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Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs Drilon GR 81958 30 June 1988

Facts: DOLE enacted Department Order No 1, outlining guidelines of temporary suspension deployment of female
domestic workers. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, engaged in the recruitment of overseas workers
assailed the validity of the said order. They contend that this is discriminatory against female domestic workers and
does not apply to all Filipino workers but to domestic helpers only.

Issue: Whether or not DO No 1 violates equal protection on the ground of sexual discrimination?

Decision: Petition dismissed. The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force
abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical
and personal abuse. The same cannot be said of our male workers. It is the avowed objective of DO No 1 to
“enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers” this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the
terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and
welfare. The Court finds the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it
does not apply to “all Filipina workers” is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal
applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. Not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What
the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the
prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled
“An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional
stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance,
Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing
its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which,
being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection
clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not.”
GR No. L-7859, December 22, 1955
98 PHIL 148


Plaintiff Walter Lutz, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Antionio Ledesma,
sought to recover from the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the CA
567 or the Sugar Adjustment Act thereby assailing its constitutionality, for it provided for an increase of the
existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, alleging that such enactment is not being levied for a public purpose
but solely and exclusively for the aid and support of the sugar industry thus making it void and
The sugar industry situation at the time of the enactment was in an imminent threat of loss and needed to be
stabilized by imposition of emergency measures.


Is CA 567 constitutional, despite its being allegedly violative of the equal protection clause, the purpose of
which is not for the benefit of the general public but for the rehabilitation only of the sugar industry?


Yes. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the
Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its
promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed to fully play, subject only to the test of
reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in the law bear no relation to the objective
pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is
why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the
implement of the state's police power.
78742; 14 JUL 1989]


Several petitions are the root of the case:

a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a
9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified
farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power.

b. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and
EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.

c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven

Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional.

Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent
Domain. RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not
a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of
said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the
method employed to achieve it.
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved
seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court
declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.


1. Does BP 22 is violate the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt?

2. Does it impair freedom of contract?
3. Does it contravene the equal protection clause?


1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the
law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because
of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank
and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure
payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will
be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and
commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in
commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is
shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice
therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create
havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into “lawful” contracts. Contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere
contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money;
it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory,
since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the
crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check
there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both
the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection
of the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the
law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.

Private respondent, San Diego, is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of B.S. in
Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) three
times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his
application on the basis of the NMAT rule:


He then went to RTC Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test. In his petition, he squarely
challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-
cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

Whether respondent was deprived of his right to a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power.

The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations is a valid exercises of governmental power.

The Court agreed that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as
a means of achieving its stated objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into medical
schools” and of “improving the quality of medical education in the country.”

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is
the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The
three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession
from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.


Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when
they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. No. 626-A
which prohibits the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. Petitioner sued for recovery, and the trial
Court of Iloilo issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of twelve thousand pesos (P 12,
000.00). After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the said carabaos and, since
they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.


Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.


Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this case for the reason that the present condition
demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for
energy needs, it does not however, comply with the second requisite for a valid exercise of the said power which is,
"that there be a lawful method." The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. To justify the State
in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the public, it must be:

1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;

2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta

An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of private
cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a
private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also
contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police
power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.


Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property


No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of
expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the
property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property
that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come
forward and not the police power of the state.
Petitioners emphasize that they are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but
are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the
implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution,
which provides that: "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."... petitioners cite
Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[12] where it was ruled that the 20% discount privilege constitutes
taking of private property for public use which requires the payment of just compensation
The Petition lacks merit.
The validity of the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme under RA 9257, as an
exercise of police power of the State, has already been settled in Carlos Superdrug Corporation.
The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of
private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners
would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation.
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would
not meet the definition of just compensation.
Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of
a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a
government program.
The Court believes so.
As a form of reimbursement, the... law provides that business establishments extending the twenty
percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the
mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is
unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and
come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to... show properly whether or not the
tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage.
We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the
police power of the State.
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less
likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of
subsidy in purchasing basic commodities.
the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to price their products
and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution
affords preferential concern... it does... not purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used
in the operation or conduct of the business of private establishments, for the use or benefit of the
public, or senior citizens for that matter
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price
control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power
measures.[77] These laws generally regulate public... utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with
public interest in order to protect consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as
temper corporate greed by controlling the rate of return on investment of these corporations...
considering that they have a monopoly... over the goods or services that they provide to the general
On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure.
The obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[78] however, describes the 20% discount as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain and the tax credit, under the previous law, equivalent to the
amount of discount given as the just compensation... therefor.
It presupposes that the subject regulation, which impacts the pricing and, hence, the profitability of a
private establishment, automatically amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
If this were so,... then all price and rate of return on investment control laws would have to be
invalidated because they impact, at some level, the regulated establishment's profits or income/gross
sales, yet there is no provision for payment of just compensation
The obiter is, thus, at odds with the settled doctrine... that the State can employ police power
measures to regulate the pricing of goods and services, and, hence, the profitability of business
establishments in order to pursue legitimate State objectives for the common good, provided that the
regulation does not go too far as to... amount to "taking."
Police power versus eminent domain.
Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and
property for public welfare.[58] The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be
reasonable, not oppressive.
"property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in... order to fulfill the
objectives of the government.
The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare [as long as] the interference [is] reasonable and not arbitrary.
Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate private
property for public use.
private property shall not be taken without due process of law and the... payment of just
In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation,[65] or the use of property
is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted[66] to promote public welfare.
payment of just compensation is not required.
in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property interests are appropriated and applied to
some public purpose which necessitates the payment of just compensation therefor.
Normally, the title to and possession of the property are transferred to the... expropriating authority.
White Light Corporation vs City of Manila

Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774
entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of
Manila.” On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO)
impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the prayer that the
Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-
intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels
and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.
The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered
a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power

Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and
varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any
and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated
analysis of its guarantees to the people.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the
guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted
to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial
review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the
vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby

Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an American
corporation, whereby telephone messages coming from the US and received by RCA’s domestic station, could
automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.

The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its own Government Telephone
System, by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT, entered into an
agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service.

Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and receiving no reply, disconnected
the trunk lines being rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a case before the CFI praying for
judgment commanding PLDT to execute a contract with the Bureau for the use of the facilities of PLDT’s telephone
system, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant to restrain the severance of the existing trunk
lines and restore those severed.


Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to enter into a contract with the plaintiff.


“ x x x while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the
exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the
government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to
the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.”


Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that prohibits the
construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission
to the mayor.

After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near the town
plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction under the rationale that he
needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.

He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view.

He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinance’s


Is the ordinance constitutional?


No, petition granted.


The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and
unlimited conferment.

Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be
exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established
a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this

The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right
to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation.

While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate structures
offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.

Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do this legally,
there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable
purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.

The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council shall
have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or
repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be
determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and
one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection
shall accrue to the municipal school fund.

Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits
within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within
them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and
promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c)
Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda. De Castellvi (G.R. No. L-20620)


In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement
over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate
the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an ejectment
proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for
the land in question.


Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.


The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation
should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property that year .

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;

2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;

3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;

4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and

5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when applied to
possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a limited period” -- not indefinite
or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year.

The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the
Republic, through AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that
the entry into the lant was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by
consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee,
undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first
occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as
may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail
over the clear and express terms of the lease contract.

The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the property and its
utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of
the property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as
shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract
whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated.
Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was
bound to pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the
complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s property should not be determined on
the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held
that the “taking” of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

Petitioner Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a lot in Banilad Estate, Cebu
City. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot
for the construction of road, specifically, the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of
the land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. RTC dismissed the case on the ground of
State Immunity, that the government cannot be sued without its consent.

Whether the petitioner may properly sue the government.

Yes. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without
going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

Strongly upheld is that the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the
petitioner’s certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any
portion of her lot to the government, the petitioner remains the owner of the whole lot. As
registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in
question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since
restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at
this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for
the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the
time of the taking.
Decision is set aside and remanded for determination of just compensation.


Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free
Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and
candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and
their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for
dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec
over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard
and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.


Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel
print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal
property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover,
the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of
private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just
compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power
of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take
private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.


On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation
of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal)
including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the
possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied.

Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality
of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended. Petitioners argue that:


Whether “socialized housing” as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose
of condemnation proceedings is not “public use” since it will benefit only “a handful of people,
bereft of public character?


No, “socialized housing” fans within the confines of “public use”. It is, particularly important to
draw attention to paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224 which opportunities inextricably linked
with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement
emphasize the public purpose of the project. The use to which it is proposed to put the subject
parcels of land meets the requisites of “public use”. The lands in question are being expropriated
by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to
low-salaried government employees.
Manosca vs. CA


Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the
birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring
the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main
thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act
would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support
of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the
1987 Constitution.


Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.


Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the
public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not
so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes
into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what
public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private
enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing
Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation(San
Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an
order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the
payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter
contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value
declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such
objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the
commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from
further hearing the case.

Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It
tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining
just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee
in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute,
decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less
can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.


On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Petitioner passed Resolution authorizing
the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site. The
San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion, moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground
of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The trial court denied the motion and authorized the
Petitioner to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court, The trial court
issued a writ of possession in an order dated January18, 1990. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief
from the order, authorizing the Petitioner to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an
amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 1990.

the San Joaquins petitioned before the Court of Appeals, In its answer to the petition, the Petitioner
claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose. The Solicitor
General stated there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the
Petitioner of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the
Petitioner must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate
the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondents’ lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to
dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Petitioner
shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the
classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Issue: Whether the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use?

Held: Yes, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of “public purpose” or “public
use” for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. Under the new concept, “public use”
means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the
prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project. The
expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people
of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community
invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the
livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies
the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.


The Municipality of Parañaque filed an expropriation case against Private Respondent V.M.
Realty Corporation over two parcels of land pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution. The
expropriation was allegedly “for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.”
Petitioner, pursuant to the resolution made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property
with private respondent, which the latter did not accept.

Private respondent, on the other hand, filed its Answer alleging that (a) the complaint of
petitioner was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the Local
Government Code; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res


1. Whether a resolution has the same force and effect of an ordinance for expropriation case.
2. Whether Res Judicata can bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property.


First Issue: Resolution Different from an Ordinance

A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
An LGU may exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints. Thus, the following essential requisites
must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council;

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless;
3. There is payment of just compensation;
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

Second Issue: Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata

The Court holds that the principle of res judicata cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the
State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior
judgment or res judicata.

In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose
of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia
and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May
1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just
compensation. The Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of
judgment was made on April 5, 1948.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for
rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt.
Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a
reasonable time.

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons· successors-
in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession
with damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property.

On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio
with the annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said
parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value".

On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that
they are the owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republic·s
failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in
view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of
the Republic.

They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still
the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation
by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may
only demand the payment of their fair market value.

Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein
respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the
mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in his name.

On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the
petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the
absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the
right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision dated September 18,
2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ´... This is contrary to the rules of fair play because
the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the owners of the land,but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from
its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"...”
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as
the owner of Lot 932.

Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI
rendered as early as May 14, 1940.

One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of
his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element
of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for
public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: "Private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." The Republic disregarded the
foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the
just compensation for Lots 932 and 939.

The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules of fair
play. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the
payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable
time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.

As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in- interest the sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in
question." Unfortunately, it did not comply
and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. It is tantamount to
confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need
of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the
occasion demands, however from the taking of private property by the government under the
power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss.
There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. So, how could the Republic
acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required
by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be
no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator.

SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is concerned
with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise. The second is concerned with the determination by the court of
"the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." It is only upon the completion of
these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed In Republic v. Salem
Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not completed until payment of just
compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-
interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.
Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover
possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic.

While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the
private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes
property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In
Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the
property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
Punsalan v City of Manila
Ordinance 3398 was enacted pursuant to paragraph 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila,
imposing a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city. Various
professionals filed suit to annul the ordinance and the provision of law authorizing the enactment of the
ordinance and to call for the refund collected taxes under the ordinance.

Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause

No. The legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupation shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion
it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the other untaxed. Manila, as the seat of the
National Government and with a population and volume of trade many times that of any other Philippine City or
municipality, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so that it is but fair that the
professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces.

The ordinance imposes the tax upon every person “exercising” or “pursuing” any of the occupation named in the
ordinance, and does not make any distinction between professionals having offices in Manila and outsiders who
practice their profession therein. What constitutes exercise or pursuit of a profession in the city is a matter of judicial

Thus, the ordinance does not violate the equal protection clause.

Facts: Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory relief
with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act appropriating funds for public works,
providing P85,000 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension
and improvement of Pasigfeeder road terminals, were nothing but projected and planned
subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Subdivision is owned by the
respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the Philippines. Respondent offered to
donate the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the
council, subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an
agreement to change the names of two of the street. However, the donation was not
executed, which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention
the approval of RA 920. The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter
that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at the time of passage
and approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore,
void ab initio. Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed
of donation be declared unconstitutional. Lower courtdismissed the case and dissolved the
writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in RA
920 are constitutional.

Held: The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but public purpose. The taxing power must be exercised for public
purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes
and not for the advantage of private individuals.

In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon
whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by
congress or when it became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the
appropriation sought a private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not cure
the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not
precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation.
The decision appealed from is reversed.
Double Taxation

Respondent paid the local business tax only as a manufacturers as it was expressly exempted from the business tax
under a different section and which applied to businesses subject to excise, VAT or percentage tax under the Tax
Code. The City of Manila subsequently amended the ordinance by deleting the provision exempting businesses
under the latter section if they have already paid taxes under a different section in the ordinance. This amending
ordinance was later declared by the Supreme Court null and void. Respondent then filed a protest on the ground of
double taxation. RTC decided in favor of Respondent and the decision was received by Petitioner on April 20, 2007.
On May 4, 2007, Petitioner filed with the CTA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review asking
for a 15-day extension or until May 20, 2007 within which to file its Petition. A second Motion for Extension was
filed on May 18, 2007, this time asking for a 10-day extension to file the Petition. Petitioner finally filed the Petition
on May 30, 2007 even if the CTA had earlier issued a resolution dismissing the case for failure to timely file the


(1) Has Petitioner’s the right to appeal with the CTA lapsed?
(2) Does the enforcement of the latter section of the tax ordinance constitute double taxation?


(1) NO. Petitioner complied with the reglementary period for filing the petition. From April 20, 2007, Petitioner had
30 days, or until May 20, 2007, within which to file their Petition for Review with the CTA. The Motion for
Extension filed by the petitioners on May 18, 2007, prior to the lapse of the 30-day period on 20 May 2007, in which
they prayed for another extended period of 10 days, or until 30 May 2007, to file their Petition for Review was, in
reality, only the first Motion for Extension of petitioners. Thus, when Petitioner filed their Petition via registered
mail their Petition for Review on 30 May 2007, they were able to comply with the period for filing such a petition.

(2) YES. There is indeed double taxation if respondent is subjected to the taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of the
tax ordinance since these are being imposed: (1) on the same subject matter — the privilege of doing business in the
City of Manila; (2) for the same purpose — to make persons conducting business within the City of Manila
contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same taxing authority — petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the same taxing
jurisdiction — within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods — per
calendar year; and (6) of the same kind or character — a local business tax imposed on gross sales or receipts of the