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ruled that petitioner was qualified to run in her home province, as she was no longer bound by the domicile of her deceased husband, and had, thus, reverted back to her original domicile. [Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, in a separate opinion, took exception to the rationale of the decision and argued that the petitioner may be said to have established her domicile, not because she automatically reverted back to the same upon the death of her husband, but because she exercised her choice to establish Leyte as her domicile.] Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor, supplying the following information in response to item no. 8: RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ___ Years and Seven Months The incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo, who was then seeking reelection, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On 29 March 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry seven months to since childhood (in item no. 8 of the amended certificate). Petitioner explained that the entry of the word seven in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an honest misinterpretation which she sought to rectify by adding the words since childhood in her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, since she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. On 24 April 1995, the COMELEC came up with a Resolution: (1) finding private respondent s Petition for Disqualification meritorious; (2) striking out petitioner s Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy; and (3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. According to the COMELEC, the petitioner s conduct revealed her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile: she registered as a voter in different places and, on several occasions, declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in different places. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner was a resident of the First District of Leyte, and therefore, she possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the said district and province. According to the Court, the deliberations of the members (of the 1987 Constitutional Commission) on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond
Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin. The Supreme Court stressed that it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage in 1952 to the late President Ferdinand E. at that time. petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband s actual place of residence fixed by him. petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts.doubt the principle that. Rizal and Batac. Justice Flerida Ruth Romero It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband to unilaterally fix the residence or domicile of the family. At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise of her husband. in this case. but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes. When and while petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos in 1954. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently. what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. cannot be inferred from the use of the term residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well-delineated. can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband. her election of a domicile of choice. by operation of law. as laid down in the Civil Code. like the petitioner and others similarly situated. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence. The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband s domicile. upon marriage. But assuming that Mr. it actually means only domicile. for there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of domicile and residence. if at all she was before. There is no showing as to which of these places Mr. * Separate Opinion. The problem here is that. or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage. a reversion to her domicile of 2 . it would be highly illogical to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband. She did not lose her domicile of origin. among which were: San Juan. Moreover. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? I submit that a widow. both of which are located in the First District of Leyte. but exercising free will. even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased. when the Constitution speaks of residence in election law. is to close one s eyes to the stark realities of the present. proceeding from the discussions pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin. Mr. Marcos. Tolosa. Marcos fixed as his family s residence. Ilocos Norte. absent a positive act of selecting a new one in situations during the subsistence of the marriage itself. she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband s. Marcos had several places of residence. to Barangay Olot.
the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.origin. 3 . Added together.
Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against respondent on Feb. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The RTC granted the motion. while petitioner s motion for reconsideration was denied. 25. Dulce Javier. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based. Respondent cannot be permitted to use his malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him. at the RTC of Quezon City. 1998. 4 . ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy. Consequently. respondent initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage license.IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Thus. and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with Ma. thereafter. 25. Thereafter. 1996). With said marriage not yet annulled. Its two essential elements are (a) the civil action involves an issue raised in the criminal action. nullified nor terminated. He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceeding for bigamy invoking the civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. and a third marriage with certain Julia Hernandez. 2000 FACTS: On October 21. 138509 July 31. but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the civil case. 1985. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. he contracted a second marriage with herein petitioner Imelda Marbella (on Jan. a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. HELD: Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. ISAGANI BOBIS GR No. It is therefore not a prejudicial question.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be successfully invoked as an excuse. contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead. why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage. or in case his or her spouse is absent. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite usually the marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. Relova. the respondent s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. 5 . he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. (3) that he contracts a subsequent marriage. 22 SCRA 731(1968): Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity. (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Prior to such declaration of nullity of the first marriage is beyond question. considering that the prosecution has not yet presented single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. [as] only competent courts have such authority. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code. The elements of bigamy are (1) the offender has been legally married. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy.In the case at bar. The exceptions to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by Article 41 of the Family Code and by PD 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Otherwise.
owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato brought to Cebu for the purpose of transporting Smith. 6 .. Legislature in its enactment of Act 2761. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands. BELL & CO. If one be severed. Certificate of Philippine Register. the right to register vessels in the Phils. Literally and absolutely. and of more than 15 tons gross. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of 15 tons gross or less. -application for registration was made at Cebu at the Collector of Customs---denied. J. Bell & Co./US or both -plaintiff s contention: Act No. Specifically within the purview of the police power. 2671 deprives the corp.) RD: Act No. steamship lines are the arteries of the commerce in the Phils. a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. Bell & Co. falls within the authorized exceptions. the company was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership of the Bato and that they are left with a naked title they could not use. Issue: WON Smith. 2761. the lifeblood of the nation is lost. Islands.) 40 Phil 136. -domestic ownership. of its property without due process of law because by the passage of the law. majority of the stockholders are British. vs NATIVIDAD (Malcolm. (c) any corporation or company composed wholly of citizen of Phils. Sec. s merchandise between ports in the islands. 144-145 (1919) Facts: -Smith. were denied of the due process of law by the Phil. as used in this section. Coastwide trade. Bell & Co. Ltd. in denying to corporations such as Smith. upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership. Bell & Co. If these are protected. (judgment affirmed plaintiff can t be granted registry. the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner. 1172. security of the country and general welfare is sustained. (b) citizens of the US residing in the Phil. -Act 2671. Because they were not citizens of the US/Phils. means ownership vested in the (a) citizens or native inhabitants of the Phil Islands.SMITH. Ruling: No.
For its part. defendants denied knowing Ramonito and Generoso and claimed that Gavino died single and without issue. who was a family friend. and Catalina herself. CA affirmed. March 7. that a child is presumed to be legitimate. 83598. 7 . FACTS: This is an action for partition brought by Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog against Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog. No. As proof of this. the mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934. holding that private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married. they presented certificates showing that there was no record in the Register of both the marriage between Gavino and Catalina and the birth of Ramonito. another. ISSUE: y y Whether or not the presumption of marriage applies Whether or not Ramonito and Generoso were legitimate children of Gavino HELD: The SC found no reversible error committed by the CA. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 (only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry) since the marriage was celebrated when such law was in effect. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of Ramonito and Generoso. predeceasing their parents. the grandparents of Ramonito and Generoso. the elder brother of Leoncia and Gaudioso. Gavino died in 1935.R. Ramonito and Generoso claimed that they were the legitimate children of Catalina and Gavino. and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. Petitioner contends that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should be proven in accordance of Arts. Hence this petition. Ramonito and Generoso presented witnesses: one.G. the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. 1997 y y Presumption of marriage Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage.
wherein Gaudioso himself admitted that Ramonito is his nephew. Their legitimacy was proved by testimony of witnesses. Consequently. 53 and 54 never came into force. Cheong Seng Gee: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Always presume marriage.But the SC noted that Arts. Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. but it is a new relation. Under the Rules of Court. although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage. and the rules on evidence. there was submitted an official transcript of an investigation before the Police Investigation Committee of Balamban. the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. 8 . Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract. Consequently. the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being. The reason is that such is the common order of society. the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. Arts. because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. including Catalina. to be in fact married. every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968. Cebu. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case. Indeed. except as they related to vested rights. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect. Legitimacy of Children The SC held that the fact that there was no record of birth in the Civil Registry does not mean that Ramonito and Generoso were not legitimate children. Rationale for the presumption The law favors the validity of marriage. having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this country. an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. the mother herself. Adong vs. which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code. Moreover. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed.
The Court held this admission of relationship as admissible against Gaudioso as a reliable declaration against interest. 9 . Decision affirmed.
In the present case.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection and due process rights. Held: No. When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work. Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 10 . Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be retirees who are even younger and a 65 year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official who is not a retiree. Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local elective office from which he has retired. COMELEC [95 SCRA 392. 22 JAN 1980] Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for office because there is the need for new blood to assume relevance . WHEREFORE. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter are not. the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on reasonable and real differentiations.DUMLAO VS. employees 65 years of age have been classified differently from younger employees. 4 of BP. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. L-52245.
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