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Indeterminate Sentence Law

Pp vs Gonzalez, 73 Phil 549

Incident: Gonzalez was charged with estafa through falsification of a public document. He forged and falsified reimbursement
expense receipts and presented them to the disbursing officer, after receiving payment, the accused misappropriated the amount for
his own personal use. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty.

The offense charged and admitted by the appellant constitutes the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a public
document. Pursuant to Article 48 of the RPC, the penalty for the more serious offense should be applied in its maximum period, in
this case prision mayor. But since the appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty,
the penalty next lower, which is prision correccional should be imposed in accordance to Article 64.

Using Indeterminate Sentence Law, what should be the penalty to imposed?

Ruling: For purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower should be determined without regard as to whether
the basic penalty provided by the Code should be applied in its maximum or minimum period as circumstances modifying liability
may require. When, however — and this may be the only exception to the rule - the number of mitigating circumstances is such as
to entitle the accused to the penalty next lower in degree, this penalty, in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, should
be taken as the starting point for the determination of the penalty next lower. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to the
accused, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon him shall be the maximum period of prision correccional that is, from 4
years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. Prision correccional is the penalty provided by law for the offense and the penalty
next lower is arresto mayor which may be applied in any of its periods in the discretion of the court.

The basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law 'to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness' . . . it is necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an individual
and, second, as a member of society.

Sison vs People, G.R. No. 222704, 13 April 2016

Incident: Gerald and Jason were caught carrying and pulling PLDT cable wire along Pangasinan. They were found guilty for the crime
of theft and was sentenced to prision mayor as maximum (8years to 10years) and prision correccional as minimum, and to pay PLDT
the amount of P78,384. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and the penalty, and they petitioned for certioarari.

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the guilt of the accused, but modified their sentence as to the following:

The value of the property stolen by appellant was P78,384.00. Under Article 309 (1), the basic penalty is prision mayor which should
be imposed in the maximum period since the value of the stolen goods exceeded P22,000.00, plus one year for every additional
10,000, but the total penalty should not exceed 20yrs.

To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we deduct the amount of P22,000.00, thus leaving the amount of P56,384.00.
Next, the net amount should be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount below P10,000.00. Thus, five (5) years must be
added to the basic penalty of the maximum period of prision mayor. Thus, the imposable penalty is thirteen (13) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which, taking into consideration the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall
be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense.

The maximum penalty is fifteen (15) years, which is already reclusion temporal, so the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed for the offense is prision mayor.
Probation Law

Sable vs Pp, G.R. No. 177961, 7 April 2009

Incident: Petitioner was convicted of Falsification of Public Documents, falsifying Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Waiver of
Rights and Partition Agreements in relation to lots that were subdivided. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal but was denied for having
been filed out of time. Petitioner then applied for probation.

Is she qualified for Probation?

Ruling: No. Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and
encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state the time, effort and expenses to jettison
an appeal.

An application for probation must be made within the period for perfecting an appeal, and the filing of the application after the time
of appeal has lapsed is injurious to the recourse of the applicant. What the law requires is that the application for probation must be
filed within the period for perfecting an appeal. The need to file it within such period is intended to encourage offenders, who are
willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, to avail themselves of probation at the first opportunity.

Furthermore, the application for probation must necessarily fail, because before the application was instituted, petitioner already
filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC. The Probation Law is patently clear that "no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."

The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This
outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is
finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well nigh at hand and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for
probation as an "escape hatch", thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction.

This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended, precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of
conviction even if the sentence is probationable, for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the
accused fails in his bid.

Colinares vs Pp, G.R. No. 182748, 13Dec2011

Incident: Arnel was convicted for Frustrated Homicide at the RTC and was sentenced for more than 6 years. When he appealed his
case, however, the Supreme Court only found him guilty of Attempted Homicide with the sentence reduced to less than 6 years. Is he
allowed to apply for Probation?

Ruling: Yes. The Probation Law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not
have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for
probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice.

Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at
best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way,
therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for

In a real sense, the Court's finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original
conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have
found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation. The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation
through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused.
Art. 89. Total Extinction of Criminal Liability

Pp vs Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 Sept 1994

Incident: Bayotas was accused and eventually convicted of the crime of rape. While his appeal was still pending, he died due to
cardiac arrest. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, the Solicitor General was
asked to comment with regard to his civil liability arising from the commission of the crime. Should the civil liability also be
extinguished by reason of the death of the accused?

Ruling: Yes. The rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources
of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it
were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the
civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

Pp vs Santiago, G.R. No. 27972, 31 October 1927

Incident: Accused raped the niece of his deceased wife then brought her to a minister to conduct a marriage ceremony. After the
marriage, accused gave the girl some money to send her home. Is the criminal liability of rape extinguished by virtue of marriage?

Ruling: No. The consent of the girl to the performance of the marriage was vitiated by duress and that the marriage ceremony had
been performed as a mere device of the accused to escape punishment. Such marriage is therefore illegal and constitutes no
obstacle to the prosecution of the accused for the offense.

The manner in which the appellant dealt with the girl after the marriage, as well as before, shows that he had no bona fide intention
of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void
for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.

Pp vs Lipata, G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016

Incident: Appellant was convicted for the crime of murder. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, however, the appellant died prior to
final judgement. What happens to his criminal and civil liability?

Ruling: The criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to
final judgment.

The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator
or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based.

Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case.
Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present
Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate
civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his heirs
cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.
Art. 100. Civil Liability

Abellana vs Pp, G.R. No. 174654, 17 August 2011

Incident: Accused was charged for estafa through falsification of documents. He was, however, acquitted of the crime but was asked
to pay for civil damages. Thus, accused filed a petition for review on the civil liability imposed on him by virtue of his acquittal.

Ruling: It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely
due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the
offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction
of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability]
might arise did not exist."

Civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another.
Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the

Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses
Alonto, thus the imposition of damages is hereby deleted for lack of legal and factual basis.

Pp vs Jadap, G.R. No. 177983, 30 March 2010