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N. Structural Realism after Kenneth Waltz the Cold War
Some studentsof in-
ternational politicsbelieve thatrealismis obsolete.1They argue that,although realism's concepts of anarchy, self-help, and power balancing may have been appropriateto a bygone era, theyhave been displaced by changed conditions and eclipsed by better ideas. New times call for new thinking.Changing conditionsrequirerevised theoriesor entirely different ones. True,if the conditionsthata theorycontemplatedhave changed, the theory no longer applies. But what sorts of changes would alter the international political systemso profoundlythat old ways of thinking would no longer be relevant?Changes ofthe systemwould do it; changes in the systemwould not. Within-system changes take place all the time,some important, some not. Big in the means of transportation, and war fighting, for changes communication, how states and other agents interact.Such changes example, stronglyaffect occur at the unit level. In modern history, perhaps in all of history, or the introduction nuclear weaponry was the greatestof such changes. Yet in the of nuclear era, international politics remains a self-helparena. Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possibly for others' security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of the international political system. of Changes in the structure the systemare distinctfromchanges at the unit level. Thus, changes in polarityalso affect how statesprovide fortheirsecurity Significant changes take place when the number of great powers reduces to two or one. With more than two, states rely for theirsecurityboth on their
Kenneth Waltz, is N. FordProfessor PoliticalScienceat theUniversity California, former of of Berkeley, a Research Associate theInstitute Warand Peace Studiesand Adjunct at of of Professor Columbia University. I am indebted to Karen Adams and RobertRauchhaus forhelp on this articlefromits conception to its completion.For insightful criticisms wish to thank RobertArt,Richard I and constructive WarnerSchilling,and Mark Sheetz. Betts,Barbara Farnham,Anne Fox, RobertJervis, 1. For example, RichardNed Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War,and the Failure W. of Realism," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 249-277; Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall Security, 1999), pp. 5-55; Bruce Russett,GraspingtheDemocratic Peace: Principles a Post-Cold WarPeace for (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1993); Paul Schroeder,"Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory,"International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 108-148; and JohnA. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. ProgressiveResearch Programs:An ApPoliticalScience praisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition,"American Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912.
International Secuirity, 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41 Vol. ? 2000 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute Technology of
International Security 25:1 | 6
own internalefforts and on alliances theymay make with others.Competition in multipolarsystemsis more complicated than competitionin bipolar ones because uncertainties about the comparativecapabilities of states multiplyas numbers grow, and because estimates of the cohesiveness and strengthof coalitionsare hard to make. Both changes of weaponry and changes of polarity were big ones with ramifications that spread through the system, yet they did not transform it. If the systemwere transformed, international politics would no longer be international politics,and the past would no longer serve as a guide to the future.We would begin to call internationalpolitics by another name, as some do. The terms"world politics" or "global politics,"forexample, suggest that politics among self-interestedstates concerned with their security has been replaced by some otherkind of politics or perhaps by no politics at all. What changes,one may wonder,would turninternational politicsintosomething distinctly different? The answer commonly given is that international and realismis being renderedobsolete as democpoliticsis being transformed its racy extends its sway,as interdependence tightens grip,and as institutions smooth the way to peace. I consider these points in successive sections. A fourthsection explains why realisttheoryretainsits explanatorypower after the Cold War.
and Democracy Peace
The end of the Cold War coincided with what many took to be a new democratic wave. The trend toward democracy combined with Michael Doyle's rediscoveryof the peaceful behavior of liberal democraticstates interse contributesstrongly the belief that war is obsolescent,if not obsolete, among to the advanced industrialstates of the world.2 The democraticpeace thesis holds that democracies do not fightdemocracies. Notice that I say "thesis," not "theory" The belief that democracies constitutea zone of peace rests on a perceived high correlationbetween formand international outcome. Francis Fukuyama thinksthat governmental the correlation perfect: is Never once has a democracyfoughtanotherdemocracy JackLevy says that it is "the closest thingwe have to an empiricallaw
2. Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and ForeignAffairs, Parts 1 and 2," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, Nos. 3 and 4 (Summer and Fall 1983); and Doyle, "Kant: Liberalism and World Politics,"American PoliticalScienceReview, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.
and a highlycompetentbureaucracy5But in the French.a freepress."Kant. Levy.6 That rathergives the game away Liberal democracies have at times prepared forwars against other liberal democracies and have sometimes come close to fighting them. Waltz. Liberalism. ChristopherLayne. 4 (1991). Subsequent Kant references found in this work. Ido Oren. No. FrancisFukuyama. JohnM. "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace. 87-125. Vol. JohnOwen tried to finessethe problem of definition arguing thatdemocracies thatperceive one anotherto be liberal by democracies will not fight. be a democracyof the rightkind.4And iftheydid. Rabb. "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon. in the A second half of Layne and Sean M.: MIT Press. LiberalWar:American Politicsand International Security (Ithaca."PoliticalScienceand Politics. 6. his LiberalPeace. liberal ones) are peaceful in relationto one another. 2 (Fall 1995). No. are 5. 19." International Security. 24."3 But. let alone two or more. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. No. . if it is true thatdemocracies rest reliablyat peace among themselves.Mass. pp. of Layne gets to the heartof the matter. KennethN. Lynn-Jones. 157ff. 662. TheOriginand Prevention Major Wars(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity of Press. 5-49.and War.7 Conformity countriesto a prescribed 3. argues convincingly foreignand military policy was no weaker than France's or Britain's. could Britain and France fighteach other over Fashoda in 1898 when Germany lurked in the background? In emphasizing the internationalpolitical reasons for democracies not fightingeach other. pp. 19.forthcoming). No. have not a theory we but a purportedfact begging foran explanation. 1989). parties.e. Cf. JackS. 20. who can say thattheywould continue to be of the rightsort or continueto be democracies at all? The shortand sad lifeof the WeimarRepublic is a reminder. Vol. 2 (Fall 1994).S.a legislaturethat controlledthe purse. And how does one definewhat the rightsort of democracyis? Some American scholars thoughtthatWilhelmine Germany was the very model of a modern democratic state with a wide honest elections. eds. The explanationgiven generallyruns this way: Democracies of the right kind (i. ShouldAmerica SpreadDemocracy? Debate (CamthatGermany'sdemocraticcontrolof bridge.This was Immanuel Kant's point.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 7 the in the study of international relations. Vol. "Domestic Politics and War."in RobertI. Germany. 1997). competitive suffrage. 56. 2 (June1962). 88. Vol."International Security. How.. Owen." International Security. Perceptionsof Imperial of Vol."American PoliticalScienceReview. for example.. p. "The Subjectivity the 'Democratic' Peace: Changing U.as factsdo. 4. ChristopherLayne.Y: Cornell University Press. Germanyturnedout not to British. ChristopherLayne shows that some wars between democracieswere avertednot because of the reluctanceof democracies to fighteach other but for fear of a thirdparty-a good realist reason. N. pp.and his definition a republic was so restrictive or of that it was hard to believe that even one of them could come into existence. 2 (Fall 1994). The termhe used was Rechtsstaat republic. and American view afterAugust of 1914.. 7. Rotbergand Theodore K. p. No.
Leopold von Ranke."That is Kant's answer: The natural state is the state of war.9Kant a centuryearlier entertainedthe same worry The 8. so long as it remained democratic. 24.TheEnd ofHistory theLastMan (New York:Free Press. and Russett. . Gerhard Ritter. then. the politicsout of international out politics. 9. it "may be possible in part to supersede the 'realist' principles (anarchy. since at least the seventeenthcenis tury"8Thus the structure removed fromstructural theoryDemocraticstates would be so confident the peace-preserving of effects democracythatthey of would no longer fear that another state. the relativeout of relativegains. Under the conditions of international politics.1992). . Over the centuries.the national out of international politics. German historiansat the turn of the nineteenthcenturywondered whetherpeacefullyinclined states could be planted and expected to grow where dangers fromoutside pressed daily upon them. The guarantee of the state's proper external behavior would derive fromits admirable internalqualities.The ideal of nineteenth-century liberalswas the police state. THE CAUSES OF WAR To explain war is easier than to understandthe conditionsof peace. The ideal of the laissez-fairestate finds many counterparts among studentsof international politicswith theiryen to get the power out of power politics.war recurs." He sees no reason to associate anarchy with war. The American William Graham Sumner and many othersshared theirdoubts. For example.the securitydilemma of states) that have dominated practice . Francis Fukuyama finds it "perfectlypossible to imagine anarchic state systems that are nonetheless peaceful.and the structure of structural theory Proponents of the democraticpeace thesis write as though the spread of of democracy will negate the effects anarchy No causes of conflictand war will any longer be found at the structurallevel. the simple answer is "anything. p. Bruce Russett believes that.pp. If one asks what may cause war.is to abolish international politics.International Security 25:1 | 8 politicalformmay eliminatesome of the causes of war. would do it wrong.the sure way to abolish war.thatis.with enough democracies in the world. liberalshave shown a strongdesire to get the politicsout of politics. and Otto Hintze. FrancisFukuyama. 254-256.Grasping Democratic the Peace. .the dependence out of interdependence. the state that would confineits activitiesto catchingcriminalsand enforcing contracts.The democraticpeace thesiswill hold only if all of the causes of war lie inside of states. it cannot eliminateall of them. This is a conclusion thatKant would not sustain.
12 deemed the demoThus. "The KissingerDoctrine. W. Edward Hallett Carr. 1946). (New York:Harper and Row. "Lesion of a less powerfulcountry.withoutthe open tematically use of force. 13.The White House Years(Boston: Little. trans. 218. pp.. but its actions surely cast doubt on the democratic anotherdemocpeace thesis.Realismafter Cold War | 9 the Structural seventhpropositionof his "Principlesof the Political Order" avers thatestablishmentof the proper constitution internally requiresthe proper orderingof externalrelationsof states.000troopswithina week. JohnMueller. and in the State of Nature an attack under such circumstanceswould be In warrantable. 2d ed. Hastie (Edinburgh:T. AmericanPoliticalScience Association.Washington. chap. Quoted in AnthonyLewis.1" Some of the major democracies-Britain in the nineteenth centuryand the United States in the twentieth century-have been among the most powerful states of theireras.Brown." Kant writes.thereis no such thingas an unjust war.because its leaders thoughtthat his governmentwas taking a wrong turn. of p.As Henry Kissingerput it: "I don't see why we need to stand by of and watch a countrygo Communist due to the irresponsibility its own people.C. The Philosophy Law. 55ff.p. The first the duty of the state is to defend itself.JohnMueller the properlyspeculates that it is not democracythat causes peace but that other conditions cause both democracy and peace. the Americangovernment craticallyelected Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic too weak to bring The United States toppled his governmentby sending order to his country. democratically and effectively underminedby the United States.pp."New York Times. and outside of a juridical order none but the state itselfcan definethe actions required. Powerful statesoftengain theirends by peaceful means where weaker states eitherfail or have to resortto war. 17. 12. and see Henry Kissinger. and T. August-September1991.Twenty Years' Crisis:An Introduction theStudyofInternational to Relations. a 23. February27. D. Everyone has also known at least since David Hume thatwe have no reason to believe thatthe association of events provides a basis forinferring presence of a causal relation. 1995).So do the instanceswhen a democracydid fight 10. 35."Is War Still BecomingObsolete?" paper presentedat the annual meetingof the cf."13That is the way it is with democracies-their people may show bad judgment. 1887)."10 the state of nature. was sysunnecessary Salvador Allende.1979)."Wayward" democraciesare especiallytempting objectsof intervention by otherdemocracies thatwish to save them. 129-132."may be involved merelyin the conditionof a more powerfulneighborpriorto any action at all. troopswhose mere presencemade fighting war elected rulerof Chile. Immanuel Kant. . his Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections theRecentTransformationWorld on of Politics(New York:HarperCollins. 11. Clark. 1975. Every student of international politics is aware of the statisticaldata supportingthe democraticpeace thesis.Americanpolicy may have been wise in both cases.
as they were earlier.Rome. Venice. as has happened forexample in Pakistan and Jordan. Carthage. Quoted in Walter A. and the possibilityof war was at times seriously entertainedon both sides of the Atlantic. 15."Is War Still Becoming Obsolete?" p.France and Britainwere among the principal adversaries in the great power politics of the nineteenth century.JohnQuincy Adams. Alexander Hamilton asked whetherthe thirteen states of the Confederacymightlive peacefullywith one anotheras freelyconstituted republics.International Security 25:1 | 10 racy. In response to domestic interests. the democraticpluralismof Germanywas an underlying cause of the war. and Britain.He answered thattherehave been "almost as many popular as royal wars. Their becoming democracies did not change their behavior toward each other. state cannot be sure that today's friendwill not be a tomorrow's enemy Indeed. Holland.In 1914. .the structure international of politicswould remain anarchic. "America as Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective. Waltz. The structureof internationalpolitics is not transformed changes by internalto states. p. Once one begins to go down thatroad. CrusaderState (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. and Mueller.yes. No.14 do the instances in which democraticallyelected legislatureshave So clamored forwar. I am temptedto say thatthe democraticpeace thesisin the formin which A its proponentscast it is irrefutable. 1997). averred "that the governmentof a Republic with the leaders of a freepeople as neighborwas as capable of intriguing In as ing monarchs. In the absence of an externalauthority. Germanyfollowed 14. liberal democracy at war with another countryis unlikelyto call it a liberal democracy Democracies may live at peace with democracies. as they prepare for a war they may fear. Athens. but even if all states became democratic.however widespread the changes may be. 36. democracies have at times behaved as though today's democracyis today's enemyand a presentthreat them. McDougall. See. Indeed. thereis no place to stop. 24. democraticEngland and France foughtdemocraticGermany."'15 the latterhalf of the nineteenthcentury. PromisedLand. Vol.In Federalist to Paper number six. for example. One can of course say. 5. and doubts about the latter's democraticstandingmerelyillustratethe problem of definition. begin to look less liberal and will look less liberal still if they begin to fight one. 4 (December 1991)."PS: PoliticalScienceand Politics. in response to JamesMonroe's contrary claim. The problemis heightened because liberal democracies." He cited the many wars foughtby republican Sparta. 28 and n. the United States and Britainbecame more democratic. Kenneth N. but the Dominican Republic and Chile were not liberal democracies nor perceived as such by the United States.bitternessgrew between them.
and ForeignAffairs.March 11.Japan. WarrenChristopher. as Michael Doyle has noted." p.Thus former of claimed that"demoSecretary StateWarrenChristopher cratic nations rarely start wars or threatentheir neighbors. 337. "Kant. DEMOCRATIC WARS Democracies coexist with undemocraticstates. the State. in claimed thatthere"is no security any partof theworld where people cannot thinkof a government withouta king and never will be.16 Citizens of democraticstates tend to thinkof their countriesas good.we mightsay. Rusk quoted in Layne.theydo. p.-JapanRelationship:The Responsibility Change. urged the United States to take measures to enhance democracy around the world. And today if a war thata few have fearedwere foughtby the United States and Japan."18 Policies statesis a danger to others. 46.PresidentBill Clintonand his national security adviser.S. "Kant or Cant. . and thenadd as a word of essentialcautionthattheinternal excellenceofstates is a brittle basis of peace.p. but merelya one-party state. During World War I.Democracies promote war because they at times decide that the way to preserve peace is to defeatnondemocraticstates and make them democratic.Tokyo.FormerArmyChiefof Staff Americanmilitary General Gordon Sullivan." address to to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives. simply because they are democratic." replacingthe negative aim of containmentwith a positive one: "To promote democracy. 18.Structural Realismafter Cold War I 11 the policies bound to frighten both Britainand Russia.AnthonyLake. Citizens of democraticstates also tend to thinkof undemocraticstates as bad. Americanambassador to England." p.fight least theirshare at of wars against others.Secretary State Dean Rusk claimed that the "United States cannot be is secure untilthe totalinternational environment ideologicallysafe. What'can we conclude? Democracies rarelyfight democracies.Bureau of Public Affairs.American aside. Page quoted in Waltz. Man. 17. forexample.S. aside fromwhat theydo. favoreda new military "model. "The U. Liberal interventionismis again on the march. 1959)." During the Vietnam of War. one fears. Liberal Legacies. aside fromwhat they do. 16. Doyle.and War:A Theoretical Analysis(New York: Columbia University Press. theveryexistenceof undemocratic political and intellectualleaders have oftentaken this view."17 One might suggest that he tryhis propositionout in Central or South America.will be taken up by the with some enthusiasm.Although democracies seldom fight democracies. The task. Departmentof Officeof Public Communication). 1994 (U. State. Part 2.many Americans would say that Japan was not a democracy afterall. 121. WalterHines Page. 3. simplybecause theyare undemocratic.
p. Putnam's Sons. thought. for 22. "FromParadigm to Paradigm Shift: Vol. and governmentsare sometimes measures. 1945). For in task." New Republic."The Returnof the Bomb. 19. Tawney Crusades are frightening said: "Either war is a crusade.23 Democraticgovernments may respond to internalpolitical imperahave tives when theyshould be respondingto externalones. is war fervor people and theirrepresentatives at timeshard to contain. 21.Thus of Hans Morgenthau believed that "the democraticselection and responsibility as system morality an effective of government officials destroyedinternational of restraint. 2d Diplomatic Problems Our Time. August 3. as Kant believed.peace has to be contrived. p."Journal PoliticalScience. 27. That peace may prevail among democraticstates is a comforting The obverse of the proposition-that democracy may promote war against If undemocraticstates-is disturbing. Democratic leaders may respond to the fervorfor war that theircitizens sometimesdisplay. war among self-directed doing so is a difficult breakout."22 states will occasionally Since.1973).democracies no doubt fewer than others. "the strugglefor liberal government As becomes a strugglenot simplyforjustice but forsurvival. Turregano and RickyLynnWaddell. 20. . if the world can be made safe for democracy only by making it and to use thembecomes a duty. Peter Beinart. of 23. (New York:OxfordUniversity Press. or it is a crime.25:1 | 12 International Security Other voices urge us to enter and economic prosperity. alas."21 because crusaders go to war for righteous causes. 22 (1994).The thenall means are permitted democratic. (New York: Knopf.and all statesare at timesdeficient accomplishingit.Forceand Statecraft: ed. Morgenthau. 1. of The Militaryand Operations Other than War. 64. 15. But. the latterholds.p.P. Quoted in Clemson G.One mighthave hoped thatAmericans would have learned thattheyare not verygood at causing democracyabroad. 248. p. Make ThistheLast War(New York:G. we cannot even say for sure thatthe spread of democracywill bringa net decrease in the amount of war in the world."20 R." Having apparently solved the problem of justice at home."19 regional stability. 1990). p.but that is not good enough to sustain the democraticpeace thesis. any government. Hans J.or even tryto arouse it.5thed.even iftheywish to. which they define for themselvesand tryto impose on others. All governments their faults.his party would have lost the next election.H. into a "struggleto ensure thatpeople are governed well. 1998.Thus British constrained electoralcalculationsto deferpreventive by Prime MinisterStanley Baldwin said that if he had called in 1935 forBritish rearmamentagainst the German threat. Quoted in Michael Straight. Gordon Craig and Alexander George. Politics amongNations:TheStruggle Powerand Peace.
The effect heightenedwhen one democratic is statebecomes dominant.as the United States is now. with Kant. oftenbrings more harm than good.which it had previouslyaccepted. but as a matterof right. to work to upliftbenightedpeoples and bring the benefitsof liberty. while agreeingon the benefits to the world. are to at the whim of the stronger. The intervention.theyare found in both. overreaction. as well as outside of. In the first.Devotees of the democraticpeace thesis overlook it.no state can intervenein the internalarrangementsof another.America provided the hope. In both it cases. the interventionist spiritflourishes.one may notice that even forworthyends. have emphasized the difficulties and the dangers of actively seeking its propagation. Ever since liberals first it expressed theirviews. forexample. Inside of. the United States demonstrateda as disregarded decade ago by mining Nicaraguan waters and by invading Panama. Kant insists.Otherliberals. it flauntedthe law embodied in theCharter of the Organization of AmericanStates.The end is noble. When democracyis ascendant. If the world is now safe fordemocracy. use Kant's language. structural realisttheoryis wrong. that republics are by and large good states and that unbalanced power is a danger no matterwho wields it. Peace is the noblestcause of war. denied the jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt of Justice.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 13 the Witha republicestablishedin a strongstate.Kant and Richard thatdemocracycan bring Cobden. If the democraticpeace thesisis right.and weaker statesfear theirdoing so. to and Bill Clintonare all interventionist liberals. In 1795. Ifthe conditionsof peace are lacking. In the second.The causes of war lie not simply in states or in the state system.JohnStuartMill. theyhave been divided.Kant hoped therepublicanform would gradually take hold in the world. the United States blatantlyviolated internationallaw. overextention. peace depends on a precarious balance of forces. in a bipolar world. a conditionthat in the twentiethcenturyattended the winning of hot wars and cold ones.remarkably. Some have urged liberalstates justice. the circle of democratic states. one has to wonder whetherdemocracy is safe forthe world.thenthe country witha capability of creatingthem may be temptedto do so. in Peace is maintainedby a delicate balance of internaland externalrestraints. a unipolar world. and prosperity them. Two hundred years later. whetheror not by force. States having a surplus of power are temptedto use it.of which it was a principalsponsor. Woodrow Wilson. still does. .As a matterof fact. vice to which greatpowers easily succumb in a multipolarworld is inattention. Kant understood this. Giuseppe Mazzini. The laws of voluntaryfederations.One may believe.
Lawrence Keely. "The Third Leg Organizationsand MilitarizedDisputes. and David R. Powerin the World Economy (New York:Cambridge University 26. and Russett. among the forces that shape international politics.The Rise oftheTrading State:Commerce Coalitions theModernWorld of of (New York:Basic Books. No. pp. War before of The Civilization: MythofthePeaceful Press. and at timesSusan Strange. Stronglyaffirmative answers are given by JohnR. 1950-85. The trading state is replacing the political-military state."Economic Interdependence:A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?"Journal Peace Research.war became more frequent. 27. Richard Rosecrance. Democratic states may increasingly power of the profit devote themselves to the pursuit of peace and profits.and enlarged ed. a small push the ripplesthroughsocietyThe closerthe social bonds. The GreatIllusion.Huge factoriesdepended fortheiroutput on products exchanged 24.26 Interdependence some ways promotes peace by multiplyingcontacts among states and contributing to mutual understanding. thatwith increasesof trade and intermarriage . (New York:Putnam's." Vol. Oneal and Bruce Russett.p.It also multipliesthe occasions forconflicts that may promote resentment and even war. 4 (July1999). pp. One countryis then inclined to treatanothercountry's interests acts as events withinits own polityand to attemptto controlthem.interdependence adds the propulsive motive. 423-442.TheRetreat theState:The Diffusion Press. Katherine Barbieri. 36.27 Close interdependenceis a conditionin which one party can scarcely move without jostling others.shows Savage(New York:OxfordUniversity among tribes. Interdependence withinmodernstatesis much closerthanitis across states.and the power of the marketnow rivals or surpasses the power of the state. 33.4th rev.1996). Norman Angell." of the Kantian Tripod forPeace: International International Organization. and one cannot sensibly pursue an interestwithout taking others' into account. the more extreme effect becomes. in foughta long and bloody war.either way.International Security 25:1 | 14 The WeakEffects Interdependence of If not democracyalone.The Soviet economy but was planned so that its far-flung parts would be not just interdependent integrated. 52. and in 25. may not the spread of democracycombined with the of tightening nationalinterdependence fulfill prescription peace offered the for by nineteenth-century liberals and so oftenrepeated today?24 the supposTo of edly peacefulinclination democracies. 1913). Davis.Oneal.or so some believe.each other's secondbest customers. 1 (February 1996).25 BeforeWorldWar I. 441-467. Vol. yet Germany and Britain. 3 (Summer 1998)."Assessing the Journal PeaceResearch. That interdependencepromotes war as well as peace has been said often enough. No. 1996). 196.interdependenceis a weak one. 1986). Vol. No. Norman Angell believed thatwars would not be fought because they would not pay. What requires emphasis is that. of LiberalPeace withAlternative Specifications: Trade StillReduces Conflict.
in StevenL.: Winthrop. N. Waltz. goods and capital flowfreely where peace among countries appears to be reliably established. 30.28 The impulse to protect one's identity-cultural and political as well as economic-from encroachmentby others is strong.30Relatively independent states are in a stronger positionthanrelatively dependentones. 1996). interdependencebecomes so close that integration the proper word to describe it. shy away frombecoming excessively dependent on goods and resources that may be denied them in crisesand wars. and Suzanne Bergerand Ronald Dore. Conflict World in Politics (Cambridge. 29.mutual understanding. you have more ways of influencing and affecting my 28. war. States. ed. if they can affordto. With others.Despite the tightintegration the Soviet economy. Robert0.such as Japan'smanaged trade. The uneven effects interdependence. mutual resentment. of with some partiesto it gainingmore.like integration.Once externalpolitical pressure lessened.chap. neitherconflict international The zone in between is becomes national politics.. leading to protectionism.Externally. internal economic interestswere too weak to hold the countrytogether. 1989). (New York:Harper2d Collins. The PoliticalEconomy International of (Princeton. a gray one with the effects interdependencesometimes good. .to avoid excessive dependence on others. KennethN. Keohane and JosephS. Powerand Interdependence. 13.With zero interdependence. Nye. see especially Robert Relations Gilpin.J. and conflict. N.29 integration. It is more a dependent than an independent variable. of othersgaining less. 1971). utopias were set in isolation fromneighborsso thatpeople could construct theircollectivelifeuncontaminated contactwith by nor war is possible. Cf. of and culturalenrichment. From Plato onward. Interdependence. Interdependencebecomes inteis gration because internallythe expectationthat peace will prevail and order will be preservedis high.eds. Spiegel and Waltz.the state fell of apart. Internally. 10.Y: Cornell University Press. States take measures. chap.One must wonder whether economic interdependenceis more effectthan cause. depends on other conditions. NationalDiversity GlobalCapitalism (Ithaca. and sometimesbad. Yugoslavia provides another stark illustration. providing of the benefits divided labor.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 15 the with others. are obscured by the substitution RobertKeohane's and JosephNye's term"asymmetric interdependence"forrelationsof dependence and independence among states." to swimmingseparatelylooks attractive those able to do it.When it seems that "we will sinkor swim together.:PrincetonUniversity Press. IfI depend more on you than me you depend on me. On states managing interdependenceto avoid excessive dependence. eds. Mass. and 1987)..
5. power does sometimesslip away and sometimesmove sideways to markets.33 international In politics.One may doubt whethermarketsany more escape the controlof major states now than they 31.32 her recentbook.however.: MIT Press. not of very fungibleforweak states.withno centralauthority. p. Interdependencesuggests a condition of roughly equal dependence of parties on one another. Studies.and firms of the stronger statescontrolthe largestmarketshares anyway. the effects inequality are blunted. ibid.1986). The historyof American foreignpolicy since World War II is replete with examples of how the United States used its superioreconomic capabilityto promoteits political and securityinterests. 46. Waltz. 189.politicsis about inequalities.Much of international.. If weak statesmay have decisive advantages on some issues. power is not veryfungible. See Art. and (3) some power has "evaporated" with no one exercising it. Keohane emphasized thatpower is notveryfungible Keohane. But power. of . The International Corporation (Cambridge." of of Security Vol.throughinternational production.has shiftedthe balance of power away fromstatesand towardworld markets. "The Myth of National Interdependence. 32. In The Retreat theState. RobertJ. ed. Her argument is that "the progressive integrationof the world economy.. Waltz.Art analyzes the fungibility power in detail. and see KennethN."American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility Force.but by an of odd route." Charles P. Again. Kindleberger. for example."Reflection on Theoryof International Politics:A Response to My Critics. of as national. rich and poor nations are similarlyentangled in a thickweb of interdependence.. 4 (Summer 1996).Mass.I described interdependence an ideology used by Amerias cans to camouflagethe greatleverage the United States enjoys in international politics by making it seem that strongand weak. Keohane and Nye are on both sides of the issue. 33. "Theoryof WorldPolitics. 1970).When serious slippage occurs."in ibid. in ed.pp.International Security 25:1 | 16 fate than I have of affecting yours.Separatingone "issue area" fromothers and emphasizing that weak states have advantages in some of them reduces the sense of inequality Emphasizing the low fungibility power furthers of the effect. KennethN. See.31 In a 1970 essay.Susan Strangereached the same conclusion."Neorealism in and Its Critics (New York:Columbia University Press. No. 28.Retreat theState.is very fungibleforstrongones. (2) power has "shifted sideways fromstates to marketsand thus to non-stateauthoritiesderiving power fromtheirmarketshares". Omitting the word "dependence" blunts the inequalities that mark the relations of states and makes them all seem to be on the same footing.stronger statesstep in to reverseit."She advances threepropositions in support of her argument:(1) power has "shiftedupward fromweak states to strongerones" having global or regional reach. Strange.
1.Anyone. despite the misgivingsof Germany or Japan. the behavstate with the longestreach repeated Britain'sinterventionist strongest ior and.She observed near the beginningof her book thatthe "authority-the 'power over' global outcomes enjoyed by American society. as compared to when? Weak states have lost some of but strongstates have not theirinfluenceand controlover externalmatters. governmentsin Western Europe disposed of about a quarter of theirpeoples' income. The absence of empire hardly means. In the twentieth century. might thinkStrange's first propositionis the importantone.the strongeststate with the longest reach intervenedall over the globe and built history'smost extensiveempire. Alexis de Tocqueville observed during his visit to the United States in 1831 that "the Federal Governmentscarcelyever in interferes any but foreign affairs.trans.And the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is obliged to follow the American lead. 35.George Lawrence (New York: Harper Perennial. she answered immediately:"The fate of Mexico is decided in Washingtonmore than Wall Street.The patternsare hardlynew ones. however. Britons. Ibid. realist or not.Russians.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 17 the did in the nineteenth century earlier-perhaps less so since the competence or of states has increased at least in proportion to increases in the size and complicationsof markets. pp. .P."35AfterWorld War II. Mayer.Losing control.on an ever widening scale.Strange recognized reality. 25.The witheringaway of the power of the state.Democracy America. without building an empire.whetherinter34. in ed.one wonders. In the eighteenth centuries. it was puzzling to be told that states were losing controlover their externalaffairs.and therefore indirectly the United States by government-is stillsuperiorto thatof any othersocietyor any othergovernment.that the extent of America's influence and control over the actions of others is of lesser moment. At a time when Americans. and Chinese were decryingthe controlof the stateover theirlives. and nineteenth lost theirs. n. 192. since the end of the Cold War."Ifone wondered which government the she had in mind. Despite believing that power has moved from states to markets. she remarkedthat the "authorityof governments tends to over-rule caution ofmarkets.. The proportion now is more than half. Never since the Roman Empire has power been so concentratedin one state. J." And near the end. 446."34 The historyof the past two centurieshas been one of centralgovernments acquiring more and more power. p.1988). Alexis de Tocqueville. and the governments the statesin reality of direct society in America.
Instead. autarky.NATO not states until.however.and the strange case of NATO's (the NorthAtlanticTreaty Organization's) outlivingits purpose shows why realists believe thatinternational institutions shaped and limitedby the statesthat are Liberal institutionfound and sustain themand have littleindependenteffect. lateramended to suit its purposes. Under the Pax Britannica. the core of an alliance consisted of a small numberof states Theircontributions one another's security to were of of comparable capability. the interdependenceof states became unusually close. the word "alliance" took on a different meaning. EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS The nature and purposes of institutions change as structures vary In the old multipolarworld. which to many portended a peaceful and prosperous future. of alists paid scant attention organizationsdesigned to buttressthe security to fromrealisttheories. Because major allies were the closely interdependentmilitarily.contrary expectationsinferred to only survived the end of the Cold War but went on to add new membersand or to promiseto embracestillmore. The members of opposing alliances beforeWorldWarI were tightly knitbecause of theirmutual dependence.the recenthistory NATO illustrates subordination of to of international institutions national purposes. the United States or the Soviet Union. In the new bipolar world. One country. defectionof one would have made its partnersvulnerable to a competingalliance. The international WorldWar II and economicsystem. more of a wish and an illusion than a realityin most of is the world. Yet even as relations vary. states have to take care of themselvesas best they can in an anarchic environment. Internationally. The Limited Role ofInternational Institutions One of the chargeshurled at realisttheoryis thatit depreciatesthe importance of institutions. Not only are the effects close interdependbut so also is its durability ence problematic. may last The characterof internationalpolitics changes as national interdependence tightensor loosens. a prolonged period of war. and more war followed.but twenty-five years is a slight base on which to of ground optimisticconclusions.but thenagain it may not. the clouds lifteda little. The charge is justified. crucialimportancebecause theywere of similarsize. provided most of the .Far frominvalidatingrealisttheory casting the doubt on it. constructed under Americanauspices after longer.International Security 25:1 | 18 nally or externally. In its last quarter. the twentieth centuryfor the most part was an unhappy one.
Thus the end of the Cold War quickly changed the behavior of allied countries. Glenn H. withoutwaiting forany such plans.In early Julyof 1990. 21. Snyder.AlliancePolitics(Ithaca. and the Balance of World Power. guarantee against whom? Functions vary as structures change. 39.Americansspoke with alarm about the threatof monolithiccommunism arising fromthe combined strength the of Soviet Union and China.Structural Realismafter Cold War I 19 the securityforits bloc.36 Glenn Snyderhas remarkedthat"alliances have no meaning apart fromthe I adversarythreatto which theyare a response. "The EmergingStructureof International Politics. 257 (London: International Institute StrategicStudies. Similarly."International Security. See Kenneth N.especially big ones with strongtraditions. 80-81. the expectationhas been borne out. Kenneth N. Withits old purpose dead. American officialsdid not proclaim that with China's defection.but once created.38In a basic sense. 1997). yet the bloc's disintegration caused scarcelya ripple.theymay take on somethingof a lifeof theirown. No.becoming less dependent on the wills of theirsponsors and members. 38. The withdrawalof France fromNATO's command structure and the defectionof China fromthe Soviet bloc failed even to tilt the centralbalance. JohnRoper. and the individual and collectivebehavior of its members altered accordingly. 75-76. American officialsdid not proclaim that defense spending had to be increased for that reason. how does one explain NATO's survival and are expansion? Institutions hard to createand set in motion. when France stopped playing its part in NATO's military plans. Having won the war 36.pp. No. pp. Winter1990/91). N. Vol.: Cornell University Press. have long lives.Y. NATO supposedly validates these thoughts. NATO announced that the alliance would "elaborate new force plans consistentwith the revolutionarychanges in Europe. Vol. 18. Properlyspeaking. Waltz. 192. Early in the Cold War. "InternationalStructure. they may begin to act with a measure of autonomy. 2 (Fall 1993). Even the pretense unilaterally of continuingto act as an alliance in settingmilitary policy disappeared."Adephi Paper No.America's defensebudget could safelybe reduced by 20 or 10 percentor even be reduced at all."39By the end of July. the major European members of NATO announced large reductionsin theirforcelevels. 2 (1967). as does the behavior of units. institutionalists claim. p." Journal International of Affairs. for . NATO and the WTO (Warsaw TreatyOrganization) were treatiesof guarantee ratherthan old-stylemilitary alliances."Shaping Strategy withoutthe Threat. 37. National Force."37 expected NATO to dwindle at the Cold War's end and ultimatelyto disappear. Waltz. The March of Dimes is an example sometimes cited. 219. p. NATO is no longer even a treaty guarantee of because one cannot answer the question. Organizations.
Nevertheless.40Once created. the ameliorationof birth as defects. and the 41.but states determineits fate.it cast about fora new malady to cure or contain.U. in and Social Classes (New York:Meridian Books. createan organization and it will findsomethingto do." Security Studies. p." Schumpeter. ConferenceReport (The Hague: NetherlandsAtlanticCommission. 1955). 14."42The survival and expansion of NATO tell us much about American power and influenceand little about as institutions multilateral entities. senior deputy to the undersecretary of state for European affairs. is interpreted institutionalists evidence by strongly arguing forthe autonomy and vitalityof institutions.Even thoughthe most appealing ones-cancer.Realists. 40.A deeply entrenched international bureaucracycan help to sustain the organization." he wrote. "The Alliance.it did finda worthycause to pursue.1994)." the "The Sociology of Imperialism. Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf. and the old purpose of as the organizationhas disappeared.The abilityof the United States to extend instituthe life of a moribund institution nicely illustrateshow international tions are createdand maintainedby stronger statesto serve theirperceived or misperceivedinterests." NATO on Track the 21st Century. JosephA. multiple sclerosis.and cysticfibrosis-were already taken.put it this way: "created zvarsthatrequired the by Imperialism machine nowcreated warsit required. How can one make such a claim forNATO? The question of purpose may not be a veryimportant one. 20. it. 1 (Autumn 1993). writingof armies. A big organizationis managed by large numbersof bureaucratswho develop a in stronginterest its perpetuation."NATO's Second Half Century-Tasks foran Alliance.Liberal institutionalists take NATO's seeming vigor as confirmation the importanceof internaof tional institutions and as evidence of theirresilience.pursuing an end consonant with its originalpurpose. p. Neoliberal Institutionalism. The institutionalist interpretation misses the point.41 The durabilityof NATO even as the structure international of politics has changed. diseases of the heart and lungs.and the more so once it has become well established. NATO is firstof all a treaty made by states. Futureof NATO.One can fairly claim thatthe March of Dimes enjoys continuity an organization. neatly described NATO's new role. 1993 NATO headquarterswas manned by 2. "Neorealism. its mission was accomplished.noticingthatas an alliance NATO has lost its major function."provides a vehicle forthe applicationof Americanpower and vision to the securityorder in Europe. Schumpeter. No.see it mainly as a means of polimaintainingand lengthening America's grip on the foreignand military cies of European states. 3. 25 (emphasis in original).Accordingto GuntherHellmann and Reinmost of hard Wolf. in whom presumablywanted to keep theirjobs. Vol. . JohnKornblum. p.640 officials. for 42.S.JohnKornblum.an organizationbecomes hard to get rid of.International Security 25:1 | 20 against polio.
formedin 1954. 1 (Summer 1995). p.41 Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin. and the Clinton administration continued to see.In 1991. especially in the securityrealm. 170. How are we "to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding internationalinstitutionsif such institutionsare lacking in sigIf nificance?"45 the answer were not already obvious. decided to strengthen that institution as both NATO's European pillar and the defense component of the European Union. No. Alan S.S. Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew'sletterto the governments European memof bers of NATO warned against Europe's formulating independentpositions on defense. 45. and the inabilityof the WesternEuropean Union in the more than four decades of its existence to find a significant role independent of the United States. Realism reveals what liberal institutionalist institutions serve primarilyna"theory"obscures: namely.p.that international tional ratherthan international interests. . and Mike Winnerstig. Robert0."43 The European pillar was to be containedwithinNATO. U. France and Germany had thought that a European security and defense identitymight be developed within the EU and that the Western European Union. Vol.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 21 the The Bush administration saw. 23.Washington. . ask: of replyingto JohnMearsheimer's criticism liberal institutionalism. President that "we are pleased that our Allies George Bush could say with satisfaction in the WesternEuropean Union . . Milward. the expansion of NATO would make it so: to serve what powerfulstatesbelieve to be theirinterests. "Rethinking Alliance Dynamics. and its policies were to be made in Washington. Sheetz. The Bush administration quickly squelched these ideas. himself effective an foreign policy leader. Mark S."The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.foreclosing membershipwould have handed anotherissue to the Republican Partyin the 43. Keohane and Lisa L. Cf. 20. D. No. Security. 44. despite America's support of it."International Vol.Withthe nationalheroes Lech Walesa NATO and Vaclav Havel clamoringfortheircountries'inclusion. Martin.." paper presentedat the annual meetingof the International Studies Association. Weaker stateshave troublefashioninginstitutions to serve theirown ends in theirown ways. 40.C. 22. could be revived as the instrument its for realization. The day after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in December of 1991. Think of the defeat of the European Defense Community in 1954. 1997. 3 (Winter1997/98). 1992).at p. Withthe administration's Clintonneeded to show Bosnian policy in trouble. "Correspondence:Debating the Unipolar Moment. NATO as the instrument for maintainingAmerica's domination of the foreignand military policies of European states. March 18-22. The European RescueoftheNation-State (Berkeley:University California of Press."International Security.
No. 8. Vol. The reasons for opposing It expansion are strong.International Security 25:1 | 22 congressional elections of 1994. 1997. No. Brown. Decision to but EnlargeNATO (Washington. The American and arms industry. 1996). 94-95.RussiaFaces NATO Expansion: Bearing or Arms?(Lanham.: Rowman Gifts Bearing and Littlefield.by expanding. March 1998). expectingto capture its usual large share of a new market. NATO. Vol. NATO brazenly broke WTO memberswould not be promises it made in 1990 and 1991 thatformer allowed to join NATO. and Jeff Gerthand Tim Weiner. William D." Survival." Survival. Goldgeier.1999). . 2000). JamesM. Vol. 47. And see his Not Whether When:The U.NATO held naval exerciseswithUkrainein theBlack Sea."NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision. New members of NATO will be required to improve theirmilitary infrastructure to buy modernweapons. It weakens those Russians most inclined toward liberal democracy and a marketeconomy It strengthens Russians of the opposite inclination. led by America. pp. June29."WelfareforWeapons Dealers 1998: The Hidden Costs of NATO Expansion" (New York: New School forSocial Research. TheDawn ofPeace in Europe(New York:Twentieth CenturyFund Press.C. scarcelyconsidered the plight of its defeated adversary Throughoutmodern history. No.and can findno logical stoppingplace west of Russia. With good reason. 21. p. Cleveland.In Juneof 1998. alienatesthose leftout. I. Russia has been rebuffedby the West. 175-201. the more Russia is forcedto look to the east ratherthan to the west. has lobbied heavily in favorof NATO's expansion. theyalso heightenits concernover destabilizingevents near their 46.It reduces hope for further large reductionsof nuclear weaponry."The Flawed Logic of Expansion. D.: Brookings. pp. Not only do new membersrequireNATO's protection. with more joint exercisesto come. and Detroit. The expansion of NATO extends its military interests. 34-52.47 The reasons for expanding NATO are weak.46 Votes and dollars are the lifeblood of American politics.Black. Md.citieswith significant numbers of East European voters.Zbigniew Brzezinskiwent to Kiev with the message thatUkraine should prepare itselfto join NATO by the year 2010." New York Times. 48. pp.S. 1 (Spring 1995). Many Russians believe that. 5-35. 1 (Spring 1996).L." Washington Quarterly.48 draws new lines of divisionin Europe. 37. Philip Zelikow. Hartung.and increases its burdens. enlarges its responsibilities. isolated and at times surrounded.World Policy Institute. J. See Michael E. 38. 49.49 The farther NATO intrudesinto the Soviet Union's old arena. "The Masque of Institutions. "Arms Makers See Bonanza in Selling NATO Expansion. To tout NATO's eastward march. In 1997. 1 (Winter1998).It pushes Russia toward China instead of drawing Russia toward Europe and America. and announced plans to use a military testingground in westernUkraine. Michael Mandelbaum. Russians fear that NATO will not only admit additional old membersof the WTO but also former republics of theSoviet Union. President Clintongave major speeches in Milwaukee.
the motivationsof the artificersof expansion-President Clinton.50Yet investing in defense slows economic growth.and mountingtroublesmay bringexpansion to a halt. a thoughtborne out by the empires of Republican Rome. The momentum of expansion has oftenbeen hard to break. p.yetifEuropean statesdo achieve their this goals of creatinga 60.U. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake.S. In any event. Will it be different time?Perhaps. Balkan operationsin of the air and even more so on the ground exacerbate differences interest of among NATO membersand strainthe alliance.One may wonder. Europe's reaction to to America's Balkan operations duplicates its determination remedydeficiencies revealed in 1991 during the Gulf War.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 23 the borders. Americans believe they must lead the way because the credibility NATO is at stake. and others-were to nurture democracy in young. and of Liberal Britain. however. Aware of their weaknesses. the tensionbetween a NATO controlledby the United States and a NATO allowing for independent European action will again be bothersome.By common calculation. Thus Balkan eruptions become a NATO and not just a European concern. The task of building democracy is not a militaryone. Expansion buys trouble. True. Pressing in the opposite directionis the momentum of American expansion. of Czarist Russia..the prospectof militarily bogging down in the Balkans teststhe alliance and may indefinitely delay its furtherexpansion.why this should be an American rather than a European task and why a militaryrather than a political-economic organizationshould be seen as the appropriatemeans for carryingit out. Europeans express determination modernize theirforcesand to to develop their ability to deploy them independently. 72. long-suffering countries. AssistantSecretary Defense Franklin D.000 strongrapid reactionforceand enlargingthe role of the WEU. One is oftenremindedthatthe United States is not just the dominantpower in the world but that it is a liberaldominant power. In 1997. . fragile. European conditions and Russian opposition work against the eastward extension of NATO. Ibid.defensespendingstimulateseconomicgrowth 50. Kramer told the Czech defense ministrythat it was spending too little on defense.In the absence of European initiative. The militarysecurityof new NATO members is not in jeopardy. European membersmarvel at the surveillance and communicationscapabilities of the United States and stand in awe of the modern militaryforcesat its command. their political of developmentand economic well-beingare.a determination thatproduced few results.
Structures shape and shove. 46.an instrument the pursuit of national interest othermeans.it turnsout."p. Twenty 107: "international governmentis. withlittlefearof adverse affects the shortrun. The error of realist predictionsthatthe end of the Cold War would mean the end of NATO arose not froma failureof realisttheoryto comprehend international politics. "make a significant realities."54 Yes! Liberal institutionalism. Thus Susan Strange. Indeed. economic not military securityis the problem and enteringa military alliance compounds it. 55."The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.. "is no longer a as to been swallowed up by it."p. theyinterpret as laws. as it never was an alternativeto realism. in ways thatsuit them. On realistshave noticed that whetherinstitutions have strongor weak effects depends on what states intend. Institutionalist theory."pp. country'sinternalimpulses a prevail. 42."55 clear alternative realism.Thze of Years' Crisis. Cf.p. The winner of the Cold War and the sole remaininggreat power has behaved as unchecked powers have usually done. 54. p.observes that "internationalorganization is above all a tool of national government.Strongstates use institutions.International Security 25:1 | 24 about half as much as directinvestmentin the economy. Strange. whether fueled by liberal or by other urges. "A . Mearsheimer. Having claimed that his realism is "not well specified.Retreat theState. Realist Reply.p.but of froman underestimation America's folly The survival and expansion of NATO illustratenot the defectsbut the limitations structural of explanations.in theireffort refuteMearsheimer's to Interestingly. Mearsheimersays. Keohane and Martin. in pondering the state's retreat. Keohane has 51."52 for by Keohane and Martin. in fact. and see pp." 53."they note that "institutional both as independent and dependent varitheoryconceptualizes institutions Instiables. 46. in Do liberal institutionalists provide betterleverage for explaining NATO's survival and expansion? Accordingto Keohane and Martin.In Eastern Europe.but has. xiv."53Dependent on what?-on "the realitiesof power and interest. governmentby that state which supplies the power necessaryforthe purpose of governing. In the absence of counterweights. 85.realistsinsist"that institutions have only marginaleffects. Ibid."The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.A state the that is strongerthan any other can decide for itselfwhetherto conformits policies to structural pressuresand whetherto avail itselfof the opportunities thatstructural change offers. Keohane and Martin. in trenchantcriticismof institutional theory. in effect. Carr. 192-193. Using the example of NATO to reflect the relevance of realism afterthe on Cold War leads to some importantconclusions." in difference conjunctionwith power tutions."51 the contrary. effectagree with him. 42. 52. theydo not determine actionsof states.
Powerand Interdependence." p.: Westview. 58. NATO now within. European states will lapse into a "securitycomAs petition"among themselves.. in Keohane.Robert Art has argued forcefully American troops in Europe."57 part. "Why WesternEurope Needs the United States and NATO. I suppose. The TripleAlliance and the Triple Entente were quite durable.has disappeared. The point is worthpondering.Colo. 1 (Spring 1996). Institutional theory attributes institutions to causal effects thatmostlyoriginate withinstates.but I need to say here only thatit 56. Keohane."56The institutional approach startswith structural theory. there hardly being any. p. the dampening of intra-alliance tension is the main task left. is an anomaly. and it is a task not forthe alliance but forits leader. applies it to the origins and operations of institutions." 57. Neorealism and Its Critics. Art. Previous alliances lacked institutions because in the absence of a hegemonic leader. preservingNATO. NATO lasted as a militaryalliance as long as the Soviet Union appeared to be a directthreatto its members. where he describes his approach as a "modified p. and both their durabilityand ." PoliticalScience Quarterly. Keohane.which Keohane and Nye sought "to broaden. In his view. International and Inistitutions StatePozver:Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder. 193.continuesto be performed the United by States even though the primarytask. "Theoryof World Politics. 15. are required in order to preventa securitycompetitionthat would promote conflict and impairthe institutions the European Union. In strength may depend in parton theirinstitutional characteristics. structural researchprogram. intra-alliance management.Structural Realismafter Cold War 125 the stressed. They lasted not because of alliance institutions. NATO's survival also exposes an interesting aspect of balance-of-power that without NATO and without theory.has as its core structural realism. but because the core members of each alliance looked outward and saw a pressing threatto theirsecurityPrevious alliances did not lack institutions because states had failed to figureout how to constructbureaucracies.1989). of. cf. Alliances illustratethe weaknesses of institutionalism with special clarity. and maintainingAmerica's leading role in it. Keohane and Nye. Robert0. 111.No. The secondarytask of an alliance. balancing continued within as well as across alliances. this is a realistexpectation. . 251.58 he emphasizes. defense against an externalenemy.. RobertJ. Keohane has remarked that "alliances are institutions. The case of NATO nicely illustratesthis shortcoming.It survives and expands now not because of its institutions mainlybecause the United Stateswants but it to. and unsurprisingly ends with realistconclusions. but one must wonder in how large a part. Vol.
The Bretton individual statesand the conduct of international affairs.S. We can agree on U.As in Europe. "Global Communicationsand National Power: Lifeon theParetoFrontier. 62. Nixon shocks the of 1971 were administered. "is better of to explained by the distribution national power capabilitiesthan by efforts solve problemsof marketfailure"61-or.1993). leadership. 234. eds."in Helga Haftendornand ChristianTuschhoff. StephenD. "The nature of institutional as arrangements. Krasner. Eitherinternational remainclose to the and institutions conventions. Keohane believes that "avoiding military conflict Europe afterthe Cold in War depends greatlyon whetherthe next decade is characterizedby a continuous patternof institutionalized If cooperation. of . p. 36."60 one accepts the conclusion.: Westview.Krasnerfound thatin all of the instances"it was the value of strong states that dictated rules that were applied in a 59. of underlyingdistribution national capabilities or they court failure. p. As a high-levelEuropean diplomat put it.Structural The Third Worldagainst Global Liberalism (Berkeley: Conflict: University California. Krasner.International institutions created by the more are survive in theiroriginal formas long as powerfulstates.and the institutions of or theyserve the major interests theircreators.I would add. A European power brokeris a hegemonic power. but not on one of our own. Keohane." World Politics.62 Citing examples fromthe past 350 years. p. "it is not acceptable that the lead nation be European. 43. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND NATIONAL AIMS What is trueof NATO holds forinternational institutions generallyThe effects thatinternational institutions may have on national decisions are but one step removed fromthe capabilities and intentions the major state or states that of Woods systemstrongly affected gave thembirthand sustainthem. 61.1985).. by anythingelse.International Security 25:1 | 26 further illustratesthe dependence of internationalinstitutionson national decisions. are thoughtto do so. Vol. Quoted in ibid. Americaand Europein an Era of Change(Boulder.. the question remains: What or who sustains the "pattern of institutionalized cooperation"?Realists know the answer.Colo. "The Diplomacy of Structural Change: MultilateralInstitutions Strategies. No. 263 and passim. treaties. and betterthe hegemonic power should be at a distance than next door. Stephen D. a hegemonic power may suppress it. p." Stephen Krasner put it. 1 (April 1991). Robert0. and State 60. when the United But States found that the systemno longer served its interests."59Acceptingthe leadership of a hegemonicpower preventsa balance of power fromemergingin Europe. 53.Balancingamong statesis not inevitable.
"The Stabilityof a Unipolar World. however.The latteris a task for theories about how national governmentsrespond to pressures on them and take advantage of opportunitiesthat may be present. the internationalpolitical system became unipolar. Quoted in RobertTucker. 5. 1 (Spring 1994).66 in sayingwhen it will happen. The bottomline was yes. it will be a long time Wohlforth argues thatthoughrestoration Of necessity. 1985). 65. 64." ReviewofInternational PoliticalEconomy.. 3 (Spring 1996).65 key propositionderived fromrealisttheoryis that international politics reflects distribution national capabilities. 3-28.A limitationof the theory. Krasner. In the light of structural theory. 63. . realisttheoryis betterat saying what will happen than coming. This is so fortwo main reasons. p."International Vol. 16. Upon the demise of the Soviet Union. that some rightsare more fundamentalthan the rightof nations to nonintervention. a universallyrecognized international institution. Vol. unipolarityappears as the least durable of international configurations. "International PoliticalEconomy:Abiding Discord. 5. William C.one may wonder why A realismis in bad repute.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 27 the discriminating fashion only to the weak. Robert Gilpin explains the oddity. Intervention theReaganDoctrine and (New York:Council on Religious and International Affairs. 1 (Summer 1999). Reagan administration "debated whetherwe had the right to dictatethe formof anothercountry'sgovernment. p."64 Most international law is obeyed most of the time. according to a the senior official. 5-41. No. William will take place." Security Studies.See Gilpin. "No One Leaves a Political Realist. Vol. Theorycannotsay when "tomorrow"will come on because international political theorydeals with the pressuresof structure states and not with how states will respond to the pressures. 1. Wohlforth. pp."63 The sovereigntyof nations.but strongstatesbend or break laws when theychoose to. StephenD. No. 66. One does.observe balancing tendenciesalready takingplace.a propothe of sitiondaily borne out. pp. hardlystands in the way of a strongnation that decides to intervenein a weak one. Anotherkey propositionis thatthe balancing of power by some states against others recurs. No. Security. is that it cannot say when. limitation common to social science theories. Realist theory predicts that balances a disrupted will one day be restored.. 24.. Balancing Power:Not Todaybut Tomorrow Withso many of the expectationsthatrealisttheorygives rise to confirmed by what happened at and afterthe end of the Cold War. We don't have the rightto subverta democracybut we do have the rightagainst an undemocraticone. Thus.
68. is a potential danger to others.1800-1971. some states tryto increase theirown strength theyally with or othersto bringthe international distribution power into balance.reached the same conclusion thatRobertWesson had reachedearlier:"Imperial decay is . beginningin the 1950s.thus weakening themselves in the long run.of Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler of Germany. Is unbalanced power less of a danger in international than in national politics?Throughoutthe Cold War.restraint.In international politics. thinkof itselfas actingforthe sake of peace. These terms. can PoliticalScienceReviezv.which may conflict with the preferences and interestsof others.weaker states will worry about its future behavior.and the United States does. illustrate point."Persistenceand Change in PoliticalSystems. Paul Kennedy. justice.and well-beingin the world.however.Now the United States is alone in the world.America's foundingfathers warned againsttheperilsofpower in the absence of checks and balances.Even so."Ameri- ImperialOrder (Berkeley: Universityof California Press. so international politicsabhors unbalanced power.what the United States and the Soviet Union did.overwhelmingpower repels and leads others to tryto balance against it."67 other reason for the The shortduration of unipolarityis that even if a dominantpower behaves with moderation. The reacof tions of other states to the drive fordominance of Charles V. The powerfulstatemay. For almost half a century. and how theyinteracted. whoever wields it. primarily resultof themisuse ofpower a which follows inevitablyfromits concentration. Faced withunbalanced power.. unpaginated preface. of Louis XIV and Napoleon I of France. With benign intent. Vol. and forbearance.constrained each other. 67. however.International Security 25:1 | 28 One is that dominant powers take on too many tasks beyond their own borders. Hapsburg ruler of Spain.Other countriescould relyon the United States for protectionbecause protectingthem seemed to serve American security interests. Wesson. WesternEuropean countriesand.. were dominant factorsin international politics. the THE BEHAVIOR OF DOMINANT POWERS Will the preponderantpower of the United States elicit similar reactions? Unbalanced power. 4 (December 1974). As nature abhors a vacuum. No. fromRobertG. Cf. 1987). 1504. Quoted in Ted RobertGurr.The Rise and Fall ofGreatPowers:Economic Changeand Military from 1500 to 2000 Conflict (New York:Random House. the constancy of the Soviet threatproduced a constancyof Americanpolicy. The . Ted Robert Gurr.the United States has behaved and. 1967). until its power is broughtinto balance.are definedto the likingof the powerful.The two countries. p. will continue to behave in ways thatsometimesfrighten others.after examining336 polities.
Aside fromspecificthreatsit may pose.but with power so sharplyskewed. Japan developed similarworries. I'm down to Castro and Kim I1 Sung. the United States no longer faces a major threatto its securityAs General Colin Powell said when he was "I'm runningout of demons. absence of threat permits policy to become are capricious. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union.Realismafter Cold War | 29 the Structural of beginningin the 1970s.the United States failed to respond until Senator Robert presidential Dole moved to make Bosnia's peril an issue in the forthcoming and it acted not for the sake of its own securitybut to maintain election. When Yugoslavia's collapse was followed by genocidal war in successor states. American behavior over the past in centuryin Central America provides little evidence of self-restraint the the United absence of countervailingpower. American policy was generated not by external security interests.WesternEuropean American nuclear deterrent. "Cover Story:Communism's Collapse Poses a Challenge to America's Military. 1991.a country'spolicy becomes sporadic and self-willed.The in United States has a long historyof intervening weak states. unbalanced power leaves weaker states feelinguneasy and gives themreason to strengthen theirpositions."68Constancy of threat produces constancy of policy.Japanhad increasingdoubts about the reliability the As increased. p.othercountriesmay well wish forways to fend offits benign ministrations. News and World Report. To understand why some states want to bring power into a semblance of balance is easy. One example is enough to show this. October 14. Contemplatingthe historyof States and measuringits capabilities.but by internal political pressure and national ambition. and later its when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and strengthened forcesin the Far East. its leadership position in Europe."U. Concentratedpower invites distrustbecause it is so easily misused. Soviet strength countriesbegan to wonder whetherthe United States could be counted on to use its deterrent theirbehalf. what country group of countrieshas the materialcapabilityand thepolitical or will to bringthe "unipolar moment"to an end? 68.thus riskingits own cities.oftenwith the intentionof bringingdemocracy to them. A dominant power acts internationally only when the spirit moves it.S. When few if any vital interests endangered. . The absence of serious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreignpolicy choices. I'm running chairmanof the Joint Chiefsof Staff: out of enemies. When President on JimmyCarter moved to reduce American troops in South Korea. 28.
Vol. although he ends his articlewith the thoughtthat "eventually. and thus restoringa balance. 79. conditionsdeterminethat. 2 (June1993). but a forbearancethat will give other countriesat long last the chance to deal with theirown problems and make theirown mistakes..The international equilibriumis broken. I ended a 1993 article this way: "One may hope that America's internal preoccupations will produce not an isolationist policy. the materialsforconstructing new balance were readily a at hand. Clearly somethinghas changed.Those who referto the National and international unipolar moment are right."The EmergingStructure International Studies? Realist Myths and "The Neoidealist Moment in International 71. 69. in historicalperspectives. Vol. In the aftermath of earliergreatwars. Some believe that the United States is so nice that. say thata new balance of power will formbut not to say how long it will take.the new balance is emerging it slowly.But I would not bet on it. are the European Union or Germanyleading a coalition. Japan. realists will be vindicated. 37."International analysis of America's role.25:1 | 30 International Security BALANCING POWER IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD The expectationthatfollowingvictoryin a greatwar a new balance of power will formis firmly grounded in both historyand theory The last fourgrand coalitions (two against Napoleon and one in each of the world wars of the twentiethcentury)collapsed once victorywas achieved. p. See Josef Security. Victoriesin major wars leave the balance of power badly skewed."p.believes this to be so. The winningside emerges as leads one a dominantcoalition. 4 (Spring 1997). Strategy afterBipolarity. 21.Jr.theory to expect its restoration. Russia." Politics.71Seldom do signs of vindication appear so promptly."69Others believe that the leaders of states have In learned that playing the game of power politics is costlyand unnecessary. fact. 4 (Spring 1995). Realities. among others."'Bismarck' or 'Britain'?Toward an AmericanGrand Joffe's interesting International Secuirity. StudiesQuarterly."International the New International .China.othersdo not feelthe fear thatwould spur them to action. 149. which has become impossible. Charles Kegley has said. will come in the blink of an eye. No. Michael Mastanduno. sensibly."70I should think that few would do so now. Waltz. Charles W.that if the world becomes multipolar once again. No.despite the dangers of unbalanced power.S.the explanation for sluggish balancing is a simple one. of 70. 19. 88. Grand Vol. Strategyafterthe Cold War. Previous wars lefta sufficient number of great powers standing to Theory enables one to permita new balance to be rathereasily constructed. No. "Preservingthe Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U. The candidates for becoming the next great powers. power will check power. The countriesoftheEuropean Union have and in a moredistantfuture.In our perspective. Kegley. Michael Mastanduno. p.
Vol. ." President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister as Lionel Jospincall for a strengthening such multilateralinstitutions the of InternationalMonetary Fund and the United Nations. European leaders expressdiscontent chafeat America's makingmost of the important decisions. and military capabilities-but lacks theorganizationalabilityand the collectivewill to use them. as Foreign MinisterHubert V6drinerecentlyput it.If French and 72.they will have to develop the unity in foreignand militaryaffairsthat they are achieving in economic matters.Now as withEurope's secondaryposition. resources. 73.however.makingbold or riskyaction impossible.it has even less hope of doing so now.73 German and Britishleaders now more oftenexpress similar discontent. Craig R. a pillar thatis never built. not just a single one. As Jacques Delors said when he was presidentof the European Commission: "It will be forthe European Council. "NATO at 50: WithNations at Odds.p. signs of fundayet mental change in mattersof foreignand militarypolicy are faint.and show a desire to directtheirown destiny. 106.Americanshave talked of a European pillar forthe alliance. to agree on the essential interests theyshare and which theywill agree to defendand promotetogether. . 1 (March/April 1991). Only when the United States decides on a policy have European countriesbeen able to follow it.WesternEurope was unable to make its own foreign and military policies when its was an organizationof six or nine states living in fear of the Soviet Union. . On questions of foreign and military policy. Jacques Delors.the European Union can act only with the consentof its members. will not be able to claim a louder voice in alliance affairsunless it builds a platformfor giving it expression."Survival. No. although how this would diminish America's influence is not explained. Is It a Misalliance?" New YorkTimes. 1999. earlier. consistingof heads of state and government. February15. however."72 Policies thatmustbe arrived at by consensus can be carriedout only when theyare fairly inconsequential. . The achievementof a large measure of economic integration withouta corresponding political unity is an accomplishmentwithout historical precedent. p. More to the point. 33. Frenchleaders oftenvent theirfrustration pine and for a world. "European Integrationand Security. Al. V6drinecomplains thatsince PresidentJohnKennedy. "of several poles.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 31 the been remarkably successful in integratingtheir national economies.If Europeans ever mean to write a tune to go with their libretto. Whitney. Withless pressure and more members. Inaction as Yugoslavia sank into chaos and war signaled thatEurope will not act to stop wars even among near neighbors.Europe.technology. Europe may not remain in its supine position forever. The European Union has all the tools-population.
its nuclear forcesto a level of paritywith the United Statesifit has easily raise missiles (DF-5s) not already done so. It does not require quantitativeor qualitative equality of forces.the is all-but-inevitable movementfromunipolarityto multipolarity takingplace not in Europe but in Asia.but would the United States risk the destructionof. becomingimpatient. Al.the United States and the world will begin to European military treatEurope as a major force. a coalition. immobile missiles are vulnerable.74China will emerge as a greatpower even withouttrying China can long as it remains politicallyunited and competent. 3 (September1990).But where is the incremental to a European foreignand militarypolicy to be found? European leaders have not been able to findit or even have triedvery hard to do so.75China has fiveto seven intercontinental able to hit almost any American targetand a dozen or more missiles able to reach the west coast of the United States (DF-4s). Vol. In the absence politicsforas far of radical change.25:1 | 32 International Security Britishleaders decided to merge theirnuclear forcesto formthe nucleus of a organization. INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE AND NATIONAL RESPONSES internationalpolitics centered on Europe. Nuclear parity is reached when countries have second-strikeforces. given its presentstage of have surmised.In the meantime. world wars ended Europe's dominance. "Will Beijing's Nuclear Arsenal Stay Small or Will It Times. Even during Asia's near economic collapse of the 1990s.Europe will count forlittlein international decides to lead ahead as the eye can see. The European Economic Communitywas formedin 1957 and has grown route to incrementally its presentproportions. unless Germany. China's growthrate remained approximatelyin that range." American PoliticalScienceReviezv. March 15.someday emerge as a greatpower is a matterforspeculation. economic development. p." 75.can be sustained at 7 to 9 percentforanotherdecade or more. of 74. David E. "The EmergingStructure International Politics. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities.See Waltz. Mushroom?" New York . No.Strategically. 84. The followingfour pages are adapted fromWaltz.Seattle. Sanger and Erik Eckholm. say. 1999.San Francisco. A growth rate of 7 to 9 percentdoubles a country'seconomy every ten to eight years.and San Diego ifChina happens to have a few more DF-4s than the United States thinksor if it should fail to destroyall of them on the ground? Deterrenceis much easier to contrivethan most Americans China's growthrate. 76. The internaldevelopmentand the externalreaction of China and Japan are steadily raising both countries to the great power very hard so level.WhetherEurope will somehow.76Liquid fueled. Two Throughout modern history. Economically.
In a self-help system. Countries have always competed forwealth and security. Japan is made uneasy now by the steady growthof China's military budget. and between Japanand China over the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands.and the gradual growth of its sea. the possession of mostbut not all of the capabilitiesof a greatpower leaves a state vulnerable to othersthathave the instruments thatthe lesser statelacks. For a countryto choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly For thatreason. one must wonder whetherJapan will remain immune to them.produce apprehensionin all of China's neighborsand add to the sense of instability a region where issues of sovereignty in and disputes over abound. Economically. one may wonder how any state with the economic capabilityof a greatpower can refrain fromarmingitselfwith the weapons thathave served so well as the great deterrent.The high volume of a country'sexternalbusiness thrustsit ever more deeply into world affairs.however. statusof countrieshas usually sooner. The presence of China's ample nuclear forces.Uncomfortable dependencies and perceived vulnerabilities have led Japan to acquire greater military capabilities. Remindersof Japan's deof pendence and vulnerability multiplyin large and small ways. stateshave been sensitiveto changing relations of power among them. Given the expectationof conflict. Even though one may believe that fears of nuclear blackmail are misplaced. and the necessityof taking care of one's interests.Sooner or later.even though many Japanese may prefernot to.combined with the drawdown of American militaryforces.can hardly be ignored by with the United States cast doubt Japan. Japan is obviously reluctantto assume the mantle of a great power.Disputes exist between Japan and Russia over the Kurile Islands. For example. undergoing modernization. and the competitionhas oftenled to conflict. strategically located and supposedly rich in oil. Japanbecame acutelyaware of its lack of observationsatellites.the international . Cambodia is a troublesomeproblemforboth Vietnamand China. the choice is a difficult one to sustain.and air-power projection capabilities.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 33 the Unlike China.It widens the range of a state's interestsand increases theirimportance. as rumorsabout North Korea's developing nuclear capabilitiesgained credence. Taiwan is an unending source of tension.the less so because economic conflicts on the reliability American militaryguarantees. Its reluctance. The Korean peninsula has more militaryforcesper square territory kilometerthan any otherportionof the globe. Its nearly3 millionstrong army. is steadily though slowly waning. Half a dozen countries lay claim to all or some of the SpratlyIslands. Japan's power has grown and spread remarkably The growth of a country'seconomic capabilityto the great power level places it at the center of regional and global affairs. Historically.
Increasingly.Japan has put itself politicallyand technologicallyin a position to do so.International Security 25:1 | 34 risen in step with theirmaterialresources.Japan will equip itselfwith a nuclear force. however. Norman D. Japan is being pressed to enlarge its conventionalforces and to add nuclear ones to protectits interests.is a constrainedone. The choice. would be deemed constitutional should Japan decide to build some. The behavior of states responds more to externalconditionsthan to internalhabit if externalchange is profound. Japan. Consistentlysince the mid-1950s.Countrieswith greatpower economies have become great powers. Levin. Because of the extentof theirinterests. and othersfrom perhaps North Korea have nuclear weapons capable of deterring threateningtheir vital interests. largerunits existingin a contentiousarena tend to take on systemwidetasks. seeking and gaining Its its prominencein such bodies as the IMF and the World Bank.India. whetheror not reluctantlySome countries may striveto become great powers. AfterWorld War II.whetheror not openly. Does Japan once again aspire to a larger role internationally? concerted regional activity.How long can Japan live alongside other nuclear stateswhile denyingitselfsimilarcapabilities?Conflicts and crisesare certainto make Japanaware of thedisadvantages ofbeing withoutthe military instruments thatotherpowers command. In the standingsuffered previous half century. China.the governmenthas defined all of its Self-DefenseForces as conNuclear weapons purely for defense formingto constitutional requirements. and its obvious pride in economic and technologicalachievementsindicate that it does. Japanese nuclear inhibitions arising fromWorldWar II will not last indefinitely. of . ASEAN. may expect themto expire as one generationalmemoriesfade.1990). "Japan's Defense Policy: The InternalDebate." in Harry H. and theUnitedStates(Berkeley:Institute East Asian Studies.. they shape the behavior of states. Japan's behavior in the past half centuryreflectsthe abrupt change in its international because of its defeatin war.eds. When externalconditionspress firmly enough. the United States broke with its centuries-long traditionof actingunilaterallyand refusing make long-term to commitments.77As a secret reportof the Ministryof Foreign Affairs put it in 1969: "For the time 77. Pakistan. Kendall and Clara Joewono. Profoundchange in a country's international situationproduces radical change in its externalbehavior. of University California. Japanese officialshave indicated that when the protectionof America's is extended deterrent no longer thoughtto be sufficiently reliable. othersmay wish to avoid doing so. if not beyond. aftervictoryover China in 1894-95.Japan pressed for preeminencein Asia.
1994. Michael J." Journal East Asian Affairs. August 1.: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace. Pyle. 10. and of Russia combines with ineviof table doubts about the extentto which Japan can relyon the United States to In protectits security.JapanDisavows Any Nuclear-Arms Expertise. 364. Andrew Hanami. Sanger. of both Koreas. while seeing to it thatJapan will not be interfered with in this regard." in Harrison.82 Japan has laid a firmfoundationfordoing so by developing much of its own weaponry instead of relyingon cheaper imports. Harrison.83 the opinion of Masanori Nishi. 81. 41.Remaining months or moments away from having a nuclear militarycapability is well designed to protectthe country'ssecuritywithoutunduly alarmingits neighbors. 2. No. and theUnitedStates. . Hanami. p. Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita called for a defensive capabilitymatchingJapan's economic power. June22."Japanand Nuclear Weapons.regardlessof joining the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty]or not. TheJapanese D. of Vol. 1996). "The Capability to Develop Nuclear Weapons Should Be Kept: Ministryof Foreign Affairs SecretDocument in 1969.Prime In MinisterTsutumuHata mentionedin parliamentthatJapan had the abilityto make nuclear weapons. "Japan and the MilitaryBalance of Power in Northeast Asia. David E. the main cause of Japan's greater"interest enhanced defense capabilities"is its in belief that America's interestin "maintainingregional stabilityis shaky"84 Whether or reluctantly not.C. p. points out that Japan wonders whether the United States would help defend Hokkaido. StephanieStrom. No.p. others see a countrythat has skillfully used the protectionthe United States has afforded and adroitlyadopted the means of maintainingits securityto its regional environment. 82.. p. 26. 84. Press." New York Times. 1994." New York Times. we will maintainthe policy of not possessing nuclear weapons. 7.Japanand China will followeach otheron theroute 78. However. 276. quoted in Selig S. 83."78 In March of 1988.: AEI Question: Powerand Purposein a New Era (Washington.p. 2 (September1998).ed. April 8." in Kendall and Joewono. 79. "US and ASEAN Perceptionsof Japan's Role in the Asian-PacificRegion."Mainichi.80 Where some see Japan as a "global civilian power" and believe it likelyto remain one.Japan. 80.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 35 the being. p. David Arase.79 Only a balanced conventionalnuclearmilitary capabilitywould meetthisrequirement.p. Japan'sNuclearFuture(Washington."AccessAsia of Review. Vol. Juneof 1994."In Face-SavingReverse. KennethB.C. A4.Green. D. 1992).judiciouslysummarized different interpretations Japan's securitypolicy. 2 (Summer/Fall1994). for example.81 Prime MinisterShigeru Yoshida in the early 1950s suggested thatJapan should rely on American protectionuntil it had rebuiltits economy as it gradually prepared to stand on its own feet."State of the Field Report:Researchon JapaneseSecurity Policy."JapanBeginningto Flex Its Military Muscles. a defense official. The hostility China. 9. ASEAN. 1999. we will keep the economic and technicalpotentialforthe productionof nuclear weapons.
military. Green and Benjamin L. and the very effort maintaina hegemonic position is the surestway to undermine to 85. Whatever worries the United States has and whatever it Japanhas threats feels. The GreatWall and theEmptyFortress: China's Search Security for (New York:W. and the the changingrelationsof countrieswithinthe East and the West. demographic. with or withoutAmerican participation. where no military extendingNATO eastward. The ComingConflict zvith China (New York:AlfredA.85 hegemonytheynow enjoy in mean thattheyintend to maintainthe strategic to the absenceof such a balance. which is becomingpartof the new balance of power in the world.000troopsin East Asia and by providingsecurity guaranteesto Japanand South Korea is intendedto keep a new balance of power fromformingin Asia." Survival.Fortunately. and Andrew J. with the world's second or third largest defense budget and the ability to advanced weaponry. 38. When Americans speak of preservingthe balance of power in East Asia the Chinese understandablytake this to through their militarypresence. By continuingto keep threatis in sight.the United Statespursues the same goal in Europe. America's policy of containingChina by keeping 100. the task will exceed America's economic.nuclear weapons moderate the behavior to of theirpossessors and renderthemcautious whenever crisesthreaten spin out of control.Japanhas themearlierand feelsthemmore intensely.The tensionsand conflicts thatintensify when profound changes in world politics take place will continue to mar the relations of nations. 43. Nathan and RobertS. Munro. 1997).and South Korea.while nuclear weapons keep the peace among those who enjoy their protection. Japan. No.are takingplace in a nuclear context.China thenworriesas Japanimprovesits airlift sealiftcapabilitiesand as the United States raises its supportlevel forforcesin South Korea.000troops in WesternEurope. In the not very long run.Norton. Richard Bernsteinand Ross H. Ross. 86. "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalismto ReluctantRealism.and political resources. and graduallyreactedto them. When China makes steady but modest efforts forces. Vol. as we know fromhappy experience.1997).is closer to greatpower produce the most technologically status at the moment. Knopf.86The actions and reactionsof China. encountersof East and West have oftenended in tragedy Yet. changing relations of East to West. . Self.Japan. Michael J. 2 (Summer 1996).Security 25:1 | 36 International to becoming great powers. creatinga new balance of power are in East Asia.and by 100. China has the greaterlong-term potential.W. p. The Americanaspirationto freezehistoricaldevelopmentby workingto keep the world unipolar is doomed. Americanssee a future threatto their improvethe qualityof its inferior and others' interests. Historically.
International RelationsTheory and the Third World. Moreover. oftenact in ways that create futureenemies. in however. Grand Strategy. American political leaders to a dismaying extent thinkof East or Westratherthan of theirinteraction.87 States are freeto disregardthe imperativesof power.suffered invasion. 1 (Spring 1998).relatively weak and divided statesmay findit impossible to concerttheirefforts countera hegemonicstatedespite ample provoto cation. United States is repeatingpast errorsby extending its influenceover what used to be the province of the vanquished. ed. facingfew impedimentsto the exerciseof theirwills.Winners is of wars. 40. Whetheror not balancing takes place also depends on the decisions of governments. that is how balances of is power are made. abounds in examples of states that failed to mind theirown security or interests throughinternalefforts externalarrangements.and the Allies' harsh In of treatment GermanyafterWorldWar I produced a similareffect. The effort maintain dominance stimulates some countries to work to to overcome it.Magnanimity victory rare..often bringslastingenmities. This has long been the conditionof the WesternHemisphere.Ratherthan the learningfromhistory." Survival.but theymust expectto pay a price fordoing so. p. In the Cold War.A dominant power may suppress balancing as the United States has done in Europe. Stephanie Neuman's book. and as one would expect. Vol. Multipolarity developing beforeour eyes. Prussia took no Austrian territory. Despite much talk about the "globalization" of internationalpolitics. loss of autonomy. As theoryshows and historyconfirms.88This alienates Russia and nudges it toward China instead of drawing it toward Europe and the United States. No. . Bismarck persuaded the kaiser not to march his armies along the road to Vienna afterthe great victoryat K6niggratzin 1866. Thus Austria. Witha historyof conflict RelationsTheoryand the Third World(New York: St. JohnLewis Gaddis commentsthathe has never known a time when therewas less and NATO support among historiansforan announced policy. In the Treatyof Prague.it is emergingin accordance with the balancing imperative. 88. Tellingly. 147.earned its lastingenmity.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 37 the it. 87. the United States won a telling victory Victoryin war. was available as an alliance partner Germanyin 1879.by taking Alsace and most of Lorraine fromFrance in 1871. contrast. Enlargement. American leaders seem to believe that America's preeminentposition will last indefinitely The United States would then remain the dominant power withoutrivals risingto challenge it-a position withoutprecedentin modern historyBalancing. is not universal and omnipresent.Gaddis. and dismemberment. Thus Germany. having become Austriafor Hungary. Moreover. "History.1998). International Martin's. Stephanie Neuman. of course.
do not lead one to expect thatstates will always or even usually engage in for balancing behavior.of a threatto China.The lattermay sometimes seem a than balancing.many states have insufficient sources forbalancing and littleroom formaneuver. Balancing is a strategy survival.or in regional subsystems.a weak formofbandwagoning. bandwagoning is another.China drew close to Russia afterWorld War II and remained so until the United States seemed harmoniless. In this section. however. the discussion of balancing has been more empirical and I on end speculativethan theoretical.States tryvarious strategiesforsurvival. it. To argue that bandwagoning represents behavior more common to statesthanbalancing has become a bit a of a fad.rather reand realigningto thwartthem.25:1 | 38 Security International along a 2. Indeed. alienate Russia by expanding NATO. Moreover.to follow.to strategiesof resortto balancing when they have to. They may hope to avoid war by thanby rearming appeasing adversaries. That states trydifferent . To believe that an affirmative the ance-of-powertheoryis. and to are its alienate China by lecturing leaders on how to rule theircountry.stateshave to make perilous choices. Amid the of pressures of domestic politics and the shifting uncertainties international politics.600 mile border. mineral-rich but to Russia and China will findit difficult cooperate effectively. can hasten its coming as it has been earnestlydoing. policies could afford.requiringless less demanding and a more rewardingstrategy effort and extracting lower costs while promisingconcreterewards. theory. The relatively ous relationsthe United States and China enjoyed during the 1970s began to sour in the late 1980s when Russian power visibly declined and American To hegemonybecame imminent. Balancing is one of them.with ethnicminoritiessprawling across it. of Balancing theory does not predict uniformity behavior but ratherthe strongtendencyof major states in the system. with a and sparsely populated Siberia facingChina's teemingmillions.The United States cannot preventa new balance of It power fromforming. Whether states bandwagon more often than they balance is an answer would refutebalinteresting question.to misinterpret theoryand to commit what one mightcall "the numericalfallacy"-to draw a qualitativeconclusion froma quantitativeresult.They have to jump on the wagon only later to wish theycould fall off. and onlya foolish powerfulcountry thatonlyan overwhelmingly one be tempted. and the Soviet Union more. therefore with some reflections balancing Structural and the theoryof balance of power thatfollowsfrom theory.a way of attempting to maintain a state's autonomous way of life. the United States has provided the key to Russian-Chinese relations over the past half century Feeling Americanantagonismand fearingAmericanpower. the United States is doing its best to help them do so.
structure international the of has simplybeen remade by the disappearance of theSoviet Union. the Cold War "is firmly rooted in the structure postwar international of politicsand will last as long as thatstructure endures.Those who set the Soviet Union on the path of reform were old Soviet apparatchikstrying rightthe Soviet economy in orderto preserveits to position in the world. The revolutionin Soviet affairs and the end of the Cold War were not broughtby democracy. p. the leaders of states would no longer have to ask themselves how they will get along tomorrowas well as today. or instiinterdependence.the Structural Realismafter Cold War | 39 survival is hardlysurprising.The recurrent emergenceof balancing behavior. and the Cold War ended only when the bipolar structure So of the world disappeared. Occasionally. It does not break the essentialcontinuity international of of politics. however.awaits the day when the international systemis no longer populated by states that have to help themselves. States could combine their efforts cheerfullyand work to maximize collective gain without worrying about how each mightfarein comparison to others. The world.If the day were here. anarchicconditionact myopically-that is. As I wrote some years ago. 628. States' perennial uncertaintyabout their fates presses governments to prefer relative over absolute gains.has not been transformed. international tutions. That is anotherway of saying thatinternational politicshas been transformed. on calculationsof immediateinter89.international politics was not remade by the forces and factorsthat some believe are creatinga new world order. and politics for a time we will live with unipolarity. should all the more be seen as impressiveevidence supportingthe theory. one would be able to say who could be relied on to help the disadvantaged or endangered. Instead." Journal Interdisciplinary of History. Moreover. Waltz. people pop up to proclaim thatrealism is dead. ."The OriginsofWar in NeorealistTheory. 4 (Spring 1988). Vol. the ominous shadow of the futurecontinues to cast its pall over interactingstates. however. Without the shadow.Instead the Cold War ended exactlyas structural realism led one to expect. one finds the statementthat governmentsin their natural.The transformation international politicsalone could do that. Structuralchange affectsthe behavior of states and the outcomes their interactions produce."89 it did.Transformation. KennethN. 18. and the appearance of the patternsthe behavior produces. No. Conclusion Every time peace breaks out.
p. . see also p. My revision. 103. "Guns. widening the gap in welfare or and strength between themselves and others.91 Yet. 1 (March 1993). States do not live in the happiest of conditionsthatHorace in one of his odes imagined for man: Happy the man. Butter.however. Germany feared Russia's rapid industrialand population growth.have to concernthemselvesnot with maximizing collectivegain but with lessening. World War I was a preventivewar all around.preserving.France and Britainsuffered fromthe same fear about Germany." See Powell.The shadow may facilitatecooperation in the former. They see the long shadow of the future. .93 Because statescoexistin a self-help system. The point is made by Robert0.The one conditionforsuccess is thatthe game be played under the shadow ofthefuture. Neorealism in The Debate (New York:Columbia University Press.92 RobertAxelrod has shown that the "tit-for-tat" tactic.:PrincetonUniversity Press. The war was promptedless by considerations of present security and more by worries about how the balance might change later. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy:Strategies and Neoliberalism: Contemporary and Institutions. 108. the futurewas what the major stateswere obsessivelyworried about. leads to greater American PoliticalScienceReview. pp.perhaps because they tryto look too far ahead and see imaginary dangers. 116. In 1914. N.In an important sense. who can say. "the shadow of the futureseemed so small" (p. as their own discussion shows. 1984). 92). Tomorrowdo thyworst. 117 on the question of the compatibility liberal institutionalism and structural realism. ed. theysay.Realists are said to sufferfromthis optical defect. After Hegemony: Cooperation Discordin theWorld and PoliticalEconomy (Princeton. and in addition Britainworried about the rapid growth of Germany'snavy. Keohane. military allocations.forI have lived today.but they have trouble reading its contours.Worries 90. 92.but responsibleones who behave realistically not suffer do frommyopia. Future fears dominated hopes forshort-term gains. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane believe that World War I might have been averted if certainstates had been able to see how long the future'sshadow was.International Security 25:1 | 40 est-while hoping that the futurewill take care of itself. For German leaders." of Vol. RobertPowell shows that "a longer shadow .The Evolution Cooperation of (New York:Basic Books. No. 99. 93. and Anarchy. and happy he alone.J.90 Political leaders may be astigmatic. RobertAxelrod and Robert0." David Baldwin. 87. 1984)..and no other. 1993).theymay. 91.maximizes collectivegain over time.it works against it in the latter. RobertAxelrod. Keohane. The contours of the future's in shadow look different hierarchicand anarchic systems. . The problems of governmentsdo not arise from their short time horizons.
Structural Realismafter Cold War | 41 the about the futuredo not make cooperation and institution building among nations impossible. it remains the basic theoryof international politics. . Liberal institutionalists were rightto starttheirinvestigations with structural realism. theydo strongly conditiontheiroperation and limittheir accomplishment. Until and unless a transformation occurs.
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