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Republic of the Philippines

5th MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT


Second Judicial region
Naguilian, Isabela

DONALD CASTILLO,
Plaintiff, CIVIL CASE NO. ___________

- versus - - for -

Atty. CESAR RAMIREZ, FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DAMAGES


Defendant.
x----------------------------/

COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF by counsel, to this Honorable Court, most respectfully avers that:

1. Plaintiff DONALD CASTILLO is of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and a


resident of Marasat Pequno, San Mateo, Isabela where he may be served
with summons and other court processes;

2. Defendant Atty. Cesar Ramirez is also of legal age, married, Filipino and a
resident of Naguilian, Isabela, where he may be served with summons and
other processes of this Honorable Court;

3. The plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of land located in San Mateo, Isabela,
containing an area of ONE MILLION(1,000,000.00) SQUARE METERS, more
or less, which realty is titled in his name as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-222222222 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Isabela, photocopy of which is hereto attached as Annex “A”
and made an integral part of this complaint;

4. Plaintiff, by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in


peaceful possession of the land continuously and uninterrupted for more
than fifty (50) years;

5. On January 28, 2011, defendant together with hired laborers without the
knowledge, consent and authority of the plaintiff, by force, strategy and
stealth entered the land described in paragraph 3 hereof, encroached on
and took possession of a portion of the said land having an area of 500,000
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square meters with the following bounderies: on the Northeast by the


remaining portion; and on the Southwest by a provincial Road;

6. Simultaneous to their unlawful entry, defendant with his hired laborers


started construction of a residential house, notwithstanding plaintiff’s
repeated demands for them to stop and to desist from further acts of
dispossession;

7. Plaintiff, by himself and through his representative, repeatedly demanded


of the defendant to vacate the area occupied by him and to deliver the
peaceful possession of the same to plaintiff, but defendant, without any
just or legal reason, refused and continue to refuse to leave the premises
and restore peaceful possession to the plaintiff of the portion which he
unlawfully wrested from the plaintiff;

8. Efforts for a possible settlement and/or reconciliation was exerted by the


plaintiff by seeking the intervention of barangay officials of Barangay
Marasat Pequeno, San Mateo, regrettably all efforts to amicably settle their
dispute were in vein. Copy of the certification issued by Barangay Secretary
Levy teodorao, dated Febuary 9, 2011 is hereto appended and marked as
Annex “B”;

9. As a consequence of the unlawful entry and occupation of the subject land


by the defendant and his subsequent refusal to vacate the premises,
plaintiff was compelled to file this action and, for this reason have to
engage the services of counsel for an agreed professional fee of P25,000.00
pesos;

10. As further consequence of the defendant’s refusal to surrender and


restore peaceful possession of the land, plaintiff, suffered mental anguish,
emotional disturbance, embarrassment, besmirched reputation which
entitles him to recover from defendant moral and exemplary damages
amounting to not less than P50,000.00 pesos.

11. The instant action is brought within the period of one year, reckoned from
the date of actual possession of the subject land by the defendant on
January 28, 2011.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays the Honorable Court to render


judgment;
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1. Ordering the defendant to vacate the premises of the area occupied by


him and to deliver peaceful possession of the same to the plaintiff or his
representative.

2. Ordering the defendant to remove any structure which he, in bad faith,
have erected in the area occupied by him or, in default thereof, to order
the demolition of his building or structures which are standing in the land,
all at the expense of the defendant.

3. Condemning the defendant to pay to the plaintiff:

a. The sum of P25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the sum of P5,000 as


expenses of litigation;
b. Moral and exemplary damage of not less than P50,000.00; and
c. The costs of this suit:
d. Plaintiff pray for other reliefs and remedies as may be just and
equitable in the premises.

Ilagan, Isabela, November 2, 2011.

ATTY. LEIF JOHN L. ROBINO


Counsel for the Plaintiff
PTR No.

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION

I, Donald Castillo, of legal age, married, Filipino and resident of


Marasat Pequeno, San Mateo, Isabela, after being sworn to, in accordance
with law, hereby depose and state:

1 .I am the Plaintiff in the above entitled case.

2. I have caused the preparation and filing of this complaint

3. I have read and understood the contents of this complaint and all
the allegations contained therein are true and correct of my own personal
knowledge and based on authentic documents.
4. I hereby certify that I have not commenced any other action or
proceedings involving the same issues in the above entitled case before the

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Supreme Court, Court of Appeals of Justice or quasi-judicial body, or


government agency; and should I learn of a similar action or proceeding
and/or the pendency thereof before any other Court of Justice, quasi-
judicial body or government agency, I do hereby undertake to report the
same within (5) days there from to this Honorable Court.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this ___


day of March 2012 at Ilagan, Isabela, Philippines

Donald Castillo
Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before this ___ day of March 2012 at


Ilagan, Isabela, Philippines.

Doc. No _____;
Page No. ____;
Book No.____;
Series of 2012.
Ejectment Case: Forcible Entry or Unlawful
Detainer Explained

An ejectment case is a summary proceeding designed to


provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or
the right to possession of the property involved
(Barrientos v. Rapal, G.R. No. 169594, July 20, 2011). It is
expeditious as it is governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, a special rule where extra pleadings and
motions (other than the Complaint and Answer),
otherwise available in an ordinary civil action, are
prohibited precisely to insulate it from unnecessary
delays. The main issue to be resolved here is the issue of
possession or the right to hold possession.

If you’re a lessor of real property, you may, if you haven’t


already, have to resort to the remedy of ejectment in
cases where a lessee withholds possession of leased
property after the latter’s right to hold the same has
already terminated, as where lessee has failed to pay
rental, or has failed to comply with the conditions of the
lease contract, in which case it is called Unlawful Detainer.

It is also available where a present possessor has held


possession of a subject property at the tolerance of the
owner or the one entitled to its possession, and thereafter
refused, after demand to vacate has been made upon him,
or continues his possession thereof. In this case, an
inceptively lawful possession has become unlawful, when
the tolerated possessor refused to return the property
upon demand by the rightful possessor or owner. Anyone,
whose stay in the property is merely tolerated, is bound by
an implied obligation to vacate and return the same to,
upon demand of, the rightful possessor or owner.
Note that even the owner of the property may be sued for

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ejectment when he deprives another of lawful possession,


as in a case of a lessor depriving or ousting a lessee, who
has been compliant with his obligations under a lease
contract, of possession thereof.

Another species of ejectment is Forcible Entry. It is the


same special proceeding as Unlawful Detainer, but the
means whereby the lawful possessor or owner of the
subject property has been deprived thereof are: Force,
Intimidation, Strategy, Threat, and/or Stealth (FISTS).
Anyone who has been ousted of possession to a real
property by a "strong hand" using any of the means
mentioned, may resort to this summary remedy to restore
him immediately to possession.
In both cases, ownership is not imperative in order for a
plaintiff to acquire legal personality to sue, as again, the
issue is mere right to possession. In unlawful detainer it is
indispensable or jurisdictional that a demand to pay rental
or comply with the conditions of the lease and vacate is
made before an action may properly be filed. Accordingly,
absence of such prior demand could lead to the dismissal
of the case. However, the same is not true in forcible
entry.

In both cases, resort to barangay conciliation is condition


precedent, meaning that the opposing party may raise as
objection the fact that the dispute has not been referred
to the barangay authorities for conciliation, and the same
may be ground for the dismissal of the action. However, it
is not jurisdictional, meaning that it may be waived by
such opposing party. It is deemed waived when the
opposing party failed to timely object to the fact of its
(barangay conciliation) absence.

Both actions must be brought (filed in court) within one

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year. The period of one year is reckoned from, in the case


of forcible entry, the date of actual possession if the
deprivation or the ground for the action is force,
intimidation, or threat; and the date of discovery and
prohibition if the deprivation or ground for the action is
strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, the period of one
year is counted from the date of last demand.

In the case of forcible entry, the possession is


unlawful/illegal from the very beginning, while in unlawful
detainer, it is inceptively lawful until the defendant
refused and failed to vacate, after demand is made upon
him by the plaintiff. Demand is made upon the termination
of the defendant's right to hold possession of the subject
property, either by expiration of contract, breach of terms
of the contract, or when an owner who tolerated the
defendant's stay has manifested its intention to use the
property effectively ending the tolerance.

In both cases, the provisional remedy of preliminary


injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) is
available under the provision of Rule 70, on forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, and in relation to Rule 58, on
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
Recovery of possession; forcible entry - G.R. No. 142676
[EMERITA MUOZ vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR. and
SAMUEL GO CHAN, ET. AL., June 6, 2011]

"x x x.

There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived


of physical possession of land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such
cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the
basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de
facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two
allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to
acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior
physical possession of the property, and second, he must
also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any
of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof,
what is important is determining who is entitled to the
physical possession of the property. Indeed, any of the
parties who can prove prior possession de facto may
recover such possession even from the owner himself
since such cases proceed independently of any claim of
ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior
possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof. [Baes
v. Lutheran Church of the Philippines, 511 Phil. 458, 479-
480 (2005)]

Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the court


should base its decision on who had prior physical
possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for
forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth,
so that it behooves the court to restore possession
regardless of title or ownership. [Domalsin v. Valenciano,
G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 115, 132]
We more extensively discussed in Pajuyo v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492]
that:

“Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership


is not at issue in an action for recovery of possession. The
parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or
right to legal possession except to prove the nature of the
possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical
possession. The same is true when the defendant asserts
the absence of title over the property. The absence of title
over the contested lot is not a ground for the courts to
withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.

“The only question that the courts must resolve in


ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical
possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de
facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even
matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable, or
when both parties intruded into public land and their
applications to own the land have yet to be approved by
the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a
strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful
withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold
respect for prior possession.

“Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover


such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever
may be the character of his possession, if he has in his
favor prior possession in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until a person with
a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue
that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right
to physical possession. [Id. at 510-511] (Emphases ours.)
“Based on the foregoing, we find that the RTC-Branch 88
erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 even
before completion of the proceedings before the MeTC. At
the time said case was ordered dismissed by RTC-Branch
88, the MeTC had only gone so far as holding a hearing on
and eventually granting Muñoz’s prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

“Muñoz alleges in her complaint in Civil Case No. 8286 that


she had been in prior possession of the subject property
since it was turned-over to her by the sheriff on January
10, 1994, pursuant to the Alias Writ of Execution issued by
the RTC-Branch 95 to implement the final judgment in Civil
Case No. Q-28580. The factual issue of who was in prior
possession of the subject property should be litigated
between the parties regardless of whether or not the final
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the
spouses Chan. Hence, the pendency of the latter issue in
Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95 did not
warrant the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 before the
MeTC on the ground of litis pendentia. The two cases
could proceed independently of one another.

“Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut aver that the spouses


Chan have never lost possession of the subject property
since acquiring the same from BPI Family in 1990. This is a
worthy defense to Muñoz’s complaint for forcible entry,
which Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut should
substantiate with evidence in the continuation of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC.

“In addition, Civil Case No. 8286, a forcible entry case, is


governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
Section 19 whereof provides:
“SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The
following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

“x x x x

“(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition


against any interlocutory order issued by the court.

“The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to


achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this
objective, the Rule prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a
number of other pleadings, in order to prevent
unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of
cases. [Go v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 214, 224 (1998)]

x x x."

Preliminary Injunction
Category: Civil Procedure

Preliminary Injunction is defined in Section 1, RULE 58,


Revised Rules of Court on Preliminary Injunction, to wit:

"Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. — A


preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of
an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to
refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it
shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
(1a)"1
In Section of the same rule, the court which can grant a
preliminary injunction is provided:

"Section 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. — A


preliminary injunction may be granted by the court where
the action or proceeding is pending. If the action or
proceeding is pending in the Court of Appeals or in the
Supreme Court, it may be issued by said court or any
member thereof. (2a)"2

Additionally, in Section 3 of the same rule, there provided


the grounds in issuance of a preliminary injunction, to wit:

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.


— A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,


and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-


performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,


threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation
of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual. (3a)3”
A common question that is asked pertaining to
preliminary injunctions is:

May a court suspend the proceedings in the MeTC/MTC


for Unlawful Detainer if a case questioning the ownership
of the property of the plaintiff in the MeTC was filed with
the RTC?

Generally, the answer is in the negative. However, in cases


of equity, the proceedings in the MeTC/MTC may be
suspended as enshrined in AMAGAN, et. al. v. MARAYAG4,
to wit:

“As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or


suspended by the mere filing before the regional trial
court (RTC) of another action raising ownership of the
property as an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful
detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on
considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of
petitioners' house would result from the enforcement of
the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment.”

References:

1Revised Rules of Court, Philippines.

2Id.

3Id.

4G.R. No. 138377. February 28, 2000.


Civil Cases

RULE 70
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.


Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied,
or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution
of such possession, together with damages and costs.

Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand.


Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall
be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with
the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the
lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon
the person found on the premises, or by posting such
notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and
the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days
in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.

Sec. 3. Summary procedure.


Except in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy laws or
when the law otherwise expressly provides, all actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the
amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be
recovered, shall be governed by the summary procedure
hereunder provided.

Sec. 4. Pleadings allowed.


The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaint,
compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the
answer, and the answers thereto. All pleadings shall be
verified.

Sec. 5. Action on complaint.


The court may, from an examination of the allegations in
the complaint and such evidence as may be attached
thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds
for the dismissal of a civil action which are apparent
therein. If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall
forthwith issue summons.

Sec. 6. Answer.
Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve
a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative
defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived,
except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-
claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the
answer shall be considered barred. The answer to
counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed
within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which
they are pleaded.

Sec. 7. Effect of failure to answer.


Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within
the period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on
motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein. The court may in its
discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney’s
fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of
section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants.
Sec. 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties.
Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed,
a preliminary conference shall be held. The provisions of
Rule 18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the preliminary
conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this
Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary


conference shall be cause for the dismissal of his
complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of
the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his
counterclaim in accordance with the next preceding
section. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall


likewise be entitled to judgment in accordance with the
next preceding section. This procedure shall not apply
where one of two or more defendants sued under a
common cause of action who had pleaded a common
defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.
No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be
granted except for highly meritorious grounds and without
prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the exercise of
sound discretion may impose on the movant.

Sec. 9. Record of preliminary conference.


Within five (5) days after the termination of the
preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order
stating the matters taken up therein, including but not
limited to:
1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable
settlement, and if so, the terms thereof;
2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the
parties;
3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the
stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment
may be rendered without the need of further proceedings,
in which event the judgment shall be rendered within
thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;
4. A clear specification of material facts which remain
controverted; and
5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition
of the case.

Sec. 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers.


Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned
in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the
factual issues defined in the order, together with their
position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied
upon by them.

Sec. 11. Period for rendition of judgment.


Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits and
position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing
the same, the court shall render judgment.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify
certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue
an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require
the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the
said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said
order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days
after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of
the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just
to gain time for the rendition of the judgment.

Sec. 12. Referral for conciliation.


Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where there is no
showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be
dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only
after that requirement shall have been complied with.

Sec. 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions.


The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be
allowed:
1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to
comply with section 12;
2. Motion for a bill of particulars;
3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a
judgment, or for reopening of trial;
4. Petition for relief from judgment;
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits
or any other paper;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
9. Dilatory motions for postponement;
10. Reply;
11. Third-party complaints;
12. Interventions.

Sec. 14. Affidavits.


The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule
shall state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the
affiants which are admissible in evidence, and shall show
their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.
A violation of this requirement may subject the party or
the counsel who submits the same to disciplinary action,
and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or
portion thereof from the record.

Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction.


The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the
defendant from committing further acts of dispossession
against the plaintiff.

A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible


entry or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from
the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in
his possession. The court shall decide the motion within
thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.

Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.


When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession.

Sec. 17. Judgment.


If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the
complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the
plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly
due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees
and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it
shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his
costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall
render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either
party and award costs as justice requires.

Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not


conclusive in actions involving title or ownership.
The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession
only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not
bar an action between the same parties respecting title to
the land or building.

The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the


appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the
same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings
had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or
briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by
the Regional Trial Court.
Sec. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay
same.

If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution


shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has
been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal
Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the
rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of
the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate
court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall
deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value
of the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined by the
judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of
each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond
shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the
other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to
which the action is appealed.

All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be


deposited with said court or authorized government
depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final
disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement
of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable
grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for
justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the
defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed
from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the
appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon
proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the
judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of
possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the
appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof
on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any
money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of
the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant
has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or
building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of
the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for
such deprivation of possession and restoration of
possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.

Sec. 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of


appeal.

Upon motion of the plaintiff, within ten (10) days from the
perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the
latter may issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
to restore the plaintiff in possession if the court is satisfied
that the defendant’s appeal is frivolous or dilatory, or that
the appeal of the plaintiff is prima facie meritorious.

Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of


Appeals or Supreme Court.

The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the


defendant shall be immediately executory, without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.