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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

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Instructions 5 

Case Digest Format 5 

PART ONE 6 

I. General Provisions 6 

A. Rule 128 6 

Cases: 6 
(1) Knapp v. State, 79 N.E. 1076 (1907) 6 
(2) State v. Ball, 339 S.W. 2nd 783 (1960) 7 

B. Rules of Exclusion 9 

a) §2-3, Constitution Art. III 9 

b) §12, Constitution Art. III 9 

c) §17, Constitution Art. III 9 

d) §201, Tax Reform Act of 1997 9 

e) R.A. 4200, Anti-Wiretapping Law 9 

f) R.A. 1405, Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits 9 

g) R.A. 6426, FCD Act of the Philippines 9 

Cases: 9 
(1) Mamba v. Garcia, 359 SCRA 426 (2001) 9 
(2) Marquez v. Desierto, 359 SCRA 772 (2001) 11 
(3) Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, 509 SCRA 190 (2006) 13 

II. What need not be proved (Rule 129) 14 

A. Judicial Notice (§1-3, Rule 129) 14 

Cases: 14 
(1) Manufacturers Hanover Trust v. Guerrero, 397 SCRA 709 (2003) 14 
(2) Pigao v. Rabanillo, 488 SCRA 546 (2006) 15 
(3) BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. CTA, 330 SCRA 507 (2000) 18 
(4) Land Bank v. Yatco Agriculture Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, 15 January 2015 18 
(6) Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, 13 December 2011 22 
B. Judicial Admissions 25 

a) §4, Rule 129 25 

b) § 8, Rule 10 25 

c) §1-4, Rule 26 25 

d) Arts. 12 and 2035, Civil Code 25 

e) Arts. 48 and 60, Family Code 25 

f) §2, Rule 118 25 

Cases: 25 
(1) Herrera-Felix v. Court of Appeals, 436 SCRA 87 (2004)- Galacio, Ellah 25 
(2) Heirs of Pedro Clemeña v. Heirs of Irene Bien, 501 SCRA 405 (2006) 27 
(3) Luciano Tan v. Rodil Enterprises, 511 SCRA 162 (2006) 28 
(4) Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596 (1997) 31 
(5) People v. Lacson, 413 SCRA 20 (2003) 35 
(6) Dimaguila v. Monteiro, 314 SCRA 565 (2014) 35 

III. Rules of Admissibility (Rule 130) 36 

A. Object Evidence 36 

Cases: 36 
(1) Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995) [cf. § 1, Rule 11 of Rules of Electronic Evidence] 36 
(2) People v. Rullepa, 398 SCRA 567 (2003) 41 

B. Documentary Evidence 43 

Case: 43 
(1) Yap v. Inopiquez, Jr., 403 SCRA 141 (2003) 43 

1. Best Evidence Rule ( §3-8, Rule 130) 46 

a) E-Commerce Act, §10 46 

b) Rules on Electronic Evidence Rules 2(h), 3, and 4 46 

Cases: 46 
(1) Consolidated Bank v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., 465 SCRA 117 (2006) 46 
(2) Lee v. People, 440 SCRA 662 (2004) 48 
(3) Citibank, N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, 411 SCRA 577 (2003) 48 
(5) Vila Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845 (1968) 51 
(6) Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, 77 SCRA 24 (1977) 53 
(7) Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 272 (2004) 54 
(8) Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, G.R. No. 171701, 8 February 2012 56 

2. Parol Evidence Rule (§9, Rule 130) 56 

a) Express trusts on immovables (Art. 1443, Civil Code) 56 

b) Statute of Frauds (Arts. 1403 and 1405, Civil Code) 56 

Cases: 56 
(1) Financial Building Corporation v. Rudlin, G.R. No. 164186, 4 October 2010 56 
(2) Palanca v. Fred Wilson & Co., 37 Phil. 506 (1918) 56 
(3) Maulini v. Serrano, 28 Phil. 640 (1914) 58 
(4) Woodhouse v. Halili 93 Phil. 526 (1953) 60 
(5) Land Settlement Development Corp. v. Garcia Plantation Co., Inc., 7 SCRA 750 (1963) 60 
(6) Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos 50 Phil. 387 (1927) 63 
(7) Philippine National Railways v. CIR of Albay, Br. I, 83 SCRA 569 (1978) 65 
(8) Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 328 (2004) 67 
(9) Baluyot v. Poblete, 514 SCRA 370 (2007) 67 
(10) Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta, G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011 67 
(11) Lechugas v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 335 (1986) 68 
(12) Inciong v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 578 (1996) 71 

3. Interpretation of Documents (§§10-19, Rule 130) 71 

C. Testimonial Evidence 71 

1. Qualifications of Witnesses (§20, Rule 130) 71 

a) Art. 821, Civil Code 71 

b) §17, Rule 119, Rules of Court 71 

Case: 71 
(1) Recto v. Republic, 440 SCRA 79 (2004) 71 

2. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity (§21, Rule 130) 71 

a) §6 of Child Witness Rule 71 

Cases: 71 
(1) People v. Deauna, 386 SCRA 136 (2002) 71 
(2) People v. Macapal, Jr., 463 SCRA 387 (2005) 71 
(3) People v. Santos, 501 SCRA 325 (2006) 71 

3. Marital Disqualification (§22, Rule 130) 71 

Cases: 71 
(1) Lezama v. Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166 (1968) 71 
(2) Alvarez v. Ramirez, 473 SCRA 72 (2005) 73 

4. Dead Man’s Statute (§23, Rule 130) 73 

Cases: 73 
(1) Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 (1927) 73 
(2) Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 (1949) 73 
(3) Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622 (1955) 75 
(4) Asturias v. Court of Appeals, 9 SCRA 131 (1963) 75 
(5) Guerrero v. St. Claire’s Realty & Co., 124 SCRA 553 (1983) 75 
(6) Razon v. IAC, 207 SCRA 234 (1992) 77 
(7) Sunga-Chan v. Chua, 363 SCRA 249 (2001) 80 
(8) Zeigler v. Moore, 75 Nev. 91 335 P2d S. 425 (1959) 80 

5. Privileged Communication (§24, Rule 130) 80 

a) Marital Communications Cases: 80 

Cases: 80 
(1) United States v. Antipolo, 37 Phil. 726 (1916) 80 
(2) People v. Carlos, 47 Phil 626 (1925) 82 
(3) Zuleta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, 20 February 1996 82 
(4) People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947) 82 
(5) Lacurom v. Jacoba, 484 SCRA 206 (2006) 82 

b) Attorney-Client Privilege 82 

Cases: 82 
(1) Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., 46 Phil. 938 (1924) 82 
(2) Orient Insurance v. Revilla, 54 Phil. 919 (1930) 86 
(3) Upjohn Company v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383 (1981) 86 
(4) People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997) 86 
(5) Mercado v. Vitriolo, 459 SCRA 1 (2005) 86 
(6) Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 124 (1996) 86 

c) Physician - Patient Privilege 86 

—See also Rule 28— 86 

Cases: 86 
(1) Lim v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 273 (1992) 86 
(2) Krohn v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146 (1994) 88 

d) Priest/Minister - Penitent Privilege 88 

e) State Secrets 88 


(1) Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 (1986) 88 
**See §16, R.A. 7653 (New Central Bank Act) 88 
(2) Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006) 88 

f) Parental and Filial Privilege (§25, Rule 130) 90 

(a) Art. 215, Civil Code 90 

Case: 90 
(1) People v. Invencion, 398 SCRA 592 (2003) 90 

g) Newsman’s Privilege (See R.A. No. 53, as amended by R.A. 1477) 90 

Case: 90 

(1) In the Matter of Farber, 394 A.2d 330 (1978) 90 

h) Trade Secrets 90 

Case: 90 
(1) Air Phil Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc. (13 December 2007) 90 
 

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Instructions 
1. Look for your assigned case title from the table of contents. 
2. Click the link to go to the page. 

 
3. Copy and paste your digest below the case title. 
 
NOTE: Do not edit the table of contents. 

Case Digest Format  


● Your Name  
● Legend of Characters  
(i.e. X = Petitioner’s name; Y = Respondent’s name) 
● Bar Question 
● Suggested Answer 
 

PART ONE 

I. General Provisions 

A. Rule 128 

Cases: 

(1) Knapp v. State, 79 N.E. 1076 (1907) 


 
Amanense, Bryan 
 
BAR EXAM QUESTION: 
 
Knapp killed a deputy sheriff who attempted to arrest him and claimed that he murdered in 
self-defense.  
 
In trying to prove that he killed the victim in self-defense, Knapp testified that he had heard a 
story that the victim, who was a police officer, clubbed and seriously injured an elderly man while 
in the process of arresting him. When asked, Knapp could not recall who told him the story. 
 
The prosecutor then submitted evidence that the elderly man had actually died of senility and 
alcoholism and had no violent marks on his body when he died. The trial court admitted this 
evidence and convicted Knapp of murder. Knapp appealed his case and claimed that the real 
issue was whether he had heard that the deputy had killed the elderly man. 
 
Is the trial court correct in convicting Knapp? 
 
RULING: 
 
Yes. 
 
According to the rules, evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends 
in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. 
 
In this case, Knapp claimed that he had heard that the deputy killed the elderly man, but was 
unable to identify the informant making his claim of what he heard less probable. If in fact the 
deputy had not killed the old man, it is less likely that someone would have told Knapp such a 
story. 
 

(2) State v. Ball, 339 S.W. 2nd 783 (1960) 


 
Mareja Aña G. Arellano 
 
A= A.L Krekeler & Sons Jewelry Co., 
B= William Arthur Ball 
D= Krekeler 
 
Question: 
 
  A  was  robbed  by  two  men  who  took  watches  and  rings amounting to $4455.21 and $140 cash 
from  register.  B  was  arrested  and  subdued by the officers who took from his person the effects. 
B  objected  in  his  motion  for  new  trial  to  the  fact  that  a  police  officer  who  arrested  him  was 
allowed  to  testify  that  $258.02  in  currency  and  two  pennies  were  taken  from him. It is said that 
the  introduction  of  these  exhibits were immaterial and irrelevant neither would tend to prove nor 
disprove  any  issues  involved in the case; that said money as seized at the time of the arrest was 
neither  identified  by  D  or  by  any  other person as the money which was allegedly stolen from the 
A;  and  that  said  evidence  was  considered  by  the  jury  to  the  prejudice  of  the  appellant.  Are  the 
effects confiscated from B admissible in evidence? 
 
Answer: 
 
No. There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was simply a 
total  of  $140.  The  mere  possession  of  a  quantity  of  money  is  in  itself  no  indication  that  the 
possessor  was  the  taker  of  money  charged  as  taken,  because in general all money of the same 
denomination  and  material  is  alike,  and  the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the 
money  taken  is  too  forced and extraordinary to be receivable." 1 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 154, p. 
601.  In  the  absence  of  proof  or  of  a  fair  inference  from  the  record  that  the  money  in  B’s 
possession  at  the  time  of  his  arrest  came from or had some connection with the robbery and in 
the  absence  of  a  plain  showing  of  his  impecuniousness  before  the  robbery  and  his  sudden 
affluence  (State  v.  Garrett, 285 Mo. 279, 226 S.W. 4), the evidence was not in fact relevant and in 
the  circumstances  was  obviously  prejudicial  for  if  it  did  not  tend  to  prove the offense for which 
the appellant was on trial the jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery. 
 
 
Facts: 
 
Krekeler  Jewelry  Store  was  robbed  by  two  men  who  took  watches  and  rings  amounting  to 
$4455.21 and $140 cash from register. The officers subdued and arrested Ball and took from his 
person  and  impounded  a  brown  felt  hat,  "a  brownish"  windbreaker  type  jacket,  trousers,  gray 
shirt  and  shoesthese  which  Ball  admitted  that  they  belonged  to  him  although  his  evidence 
tended  to  show  that  he  had  purchased  the  jacket  after the robbery. These items were of course 
relevant  and  admissible  in  evidence  and  there  is  no  objection  to  them.  State  v.  Johnson,  Mo., 
286 S.W.2d 787, 792. 
 
In  Ball’s  Motion  for  New  Trial,  he  objected  to  the  fact that a police officer who arrested him was 
allowed  to  testify  that  $258.02  in  currency  and  two  pennies  were  taken  from him. It is said that 
the  introduction  of  these  exhibits were immaterial and irrelevant neither would tend to prove nor 
disprove  any  issues  involved in the case; that said money as seized at the time of the arrest was 
neither  identified  by  Krekeler  or  by  any  other  person  as  the  money  which  was  allegedly  stolen 
from  the  A.L  Krekeler  &  Sons  Jewelry  Co.,  on Oct. 15; and that said evidence was considered by 
the jury to the prejudice of the appellant. 
 
Issue: 
 
Whether or not the effects confiscated from Ball should be admissible in evidence. 
 
Ruling: 
 
No.  The  proof  of  the  money  here  was  evidently  on  the  theory  that  Ball  did  not  have  or  was  not 
likely  to  have  such  a  sum  of  money  on  his  person  prior  to  the  commission  of  the  offense.  1 
Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Sec. 204, p. 410. Not only was Krekeler unable to identify the money 
or  any  of  the  items  on  Ball's  person  as  having  come  from  the  jewelry  store  so  that  in  fact  they 
were  not  admissible  in  evidence  (annotation  3  A.L.R.  1213),  the  charge  here  was  that  Ball  and 
his  accomplice  took  jewelry  of  the  value  of  $4,455.21  and  $140  in  cash  from  the  cash register. 
There  was  no  proof  as  to  the  denomination  of  the  money  in  the  cash  register,  it  was  simply  a 
total  of  $140.  Here  nineteen  days  had  elapsed,  there  was  no proof that Ball had suddenly come 
into  possession  of  the  $258.02  (annotation  123 A.L.R. 119) and in all these circumstances "The 
mere  possession  of  a  quantity  of  money  is  in  itself  no  indication  that  the  possessor  was  the 
taker  of  money  charged  as  taken,  because  in  general  all  money  of  the  same  denomination and 
material  is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the money taken is too 
forced and extraordinary to be receivable." 1 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 154, p. 601. In the absence 
of  proof  or  of  a  fair  inference  from  the  record  that the money in Ball's possession at the time of 
his  arrest  came  from  or  had  some  connection  with  the  robbery  and  in  the  absence  of  a  plain 
showing  of  his  impecuniousness  before  the  robbery  and  his  sudden  affluence  (State  v.  Garrett, 
285  Mo.  279,  226  S.W.  4),  the  evidence  was  not  in  fact  relevant  and  in  the  circumstances  was 
obviously  prejudicial  for  if  it  did  not  tend  to  prove  the  offense  for  which  the  appellant  was  on 
trial  the  jury  may  have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery. State v. Bray, Mo. App., 278 
S.W.2d  49;  People  v.  Orloff,  65  Cal.  App.  2d  614,  620-621,  151  P.2d  288;  annotation  123  A.L.R. 
loc.  cit.  132-134  and  compare  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  State  v.  Garrett,  supra.  The 
admission  of  the  evidence  in  the  circumstances  of  this  record  infringed  the  right  to  a  fair  trial 
and for that reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
 

B. Rules of Exclusion 

a) §2-3, Constitution Art. III 

b) §12, Constitution Art. III 

c) §17, Constitution Art. III 

d) §201, Tax Reform Act of 1997 

e) R.A. 4200, Anti-Wiretapping Law 

f) R.A. 1405, Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits 

g) R.A. 6426, FCD Act of the Philippines 

Cases: 

(1) Mamba v. Garcia, 359 SCRA 426 (2001) 


 
Bucog, Roseller 
 
BAR Question 
 
Judge Daya is alleged to have taken bribes from apprehended motorist who have carried 
firearms without a license. The National Bureau of Investigation conducted an entrapment 
operation where the accused motorist was given a tape recorder to record his conversation with 
Judge Daya and the apprehending officer. Upon arrival at the sala, Judge Daya then called the 
accused and led him and the two police officers to his chamber. After handing the money to the 
police officers, the accused went out of chamber and the NBI operatives arrested the two police 
officers. Judge Daya was investigated where the Investigating Judge relied on the taped 
conversation between the two (2) policemen and accused inside the chamber of the Judge 
Daya where the police told Bulatao “to take care of the Judge” which implies that the Judge 
knew of the pay-off being made and was willing to abide by the "deal" provided he would be 
"taken care of" by Bulatao. Consequently, the Investigation Judge found Judge Daya guilty of 
improper conduct.  
 
Are the contents of the tape recorder admissible in evidence? 
 
Answer: 
 
No, the contents of the tape recorder are inadmissible in evidence because any evidence 
obtained in violation of a law is incompetent evidence.  
 
Section 4 of Republic Act 4200 expressly provides “any communication or spoken word, or the 
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or 
any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the 
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, 
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.” 
 
In this case, the accused, not being authorized by all the parties to the private communication or 
spoken word, secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by 
using a tape recorder. 
 
Thus, the contents of the tape recorder cannot be relied upon to determine the culpability of 
Judge Daya. 
 
 
Facts: 
 
When accused Renato Bulatao was charged for illegal possession of firearms before the sala of 
respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia, he complained to the NBI that, at the scheduled 
preliminary investigation, P/Sr. Inspector Salvador and respondent judge demanded money from 
him in consideration of the withdrawal of the criminal case against him. Based on Bulatao’s 
report, the NBI set out an entrapment where Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record his 
conversation. During the preliminary investigation, respondent judge then called Bulatao and led 
him and the two police officers to his chambers and left them there as he proceeded to his sala. 
After handing the money to the police officers, Bulatao went out of respondent's chambers and 
the NBI operatives arrested the two police officers and an administrative complaint was filed 
against respondent judge. Finding respondent judge guilty of improper conduct, the 
Investigating Judge Orlando D. Beltran, Jr. relied on the taped conversation between the two (2) 
policemen and Renato Bulatao inside the chamber of the respondent Judge where the police 
told Bulatao “to take care of the Judge” which implies that the Judge knew of the pay-off being 
made and was willing to abide by the "deal" provided he would be "taken care of" by Bulatao. 
 
Issue: 
 
Whether the contents of the tape recorder can be relied upon solely to determine the culpability 
of respondent judge. 
 
Ruling: 
 
The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao and the 
two police officers is erroneous. The recording of private conversations without the consent of 
the parties contravenes the provisions of Rep. Act. No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire 
Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. Thus, the 
contents of the tape recorder cannot be relied upon to determine the culpability of respondent 
judge. 
 
Ratio Decidendi: 
 
The prohibition on recording private conversations without the consent of the parties covers 
even those recorded by persons privy to the private communications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

(2) Marquez v. Desierto, 359 SCRA 772 (2001) 


 
Cagaanan, Vic Raymond C. 
  
X = Marquez (petitioner) 
Y = Union Bank of the Philippines 
 
Bar Question: 
X  received  an  Order  from  the  Ombudsman  to  produce  several  bank  documents  for 
purposes  of  inspection  in  camera  relative  to  various  accounts  maintained  at  Y  Bank  where X is 
the  branch  manager.  The  accounts  were  involved  in  a  violation  of  RA  3019  which  was  pending 
before  the  Ombudsman.  The  Ombudsman  cited  X  for  indirect  contempt  for  failure  to  comply 
with  the  order.  X  together  with  Y  Bank,  filed  a  petition  for  declaratory  relief,  prohibition  and 
injunction  with  the  Regional  Trial  Court,  Makati  City,  against  the  Ombudsman  to  the  clear 
conflict  between  the  power  of  the  Ombudsman  to  conduct  investigation  and  the  law  on  bank 
secrecy.  Is  the  order  of  the  Ombudsman  to  have  an  in  camera  inspection  of  the  questioned 
account allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits? 
  
Suggested Answer: 
  No.  The  Supreme  Court  held  that  before  an  in  camera  inspection  may  be  allowed,  there 
must  be  a  pending  case  before  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction.  There  is  yet  no  pending 
litigation  before  any  court  of  competent  authority.  What  is  existing  is  an  investigation  by  the 
office  of  the  Ombudsman.  Clearly,  there  was  no  pending  case  in  court  which would warrant the 
opening  of  the  bank  account  for  inspection.  Zones  of  privacy  are  recognized  and  protected  in 
our  laws.  Invasion  of  privacy  is  an  offense  in  special  laws  like  the  Anti-Wiretapping  Law,  the 
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code. 
  
FACTS: 
Sometime  in  May  1998,  X  received  an  Order  from  the  Ombudsman  to  produce  several  bank 
documents  for  purposes  of  inspection  in  camera  relative  to  various  accounts  maintained  at  Y 
Bank  where  X  is  the  branch  manager.  The  accounts  to  be  inspected  are  involved  in  a  case 
pending  with  the  Ombudsman  for  violation  of  RA  3019.  However,  X  wrote  the  Ombudsman 
explaining to him that the accounts in question cannot readily be identified and asked for time to 
respond  to  the  order.  The  reason  forwarded  by  X  was  that  despite  diligent  efforts  and from the 
account  numbers  presented,  these  accounts  cannot be identified since the checks are issued in 
cash or bearer. 
  
Thus,  on  June  16,  1998,  the  Ombudsman  issued  an  order  directing  X  to  produce  the  bank 
documents  relative  to  the  accounts  in issue and cited petitioner for indirect contempt for failure 
to  produce  the  documents  on  time.  X  together  with  Y Bank, filed a petition for declaratory relief, 
prohibition  and  injunction  with  the  Regional  Trial  Court,  Makati  City,  against the Ombudsman to 
the  clear conflict between the power of the Ombudsman to conduct investigation and the law on 
bank secrecy. 
  
ISSUE: 
  WON  the  order  of  the  Ombudsman  to  have  an  in  camera  inspection  of  the  questioned 
account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R. A. No. 1405) 
  
HELD: 
  No. 
  
  The  Supreme  Court  held  that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must 
be  a  pending  case  before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly 
identified,  the  inspection  limited  to  the  subject  matter  of  the  pending  case  before  the  court  of 
competent  jurisdiction.  The  bank  personnel  and  the  account  holder  must  be  notified  to  be 
present  during  the  inspection,  and  such  inspection  may  cover  only  the  account  identified in the 
pending case. 
  
In  the  case  at  bar,  there  is  yet  no  pending  litigation  before  any  court  of  competent 
authority.  What  is  existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the 
Office  of  the  Ombudsman  would  wish  to  do  is  to  fish  for  additional evidence. Clearly, there was 
no  pending  case  in  court  which  would  warrant  the  opening  of  the  bank  account  for  inspection. 
Zones  of  privacy  are  recognized  and  protected  in  our  laws.  Invasion  of  privacy is an offense in 
special  laws  like  the  Anti-Wiretapping  Law,  the  Secrecy  of  Bank  Deposits  Act,  and  the 
Intellectual Property Code. 
  
 

(3) Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, 509 SCRA 190 (2006) 


Canete  
 
BAR Q: 
 
A Plunder case was filed against X . The special prosecution panel filed before the SB 
request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum directing the President of Bank 1 and a 
request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed to the 
authorized representative of Equitable-PCI Bank . Both were granted by the SB . A 
Motion to Quash was filed because Petitioner x claims that subpoenas issued by the 
Sandiganbayan are invalid and may not be enforced, petitioner contends that the 
information found therein, given their extremely detailed character, could only have been 
obtained by the Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank 
officials concerned. The motion was denied. 
  
Did the Judge correctly deny the motion to quash? 
   
ANSWER: 
  
Yes, the judge was correct. 
  
Under  the  fruit  of  the  poisonous  tree  principle,  which  states  that  once  the  primary 
source  (the  tree)  is  shown  to  have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative 
evidence (the fruit) derived from it is also inadmissible. 
  
In  this  case,  the  fruit  of  the  poisonous  tree  doctrine[presupposes  a  violation  of  law.  If 
there  was no violation of R.A. 1405 in the instant case, then there would be no poisonous 
tree to begin with, and, thus, no reason to apply the doctrine. 
  
 
II. What need not be proved (Rule 129) 

A. Judicial Notice (§1-3, Rule 129) 

Cases: 

(1) Manufacturers Hanover Trust v. Guerrero, 397 SCRA 709 (2003) 


 
Capao, Henna Auggie M. 
 
A = Guerrero 
B = Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co. 
 
Bar Question: A filed a complaint for damages against B. B contended that A's checking account 
is governed by New York law. B also claimed that such law does not permit A's claims except 
actual damages. Thus, B filed a motion for summary judgment which was supported by C, a 
New York attorney. Is the motion for summary judgment filed by B correct? 
 
Suggested Answer: No, the motion for summary judgment is not correct. There can be no 
summary judgment where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute. Foreign laws are 
not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. The 
conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims 
present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the 
merits. 
 
Detailed Case Digest: 
 
FACTS: Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or 
Chemical Bank with the RTC allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests 
on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check US$18,000.00 due to signature 
verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account. 
 
The Bank alleged, inter alia, that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law 
and this law does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the 
Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims. 
 
The affidavit of Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s contentions and its Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. 
 
Both the RTC and the CA denied the motion for partial summary judgment. 
 
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the Bank is tenable. 
 
RULING: The motion filed by the Bank is not tenable. 
 
A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either 
party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no 
important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages. 
 
A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings would show that there are genuine issues of fact 
that necessitate formal trial. 
 
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material 
allegations of the pleadings are in dispute. The resolution whether a foreign law allows only the 
recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since 
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts. 
 
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and 
proven. 
 
Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to 
Guerrero’s claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by 
a trial on the merits. 
 

(2) Pigao v. Rabanillo, 488 SCRA 546 (2006) 


 
Daclan, Chase 
 
Facts: 
Sometime  in  1947,  the  late  Eusebio Pigao, petitioners’ father, together with his family, settled on 
a  240  square  meter  lot  located  at  92 (now 102) K-5th Street, Kamuning, Quezon City. The parcel 
of  land  used  to  be  government  property  owned  by  the  People’s  Homesite  and  Housing 
Corporation  (PHHC),3  under  Transfer  Certificate  of  Title  (TCT)  No.  27287.4  Eusebio  applied  for 
the  purchase  of  the  subject  lot  and  a  contract  to  sell  for  a  consideration  of  P1,022.19  was 
thereafter entered into by Eusebio and PHHC. 
In  1959,  Eusebio  executed  a  deed  of  assignment  of  rights  over  one-half  of the property in favor 
of  respondent,  for  a  consideration  of  P1,000.  Respondent  proceeded  to  occupy  the  front  half 
portion,  established  a  residential  building  thereon,  and  paid  the  amortizations  for  the  said 
portion. 
In  1970,  Eusebio  executed  a  deed  of  mortgage  over  the  same  half-portion  of  the  property  in 
favor  of  respondent. After the amortizations on the subject lot were fully paid in 1973, the PHHC 
issued  a  deed  of  sale  over  the  entire lot in favor of Eusebio. Consequently, TCT No. 197941 was 
issued  in  Eusebio’s  name.  In  1978,  respondent  executed  an  affidavit  of  adverse  claim  over  the 
front  half  portion  of  the  lot  registered  in  Eusebio’s  name.  This  affidavit  was  duly  annotated  on 
TCT  No.  197941.  On  June  17,  1979,  Eusebio  died  and  was  survived  by  his  children,  herein 
petitioners. 
In  1988,  after  the  Office  of  the  Register  of  Deeds  of  Quezon  City  was  gutted  by  fire,  petitioner 
Estrella  Pigao  applied  for  the  reconstitution  of  the  original  of  TCT  No. 197941 that was burned. 
This  was  approved  in  1990  and  TCT  No. RT-11374 was issued, still in the name of Eusebio. This 
reconstituted title no longer carried the annotation of the adverse claim of respondent. 
In  1992,  petitioners  executed  an  extrajudicial settlement of Eusebio’s estate among themselves, 
including  the  entire  subject  lot.  As  a  consequence,  TCT  No.  56210  was  issued  for the entire lot 
in  the  name  of  petitioners.  Respondent  continued  to  occupy  the  front  half  portion  through  his 
tenant,  Gil  Ymata.  On  January  29,  1996,  petitioners  instituted  civil  case  no.  Q-96-26270  in  the 
Regional  Trial  Court  (RTC)  of  Quezon  City,  Branch  95,  against  respondent  and  Ymata  wherein 
they  sought  to  quiet  their  title  over  the  entire  lot  and  to  recover  possession  of  the  front  half 
portion.  They  averred  that  Eusebio’s  deed  of  assignment  and  deed of mortgage were clouds on 
their title which should be nullified.5 The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. 
CA reversed the RTC decision and ruled in favor of respondent. 
  
Issue: 
  
Can  the  court  take  judicial  notice  of  the  fact  that  the  pro-forma  conditional  contracts-to-  sell 
between PHHC and applicants. 
  
  
  
Ruling: 
  
No. 
  
The  court  cannot  take  cognizance  of  this  document  –  the  conditional  contract to sell between 
Bernabe  and  the  PHHC  alleged  to  be  the  pro-forma  contract  used by PHHC with its applicants - 
which  petitioners  are  presenting  for  the  first  time.  This  document  is  not among the matters the 
law  mandatorily  requires  to  take  judicial  notice  of.19  Neither  can  the  court  consider  it  of public 
knowledge  nor  capable  of  unquestionable  demonstration  nor  ought  to  be  known  to  judges 
because of their judicial functions.20 The SC have held that: 
Matters  of  judicial  notice  have  three  material  requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common 
and  general  knowledge;  (2)  it  must  be  well  and  authoritatively  settled  and  not  doubtful  or 
uncertain;  and  (3)  it  must be known to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court. The power 
of  taking  judicial  notice  is  to  be  exercised  by  courts  with  caution.  Care  must  be  taken  that  the 
requisite  notoriety  exists  and  every  reasonable  doubt  on  the  subject  should  be  promptly 
resolved in the negative. 
Consequently,  for  this  document  to  be  properly  considered  by  them  court,  it  should  have  been 
presented  during  trial  and  formally  offered  as  evidence.  Otherwise,  the  court  would  be  denying 
due process of law to respondent. 
Besides,  this  document does not even pertain to the lot and parties involved here. Accordingly, it 
is  neither  relevant  nor  material  evidence.  But  even  assuming  that  it  were,  then  it  would 
substantially  affect  the  outcome  of  the  case  so  respondent  should  have been given the chance 
to  scrutinize  the  document  and  object  to  it  during  the  trial  of the case. It is too late to present it 
now when nothing prevented petitioners from introducing it before. 
  
  
Bar Qs. 
  
  
X acquired a parcel of land by entering into a contract with PHHC. X subsequently 
executed a deed of assignment of rights to Y for 1/2 of the property.. However 
a fire gutted the of deeds and the reconstituted title does not contain 
the adverse claim of Y. Y sought to quiet title. The CA ruled in favour of Y. 
  
  
did  the  judge  correctly  take  judicial  notice  of  pro-forma  conditional  contracts-to-  sell  between 
PHHC and applicants? 
  
No. The court cannot take cognizance of this document  
  
  
Jurisprudence  provides  that  matters  of  judicial  notice  have  three  material  requisites:  (1)  the 
matter  must  be  one  of  common  and  general  knowledge;  (2)  it  must  be  well  and  authoritatively 
settled  and  not  doubtful  or  uncertain;  and  (3)  it  must  be  known  to  be  within  the  limits  of 
jurisdiction  of  the  court.  The  power  of  taking  judicial  notice  is  to  be  exercised  by  courts  with 
caution. 
  
In  this  case,  .  this  document  is  not  among  the  matters  the  law  mandatorily  requires  to  take 
judicial  notice  of.1Neither  can  the  court  consider  it  of  public  knowledge  nor  capable  of 
unquestionable  demonstration  nor  ought  to  be  known  to  judges  because  of  their  judicial 
functions. 
  
Furthermore,  for  this  document  to  be  properly  considered  by  them  court,  it  should  have  been 
presented  during  trial  and  formally  offered  as  evidence.  Otherwise,  the  court  would  be  denying 
due process of law to respondent. 
 
 
 

(3) BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. CTA, 330 SCRA 507 (2000) 

(4) Land Bank v. Yatco Agriculture Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, 15 January 2015 
EUPENA, Ron Christian 
 
 
Bar Q: 
Y is an owner of an agricultural land that was put under the CARP coverage of the government. 
Pursuant to E.O. 405, LBP valued the property at ₱1,126,132.89 but Y did not find this valuation 
acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial 
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). The PARAD computed the value of the property at 
₱16,543,800.00;10 The LBP filed with the RTC- Special Agrarian Court a petition for the judicial 
determination of just compensation which fixed the just compensation for the property at 
₱200.00 per square meter.13 The RTC-SAC arrived at this valuation by adopting the valuation 
set by the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 35 which, in turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC of 
Calamba City, Branch 36 (Branch 36) arrived at.  
 
Is the RTC-SAC’s decision in adopting only the valuation set by branch 35 and 36 proper? 
 
Answer: 
No. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive power to 
determine just compensation for lands under CARP coverage. The law likewise empowers the 
DAR to issue rules for its implementation. Thus, RTC-SAC must consider Section 17 of R.A. No. 
6657, and the basic formula by the DAR, in determining just compensation. RTC-SAC, however, 
are not strictly bound to apply the DAR formula, they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax 
the formula’s application to fit the factual situations before them.  
Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of 
other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before 
the same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in 
another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any 
opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either 
case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules 
of Court. 
We note that Y offered in evidence copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the LBP 
opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however, that the order of the 
RTC-SAC constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129, 
RTC-SAC’s valuation is legally erroneous because the RTC-SAC fully disregarded Section 17 of 
R.A. No. 6657 and DAR AO 5-98 and thus acted outside the contemplation of the law. 
 
 
 
Case digest: 
Facts: 
Yatco is the registered owner of a 27 hectare agricultural land. On April 30, 1999, the 
government placed the property under the coverage of its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program (CARP). Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 405, the LBP valued the property at 
₱1,126,132.89. Yatco did not find this valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the 
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San 
Pablo City. The PARAD computed the value of the property at ₱16,543,800.00; The LBP did not 
move to reconsider the PARAD’s ruling. Instead, it filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the 
judicial determination of just compensation. The RTC-Special Agrarian Court fixed the just 
compensation for the property at ₱200.00 per square meter. The RTC-SAC arrived at this 
valuation by adopting the valuation set by the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 35 (Branch 35) in 
Civil Case No. 2326-96-C, which, in turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC of Calamba City, 
Branch 36 (Branch 36) arrived at in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C. CA thus affirmed the RTC-SAC’s 
valuation which was founded on factual and legal bases. The LBP filed the present petition after 
the CA denied its motion for reconsideration in the CA’s May 3, 2006 resolution.  
Issue: 
Whether the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the property was proper. 
Held: 
No.  
The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function. Section 57 of R.A. 
No. 6657 explicitly vests the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive power to determine just 
compensation for lands under CARP coverage. 
To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the 
factors required to be taken into account to correctly determine just compensation. The law 
(under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657) likewise empowers the DAR to issue rules for its 
implementation. The DAR thus issued DAR AO 5-98 incorporating the law’s listed factors in 
determining just compensation into a basic formula that contains the details that take these 
factors into account. 
That the RTC-SAC must consider the factors mentioned by the law (and consequently the DAR’s 
implementing formula) is not a novel concept. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal,30 
we said that the RTC-SAC must consider the factors enumerated under Section 17 of R.A. No. 
6657, as translated into a basic formula by the DAR, in determining just compensation.  
In other words, in the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial function of determining just 
compensation, the RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply 
the R.A. No. 6657-enumerated factors and the DAR formula that reflect these factors. 
When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the RTC-SACs, however, are not strictly 
bound to apply the DAR formula to its minute detail, particularly when faced with situations that 
do not warrant the formula’s strict application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax 
the formula’s application to fit38 the factual situations before them. 
This use of considerations that were completely outside the contemplation of the law is the 
precise situation we find in the present case, as fully explained below. 
The rules allow the courts to take judicial notice of certain facts; the RTC-SAC’s valuation is 
erroneous 
The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose 
that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, 
courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases 
even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same 
judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another 
case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition 
from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the 
courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. 
We note that Yatco offered in evidence copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the 
LBP opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however, that the April 21, 
2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatco’s offer in evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it) 
constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of 
Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on Branch 36’s previous ruling – to be 
legally erroneous because The RTC-SAC fully disregarded Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR 
AO 5-98 and thus acted outside the contemplation of the law. 
 
(5) Land Bank of the Philippines v. Banal, 434 SCRA 543 (2004) 
 
Evardo, Benny Boy P.   
 
X = Petitioner Landbank of the Philippines 
Y=Respondent Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal 
 
BAR Qs 
Y is the registered owner of agricultural land. A portion of the land was compulsorily acquired 
by the Department of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, as amended. 
Y rejected the valuation of X hence a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before 
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. 
Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the X’s valuation. Dissatisfied with the 
Decision of the PARAD, Y filed with the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation. In 
determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in 
another case pending before it and applying the same to the present case without conducting a 
hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties. 

Is the trial court erred in taking judicial notice? 


  
Suggested Answer 
  
Yes. 
Well-settled  is  the  rule  that  courts  are  not  authorized  to  take  judicial  notice  of  the  contents  of 
the  records  of  other  cases  even  when  said  cases  have  been  tried  or  are  pending  in  the  same 
court  or  before  the  same  judge.  The  Rules  of  Court  shall  apply  to  all  proceedings  before  the 
Special  Agrarian  Courts.  In  this  regard,  Section  3,  Rule  129  of the Revised Rules on Evidence is 
explicit  on  the  necessity  of  a  hearing  before  a  court  takes  judicial  notice  of  a  certain  matter, 
thus:  “Section 3 provides that judicial notice, when hearing necessary states that During the trial, 
the  court,  on  its  own  initiative,  or  on  request  of  a  party,  may  announce  its  intention  to  take 
judicial  notice  of  any  matter  and  allow  the  parties  to  be  heard  thereon.  “After  the  trial,  and 
before  judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may 
take  judicial  notice  of  any  matter  and  allow  the  parties  to  be  heard  thereon  if  such  matter  is 
decisive of a material issue in the case.” Thus, RTC failed to observe the above provisions. 
  
Detailed Digest 
  
FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 
agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was 
compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act 
(R.A.) No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 
1988. Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a summary administrative 
proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to 
determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the 
LandBank’s valuation. Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the 
RTC a petition for determination of just compensation. In determining the valuation of the land, 
the trial court based the same on the facts established in another case pending before it. 
  
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the average production figures in 
another case pending before it and applying the same to the present case without conducting a 
hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties 
  
HELD:  Well-settled  is  the  rule  that  courts  are  not  authorized  to  take  judicial  notice  of  the 
contents  of  the  records  of  other  cases  even  when  said  cases  have  been  tried  or  are pending in 
the  same  court  or  before  the  same  judge.  They  may  only  do  so  “in  the  absence  of  objection” 
and “with the knowledge of the opposing party,” which are not obtaining here. 
Furthermore,  as  earlier  stated,  the  Rules  of  Court  shall  apply  to  all  proceedings  before  the 
Special  Agrarian  Courts.  In  this  regard,  Section  3,  Rule  129  of the Revised Rules on Evidence is 
explicit  on  the  necessity  of  a  hearing  before  a  court  takes  judicial  notice  of  a  certain  matter, 
thus: 

“SEC.  3.  Judicial  notice,  when  hearing  necessary.  –  During  the  trial,  the  court,  on  its  own 
initiative,  or  on  request  of  a  party,  may  announce  its  intention  to  take  judicial  notice  of  any 
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. 
“After  the  trial,  and  before  judgment  or  on  appeal,  the  proper  court,  on  its  own  initiative  or  on 
request  of  a  party,  may  take  judicial  notice  of  any  matter  and  allow  the  parties  to  be  heard 
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.”  
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions. 

(6) Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, 13 December 2011 


 
Gamao, Arthelly D.  
  
A= Republic-Petitioner 
B= Respondents 
C=Mr. Bane 
  
  
 
 
Question: 
  
A filed a civil case against B in the Sandiganbayan. In a subsequent civil case proceeding, the 
testimony of C was taken by way of deposition upon oral examination before the Philippine 
consul in England. A then claimed that since the deposition was already introduced in the 
subsequent civil case, the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice of it. 
Is A correct? 
 
Answer: 
No. 
The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the revised Rules on Evidence. 
In the present case, A approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical 
perspective. It is the duty of A to lay before the Court the evidence it relies upon to support the 
relief it seeks. 
  
G.R. NO. 152375, Dec. 13, 2011 
Republic of the Phils. vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al. 
  
FACTS: 
A case was filed against the respondents for before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for reconveyance, 
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages in relation to the allegation that respondents 
illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in 
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI). This case docketed as Civil Case No. 
0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130, a petition 
instituted by Victor Africa (Son of the late Jose Africa) which sought to nullify the orders of the 
PCGG directing him to account for the alleged sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and 
desist from exercising voting rights. The present respondents were not made parties either in 
Civil Case No. 0130. In the former case, Victor Africa (Africa) was not impleaded in and so is 
plainly not a party thereto. 
  
In the proceedings for Civil Case No. 0130, testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director 
and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane 
deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, 
England. The purpose was for Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit so 
as to prove the ownership issue in favor of the petitioner and/or establish the prima facie 
factual foundation for sequestration of ETPI’s Class A stock. 
  
As to Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner filed a motion (1st Motion) to adopt the testimonies of 
the witnesses in Civil Case No. 0130, including the deposition of Mr. Maurice Bane which was 
denied by SB in its April 1998 Resolution because he was not available for cross-examination. 
The petitioners did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal 
Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as 
part of its offered exhibits. In rectifying this, they filed a second motion with prayer for 
re-opening of the case for the purpose of introducing additional evidence and requested the 
court to take judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane deposition. This was however 
denied by the SB in its November 6, 2000 resolution (2000 resolution). A third motion was filed 
by the petitioners on November 16, 2001 seeking once more to admit the Bane deposition which 
the SB denied for the reason that the 1998 resolution has become final in view of the petitioner’s 
failure to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. 
  
ISSUE: 
  Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under the rules of court and under the 
principle of judicial notice. 
  
RULING: 
  
Despite the cases being closely related, admissibility of the Bane deposition still needs to 
comply with the rules of court on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a 
different proceeding. Depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open 
court of a party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in 
open court at the trial or hearing otherwise, the adverse party may oppose it as mere hearsay. 
Cross-examination will test the truthfulness of the statements of the witness; it is an essential 
safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. Depositions from the former trial 
may be introduced as evidence provided that the parties to the first proceeding must be the 
same as the parties to the later proceeding. In the present case, the petitioner failed to establish 
the identity of interest or privity between the opponents of the two cases. While Victor Africa is 
the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, the deposition is admissible only against him as an 
ETPI stockholder who filed Civil Case No. 0130. 
  
Further, the rule of judicial notice is not applicable in this case as it would create confusion 
between the two cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before 
the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that 
same duty on the court. 
  
The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit. 
  
B. Judicial Admissions 

a) §4, Rule 129 

b) § 8, Rule 10 

c) §1-4, Rule 26 

d) Arts. 12 and 2035, Civil Code 

e) Arts. 48 and 60, Family Code 

f) §2, Rule 118 

Cases: 

(1) Herrera-Felix v. Court of Appeals, 436 SCRA 87 (2004)-  

Galacio, Ellah 
BAR Q: 
 
X  filed  a  complaint  for  sum  of  money  against  Y  with  a  prayer  for  a  writ  of  preliminary 
attachment.  The  trial  court  granted  the  writ  and  the  Sheriff  levied  and  took  custody  of  the 
personal  properties  of  Y.  The  copy  of  the  writ,  summons  and  complaint  were  served  to  her 
residence  but  was  received  by  her  sister  A  since  Y  was  out  of  the  country.  The  counsel  of  Y, 
Atty.  B  filed  for  a  motion  for  an  extension  of  time  to  file  her  answer  to  the  compliant.  The  trial 
court  rendered  a  decision  in  favor  of  X.  Did  the  court  acquire  jurisdiction  over  her  person 
through the service of the complaint and summons on her sister? 
 
SUGGESTED ANSWER: 

Yes.  Y  appeared  before  the  court, through counsel, and filed a motion for extension of time to file 


her  answer  to  the  complaint  which  the  trial  court  granted.  She  even  admitted  in  the  said motion 
that  she  was  served  with  a  copy  of  the  complaint  as  well  as  the  summons.  The  admissions 
made  in  a  motion  are  judicial  admissions  which  are  binding  on the party who made them. Such 
party  is  precluded  from  denying  the  same  unless  there  is  proof  of  palpable  mistake  or  that  no 
such  admission  was  made.  By  filing  the  said  motion,  through  counsel,  the  petitioner  thereby 
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 
 
CASE DIGEST- FACTS: 

St.  Joseph  Resource  Development,  Inc. filed a complaint for sum of money against the Spouses 


Restituto  and  Ofelia  Felix  with  a  prayer  for  a  writ  of  preliminary  attachment.  It was alleged that 
during  the  period  from  November  1992  to  December  1992,  the  Felix  Spouses  purchased  from 
the  respondent  tubs  of  assorted  fish  and  had  an  outstanding  obligation  of  P1,132,065.50.  The 
trial  court  granted  the  respondents  prayer  for  a  writ  of  preliminary  attachment  and  the  Sheriff 
levied  and  took  custody  of  some  of  the  personal  properties  of the Felix Spouses.  A copy of the 
writ  of preliminary attachment, summons and complaint were served on them at their residence, 
through the sister of Ofelia Herrera-Felix, Ma. Luisa Herrera as Ofelia Herrera-Felix was out of the 
country.  The  Felix  Spouses,  through  Atty.  Celestino  C.  Juan,  filed  a  motion  praying  for  an 
extension  of  time  to  file  their  answer  to  the  complaint  which  the  court  granted.  However,  the 
Felix Sps failed to file their answer to the complaint and were declared in default. 

Later,  the  court  a  quo  rendered  a  decision  in  favor  of  SJRD,  Inc.  ordering  the  Felix  Sps.  to  pay. 
Copies  of  the  said  decision  were  mailed  through  registered  mail  but  returned  to  the  court  after 
two  notices  for  having  been Unclaimed. However, the counsel for the Felix Spouses received his 
copy  of  the  decision.  The  court  thereafter  issued  an order granting the motion and directing the 
issuance  of  a  writ  of  execution.  Thereafter,  the  personal  properties  of  Felix  Sps.  were  levied 
upon  and  sold  by  the  sheriff  at  public  auction  to  SJRD,  Inc.  as  the  winning  bidder.  Ofelia 
Herrera-Felix  filed  a  petition  with  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  nullification  of  the  trial  courts 
judgment  by  default,  the  writ  of  execution  and  the  sale  of  her  properties  at  public  auction 
alleging  that  the  complaint  and  summons  were  handed  over  to  her  sister,  Ma.  Luisa  Herrera, 
who  was  merely  a  visitor  in  her  house  and,  as  such,  was  not  a  valid  substituted  service.  CA 
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 

ISSUE: 

WON  the trial court acquire jurisdiction over her person through the service of the complaint and 
summons on her sister and her counsel. 

RULING: 

Yes.  The  court  acquires  jurisdiction  over  the  person  of  the  defendant  by  service  of  the 
complaint  and  summons  on  him,  either  by  personal  service  or  by  substituted  service  or  by 
extra-territorial  service  thereof  or  by  his  voluntary  personal  appearance  before  the  court  or 
through  counsel.  In  this  case,  the  petitioner appeared before the court, through counsel, and filed 
a  motion  for  extension  of  time  to  file  her  answer  to  the  complaint  which  the  trial  court  granted. 
She  even  admitted  in  the  said  motion  that  she  was  served  with  a  copy of the complaint as well 
as  the  summons.  The  admissions  made  in  a  motion  are  judicial  admissions  which  are  binding 
on  the  party  who  made  them.  Such  party  is  precluded  from  denying  the  same  unless  there  is 
proof  of  palpable  mistake  or  that  no  such  admission  was  made.  By  filing  the  said  motion, 
through counsel, the petitioner thereby submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court.  

 
(2) Heirs of Pedro Clemeña v. Heirs of Irene Bien, 501 SCRA 405 (2006) 
 
Licayan, Abby 
 
BAR Q:  
 
B filed a case against C for payment of compensatory damages for depriving them of 
owner’s share of the harvest from a tract of land. B claims that he is the absolute owner 
of the land in question and that he acquired it from a person who in turn acquired it from 
the administrator of the estate of X. C alleged that the land was his by sale from estate 
of X and that it was in his exclusive possession. CA awarded damages to B. C’s heirs 
later did not dispute B’s ownership but insisted that they cannot be held liable for the 
harvest because they never took possession of the harvest.  
 
Can the contention of C’s heirs that the land was never in their possession be 
admissible? 
 
Answer: 
No. The statement in so far as it confirmed the allegation in the complaint that C had the 
possession of the land took on the character of a judicial admission under Sec4 Rule 
129 of the Rules of Court. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He 
cannot thereafter contradict it. As substituting defendants the heirs of C are bound by 
the admission of C. Without any showing that the admission was made through palpable 
mistake or that no such admission was made, petitioners cannot now contradict it. 
 
Detailed digest: 
 
Facts: 
Irene Bien filed a case for recovery of possession against Pedro Clemeńa y Zurbano. 
Irene Bien claims that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land situated in Albay. She 
claims that she acquired the land by purchase from Victoriano Napa who in turn 
acquired it from Francisco Barrameda who also bought it from the administrator of the 
estate of Pedro Clemeńa y Conde. That Zurbano ever since he was removed as 
administrator of the estate of Conde deliberately continued to occupy and usurp the 
possession and use of the land and refused to relinquish the possession of the same. 
That by the reason of this unlawful occupation, Bien suffered damages for the harvest. In 
his answer, Zurbano alleged that the land was his and that it was in his exclusive 
possession. His claim of ownership was based on a sale by the estate of Conde to his 
predecessor-in-interest. The parties were later substituted by their heirs.  
RTC declared the Heirs of Zurbano as the owners. RTC later held that both parties failed 
to prove their claims of ownership and therefore the land still belongs the estate of 
Conde. CA reversed the ruling of ownership in favor of the Heirs of Bine rewarded them 
damages. Heirs of Zurbano filed MR but was denied. Hence this petition. Petitioners no 
longer dispute respondents’ ownership but they insist that they cannot be held liable to 
respondents for damages as they never took possession of the property. 
Issue: 
Whether or not the contention of the petitioners that they never took possession of the 
property is admissible. 
Ruling: 
No. Petitioners’predecessor Zurbano alleged in his answer that the land was in his 
exclusive possession. The statement in so far as it confirmed the allegation in the 
complaint that C had the possession of the land took on the character of a judicial 
admission under Sec4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:  
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in 
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by 
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was 
made.  
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter 
contradict it. The exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in 
the exercise of its discretion and because of string reasons to support its stand, may 
relieve a party from the consequences of his admission. As substituting defendants they 
were bound by the admission of Zurbani, their predecessor in the litigation. Without any 
showing that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such 
admission was made, petitioners cannot now contradict it.  
 
 

(3) Luciano Tan v. Rodil Enterprises, 511 SCRA 162 (2006) 


 
LUANSING, ANNIELOU L. 
 
LEGEND:   
X – LUCIANO TAN (petitioner);  
Y – RODIL ENTERPRISES (respondent) 
 
BAR QUESTION: 
A contract of lease was drawn between Y and the Republic of the Philippines on a building 
owned by the latter. As lessee of the building, Y was able to sublease a unit to X. However, X 
unreasonably refused to pay the rentals and despite demands, refused to vacate the premises 
and to pay the rents due, thus, Y filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against X. In the course 
of the proceedings, the parties agreed in principle in open court that X will pay his outstanding 
obligation to Y. Further, X filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals to the City 
Treasurer of Manila but the same was denied as it contravenes the Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Y, which decision states that X did not contest the 
sublease and in fact admitted in judicio that X will pay Y his outstanding obligation.  
 
Can the admission of X be taken as an admission of his liability? 
 
SUGGESTED ANSWER: 
Yes.  
The general rule that an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability and is 
not admissible in evidence against the offeror is not absolute. 
As cited in the case of Luciano Tan vs. Rodil Enterprises, to determine the admissibility or 
non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the 
party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but 
offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of 
settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the 
existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the 
admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness. 
In the case at bar, the MeTC properly appreciated X’s admission as an exception to the general 
rule of inadmissibility. The MeTC found that petitioner did not contest the existence of the 
sublease. The Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an 
explicit acknowledgment of X’s liability on the subleased premises. 
 
CASE DIGEST: 
Facts: 
 
Rodil Enterprises filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed against Luciano Tan, alleging that 
under a Contract of Sublease, Tan bound himself to pay P13,750.00 as monthly rentals. 
However, Tan refused to pay the rentals from September 1997 up to the time of the filing of the 
Complaint. 
 
In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the government who owns the 
Ides ORacca Building and not of Rodil Enterprises. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the 
Complaint, and for the return of whatever amount Rodil Enterprises had collected from 1987 to 
1997, or during such time when he was still paying rentals to the latter. 
 
On 27 June 2000, the MeTC issued an Order, recognizing an agreement entered into in open 
court by Luciano Tan and Rodil Enterprises. The Order, inter alia, declared, thus: 
 
On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms 
to put an end to this civil case for ejectment between them: 
 
1.) that [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September, 1997 up to the 
present, which is the outstanding obligation of [Luciano Tan] as of June, 2000, on or before June 
30, 2000; and 
 
2.) [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day 
of each month after June 30, 2000.  
 
Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, averring therein that he had agreed to 
pay all the rentals due on the subject premises and to pay the subsequent monthly rentals as 
they fall due; that the rentals in arrears from September 1997 amounted to P467,500.00; and in 
line with his good faith in dealing with Rodil Enterprises, he would like to deposit the aforesaid 
amount, and the subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due. He prayed that he be allowed to 
deposit the Managers Check for the amount of P467,500.00, made payable to the City Treasurer 
of Manila. However, on 15 August 2000, the MeTC denied the Motion on the rationalization that 
Luciano Tan's prayer to deposit the specified sum with the City Treasurer of Manila contravenes 
Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
The MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Rodil Enterprises.   
 
According to the MeTC, notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in civil cases that an offer of 
compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the 
offeror, the court cannot overlook the frank representations by Luciano Tan's counsel of the 
former's liability in the form of rentals, coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The foregoing 
gestures, as appreciated by the MeTC, were akin to an admission of a fact, like the existence of 
a debt which can serve as proof of the loan, and was thus, admissible. The court pronounced 
that Luciano Tan had explicitly acknowledged his liability for the periodic consideration for the 
use of the subleased property. Estoppel, thus, precludes him from disavowing the fact of lease 
implied from the tender of payment for the rentals in arrears. 
 
Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and then, reiterated in his 
Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his liability, 
citing Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states, inter alia, that an offer of 
compromise in a civil case is not a tacit admission of liability. 
 
 
Issue: 
 
Can the admission of Tan, made in open court and reiterated in his Motion to Allow Defendant to 
Deposit Rentals be taken as an admission of his liability? 
 
 
Held: 
 
Yes. The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability. It 
is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. 
 
The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court in Trans-Pacific 
Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, to wit: 
 
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the 
circumstances of the case and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered. 
Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of 
buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course 
thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence of an indebtedness combined with a 
proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such 
indebtedness. Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission of a borrowers loan 
balance. 
  
Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co. the Court applied the 
exception to the general rule. In Varadero there was neither an expressed nor implied denial of 
liability, but during the course of the abortive negotiations therein, the defendant expressed a 
willingness to pay the plaintiff. Finding that there was no denial of liability, and considering that 
the only question discussed was the amount to be paid, the Court did not apply the rule of 
exclusion of compromise negotiations. 
 
In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated petitioners 
admission as an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The petitioner did not contest 
the existence of the sublease, and his counsel made frank representations anent the former's 
liability in the form of rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a proposal to 
liquidate. The Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals was as an explicit acknowledgment 
of petitioners liability on the subleased premises. The existence of the Contract of Lease, dated 
18 October 1999 was not denied by petitioner. The contracts that were assailed by petitioner are 
the contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, the validity of which has been upheld by this Court in 
the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No. 135537. (Tan vs. Rodil Enterprises, G. R. 
No. 168071, December 18, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 

(4) Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596 (1997) 


 
Lumbre, Jeany Lou P. 
 
X = Petitioner Attillo 
Y= Respondent Lhuilier 
Z= Respondent Amancor Corporation 
 
Bar Question: 
 
Z Corp contracted a loan with X. For failure to pay , X filed a complaint against Y, and Z 
corporation for collection of sum of money. In his answer, Y made an admission that he 
has personal liability in the transaction. However, the RTC rendered a decision ordering Z 
bank to pay X, absolving Y of any personal liability. 
 
Is an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such 
admission and are conclusive as to him? 
 
 
Answer: 
 
No. The party may contradict an admission by denying that he made such an 
admission. 

Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a judicial admission is 
conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two 
exceptions:  
 
1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and  
2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made.  
 
The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made 
such an admission. The one making the admission may show that he made no 'such' 
admission, or that his admission was taken out of context. 
 
 
Facts of the case: 
 
Amancor, owned and controlled by Florentino L. Atillo, contracted a mortgage 
loan with MBTC in 1985. In 1988, before the loan was paid, Michel Lhuillier 
bought shares of stock of Amancor. As a consequence, each became owner 47% 
of the outstanding stocks.  
 
In view of the urgent and immediate need for fresh capital to support the 
business operations of AMANCOR, ATILLO and LHUILLIER executed 
Memorandum of Agreement whereby LHUILLIER undertook to invest additional 
capital in AMANCOR. Atillio will dispose of his mortgage property which will 
involve pre-payment of AMANCOR’s mortgage with MBTC. While AMANCOR may 
not yet be in the position to re-pay said amount to him, it shall pay the interests to 
him equivalent to prevailing bank rate. 
 
Because of the failure of AMANCOR to satisfy its obligation to repay petitioner, 
the latter filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money. RTC rendered a 
decision in favor of the petitioner , ordering AMANCOR to pay him. LHUILLIER 
was, however, absolved of any personal liability therefor. 
 
Petitioner claims that LHUILLIER made a judicial admission of his personal 
liability in his Answer wherein he stated that: . 
"3.11. In all the subject dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier 
personally without the official participation of Amancor, Inc. 
 
xxx xxx xxx 
 
3.14 . Since the board of Amancor, Inc. did not formally ratify nor acceded 
(sic) to the personal agreement between plaintiff and Lhuillier through no 
fault of the latter, the corporation is not bound and the actionable 
documents are, at most, unenforceable insofar as the subject claim of 
plaintiff is concern 
 
Issue:  
 
Is an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party 
making such admission and are conclusive as to him? 
 
Ruling: 
 
No. The party may contradict an admission by denying that he made such an 
admission. 

Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a judicial 
admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof 
admits of two exceptions:  
 
1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and  
2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made.  
 
The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he 
made such an admission. 
 
"For instance, if a party invokes an 'admission' by an adverse party, but cites the 
admission 'out of context', then the one making the admission may show that he 
made no 'such' admission, or that his admission was taken out of context. 
 
This may be interpreted as to mean 'not in the sense in which the admission is 
made to appear.' That is the reason for the modifier 'such'." 
 
Here, petitioner appears to have taken the admissions made by LHUILLIER in 
paragraph 3.11 of his Answer "out of context". Petitioner is seemingly misleading 
this Court by isolating paragraph 3.11 of the said Answer from the preceding 
paragraphs. A careful scrutiny of the Answer in its entirety will show that 
paragraph 3.11 is part of the affirmative allegations recounting how LHUILLIER 
was persuaded to invest in AMANCOR which was previously owned and 
managed by petitioner.Paragraph 3.11 has reference to the fact that in all 
investments made with AMANCOR through stock purchases, only petitioner and 
LHUILLIER dealt with each other. It is more than obvious that paragraph 3.11 has 
nothing to do with the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner which is the subject 
of the present case. Contrary to petitioner's allegations, LHUILLIER had 
categorically denied personal liability for AMANCOR's corporate debts 
 
Granting arguendo that LHUILLIER had in fact made the alleged admission of 
personal liability in his Answer, We hold that such admission is not conclusive 
upon him. Applicable by analogy is our ruling in the case of Gardner vs. Court of 
Appeals which allowed a party's testimony in open court to override admissions 
he made in his answer. Thus: 
 
"The fact, however, that the allegations made by Ariosto Santos in his pleadings 
and in his declarations in open court differed will not militate against the findings 
herein made nor support the reversal by respondent court. As a general rule, 
facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are 
binding upon it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere 
statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. 
As ARIOSTO SANTOS himself, in open court, had repudiated the defenses he had 
raised in his ANSWER and against his own interest, his testimony is deserving of 
weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in his 
credibility and we find no reason to overturn their factual findings thereon."[20] 
(Underscoring supplied.) 
 
 
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is clear that in spite of the presence of judicial 
admissions in a party's pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider 
other evidence presented. This rule should apply with more reason when the 
parties had agreed to submit an issue for resolution of the trial court on the 
basis of the evidence presented. As distinctly stated in the stipulation of facts 
entered into during the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the 
determination of LHUILLIER's liability shall be based on the Memoranda of 
Agreement designated as ANNEXES "A", "B" and "C" of the Complaint. Thus, the 
trial court correctly relied on the provisions contained in the said Memoranda of 
Agreement when it absolved LHUILLIER of personal liability for the obligation of 
AMANCOR to petitioner. 
 

(5) People v. Lacson, 413 SCRA 20 (2003) 

(6) Dimaguila v. Monteiro, 314 SCRA 565 (2014) 


 
 
Febeh Marikit 
 
X = Spouses Monteiro, Respondent 
Y = Perfecto Dimaguila, son of YW 
W = Vitaliano Dimaguila, son of YW 
YW = Maria Ignacio Buenaseda, mother of Y and W 
Y1 = Pedro Dimaguila, son of Y 
Y1.1 = Heirs Of Pedro Dimaguila, ALL SURNAMED DIMAGUILA, Petitioners,   
 
Bar Question: 
Anchored on a Deed of Sale executed in favor of X by A, X filed a complaint against the heirs of 
Y (heirs) alleging that all the parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a property. In 
their answer, the heirs countered that there was no co-ownership; that the property, then owned 
by YW, had long been partitioned equally between her two sons, Y and W, with its southern-half 
portion assigned to W and the northern-half portion to Y. 
 
X amended his complaint adopting the heirs’ admission in their answer that the subject property 
had already been partitioned between Y and W. X further averred that Y was 
survived by Y1, Y2, and Y3, who divided the southern-half portion equally, 1/3 each share; that Y1 
sold his 1/3 share to X which is adjacent to the northern-half adjudicated to the heirs of W; and 
when X attempted to take possession of the share of Y1, they discovered that the subject 
portion was being occupied by the heirs of W. 
 
The heirs of W argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in 
his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them. Is the contention of the 
heirs of W tenable? 
 
Suggested Answer: 
 
No. 
 
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the 
course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted 
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. 
 
In their original answer to the complaint for partition, their claim that there was already a 
partition into northern-half and southern-half portions, was the very essence of their defense. It 
was precisely this admission which moved X to amend his complaint. The heirs of Y cannot now 
insist that the very foundation of their original defense was a palpable mistake. 
 
Hence, the contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self- serving claim unsupported by any iota 
of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. 

III. Rules of Admissibility (Rule 130) 

A. Object Evidence 

Cases: 

(1) Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995) [cf. § 1, Rule 11 of Rules of Electronic Evidence] 
Andrew M. Navarrete 
 
BAR Question: 
Two groups of loyalists converged where tension and animosity broke into violence between the 
groups which resulted in the murder of X. 
  
Informations for murder were filed and these cases were consolidated. The prosecution 
presented twelve witnesses including A and B. In support of their testimonies, the prosecution 
also presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and 
various photos. However, Witness A mistook in identifying one of the accused. 
  
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling. 
  
The CA found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength.  
  
Is the court correct in giving evidentiary weight to the photographs of the mauling incident? 
  
Suggested Answer: 
Yes 
  
Witness A's mistake in identifying one of the accused does not make his whole testimony a 
falsity. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses. In the 
court's discretion, the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved 
with respect to others. 
  
The rule is that when Photos are presented in evidence, they must be identified by the 
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were 
produced. Value lies in it being a correct representation or reproduction of the original. 
Admissibility determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. 
  
The correctness of the photo can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person 
who made it or by other competent witnesses. After which it can be admitted subject to its 
impeachment as to its accuracy. Therefore, the photographer or another competent witness can 
testify as to the exactness and accuracy of the photograph. 
  
The SC ruled that the use of the photographs by the attorney for the appellants is an admission 
of the exactness and accuracy of such. That the photos were faithful representations of the 
mauling incident was affirmed when appellants identified themselves in the pictures and 
explained their presence in said pictures. 
 
  

[G.R. Nos. 108280-83. November 16, 1995] 


ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, 
petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents 
  
Case Digest Version 
  
Doctrine: 
ADMISSIBILITY; PHOTOGRAPHS; PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF EXACTNESS AND ACCURACY 
SUFFICIENT. — The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, 
must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances 
under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct 
representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy 
in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only 
witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a 
faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony 
of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it 
subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the 
photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. 
  
Facts: 
The case occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA 
Revolution. This was the time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon C. 
Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos 
loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and animosity 
between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the 
murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista." 
  
On July 27, 1986, Marcos loyalists scheduled a rally at the Luneta but their application for permit 
to hold the rally was denied. They continued with the demonstration anyway. The police arrived 
and they could not produce a permit so they were asked to disperse in 10 minutes but instead of 
leaving, they became violent. The police pushed them and used tear gas to disperse them. The 
group fled to Maria Orosa street and the situation stabilized. 
  
A small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. They then 
saw Annie Ferrer a starlet and supporter of Marcos. Annie Ferrer learned of their dispersal, she 
continued jogging while shouting “Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, bugbugin 
ang mga nakadilaw”. The group answered “Bugbugin!”. Annie was arrested later, which 
prompted someone to shout “kailangang gumanti tayo ngayon!” the group then started 
attacking persons in yellow. Renato Banculo saw this and removed his yellow shirt. 
  
Banculo later saw the group pursuing a man in yellow who was later found out to be Stephen 
Salcedo. The group caught up with Salcedo and boxed, and kicked and mauled him. He tried to 
free himself but they kept on hitting him. Ranulfo Sumilang came to Salcedo's help but the group 
kept on hitting Salcedo, somebody handed Sumilang a loyalist tag and he then presented this to 
the group. The group backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to get Salcedo away from 
them. But the accused in this case, namely, Raul Billosos, Richard de los Santos, Joel Tan, Nilo 
Pacadar, Joselito Tamayo, Romeo Sison continued with the hitting. Sumilang also saw Gerry 
Neri but did not see what he did to Salcedo. 
  
  
  
Salcedo was able to get away from the group and sat on some cement steps, he tried to flee to 
Roxas boulevard but Tan and Pacadar pursued him. Salcedo cried for help but no one answered. 
The mauling continued at the Rizal monument until Salcedo eventually collapsed. Sumilang 
hailed a van and brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but was refused admission. He 
was then brought to PGH where he died upon arrival. 
  
The mauling was witnessed by many and the press took pictures and a video of the event which 
became front-page news the following day. Cory instructed the Western Police district to 
investigate on it and Brigadier General Alfredo Lim offered a P10,000 reward for persons who 
could give information which could help arrest the killers. Sumilang and Banculo cooperated 
with the Police and several persons including the accused were investigated. 
  
Informations for murder were filed and these cases were consolidated. The prosecution 
presented twelve witnesses including Sumilang and Banculo. In support of their testimonies, the 
prosecution also presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the 
indicent and various photos. 
  
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling. Either they 
were not there (since they were not in the Photographs) or that they were there and were in the 
photos because they were just watching or trying to stop the maulers. Sison, however, said that 
he was not there and was in fact waiting for his photos to be developed (he was a commercial 
photographer) and was afflicted with hernia which impaired his mobility. 
  
The RTC found Sison, Pacadar, Tan, de los Santos and Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime 
of murder qualified with treachery. Starlet Annie Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice. The 
court acquitted the others. 
  
On appeal, CA acquitted Starlet Annie Ferrer and increased the penalty of the rest of the 
accused except Tamayo. The CA found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior 
strength (penalty increased to RP). Hence auto review before the SC (for those sentenced to 
RP). 
  
Issues: 
1. WON the CA erred in sustaining the testimonies of Sumilang and Banculo. 
2. WON the CA erred in giving evidentiary weight to the photographs of the mauling incident. 
  
Ruling: 
1. NO. The defense was arguing that the 2 only testified because of the reward and that Banculo 
submitted 3 sworn statements. They also pointed out that Banculo pointed at the wrong person 
when asked to identify Rolando Fernandez. The court disagreed. 
  
There is no proof that they only testified because of the reward, since Sumilang went to the 
police station to issue a statement just 2 hours after the incident. Banculo, on the other hand, 
executed 3 statements to identify more suspects. This did not make his testimony incredible. 
Banculo's mistake in identifying one of the accused does not make his whole testimony a falsity. 
Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses. In the court's 
discretion the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved with 
respect to others. 
  
2. No. Aside from the photographs, the appellants also questioned the way the court gave 
evidentiary weight to the joint affidavit of 2 patrolmen but the court held that the joint affidavit 
merely reiterated what the other witnesses testified to and was a mere surplusage. 
  
As for the photographs, the appellants were questioning such evidence for lack of proper 
identification by the person or persons who took the same. 
  
The rule is that when Photos are presented in evidence, they must be identified by the 
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were 
produced. Value lies in it being a correct representation or reproduction of the original. 
Admissibility determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. 
  
The correctness of the photo can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person 
who made it or by other competent witnesses. After which it can be admitted subject to its 
impeachment as to its accuracy. Therefore, the photographer or another competent witness can 
testify as to the exactness and accuracy of the photograph. 
  
Initially, the defense objected to the admissibility of the photos but then they used the same 
photos in proving that some of the accused could not have participated since they were not in 
the photos. It was not until the third hearing where the attorney for the appellants interposed a 
continuing objection to their admissibility. 
  
The SC ruled that the use of the photographs by the attorney for the appellants is an admission 
of the exactness and accuracy of such. That the photos were faithful representations of the 
mauling incident was affirmed when appellants de los Santos, Pacadar and Tan identified 
themselves in the pictures and explained their presence in said pictures. 
  
Three (3) of the accused could be readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering 
behind or over the victim. The hernia afflicted Sison appeared only once and he was shown 
merely running after the victim. Tamayo was not identified in any of the photos but this does not 
exculpate him. He was still identified by Sumilang and Banculo. 
  
The appellants also questioned that the lower court erred in finding conspiracy among the 
principals and finding them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength instead of 
death in tumultuous affray. 
  
SC disagreed and said Art. 251 of the RPC (Death caused in a tumultuous affray) takes place 
when a quarrel between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, 
in the course of which some are killed or wounded and the author cannot be ascertained. But in 
this case, the “quarrel” was between a group and an individual. The group took advantage of 
their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape. 
This qualifies the killing to murder. Also, the SC held there was no treachery, though the essence 
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without slightest provocation but in this case, 
the victim had the chance to sense the temper of the group and run away from them but he was 
overtaken by them. 
  
There was however conspiracy, there was a concerted effort to bring down Salcedo. 
 

(2) People v. Rullepa, 398 SCRA 567 (2003) 


 
Ngujo, Monica Pearl D. 
TOPIC: Object Evidence 
  
X = Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto 
Y = Cyra May Francisco Buenafe 
Z = Gloria Francisco Buenafe 
  
BAR QUESTION: 
X,  a  houseboy,  was  charged  with  Rape  before  the  Regional  Trial  Court  (RTC)  of  Quezon City for 
allegedly  having  carnal  knowledge  with  Y,  a  minor  and  against  her will and without her consent. 
Y  and  her  mother,  Z,  testified  that  she  was  only three years old at the time of the rape. However, 
the  prosecution  did  not  offer  the  victim‘s  certificate  of  live  birth  or similar authentic documents 
in  evidence.  Finding  for  the  prosecution,  the  RTC  rendered  judgment  finding  X  guilty  beyond 
reasonable doubt of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death. 
  
Was the trial court correct in imposing the penalty of death upon X? 
  
SUGGESTED ANSWER: 
No.  A  person‘s  appearance,  where  relevant,  is  admissible  as  object  evidence,  the  same  being 
addressed to the senses of the court. However, where reasonable doubt exists as to the true age 
of  the  victim,  appearance  of  victim,  as  object  evidence,  cannot  be  accorded  much  weight  and 
the testimony of the mother, by itself, insufficient. 
  
In  the  present  case,  the  prosecution  did  not  offer  the  victim's  certificate  of  live  birth  or  similar 
authentic  documents  in  evidence.  Whether  the  victim  was  below  seven  years  old,  however,  is 
another matter. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped 
seven-year old.   
  
As  it  has  not  been  established  with  moral  certainty  that Cyra May was below seven years old at 
the  time  of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the 
death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him. 
 
Facts: 
X  was  accused  of  sexually  assaulting  Y,  a  minor,  on  November  17,  1995.  During  the  trial,  Y 
narrated  at  the  witness  stand  how  the  accused  committed  the  immoral  act. Her testimony was 
corroborated  by  the  findings  of  the  examining  physician  that  there  were  abrasions  on  the  labia 
minora,  which  she  opined  could  have  been  caused  by  friction  with  an  erect  penis.  X,  however, 
denied  having  anything  to  do  with  the  abrasions found in the victim's genitalia, and claimed that 
prior  to  the  alleged  incident,  Y  was  already  suffering  from  pain  urinating.  He  surmised  that  she 
could  have  scratched  herself  which  caused  the  abrasions.  Nevertheless,  the RTC found X guilty 
beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced him to death. 
  
Issue: 
Was the trial court correct in imposing the penalty of death upon X? 
  
Ruling: 
No.  A  person's  appearance,  where  relevant,  is  admissible  as  object  evidence,  the  same  being 
addressed to the senses of the court. 
  
There  can  be  no  question,  therefore,  as  to  the  admissibility  of  a  person's  appearance  in 
determining  his  or  her  age.  As  to  the  weight  to  accord  such  appearance,  especially  in  rape 
cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced hereunder: 
  
3.  If  the  certificate  of  live  birth  or  authentic  document  is  shown  to  have  been  lost  or 
destroyed  or  otherwise  unavailable,  the  testimony,  if  clear and credible, of the victim's 
mother  or  a  member  of  the  family  either  by  affinity  or  consanguinity  who  is  qualified 
to  testify  on  matters  respecting  pedigree  such  as  the exact age or date of birth of the 
offended  party  pursuant  to  Section  40,  Rule  130  of  the  Rules  on  Evidence  shall  be 
sufficient under the following circumstances: 
  
a.  If  the  victim  is  alleged  to  be  below  3  years  of  age  and  what  is  sought  to  be 
proved is that she is less than 7 years old; 
  
b.  If  the  victim  is  alleged  to  be  below  7  years  of  age  and  what  is  sought  to  be 
proved is that she is less than 12 years old; 
  
c.  If  the  victim  is  alleged  to  be  below  12  years  of  age  and what is sought to be 
proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 
  
Under  the  above  guideline,  the  testimony  of  a  relative  with  respect  to  the  age  of  the  victim  is 
sufficient  to  constitute  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt  in  cases  (a),  (b)  and  (c)  above.  In  such 
cases,  the  disparity  between  the  allegation  and  the  proof  of  age  is  so  great  that  the  court  can 
easily  determine  from  the  appearance  of  the  victim  the  veracity  of  the  testimony.  The 
appearance corroborates the relative's testimony. 
  
In  the  present  case,  the  prosecution  did  not  offer  the  victim's  certificate  of  live  birth  or  similar 
authentic  documents  in  evidence.  The  victim  and  her  mother,  however,  testified  that  she  was 
only  three  years  old  at  the  time  of  the  rape.  Because  of  the  vast  disparity  between  the  alleged 
age  (three  years  old)  and the age sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would 
have  had  no  difficulty  ascertaining  the  victim's  age  from  her  appearance.  No  reasonable  doubt, 
therefore,  exists  that  the  second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve 
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present. 
  
Whether  the  victim  was  below  seven  years  old,  however,  is  another  matter.  Here,  reasonable 
doubt  exists.  A  mature  three  and  a  half-year  old  can  easily  be  mistaken  for  an  underdeveloped 
seven-year  old.  The  appearance  of  the  victim,  as  object  evidence,  cannot  be  accorded  much 
weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient. 
  
As  it  has  not  been  established  with  moral  certainty  that Cyra May was below seven years old at 
the  time  of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the 
death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him. 
 

B. Documentary Evidence 

Case: 

(1) Yap v. Inopiquez, Jr., 403 SCRA 141 (2003) 


 
ROJAS, ELIZA FE V. 

SPO2 JOSE B. YAP vs. JUDGE AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ, JR. 

Bar question: 

X –complainant SPO2 Yap 

Y – respondent – Judge Aquilino Inopiquez of MCTC Kananga Matag-ob 

Y  issued  an  order  of  release  to  the  accused  arrested  by  X  on  the  basis of cash bond posted on 
March  8,  1999  as  shown  by  the  corresponding  official  receipt  number  9215725.  Y  issued 
another  order  of  release  based  on  a  property  bond  which  bond  was  subscribed  and  sworn  to 
before  him,  evidenced  by  a  Jurat  executed  on  March  10, 1999. However, this date was changed 
to March 6. 

X  filed  an  administrative  complaint  claiming  that Y issued the two orders of release on March 6, 


1999  although  there  was yet no cash bond or property bond for actually the cash bond was filed 
on March 8 and the property bond on March 10. 

However,  Y  maintained  that  both  the  cash  bond and the property bond were posted on March 6, 


the same day he issued the corresponding order of release.   

Should Y be held administratively? 


  

Suggested Answer: 

Yes. 

Jurisprudence  dictates  that  as  a  general  rule,  testimonial  evidence  cannot  prevail  over 
documentary  evidence.  It  is  an  elementary  rule  in  evidence  that  between  documentary and oral 
evidence,  the  former  carries  more  weight  as  decided  in the case of Romago Electric Co. Inc. vs. 
Court of Appeals. 

The  cash  bond  was  posted  on  March  8,  (Monday)  not  March  6,  1999  as  shown  by  OR  No. 
9215725.  The  property  bond,  in  substitution  of  the  cash  bond,  was  filed, not on March 6, but on 
March  10  (Wednesday)  as  shown  by  the  Jurat.  Both  orders  of  release  were  issued  on  March 6, 
Saturday.  Therefore,  there  is  no  doubt  that  Y  ordered  the  release  the  accused  despite  the  fact 
that there was yet no bail filed and approved for provisional liberty. 

 
Case Digest 

Facts: 

SPO2  Jose  Yap  arrested  Antonio  Luarente  Jr.  Respondent  Judge  Aquilino  Inopiquez  Jr. 
issued  an  Order  of  Release  on  the  basis  of  a  cash  bond  posted  on  March  8,  1999  as shown by 
the  corresponding  Official  Receipt  No.  9215725.  Also  on  March  6,  respondent  judge  issued 
another  Order  of  Release,  this  time  based  on  a  property  bond,  subscribed  and  sworn  to  before 
him  on  March  10,  1999  although there was no cash bond or property bond, for actually the cash 
bond  was  posted  on  March  8,  while  the  property  bond  was  filed  on  March  10.  Laurente  filed  a 
complaint  against  Inopiquez  for  grave  abuse  and  for  acts  unbecoming  of  a  judge  for  having 
issued  the  order  of  release  prematurely.  He  also  alleged  that  the  issuance  of  the  release  order 
was a help extended the accused who is allegedly a relative of the judge’s wife. 

On  October 27, 1999, respondent judge filed his comment. He denied the charges, asserting that 
the  relationship  of  his  wife  to  the  accused  has  no  bearing  to his judicial duties of approving the 
bail  and  issuing  the  Order  of  Release.  On  March  6,  1999,  when  accused  Laurente,  Jr.  was 
arrested,  his  brother  Silverio  Laurente  and  one  Salvador  Almoroto  went  to  respondents 
residence  and  presented  O.R.  No.  9215725  showing  that  on  that  date,  a  cash bond was posted 
with  the  office  of  respondents  Clerk  of  Court  Servando  O.  Veloso,  Jr.  The  money  in  the amount 
of  P18,000.00  belonged  to  Almoroto.  Silverio  Laurente  also  handed to respondent judge, for his 
signature,  the  Order  of  Release  dated  March  7,  1999  prepared  by  Clerk  of  Court  Veloso.  The 
latter  placed  the  date  March  7  instead  of  March  6  because  he  thought respondent judge would 
only be available on that date. 

Also  on  the  same  day,  March  6,  minutes  after  Silverio  Laurente  and  Almoroto  left,  Antonio 
Laurente,  Sr.,  accuseds  father,  and  Court  Interpreter  Pedro  M.  Beltran  arrived.  Laurente,  Sr. 
presented  to  respondent  judge  a  property  bond  and  an  Order  of  Release,  also  dated  March  6, 
1999,  both  prepared  by  Beltran.  Respondent  judge  told  them  that  he  had  already  approved  the 
cash  bond  and  signed  the  corresponding  Order  of  Release.  However,  Laurente,  Sr.  pleaded  to 
him  to  approve  the  property  bond  in  order  that  the  money  utilized  as  cash  bond  could  be 
returned  to  Almoroto  to  avoid  paying  interest  thereon.  After  examining  the  property  bond, 
respondent judge approved the same and signed another Order of Release 

Respondent  Judge  claimed  that  O.R.  No.  9215725  was  actually  issued  to  Almoroto  on 
March  6  after  he  had  posted  the  cash  bond  that  same  day.  Respondent  Judge  insisted  though 
that it was Clerk of Court Veloso who altered the date appearing thereon, from March 6 to March 
8,  1999,  since  Complainant angrily protested that Veloso, the clerk of court, should not issue the 
official receipt dated March 6, 1999 as it was a Saturday, a non-working day. 

The  case  was  referred  to  Executive  Judge  Madrona  who  declared  that  there  was  no 
substantial  basis  for  the  complaint.  Afterwhich,  it  was  referred  to  the  office  of  the  Court 
Administrator who declared that the respondent Judge should be held administratively liable. 

  

Issue 

Is the Court Administrator correct in holding the administrator administratively liable? 

  

Ruling 

Yes. 

Jurisprudence  dictates  that  as  a  general  rule,  testimonial  evidence  cannot  prevail  over 
documentary  evidence.  It  is  an  elementary  rule  in  evidence  that  between  documentary and oral 
evidence,  the  former  carries  more  weight  as  decided  in the case of Romago Electric Co. Inc. vs. 
Court of Appeals. 

It  is  observed  that  the  property  bond  was  subscribed  and  sworn  to  by  bondsman  Antonio 
Laurente,  Sr.  before  respondent  judge  on  March  10,  1999  (Wednesday).  However,  very  clear  to 
the  naked  eye  is  that  6  was  superimposed on 10th (day of March) to make it appear that the bail 
was  accomplished  and  filed  on  March  6.  The  jurat  positively  shows  that  the  property  bond,  in 
lieu  of  the  cash  bond,  was  filed,  not  on  March  6,  but  on  March  10,  1999,  or  four  (4)  days  after 
respondent  judge  issued  his  second  Order  of  Release  on  March  6,  1999.  It  is  a  basic  rule  of 
evidence  that  between  documentary  and  oral  evidence,  the  former  carries  more  weight.  The 
cash  bond  was  posted  on  March  8  (Monday),  not  on  March  6,  1999,  as  shown  by  O.R.  No. 
9215725.  The  property  bond,  in  substitution  of  the  cash  bond,  was  filed, not on March 6, but on 
March  10  (Wednesday),  as  shown  by  the  jurat.  Both  Orders  of  Release  were  issued on March 6 
(Saturday).  Therefore,  there  is  no  doubt  that  respondent  judge  ordered  the  release  of  the 
accused  despite  the  fact  that  there  was  yet no bail filed and approved for his provisional liberty. 
That  respondent  judge  issued  the  release  orders  prematurely  is  not  difficult  to  understand.  He 
admitted  that  accused  Antonio  Laurente,  Jr.  is  his  wifes  relative.  And  in  his  desire  to  help  the 
accused  and  please  his  wife,  he  would  even  involve  his  Clerk  of  Court  and  Interpreter. 
Considering  the  facts  of  this  case,  it  is  safe  to  conclude  that  they  were  constrained  to  comply 
with his instructions. Hence, they should have been spared from any administrative sanction. 

1. Best Evidence Rule ( §3-8, Rule 130) 

a) E-Commerce Act, §10 

b) Rules on Electronic Evidence Rules 2(h), 3, and 4 

Cases: 

(1) Consolidated Bank v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., 465 SCRA 117 (2006) 
  
Gladys Viranda 
  
Consolidated Bank v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., 465 SCRA 117 
Topic: Best Evidence Rule ( §3-8, Rule 130) 
 
X bank - Petitioner 
Y - Respondent 
  
BAR Q 
X bank filed a complaint against Y in which X alleges that it loaned 1 million to Y evidence by a 
promissory note. In his answer, Y interpose as a defense that he has never signed the 
promissory note. During the trial, X sought admission of the duplicate original of the promissory 
note as Exhibit E as it could no longer found the original copy (Exhibit A). Y opposed the 
admission because Exhibit E was not the original of Exhibit A which was the foundation of the 
claim. The trial court ordered the exclusion of Exhibit A and E and then granted the motion to 
dismiss filed by Y on the ground that X no longer possessed any proof of Y’s alleged 
indebtedness. 
Is it essential that the best evidence rule must be applied to establish the promissory note which 
was the basis of the recovery of the money allegedly loaned by Y? 
 
ANSWER: 
 
No. 
The best evidence rule accepts exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject 
document is in the possession of the adverse party. Significantly, Y failed to deny specifically the 
execution of the promissory note. This being the case, there was no need for X to present the 
original of the promissory note in question. Y’s judicial admission with respect to the 
genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to X 
regardless of the fact that X failed to present the original of said note. X need not prove that fact 
as it is considered admitted by Y. 
  
LONG VERSION: 
FACTS: 
Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for recovery of money against respondents. 
Petitioner alleges it extended a 1 million pesos loan in favor of respondents as evidence by a 
promissory note. Under the promissory note, respondent corporation and Morales bound 
themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner through installments. 
Respondents defaulted on their installments making the full amount of the loan due and 
demandable. Petitioner alleges that they made demands but were unheeded. Petitioner 
attached to its complaint as Annexes A, B and C respectively a photocopy of the promissory 
note executed by respondents, demand letter and statement of account. 
In his answer, respondent Morales admits the paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the complaint and 
interpose as special and affirmative defense that he has never signed the promissory note 
attached to the complaint and said documents is void for lack of valid consideration. 
During trial, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of 
Exhibit A could no longer be found, petitioner sought the admission of the duplicate original of 
the promissory note as Exhibit E. Respondents claim that Exhibit E should not have been 
admitted as it was immaterial, irrelevant and hearsay evidence and that Exhibit E was not the 
original of Exhibit A which was the foundation of the complaint. 
The trial court ordered the exclusions of Exhibit A and E and with this, respondents move to 
dismiss the case on the ground that petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondent’s 
alleged indebtedness. Later, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case. On appeal, CA 
affirmed the trial court decision. 
 
ISSUE: 
Whether CA erred when it upheld the exclusions of Exhibit E, the second original of the 
promissory note. 
  
HELD: 
Yes. 
The best evidence rule is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil 
Procedure which provides: 
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the 
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, 
except in the following cases: 
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad 
faith on the part of the offeror; 
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the 
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; 
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be 
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is 
only the general result of the whole; and 
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public 
office. 
The best evidence rule as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. The rule 
accepts of exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the 
possession of the adverse party. 
Significantly, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note. This 
being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in 
question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the 
promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that 
petitioner failed to present the original of said note. 
Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and 
genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is 
considered admitted by the defendant. 
  
 

(2) Lee v. People, 440 SCRA 662 (2004) 

(3) Citibank, N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, 411 SCRA 577 (2003) 


Mareja Aña G. Arellano 
 
A= Citibank NA Mastercard (Petitioner) 
B= Efren S. Teodoro (Respondent) 
 
Question: 
B  is  a  Citibank  Card  credit  card  holder  who made various purchases through his credit card and 
was  billed  by  A  for  those  purchases,  for  which  he tendered various payments. C claims that the 
obligations  of  respondent  stood  at  P191,  693.25,  inclusive  of  interest  and  service  charges. 
Several  times  it  demanded  payment  from  him,  but  he  refused  to  pay,  claiming  that  the  amount 
demanded  did  not  correspond  to  his  actual  obligations.  Citibank  presented  several  sales 
invoices  or  charge  slips,  which  added  up  to  only  P24,388.36. Although mere photocopies of the 
originals,  the  invoices  were  marked  in  evidence  as  Exhibits  F  to  F-4.  Are  the photocopies of the 
sales invoices or charge slips marked during trial as Exhibits F to F-4 admissible in evidence? 
 
Answer: 
1No. The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged 
obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. 
 
Before  a  party  is  allowed  to  adduce  secondary  evidence  to  prove  the  11q  original;  (2)  the  loss 
and  destruction  of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of 
the offerror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.  
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. 
 
In the case at bar, Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were unavailable, and 
that due diligence had been exercised in the search for them. 
 
Case Digest 
Facts: 
Citibank  operates  a  credit  card  system  which  it  extends  credit  accommodations  to  its 
cardholders  for  the  purchase  of  goods  and  services.  Respondent  Efren  S.  Teodoro  was  one  of 
the  cardholders,  who  applied  for  membership  with  petitioner.  After  his  application  was 
approved,  he  was  issued  Citibank,  N.A.  Mastercard.  Teodoro  made  various  purchases  through 
his  credit  card  and  was  billed  by  petitioner  for  those  purchases,  for  which  he  tendered  various 
payments.  Citibank  claims  that  as  of  January  20,  1995,  the  obligations  of  respondent  stood  at 
P191,  693.25,  inclusive  of  interest  and  service  charges.  Several  times  it  demanded  payment 
from  him,  but  he  refused  to  pay,  claiming  that  the  amount  demanded  did  not  correspond to his 
actual  obligations.  His  refusal  prompted  petitioner  to  file  a  Complaint  for  collection  before  the 
Regional  Trial  Court(RTC)  of  Makati  City,  however  the  case  was  dismissed  because  of  lack  of 
jurisdiction  over  the  amount  involved  and  transferred  the  case  to  Metropolitan  Trial  Court  of 
Makati  City.  During  the  trial,  petitioner  presented  several  sales  invoices  or  charge  slips,  which 
added  up  to  only  P24,388.36.  Although  mere  photocopies  of  the  originals,  the  invoices  were 
marked  in  evidence  as  Exhibits  F  to  F-4.  Because  all  these  copies  appeared  to  bear  the 
signatures  of  respondent,  the  trial  court deemed them sufficient proof of his purchases with the 
use  of the credit card. MTC decided in favour of Citibank. Teodoro appealed to RTC and affirmed 
MTC decision. CA reversed. 
 
Issue:  
WON  CA  erred  in  holding  that  petitioner  failed  to  prove  the  due  execution  and  the  cause  of  the 
unavailability and non-production of the charge slips marked in evidence as Exhibits F to F-4 
 
Ruling:  
SC  affirmed CA decision. The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove 
the  alleged  obligation.  Photocopies  thereof  are  mere  secondary  evidence.  Before  a  party  is 
allowed  to  adduce  secondary  evidence  to  prove  the  contents  of  the  original  sales  invoices,  the 
offeror  must  prove  the  following:  (1)  the  existence  or  due  execution  of  the  original;  (2)  the loss 
and  destruction  of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of 
the  offeror,  the  absence  of  bad  faith  to  which  the  unavailability of the original can be attributed. 
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. 
 
When  more  than  one  original  copy  exists,  it  must  appear  that  all  of  them  have  been  lost, 
destroyed,  or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A 
photocopy  may  not  be  used  without  accounting  for  the  other  originals.  Each  of  these  three 
copies  is  regarded  as  an  original  in  accordance  with  Section  4  (b)  of  Rule  130  of  the  Rules  of 
Court.  Petitioner  failed  to  show  that  all  three  original  copies  were  unavailable,  and  that  due 
diligence had been exercised in the search for them. 
 
(4) Vda. De Corpus v. Brabangco (C.A.), 59 O.G. 8262 (1963) 
 
Bar Question 
 
Benzer  is  the  declared  owner  of  two  parcels  of  land,  which  the  surviving  widow  and children of 
Mark  Corpus  claimed  that  they  were  sold  by  Benzer  to  Mark  Corpus  in  1925  for  P450.00,  of 
which  P300  was  paid.  In  order  to  prove  their  claim,  the  heirs  invoked  the  deed  of  sale  in  due 
form  and  witnessed  by  Pablo  and  Bonifacio  Villareal  and  acknowledged  by  Benzer  before  a 
Notary  Public,  Roseller  Tirador.  They  further  alleged  that  the balance have been paid by Mark to 
Benzer,  as  evidenced  by  a  receipt.  When  the  trial  court  asked  about  the  deed  of  sale,  Corpus’ 
heirs  could  not produce the deed of sale which has allegedly been lost during the Japanese war. 
Benzer  moved  to  strike  the  testimony  of  Corpus’  heirs  on  the  ground  of  violation  of  the  best 
evidence rule. 
 
Is the motion meritorious?  
 
Answer: 
 
No, the motion is not meritorious. 
 
Under  the  best  evidence  rule,  the  original  document  must  be  produced  whenever  its  contents 
are  the  subject  of  inquiry.  As  an  exception,  a  party  may  be  allowed  to  adduce  secondary 
evidence  to  prove  the  contents  of  the  original,  provided  that  the  offeror  must  prove  the 
following:  (1)  the  existence  or  due  execution  of  the  original;  (2)  the  loss  and  destruction  of  the 
original  or  the  reason  for  its  non-production  in  court;  and  (3)  on  the  part  of  the  offeror,  the 
absence  of  bad  faith  to  which  the  unavailability  of  the  original  can  be  attributed.  The  correct 
order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. 
 
In  this  case,  the  original  deed  of  sale  signed  by  Benzer  was  lost  during  the  war  and  the  heirs 
made  efforts  to  trace  the  whereabouts  of  Notary  Public  Roseller  Tirador  to  get  a  copy  of  the 
deed,  but  the  latter’s  children  said  that  their  parents  were  already  dead  and  that  their 
house  in  which  their  father  had  kept  his  documents  had  burned  down.  The  existence  of  the 
deed,  however,  was  convincingly  proven  not  only  by  the  testimony  of  Corpus’  widow, 
but  also  by  the  disinterested  testimony  of  Pablo  Ableza,  a  municipal  councillor  who 
served as one of the witnesses in the execution of the sale. 
 
 
Facts: 
 
Tiburcia  Brabangco  is  declared  owner  of  two  parcels  of  land,  which  the  surviving  widow  and 
children  of  German  Corpus  claimed  that  they  were  sold  by  Tiburcia  Brabangco  to  German 
Corpus  in  1925  for  P450.00,  of  which  P300  was  paid  upon  the  execution  of  the  deed  of sale in 
due  form,  as  witnessed  by  Pablo  and Bonifacio Villareal and acknowledged by Tiburcia before a 
Notary  Public,  Jose  Tirador.  The  balance  was  also  alleged  to  have  been  paid  by  Corpus  to 
Tiburcia,  as  evidenced  by  a  receipt.  Corpus’  heirs  claim that Corpus had been in the possession 
of  the  said  land from 1926 until his death. However, Corpus’ heirs could not produce the deed of 
sale which has allegedly been lost during the Japanese war.  
 
Issue: 
 
Whether  the  heirs  can  establish  the  contents  of  the  deed  of  sale  despite  the  absence  of  the 
original document. 
 
Ruling: 
 
Yes,  the  heirs  can  establish  the  contents  of  the  deed  of sale despite the absence of the original 
document  because  after  proper  proof  of  the  due  execution  and  delivery  of  the  instrument,  and 
its  loss  or  destruction,  oral  evidence  may  be  given  of  its  content  by  any  person  who signed the 
document  or  read  it. In this case, the original deed of sale signed by Tiburcia was lost during the 
war  and  the  heirs  made  efforts  to  trace  the  whereabouts  of  Notary  Public Jose Tirador to get a 
copy  of  the  deed,  but  the  latter’s  children said that their parents were  already  dead  and  that 
their  house  in  which their father had kept his documents had burned down. The existence  of 
the  deed,  however,  was  convincingly  proven  not  only  by  the  testimony  of  Corpus’ 
widow,  and  by  the  environmental  facts  disclosed  by  the  evidence,  but  also  by  the 
disinterested  testimony  of  Pablo  Ableza,  a  municipal councillor  who  served  as  one 
of the witnesses in the execution of the sale.  
 
Ratio Decidendi: 
 
When  the  existence  of  a  document  is  proven,  the  court  should  allow  the  lost  document  to  be 
proven  by  parole;  testimonies  of  a  witness  regarding  the  contents of the document need not be 
verbatim or perfect. 

(5) Vila Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845 (1968) 


 
Cagaanan, Vic Raymond C. 
  
X = Jose M. Villarama 
V  = Villa Rey Transit 
V Inc. = Villa Rey Transit, Inc. 
P = Pangasinan Transportation Company, Inc. 
Y  = Natividad Villarama 
Z  = Valentin Fernando 
A  = Eusebio Ferrer 
  
FACTS: 
X was an operator of a bus transportation, under the business name of V Transit. He sold 
the  aforementioned  two  certificates  of  public  convenience  to  P  Company  with  the  condition, 
among  others,  that  X  shall  not  for  a  period  of  10  years  from  the  date of sale, apply for any TPU 
service  identical  or  competing  with  the  buyer.  Barely  three  months  thereafter,  a  corporation 
called  V,  Inc.  was  organized  and  Y,  the  wife  of  X  was one of the incorporators and the treasurer. 
It  bought  five  certificates  of  public  convenience  from  Z.  Before  the  approval  of  sale,  two  of  the 
five  certificates  of  public  convenience  were  levied  by  the  sheriff  in  favor  of  A,  the  judgment 
creditor  of  Z.  Thereafter,  A  sold  the  two  certificates  of public convenience to P. P therein prayed 
that  it  be  authorized  provisionally  to  operate  the  service  involved  in  the  said  two  certificates.  P 
argued  that it has a better right to the certificate since the sale between X and P is subject to the 
condition  that  X  shall  not  for  a  period  of  10  years  from  the  date  of  sale,  apply  for  any  TPU 
service  identical  or  competing  with P. P presented to the court photocopies of the ledger entries 
and  vouchers  of  V  Inc.  to  show  that  the  funds  of  X  and  Y  were  used  as  investment  in  the 
corporation to prove that the corporation is the alter ego of X. 
  
ISSUE: 
  WON the photocopies of the documents are admissible in evidence 
  
HELD: 
  Yes. 
  
  Section  5  of  Rule  130  of  the  Rules  of  Court  provides  for  the  requisites  for  the 
admissibility  of  secondary  evidence  when  the  original  is  in  the  custody  of  the  adverse  party, 
thus:  (1)  opponent's  possession  of  the  original;  (2)  reasonable  notice  to  opponent  to  produce 
the  original;  (3)  satisfactory  proof  of  its  existence;  and  (4)  failure  or  refusal  of  opponent  to 
produce the original in court. 
  

 
In the case at bar, at the time of the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum, the originals were 
already  missing,  therefore,  V,  Inc.  was  no  longer  in  possession  of  the  same.  However,  it  is  not 
necessary  for  a  party seeking to introduce secondary evidence to show that the original is in the 
actual  possession  of  his  adversary.  It  is  enough  that  the  circumstances  are  such as to indicate 
that  the  writing  is  in  his  possession  or  under  his  control.  Neither  is  it  required  that  the  party 
entitled  to  the  custody  of  the  instrument  should,  on  being  notified  to  produce  it, admit having it 
in  his  possession.  Hence,  secondary  evidence  is  admissible  where  he  denies  having  it  in  his 
possession.  The  party  calling  for  such  evidence  may  introduce  a  copy  thereof  as in the case of 
loss.  For,  among  the  exceptions  to  the  best  evidence  rule  is  "when  the  original  has  been  lost, 
destroyed,  or  cannot  be  produced  in  court."  The  originals  of  the  vouchers  in  question  must  be 
deemed  to  have  been  lost,  as  even  the  Corporation  admits  such  loss.  Viewed  upon  this  light, 
there can be no doubt as to the admissibility in evidence. 
  
  
Bar Question: 
X  was  an  operator  of  a  bus  transportation  and  he  sold  two  certificates  of  public 
convenience  to  P  Company  with  the  condition,  among  others,  that  X shall not for a period of 10 
years  from  the  date  of  sale,  apply  for  any  TPU  service identical or competing with P. Thereafter, 
V,  Inc.  was  organized  and  Y,  the  wife  of  X,  was  one  of  the  incorporators  and  the  treasurer.  It 
bought  five  certificates  of  public convenience from Z. Before the approval of sale, two of the five 
certificates  of  public  convenience  were  levied  by  the  sheriff  in  favor  of  A,  the  judgment  creditor 
of  Z.  Thereafter, A sold the two certificates of public convenience to P. P therein prayed that it be 
authorized  provisionally  to  operate  the  service  involved  in  the  said  two  certificates.  P  argued 
that  it  has  a  better  right  to  the  certificate  since  the  sale  between  X  and  P  is  subject  to  the 
condition  that  X  shall  not  for  a  period  of  10  years  from  the  date  of  sale,  apply  for  any  TPU 
service  identical  or  competing  with P. P presented to the court photocopies of the ledger entries 
and  vouchers  of  V  Inc.  to  prove that the corporation is the alter ego of X. Are the photocopies of 
the documents admissible in evidence? 
  
Suggested Answer: 
  Yes. Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for the 
admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party, 
thus: (1) opponent's possession of the original; (2) reasonable notice to opponent to produce 
the original; (3) satisfactory proof of its existence; and (4) failure or refusal of opponent to 
produce the original in court. It is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary 
evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is enough that 
the circumstances are such as to indicate that the writing is in his possession or under his 
control. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument should, on 
being notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession. The party calling for such 
evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exceptions to the 
best evidence rule is "when the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in 
court." 

(6) Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, 77 SCRA 24 (1977) 


 
Canete 
 
BAR Q: 
 
X and Y entered into a contract whereby Y is to provide arrastre and stevedoring 
services to X. Later, X notified Y of its intention to terminate the contract and 
thereafter hired the services of Z. Y picketed the wharf and prevented Z from 
doing work. X filed a complaint for damages against Y and presented an auditor’s 
report as evidence of its losses. The court awarded actual damages based on the 
auditor’s reports. 
  
Is the court correct considering the auditor’s report as admissible? 
 
ANSWER: 
 
No. 
  
Rule  130,  Sec.  3  of  the  Rules  of  Court  provides  when  the  original  consists  of 
numerous  accounts  or  other  documents  which  cannot  be  examined  in  court 
without  great  loss  of  time  and  the  fact  sought  to  be  established  from  them  is 
only  the  general  result  of  the  whole,”  the  original  writings  need  not  be  produced. 
In  order  for  this  rule  to  apply,  the  voluminous  character  of  the  accounts  or 
documents should be established. 
  
In  the  case  at  bar,  the  company  failed  to  make  a  preliminary  showing  as  to  the 
difficulty  or  impossibility  attending  the  production  of  the  records  in  court  and 
their  examination  and  analysis  as  evidence  by  the  court  before  offering  the 
auditor’s report as evidence 
  
Thus, the court is incorrect. 
 
 

(7) Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 272 (2004) 


 
Capao, Henna Auggie M. 
 
A = Tenebro 
B = Ancajas 
C = Villareyes 
 
Bar Question: A was married to B. B filed a complaint for bigamy against A when A informed B 
that he is previously married to C. B presented as evidence A and C's marriage contract and C's 
handwritten letter admitting her marriage with A. A, on the other hand, presented certifications 
from the NSO and Civil Registry that no record of marriage celebrated between A and C. Which 
evidence presented should be deemed as the "Best Evidence"? 
 
Suggested Answer: B's evidence should be deemed as the "Best Evidence". Pursuant to Section 
7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a 
public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The 
marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence 
of the marriage between A and C, which should be given greater credence than documents 
testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage. It should also be considered that 
there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to 
the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. 
 
Detailed Case Digest: 
 
FACTS: Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The couple separated in 1991 when 
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to Villareyes in 1986. 
 
In 1993, Tenebro contracted another marriage with Villegas. 
Thus, Ancajas filed a complaint for bigamy against Tenebro. 
 
Both the RTC and the CA found Tenebro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy 
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 
 
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy. 
 
RULING: Tenebro is guilty of bigamy. 
 
The prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the 
existence of the first marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. Documentary evidence 
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes; 
and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas informing the latter that Villareyes and 
Tenebro were legally married. 
 
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, Tenebro presented a certification issued by the 
National Statistics Office and a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, both 
documents attesting that such offices have no record of marriage celebrated between Tenebro 
and Villareyes. 
 
However, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the certified copy of the 
marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best 
evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated 
between Tenebro and Villareyes, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to 
public documents. 
Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary 
evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the 
invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. 
 
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the 
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater 
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, 
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract 
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a 
marriage. 
 

(8) Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, G.R. No. 171701, 8 February 2012 

2. Parol Evidence Rule (§9, Rule 130) 

a) Express trusts on immovables (Art. 1443, Civil Code) 

b) Statute of Frauds (Arts. 1403 and 1405, Civil Code) 

Cases: 

(1) Financial Building Corporation v. Rudlin, G.R. No. 164186, 4 October 2010 

(2) Palanca v. Fred Wilson & Co., 37 Phil. 506 (1918) 


 
EUPENA, Ron Christian 
 
Bar Q 
X and Y entered in to a contract where the former will purchase from the latter a distilling 
apparatus. In the contract, it provided: ("A device, 'Guillaume' for direct and continuous 
distillation-rectification, type 'C,' Agricola, with a capacity of 6,000 liters per 24 working hours, of 
a grade of 96-97 Gay Lussac, all according to the engraving of page 30 of the Egrot catalog, 
edition of 1907. "). A suit for breach of contract was instituted by X for failure of Y to deliver a 
machine that is capable of producing 6000 liters for every 24 hours. Y, on the other hand asserts 
that they would only supply an apparatus to treat 6,000 liters.  
Rule on the proper interpretation of the word “capacity”  
Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing that a written agreement shall be 
presumed to contain all the terms, nevertheless "does not exclude other evidence of the 
circumstances under which the agreement was made, or to which it relates, or to explain an 
intrinsic ambiguity."  
We are accordingly constrained to hold that the proper construction of clause 1 of the contract, 
in question in connection with the conduct of the parties and surrounding circumstances, is that 
Wilson and Co. were to furnish Song Fo and CO. a distilling apparatus, type C (Agricola), as 
described on page 30 of the maker's catalogue, capable of receiving or treating 6,000 liters 
every 24 hours of work and of producing alcohol of a grade 96-97 Gay Lussac. 
 
 
Case digest 
Facts: 
Song Fo and Co., of Manila, through its manager Carlos Palanca, entered into a contract with 
Fred Wilson and Co. for the purchase of a distilling apparatus. About five months after the 
machine was installed, Palanca wrote Wilson and Co. that the machine was not capable of 
producing the amount of alcohol stipulated in the contract. Subsequently, action for damages 
for breach of contract was begun in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. appellant 
vigorously asserts that there has been a breach of the contract in that instead of the machine 
having a capacity of 6,000 liters for every 24 hours of work, it only had (a producing) capacity of 
480 liters for this period of time. Appellee on the other hand relies on the ordinary meaning of 
the word "capacity" as indicating receptivity and on the preliminary negotiations as explaining 
the intention of the parties. Carlos Palanca, the manager of Song Fo and Co., and now the 
successor of the company, testified that he told the agents of Wilson and Co. that he need a 
machine that would produce at least 6,000 liters of alcohol a day. The agent of Wilson and Co., 
James F. Loader, squarely contradicted this on the stand and said that Palanca asked him to get 
on an apparatus to treat 6,000 liters. 
It is around the first clause of the contract (Exhibit D) that all the argument centers. This clause 
reads:  
"Un aparato; 'Guillaume' para la destilacion-rectificacion directa y continua; tipo 'C,' Agricola, de 
una capacidad de 6,000 litros cada 24 horas de trabajo, de un grado de 96-97 Gay Lussac, todo 
segun el grabado de la pagina 30 del catalogo Egrot, edicion de 1907." ("A device, 'Guillaume' for 
direct and continuous distillation-rectification, type 'C,' Agricola, with a capacity of 6,000 liters 
per 24 working hours, of a grade of 96-97 Gay Lussac, all according to the engraving of page 30 
of the Egrot catalog, edition of 1907. ") 
Issue: 
What is the proper interpretation of the word “capacity” 
Ruling: 
Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing that a written agreement shall be 
presumed to contain all the terms, nevertheless "does not exclude other evidence of the 
circumstances under which the agreement was made, or to which it relates, or to explain an 
intrinsic ambiguity." (That in connection with the distilling of liquor, the word "capacity" may have 
different meanings unless restricted in terminology, is disclosed by the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Chicago Distilling Co. vs. Stone where the qualifying phrases "working 
capacity" and "producing capacity" are specifically" mentioned. The ordinary meaning of the 
word is defined in the English Dictionaries as "ability to receive or contain; cubic extent; carrying 
power or space; said of that within which any solid or fluid may be placed, and also used 
figuratively; as the keg has a capacity of 10 gallons; the ship's capacity is 1,000 tons." The 
ordinary meaning of the Spanish equivalent "capacidad" as disclosed by the Spanish 
Dictionaries is "ambito que tiene alguna cosa y es suficiente para contener en si otra; como el 
de una vasijia, arca, etc. En el vaso se debe atender la disposicion y capacidad." Both definitions 
denote that which anything can receive or contain. [your discretion to include it on your 
notebook,I just included it here for reference ☺ ]) 
The proper construction of clause 1 of the contract, in question in connection with the conduct 
of the parties and surrounding circumstances, is that Wilson and Co. were to furnish Song Fo 
and CO. a distilling apparatus, type C (Agricola), as described on page 30 of the maker's 
catalogue, capable of receiving or treating 6,000 liters every 24 hours of work and of producing 
alcohol of a grade 96-97 Gay Lussac. 
 
 
 

(3) Maulini v. Serrano, 28 Phil. 640 (1914) 


 
Evardo, Benny Boy P.  
X = Petitioner Fernando Maulini 
Y = Respondent Antonio Serrano 

Y  is  a  broker and part of his business consisted in looking up and ascertaining persons who had 
money  to  loan  as  well  as  those  who  desired  to  borrow  money  and,  acting  as  a  mediary, 
negotiate  a  loan  between  the  two.  The  broker  delivered  the  money  personally  to  the  borrower, 
took  note  in  his own name and immediately transferred it by indorsement to the lender. The only 
payment  that  the  broker  received  was  for  his  services  in  negotiating  the  loan.  Y  was  paid 
absolutely  nothing  for  becoming  responsible  as  an  indorser  on  the  paper  nor  did  the  indorsee 
lose,  pay  or  forego  anything,  or  alter  his  position  thereby.  The  debtor  was  not  able  to  pay.  X 
sought the enforcement of the indorser’s liability. 

The  trial  court,  although  it  received  parol  evidence  on  the  subject  provisionally,  held,  that  such 
evidence  was  not  admissible  to  alter,  vary,  modify  or  contradict  the  terms  of  the  contract  of 
indorsement,  and,  refused  to  consider  the  evidence  provisionally  received.  Is  the  Trial  court 
erred in its decision? 

Suggested Answer 

Yes. 

The  prohibition  against  the  introduction  of  Parol  Evidence  contained in Section 285 of the Code 


of  Civil  Procedure  was  designed  to  prevent  alteration,  change,  modification,  variation  or 
contraction  of  the  terms  of  a  written  instrument  admittedly existing except in cases specifically 
named therein. 

The  prohibition  does  not  apply  where  the  purpose  of  the  Parol  evidence  is  to  show  that  no 
written  contract  ever  existed,  that  the  minds  of  the  parties  never  met  on  the  terms  of  such  a 
contract,  that  they  never  mutually  agreed  to  enter  into  such  a  contract,  and  that  there  never 
existed  any  consideration  upon  which  such  an  agreement  could  be  founded.  In  this  case, there 
was  never  a  moment  that  Y  was  the  real  owner  of  the  note.  It  was  always  the  note  of  the 
indorsee,  X,  having  furnished  the  money  which was the consideration for the note directly to the 
maker. Hence, Parol Evidence should be considered. 

Detailed Digest 

Facts: 

Serrano  is  a  broker  and  that  part  of  his  business  consisted  in  looking  up  and  ascertaining 
persons  who  had  money  to  loan  as  well as those who desired to borrow money and, acting as a 
mediary,  negotiate  a  loan  between  the  two.  According  to  the  method  usually  followed  in  these 
transactions,  and  the  procedure  in  this  particular  case,  the  broker  delivered  the  money 
personally  to  the  borrower,  took  note  in  his  own  name  and  immediately  transferred  it  by 
indorsement  to  the  lender.  In  the  case  at  bar  this  was  done  at  the  special  request  of  the 
indorsee  and  simply  as  a  favor  to  him,  the  latter  stating  to  the  broker  that  he  did  not  wish  his 
name  to  appear  on  the  books  of  the  borrowing  company  as  a  lender  of  money  and  that  he 
desired  that  the  broker  take  the  note  in  his  own  name,  immediately  transferring  to  him  title 
thereto by indorsement. This was done, the note being at once transferred to the lender. 

The  only  payment  that  the  broker  received  was  for  his  services  in  negotiating  the  loan.  He  was 
paid  absolutely  nothing  for  becoming  responsible  as  an  indorser  on  the  paper,  nor  did  the 
indorsee lose, pay or forego anything, or alter his position thereby. 

The debtor was not able to pay. Maulini sought the enforcement of the indorser’s liability. 

Issue: 

Whether  the  trial  court  erred  to  consider  parol  evidence,  that  the  indorsement  was  wholly 
without  consideration  and  that,  in  making  it,  the  indorser  acted  as  agent  for  the  indorsee,  as  a 
mere  vehicle  of  transfer  of  the  naked  title  from  the maker to the indorsee, for which he received 
no consideration whatever. 

Held: 

Yes. 

The  prohibition  in  section  285  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  does  not  apply  to  a  case  like  the 
one  before  us.  The  purpose  of  that  prohibition  is  to  prevent alternation, change, modification or 
contradiction  of  the  terms  of  a  written  instrument,  admittedly  existing,  by  the  use  of  parol 
evidence, except in the cases specifically named in the section. The case at bar is not one where 
the  evidence  offered  varies,  alters,  modifies  or  contradicts  the  terms  of  the  contract  of 
indorsement  admittedly  existing.  The  evidence  was  not  offered  for  that  purpose.  The  purpose 
was  to  show  that  no  contract  of  indorsement  ever  existed;  that  the  minds of the parties never 
met  on  the  terms  of  such  contract;  that  they  never  mutually  agreed  to  enter  into  such  a 
contract;  and  that  there  never  existed  a  consideration  upon  which  such  an  agreement could be 
founded.  The  evidence  was  not  offered  to  vary,  alter,  modify,  or  contradict  the  terms  of  an 
agreement  which  it  is  admitted  existed  between  the  parties,  but  to  deny  that  there  ever  existed 
any  agreement  whatever;  to  wipe  out  all  apparent  relations  between  the  parties, and not to vary, 
alter  or  contradict  the  terms  of  a  relation  admittedly  existing; in other words, the purpose of the 
parol  evidence  was  to  demonstrate,  not  that  the  indorser  did  not intend to make the particular 
indorsement  which  he  did  make;  not  that  he  did  not  intend  to  make  the  indorsement  in  the 
terms  made;  but,  rather,  to  deny  the  reality  of  any  indorsement;  that  a  relation  of  any  kind 
whatever  was  created  or  existed  between  him  and  the  indorsee  by  reason  of  the  writing  on  the 
back  of  the  instrument;  that  no  consideration  ever  passed  to  sustain  an  indorsement  of  any 
kind whatsoever. 

The  contention  has  some  of  the  appearances  of  a  case  in  which  an  indorser  seeks  prove 
forgery.  Where  an  indorser  claims  that  his  name  was  forged,  it  is  clear  that  parol  evidence  is 
admissible  to  prove  that  fact,  and,  if  he  proves  it,  it  is  a  complete  defense,  the  fact being that 
the  indorser never made any such contract, that no such relation ever existed between him and 
the  indorsee,  and  that  there  was  no  consideration  whatever  to  sustain  such  a  contract.  In  the 
case before us we have a condition somewhat similar. While the indorser does not claim that his 
name  was  forged,  he  does  claim  that  it  was  obtained  from him in a manner which, between the 
parties themselves, renders the contract as completely inoperative as if it had been forged. 

(4) Woodhouse v. Halili 93 Phil. 526 (1953) 

(5) Land Settlement Development Corp. v. Garcia Plantation Co., Inc., 7 SCRA 750 (1963) 
Gamao, Arthelly D. 
P- Land Settlement and Development Corp. 
D- Garcia Plantation Co., Inc. 
Question: 
D  Company  purchase  two  tractors  on  credit  from  P  Company  and  executed  two  promissory 
notes  in  favor  of  the  latter.  On  due  date,  D  failed  to  pay  P  the  unpaid  balance of the notes, thus 
resulting  to  the  institution  of  specific  performance  case  filed  by  P.  On  their  answer, D and other 
co-defendants admitted the execution of the promissory notes but contended that the same had 
been  novated by a subsequent agreement contained in the letter sent by D’s Manager, K. D on its 
reply  and  answer  to  the  counterclaim,  admitted  the  due  execution  and  the  genuineness  of  the 
letter  but  contended  that  the  same  did not express the true intent and agreement of the parties. 
The  court  admitted  all  the  documentary  evidence  presented  by  the  parties  but  prevented  the 
testimony  of  the  legal  officer  of  P,  which  will  testify  on  the  true  agreement  and  intention  of  the 
parties  at  the  time  the  letter  was  drafted  and  prepared,  because  of  the  parole  evidence  rule. 
Thereafter,  the  court  dismissed  the  case.  Is  the  exclusion  of  the  court  of  the  testimony  of  P’s 
legal officer because of the parole evidence rule proper? 
Answer: 
No. 
Jurisprudence  provides  that,  when  operation  of  contract  depends  on  occurrence  of  an  event 
which is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence. 
In  the  case  at  bar,  the  lower  court  should  have  admitted  the  parol  evidence  sought  to  be 
introduced  to  prove  the  failure  of  the  document  in  question  to  express  the  true  intent  and 
agreement  of  the  parties.  It  should  not  have  improvidently  and  hastily  excluded  said  parol 
evidence, knowing that the subject matter treated therein, was one of the exceptions to the parol 
evidence  rule.  When  the  operation  of  the  contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an 
event,  which,  for  that  reason  is  a  condition  precedent,  such  may  be  established  by  parol 
evidence. 
  
  
LAND SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. GARCIA PLANTATION CO., INC 
G.R. No. L-17820 || April 24, 1963 || Paredes J. 
  
Petitioner:  LAND  SETTLEMENT  AND  DEVELOPMENT  CORPORATION  (LSDC  hereinafter), 
plaintiff-appellant 
Respondent:  GARCIA  PLANTATION  CO.,  INC.,  and/or  SALUD  GARCIA  and  VICENTE  B.  GARCIA, 
defendant-appelle 
 
FACTS: 
·  LSDC  filed a specific action case against Garcia Plantation (Salud and Vicente Garcia) for 
the recovery of P5,955.30, as unpaid balance of 2 tractors bought by respondents. 
·  Salud  was  made  a  co-defendant  because  of  two  promissory  notes  executed  by  her  , 
whereby she personally assumed the account of the company and her husbad Vicente. 
§  Defendants  contended  that  it  has  been  novated  by  a  subsequent  agreement  contained  in  a 
letter  (Exh.  L)  sent  by  Filomeno  C.  Kintanar, Manager, Board of Liquidators of the LSDC allowing 
an extension to pay (Until May 31, 1957). 
§  Furthermore,  since  the  complaint  was filed on February 20, 1957, they claimed that the action 
was premature and prayed that the complaint be dismiss. 
·  LSDC  admitted  the  genuiness  of  the  letter  but  contended  that  the  same  did  not express 
the true and intent agreement of the parties, thereby placing the fact in issue. 
·  The  parties  requested  for  more time to settle the case but the court ordered a trial on the 
merits. 
·  At  the  trial,  the  defendant  admitted  defendant  admitted  the  documentary evidence of its 
debt. 
·  When  the  plaintiff  presented  Atty.  Lucido  A.  Guinto,  Legal  Officer  of  the  Board  of 
Liquidators,  to  testify on the true agreement and the intention of the parties at the time the letter 
(Exh.  L)  was  drafted  and  prepared,  the  lower  court  judge,  upon  the  objection  of  the  counsel for 
defendants,  ruled  out  said  testimony and prevented the introduction of evidence under the parol 
evidence rule (Sec. 22, Rule 123).  
·  Since  the  court  ruled  out  Atty.  Guinto’s  testimony,  writer  of  the  letter  in  question,  the 
plaintiff rested its case. Lower court dismissed the case. CA certified the case to the SC. 
  
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the Court erred in excluding parol evidence. Yes. 
  
HELD: 
The  decision  appealed  from  is  reversed,  and  the  case  remanded  to  the  lower  court  for  further 
proceedings. Costs against the appellees. 
  
RATIO: 
· The parol evidence consisted of the testimony of Attys. Guinto and Kintanar. 
§  Atty.  Kintanar  gave  the  defendants  up  to  May  31,  1957,  to  coincide  with  their  ramie  harvest 
"provided  that  they  will  make  a  substantial  down  payment  immediately,  with  the  understanding 
that upon non-payment of the substantial amount, the extension shall be deemed as not granted 
and the LASEDECO shall feel free to seek redress in court" 
·  That  there  was  such  condition  precedent as manifested by the second paragraph of the 
letter Exhibit L: 
  
Mrs. Salud de Garcia Tacurong, Cotabato 
 
Dear Madam; 
  
Please be advised that the Board has granted you an extension up to May 31, 1957, within which 
to pay your account. 
  
This matter has been the subject of agreement between your husband and this office. 
Respectfully, 
(Sgd.) FILOMENO C. KINTANAR 
  
§  The  subject  of  the  contention  was  the  condition  to  be  complied  with  or  the  consideration 
given for the extension of time, within which the Garcia spouses pay their account. 
· The lower court should have admitted the parol evidence 
§  The  parol  evidence  sought  to  be  introduced  to  prove  the  failure  of  the  document in question 
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. 
§  When  the  operation  of  the  contract  is  made  to  depend  upon  the  occurrence  of  an  event, 
which,  for  that  reason  is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence. This 
is an exception to parol evidence rule. * 
§  This  is  not  varying  the  terms  of  the  written  contract  by  extrinsic  agreement,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  there  is  no  contract  in  existence;  there  is  nothing  to  which  to  apply  the  excluding 
rule. 
§  This  rule  does  not  prevent  the  introduction  of  extrinsic  evidence  to  show  that  a  supposed 
contract  never  became  effective  by  reason  of  the  failure  of  some  collateral  condition  or 
stipulation, pre-requisite to liability" (Peabody & Co. v. Bromfield & Ross, 38 Phil. 841). 
·  The  rule  excluding  parol  evidence  to  vary  or  contradict  a  writing  does  not  preclude 
admission  of  extrinsic  evidence,  to  show  prior  or  contemporaneous  collateral  parol 
agreements between the parties 
§  Such  evidence  may  be  received,  regardless  of whether or not the written agreement contains 
reference to such collateral agreement (Robles v. Lizarraga Hnos., 50 Phil. 387) 
§  In  the  case  at  bar,  reference  is  made  of  a  previous  agreement,  in  the  second  paragraph  of 
letter  Exhibit  L,  and  although  a  document  is  usually  to  be  interpreted  in  the  precise  terms  in 
which  it  is  couched,  Courts,  in  the  exercise  of  sound  discretion,  may  admit  evidence  of 
surrounding circumstances, in order to arrive at the true intention of the parties 
· Re: prematurity of the case 
§  If  the  court allowed the plaintiff to prove the intention of the parties, then it could have proved 
that there was a breach of the letter. 
§  So  that,  although  the  complaint  was  filed  on  February  20,  1957,  three  months  before  the 
deadline of the extension on May 31, 1957, there would be no premature institution of the case. 
  
  
  
 

(6) Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos 50 Phil. 387 (1927) 


LICAYAN 
 
BAR Q: 
A and B are owners of an hacienda, when B died A leased it to R for 6 years. Three years 
before the lease is to expire A died. The heirs of A and B then entered into an agreement 
with H to sell the property. R alleges that in consideration for the shortened term of his 
lease H agreed to pay the improvements he made to the hacienda and that the 
agreement was not included in the contract of conveyance because the representative of 
H said that it was unnecessary in view of the confidence existing between the parties. R 
filed a case against H for recovery of compensation of improvements made and value of 
implements and farming equipment and damages for breach of contract.  
 
Can oral evidence of the contract different from that expressed in the contract of 
conveyance be admissible? 
 
Answer: 
Yes. The rule excluding parole evidence to contradict a writing does not extend so far as 
to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous 
parole agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received regardless 
of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral 
agreement. In this case the deed of conveyance does not contain anything concerning 
the rights of R in the hacienda by lease. The verbal contract which R has established is 
independent of the main contract of conveyance and evidence of such verbal contract is 
admissible under the doctrine stated.  
 
Detailed digest: 
Facts: 
Robles filed against Lizarraga a case for recovery of compensation for improvements 
made by him upon hacienda Nahalinan and the value of implements and farming 
equipment supplied by him to the hacienda, as well as damages for breach of contract. 
The hacienda originally belonged to Sps. Zacarias Robles and Anastacia de la Rama, 
parents of plaintiff. Upon the death of Zacarias, Anastacia as administratric leased the 
hacienda to plaintiff Robles for 6 years. It was stipulated that any permanent 
improvements necessary to the cultivation and exploitation of the hacienda should be 
made at the expense of the lessee without right to indemnity at the end of the term. 3 
years before the lease was to expire, Anastacia died leaving as heirs the plaintiff, Jose 
Robles, Evarista Robles, Magadalena Robles, Felix Robles, and the children of a 
deceased daughter Purificacion Robles. Later, plaintiff, Jose, and Evarista acquired the 
shares of their coheirs. Lizarraga then proposed to buy the property. In the course of the 
negotiations it was proposed that plaintiff surrender the last 2 years of his lease. 
Plaintiff alleges that in consideration of shortened term of his lease, the defendant 
Lizarraga agreed to pay him the value of all betterments that he had made on the 
hacienda and to purchase from him all that belonged to him personally in the hacienda. 
He further alleged that when the contract of conveyance was presented to him it made 
no mention of the agreement regarding compensation for the improvement, and that 
defendant explained that it was unnecessary in view of the confidence existing between 
the parties. Upon this manifestation, plaintiff believing that the agreement would be 
carried out in good faith did not further insist on the incorporation of the agreement into 
the contract nor was it reduce in writing.  
Defendant on the other hadn claimed that the agreement was never made. That what 
reall happened was that after the sale of the hacienda, the plaintiff offered to sell to 
defendant the crop and carabao, but the parties did not come to an agreement. 
 
Issue: 
Whether or not oral evidence of the contract different from that expressed in the contract 
of conveyance be admissible? 
 
Ruling: 
Yes. The purpose of this case is to enforce an independent or collateral agreement 
which constituted an inducement to the making of the sale, or part of the consideration 
therefor. The execution of a contract I writing is deemed to supersede all oral 
negotiations or stipulations concerning its terms and the subject-matter which preceded 
the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident, fraud or mistake of fact. But 
it is recognized that this rule is to be taken with proper qualifications, and all the 
authorities are agreed that proof is admissible of any collateral, parole agreement that is 
not inconsistent with the terms of the written contract, though it may relate to the same 
subject matter. The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not 
extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or 
contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such evidence 
may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any 
reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or inequity.  
In the case before us, the deed of conveyance purports to transfer to defendant only 
such interests in certain properties as had come to the conveyors by inheritance. 
Nothing is said concerning the rights in the hacienda which the plaintiff had acquired by 
lease or concerning the things that had been placed thereon by way of improvement or 
had acquired by purchase. The verbal contract which the plaintiff has established in this 
case is therefore clearly independent of the main contract of conveyance, and evidence 
of such verbal contract is admissible under the doctrine stated above. The written 
contract is complete in itself, the oral agreement is also complete in itself, and it is a 
collateral to the written contract notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related 
matters. 

(7) Philippine National Railways v. CIR of Albay, Br. I, 83 SCRA 569 (1978) 
Maamo, Rexis Jun M.  
 
ABC  =  Respondent-Plaintiff  Carmen  Myrick,  Salvacion  Myrick,  and  Celso, Josefina and Celerina, 
all surnamed Millabas 
X = Petitioner-Defendant Philippine National Railways (PNR) 

Bar Q: 

ABC  filed  a  complaint  to  annul  a  supposed  conditional  donation  of  two  parcels  of  land,  a 
donation  which  they  had  allegedly  made  to  X.  The  Deed  of  Donation  did  not contain conditions 
alleged  by  ABC;  thus,  during  trial,  ABC  tried  to  prove  the  conditions  by  oral  evidence,  which  X 
objected to. 

Is the objection proper? 

Yes. 
Section  7  of  Rule  130  requires  that  in  order  that  parol  or  extrinsic  evidence  may be admitted to 
vary the terms of the writing, the mistake or imperfection thereof or its failure to express the true 
intent and agreement of the parties should be put in issue by the pleadings. 

In  the  instant  case,  ABC  did  not  expressly  plead  that  the  deed  of  donation  was  incomplete  or 
that  its  execution  was  vitiated  by  mistake  or  that it did not reflect the intention of the donor and 
the donee. 

 
Digest: 
 
Facts:  ABC  filed  a  complaint  to  annul  a  supposed  conditional donation of two parcels of land, a 
donation  which  they  had  allegedly  made  to  X.  The  ground  for  the  annulment  was  the  alleged 
non-fulfillment  of  the  five  conditions  of  the  donation.  The  plaintiffs  in  paragraph  four  of  their 
complaint  merely  alleged  that  the  donation  was  subject  to  five  conditions.  Then,  they  prayed 
that  the  donation  should  be  annulled  or  rescinded  for  noncompliance  with  those conditions. At 
the trial they tried to prove those conditions by parol evidence. 
 
Issue: W/N parol evidence is admissible in this case? 
 
Ruling: No. 
 
That rule is found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:  
 
SEC.  7.  Evidence  of  written  agreements.  —  When the terms of an agreement have been reduced 
to  writing,  it  is  to  be  considered  as  containing  all  such  terms  and.  therefore,  there  can  be, 
between  the  parties  and  their  successors  in  interest,  no  evidence  of  the  terms  The  agreement 
other than the contents of the writing, except in the following case:  
 
(a)  Where  a  mistake  or  imperfection  of  the  writing,  or  it  failure  to  express  The  true  intent  and 
agreement of the parties, or the of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;  
(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing,  
 
The term 'agreement' includes wills. 
 
Section  7  requires  that  in  order  that  parol  or  extrinsic  evidence  may  be  admitted  to  vary  the 
terms  of  the  writing,  the  mistake  or  imperfection  thereof  or  its  failure  to  express  the true intent 
and  agreement  of  the  parties  should  be  put  in  issue  by  the  pleadings.  In  the  instant  case,  the 
plaintiffs  did  not  expressly  plead  that  the  deed of donation was incomplete or that its execution 
was vitiated by mistake or that it did not reflect the intention of the donor and the donee. 
 
At  the  trial  they  tried  to  prove  those  conditions  by  parol  evidence.  Obviously,  they  could  not 
introduce  parol  evidence  to  vary  the  terms  of  the  agreement  because  they  did  not  plead  any of 
the  exceptions  mentioned  in  the  parol  evidence  rule.  Their  case  is  covered  by  the  general  rule 
that  the  contents  of  the  writing  constitute  the  sole  repository  of  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
between  the  parties.  Thus,  it  was  held  that  where  there  is  no  allegation  in  the  complaint  that 
there  was  any  mistake  or  imperfection  in  the  written  agreement  or  that  it  failed  to  express  the 
true  intent  of  the  parties,  parol  evidence  is  inadmissible  to  vary  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
(Villanueva vs. Yulo, 106 Phil. 1170). 

(8) Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 328 (2004) 

(9) Baluyot v. Poblete, 514 SCRA 370 (2007) 

(10) Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta, G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011 
By Febeh Marikit 
A = Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) 
A.1 = Heirs of Alfonso 
AA = Amparo Castillo, Grandchild of A 
P = Policronio, son of A 
C = Conrado, son of P 
P.1 = Heirs of P 
 
BAR QUESTION: 
A executed 4 Deeds of Sale to his 3 children (including P) and his common­law wife to reduce 
the inheritance taxes. When A died, his heirs executed a Deed of Extra­Judicial Partition with C, 
P’s eldest son, signing the Deed in behalf of his co­heirs. Believing that the six parcels of land 
belonged to P, and, excluded from the Deed of Extra­Judicial Partition, P.1 filed a Complaint for 
Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and 
Damages against A.1 before the RTC. 
 
The RTC declared the Deed of Sale null and void for being absolutely simulated but declared 
the Deed of Extra­Judicial Partition valid as all the heirs of A were represented. 
CA affirmed the RTC ruling as to the Deed of Sale. It considered the testimony of AA one of the 
grandchildren with regard to the simulation of the Deed of Sale.  
On MR, P.1 argue that RTC violated the best evidence rule in giving credence to the testimony 
of W with regard to the simulation of the Deed of Sale. P.1 argued that based on the parol 
evidence rule, A.1 and, specifically, AA were not in a position to prove the terms outside of the 
contract because they were not parties nor successors­in­interest in the Deed of Sale in 
question. Is P.1 correct? 
 
 
SUGGESTED ANSWER: 
No. 
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides as exceptions to the parol evidence rule 
that, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if 
he puts in issue in his pleading:  
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;  
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties 
thereto;  
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or  
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the 
execution of the written agreement. The term “agreement” includes wills. 
 
In the case at bar, both the P.1 and A.1 are successors­in­interest of the parties to the Deed of 
Sale as they claim rights under P and A, respectively. The parol evidence rule excluding 
evidence aliunde, however, still cannot apply because the present case falls under two 
exceptions to the rule, paragraphs (b) and (c). Considering that the Deed of Sale has been 
shown to be void for being absolutely simulated and for lack of consideration, the Heirs of A are 
not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written 
agreement. 

(11) Lechugas v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 335 (1986) 


Andrew M. Navarrete 
 
X = Petitioner Lechugas 
Y = Leoncia Lasangue 
Z = Defendants (Respondent Loza’s) 
  
BAR Question: 
X bought a land from Y. After the purchase of the land, a Deed of Sale was executed. The Deed 
of Sale specified Lot No. 5456 as the subject of the contract. 
  
When Z occupied Lot No. 5456, X filed an ejectment suit against Z, thereafter filed a petition for 
the recovery of possession against the same defendants and the same disputed lot. 
  
Defendants Z took Y to testify before the trial court. Based on Y’s testimony, the lot indicated in 
the Deed of Sale which she sold to X was erroneous and not the lot she intended to sell. X 
objected on the ground of the Parol Evidence Rule. 
  
Rule on the objection. 
  
Suggested Answer: 
No. The Parol Evidence Rule will not apply in this case because it is Y who is one of the parties 
to the subject Deed of Sale not the defendants. The defendants in the case were not parties to 
the Deed of Sale executed between Y and Petitioner X. 
  
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where 
the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of 
sale was executed by Y in favor of Petitioner X. The dispute over what was actually sold is 
between petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Y, it 
was shown that what she really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 
5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, 
the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was 
the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead. 
 
  

[G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300  August 6, 1986] 


VICTORIA LECHUGAS, petitioner, vs. 
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA LOZA, SALVADOR LOZA, ISIDRO LOZA, CARMELITA LOZA, 
DAVID LOZA, AMPARO LOZA, ERLINDA LOZA and ALEJANDRA LOZA, respondents. 
 
Case Digest Version 
  
Doctrine: 
The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the 
litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a 
party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or 
assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. (Francisco on 
Evidence, Vol. VII, part I of the Rules of Court, p. 155 citing 32 C.J.S. 79.). 
  
Facts: 
Victoria Lechugas (petitioner) bought a land from a certain Leoncia Lasangue. After the 
purchase of the land, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Leoncia Lasangue in her favor 
specified a certain land Lot No. 5456 stated in the contract. When the defendants (respondents) 
occupied Lot No. 5456, petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages (ejectment 
case) against the defendants but it was dismissed. 
  
Petitioner appealed the case to the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo. 
  
While the appeal for the ejectment case was pending, petitioner filed another case in the RTC for 
the recovery of possession against the same defendants involving the same Lot No. 5456. 
During the trial, the defendants presented their star witness in the person of Leoncia Lasangue 
herself. 
  
Leoncia Lasangue testified during the trial. That according to her, the lot that she sold to the 
petitioner was not Lot No. 5456 but another lot, Lot 5522. Lasangue did not know how to read 
and write, so the document of sale was prepared by the petitioner, thereafter, the former was 
made to sign it. Based on her testimony, the lot indicated in the Deed of Sale which she sold to 
petitioner was erroneous. It was clear that she did not intend to sell a piece of land already sold 
by her father to the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants (respondents). This was objected 
by the petitioner under the Parole Evidence Rule. 
  
Issue: 
Whether or not the Parole Evidence Rule apply in this case 
  
Ruling: 
No. The Parole Evidence Rule will not apply in this case because it is Leoncia Lasangue who is 
one of the parties to the subject Deed of Sale not the defendants. The defendants in the case 
were not parties to the Deed of Sale executed between Leoncia Lasange and petitioner 
Lechugas. 
  
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where 
the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of 
sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what 
was actually sold is between petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through 
the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to sell and to be 
the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying 
on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of 
paper which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale 
described the disputed lot instead. 
  

(12) Inciong v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 578 (1996) 

3. Interpretation of Documents (§§10-19, Rule 130) 

C. Testimonial Evidence 

1. Qualifications of Witnesses (§20, Rule 130) 

a) Art. 821, Civil Code 

b) §17, Rule 119, Rules of Court 

Case: 

(1) Recto v. Republic, 440 SCRA 79 (2004) 

2. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity (§21, Rule 130) 

a) §6 of Child Witness Rule 

Cases: 

(1) People v. Deauna, 386 SCRA 136 (2002) 

(2) People v. Macapal, Jr., 463 SCRA 387 (2005) 

(3) People v. Santos, 501 SCRA 325 (2006) 

3. Marital Disqualification (§22, Rule 130) 

Cases: 

(1) Lezama v. Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166 (1968) 


 
Bucog, Roseller 
Bar Question 
 
The acting receiver of La Paz Ice Plant filed an action in court naming Marciano C. Roque and 
spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama for the annulment of a judgment rendered against 
the La Paz Ice Plant and in favour of Roque by alleging that, because of mismanagement by the 
Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership. In their answer, the defendant 
spouses denied entering into collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest Roque’s 
claim because they know it to be a legitimate obligation which the La Paz Ice Plant had incurred. 
At the hearing, the receiver asked the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as 
“a witness summoned by the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court.” 
 
May the request of the receiver be granted? 
 
Answer: 
 
No. Under the Rules on Evidence, a husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without 
her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by 
one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other, or in 
a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. 
 
In this case, a wife who is a co-defendant of her husband in a case of collusive fraud, where their 
interests are not separate, cannot be examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party. 
Evidently, Pacquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the 
meeting and will be asked questions on matters of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the 
books of the corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her 
own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband. The interests of 
husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated.  
 
Digest 
Facts: 
 
The acting receiver of La Paz Ice Plant filed an action in court naming Marciano C. Roque and 
spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama for the annulment of a judgment rendered against 
the La Paz Ice Plant and in favour of Roque by alleging that, because of mismanagement by the 
Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership. In their answer, the defendant 
spouses denied entering into collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest Roque’s 
claim because they know it to be a legitimate obligation which the La Paz Ice Plant had incurred. 
At the hearing, the receiver asked the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as 
“a witness summoned by the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court.” 
 
Issue: 
 
Whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may be examined as a 
hostile witness by the adverse party, without infringing on her marital privilege not to testify 
against her husband. 
 
Ruling: 
 
No, a wife who is a co-defendant of her husband in a case of collusive fraud, where their 
interests are not separate, cannot be examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party. 
Evidently, Pacquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the 
meeting and will be asked questions on matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the books 
of the corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her own 
interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband. The interests of husband 
and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated.  
 
Ratio Decidendi: 
 
The reason for the privilege of husband and wife not to testify against each other is the natural 
repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the 
other’s condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned by the 
words of his intimate life partner. 
 

(2) Alvarez v. Ramirez, 473 SCRA 72 (2005) 

4. Dead Man’s Statute (§23, Rule 130) 

Cases: 

(1) Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 (1927) 

(2) Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 (1949) 


 
Capao, Henna Auggie M. 
 
A = Fitzsimmoms 
B Corporation = Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company 
 
Bar Question: A was the president and stockholder of B corporation. A's 545 shares had not 
been fully paid. A died and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted. 
B corporation filed its claim against the estate of A but A's administrator denied such claim. So, 
B corporation presented evidence for its claim which consisted of the testimony of its officers. 
Are the officers of the corporation disqualified from testifying? 
 
Suggested Answer: No, the officers of the corporation are not disqualified from testifying. The 
law only disqualifies parties or assignors of parties. The officers and/or stockholders of a 
corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to 
an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of 
fact occurring before the death of such deceased person. 
 
Detailed Case Digest 
 
FACTS: Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila is a foreign corporation duly registered and 
licensed to do business in the Philippines. On the other hand, Fitzsimmons was the president 
and one of the largest stockholders of said company. 
 
Fitzsimmons held 1,000 stocks, of which 545 shares had not been fully paid for. Under his 
agreements with the company, should he die without having fully paid for the said 545 shares of 
stock, the company, at its option may either reacquire the said 545 shares of stock by returning 
to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the corresponding 
number of the company’s shares of stock equivalent to the amount paid thereon at P450 a 
share. 
 
Subsequently, Fitzsimmons died and a special proceeding was instituted for the settlement of 
his estate. 
 
The company filed a claim against the estate of Fitzsimmons and offered to reacquire the 545 
shares sold to Fitzsimmons upon return to his estate of the amount of P64,500 paid thereon, 
and asked the court to authorize the setoff of the amount of its claim of P63,868.67 from the 
amount of P64,500 returnable to the estate. 
 
However, the administrator denied the alleged indebtedness of Fitzsimmons to the company. 
 
Thus, the company presented an evidence (item A) which consisted of the testimony of its chief 
accountant and assistant accountant. Aside from them, the company likewise called as 
witnesses the vice-president-treasurer and the president of the claimant company. 
 
ISSUE: Whether or not the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an 
executor or administrator of a deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to any matter 
of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person. 
 
RULING: The officers of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying. 
Under Rule 123, section 26 (c) of the Rules of Court, it provides that “Parties or assignors of 
parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or 
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound 
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such 
person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of 
such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.” 
The said provision was taken from our former Code of Civil Procedure, which in turn was derived 
from the Code of Civil Procedure of California. 
 
However, in the case of City Savings Bank vs. Enos, the Supreme Court of California ruled that, 
“the law disqualifies only ‘parties or assignors of parties,’ and does not apply to persons who are 
merely employed by such parties or assignors of parties.” 
 
Inasmuch as section 26 (c) of Rule 123 (now Section 23, Rule 130) disqualifies only parties or 
assignors of parties, the Court is constrained to hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a 
corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to 
an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of 
fact occurring before the death of such deceased person. 
 
The trial court erred in not admitting the testimony of the vice-president-treasurer and the 
president. However, it is not necessary to remand the case for the purpose of taking the 
testimony of said witnesses because it would be merely corroborative. 
 

(3) Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622 (1955) 

(4) Asturias v. Court of Appeals, 9 SCRA 131 (1963) 

(5) Guerrero v. St. Claire’s Realty & Co., 124 SCRA 553 (1983) 
 
EUPENA, Ron Christian , 
 
Bar Q 
Andres owns a lot which he acquired as an inheritance from his deceased father. Shortly after 
the Japanese occupation, Andres entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero. Cristina 
continued as trustee of the deceased. At about 1971, the petitioners discovered that the land 
was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, on the basis of a “Deed of Sale of Land” 
dated 1948 purportedly executed by their Aunt Cristina. Manuel subsequently sold this lot in 
favor of the defendants Guerrero’s, also cousins of the petitioners. The defendants Guerrero’s 
later sold the disputed lot to a St. Clare’s Realty, a partnership constituted by them. During trial, 
Laura Cervantes, a daughter of Cristina, was presented as witnesses for the petitioners. This 
was objected to by the counsel of the defendants based on Sec. 20 (a), Rule 130(now, Sec.23, 
Rule 130).  
Rule on the issue 
Laura can be presented as witness. Sec. 20(a), r130 (now, sec. 2, R130) provides: 
"Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. — The following persons 
cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein 
enumerated: 
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is 
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, 
or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such 
deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of 
fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such became of unsound 
mind."  
Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither are they 
assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Mere witnesses 
who are neither parties’ plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is 
prosecuted, are not included in the prohibition." Moreover, the present case is not a claim or 
demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerrero’s are not 
the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as 
claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of 
the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man’s rule. 
 
 
Case digest 
Facts: 
The disputed lot was formerly owned by Andres Guerrero, father of the petitioners. Andres 
physically possessed and cultivated the land through a tenancy agreement. Shortly after the 
beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, 
who was to enjoy the owner’s share in the produce of the land. After the death of Andres in 
1943, Cristina continued as trustee of the deceased. 
Petitioners alleged that the land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of 
Andres Guerrero as early as 1957. Then, at about 1971, the petitioners discovered that the land 
was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, on the basis of a “Deed of Sale of Land” 
dated 1948 purportedly executed by their Aunt Cristina. They further alleged that 
notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs of Cristina, Manuel was successful in his application 
of the registration of the land in his favor. 
Manuel subsequently sold this lot in favor of the defendants Guerreros, also cousins of the 
petitioners. The defendants Guerreros later sold the disputed lot to a St.Clare’s Realty, a 
partnership constituted by them. 
According to the complaint, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel was fraudulently obtained and 
that the subsequent deeds of sale were likewise fraudulent and ineffective since the defendants 
allegedly knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero. 
During trial, Laura Cervantes, a daughter of Cristina, was presented as witnesses for the 
petitioners. She testified that the money used for the illness of her mother was obtained from 
Manuel by mortgaging the land as security for the loans obtained. This was objected to by the 
counsel of the defendants based on Sec. 20 (a), Rule 130(now, Sec.23, Rule 130). Initially, the 
trial court allowed the witness to continue, but upon a written motion to disqualify on the same 
basis, the trial court declared Laura and Jose Cervantes disqualified from testifying in the case. 
Subsequently, petitioners filed a “Motion for the Judge to Inhibit and/or to Transfer the case to 
another Branch.” This was denied. Petitioners then failed to appear at the set schedule for trial, 
and the trial court judge issued an order stating that petitioners “are deemed to have waived 
their right to further present or formally offer their evidence in court” as a consequence of their 
non-appearance. 
Petitioners filed a “Manifestation” that they did not waive their rights to present further evidence, 
to cross-examine defendants’ witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence. They added that they 
reserved such right upon the decision of the CA in a petition for certiorari which they were 
preparing to file. 
Despite this, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants Guerreros, even 
ordering the petitioners to pay damages in the amount of more than P2M. This was affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals. 
Issues: 
Whether the witnesses Laura and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from testifying in 
the case and their testimonies excluded on the basis of the “dead man’s rule”? 
Whether the exclusion of petitioners’ evidence and their preclusion from presenting further 
proof was correctly sustained by the CA? 
Ruling: 
Laura and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither is they assignors of 
the parties nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. They are mere witnesses by 
whose testimonies the petitioners aimed to establish that it was not Cristina who owned the 
disputed land at the time of the alleged sale to Manuel, and that Cristina merely mortgaged the 
property to Manuel. 
The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. 
The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such 
deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the 
disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Thus, the dead man’s rule is 
clearly inapplicable. 
Aside from the disqualified witnesses, other witnesses testified and it was error to hold that the 
testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or that without such offer, such 
evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is affected by calling the witness to the 
stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions. 
The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of defendants’ evidence and without 
regard to the proofs that petitioner has presented. Therefore, exclusion of petitioners’ evidence 
and their preclusion from presenting further proof was incorrect. 
 
 

(6) Razon v. IAC, 207 SCRA 234 (1992) 


 
Evardo, Benny Boy P. 
  
X = Petitioner Enrique Razon 
Y=Respondent Vicente B. Chuidian 
Z= Juan Chuidian, Vicente’s deceased father 
  

Y  administrator  of  Z’s  estate  filed  a  complaint  for  the  delivery  of  the  certificates  of  stocks 
against  X  in  the  E.  Razon,  Inc.  Y  argued  that  stock  certificate  of  defendant’s  corporation  was 
issued  in  the  name  of  Z.  X  had  not  questioned Z’s ownership of the shares and had not brought 
any action to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled. 

X’s  in  his  answer  and  in  his  oral  testimony  said  that  he  distributed  shares,  previously  placed  in 
the  names  of  the  withdrawing nominal incorporators, to some friends including Z. The shares of 
stock  were  registered in the name of Z only as nominal stockholder and with the agreement that 
the  said  shares  were  owned  and  held  by  the  X  as  he  was  the  one  who  paid  for  all  the 
subscription. Z was given the option to buy the same but did not do so. 

CFI  (RTC)  declared  that  X  is  the  owner  of  the  said  shares.  IAC  (CA)  reversed and ruled that Z is 
the  owner.  IAC  excluded  the  testimony  of  X  under  the  Dead  Man’s  Statute  rule  (DMS), although 
such  testimony  was  not  objected  to  during  trial.  Is  X’s  testimony  is  within  the prohibition under 
DMS Rule. 

Suggested Answer 

No.  The  case  was  not  filed  against  the  administrator  of  the  estate,  nor  was  it filed upon claims 
against the estate. 

The  purpose  of  DMS  Rule  is  that  “if  persons  having  a  claim  against  the  estate  of the deceased 
or  his  properties  were  allowed  to  testify  as  to  the  supposed  statements  made  by  him  the 
deceased  person, many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as 
the  latter  can  no  longer  deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to 
false  or  unscrupulous  claims  or  demands.  The  purpose  of  the  law  is  to  'guard  against  the 
temptation  to  give  false  testimony  in  regard  to  the  transaction  in  question  on  the  part  of  the 
surviving party.” 

In  this  stance,  the  case  was  filed  by  Y  the  administrator  of  the  estate  of  the  late  Z  to  recover 
shares  of  latter’s  allegedly  owned,  it  is  the  estate  which  instituted  the  action  or  initiated  the 
attack. Hence, the testimony of the X is not within the prohibition of the rule. 

FACTS: 

Vicente  Chuidian  (administrator  of  the  estate  of  his  deceased  father)  filed  a  complaint  for  the 
delivery  of  the  certificates  of  stocks  representing  the  1,500  share  holdings  of  his  deceased 
father,  Juan  Chuidian,  in  the  E.  Razon,  Inc.  (organized  for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre 
services  in  South  Harbor,  Manila).  In  the  answer,  Razon  alleged  that  he  owned  the  shares  and 
the  same  remained  in  his  possession.  It  was  alleged  that the late Juan Chuidan did not pay any 
amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares in question. 

CHUIDIAN’s EVIDENCE: On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,5000 shares of stock of 
defendant  corporation  was  issued  in  the  name  of  Juan  Chuidian  (Juan).  Razon  had  not 
questioned  (not  until  the  demand  was  made)  Juan’s  ownership  of  the  shares  and  had  not 
brought any action to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled. 

RAZON’s  EVIDENCE  (In  the  answer  and  in  his  oral  Testimony):  After  organizing  E.  Razon,  Inc., 
Razondistributed  shares,  previously  placed  in  the  names  of  the  withdrawing  nominal 
incorporators,  to  some  friends  including  Juan.  The  shares  of  stock were registered in the name 
of  Juan  only  as  nominal  stockholder  and  with  the  agreement  that  the  said  shares  were  owned 
and  held  by  the  Razon  (as he was the one who paid for all the subscription). Juan was given the 
option to buy the same but did not do so. 

CFI  (RTC)  declared  that  Enrique  Razon  is  the  owner  of  the  said  shares.  IAC  (CA)  reversed  and 
ruled  that  Juan  Chuidian  is  the  owner.  IAC  excluded  the  testimony  of  Razon  under  the  dead 
man’s  statute  rule  (DMS)  under  Section  20  (a)  Rule  130  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  although  such 
testimony was not objected to during trial. 

ISSUE: WON Razon’s testimony is within the prohibition under DMS Rule. 

HELD:  No.  The  case  was  not  filed  against  the  administrator  of  the  estate,  nor  was  it  filed  upon 
claims against the estate. 

  

The  purpose  of  DMS  Rule  is  that  “if  persons  having  a  claim  against  the  estate  of the deceased 
or  his  properties  were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased 
person),  many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter 
can  no  longer  deny  or  refute  them,  thus  unjustly  subjecting  their  properties  or  rights  to  false or 
unscrupulous  claims  or  demands.  The  purpose  of  the  law  is to 'guard against the temptation to 
give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.” 

However,  the  rule  is  only  applicable  to “a case against the administrator or its representative of 


an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.” 

In  this  stance,  the  case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to 


recover  shares  Juan  allegedly  owned  (IOW,  it  is  the  estate  which  instituted  the  action  or 
initiated  the  attack).  Hence,  the  testimony  of  the  petitioner  is  not  within  the  prohibition  of  the 
rule. 

Records  also  show  that  Razon’s  testimony  was  not  objected  to.  It  was  subjected  to 
cross-examination.  Granting  that  it  is  within  the  prohibition  under  DMS,  Chuidian  is  deemed  to 
have  waived  the  rule.  The  court  cannot  disregard  evidence  which  would  ordinarily  be 
incompetent  under  the  rules  but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object 
thereto. 

SC’s  DECISION:  Juan  was  the  owner  of  the  shares.  Razon’s  testimony,  though  admitted,  is  not 
sufficient  to  prove  his  ownership.  Records  show  that  during  his  lifetime  Juan  was  elected 
member  of  the  Board  of  Directors  which  clearly  shows  that  he  was  a  stockholder  of  the 
corporation.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  corporation,  Juan  was  the owner. For Razon to claim 
ownership, he must show that the shares were transferred to him. 

Corporation  Code  provides  that  in  order  for  a  transfer  of  stock  certificate  to  be  effective,  the 
certificate  must  be  properly  indorsed  and  that  title  to  such  certificate  of  stock  is  vested  in  the 
transferee  by  the  delivery  of  the duly indorsed certificate of stock. However, since the certificate 
of  stock  covering  the  questioned  1,5000  shares of stock registered in the name of the late Juan 
Chuidian  was  never  indorsed  to  the  Razon,  the  inevitable  conclusion  is  that  the  questioned 
shares  of  stock  belong  to  Juan.  Indorsement  of  the  certificate  of  stock  is  a  mandatory 
requirement  of  law  for  an  effective  transfer  of  a  certificate  of  stock  and  Razon’s  asseveration 
that  he  did  not  require  an  indorsement  in  view  of  his  intimate  friendship  with  the  late  Juan 
Chuidian  cannot  overcome  the  failure  to  follow  the  procedure  required  by  law  or  the  proper 
conduct of business even among friends. 

There  is also preponderance of evidence that would show that the shares were given to Juan for 
value.  Juan  was  the  legal  counsel  who  handled  the  legal  affairs  of  the  corporation  and  the 
shares were payment for his legal services to the corporation. 

(7) Sunga-Chan v. Chua, 363 SCRA 249 (2001) 

(8) Zeigler v. Moore, 75 Nev. 91 335 P2d S. 425 (1959) 

5. Privileged Communication (§24, Rule 130) 

a) Marital Communications Cases: 

Cases: 

(1) United States v. Antipolo, 37 Phil. 726 (1916) 


LICAYAN 
BAR Q: 
D was convicted of murder and homicide by the CFI. D appealed on the ground that the 
widow of the man whom he was accused of murdering was not permitted to testify as a 
witness on behalf of the defense concerning the dying allegations of the deceased.  
 
Can the widow testify regarding her late husband’s dying declaration? 
 
Answer: 
 
Yes. The rule that spouses cannot be competent witnesses for or against the other in a 
proceeding to which one or both shall be parties is not applicable in this case. The 
purpose of such rule is to protect accused persons against statements made in the 
confidence engendered by marital relations and to relieve the spouse to whom the 
communication have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice 
of the other spouse. When a person at the point of death makes a statement regarding 
the manner in which he received the injuries the communication is not confidential. Such 
communication is made for the purpose that it may be communicated to the authorities 
concerned inquiring into the cause of death.  
 
 
Detailed digest: 
Facts: 
Appellant Antipoli was charged with murder of Fortunato Dinal and convicted of 
homicide. He appealed on the ground of error based on the refusal of the trial judge to 
permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow ot the man whom appellant is accused of having 
murdered, to testify as witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged dying 
declarations. The fiscal objected on the ground that the widow was not competent to 
testify under the rules of procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the 
consent of her husband, and as he is dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows 
that the witness is disqualified from testifying in this case which her husband is the 
injured party. 
Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was competent, arguing that the 
disqualification only relates to cases in which a husband or wife of one of the parties to 
a proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a criminal case are 
the government and the accused; that the marriage having been dissolved by death, she 
is no longer his wife and therefore not subject to any disqualification arising from the 
status of marriage.  
 
Issue: 
Whether or not the widow can testify regarding her husband’s dying declaration. 
 
Ruling: 
Yes. The case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is 
based. The purpose of the statue is to protect accused persons against statements 
made in the confidence engendered by marital relations and to relieve the husband or 
wife to whom such confidential communications might have been made from the 
obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse. When a person at the 
point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the 
manner in which he received those injuries the communication so made is not 
confidential. Such communication is made for the purpose that it may be communicated 
to the authorities concerned inquiring into the cause of death.  
The statue relates only to cases in which the testimony of a spouse is offered for or 
against the other in a proceeding to which the other is a party. The court erred in 
excluding the testimony of the witness. 

(2) People v. Carlos, 47 Phil 626 (1925) 

(3) Zuleta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, 20 February 1996 

(4) People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947) 

(5) Lacurom v. Jacoba, 484 SCRA 206 (2006) 

b) Attorney-Client Privilege 

Cases: 

(1) Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., 46 Phil. 938 (1924) 
 
Navarrete 
 
X = Plaintiff Barton 
Y = Defendant Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co. 
  
BAR Question: 
X  and  Y  entered  into  an  agreement  or  sales  agency  whereby  Y  authorized  X  to  be  the  sole  and 
exclusive sales agent of the latter’s limestone. 
  
X filed an action against Y to recover from Y damages for breach of contract. 
  
One  of  the  exhibits offered in evidence by the defendant was a carbon copy of a letter written by 
the  plaintiff  to  his  attorney.  The  authenticity  of  this  document  is  admitted  and  the  counsel  for 
the  plaintiff  announced  that  he  had  no  objection  to  the  introduction  of  this  carbon  copy  in 
evidence if counsel for the defendant would explain where this copy was secured. 
  
The  attorney  for  the  plaintiff  proposed  to  object  to  its  admission  on  the  ground  that  it  is  a 
confidential  communication  between  client  and  lawyer."  No  further  information  was  then  given 
by the attorney for the defendant as to the manner in which the letter had come to his hands and 
the  trial  judge  thereupon  excluded  the  document,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  privileged 
communication between client and attorney. 
  
Is  the  trial  judge  correct  in  excluding  the  document  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  privileged 
communication between client and attorney? 
  
Suggested Answer: 
  
No 
The  trial  judge  erred;  for  even  supposing  that  the  letter  was  within  the  privilege  which  protects 
communications  between  attorney  and client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the 
hands  of  the  adverse  party.  And it makes no difference how the adversary acquired possession. 
The  law  protects  the  client  from  the  effect  of  disclosures  made  by  him  to  his  attorney  in  the 
confidence  of  the  legal  relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client, 
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence. 
  
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., Ltd. 
046 Phil 938 
  
Case Digest Version 
  
Doctrine: 
EVIDENCE;  PRIVILEGE  OF  ATTORNEY  AND  CLIENT;  LOSS  OF  PRIVILEGE.  —  The privilege which 
protects  communications  between  attorney  and  client  does  not  extend  to  a  copy  of  a  letter 
written  by  the  client  to  his  attorney  which  comes  to  the  hands  of  the  adverse  party.  Where  the 
authenticity of such a document is admitted, the court will take no notice of the manner in which 
it was obtained. 
  
Facts: 
James  Barton  is  a  US  citizen  residing  in  Manila  while  Leyte  Asphalt  is  a  Philippine  company 
which  has  its  principal  office  in  Cebu.  Barton  sought  to  recover  the  sum  of  $318,563.30  in 
damages  from Leyte Asphalt due to breach of contract along with a judicial pronouncement that 
he  was  entitled  to  an  extension  of  the  terms  of  the  sales  agencies  specified  in  the  contract 
(Exhibit A).  
  
Leyte  Asphalt  appears  to  be  the  owner  of  the  Lucio  Mine  in  Leyte,  a  valuable  deposit  of 
bituminous  limestone  and  other  asphalt  products.  William  Anderson,  the  general  manager  of 
Leyte  Asphalt,  wrote a letter to Baron authorizing the latter to sell the products of the Lucio Mine 
in  the  Commonwealth  of  Australia  and  New  Zealand  upon  a  scale  of  prices  indicated  in  said 
letter. 
  
Exhibit A, the authorization Baron relies on, contained the following stipulations (among others): 
-Baron  is  given  the  sole  and  exclusive  sales  agency  for  the  bituminous  limestone  and  other 
asphalt  products  of  the  Leyte  Asphalt  in  Australia,  Saigon,  Java,  New  Zealand,  India,  China, 
Tasmania, Sumatra, Siam, the Strait Settlements, USA and Hongkong until May 1, 1921. 
-  No  orders  for  less  than  one  thousand  (1,000)  tons  will  be  accepted  except  under  special 
agreement with Leyte Asphalt. It also contained a breakdown of the prices per ton. 
-  If  “the  sales  in the above territory equal or exceed ten 10,000 tons in the year ending October 1, 
1921  then  in  that  event  the  price  of  all  shipments  made  during  the  above  period  shall  be  ten 
pesos  (P10)  per  ton,  and  any  sum  charged  to  any  of  your  customers  or  buyers  in  the aforesaid 
territory in excess of ten pesos (P10) per ton” shall be rebated to Baron. 
-  Baron  also had full authority to sell the Lucio mine products for any sum he saw fit in excess of 
the  prices  quoted  above  and  such  excess  in  price  was  to  be  his  extra  and  additional  profit  and 
commission. 
-  All  ships,  steamers,  boats or other carriers were to be loaded promptly with not less than 1,000 
tons  each  24  hours  after  March  1,  1921,  unless  there  was  to  be  prior  notice.  It  was  also 
stipulated  that  Leyte  Asphalt  shall  not  be  required  to  ship  orders  of  5,000  tons  except  on  30 
days notice and 10,000 tons except on 60 days notice. 
  
Baron  entered  into  subagency  agreements  in  San  Francisco  and Australia.  In San Francisco, he 
entered into an agreement with Ludvigsen & McCurdy.  Ludvigsen & McCurdy was instituted as a 
subagent  and  given  the  sole  selling  rights  for  the  bituminous  limestone  products  of  Leyte 
Asphalt for 1 year.  
  
Baron had also gone to Australia where he instituted Frank Smith as his sales agent.  
February  5,  1921  –  Ludvigsen & McCurdy advised Baron of an order of 6,000 tons of bituminous 
limestone which Baron accepted. 
  
Anderson  (GM  of  Leyte  Asphalt)  informed  Baron  that Leyte Asphalt was behind construction so 
it  could  not  handle  big  contracts  as  of  the  moment.  The  two  met  in  Manila  on  March  12  and 
Baron  told  Anderson  about  the  San  Francisco  order.  Anderson  said  that,  owing  to  lack  of 
capital,  adequate  facilities  had  not  been  provided  by  the  company  for  filling  large  orders  and 
suggested that Baron had better hold up in the matter of taking orders.  
  
Despite  Anderson’s  response,  Baron  wrote  a  notification to Leyte Asphalt for the company to be 
prepared  to  ship  five  thousand  tons  of  bituminous  limestone  to  San  Francisco.  He  also  made 
additional orders for Smith in Australia. 
  
Leyte  Asphalt  acknowledged  the  orders  for  Australia  and  San  Francisco  but  stated  that  no 
orders would be entertained without a cash deposit.  
The  CFI absolved Leyte Asphalt from four of the six causes of action.  The CFI allowed Barton to 
recover $202,500 from the first cause of action and $405,000 from the fourth cause of action. 
  
Among  the  evidence  presented  was  a  carbon  copy  of  a  letter written by Baron to Atty. Ingersoll, 
his  lawyer.  In  the  said  letter,  Baron  wrote  that  his  profit  from  the  San Francisco contract would 
have been at the rate of 85 cents per ton.  
  
When  the  letter  was  offered  in  evidence  by  the  attorney  for  the  defendant,  the  counsel  for  the 
plaintiff  announced  that  he  had  no  objection  to  the  introduction of this carbon copy in evidence 
if counsel for the defendant would explain where this copy was secured. 
  
The  attorney  for  the  defendant  informed  the  court  that  he  received  the  letter  from  the  former 
attorneys  of  the  defendant  without  explanation  of the manner in which the document had come 
into their possession.  
  
Baron’s  lawyer  then  made  an  announcement  that unless the defendant’s counsel explained how 
the  letter  came  to  the  defense’s  possession,  he proposed to object the letter’s admission on the 
ground that it was a confidential communication between client and lawyer. 
 
The trial judge excluded the letter. 
  
Issue: 
Whether or not the letter should be excluded 
  
Ruling: 
NO 
Ratio  When  papers are offered in evidence a court will take no notice of how they were obtained, 
whether  legally  or  illegally,  properly  or  improperly;  nor  will  it  form  a  collateral  issue  to  try  that 
question. 
  
Rationale: 
Even  supposing  that  the letter was within the privilege which protects communications between 
attorney  and  client,  this  privilege  was  lost  when  the  letter  came  to  the  hands  of  the  adverse 
party and it makes no difference how the defense acquired possession. 
  
The  law  protects  the  client  from  the  effect  of  disclosures  made  by  him  to  his  attorney  in  the 
confidence  of  the  legal  relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client, 
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence. 
  
According  to  Wigmore:  “Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are entirely in 
the  client's  hands,  and  since  the  privilege  is  a  derogation  from  the  general testimonial duty and 
should  be  strictly  construed,  it  would  be  improper  to  extend  its prohibition to third persons who 
obtain  knowledge  of  the  communications.  One  who  overhears  the  communication,  whether 
with  or without the client's knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege. The same rule 
ought  to  apply  to  one  who  surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document in original 
or copy.” 
  
Disposition Judgment reversed 
  
  
 
 
 
 

(2) Orient Insurance v. Revilla, 54 Phil. 919 (1930) 

(3) Upjohn Company v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383 (1981) 

(4) People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997) 

(5) Mercado v. Vitriolo, 459 SCRA 1 (2005) 

(6) Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 124 (1996) 

c) Physician - Patient Privilege 

—See also Rule 28— 

Cases: 

(1) Lim v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 273 (1992) 


 
Bucog, Roseller 
 
Cesar Monterry filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Sissy Crux on the ground that 
the latter has been allegedly suffering from schizophrenia “before, during and after the marriage 
and until the present. Cesar’s counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the 
Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acamporado, a Doctor of 
Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Sissy’s counsel opposed the motion on the ground that 
the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had examined 
Sissy in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. 
Counsel for Cesar contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert 
witness and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a 
professional capacity. 
 
May Dr. Acamporado be allowed to testify as an expert witness without violating the rule on the 
confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship? 
 
Answer: 
 
Yes, Dr. Acamporado may be allowed to testify as an expert witness without violating the rule on 
the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship provided that she will not testify on any 
information she acquired in attending the patient in her professional capacity. 
 
In Lim vs. Court of Appeals, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to 
enable him "safely and efficaciously treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. The mere fact 
of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of 
consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject 
communicated is not stated. 
 
In this case, although the doctor testified that she examined and interviewed the patient, she did 
not disclose anything she obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of 
her patient. 
 
 
Facts: 
 
Private respondent filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with petitioner Nelly Lim on the 
ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from schizophrenia “before, during and after 
the marriage and until the present. Private respondent’s counsel announced that he would 
present as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. 
Lydia Acamporado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Petitioner’s counsel 
opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is 
privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had 
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. Counsel for private respondent contended, 
however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on 
any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity. 
 
Issue: 
 
Whether or not Dr. Acamporado may be allowed to testify as an expert witness without violating 
the rule on the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship. 
 
Ruling: 
 
Yes, Dr. Acamporado may be allowed to testify as an expert witness without violating the rule on 
the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship provided that she will not testify on any 
information she acquired in attending the patient in her professional capacity. After a careful 
scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampado's testimony, the Court finds no declaration that 
touched (sic) or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, 
during the period she attended her patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified that 
she examined and interviewed the patient, she did not disclose anything she obtained in the 
course of her examination, interview and treatment of her patient. Given a set of facts and asked 
a hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion regarding the history and behaviour 
of the fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. 
 
Ratio Decidendi: 
 
The claimant of the privilege has the burden of establishing in each instance all the facts 
necessary to create the privilege, including the confidential nature of the information given. 
 
 

(2) Krohn v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146 (1994) 

d) Priest/Minister - Penitent Privilege 

e) State Secrets 

(1) Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 (1986) 

**See §16, R.A. 7653 (New Central Bank Act) 

(2) Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006) 


 
Capao, Henna Auggie M. 
 
Bar Question: The Senate invited officials of the executive department for public hearings. 
However, the President issued an order requiring certain public officials to secure prior consent 
of the President before appearing to either House of Congress pursuant to its executive 
privilege. Is the order issued by the President valid? 
 
Suggested Answer: The order issued by the President is valid. The doctrine of executive privilege 
is premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept 
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being an exemption from the 
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high 
degree as to outweigh public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. However, it 
is essential to limit to the President that power to invoke the privilege. She may authorize the 
Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, who must state that the authority is “By 
order of the President”. 
 
Detailed Case Digest: 
 
FACTS: The Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts 
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials 
and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and office including those employed in the 
GOCCs, the AFP, and the PNP. 
Invitations were sent to various officials of the executive department for them to appear as 
resource speakers in public hearings. 
 
Subsequently, the President issued E.O. 464 which requires that all public officials enumerated 
in Section 2 (b) thereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before 
either House of Congress. 
 
Thus, the officials invited declined to appear in the public hearings with only Col. Balutan and 
Brig. Gen. Gudana attending who were later relieved from their military posts for defying the 
President’s order. 
 
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress. 
 
RULING: E.O. 464 does not completely contravene the power of inquiry vested in Congress. 
 
Executive privilege whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized 
only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. 
 
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not 
depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. 
 
The extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily 
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. 
Section 1 of E.O. 464 specifically applies to department heads. And unlike Section 3, it does not 
require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President 
herself has made the determination that they are. 
 
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the 
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the 
President to whom such department heads must give a report. Thus, Article VI, Section 22 of 
the Constitution states that Congress may only request their appearance. But, when the inquiry 
in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation” under Section 21 of the 
same article, the appearance is mandatory on particular grounds. 
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt 
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. 
The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a 
matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by 
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, 
the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh public interest in enforcing that 
obligation in a particular case. 
 
It is essential to limit to the President that power to invoke the privilege. She may authorize the 
Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, who must state that the authority is “By 
order of the President”. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to 
exercise such power. Thus, Section 1 is valid while Section 3 is not. 
 
Therefore, when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own 
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to 
inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. 
 

f) Parental and Filial Privilege (§25, Rule 130) 

(a) Art. 215, Civil Code 

Case: 

(1) People v. Invencion, 398 SCRA 592 (2003) 

g) Newsman’s Privilege (See R.A. No. 53, as amended by R.A. 1477) 

Case: 

(1) In the Matter of Farber, 394 A.2d 330 (1978) 

h) Trade Secrets 

Case: 

(1) Air Phil Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc. (13 December 2007) 


 
EUPENA, Ron Christian 
 
Bar Q 
A and B entered into a contract wherein B would supply A industrial chemicals for the latter’s 
airplanes. For failure of A to comply with its obligation under said contracts, B filed a complaint 
for collection of sum of money against A. in its answer, A Said that the items were 
misrepresented by B as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with 
products petitioner had previously purchased from the latter. A asserted that it was deceived by 
B which merely altered the names and labels of such goods. During the pendency of the trial, A 
filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical 
components of their products, which was granted but was subsequently reversed by the RTC 
realizing that such ingredients are considered as trade secrets. This was affirmed by CA 
May B be compelled by A to disclose a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components 
of their products? 
No. Rule 27, sec. 1 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, 
letters, photographs, objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not 
be privileged. The documents must not be privileged against disclosure. Section 24 of Rule 130 
draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit: (a) 
communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) 
communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; 
and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters that are 
not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to 
disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom 
they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank 
deposits. 
 
 
 
Case digest 
Facts: 
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation services. 
Respondent Pennswell Inc was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and 
selling industrial chemicals, solvents and special lubricants. 
Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Under the contracts, 
petitioner’s obligation amounted to P 449,864.98 until the amount would be fully paid. For failure 
to pay comply with its obligations unders said contract. 
Respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner. Petitioner then filed an ANSWER 
alleging that the respondent defrauded the former for its previous sale of four items. Said items 
were misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, 
identical with products petitioner had previously purchased from respondent. 
During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a 
detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components of the following products, to wit: (a) 
Contact Grease and Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-Electric Strength 
Protective Coating; and (c) Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound.  
Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be 
compelled to disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. RTC 
Granted the motion then reversed its prior decision, finding that the chemical components are 
respondent’s trade secrets and are privileged in character. CA Affirmed 
ISSUE: 
WON the court of appeals ruled was correct when it upheld the ruling of the trial court that the 
chemical components or ingredients of respondent’s products are trade secrets or industrial 
secret that are not subject to compulsory disclosure. 
RULING: 
Yes. A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to 
its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. 
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special lubricants are 
trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. Jurisprudence has consistently 
acknowledged that the private character of trade secrets-there is a privilege not to disclose 
one’s trade secret. . To compel its disclosure is to cripple respondents business, and to place it 
at an undue disadvantage. If the chemical composition of respondents lubricants are opened to 
public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the backbone on which its business is founded. This would 
result in nothing less than the probable demise of respondents business. Respondent’s 
proprietary interest over the ingredients which it had developed and expended money and effort 
on is incontrovertible 
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, 
photographs, objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be 
privileged. The documents must not be privileged against disclosure. Section 24 of Rule 130 
draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit: (a) 
communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) 
communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; 
and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters that are 
not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to 
disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom 
they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank 
deposits.