De La Salle University College of Law: Lasallian Commission On Bar Operations 2018

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW
Lasallian Commission on Bar Operations 2018
POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Justice Del Castillo Digests
Chel Sy Tet Valeza Nolan Domingo
LCBO Chairperson Academic Affairs Constitutional Law I Subject
Chairperson Head
Nico Garcia
LCBO Vice Chair for Janine Tutanes Martin Villadolid
Internals Rod Zantua Constitutional Law II
Academic Affairs Deputy Subject Head
Steph Griar Chairpersons
LCBO Vice Chair for Jesse Solis
Externals Borgy Gavina Law on Administrative
Political and International Agencies and Election Law
Pat Costales Law Chairperson Subject Head
LCBO Executive Secretary
Iris Yap Sam Loyola
Ces Naga Political and International Law on Local Governments
LCBO Executive Treasurer Law Deputy Chairperson Subject Head
Cha De Vera
Public International Law
Subject Head
Dane Chua
Anna Rae De Guia
Tetel Guillermo
Bianca Tolentino
Ivan Valcos
Political and International
Law Digest Team Members
Political and International Law Justice Del Castillo Digests
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE LIVIOCO

G.R. No. 170685| 22 September 2010
Eminent Domain
DOCTRINE: For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. There are three important concepts in this
definition the character of the property, its price, and the time of actual taking.
FACTS:
• Respondent Enrique Livioco (Livioco) was the owner of sugarland located in Mabalacat, Pampanga. He
offered his sugarland to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition under the CARP
at P30.00 per square meter, for a total of P9,189,870.00.
• The DAR referred Livioco’s offer to the Land Bank of the Philippines for valuation. Livioco was
then informed of the valuation and that the cash portion of the claim proceeds have been “kept in
trust pending his submission of ownership documents.”
• It appears, however, that Livioco did not act upon the notices given by both agencies. LBP issued
a certification to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga as compensation for Livioco’s sugarland.
• It was only after two years that Livioco requested for a revaluation of the compensation on the
ground that it has already appreciated from the time it was offered for sale. The request was denied
by the DAR Director on the ground that there was already a perfected sale.
• The DAR proceeded to take possession of Livioco’s property. The DAR awarded Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) covering Livioco’s property to 26 farmer-beneficiaries.
• Livioco filed separate complaints to cancel the CLOAs and to recover his property but the same
proved to be futile. Unable to recover his property but unwilling to accept what he believes is an
outrageously low valuation of his property, Livioco filed for a determination of just compensation
against the DAR, LBP, and CLOA holders before the RTC of Angeles City.
• He maintained that the area where his property is located has become predominantly residential,
hence, he should be paid for his property’s value as such.
ISSUE: Whether or not the determination of just compensation was proper
HELD: No, it is reminded to adhere strictly to the doctrine that just compensation must be valued at the
time of taking. The time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of
his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic.
• The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property has changed from
agricultural to residential because there is no allegation or proof that the property was approved
for conversion to other uses by the DAR. It is the DAR that is mandated by law to evaluate and to
approve land use conversion to prevent fraudulent evasion from the agrarian reform coverage.
• As to the price of the property, we find that LBP did not sufficiently substantiate its valuation.
While LBP insists that it strictly followed the statutory provision and its relevant implementing
guidelines in arriving at its valuation, the Court notes the lack of evidence to prove the veracity of
LBPs claims. LBP merely submitted its computation to the court without any evidence on record,
whether documentary or testimonial, that would support the correctness of the values or data used
in such computation.
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DOH v. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC.

G.R. No. 182358 | 20 February 2013
State Immunity
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or
impliedly, then it be the subject of a suit.
There is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.” However,
it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived
its non-suability.
“Public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection
with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.”
FACTS:
• In line with a Memorandum providing for a list of categories of sanctions to be imposed on accredited
government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of adverse findings regarding their products
(e.g. substandard, fake, or misbranded) or violations committed by them during their accreditation, the
Department of Health (DOH_ invited accredited drug companies, including Phil Pharma, to a meeting.
• The meeting appraised the drug companies that some of their products are Violative Products unfit for
human consumption. The companies were then directed to submit, within 10 days, their respective
explanation on the adverse findings on the Report.
• Phil Pharma, instead of submitting an explanation, sent a letter informing DOH Under-Secretary
(USec) that their lawyers are preparing the corresponding reply.
• USec replied telling them that their letter is “untenable” and informed them that its accreditation has
been suspended for two years.
• Phil Pharma questioned the suspension by filing a Complaint mainly seeking to nullify various DOH
Memorandums, with a prayer for damages against DOH USecs, alleging, among others, that there was
an undue suspension of its accreditation, which warrants damages.
• DOH moved to dismiss claiming that the case was one against the State.
• RTC: Dismissed. The principle of state immunity from suit is applicable. The case is one instituted
against the State
• CA: Reversed: by filing a motion to dismiss, DOH is deemed to have hypothetically admitted the
allegations in the complaint, which state that they were being sued in their individual capacities,
negating their claim that the case is an unauthorized suit against the State.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case be dismissed for being a suit against the State?
HELD: Yes, as a general rule, a state may not be sued. This immunity may be waived by way of an express
or implied consent to be sued. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides;
there is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.” However,
it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived
its non-suability. The State “will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has
entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its
sovereign or governmental capacity[,] xx x no such waiver may be implied. ”Statutory provisions waiving
[s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”
The DOH can validly invoke state immunity because it is an unincorporated agency, which performs
sovereign/governmental functions. It has neither sued nor consented to be sued. If a Complaint seeks to
“impose a charge or financial liability against the state,” the defense of non-suability may be properly
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invoked. The doctrine of state immunity extends its protective mantle to complaints filed against state
officials for acts done in the discharge and performance of their duties. “Public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where
they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.”
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 190582| 8 April 2010
Party-List System
DOCTRINE: The crucial element in party-list registration is whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941 that the party-list is indeed marginalized and under-
represented.
FACTS:
• Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). They applied for accreditation before the COMELEC but
was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base.
• Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity;
that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes,
LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation
• COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds.
• Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation.
• Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed
that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
• The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to
benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC should grant petitioner’s application for registration
HELD: Yes, the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani does not stand for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. The enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive.
• A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of
the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to
constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044
members in its electronic discussion group.
• We find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence,
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nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
NAZARENO ET AL v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE

G.R. No. 181559 | 2 October 2009
Midnight Appointments
DOCTRINE: Appointments (midnight appointment) are banned prior to the elections to ensure that
partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the appointment process, and to prevent incumbents from gaining
any undue advantage during the elections. The exception is when it will be shown that the appointments
have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up
the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk.
FACTS:
• Dumaguete City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo sought re-election in May 2001 elections but
lost to respondent Mayor Agustin R. Perdices. A few weeks before the end of his term, outgoing
Mayor Remollo promoted 15 city hall employees, and regularized another 74 city hall employees,
including the herein 52 petitioners.
• When he assumed office, Mayor Perdices publicly announced that he would not honor the
appointments made by former Mayor Remollo. On the same day, he instructed the City
Administrator, respondent Dominador Dumalag, Jr., to refrain from making any cash
disbursements for payments of petitioners' salary differentials based on their new positions.
• Petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with Injunction and Damages with Prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order against the City of Dumaguete. They sought to enjoin respondents
from taking any action or issuing any orders nullifying their appointments.
• The CSC Field Office in Dumaguete City revoked and invalidated the appointments of the
petitioners. Pertinent portions of the findings are the following:
1. There was only one meeting of the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) held to consider the
number of appointments and no PSB statements certifying that there was actual screening
and evaluation done on all candidates for each position.
2. The 89 appointments were all issued after the elections and when the new city mayor was
about to assume office.
3. The rationale against the prohibition on the issuance of "midnight appointments" by the
President is applicable to appointments extended by outgoing local chief executives
immediately before and/or after the elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mass appointments are valid
HELD: No, this case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local chief executives to issue
"midnight" appointments, especially after their successors have been proclaimed. It does not only cause
animosities between the outgoing and the incoming officials, but also affects efficiency in local governance.
Those appointed tend to devote their time and energy in defending their appointments instead of attending
to their functions.
Not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. However, it must be shown
that the appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that
there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk.
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Here, there was only one en banc meeting of the city PSB to consider the appointments, without any
evidence that there were any deliberations on the qualifications of the petitioners, or any indication that
there was an urgent need for the immediate issuance of such appointments. The absence of evidence
showing careful consideration of the merits of each appointment, and the timing and the number of
appointments, militate against petitioners’ cause. On the contrary, the prevailing circumstances in this case
indicate that the appointments were hurriedly issued by the outgoing administration.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
MAMBA ET AL v. LARA ET AL
G.R. No. 165109 | 14 December 2009
Concepts of the Judicial Department
DOCTRINE: A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed,
or that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
FACTS:
• The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed a resolution authorizing Governor Edgar R.
Lara to engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation as financial advisor or
consultant for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fund the priority projects of the governor
without cost and commitment.
• They also ratified the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into by Gov. Lara and Preferred
Ventures Corporation which provides that the provincial government of Cagayan shall pay
Preferred Ventures Corporation a one-time fee of 3% of the amount of bonds floated.
• Subsequently, the majority of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan approved
to use the bond flotation to fund the construction and development of the new Cagayan Town
Center. Gov. Lara issued the Notice of Award to Asset Builders Corporation, giving to the latter
the planning, design, construction and site development of the town center project for a fee of
₱213,795,732.39
• Petitioners Manuel N. Mamba, Raymund P. Guzman and Leonides N. Fausto filed a Petition for
Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against the respondents (Gov. Lara et al.).
• However, the RTC dismissed their petition on the grounds that the 1) petitioners are not the proper
parties or they lack locus standi in court; 2) the action is barred by the rule on state immunity from
suit; and 3) the issues raised are not justiciable questions but purely political.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file the petition.
HELD: Yes, the petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers. For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two
requisites must be met:
(1) Public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality
and in doing so, a law is violated, or some irregularity is committed, and
(2) The petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.
In this case, although the construction of the town center would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of
the bonds, which respondents insist are not taxpayer’s money, a government support in the amount of ₱187
million would still be spent for paying the interest of the bonds. Records also show that the governor
requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to appropriate an amount of ₱25 million for the interest of the
bond. Clearly, the first requisite has been met.
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As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent "direct injury test" bearing in
mind that locus standi is a procedural technicality. By invoking "transcendental importance", "paramount
public interest", or "far-reaching implications", ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to sue even if
they failed to show direct injury. In cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public
expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers.
HADJI HASHIM ABDUL v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 184496 | December 2, 2013
Concepts of Judicial Department
DOCTRINE: Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and
adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging.
FACTS:
• Abdul was first elected as municipal mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur and re-elected for a second
term. It was while serving his second term as municipal mayor when the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an information charging him and Domado, with falsification of
public documents, defined and penalized under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
• That they made it appear that Engr. Murad as Municipal Engineer prepared and signed the Local
Budget Preparation Form Nos. 152, 153 and 154 known as the Program Appropriation and
Obligation by Object, Personnel Schedule and Functional Statement and General Objective,
respectively, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew that said Zubair F. Murad was
never employed as Municipal Engineer of the said Municipality, to the damage and prejudice of
public interest which led to their suspension pendente lite.
• Hence, he filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for TRO alleging that the suspension order was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The suspension order,
however, was no longer implemented because it was superseded by the expiration of Abdul’s
second term as municipal mayor and his unsuccessful bid for re-election during the May 2004
election. During the May 2007 election, Abdul emerged as the winner in the mayoralty race and
again sat as Mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. Abdul called attention to Sandiganbayan’s
pronouncement in its Resolution that his defeat in the election has effectively rendered his
suspension moot and academic. Nonetheless, Sandiganbayan ordered anew the suspension of
Abdul from his present position for a period of 90 days. Abdul moved for reconsideration, but the
same was denied. Hence, a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in suspending him pendente lite from his position as mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del
Sur?
HELD: No, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being moot and academic. In the present case,
the acquittal of Abdul operates as a supervening event that mooted the present Petition. Any resolution on
the validity or invalidity of the issuance of the order of suspension could no longer affect his rights as a
ranking public officer, for legally speaking he did not commit the offense charged.
Notwithstanding the mootness of the present Petition, he nevertheless implores us to make a clear and
categorical resolution on whether the offense of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the
RPC is included in the term "fraud" as contemplated under Section 13 of RA 3019.
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As earlier quoted, to warrant the suspension of a public officer under the said Section 13, he must be
charged with an offense (1) under RA 3019, or (2) under Title Seven, Book II of the RPC, or (3) involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property. Admittedly, Abdul in this case was not charged under
RA 3019. Neither was he charged under Title Seven, Book II of the RPC as the crime of falsification of
public documents under Article 171 of the RPC is covered by Title Four, 26 Book II thereof. Since vouchers
are official documents signifying a cash outflow from government coffers, falsification thereof invariably
involves fraud upon public funds.
In fine, we reiterate that the issue on the validity or invalidity of petitioner’s suspension had mooted
considering his acquittal by the Sandiganbayan. As such, there is no justiciable controversy for this Court
to adjudicate.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. v. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

SOCIAL WELFARE
G.R. No. 175356 |December 3, 2013
Concepts of Judicial Department
DOCTRINE: When a party challenges the constitutionality of a law, the burden of proof rests upon him.
FACTS:
• In 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior citizens the following privileges:
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following: a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to
utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishment[s], restaurants and
recreation centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private
establishments may claim the cost as tax credit;b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on
admission fees charged by theaters, cinema houses and concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other
similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement;c) exemption from the payment of individual
income taxes: Provided, That their annual taxable income does not exceed the property level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year;d)
exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs undertaken by the OSCA as part of its
work;e) free medical and dental services in government establishment[s] anywhere in the country,
subject to guidelines to be issued by the Department of Health, the Government Service Insurance
System and the Social Security System;f) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of
the same benefits and privileges given by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social
Security System (SSS) and PAG-IBIG, as the case may be, as are enjoyed by those in actual service.
• To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD issued its
own Rules and Regulations. Hence, this petition.
• Manila Memorial Park and La Funeraria Paz are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior
citizens but are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under
RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.
• Manila Memorial Park and La Funeraria Paz posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes
Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that: "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation."
• DSWD and DOF maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police
power.
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ISSUE: Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power or
eminent domain?
HELD: Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. In conclusion, we maintain that the correct rule in
determining whether the subject regulatory measure has amounted to a "taking" under the power of
eminent domain is the one laid down in Alalayan v. National Power Corporation and followed in Carlos
Superdurg Corporation consistent with long standing principles in police power and eminent domain
analysis. Thus, the deprivation or reduction of profits or income. Gross sales must be clearly shown to be
unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory.
Under the specific circumstances of this case, such determination can only be made upon the presentation
of competent proof which Manila Memorial and La Funeraria Paz failed to do. A law, which has been in
operation for many years and promotes the welfare of a group accorded special concern by the
Constitution, cannot and should not be summarily invalidated on a mere allegation that it reduces the
profits or income/gross sales of business establishments.
EDCEL LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDEA

G.R. No. 231658 | July 4, 2017
Judicial Power
DOCTRINE: The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the
President’s decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation.
FACTS:
• President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao on May 23, 2017 for
a period not exceeding 60 days.
• The full text of Proclamation No. 216 includes the following:
o Proclamation No. 55 was issued on 04 September 2016 declaring a state of national emergency
on account of lawless violence in Mindanao;
o Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that, “Incase of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he (the President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law.”
o Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provides that, “the crime
of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and taking arms against the Government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of
the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed
forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives;”
o Part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent acts
committed by the Maute terrorist group, such as the attack on the military outpost in Lanao
del Sur in 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City
in 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees;
o That on May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in Marawi City,
established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government and private
facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and started flying the flag
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly attempting to
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive
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the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to
maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; and
o This recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to sow terror,
and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of
Mindanao.
• Three (3) Petitions were filed questioning the legality of the said declaration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by paragraph 3, Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court.
HELD: YES.
Unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII make it sui generis.
- All 3 petitions may be taken cognizance by the Court, by virtue of par 3, Sec. 18, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the SC may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
- The jurisdiction of this Court under par 3 of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and
specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article
VIII.
- The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be
denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
Jurisdiction must be specifically conferred by the Constitution or by law.

- It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the
law. Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative act,
no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution. It is
likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied from the
language of the Constitution or a statute. It must appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to
exist.
- A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority
to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
“In an appropriate proceeding” does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article
VIII.
- It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase “in an appropriate
proceeding” would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article
VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her
functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
or suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if
this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate
its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.
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Purpose/ significance of Section 18, Article VII is to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling in
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.
- Par 3, Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to constitutionalize
the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Lansang, to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review.
- “In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history of
the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct
relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects
of inquiry.”
- Montenegro v. Castaneda: The authority to decide whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged with the President and his decision
thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts. This ruling was initially reversed, but later reinstated
in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, which ruled: According to the SC, the constitutional power of the President
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to judicial inquiry.
- Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine.
Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President
on the exercise of the extraordinary powers.
- Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President
in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed
it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII. This is clear from the records of
the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on whether the President could
proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress.
Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to curtail the extent of the powers of the President.
- The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in
Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive Department.
- The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the people for a six-year
term with no reelection for the duration of his/her life. While traditional powers inherent in the office
of the President are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions which curtail
the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.
- The 1987 Constitution now provides that suspension of the privilege of the writ can be exercised only
in 2 cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety demands it, only for a period not exceeding 60 days,
and reserving to Congress the power to revoke such suspension or proclamation of martial law which
congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More importantly, the action of the
President is made subject to judicial review, thereby again discarding jurisprudence which renders the
executive action a political question and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
CAPABLANCA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 179370 | 18 July 2009
Powers and Functions of Each Constitutional Commission
12
DOCTRINE: The Civil Service Commission (“CSC”), as the central personnel agency of the Government,
is mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service.
FACTS:
• Eugenio Capablanca was appointed into the PNP with a rank of Police Officer 1 (PO1) with a
temporary status.
• He took and passed both the PNP Entrance Exam conducted by NAPOLCOM and the Career
Service Professional Exam – Computer Assisted Test (CSP) given by the CSC.
• Capablanca, thereafter, was conferred with permanent status.
• About a year after being permanently appointed, Capablanca was informed about certain alleged
irregularities relative to his CSP exam: both the picture and the signature in the Personal Data Sheet
was different from the one appearing on the seat plan – these irregularities would constitute the
offense of dishonesty if prima facie evidence is established.
• During the Preliminary Investigation, Capablanca moved to dismiss the proceedings on the
ground that it is the NAPOLCOM which has sole authority to conduct entrance and promotional
examinations for police officers, to the exclusion of the CSC, in effect voiding the CSP. He further
alleged that the administrative discipline over police officers falls under the jurisdiction of the PNP
and/or NAPOLCOM.
• CSC promulgated an order stating that there was no dispute that it is indeed the NAPOLCOM,
which has the sole authority to conduct the entrance and promotional examinations of police
officers. However, since Capablanca submitted a CSC Career Service Professional eligibility and
not a NAPOLCOM eligibility to support his appointment on a permanent status, then the CSC had
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
• After being issued a temporary restraining order, CSC moved to dismiss the summary hearing set
to resolve the application for preliminary investigation arguing, among others, that the CSC was
not stripped of its original disciplinary jurisdiction over all cases involving civil service exam
anomalies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC have jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible
administrative case of dishonesty against a PNP officer for the alleged CSP exam irregularity.
HELD: Yes. Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers
upon the CSC the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected with the
examinations.
• Capablanca asserted that CSC does not have the authority to conduct an initiatory investigation of
the case and that it only has appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of any of the disciplining
authorities above mentioned. The Court disagreed. It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil
Service Commission that the appellate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the
administrative cases filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions
of their office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil service
examinations.
LUMAYNA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 185001 | 25 September 2009
13
DOCTRINE: The Commission on Audit (“COA”) may disallow public fund disbursements through
resolutions by both the Sangguniang Bayan and Panlalawigan when the same are contrary to law (i.e. when
it exceeds the limitations set forth in the law)
FACTS:
• The Department of Budget and Management ("DBM”) issued a budget circular authorizing the
grant of a maximum of 5% salary adjustment to personnel in the LGUs.
• By virtue of the circular, the Sangguiniang Bayan (“SB”) of Mayoyao, Ifugao enacted various
resolutions and Appropriation Ordinances approving the budget containing an appropriation for
the salaries and benefits of newly created positions in the municipality.
• Upon review by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (“SP”), and after originally disallowing the same,
upon finding good faith on the part of the officials of the municipality, the SP allowed the salary
increase.
• Lumayna, et. al., were granted the salary increase.
• Meanwhile, the Regional Legal and Adjudication Office of COA issued a Notice of Disallowance
for an amount representing payments for the salary increases of municipal personnel
o The disallowance was said not to be in accordance with law
o That the limitation on personal services had been exceeded, and
o That the SB resolution was not the appropriate manner of granting the increase.
• It ordered Lumayna, et. al., to refund the amounts
ISSUE: Whether the disallowances of the funds representing the salary increase valid?
HELD: Yes, the limitation set under the LGC was exceeded. However, Lumayna, et. al., were not ordered
to refund the disallowed amounts because they acted in good faith.
• Lumayna contend that the Resolutions passed by the SB are valid exercise of legislative prerogative
in accordance with the DBM circular, which gave them the authority to grant a maximum of 5%
salary adjustment to personnel in the LGU. They also cited as basis the SP Resolution declaring as
operative the 2002 Annual Budget of the Municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao, which included the
salary increase. They further claimed that the amount disbursed did not exceed the limit.
• The annual budget of Mayoyao exceeded the limit for personal services as prescribed in the LGC.
Further, the grant of the increase through the adoption of higher salary class schedule is not among
the list of items and activities whereby the limitation for personal services may be waived pursuant
to SB Resolution.
• As regards Lumayna’s reliance on the SP Resolution, the COA in its Decision made it clear that the
review of the 2002 municipal budget by the SP was only limited to the provisions stated in the said
budget which contained, among others, provisions for the funding of the 17 newly created
positions, and not its re-alignment to the 5% salary increase. Consequently, the declaration by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the said Resolution that the 2002 municipal budget was operative
did not include the grant of the 5% salary increase, as the same was not contained in the said budget
but in Resolution No. 66, s. 2002.
CATIPON, JR. v. JAPSON

G.R. No. 191787 | 22 July 2015
DOCTRINE: The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes
involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or -controlled corporations with original
charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.
14
FACTS:
• Macario Catipon, Jr. is a holder of a Bachelor’s Degree in Commerce despite having a deficiency of
1.5 units.
• He later found employment with SSS. Sometime in 1993, the personnel head of the SSS informed
Catipon that the CSC was conducting a Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE), to which
Catipon applied to, believing that the CSC still allowed applicants to substitute the length of their
government service for any academic deficiency they may have.
• As it turns out, pursuant to a CSC Memorandum Circular and Office Memo, the policy has been
discontinued.
• Catipon, nevertheless, took the test, and obtained a rating of 80.52%. He was eventually promoted.
In 1995, he finally eliminated his deficiency.
• In 2003, Jerome Japson, filed a letter-complaint with the CSC-CAR alleging that Catipon made
deliberate false entries in his CSPE application, specifically, that he obtained his college degree in
1993 when actually he graduated in 1995 only, after removing his deficiency. Catipon was therefore
not qualified to take the CSPE since he was not a college graduate contrary to the entry in his
application form.
• Catipon was then charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official documents, Grave Misconduct
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
• CSC-CAR’s RULING: Revoked Catipon’s eligibility after passing the CSPE in 1993 for being the
fruit of a poisonous tree, so to speak. He was found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial and was meted
out with suspension.
• CA RULING: Appeal denied. Held that by filing directly with the CA, Catipon violated the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the case does not fall within any of the
exceptions to the same.
ISSUE: Whether the appeal should have first been filed with the CSC and not the CA?
HELD: Yes, the CSC has jurisdiction over decisions by CSC Regional offices brought before it on petition
for review
• In line with the Constitution and its mandate as the central personnel agency of government and
sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service, the CSC can adopt memorandum circulars
providing for rules governing public officers/employees.
• As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, the Civil Service Commission Proper, or Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction
over decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review. It is only
the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for review.
BILL OF RIGHTS
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 190582| 8 April 2010
Party – List System
DOCTRINE: Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society,
and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock,
or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
FACTS:
15
• Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). They applied for accreditation before the COMELEC but
was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base.
• Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity;
that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes,
LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation
• COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds.
• Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation.
• Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed
that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
• The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to
benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ang Ladlad is covered under the equal protection clause
HELD: Yes, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-
list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is
equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC violated the freedom of expression and association clause
HELD: Yes, under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square
that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb.
Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any
compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
ANTOLIN v. DOMONDON
G.R. No. 165036 | 5 July 2010
Right to Information
DOCTRINE: The people’s right to information is not absolute and as such is limited to “matters of public
concern,” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
FACTS:
16
• Hazel Antolin (petitioner) took the 1997 CPA Board exams but failed (4/7 of the subjects).
• Antolin was convinced she deserved to pass, thus, she wrote to Abelardo Domondon (respondent),
Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be
re-corrected.
• Antolin was shown her answer sheets which consisted merely of shaded marks, so she was unable
to determine why she failed the exam. Antolin wrote again but Domondon denied the request.
• Petitoner Antolin filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages. Respondent Domondon opposed
arguing that petitioner was not entitled to relief sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic.
HELD: No, the petition has not become moot and academic when Antolin passed the 1998 CPA Board
exam. Art. III, Sec 7 of the Constitution recognizes the right of people to matters of public information on
matters of public concern, together with the guarantee to right to information is Art. II, Sec. 28 which
promotes full disclosure and transparency in government. Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right
to information is not absolute. The people’s right to information is limited to “matters of public concern,”
and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.” Similarly, the State’s policy of full
disclosure is limited to “transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law.”
• In the case at bar, the Court has held that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams
are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would
understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to
ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession.
HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 176229 | 19 October 2011
Rights of the Accused
DOCTRINE: Allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only
to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession is extracted from the accused and becomes the
basis of their conviction
FACTS:
• 13 HK nationals arrived as tourists at NAIA. At the arrival area, the group leader of the HK tourists
presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner, Cinco. When Cinco examined each
of the baggage, she saw similar chocolate boxes from the first baggage and the second baggage.
• As Cinco became suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them.
Instead of chocolates, white crystalline substance (aka shabu) contained in a white transparent
plastic was revealed.
• The 13 HK tourists were brought to NBI for further questioning. Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI
found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his five co-accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights under custodial investigation when evidence
taken during custodial investigation was not excluded.
1. Whether petitioner was denied of his right to confrontation.
HELD: No, petitioner was not deprived of his rights. While petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a
custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under
Sec. 12, Article III of the Constitution such constitutional provision prohibits, as evidence, only confessions
and admissions of the accused as against himself.
17
• In the case at bar, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial
investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from
petitioner as evidence of his guilt and no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention
and subsequently used in evidence against him.
• As the Court held in People v. Buluran, “any allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.” Hence, petitioner’s
claim that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation
deserves scant consideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied of his right to confrontation
HELD: No, petitioner was not denied of his right. The right to confrontation, under Sec. 14(2), Art. III of
the Constitution is essentially a guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the
prosecution. The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to
the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be
given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges.
• The chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination,
so that if the opportunity for cross-examination has been secured, the function and test of
confrontation has also been accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic
preliminary to cross examination.”
POLSOTIN v. DE GUIA
G.R. No. 172624| 5 December 2011
DOCTRINE: The right to counsel, being intertwined with the right to due process, is guaranteed by the
Constitution to any person whether the proceeding is administrative, civil or criminal.
FACTS:
• Petitioners Polsotin et. al were bus drivers and conductors of Respondent De Guia, Enterprises Inc.
alleged that they were illegally dismissed without cause and due process and thus filed a complaint
before the NLRC.
• During the hearings set before the LA, De Guia Inc. failed to appear and failed to timely submit its
position paper. However, De Guia Inc. filed its position paper afterwards but without furnishing
copies to the petitioner. (NOTE: Petitioners had no counsel on record and had been filing and
signing all pleadings only through their representative, petitioner Rayala.)
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to due consideration of their petition.
HELD: Yes, the right to counsel, being intertwined with the right to due process, is guaranteed by the
Constitution to any person whether the proceeding is administrative, civil or criminal. The CA should have
extended some degree of liberality so as to give the party a chance to prove their cause with a lawyer to
represent or to assist them. The dismissal of an employee’s appeal on purely technical ground is
inconsistent with the constitutional mandate on protection to labor.” The Court has often set aside the strict
application of procedural technicalities to serve the broader interest of substantial justice.
• Labor tribunals are mandated to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily, objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure. However, in every
proceeding before it, the fundamental and essential requirements of due process should not be
ignored but must at all times be respected. Besides, petitioners’ case concerns their job, considered
as a property right, of which they could not be deprived of without due process.
18
NAPOCOR v. SPS. ZABALA

G.R. No. 173520| 30 January 2013
Just Compensation
DOCTRINE: Just compensation is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by any other branch or official
of the government and statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing
just compensation is not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines.
FACTS:
• Respondents Sps. Zabala et. al. were owners of different parcels of land in Balanga City, Bataan.
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) needed an easement of right of way over the
affected areas for its 230 KV Limay-Hermosa Transmission Lines.
• NAPOCOR repeatedly negotiated with the respondents for the acquisition of right of way
easement over the said parcels of land but failed to reach an agreement. Thus, it filed a complaint
for expropriation of such lands alleging that it has the right to take or enter upon the possession of
the subject properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 42.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 3, RA 6395 can restrict/limit NAPOCOR’s liability.
HELD: No, Section 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional power of the courts to determine
just compensation.
• Just compensation has been defined as “the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. ‘Just’ is used
to qualify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea that the amount
to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.” The payment
of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed no less by our
Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments or executive
issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners to just
compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function that cannot “be usurped by any other
branch or official of the government.
• Courts have consistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the
method of computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere
guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof. Since the high-tension electric current passing
through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of the normal use of
their land, it is only just and proper to require NAPOCOR to recompense them for the full market
value of their property.
TANENGGE v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 179448| 26 June 2013
DOCTRINE: Custodial interrogation is any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Carlos Tanenggee was the manager of Commercio Branch of Metrobank in Divisoria.
Five separate Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed against
19
him for filling up cashier checks and promissory notes under the name of Romeo Tan, a valued
client of Metrobank.
• Prosecution presented different witnesses, the most relevant which are:
o Valentino Elevado: a member of the Internal Affairs in Metrobank, testified that he
conducted and interviewed Tanenggee in January 1998 and that in said interview,
Tanenggee admitted having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging
the promissory notes.
o Maria Dolores Miranda: Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified that
several cashier’s checks were issued in favor of Romeo Tan and that Tanenggee instructed
her to encash the same; and that it was he who received the proceeds of the loan
• Tanenggee claimed that all the signatures of Tan appearing on the promissory notes and the
cashier’s checks were the genuine signatures of Tan although he never saw the latter affix them
thereon. RTC: found Tanenggee guilty of the charges. CA: affirmed.
• Tanenggee’s argument: that while he admits signing a written statement, he refutes the truth of the
contents thereof and alleged that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents.
He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Sec. 12, Art. III of the
Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of
the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tanenggee’s written statement is admissible in evidence.
HELD: Yes, the constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt
obtained in violation of Sec. 12, Art. III of the Constitution is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation is any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
• A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the
commencement thereof, which are: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above.
• In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement
regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the
questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs
manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any
significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, Tanenggee cannot be said to be under custodial
investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his
written statement.
AGUILAR v. O’PALLICK
G.R. No. 182280 | 29 July 2013
Due Process
DOCTRINE: A person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he

was not made a party to.
FACTS:
• PPGI entered into a Contract-To-Sell with Poblete and Villanueva over Unit 3301 in Makati Prime
Citadel Condominium in Makati City.
• Thereafter, PPGI issued a Deed of Sale in favor of O’Pallick after he paid the purchase price in full.
Although O’Pallick took possession of the unit, the Deed of Sale in his favor was never registered
nor annotated.
20
• Meanwhile, a case between PPGI and petitioner Aguilar (HLURB case), Aguilar was able to obtain
a final and executory decision in her favor, which resulted to the levy of several properties
including Unit 3301.
• Notice of Sale was posted and published. O’Pallick filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim. Still,
public auction was conducted where Aguilar was declared as the highest bidder. Thus, O’Pallick
filed a Complaint for quieting of title and to set aside the levy on execution of the unit, to annul the
certificate of sale issued in favor of Aguilar, as well as to recover the unit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision in the HLURB case is binding upon O’Pallick.
HELD: NO. It is not binding upon O’Pallick.

• The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding
in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
• O’Pallick was not impleaded in the HLURB case, thus, he could not be bound by the decision.
Because he was not impleaded in said case; he was not given the opportunity to present his case
therein. Since O’Pallick was not impleaded, he had the right to vindicate his claim in a separate
action, as in this case. As a prior purchaser of the very same condominium unit, he had the right to
be heard on his claim.
DEMAALA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 173523 | 19 February 2014
Due Process
DOCTRINE: Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet he failed
to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court.
FACTS:
• Demaala was the Municipal Mayor of Narra, Palawan, and is the accused for violation of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a
Motion to Suspend Demaala stating that suspension was mandatory. Demaala opposed.
• Sandiganbayan (9 Feb 2006): granted the preventive suspension.
• On 3 March 2006, Demaala filed an MR. Demaala scheduled the hearing of her MR on 26 April
2006.
• Ombudsman (prosecution) sought to reset the scheduled April 26 and 27, 2006 hearing for the
continuation of the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence to a later date and was later granted
by Sandiganbayan. The continuation for presentation of the prosecution’s evidence was scheduled
on August 2 and 3, 2006
• Sandiganbayan (23 May 2006): denied Demaala’s MR.
• Demaala claims that she was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its May 23, 2006
Resolution denying her MR even before the same could be heard on the scheduled August 2 and
3, 2006 hearings.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan its Resolution denying
the MR without conducting a hearing thereon.
HELD: No, petitioner’s failure to attend the scheduled April 26, 2006 hearing of her MR is fatal to her cause.
Her excuse was that she no longer bothered to go to court on April 26, 2006 since “she had no business to
be there” is unavailing. By being absent at the April 21, 2006 hearing, petitioner did not consider the
prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial as related to her pending MR.
21
• Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet he failed to do
so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court. Petitioner was
accorded ample opportunity to be heard through her pleadings.
• As stated in Batul v. Bayron: Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the
right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative
proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity
to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial
of due process.
SR METALS v. REYES
G.R. No. 179669 | 4 June 2014
Equal Protection
DOCTRINE: Issue on violation of EPC is moot since all small-scale miners are equally treated as the
production limit applies to all of them.
FACTS:
• SR Metals Inc. was awarded a 2-yr Small-Scale Mining Permit (SSMP) and were allowed to extract
Nickel and Cobalt (NiCo) in Agusan del Norte. The mining corporations’ ECCs contain a
restriction that the amount of Ni-Co ore they are allowed to extract annually should not exceed
50,000 MTs of ore pursuant to Section 1 of PD 1899.
• Gov. Amante of Agusan del Norte questioned the quantity of ore that had been mined and shipped
by the mining corporations. The mining corporations denied having exceeded the extraction limit
of 50,000 MTs and explained that an extracted mass contains only a limited amount/percentage of
Ni-Co because it is lumped with gangue (the unwanted rocks and minerals.)
• Gov. Amante sought the opinion of DOJ. By comparing PD 1899 to RA No. 7076, a subsequent law
that likewise defines small-scale mining, the DOJ opined that Section 1 of PD 1899 is deemed to
have been impliedly repealed by RA 7076 as nothing from the provisions of the latter law mentions
anything pertaining to an annual production quota for small-scale mining.DOJ categorically
concluded that the term ‘ore’ should be confined only to Ni-Co, that is, excluding soil and other
materials that are of no economic value to the mining corporations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 1, PD 1899 violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No, while under RA 7076, small-scale mining refers to 'mining activities which rely heavily on
manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining
equipment. Significantly, this definition does not provide for annual extraction limit unlike in PD 1899.
• DOJ Opinion concluded that since nothing from RA 7076 speaks of an annual production limit,
Sec. 1 of PD 1899 should be considered impliedly repealed by RA 7076, the later law. However,
while these two laws tackle the definition of what small-scale mining is, both have different objects
upon which the laws shall be applied to. PD 1899 applies to individuals, partnerships and
corporations while RA 7076 applies to cooperatives.
• With the 50,000-MT limit likewise imposed on small- scale miners under RA 7076, the issue raised
on the violation of the equal protection clause is moot. The fact is, the DENR treats all small-scale
miners equally as the production limit applies to all of them. There is therefore no more reason for
the mining corporations to not recognize and comply with the said limitation. It must be stressed
that the DENR is the government agency tasked with the duty of managing and conserving the
22
country’s resources; it is also the agency vested with the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations for the implementation of mining laws.
PEOPLE v. CONSTANCIO
G.R. No. 206226 | 4 April 2016
DOCTRINE: Confession is admissible when it is voluntarily executed with the assistance of a competent
and independent counsel.
FACTS:
• On the night of 10 March 2001, “AAA” after parting ways with her friends, was abducted, raped
and slain by accused Berry, Constancio, Pagkalinawan, Darden and Burog.
• Eventually, Berry and Constancio were arrested after an informant surfaced and identified them
as “AAA’s” assailants. The informant came out after Mayor Marquez offered a reward for
information leading to the identity of persons responsible for “AAA’s” rapeslay.
• During the custodial investigation, where Atty. Suarez advised him of his constitutional rights and
the consequences of his statements, Berry executed an extrajudicial confession which was
embodied in a Sinumpaang Salaysay. Berry also confessed to Amparo (an ABS CBN reporter)
during an interview that he did take part in the execution of the crime.
• At the trial, however, Berry denounced the Sinumpaang Salaysay as false, and claimed that he was
coerced into signing the same. Berry also contends that Atty. Suarez does not qualify as a competent and
independent counsel since the circumstances surrounding this lawyer’s presence at the precinct
during the custodial investigation was suspect.
ISSUE: Whether or not Berry’s extra-judicial confession is admissible.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Suarez is a competent and independent counsel and that he was in fact chosen by Berry
himself during the custodial investigation. Atty. Suarez testified that he thoroughly explained to Berry his
constitutional rights and the consequences of any statements he would give. Thus, Berry’s confession is
admissible because it was voluntarily executed with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel
in the person of Atty. Suarez.
• In addition, Berry’s confession is admissible in evidence because it was voluntarily made to a news
reporter and not to the police authority or to an investigating officer. Statements spontaneously
made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are
admissible in evidence. In this case, there was no ample proof to show that appellant Berry’s
narration of events to ABS-CBN reporter Amparo was the product of intimidation or coercion, thus
making the same admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE v ABENES
G.R. No. 210878| 7 July 2016
DOCTRINE: The guilt of the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt since the Constitution
presumes that the accused is innocent.
FACTS:
23
• Upon receiving a tip from an informant that appellant was involved in the sale of shabu, a team of
police officers arranged a buy bust operation. As arranged by the informant, they were to meet
with appellant to buy P1,000 worth of shabu.
• After proceeding to the target area, informant introduced the SPO1 assigned to appellant. The
exchange then took place, wherein the SPO1 handed to appellant the buy-bust money, and the
appellant handed in turn a plastic sachet containing shabu.
• Upon seeing this exchange, appellant was approached by the other officers and was placed under
arrest. The sachets were marked on the site. While being frisked, another plastic sachet was found
in her possession.
• She was brought to the police station where the arresting officers prepared their affidavit and
other documents. The confiscated specimen tested positive for the presence of shabu.
• Appellant was charged with illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
• RTC: Guilty for both crimes. Prosecution has sufficiently proven that appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto. The court gave credence to the prosecution witnesses who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner.
• CA: Affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt in the charges of illegal
sale and possession of dangerous drugs.
HELD: Yes, but only as to the charge of illegal sale, but not as to the charge of illegal possession.
• We must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt since the fundamental law presumes that the accused is innocent. This
presumption must prevail unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence; and the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence.
• As to the charge of illegal sale of drugs, the guilt of the appellant was established beyond
reasonable doubt.
o The elements were satisfied by prosecution’s evidence. As to the allegation of broken chain of
custody, the appellant failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized item during
trial but raised for the first time on appeal. In fact, at no instance did she manifest or even hint
that there were lapses on the part of the police officers in handling the seized item which
affected its integrity and evidentiary value. Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish the
necessary links in the chain of custody of the specimen subject of the sale from the moment it
was seized, delivery to the crime laboratory, until it was presented during trial as proof of the
corpus delicti. Hence, the guilt of the accused was duly proven.
• However, as to the charge of illegal possession, her guilt was not adequately established beyond
reasonable doubt.
o In prosecutions involving narcotics, the substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the
offense, and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain conviction beyond reasonable doubt. It is
therefore of prime importance that in these cases, the identity of the dangerous drug be
likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. With the material omission to indubitably show
the identity of the drug, subject matter in the charge of illegal possession, evidence for
prosecution casts serious doubt as to the guilt of the appellant for it has not proven the
indispensable element of corpus delicti.
o In the case herein, prosecution failed to provide a clear identification of the illegal drug seized
from appellant’s possession. The lone SPO1 involved in the exchange, who could identify the
24
plastic sachet and acknowledge the marking thereon as her own, was not even presented in
court to identify it. As such, the charge of illegal possession must be dismissed.
CITY OF ILOILO v. HON. CONTRERAS-BESANA

G.R. No. 168957 | 12 February 2010
Just Compensation
DOCTRINE: When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement
of the expropriation proceedings or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
FACTS:
• Petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain against private respondent Javellana and
Southern Negros Development Bank, the latter as mortgagee. City of Iloilo sought to expropriate
two parcels of land owned by Javellana to be used as a school site for Lapaz High School.
• Javellana admitted ownership of the Subject Property but denied the petitioner’s avowed public
purpose of the sought-for expropriation, since the City of Iloilo already had an existing school site
for Lapaz High School.
• City of Iloilo filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging that it had deposited the
amount of ₱40,000.00 with the PNB-Iloilo Branch. Petitioner claimed that it was entitled to the
immediate possession of the Subject Property.
• Javellana filed an Opposition on the grounds that the city already had a vast tract of land where its
existing school site was located, and the deposit of a mere 10% of the Subject Property’s tax
valuation was grossly inadequate.
• The court ruled in favor of City of Iloilo and authorized it to take immediate possession of the
Subject Property. Petitioner was able to take physical possession of the properties in 1985 and the
Subject Property was actually used as the site of Lapaz National High School.
• The expropriation proceedings remained dormant until 2000 when Javellana filed an Ex Parte
Motion/Manifestation, where he alleged that when he finally sought to withdraw the ₱40,000.00
allegedly deposited by the petitioner, he discovered that no such deposit was ever made.
• Javellana thus demanded his just compensation as well as interest. He alleged that since he had
not been compensated for the Subject Property, petitioner’s possession was illegal, and he was
entitled to recovery of possession of his lots.
• However, City of Iloilo argued that Javellana could no longer bring an action for recovery since the
Subject Property was already taken for public use. Rather, Javellana could only demand for the
payment of just compensation. Petitioner also maintained that the legality or illegality of
petitioner’s possession of the property should be determined in the eminent domain case and not
in a separate action for recovery of possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation should be reckoned from the filing of the complaint
HELD: Yes, just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry
into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
• An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the
plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain. Once the first order
becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no
longer be questioned.
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• Javellana did not bother to file an appeal from the May 17, 1983 Order which granted City of
Iloilo’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, authorizing it to take immediate possession of
the Subject Property. Thus, it has become final, and the petitioner’s right to expropriate the
property for a public use is no longer subject to review.
CITIZENSHIP
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO ONG

G.R. No. 175430| 18 June 2012
Naturalization
DOCTRINE: The qualification of some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation means not
only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be
shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income
over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness,
or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public charge. His income
should permit him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort.
FACTS:
• Respondent Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition for Naturalization. He alleged the following:
1. He was born in Cebu City to Chinese citizens Siao Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958. He
is registered as a resident alien and possesses an alien certificate of registration and a native-born
certificate of residence from the Bureau of Immigration.
2. He has been continuously and permanently residing in the Philippines from birth up to the present
and can speak and write in Tagalog, English, Cebuano, and Amoy.
3. He took his elementary and high school studies in Cebu and finished college in Ateneo.
4. He married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen and they have four children.
5. He has been a businessman/business manager since 1989, earning an average annual income
of P150,000.00. When he testified, however, he said that he has been a businessman since he
graduated from college. Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his business.
• The trial court granted Ong’s petition.
• Republic appealed the court’s decision alleging that respondent Ong did not prove his allegation
that he is a businessman/business manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989.
His income tax returns belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on
the nature of his profession or trade, which is the source of his income.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation
HELD: No, the applicant provided no documentary evidence, like business permits, registration, official
receipts, or other business records to demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a business. Instead,
Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his possession of some known lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation. Bare, general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an
applicant for naturalization.
• The Court finds the appellate court’s decision erroneous.
1. It should not have included the spouse’s income in its assessment of Ong’s lucrative income.
2. It failed to consider the following circumstances which have a bearing on Ong’s expenses vis-a-
vis his income: (a) that Ong does not own real property; (b) that his proven average gross annual
income around the time of his application, which was only P106,000.00, had to provide for the
26
education of his four minor children; and (c) that Ong’s children were all studying in exclusive
private schools in Cebu City.
3. The CA did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that Ong’s income had an appreciable
margin over his known expenses
REPUBLIC v. BATUIGAS
G.R. No. 183110 | 7 October 2013
Naturalization
DOCTRINE: Under existing Philippine law, foreign women who are married to Philippines citizens may
be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens
FACTS:
• Ascuzena Batuigas was born in Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents. Her
primary secondary and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools. She then practiced her
teaching profession in various schools situated in the Philippines.
• In 1968, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas, a natural born Filipino citizen.
• Azucena then filed a Petition for Naturalization.
• In her petition she stated that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and
to renounce, absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state
or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines
from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.
• After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a
lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not
allowed under the Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. The OSG likewise
disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real property because aliens are precluded from owning
lands in the country.
• RTC: Dismissed the motion to dismiss
ISSUE: Has Azucena Batuigas complied with the citizenship requirement to become a Filipino citizen?
HELD: Yes, under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the
“Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is
available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides
that:
“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications
for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial
naturalization.
REPUBLIC v. HUANG TE FU
G.R. No. 200983 | 18 March 2015
Naturalization
27
DOCTRINE: An applicant for naturalization must show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of the naturalization law; otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be denied.
FACTS:
• Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy was a citizen of the Republic of China (Taiwan).
• In 2005, Huang Te Fu filed with RTC QC a Petition for Naturalization showing that he complied
with the requirements and stating importantly that he was a businessman engaged in the
manufacture of zippers, that he is of good moral character.
• RTC: granted his petition.
• Republic opposed stating that Huang Te Fu:
o does not have some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation, thus, he is not
gainfully employed, as he merely worked in the business owned by his family and was
merely given allowances by his parents for the daily expenses of his family;
o lacks good moral character as shown in a Deed of Sale covering a parcel of land in Antipolo
City where he and his wife supposedly purchased, and falsely misrepresented himself as
a Filipino citizen.
o is either evading taxes or concealing the truth regarding his income as his income tax
returns for the years 2002-2004 reveal that his actual monthly income differs from his
monthly income as declared in his petition for naturalization.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Huang Te Fu complies with requisites under CA 473 (Revised
Naturalization Law.
HELD: No, an applicant for naturalization must show full and complete compliance with the requirements
of the naturalization law; otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be denied.
Sec. 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that an applicant for
naturalization must be of good moral character and must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation.
• Based on jurisprudence the qualification for lucrative trade means not only that the person having
the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge. His income
should permit “him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance
with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity.
Income of the applicant is the only one considered and does not include his spouse’s income.
• Moreover, his admitted false declaration under oath contained in the deed of sale that he is a
Filipino citizen is further proof of respondent’s lack of good moral character and a violation of the
constitutional prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign individuals
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
BALASBAS v MONAYAO
G.R. No. 190524 | 17 February 2014
Liabilities of Public Officers
DOCTRINE: Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is an administrative offense which need
not be related to respondent’s official functions.
FACTS:
28
• Petitioner Atty. Balasbas filed a letter-complaint with the DSWD accusing respondent Monayao—
then employed by DSWD—of misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty, and refusal to implement an
Order issued by DENR in a land dispute case filed by her brother against respondent’s father.
• Petitioner further claimed that the judgment rendered therein awarded ½ of the property to her
brother and ½ to respondent’s father; that respondent executed a notarized waiver of her rights to
her portion, but illegally sold the same to her children via a Deed of Sale purportedly executed by
respondent’s father, who was already dead at the time of the alleged execution.
• Respondent was subsequently transferred from DSWD to the LGU of the Municipality of Alfonso
Lista in Ifugao. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint therein. Lista refused to take an action, as the
acts complained of were not in relation to the latter’s duties and responsibilities as Municipal
Population Office.
• CSC-OLA: Refused to take the appeal. It held that CSC had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s
complaint as it stemmed from a private transaction between the parties.
• Petitioner alleged that respondent’s misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty, and refusal to
implement DENR’s Order constitutes acts unbecoming a public official and fall within the
jurisdiction of the CSC.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s dishonest acts and misrepresentations casted serious doubt as to her
fitness to continue in the public service.
HELD: Yes, Respondent’s supposed dishonest acts and misrepresentations committed in relation to a land
dispute arising from her private dealings case doubt on her fitness to discharge her responsibilities as a
public official. If it is true that respondent caused the execution of a forged or falsified deed of sale as
alleged herein, then she committed a dishonest act even as she is enjoined to adhere at all times to law,
morality, and decency in her private and professional life.
• Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance
of duty by the pubic officer, for it inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to
continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.
• While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and employees
whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence,
accountability, and loyalty, the Court must protect the, against unsubstantiated charges that tend
to adversely affect, rather than encourage, the effective performance of their duties and functions.
HALLASGO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 171340 | 11 September 2009
General Principles
DOCTRINE: A public office is a public trust. A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times, the highest
degree of honesty and integrity, and is accountable to all those he or she serves.
Gross misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty out of all measure beyond allowance, flagrant, shameful; such conduct as is not to be
excused.
FACTS:
• Hallasgo was the Municipal Treasurer of a municipality in Bukidnon.
• She was accused before the Deputy Ombudsman (“OMB”) with “unauthorized withdrawal of
monies of the public… amounting to malversation of public funds.”
29
o It was claimed that Hallasgo, along with two others, made unrecorded withdrawals from
the municipality’s bank account without the required supporting documents (vouchers)
and failed to liquidate cash advances despite the lapse of over a year.
• The Deputy OMB temporarily referred the matter to the Commission on Audit for an extensive
audit.
• The Special Audit Team first directed Hallasgo to account for the unauthorized withdrawals and
to record all the cash advances received, and second, found that Hallasgo failed to remit the
amounts she received thus exposing government funds to probable misuse and application.
• The Deputy OMB issued found Hallasgo guilty of grave misconduct, dismissing the latter from
service
ISSUE: Whether or not Hallasgo guilty of gross, grave misconduct?
HELD: Yes, the anomalies complained of were not the result of mere inadvertence, but rather, her actions
demonstrate her wanton and deliberate disregard for the demands of public service. Hallasgo’s failure to
ensure that disbursements are properly documented or that cash advances granted to her are properly and
timely liquidated certainly deserves administrative sanction.
• Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty. Qualified by the term “gross,” it means
conduct that is “out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to
be excused.”
• Various laws and regulation prescribes the procedure to follow regarding handling of public funds.
As treasurer of the municipality, it is Hallasgo’s duty to perform her responsibilities diligently,
faithfully, and efficiently. It behooves her to exercise the highest degree of care over the custody,
management, and disbursement of municipal funds. Even if she may have justified some of the
transactions, these explanations were belatedly done, effected only after being directed to do so by
the audit team.
• All of Hallasgo’s acts, collectively, constitute gross misconduct. Pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of
the Civil Service Rules, gross misconduct is a grave offense punishable with dismissal for the first
offense, without prejudice to the Ombudsman’s right to file an appropriate criminal case.
DELA CRUZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 161929 | 8 December 2009
Liabilities of Public Officers: Preventive Suspension
DOCTRINE: Preventive suspension of the accused is mandatory upon finding that the Information is
valid. Court possesses no discretion to determine whether one is necessary.
FACTS:
• The City of Tarlac approved budget allowing for construction and/or renovation project involving
several multi-purpose halls in various barangays therein.
• But, as it turns out, instead for renovating/constructing multipurpose halls, the funds were used
to renovate barangay chapels.
• For doing so Lynn Paz T. Dela Cruz – Assistant Accountant, and other City of Tarlac high-ranking
officials, including the mayor, were charged with the violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before the Ombudsman.
• An Information was eventually filed against all of them. The Information stated that they conspired
with one another, committing the crime in relation to their office, taking advantage of their official
position, acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence,
30
causing undue injury to the government and give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
to a specific group of constituents by approving and releasing the amount knowing fully well, that
what were being constructed are in truth chapels.
• After being arraigned, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the accused pendente lite. In
various suits, the accused filed for motions to quash, which were all denied by the Sandiganbayan.
De la Cruz et al were ordered 90-day preventive suspension pursuant to the mandatory imposition
upon a finding that the information is valid.
• Hence, this appeal filed by De la Cruz et al.
ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension is valid pending appeal.
HELD: Yes, preventive suspension of the accused under Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory upon a finding
that the information is valid.
• The court possesses no discretion to determine whether a preventive suspension is necessary to
forestall the possibility that the accused may use his office to intimidate witnesses, or frustrate his
prosecution, or continue committing malfeasance.
• The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or
commit further acts of malfeasance or do both. All that is needed is proof that a valid information
exists.
BAUSTISTA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 185215 | 22 July 2010
Rights of Public Officers
DOCTRINE:
1. A reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. A demotion in office is tantamount to
removal, if no cause is shown for it. Thus, before a demotion may be affected pursuant to a
reorganization, the observance of the rules on bona fide abolition of public office is essential
2. There is demotion when an employee is appointed to a position resulting to a diminution in duties,
responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a reduction in salary. Where an employee
is appointed to a position with the same duties and responsibilities but a rank and salary higher than
those enjoyed in his previous position, there is no demotion and the appointment is valid.
FACTS:
• Virginia Bautista worked in the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as a Technical
Assistant.
• President Aquino issued EO 81, which authorized the reorganization of DBP.
• Bautista was then appointed as Account Officer with an annual salary, which is equivalent to the
14th step of Salary Grade (SG)-20, subject to the result of the ongoing reorganization of DBP and
the approval of the CSC.
• Sometime later, the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989 took effect. To implement the this,
the DBM promulgated the Government Financial Institutions Index of Occupational Services
which mandated GFIs, like the DBP, to adopt a uniform set of position titles in their plantilla.
• As a consequence, Bautista was appointed on a permanent status as Bank Executive Officer II (BEO
II) with an annual salary equivalent to the 8th step of SG-24 (as compared to her prior to her
appointment with SG-20 (24th step))
• Bautista protested her appointment because it allegedly amounted to a demotion due to the
attendant diminution of benefits and emoluments arising from said appointment
31
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista was demoted.
HELD: No, the Court found that the reorganization of the DBP was made in good faith. There was no
demotion in this case because Bautista was appointed to a position comparable to the one she previously
occupied. There was even an increase in her rank and salary.
GSIS v. MANALO
G.R. No. 208979| 16 September 2016
Liabilities of Public Officers
DOCTRINE:
1. Gross Neglect of Duty is characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference
to the consequences, or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty.
2. Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.
3. Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity;
lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition
to defraud, deceive, or betray
FACTS:
• In 2004, Rogelio Manalo, Computer Operator IV of the GSIS was assigned as membership
processor at the Membership Department I (Manila) where his main duty was to process
membership applications. He was tasked to check the completeness of the documents submitted
to support membership application and verify the authenticity of the signatures of the authorized
officials before creating applicant’s membership record and policy.
• To enable Manalo to access system’s membership database, he was assigned computer
access/operator code.
• Sometime in 2005, the Internal Audit Service Group (IASG), GSIS, conducted an audit examination
and found that on several occasions in July 2004, Manalo’s operator code and terminal ID was used
in creating the membership records and policies of fictitious and terminated employees of the City
Government of Manila (CGM)
• These fictitious and terminated employees were granted loans because of their membership
records and policies. Additionally, it was discovered that the specimen signatures of the
individuals who purportedly endorsed the membership applications were not found in the list of
authorized endorsing officials of the City Government of Manila.
• IASG concluded that the processor and the official tasked to review his output failed to detect the
apparent defects in the supporting documents used to create membership records and policy
contracts. Hence, membership records were created in the database and policy contracts were
issued in favor of the fictitious and separated CGM employees, which became the basis for granting
of unauthorized loans.
• Manalo was eventually charged and found with Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Gross
Neglect of Duty. He was dismissed as a consequence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manalo guilty of Grave Misconduct.
HELD: No, Manalo is guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. As membership processor, Manalo was required —
upon being given Application Forms for Emergency Assistance Loan, Summer One-Month Loan, or
Enhanced Salary Loan together with the accompanying required source documents (Membership
Information Sheet, Service Record, Appointment Paper, and Plantilla) — to “examine and evaluate if the
submitted source documents are complete, authentic and in order; if the signatories are the authorized
32
officials and if the endorsing officials are complete and their signatures authentic based on their specimen
signatures on file.”
• It was his task to determine the completeness and authenticity of the source documents submitted
to him, before he can create a policy record which the GSIS member-applicant shall use to secure
the documents above mentioned.
• It turned out that Manalo created policy records of fictitious and previously terminated employee-
applicants from the City Government of Manila, and as a result, P621,165.00 worth of loans were
released and lost through these irregular policies. He was grossly negligent in evaluating and
authenticating the source documents accompanying application forms filed by fictitious
individuals or separated employees of the Manila City government.
• For failing to perform his duty which thus caused the creation of anomalous policy records which
were in turn used to defraud GSIS of P621,165.00, Manalo is guilty not of grave misconduct or
dishonesty, but gross neglect of duty
ANTONIO KING VS. FRANCISCO ROBLES

G.R. No. | 197096-97 | December 2, 2013
Ombudsman
DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty-bound to investigate on its own or on

complaint by "any person, any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."
FACTS:
• The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar
Lazo were adjudged guilty of having illegally dismissed Rogelio from service and were ordered to
reinstate Rogelio to his former position, to pay him full backwages from the time his salary was
withheld up to his actual reinstatement. This Decision became final and executory.
• Labor Arbiter Robles issued a writ of execution commanding the execution arm of the NLRC "to
proceed to the premises of Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo located at J.P. Ramos
St., Bo. Talipapa, Caloocan City or wherever it may be found and collect the sum of x x x
P471,200.99 representing [Rogelio's] backwages and 13th month pay. In case you fail to collect said
amount in cash, you are to cause the satisfaction of the same from the movable or immovable
properties of the respondent not exempt from execution.”
• In compliance with the directive in the writ of execution, respondent Deputy Sheriffs served a
Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution on Personal Properties upon the representative of therein
respondents. Personal properties found inside the compound were levied upon. Meanwhile,
Philippine Metal and Alloy Fabrication Corporation (PMAFC, one of the companies represented
by King) filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim before Arbiter Robles, asserting ownership over
the levied properties.
• Subsequently, PMAFC filed a Motion to Quash Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution of Personal
Property and to Inhibit Sheriffs. PMAFC contended that the Deputy Sheriffs levied on properties
belonging to PMAFC worth P12M and that the Deputy Sheriffs intended to sell the said properties
for a measly sum of P471,200.99.
• PMAFC thus prayed that the Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution be set aside for being void ab initio
and the Deputy Sheriffs be disqualified. In an Order Arbiter Robles directed Rogelio to post a
Sheriffs Indemnity Bond in an amount double the judgment award.
• After the consolidation of the cases and hearing the parties' respective position, the Ombudsman
dismissed all the charges against the respondents for lack of probable cause.
• According to the Ombudsman, petitioner's evidence failed to establish the four elements of the
crime of robbery. The Ombudsman held that the intent to gain is totally absent since Rogelio is the
33
owner of the subject properties on account of his being the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale
issued to him. Thus, Rogelio cannot be charged for taking the personal property of another.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in its finding of lack of probable cause to hold respondents
for trial?
HELD: No, the Ombudsman has prerogative to prosecute or dismiss a complaint.

• By constitutional fiat and under RA 6770, the Ombudsman is given wide latitude of investigatory
and prosecutory powers on offenses committed by public officers free from legislative, executive
or judicial intervention. Because of the endowment of broad investigative authority, the
Ombudsman is empowered to determine, based on the sufficiency of the complaint, whether there
exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.
• In contrast, if the Ombudsman finds the complaint insufficient in form or substance, it may also
dismiss the complaint. Such prerogative is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the
Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it except
when the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
ARNADO v COMELEC
G.R. No. 210164 | 18 August 2015
Eligibility and Qualifications Requirements
DOCTRINE: Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines could run for and hold elective public office. | For those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and
intend to run for public office, Sec 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of making a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their Certificate
of Candidacy.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was
naturalized as a US citizen.
• Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado
applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul in San Francisco. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
• He then filed his 2009 COC for the mayoralty post of Lanao del Norte for the 2010 elections.
However, his co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify on the ground that he continued to use his
US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation.
• While the petition for disqualification was pending, the 2010 elections proceeded, wherein Arnado
garnered the highest votes and was proclaimed winner.
• COMELEC 1st Division: Nullified proclamation and applied rule on succession.
• Maquiling, another co-candidate who garnered 2nd highest votes, contested to the application of
the rule on succession.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arnado was correctly disqualified from running for public office by virtue of his
subsequent use of US passport, which effectively disavowed or recalled his 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
HELD: Yes, Arnado failed to comply with the 2nd requisite because as held in Maquiling, his 2009 Affidavit
of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Since
then up to the time he filed his COC in 2012, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification.
34
• Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at the time he filed
his COC for the May 13, 2013 elections.
o Under 4(d) of the LGC, a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from running for
any elective local position. This refers to dual allegiance. Consequently, congress enacted
RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of naturalization abroad to reacquire their Philippine citizenship and enjoy full civil
and political rights.
o Hence, they may now run for public office provided they:
a.) Meet the qualifications for holding such public office, and
b.) Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath, prior to or at the time of filing their
COC.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
VILLANUEVA v. PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVT.

G.R. No. 178347| 25 February 2013
Powers of Administrative Agencies
DOCTRINE: A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or awards
that determine the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same effect as a
judgment of the court. There must be an enabling statute or legislative act conferring quasi-judicial power
upon the administrative body.
FACTS:
• Controversy arose when the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) issued a
Strategic Environment Plan (SEP) Clearance to Patricia Louise Mining and Development Corp
(PLMDC).
• Villanueva et al, farmers, sought the recall of the clearance, which was denied by the PCSD.
• They then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus for nullification of the Clearance against
PLMDC and PCSD before the RTC.
• PLMDC and PCSD sought the dismissal on various grounds including the impropriety of the
remedy of certiorari, arguing that it did not perform a quasi-judicial function.
• RTC: Denied the motion, but ruled that Certiorari is proper to assail PCSD’s action. This procedure
is an exercise of quasi-judicial power.
• PLMDC and PCSD again filed a MTD, but on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that
only the CA can take cognizance of a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed against a quasi-
judicial body.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction to review actions of quasi-judicial bodies?
HELD: The issue was not answered by the Court. However, it did rule that PCSD does not have quasi-
judicial functions.
• The Court disagrees with the parties’ reasoning and held that PCSD did not perform a quasi-
judicial function that is reviewable by petition for certiorari. There must be an enabling statute or
legislative act conferring quasi-judicial power upon the administrative body. In the case at bar, the
law creating PCSD did not confer on it quasi-judicial powers that its enabling statute clearly
withheld.
• A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or awards that
determine the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same effect as a
35
judgment of the court. In other words, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function must be clothed with power and authority to pass judgment or render a decision
on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.
• An agency admin order cannot confer a quasi-judicial power on a statutory body that its
enabling statute clearly withheld. An agency’s power to formulate rules for the proper
discharge of its functions is always circumscribed by the enabling statute. Otherwise, any
agency conferred with rule-making power, may circumvent legislative intent by creating new
powers for itself through an administrative order.
ORAIS v. ALMIRANTE
G.R. No. 181195 | 10 June 2013
Judicial Recourse and Review
DOCTRINE: Save for some instances, proof of grave abuse of discretion – as a general rule, where the
respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one-month salary, the
Ombudsman’s decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable.
FACTS:
• Fredrick Orais filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) a Complaint for corruption and
grave misconduct against his superior, Dr. Amelia Almirante. Both are under the Veterinary
Quarantine-Seaport of the Department of Agriculture.
• It was alleged that Almirante, among others, induced officers to receive money and not issue
receipts for them.
• Naturally, Almirante denied the allegations and said that all payments were received through its
duly authorized Collection Officers, the proper official receipts therefor.
• The Office of the OMB dismissed the complaint for lack of substantial basis, holding that the acts
were in accordance with law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred when it simply concurred with the OMB in dismissing the
complaint.
HELD: No, the Court agrees with the CA that consistent with law and the rules of procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman — that where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one-month salary, the Ombudsman’s decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. In
one case, the Court went so far as to declare that in such cases, “it follows that the CA has no appellate
jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse” the order or decision of the Ombudsman.
• But of course, the above principles are subject to the rule that decisions of administrative agencies
which are declared final and unappealable by law are still “subject to judicial review if they fail the
test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, or when such
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel
a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings.”
ELECTION LAW
SAÑO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 182221 | 3 February 2010
Remedies Jurisdiction in Election Law
36
DOCTRINE: The mere invocation of the grounds of a pre-proclamation controversy, without more, will
not justify the exclusion of election returns which appear regular and authentic on their face.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Saño of LAKAS-CMD and private respondent Manuel Que of the Liberal Party both ran
for Municipal Mayor of Leyte during the May 2007 elections.
• During the canvassing of votes, Saño sought to have the contested ERs excluded on the grounds of
massive fraud, illegal proceedings, and tampered/falsified and obviously manufactured returns.
He alleged that after the casting and counting of votes, a man was seen carrying a ballot box that
was not locked, inserted certain documents, took the aluminum seal, sealed the box, and turned it
over to the Reception Group. 5 election returns (ERs) were allegedly affected by this anomalous
activity.
• Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) proclaimed Que as Municipal Mayor.
• Saño filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation and/or Proceedings of the MBOC before
COMELEC. He prayed for the exclusion of the contested ERs and that he be proclaimed the
winning candidate. However, COMELEC upheld the proclamation of Que.
• Hence, Saño filed this petition for certiorari. He insisted that all 5 of the contested ERs were
prepared by one person and surreptitiously presented before the MBOC. Thus, the issues raised
before the MBOC of massive fraud, illegal proceedings, and tampered/falsified and obviously
manufactured returns were pre-proclamation controversies as defined in Sec 241 of the Omnibus
Election Code and fall within the contemplation of Sec 243(b) of the said Code. As such, the
contested ERs should have been excluded from the canvass and MBOC’s proclamation of Que
violated Sec 39 of CA 7859 and Sec 20 of RA 7166.
• Que argues that the allegations raised by Saño on the contested ERs are not proper in a pre-
proclamation controversy. Moreover, he failed to substantiate his claims and failed to follow the
mandatory procedure under Sec 20 of RA 7166.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations raised are proper in a pre-proclamation controversy.
HELD: No, the Court ruled that not only did petitioners fail to follow the proper procedure, the
unsubstantiated issues were not proper for a proclamation controversy.
1. Concept
- A pre-proclamation controversy, as defined in the Omnibus Election Code, is any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or
directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sec. 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appearance of the election returns.
2. Compliance with the procedure on contested ERs

- A pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character and limited in scope. It is to be promptly
decided so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. Hence, the BOC will not look into allegations
of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic and duly
accomplished. Consistent with its summary character, compliance with the procedure on contested
ERs before the BOC under Sec. 20 of RA 7166 is mandatory. Such provides that any candidate may
contest the inclusion of an ER by making an oral objection at the time the questioned return is
submitted for canvass.
- In the case herein, Saño failed to timely object as there was a lapse of over 12 hours after the ERs
have been presented for canvass before objections were made. Moreover, it is irregular that only
one written petition for exclusion was filed for the 5 contested ERs.
37
3. While the court was willing to overlook the procedural lapses, there is still no evidence that the ERs
were falsified or tampered with
- MBOC did not err is proclaiming the private respondent, since the unsubstantiated issues raised
by the petitioner were not proper for a pre-proclamation controversy. Claims that contested ERs
are obviously manufactured or falsified must be evident from the face of the said documents
themselves. Contrary to petitioner’s remonstrations, there is absolutely no indication that the
contested ERs were falsified or tampered with. As such, there was no valid ground to delay the
proclamation.
- Unlike a pre-proclamation controversy, the annulment proceedings before COMELEC were not
summary in character. Petitioner had every opportunity to ventilate and substantiate his
allegations before COMELEC but failed to present any evidence to overcome the presumption that
the contested ERs were valid.
DOROMAL v BIRON
G.R. No. 181809 | 17 February 2010
Election Protest
DOCTRINE: It is the over-all policy of the law to place a premium on an election return, which appears
regular on its face, by imposing stringent requirements before the certificate of votes may be used to
controvert the election return’s authenticity and operate as an exception to the general rule that in a pre-
proclamation controversy, the inquiry is limited to the four corners of the election return.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Rose Doromal and private respondent Hernan Biron were both candidates for vice-
mayoralty in the Municipality of Iloilo.
• During the canvassing of votes, Biron orally objected to the inclusion of 25 election returns (ERs)
due to alleged missing taras (lines representing one vote in the counting of votes) and discrepancy
between the number of votes stated in the ERs and those stated in the certificate of votes issued by
the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs).
• Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) denied the petitions for exclusion. It found no tampering
on the number of taras and that the ERs were complete with no material defect and duly signed
and thumbmarked by the BEIs.
• COMELEC 2nd Division: Partially granted. Ordered the exclusion of 11 contested ERs as the same
were allegedly tampered or falsified.
o Lent credence to Biron’s allegations of discrepancy and dissimilarity between the votes in the
ERs and those in the certificate of votes and found numerous irregularities in the tallying of
votes at the precinct level. Hence, necessitating the exclusion of the subject ERs.
o Gave credit to the affidavits of Biron’s poll watchers, who stated that numerous irregularities
allegedly occurred during the tallying of the votes at the precinct level.
• MBC reconvened and canvassed the remaining 14 returns. Biron was proclaimed the winner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the certificate of votes is admissible to controvert the authenticity of the election
returns.
HELD: No, the certificates of votes are inadmissible to prove tampering, alteration, or falsification for
failure to comply with Sec 16 and 17 of RA 6646. COMELEC En Banc Resolution is nullified and is ordered
to raffle to one of its division to resolve the matter.
• While Sec 16 of RA 6646 authorizes COMELEC to use the certificate of votes to prove tampering,
alteration, falsification, or any anomaly committed in the ERs, this presupposes the certificate of
38
votes was accomplished in accordance with Sec 16. In the case herein, the subject certificates of
votes are defective for they did not contain the names, signatures and thumbmarks of members of
BEI, total number of voters, time of issuance of certificates required under Sec 16, raising grave
doubts as to its accuracy.
• The affidavits of Biron’s poll watchers are self-serving and grossly inadequate to establish
tampering of the subject returns.
o The manner in which the COMELEC excluded the ERs are fatally flawed. In the absence of
clearly convincing evidence, the validity of the ERs must be upheld. A conclusion that an ER
is manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be
approved with extreme caution and only upon the most convincing proof.
• In case of discrepancy in the other authentic copies of an ER, the procedure in Sec 236 of the
Omnibus Election Code should be followed.
o In light of the minor discrepancies found in other authentic copies of the subject ERs, the proper
procedure is not to exclude the said returns, but to follow Sec 236.
o Had there been sufficient evidence of tampering in this case, it would still be highly improper
for COMELEC to outrightly exclude the ERs. It should proceed according to Sec 235 of the
OEC, which is similar to Sec 236 in that the COMELEC is authorized to open the ballot box as
a measure of last resort.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
DU v JAYOMA
G.R. No. 175042 | 23 April 2012
Powers of Local Government Units
DOCTRINE: Sangguiniang Bayan is empowered to authorize and license the establishment, operation,
and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks; A license
authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is a mere privilege that may be revoked when public
interest so requires.
FACTS:
• The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Mabini enacted an Ordinance requiring the conduct
of a public bidding for the operation of a cockpit in the municipality every 4 years.
• Due to failure of the winning bidder for the period of 1989-1992 to comply with the legal
requirements, the SB authorized petitioner Du to continue his cockpit operation until the winning
bidder complies with the requirements.
• However, in 1997, the SB discovered that Du has been operating his cockpit in violation of the
Ordinance. Hence, the Mayor of Mabini ordered Du to desist from holding any cockfighting activity
effective immediately.
• Du filed a petition for prohibition with the RTC, claiming that he has a business permit to operate
and that the order to desist deprived him of due process and was ultra vires as the Mayor enforced
it without the review or approval of the SB.
ISSUE: Whether or not Du had a legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality.
HELD: No, the Sangguniang Bayan allowed Du to continue to operate his cockpit only because the winning
bidder for the subject period failed to comply with the legal requirements for operation.
• Du’s authority to operate would end in 1992 or upon compliance of the winning bidder, whichever
comes first. The only reason he was able to continue until 1997 was due to the SB’s failure to monitor
the status of the cockpit.
39
• Even if he was able to get a business permit from the Mayor for 1997, he was still not duly authorized
considering that no public bidding was conducted. Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC provides that it
is the SB which is empowered to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks. Hence,
the SB had every reason to suspend the operation of Du’s cockpit.
• Moreover, a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which
the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege that may be
revoked when public interest so requires.
REPUBLIC v RAMBUYONG
G.R. No. 167810 | 4 October 2010
Concept of Public Corporations
DOCTRINE: The term “instrumentality” includes GOCCs—the NPC is clearly an instrumentality of the
government. A Sangguinian member cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC, which is an
instrumentality to the government.
FACTS:
• Alfredo Chu filed a case for collection of sum of money against the National Power Corporation
(NPC). Appearing as his counsel is Atty. Rambuyong, who was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor of
Ipil, Zamboanga.
• NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition of Rambuyong, alleging that Section 90(b)(1) of the LGC prohibits
Sanggunian members to appear as counsel wherein any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government so the adverse party. NPC, being a GOCC, is embraced within the term
“instrumentality.”
ISSUE: Whether or not NPC is an instrumentality of government such that Atty. Rambuyong, as a
Sanggunian member, should not appear as counsel against it.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Rambuyong cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC, which is a
government instrumentality.
• Section 446 of the LGC provides that the “Sangguiniang Bayan, the legislative body of the
municipality, shall be composed of the municipal vice mayor as the presiding officer…” Whereas,
Section 90(b)(1) of the LGC provides that, “All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation, other than the exercise of their
functions as local executives… Sangunnian members who are also members of the Bar are also
prohibited to appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a LGU or any office,
agency or instrumentality of the government is an adverse party.” Thus, pursuant to Section 90(b)(1)
of the LGC, Rambuyong, as Sanggunian member, cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to
the NPC, which is a government instrumentality.
• On the other hand, Section 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987 clearly defines an instrumentality
to “include regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and GOCCs.” Hence, there is no room for
construction. The law has to be applied as called for by the circumstances of the case. Following
Section 2, NPC is clearly an instrumentality of the government. Moreover, the Court already
categorically stated that NPC is a government instrumentality in Maceda v Macaraig.
DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS v CANTOS

G.R. No. 180200 | 25 November 2013
40
Taxing Power of the Local Government Units
DOCTRINE: Tax exemption must be clear and unequivocal, A taxpayer claiming a tax exemption must
point to a specific provision of law conferring on the taxpayer, in clear and plain terms, exemption from a
common burden. Any doubt whether a tax exemption exists is resolved against the taxpayer.
FACTS:
• By virtue of RA 7678, petitioner was granted a legislative franchise to install, operate, and maintain
telecommunications systems throughout the Philippines. Upon seeking renewal of its Mayor’s
Permit to operate in Batangas, it was informed that its business operation would be restrained
should it fail to pay the assessed real property taxes.
• As petitioner failed to pay, a Cease and Desist Order was issued enjoining petitioner from further
operating its business. Petitioner thus filed a case for Annulment of the Order before the RTC.
• RTC granted the petition. It held that a Cease and Desist Order was without legal basis as
enjoinment of petitioner’s business operation is not one of the remedies available to enforce
collection of real property taxes under existing laws. Moreover, petitioner is only liable to pay real
property taxes on properties not used in connection with the operation of its franchise. CA:
Affirmed.
• Subsequently, the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas issued 7 Warrants of Levy. Petitioner wrote
letters for the lifting of the Warrants, to no avail. Hence, it filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt
with prayer of TRO.
• RTC granted the TRO. Respondent, however, manifested that when said TRO was served upon
him, he had already affected public auction.
• Subsequently, RTC issued an Order denying the issuance of the WPI, as such issuance has become
moot and academic since the public auction sought to be enjoined was already consummated.
Moreover, petitioner should have availed of the remedy under Sec 260 of the LGC in order to stop
the scheduled auction sale—that is, to pay delinquent tax and interest due thereon under protest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the real properties of petitioner, whether used in the furtherance of franchise or
not, are subject to real property tax.
HELD: Yes, there is no grant of exemption in RA 7678.

• Petitioner failed to avail of any of the remedies provided under Sec 206 and 252 of RA 7160; namely,
to avail of tax exemption or submit the requirements to establish that it is exempted from paying
real property taxes, or to pay the assessed real property tax under protest. The availment of these
remedies could have prevented respondent’s issuance of the Warrants of Levy and the conduct of
the subsequent public auction sale of petitioner’s properties. Due to petitioner’s non-availment of
these remedies, respondent therefore remained duty bound to perform such acts. Otherwise, he
may be subjected to penalties prescribed for non-performance of his ministerial duties as provincial
treasurer, to which he is bound to perform under Sec 176 and 177 of RA 7160.
REPUBLIC v DACLAN
G.R. No. 197115 | 23 March 2015
Corporate Powers of the Local Government
DOCTRINE: Devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority
upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
FACTS:
41
• The Agoo Breeding Station was established by the Department of Agriculture (DA), through the
Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), for the purpose of breeding cattle that would be distributed to
the intended beneficiaries, pursuant to the livelihood program of the national government.
• In support of said project, the Daclans executed deeds of donation donating 4 parcels of land. The
deeds uniformly stipulated that the donated lands shall be used for the establishment of a breeding
station and shall not be used for any other purpose, and that in case of nonuse, abandonment, or
cessation of the activities of BAI, possession or ownership shall automatically revert to the Daclans.
• Subsequently, the powers and functions of certain government agencies, including those of the DA,
were devolved to the LGUs. Thus, the Province of La Union (Province) assumed the powers and
functions of the DA in the operation of the breeding station.
• Sometime after the donations were made, the La Union Medical Center (LUMC) was constructed
within a portion of the donated properties.
• The Daclans demanded the return of their donated lands on the ground that BAI has ceased the
operations of the breeding station and that the land has been abandoned. The Province refused,
alleging that the breeding station still existed, although this time it is being operated by the Province,
pursuant to the devolution program. The Daclans countered that the donated land cannot be
assigned by the Republic to the Province as the deeds did not include Republic’s successors or
assigns as intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of the breeding station by the Republic to the Province violated the
stipulations of the deeds of donation.
HELD: NO, the conditions of the donation were not violated as the breeding station remained operational.
It is not violated by way of a valid devolution.
• While the breeding station may have been transferred to the Province as a consequence of the policy
of devolution adopted by the government under the LGC, it remained operational and continued
to function as a breeding station. The activities of BAI did not cease even after it was dissolved.
Thus, the purpose for which the donations were made remained and was carried out.
o Devolution cannot have any effect on the donations made by the Daclans to the Republic.
As defined, “devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power
and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities.”
o It includes the transfer to the LGUs of the records, equipment, and other assets and
personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers,
functions, and responsibilities.
o Besides, the deed of donation did not specifically prohibit subsequent transfer of the
donated lands by the donee to the Republic.
• The argument of Daclan with regard to the supposed failure of the Province to provide “agricultural
extension and onsite research services and facilities” as required under the IRR of the LGC cannot
be made a ground for the reversion of the donated lands. On the contrary, to allow such would
condone undue interference by private individuals in the operations of government.
o The deeds of donation never stipulated that the Daclans may interfere in the management
and operation of the breeding station. They could not even directly participate in the
operations of the breeding station.
o Even if BAI ceased to exist or was abolished as an office, the deeds of donation may not be
nullified just by the fact that the BAI became defunct. Its activities continued when its
functions were devolved to the LGUs, such as the Province of LU herein.
• With regard to LUMC: The portion in which it occupied was not donated by the Daclans, but by
donors who are not parties in this case. Whatever the Daclans donated still remained part of the
breeding station. Hence, no right of reversion accrues to them.
42
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD v. CA

G.R. No. 165155 | 13 April 2010
Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands
DOCTRINE: Rules of Procedure in agrarian cases should be liberally construed for as long as the purpose
is sufficiently met, and no violation of due process takes place.
FACTS:
• Respondents, co-owners of several parcels of land primarily devoted to rice production, filed a
complaint for ejectment against petitioners for non-payment of rentals before the DARAB. They
averred that petitioners were agricultural lessees while the petitioners themselves contend that
they are farmer-beneficiaries under PD 27.
• When the complaint for ejectment was filed, the actual tillers on the land were the successors-in-
interest of two of the named defendants (Pedro and Avelino) as they had died at the time of filing,
and the same participated in the proceedings despite no formal substitution of party litigants.
• The Regional Adjudicator directed the petitioners to surrender possession of the land to the
respondents as they could only retain their status as agricultural lessees if they complied with their
statutory obligation to pay the required leasehold rentals.
• Upon appeal, the Regional Adjudicator issued, in its May 6, 2003 Order, a writ of execution against
the non-appealing defendants and deceased defendants.
• Dissatisfied, both respondents and petitioners moved for reconsideration of the order. The
respondents argued that the appeal should not have been given due course because it did not
adhere to Section 2, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. On the other hand, the petitioners
included in the writ of execution contended that said Order was hastily executed.
• In its August 5, 2003 Order, the Regional Adjudicator allowed the appeal of the heirs of the two
decedents and nullified the writ of execution as regards to them.
• Respondents moved for reconsideration, but was denied in the November 13, 2003 Order which
also ordered the sheriff to restore the farmholdings of the heirs of the deceased in view of the
quashal of the writ of execution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the notices of appeal are mere scraps of paper for failure to state the grounds relied
upon for appeal and are null and void for containing two falsified signatures.
HELD: No, the notices of appeal are valid. The defects found in the two notices of appeal are
inconsequential and are not of such nature that would cause a denial of the right to appeal.
• Under Section 2 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, it is provided that the rules should be liberally
construed to carry out the objectives of the agrarian reform program and to promote just,
expeditious and inexpensive settlement of agrarian cases.
• There is nothing sacred about the forms of pleadings, for their sole purpose is to facilitate the
application of justice to the claims of contending parties. Hence, pleadings as well as procedural
rules should be construed liberally. Courts must proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party
of statutory appeal; they must ensure that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from technical constraints.
43
• Notices of appeal in DARAB cases only serve to inform the officer that rendered the appealed
decision of the timeliness of the appeal, the general reason for such appeal, and to prepare the
records for transmission to DARAB.
o Both notices of appeal stated that the petitioners herein were appealing the decision on the
grounds of questions of fact and law, which substantially complied with the ground for appeal
under the DARAB rules. While the notices omitted to state that the decision would cause grave
and irreparable injury, requiring a literal application of the rules when its purpose has already
been served is a superfluity.
• The Regional Adjudicator has no power to determine if the appeal was intended for delay as such
matters are for the appellate body to determine after it has studied the appeal memorandum. This
principle is applicable to agrarian disputes by virtue of Section 8, Rule XIII of the DARAB rules.
Since the Board is the one which has the power to punish, it is also the one which has the power to decide
if there has been a violation. When an appeal is timely filed, it becomes a ministerial duty to approve the
same.
FERRER v. CARGANILLO
G.R. No. 170956 | 12 May 2010
DOCTRINE: The use, enjoyment, occupation or disposition of private property is not absolute, , such as
the prohibition against subleasing an agricultural lease, for it is predicated on the social functions of
property
FACTS:
• This case involved 4 separate complaints filed by Ferrer to several different respondents, one of the
complaints alleging that Domingo Carganillo subleased the subject landholding to his brother
Sergio without her knowledge and consent and that she only knew of this act when she found
Sergio in possession and cultivation of the land (Carganillo case).
• Domingo denied that he had mortgaged his possessory rights to Sergio, asserting that he is still in
actual, continuous, and peaceful possession of the property.
• In an investigation report, an officer of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office stated that the
cultivation and possession of the landholding was subleased by Domingo to Sergio as the former
was applying for work abroad. In support thereof, a Katulagan was submitted in evidence showing
that Sergio has been cultivating the land for more than 2 years prior to filing of the complaint.
• PARAD ruled that Ferrer failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is subleasing
or mortgage of the property by Domingo Carganillo.
• DARAB: Affirmed. It also held that the Katulagan is inadmissible in evidence as it was not formally
offered before the PARAD.
• CA: Affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents in the 4 cases herein are guilty of subleasing an agricultural lease.
HELD: Only the respondents in the Carganillo case were found guilty of subleasing and share-tenancy,
which are prohibited by law. However, as to the respondents in the other 3 cases, the fact of subleasing was
not sufficiently proven. Hence, the dismissal of the said cases was affirmed.
• In the Carganillo case herein, Ferrer has sufficiently proved the fact of subleasing by Domingo to
Sergio. Such is prohibited, except in the case of illness or temporary incapacity of the agricultural
44
lessee where he may employ laborers. As consequence of such, Domingo and Sergio should be
dispossessed of the subject agricultural landholding.
• Dispossession is provided under Sec. 36 of the Agricultural Reform Code, that an agricultural
lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding, except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that the lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding. Similarly, Sec. 24
of the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides that it is unlawful for a share-tenant to employ a sub-
tenant to furnish labor or any phase of the work required of him. Further, Section 4 of the
Agricultural Reform Code declared all share tenancy to be contrary to public policy.
• With regard to the Katulagan, the Court ruled that DARAB also erred in disregarding it into
evidence. The DARAB rules of procedure provide that the Agrarian Reform Adjudicators are not
bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence in the Rules of Court nor shall it apply
suppletorily.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO PUYAT and GLORIA

PUYAT
G.R. No. 175055 | 27 June 2012
DOCTRINE: Where the agrarian reform process is still incomplete at the time of effectivity of RA 6657, the
just compensation should be determined and completed under RA no. 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having
only suppletory effect.
FACTS:
• Gloria and Maximo Puyat were the registered owners of a parcel of riceland consisting of 46.8731
hectares located in Cabanatuan City of which 44.3090 hectares DAR placed under Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to PD 27.
• In 1989, DAR issued emancipation patents in favor of farmer beneficiaries which were annotated
on the Puyat’s TCT, causing the partial cancellation of their title. They did not receive any
compensation for the cancellation of title.
• 2 years after the DAR awarded the property to the farmer-beneficiaries, Land Bank received DAR’s
instruction to pay just compensation and made an initial valuation, but the Puyats rejected the
valuation for being low.
• Thus, the heirs of Puyat filed a complaint for determination and payment of just compensation
with the RTC, praying that their property be valued instead at P100, 000 per hectare instead of the
recommended P2, 012.50 per hectare. On the other hand, Land Bank and DAR argued that the
valuation was made in compliance with the formula provided for lands acquired under PD 27 and
EO 228, and that valuation should be made using the prevailing rates when PD 27 took effect.
• RTC ruled that the valuation of the property should be made in accordance with Section 17 of RA
6657. Based on the fact that the property could yield an average of 65 cavans per hectare, easily
accessible and serviced by telecommunication utilities, the reasonable compensation should be set
at P100, 000 per hectare. A 6% legal interest was also imposed.
• CA held that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot be unduly
restricted by requiring the courts to strictly adhere to a formula thus the courts can choose to rely
on the factors enumerated in Section 17, RA 6657 even if these factors do not appear in PD 27 or
EO 228. The 6% legal interest was also properly imposed as Puyats were deprived of property
without receiving just compensation.
45
• Land Bank filed a petition for review, arguing that the just compensation must be valued at the
time of taking of the property under the effectivity of PD 27, and not RA 6657. Furthermore, if PD
27 and EO 228 are to be applied, DAR AO no. 13 already provides for the 6% compounded interest,
so the imposition of the legal interest is tantamount to double interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not lands acquired pursuant to PD 27 may be valued using the factors in Section 17
of RA 6657?
HELD: Yes, when the government takes property pursuant to PD 27 but does not pay the landowner his
just compensation until after RA 6657, it becomes more equitable to determine the just compensation using
the latter.
• When the government takes property pursuant to PD 27 but does not pay the landowner his just
compensation until after RA 6657 has taken effect, it becomes more equitable to determine the just
compensation using RA 6657. Both the taking of Puyats’ property and the valuation for the just
compensation made by Land Bank occurred during the effectivity of RA 6657. PD 27 only applies
insofar as their gaps in RA 6657 but where the latter law is sufficient, PD 27 is superseded. Thus,
Land Bank cannot insist on the application of PD 27 as it would render Section 17 of RA 6657 on
determination of just compensation inutile. The lower courts also did not disregard the basic
valuation formula in DAR AO no. 5 which implements Section 17 as it took into account the factors
provided therein. While the courts should be mindful of the formula created by DAR, it is not
strictly bound to adhere to the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to impose the 6% legal interest per annum on the unpaid just
compensation?
HELD: Yes, but only because the respondents did not contest the interest award.
• As to the interest rate awarded for Land Bank’s delay, the trial courts did not apply DAR AO no.
13 so the lower courts’ imposition of the 6% interest cannot constitute a double imposition of a
legal interest. Current jurisprudence furthermore sets the interest rate for delay in payments in
agrarian cases at 12% per annum but even if this is so, the heirs of Puyat did not contest the interest
awarded by the lower courts. Hence, the interest rate imposed by the lower courts should not be
disturbed.
LADANO v. NERI
G.R. No. 178622 | 12 November 2012
DOCTRINE: For a tenancy relationship, express or implied, to exist, the following requisites must be
present: (1) the parties must be landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there
is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is sharing of harvests between the landowner and the
tenant.
FACTS:
• Ladano filed a complaint against Neri, Soto, Espanola and Blanco before the DARAB Provincial
Adjudicator, alleging that respondents forcibly entered the 2-hectare land which he and his family
have been peaceably occupying and cultivating since 1970. He maintained that he has been a
possessor in good faith for more than 30 years and cannot be removed without being compensated
for the improvements he introduced.
• Neri countered that Ladano does not have nor did he allege a leasehold arrangement with him.
46
• The Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the case, ruling that the 2-hectare property, while
agricultural, is not covered by RA 6657 which only covers agricultural properties beyond 5 hectares
nor covered by PD 27 as the property was not planted with rice or corn. It was also not covered by
tenancy laws.
• DARAB held that Ladano’s 30-year occupation and cultivation of the land could not have possibly
escaped the landowner’s notice and acquiesced Ladano’s actions, thus creating an implied tenancy.
Respondents, as landowners, has the burden to prove that Ladano was a mere intruder which they
failed to discharge.
• CA held that there is no evidence to support the conclusion that a tenancy relationship exists
between Ladano and Neri as the burden, which lies with the person who is asserting the existence
of a tenancy relationship, was not sufficiently discharged by Ladano.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ladano is an agricultural tenant of the landholding
HELD: No, there was no claim of tenancy made in the allegations and so the same could not be presumed
by the court.
• There is no tenancy relationship between Ladano and Neri. A tenancy relationship arises between
a landholder and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the
cultivation of a land belonging to the landholder, as a result of which relationship the tenant
acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. For a tenancy relationship,
express or implied, to exist, the following requisites must be present: (1) the parties must be
landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is sharing of harvests between the landowner and the tenant.
The DARAB erroneously failed to consider that occupancy and cultivation of agricultural land will
not render one a de jure tenant. Ladano did not even allege that he is a tenant of the landowner nor
did he allege that he shared his harvests with the landowner. Anent such factual bases, Ladano is
not a tenant on the land is not entitled to security of tenure.
HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO v. SOLIMAN

G.R. No. 178952 | 10 April 2013
DOCTRINE: While the tenant is emancipated from bondage to the soil, the landowner is entitled to his
just compensation for the deprivation of his land.
FACTS:
• Lazaro Jr. and Proseperidad Gallardo, two of the heirs of Gallardo, are the registered owners of a
parcel of land in Tarlac placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27.
Respondent Porferio Soliman was instituted as a qualified farmer tenant-transferee.
• The heirs of Gallardo filed a complaint for collection of land amortizations, dispossession,
ejectment and cancellation of the Deed of Transfer and Emancipation Patent against Porferio before
the PARAD, alleging that under a Kasunduan, Porferio obliged himself to pay to them 99 cavans
of palay of which 66 cavans were deducted as advance payment, but that he fell short. Despite
Porferio’s refusal to pay amortizations, the Tarlac PARO still issued him Emancipation Patents.
• PARAD ruled that the failure of the respondents to pay rentals cannot be considered deliberate
because they labored under the honest belief that they are now vested with absolute ownership.
DARAB affirmed.
• CA held that Porferio’s failure and refusal to pay the annual amortizations were deliberate and
necessitated the cancellation of his title.
47
ISSUE: Whether or not CA properly dismissed the petition for review?
HELD: No, there is a need for the CA to resolve the issue regarding the Emancipation Patents and their validity.
• The case should be remanded for proper disposition whether the Emancipation Patents issued in
respondents’ names are valid. As the farmer-tenant transferee of the land under PD 27, Porferio is required
to make amortizations on the land until he completes payment of the fixed price. Under the Kasunduan and
Deed of Transfer, he has to make good on his payments but if he fails to pay, cancellation of any certificate
of land transfer or emancipation patent issued in his name is proper based on Sec. 2, PD 816. Moreover,
when one party enters into a covenant with another, one must perform his obligations with fealty
and good faith. This becomes more imperative where such party has been given a grant, such as
land, under the land reform laws. While the tenant is emancipated from bondage to the soil, the
landowner is entitled to his just compensation for the deprivation of his land.
GARCIA v. ROBLES VDA. DE CAPARAS

G.R. No. 180843 | 17 April 2013
DOCTRINE: Any modification to the lease agreement must be made with the consent of both parties, even
those who have been instituted as substitutes, and must not violate their right to security of tenure.
FACTS:
• Makapugay is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm in Bulacan which is being tilled by Eugenio Caparas
as agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement. Before she passed away, she appointed
Amanda dela Paz-Perlas as her attorney-in-fact.
• After Eugenio died, Amanda and Pedro, Eugenio’s son, entered into an agricultural leasehold
contract whereby Pedro was installed as the lone agricultural lessee.
• In 1979, Amanda instituted Vda. De Caparas as the replacement of Pedro. The landowners
(Amanda et al) and Pedro’s sisters entered into a Kasunduan whereby Pedro’s sisters were
acknowledged as his co-lessees.
• Pedro’s sisters filed a complaint for nullification of leasehold and restoration of rights as
agricultural lessees against Pedro’s heirs and surviving spouse, alleging that notwithstanding the
terms of the 1979 agreement, Pedro and his sisters were really co-lessees. They base this contention
on the agreement entered with Pedro that they would alternately farm the land.
• PARAD, DARAB denied the petition, declaring Vda. De Caparas as the lawful successor-tenant.
• CA ruled that the cancellation of the survey plans reverts the property to its original classification
as agricultural land which vindicates the leasehold agreements of the parties. However, the
petitioners argue that the land has been re-classified as residential land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners had a right as co-lessees based on the verbal admission of Pedro?
HELD: No, the execution of a leasehold contract supersedes an extrajudicial verbal admission.
• Part of the duties as a landowner’s representative is to know the personal circumstances of the
lessee so Amanda was duty-bound under Section 9 of RA 3844 to decide who would succeed as
agricultural lessee. When she executed the 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract with Pedro, she
is deemed to have chosen the latter as Eugenio’s successor, and is presumed to have diligently
performed her duties, as Makapugay’s representative, in conducting an inquiry prior to making
the choice. As to the petitioners, if it was true that they entered into an arrangement with Pedro to
alternately till the land, they were obliged to inform Makapugay or Amanda, but they did not do
so. They even allowed 17 years to pass before revealing the claimed alternate farming agreement.
48
Thus, the 1996 Kasunduan between Amanda and petitioners, grounded on Pedro’s inadmissible
verbal admission and entered into without Dominga’s consent, constitutes undue infringement of
Dominga’s rights as Pedro’s successor in interest and operates to deprive her of such rights and
dispossesses her of leasehold against her will. Furthermore, Dominga is entitled to security of
tenure and any modification of the lease agreement must be done with the consent of both parties
without prejudicing her security of tenure.
CODERIAS v. ESTATE OF JUAN CHIOCO

G.R. No. 180476 | 26 June 2013
DOCTRINE: Although a cause of action is deemed prescribed if filed beyond the 3-year period, the same
cannot be legally invoked and the security of tenure of a tenant is deemed uninterrupted if the eviction was
due to force.
FACTS:
• Coderias was a tiller of a farm owned by Chioco. Several individuals connected with Chioco
threatened to kill Coderias if he did not leave the farm, so he eventually left.
• Upon learning of Chioco’s death, Coderias and his family re-established themselves on the farm.
He filed with the DARAB a petition against Chioco’s estate praying that his possession and
cultivation of the farm be respected, and the agricultural leasehold contract be executed.
• The Estate of Juan Chioco moved to dismiss the same, contending that Coderias’ cause of action
had gone beyond the 3-year period for filing claims since the alleged dispossession took place in
1980 but the petition was filed only in 1995. On the other hand, Coderias argued that his tenure
was uninterrupted since his departure was due to threats.
• PARAD dismissed on the ground of prescription. DARAB ruled to maintain Coderias in his
possession of the land. CA held that the action had prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Estate of Chioco had a right to claim prescription of Coderias’ cause of action.
HELD: No. A CLT, which serves as a provisional title of ownership, had already been issued in favor of
Coderias. The farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law. As
such, the Estate had neither the right to evict Coderias nor to claim prescription.
• It is undisputed that a Certificate of Land Tenancy (CLT) was issued in favor of Coderias. Thus, he
already had an expectant right to the farm. It serves as a provisional title of ownership over the
land while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of just compensation for as long as the tenant-
farmer is an amortizing owner. At any rate, the failure to immediately file was due to Chioco’s own
threats and intimidation. If the Court allows prescription to set in, it would lead to an absurd
situation wherein a tenant who was unlawfully deprived of his landholding would be barred from
pursuing his rightful claim against the transgressor.
• Section 8 of RA 3844 provides that the agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished only
under any of the following three circumstances: (1) abandonment of the landholding without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2) voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural
lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or (3) absence of the
persons under Section 9 to succeed the lessee. None of the circumstances applied herein.
• Furthermore, Section 38 provides that an action to enforce any cause of action shall be barred if not
commenced within 3 years after such cause of action accrued. In this case, the cause of action only
49
accrued upon Coderias’ knowledge of Chioco’s death. For as long as the intimidation and threats
to Coderias’ life and limb existed, he had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the recognition
of this juridical tie.
BUMAGAT v. ARRIBAY
G.R. No. 194818 | 9 June 2014
DOCTRINE: A case involving agricultural land does not immediately qualify as an agrarian dispute and
does not immediately make the possessor an agricultural tenant which would bring it into the jurisdiction
of DARAB.
FACTS:
• The petitioners Bumagat, registered owners of an agricultural land, filed a complaint for forcible
entry against Arribay with the MCTC, alleging that the latter ousted them of their lawful
possession of the property through the use of intimidation. Arribay claimed that the subject
properties are agricultural lands which should be under the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
• MCTC denied Arribay’s MTD as the pleadings failed to show the existence of a tenancy
relationship that would bring the dispute within the jurisdiction of DARAB; based on evidence,
Bumagats were in actual possession of the land. RTC affirmed.
• CA held that the dispute fell under the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the Bumagat’s titles were
obtained pursuant to PD 27 and that correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership
Awards registered with the LRA fall under said jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dispute falls under the jurisdiction of the DARAB?
HELD: No, absence of a tenancy relationship between the contesting parties divests the DARAB of
jurisdiction.
• There is no tenancy or agrarian arrangement existing between the Bumagats and Arribay. A case
involving agricultural land does not immediately qualify as an agrarian dispute and does not
immediately make the possessor an agricultural tenant. For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over
the case, there must exist a tenancy relation between the parties which is established when the
following requisites are present:
1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
OFILADA v. ANDAL
G.R. No. 192270 | 26 January 2015
DOCTRINE: The fact of working on another’s land does not raise the presumption of the existence of
agricultural tenancy as the same must be proven through the establishment that the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; the subject is agricultural land; there is consent by the landowner; the purpose
is agricultural production; there is personal cultivation; and that there is sharing of the harvests.
50
FACTS:
• Ofilada, together with her husband, brought from the heirs of Teresita Liwag a parcel of land
principally planted with rambutan and coconut trees, evidenced by an extra-judicial settlement of
estate with absolute sale wherein Miraflor Andal signed as “tenant”.
• Ten days prior to the said sale, Andal appeared before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council
Chairman and executed a Pagpapatunay stating that the land would be transferred to Ofilada.
• Two weeks after the said sale, Miraflor executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein she acknowledged
the Ofiladas as the new owner of the property and waived any tenancy rights she might have.
• Eight years later, Ofilada filed a complaint for ejectment and damages before the MTC against
spouses Andal, averring that the spouses were mere caretakers of her lands and as such, there is
no agrarian dispute.
• On the other hand, spouses Andal claimed that they were tenants of Irene’s predecessor in interest
and continued to be such despite the transfer of ownership of the properties and that DARAB
should have jurisdiction, not the MTC.
• MTC ruled that spouses Andal failed to adduce proof that they are tenants. RTC affirmed.
• CA held that the existence of tenancy relations between previous owners and spouses Andal was
undisputed, the question of whether they can be dispossessed constitutes an agrarian dispute
despite the severance of such relations, so jurisdiction remains with DARAB.
ISSUE: Whether or not a tenancy relationship between Ofilada and spouses Andal exists as to strip the
MTC of its jurisdiction over the suit for unlawful detainer?
HELD: No, the relationship was severed prior to the purchase by way of an express declaration.
• The tenancy relationship between the former owners of the properties and the spouses Andal was
clearly severed prior to Irene’s purchase of the same. Both the Pagpapatunay and Sinumpaang
Salaysay contain express declarations which evidence that at the time the property was bought by
Ofilada, the tenancy relationship between spouses Andal and Liwag had already ceased and that
no such relations would continue between spouses Andal and Ofilada. Furthermore, Miraflor
executed her Pagpapatunay stating that she and her parents have received sufficient consideration
for her to release her landlord and new purchaser from liability. As such, no relationship was
subsequently created between Irene and spouses Andal.
• As to whether a new tenancy relationship exists between Ofilada and spouses Andal, there was
dearth of evidence to prove that a tenurial relationship exists. The principal factor in determining
whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. The fact alone of working on another’s landholding
does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. For tenancy to be proven, all
indispensable elements must be established, namely: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent by the landowner; 4) the purpose is
agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of the harvests. The
first and sixth element were not sufficiently proven, thus no tenancy relationship so the action to
dispossess spouses Andal is cognizable by MTC.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES CHU

G.R. No. 192345 | 29 March 2017
DOCTRINE: Consideration of the valuation factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 and the formula under
DAR A.O. No. 05-98 s mandatory in ascertaining just compensation for purposes of agrarian reform cases.
FACTS:
51
• Spouses Chu were the registered owners of two parcels of land which were acquired by the
government pursuant to PD no. 27 and RA 6657 which LBP valued.
• Said spouses rejected LBP’s valuation so summary administrative proceedings were conducted
before the PARAD to determine the just compensation.
• PARAD recomputed the valuations of the RA 6657-acquired property and PD 27-acquired
property at P1,542,360 and P983,663.94, respectively, but LBP was dissatisfied so it filed a petition
for determination of just compensation before the RTC.
• RTC set the just compensation at P2,313,478 for the RA-acquired property and P1,155,173 for the
PD 27-acquired land, taking cognizance of the factors considered by LBP.
• CA held that LBP failed to consider the rising values of the lands in Pilar, Sorsogon which resulted
from the economic developments in coming up with value for the RA 6657-acquired land.
• LBP contends that CA improperly relied on extraneous factors and should have mandatorily
applied the formula provided in DAR AO no. 05-98.
ISSUE: Whether or not the valuation factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AOs were followed.
HELD: No, the mandatory valuation factors were not complied with. Thus, the case was remanded to the
RTC for proper determination of just compensation.
• Consideration of the valuation factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 and the formula under DAR
A.O. No. 05-98 s mandatory in ascertaining just compensation for purposes of agrarian reform
cases, the judge ought to take into full consideration the factors specifically identified therein and its
implementing rules. Otherwise, the judge runs the risk of violating the agrarian reform law should
he choose not to use the formula laid down by the DAR for the determination of just compensation.
• However, the valuation of P263,928.57 as just compensation for the RA 6657-acquired property
should not be sustained for failure to substantiate the same. The formula used sufficiently
established the capitalized net income, but not the market value component. The LBP also did not
present any testimonial evidence before the RTC which could explain or corroborate how it came
up with the figures and what credence ought to be accorded to them. Further, the valuations fixed
by PARAD and RTC were in disregard of the formula in DAR AO 05-98, as only the comparable
sales factor was considered. In sum, the respective evidence of both parties is insufficient to come
up with a correct computation on the just compensation to which respondents are entitled.
• The Court noted that it is equally glaring that none of the tribunals below took into full
consideration the factors laid down in Section 17 of RA 6657. As such, the case was remanded to the
RTC for determination of just compensation strictly in accordance with the guidelines.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SUSIE IRENE GALLE

G.R. No. 171836 | 11 August 2014
DOCTRINE: It has been the consistent pronouncement of this Court that the determination of just
compensation is basically a judicial function. Also, it is settled that in the computation of just compensation
for land taken for agrarian reform, both Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988/CARL) and the formula prescribed in the applicable Administrative Order
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) should be considered.
FACTS:
52
• Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that it was improper
for this Court to declare null and void the Decision in DARAB Case No. JC-RIX-ZAMBO-0011-CO,
which fixed just compensation on the basis of outdated 1991 data instead of valuation criteria as of
1993, the time of taking of the subject property; that said October 15, 1996 DARAB Decision is
already final and executory and thus beyond judicial review, even by this Court; and that even if
it were to be assumed that said DARAB Decision is null and void, it nonetheless cannot be the
subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
• Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that
the October 15, 1996 DARAB Decision is correct; that the 1991 valuation is accurate since the actual
taking of Galle's property for purposes of fixing just compensation may be said to have occurred
at that time when the Notice of Coverage was served upon Galle; that a property valuation
discrepancy of three years is not significant in the determination of just compensation due to the
owner of expropriated property; and that the DARAB Decision, being correct and having attained
finality, shall prevail as regards the amount of just compensation to be paid for Galle's expropriated
property.
ISSUE: Whether or not DARAB’S decision on the determination of just compensation is already final and
executory, thus beyond judicial review?
HELD: No, the determination of just compensation is primarily a judicial function.

• The Court finds nothing wrong with using the appreciation and depreciation rate factor of 5%
employed by bank appraisers, in the absence of official DAR data/evidence or any other reliable
method and given the DAR's incompetence in handling Galle's case and the unjust consequences
that resulted from such inefficiency and neglect. After all, Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL) provides that - Sec. 17. Determination of
Just Compensation. - In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be
considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.
• Out of regard for the DAR's expertise as the concerned implementing agency, courts should
henceforth consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated into the
applicable DAR formulas in their determination of just compensation for the properties covered
by the said law. If, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, courts find that a strict application of
said formulas is not warranted under the specific circumstances of the case before them, they may
deviate or depart therefrom, provided that this departure or deviation is supported by a reasoned
explanation grounded on the evidence on record. In other words, courts of law possess the power
to make a final determination of just compensation.
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ

v. TERESITA V. SALVADOR
G.R. No. 171972|8 June 2011
Concept of Social Justice
POLITICAL LAW – SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS – CONCEPT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
DOCTRINE: Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present:
53
1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6) The harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.
FACTS:
• Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against petitioners Lucia (Lucia) and
Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter before MTC, alleging that:
a. She is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by an OCT issued by virtue of Free
Patent in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador;
b. Petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-
in-interest; and
c. Despite several verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate
the subject land.
• In their Answer, Petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy – that she and her
deceased husband, Serapio, entered the subject land with the consent and permission of
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest, and under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would
devote the property to agricultural production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings.
ISSUE: Whether or not agricultural tenancy relationship exist in this case.
HELD: No, petitioners failed to prove consent and sharing of harvest between the parties.
• The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to prove the existence
of an agricultural tenancy.
o The element of consent is lacking. Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no other
evidence was submitted to show that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest consented to a
tenancy relationship with petitioners.
o Petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest. They should have presented receipts or
any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest and that there was an agreed
system of sharing between them and the landowners.
o Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an
agricultural tenant. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant
to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy
• However, the only damage that can be recovered by respondent is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property the only issue raised in
ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are
those which the respondent could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss
of the use and occupation of the property.
VICENTE ADRIANO v. ALICE TANCO, et. al.

G.R. No. 168164| July 5, 2010
Concept of Social Justice
DOCTRINE: Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once
they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner,
as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the
land.
54
FACTS:
• Respondent Alice Tanco (Alice) purchased a parcel of land located in Norzagaray, Bulacan. The land was
devoted to mango plantation. Later on, it was partitioned among the respondents (Alice and her three children,
namely, Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick).
• Alice sent to Vicente a letter informing him that subject landholding is not covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). She asked him to vacate the property.
• Vicente filed before the regional office of DARAB a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He averred that in 1970, Arsenio,
the husband of Alice, instituted him as tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation. Since then, he has been
performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of the mango trees. The
fruits were then divided equally between them.
• Respondents denied having instituted any tenant on their property. They stressed that Vicente never worked
and has no employer-employee relationship with Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick. Insofar as Alice is concerned,
respondents asserted that Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm worker.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vicente is a tenant
HELD: No, the essential element of consent is sorely missing because there is no proof that the landowners
recognized Vicente, or that they hired him, as their legitimate tenant.
• The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not
automatically give rise to security of tenure. For tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential
requisites must be present:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) The subject matter is agricultural land;
(3) There is consent between the parties;
(4) The purpose is agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation by the tenant; and,
(6) There is sharing of the harvests between the parties.
All the requisites must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy relationship, and the
absence of one or more requisites is fatal.
• Likewise, the essential requisite of sharing of harvests is lacking. Independent evidence, such as
receipts, must be presented to show that there was sharing of the harvest between the landowner and
the tenant. Self-serving statements are not sufficient.
• In the case at bench, aside from being self-serving, some of the allegations of Vicente are contradicted by the
evidence on record. While he claims that Arsenio instituted him as tenant in 1970 and has since then occupied
and cultivated respondent’s landholdings, the Deed of Absolute Sale presented by the latter indubitably shows
that Alice (or the Tanco family) acquired the same only in 1975.
55

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DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

Lasallian Commission on Bar Operations 2018

POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE LIVIOCO

ISSUE: Whether or not the determination of just compensation was proper

DOH v. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

NAZARENO ET AL v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE

ISSUE: Whether or not the mass appointments are valid

HADJI HASHIM ABDUL v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. v. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

EDCEL LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDEA

Jurisdiction must be specifically conferred by the Constitution or by law.

CAPABLANCA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

LUMAYNA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

CATIPON, JR. v. JAPSON

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied of his right to confrontation

NAPOCOR v. SPS. ZABALA

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 3, RA 6395 can restrict/limit NAPOCOR’s liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tanenggee’s written statement is admissible in evidence.

DOCTRINE: A person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he

HELD: NO. It is not binding upon O’Pallick.

ISSUE: Whether or not Berry’s extra-judicial confession is admissible.

CITY OF ILOILO v. HON. CONTRERAS-BESANA

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO ONG

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

HALLASGO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

ISSUE: Whether or not Hallasgo guilty of gross, grave misconduct?

DELA CRUZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN

ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension is valid pending appeal.

BAUSTISTA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista was demoted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manalo guilty of Grave Misconduct.

ANTONIO KING VS. FRANCISCO ROBLES

DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty-bound to investigate on its own or on

HELD: No, the Ombudsman has prerogative to prosecute or dismiss a complaint.

VILLANUEVA v. PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVT.

2. Compliance with the procedure on contested ERs

DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS v CANTOS

Taxing Power of the Local Government Units

HELD: Yes, there is no grant of exemption in RA 7678.

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD v. CA

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO PUYAT and GLORIA

ISSUE: Whether or not Ladano is an agricultural tenant of the landholding

HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO v. SOLIMAN

ISSUE: Whether or not CA properly dismissed the petition for review?

GARCIA v. ROBLES VDA. DE CAPARAS

CODERIAS v. ESTATE OF JUAN CHIOCO

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES CHU

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SUSIE IRENE GALLE

HELD: No, the determination of just compensation is primarily a judicial function.

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ

ISSUE: Whether or not agricultural tenancy relationship exist in this case.

VICENTE ADRIANO v. ALICE TANCO, et. al.

ISSUE: Whether or not Vicente is a tenant

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