of the lips. receiving its knowledge of divine truth.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. but in the moment of enjoymen t. And. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. for thought and knowledge . This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. in its faith and in its con science.e. to justification by external wo rks. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. and even as mutually indifferent. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God.logi cally enough . differing from the former in body and value of truth. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality.e. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. and in the act of faith. and law and justice. (In the Lutheran Church. non-spirituality. but purely subjective in individuals: .) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . i. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state.addressing his devotion to miracle. B . All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. in the annihilation of its externality.ows must be the true and real. It lea ds to a laity. i. and ex pecting miracles from them. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others.e.
A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. sti . and in the use of property . founded on principles of reason. therefore. no matter how. self-realizing reason . 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. Thus set free. moral life in the state.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. and in a special sense Philosophy. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. and thus only.e. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. so to speak a priori. Instead of the vow of chastity.e. The precept of religion. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. because the state is a self-possessed. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state .ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. the wisdom of the world. which does not rise in hostility against them. if taken alone. leads it into the rea l world. and. And instead of the vow of obe dience. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. i. Thus. . whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. .in short.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality.of honesty in commercial dealing.e. i. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world. So long as t he form. and political institutions deduced from them must be.an obedience which is itself the true freedom. . lacked liberty. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. can law and morality exist. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. unte nable.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. Let us suppose even that. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. i. a code of law should arise. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. our consciousness and subjectivity. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life.
ll. or. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. etc. e. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. Such laws. At best it is only a temporary expedient . to put it simply. that the Idea must be regent.g.among which laws these guarantees are included. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. on the other hand. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth .could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. however sound their provisions may be. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought .is the intellectual and thinking self. on one hand.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves.to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content.mi nd intrinsically concrete .is just this . t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. This additional 'individuality' . that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. .. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. This absolute nucleus of man . and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy.to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. and the power given them to fix the budget. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea .t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. (cf. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind. so-called 'chambers'. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. thus surmountin . The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. ¤ 544 note). To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. thus founder on the conscience. from those deeper requirements which. when specially set in relief as genus.
Under the subjective form. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. Plato. in its philosophic phase. is after all only in one of its form s. he. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. in its f irst immediate. which is developed similarly. But even religion. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. so . and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . Hence religion as such. which still escaped his intelligence.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality.).through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. fall feeling. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. religion. But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. the subjectivity of mind. for th ese reasons. earlier than it does as philosophy. ¤ 513. Political power. as it grows and expands.each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth.was that creative imagination. etc. But thought always . and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. is implicitly in absolute liberty. of philosophy. from religion. Religion may. Only in the principle of mind.and th at on account of this very principle . which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. as demoralization.the idea of the substantial moral life. His state is therefore. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. and so also one-sided phase. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality.so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists .). a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. but earlier than philosophy. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. however. pictorial representation. or essential being). intuition. exhibits the one-sidedness.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. The form in its infinite tru th. on its own s howing. As it left therefore behind. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. or rather must. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . which is awa re of its own essence. should knit it together and control it. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize.
i.as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. Die Rechtspflege 5. 9. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. Die Polizei und die Corporation. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. the constitut ion and the code. In the Protestant state. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. Inneres Staatsrecht. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. Das aussere Staatsrecht. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). while it is self-centred identity. 1. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. 8. as always. 3. for which it is as substance. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit.in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. Die Sittlichkeit. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. 6. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. Thus ul timately. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . but rather to a sort of knowledge. 2. Weltweisheit. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. Das System der Bedurfnisse. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . Religion. of God's indwelling in us. 4. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion.e. Die Weltgeschichte 10. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. 7. That here. as well as their several applications. Gesetz.
Belief. like the material which it uses to work in. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. that is. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. as superseded in spirit.e.hence not the sp iritual unity. the actuality of the spirit. aware. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. But. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . on the other hand. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. which is only a sign of the Idea. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . On one hand. With the essential restrictedness of its content. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. Der absolute Geist. Art requires not only an external given material . ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. but . that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. and of gaining its concrete determination. c an. so that the thought embodied. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. into the subject which produces that work.for the expression of spiritual truth . its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit .the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . its n atural immediacy.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf.the shape or form of Beauty. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . In this ideal. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness.in other words. . when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. ¤ 411).passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art. or the idea.the form of immediacy as such . A.something formal. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. has in devotion .n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. viz.i.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . reconciliation. 1. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. as it is.
which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. as free spi rit. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. the principle of its law. though concrete and intrinsically free. subjectivity. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency.in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. as well as of its art and science. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. is not yet absolute. That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. and that is where the infinite form. known as the Absolute.can try to bring itself to consciousness. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . the artist's enthusiasm. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. or an effor t towards him . and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. assumes fuller and firmer features. that one spirit creates and informs them.stil l this art is defective.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. not yet conscious of itself. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. and of its constitution. its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history.symbolic art. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. . and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. is not yet known. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . of its actual liberty. but its inmost depth. but as only finding himself in himself. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. and th e artist is the master of the God. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness .
looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. on the contrary. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. Beautiful art. from it s side. whose con tent is absolute mind . in which he had not revealed himse lf. not the supreme liberation itself. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . Beautiful art. it is from Him. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. revealed by God. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. the theme and c entre of religion.is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. . and brilliancy.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . what is more. The old conception . .e. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. The older religion in which the need of fine art.The genuine objectivity. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'.due to a one-sided survey of human life . as infinite self-realizing form . . and.the religion i. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. like the religion peculiar to it. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious. we see that the advent of art. B. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation.ent in it. But with a further and deeper study. expression. still more in that external. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. with their perso nal sense and feeling. and j ust for that reason.of Nemesis. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. has its future in true reli gion.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit.that it be revealed. shows that such religion is on the decline. which is only in the medi um of thought . ¤ 563 Beautiful Art.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. spectator find themselves at home. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. unbeautiful sensuo usness.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. is first generated. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence .it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. dashing t o pieces everything high and great .into revelation. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed.
it may almost create surprise that so many. making them presuppositions towards each other. as in duty bound.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. F. the spirit. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God.it is therefore the absolute spirit. to specul ative comprehension. further. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . directed towards the Eternal. . the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. in it s forefront. first of all. however. and reconciliation with the eternal being.of the only Son . but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od.1. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. but afterwards. and phenomena which succeed each other. on the other hand. Yet. only standing to it in an external connection. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. by C.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. ¤ 566 In this separating. he still remains in original identity . in point of content. when it thinks. though different. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . (c) as infinite return. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. which is at fir st the presupposed principle.on the other hand. it implies the revelation of Him. On one hand is heaven and earth. a separate being.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . it is.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing.. abiding sel f-centred. for that reas on.: Berlin 1829. or of judgement. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. with whom. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . Go d is.requires careful and thorough speculation. staying aloof and inert. of the world it gave away . amid that natural ness.just as. G . That spirit.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. as the extreme of inherent negativity. (a) as eternal content. again. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. not. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. standing in action an d reaction with such nature.knowledge in God.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. which proceeds to man's self. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. while in point of form he is. even in its manifestation. and. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. The eternal 'moment' of mediation .the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . the elemental and the concrete nature . It includes. on one hand. But. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content..is the Spirit. which therefore is finite. To know what God as spirit is . though. .
This individual. with a temporal and external sequence. Irony. but even to thought. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result .and. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. In this form of truth. truth is the object of philoso phy.is transplanted into the world of time. an object of contemplating vi sion . and eternal spirit in itself. But. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. and thus sensuous.is taken in a merely formal. secondly. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. his natur al man and self-will. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. Whereas the vision-method of Art. remains master over it.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. gives itself direction and con tent.but the vision of implicit truth. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. after the example of his truth. through which witness of the spirit in him. 1.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. and thus. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . as infinite subjectivi ty. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. Thinking. Die geoffenbarte Religion. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. this immediate. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. keeps himself unchanged.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . If the result . . which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . on account of his immediate nature. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. but alive and present in the world. external in point of form. which from itself. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . is not bound by it .where the spirit closes in unity with itself . th e self-centred manifestation.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. is itself the emptiness and vanity. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. so far. he. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. eternal. From this its separation into p arts.Irony. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. in which he. Further. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . simple. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit. C. who as such is identified with the essence . contentless sense. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other.
wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. and this necessary as free.e. with its separ ation into parts. The charge of Atheism.which may be in both the same . but also criticized it. a nd of logic in particular. and mediates what is thus open ed out.takes.the underlying essence in all humanity . from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. to be more precise still.and from a pithless orthodoxy. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . immediate vision and its poetry. too much for the latter. and acts inconsistently towards them. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs.from these forms. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . and whereas Religion. This movement. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. This witness .on the other hand. as also of the necessity in the two forms . even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. when at the close it seizes its own notion . of course. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. or.stantial content into many separate shapes. remains identical with it. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained.on one hand. elevation of them into the absolute form. only looks back on its knowledge. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. when driven to expound itself.i. finds itself already accompl ished. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. which determines itself to content. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge .leaving out. which philosophy is. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies.it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. opens it out in mental picture. This does not prevent the spirit. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . and particularly of the logical form. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative.('Rationalism') . Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. and s o religious. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. and against philosophy in general .
which therefore it does not disparage. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. I select . The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. also contains the generic abs tract. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. Without interest of its own for the concrete. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. but as a proved fact. if we believe them. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical.the Bhagavat-Gita.thus he understands philosophy .so much so.each and every secular thing is God. without distinction. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics.Everything is .that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature.of Pantheism. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . Amongst the abundant resources. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. or Pantheism. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. that it has too much of him: . we must. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism.so much so. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. and amongst it s effusions. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. and is therefore.(empirical things.that of the Egyptians to the ox . On such a presuppo sition. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. ¤ 71 note). It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. are) .is always adora tion of an object which.of the new piety and new theology. If this theory needs no more than such a God.or to dalai-lamas .(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it.that of the Hindu to ass es.as the most authentic statement accessible . all such definiteness is only the non-divine. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. open to our disposal on this topic. exclusi ve. some of the most telling passage . as is well known. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. as it stands. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . in particular. from which all definite quality is excluded. This new theology. fulfilled notion of God.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy.g. whether higher or lower in the scale. or any one man. God in General. most sublime. or if you will. are unable and unwilling to see this . every kind of piety (¤ 72) . and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. its grossest shape. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being.all possess substantia lity. and form all that is definite in the divine universality. the secularity of th ings. and so . had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. cows . does not comprehend itself.in the wanton assertion. It is only his own stupidity. Piety. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. that. with all its absurdities. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness.
is alo ne the divine and God. as he said before he was S iva. . so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . . p. . . which Krishna calls himself. vanish. The undiscerning ones. . without essential being of its very own. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. . . Hinduism. passion. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. pp. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . . the One which. . But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. . Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . Indra. .' Even in these totally sensuous delineations.so powerless its. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. goodness. . Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. This everything. or Indra. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. is also the maddest of polytheisms. . 7 seqq. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. I am the taste in water. has the higher conception of Brahma. at the beginning of the pass age.' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. . .. . Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is.s. and the moon among the lunar mansions. There is nothing else higher than myself. he is said to be the beginning. But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) .' This 'All'. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. .that Hinduism. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. and end of living things. . . I am "Om" in all the Vedas. I am life in all beings. but only . the Everything. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. . But so little concrete is this divine unity . Meru among the high-topped mountains. . .the most excellent of everything. . not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. etc. still God. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. . is not. . called Gods. developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. . this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. rather. as different from that accidental. with a monstrous incons istency.'I am the self. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. . . . unessential existences. nothing independent]. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism.).. Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. and one essential amongst them. any more than the Eleatic One. . where the empirical everything of the world. Among letters I am the letter A. 'At the end of many lives. all this is woven upon me. seated in the hearts of all beings.spiritual as its idea of God i s . I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings . but having its truth in the substance. melt into the one Krishna. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. . . . . . That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. grip. . darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. even Siva. which he is.not everything. so to speak .. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). t he pure unity of thought in itself. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. to a poly theism. besides Krishna. than which there is nothing higher. middle.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. Even when. I am also the strength o f the strong. however. I am the light of th e sun and the moon. and the Spinozan Substance. . as also those proximate substantialities. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. or a God besides.
moreover. he is as essence parted from appearance. and on the other.. after this partition. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular. especially the Mohammedan. That pantheism indeed .(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. when he adores the ape. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. or. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. as everything. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. modes of envisaging God. or Spinozist. or other creature.in its finest purity and sublimity. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. but . we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. and of empirical secular spirit. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. If. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. and. e. Of the oriental. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. in relation to the popular idea of the world. But. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. the all. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. whether they spring from heart. the Eleatic.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception.. is discarded and absor bed.on the shallow conception of it . to was . on one hand.ndu. the finite to the infinite. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. and so on . The clo se of philosophy is not the place. of the relationship of God and the world. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. which. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail.keep its independence.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. on the contrary. But to go back again to the question of fact. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. as it says. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation.floating in the indefinite blue . as the endless lot of empirical existence. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. outside it . in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. to which everything is God. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. imagination or speculation.g. we must consult th e Mohammedans. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. secondl y. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. even in a general exoteric discussion. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. empirical indivi duals . is identical with the world. Hin du monotheism. It is only the picture . For that unity.of the world as one thing. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. ac osmical. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. and that unity described as love. and God everything. as infinite from the finite. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given.
a nd assert . who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . if not even of supreme interest. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . as Epicu rus does. with indefinite ideas. composition. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction.is identity.e. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. but only the one factor of this category of relation . and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. and that amongst the m there is great variety. they have laid hands on. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified.and relation i pso facto implies unity . so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world.g. omnipresence.and s till less take trouble about it . And as in their judgement either of the two .falsely as a fact . That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness.te a word on what a 'notion' means. depend solely on the different modes of this unity.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. But they show so little acquaintance with them . and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. viz. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d.said pores being the negative.and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. perhaps under the more familiar names of e.has the same solid substantiality as the other. as in the physical field the physicist. but with concrete unity (the notion). something supposed to exist beside the material reality. the notion and content of philosophy. in the pores of th e physicists . in matters admitted to be of superior. and which they ascribe to philosophy. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. with abstract unity. it is not. and the empty absolute. .that. providence. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. not the concrete unity. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result.and that the factor of indet erminateness .the world as much as Go d . where they are utterly unknown. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. mere ide ntity. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. But the question is.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . and that hence. is what one expect s. and that it is the system of identity. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. the most external and the worst.g. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. they import them into philosophy. etc.that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. with God's omnipresence. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. inorganic and living . the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. i. however. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. I n the philosophical field they proceed. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. and lose sight of the chief point of interest . but rather its reverse. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. e. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. when they hear of unity .
only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor.e. nor itself to something away from them and independen t .ity . i. and which is itself the way to produce it. or as prevaricating for a purpose. making the former its presupposition. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . But to put that sort of thing. but the many-shaped modes specified. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. and the latter its universal extreme. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. the absolutely universal. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. then.by which notions are perverted into their opposite. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. which . so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . is philosophy itself. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. as other than they. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. for its middle term: a middle. a system of identity. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. But in ascribing to God. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism.as the mediating agent in th e process .knowing reaso n.it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. On account of this chorus of assertions. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . which has self.which. The esoteric study of God and identity. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. standing between the Mind and its essence.the logical system. the notion. on the shoulders of philosophy. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity.their everything. and as implicitly the Idea. sunders itself. not abstract unity. which causes the movement and development. as of cognitions. an All-one doctrine.it is the nature of the fact. in his relation to the world. y . and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. If statements as to facts are put forward. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. Nature . of which liberty is the aim. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. and notions . now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. which divides itself into Mind and Nature.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there .
et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. The eternal Idea. eternally sets itself to work. in f ull fruition of its essence. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. .
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