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G.R. No. L-39532 July 20, 1979 donation.

He devised to his wife properties


sufficient to constitute her legitime and
Testate Estate of Jose M. Valero, FLORA bequeathed the remainder to his two children,
VALERO VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ and ROSIE Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez.
VALERO DE GUTIERREZ, petitioners-
appellants, About a month later, or on February 15, 1966,
vs. the Valero spouses, by means of a deed of
COURT OF APPEALS and CARMEN absolute sale, conveyed the San Lorenzo
VALERO-RUSTIA, respondents-appellees. Village lots and the improvements thereon to
Carmen B. Valero-Rustia for the sum of one
Amboriso Padilla Law Office and Iglesia & hundred twenty thousand pesos. The sale
Associates for appellants. was registered on the following day. Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 163270 and 163271
Angel P. Purisima for appellees. were issued to the vendee, Mrs. Rustia.

On December 4, 1967 she mortgaged the two


lots to the Quezon City Development Bank as
security for a loan of fifty thousand pesos
AQUINO, J.:
(page 204, Rollo).
1äwphï1.ñ ët

This is supposedly a case about collation. As


Beatriz B. Valero died intestate on September
factual background, it should be stated that
12, 1972, survived by her husband and her
the spouses, Beatriz Bautista and Jose M.
adopted child. Her estate is pending
Valero, did not beget any child during their
settlement in Special Proceeding No. 88896 of
marriage In 1951 Beatriz adopted Carmen
the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mrs.
(Carmencita) Bautista. Jose wanted also to
Rustia was named administratrix of her
adopt her but because, by his first marriage,
adopted mother's estate.
he had two children named Flora Valero Vda.
de Rodriguez and Rosie Valero Gutierrez. he
was disqualified to adopt Carmen. Jose More than a month later, or on October 18,
manifested in the adoption proceeding that he 1972, Jose M. Valero died testate, survived by
consented to the use by Carmen of his his two children, Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs.
surname Valero. (See Civil Case No. 12475, Gutierrez. His will was duly probated in
Manila CFI; Art. 338[1], Civil Code and art. 28, Special Proceeding No. 88677, also of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code.) Court of First Instance of Manila. Lawyer
Celso F. Unson, the executor, submitted an
inventory wherein, following the list of conjugal
On September 18, 1964, Jose M. Valero
assets in the testator's will, the two San
donated to Carmen B. Valero (who was
Lorenzo Village lots were included as part of
already married to Doctor Sergio Rustia) his
the testate estate.
one-half proindiviso share (apparently his
inchoate share) in two conjugal lots, with the
improvements thereon, located at San That inclusion provoked Mrs. Rustia, the
Lorenzo Village, Makati, Rizal, with an area of adopted child of Mrs. Valero, and Mrs.
1,500 square meters. His wife, Beatriz, Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez, the legitimate
consented to the donation. However, the deed children of the testator, Jose M. Valero, to file
of donation was not registered. (through Mrs. Rustia's lawyer) in the testate
proceeding a motion for the exclusion of the
two San Lorenzo Village lots from the
On January 13, 1966, Jose M. Valero, who
testator's inventoried estate.
was then seventy-three years old, executed
his last will and testament wherein he
enumerated the conjugal properties of himself Adduced as reason for the exclusion is the
and his wife, including the two San Lorenzo fact that since February 16, 1966 Mrs. Rustia
Village lots. In that will, he did not mention the has been the registered owner of the lots as
shown by two Torrens titles, copies of which considerably in 1973 or 1974. Moreover, the
were attached to the motion. relatively low price of the sale could be
attributed to the fact that Mrs. Rustia and her
The executor opposed the motion on the husband lived with the Valeros and were
ground that the two lots were donated to Mrs. taking care of them.
Rustia and the donation would allegedly
involve collation and the donee's title to the The probate court denied the motion for
lots. The executor revealed that he was reconsideration. Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs.
informed by Mrs. Gutierrez and Mrs. Gutierrez, in their petition for certiorari in the
Rodriguez (supposed movants) that the two Court of Appeals, assailed the probate court's
lots should be included in the inventory. Thus, order declaring that the two lots were not
the issue of collation was prematurely raised. subject to collation.

The probate court in its order of August 9, The Court of Appeals held that the order of
1973 excluded the two lots from the inventory exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was
of the testator's estate but with the interlocutory and that it could be changed or
understanding "that the same are subject to Modified at anytime during the course of the
collation". administration proceedings.

On December 4, 1973 or one hundred twelve It further held that it was immaterial whether
days after Mrs. Rustia was served with a copy the two lots were donated or sold to Mrs.
of that order, she filed a motion for its Rustia as "a mere subterfuge to avoid
reconsideration. She insisted that she is the payment of the donor's and donee's taxes".
owner of the two San Lorenzo Village lots as According to the Appellate Court, it was
indicated in the Torrens titles. No one immaterial because under article 1061 of the
opposed that motion. At the hearing of that Civil Code, only compulsory heirs are required
motion, Mrs. Rustia's lawyer apprised the to make collation for the determination of their
court that the executor informed him over the legitimes and, under section 2, Rule 90 of the
phone that he was not opposing the motion. Rules of Court, only heirs are involved in
questions as to advancement and Mrs. Rustia
The probate court in its order of December 14, is not an heir of the testator, Jose M. Valero
1973 ruled that the two lots were (Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Valero Rustia, CA-G.
unconditionally excluded from the inventory of R. No. SP- 02944, August 28, 1974, per G. S.
Jose M. Valero's estate, meaning "that they Santos, Gaviola, Jr. and De Castro, JJ.).
are not subject to collation". That order is the
bone of contention in this case. From that decision, an appeal was made to
this Court. The appeal was not given due
Mrs. Rodriguez (without being joined by her course. However, upon motion for
sister, Mrs. Gutierrez) filed a motion for the reconsideration and over Mrs. Rustia's
reconsideration of the order of December 14, opposition, the appeal was later allowed.
1973. She alleged that the two San Lorenzo
Village lots were really conveyed to Mrs. The appellants' only assignment of error is
Rustia by way of donation because the that the Court of Appeals should have held
consideration for the sale was allegedly only that the probate court's order of exclusion
one-fifth of the true value of the lots. Mrs. dated August 9, 1973 was not interlocutory
Rodriguez further contended that the order of but was a final and appealable order valid that
August 9, 1973 was final in character. the order of December 14, 1973 modifying the
order of August 3 is void.
In reply, Mrs. Rustia countered that the prior
order was interlocutory and that in 1966 the We hold that the order of exclusion dated
true value of the two lots was around August 9, 1973 was not a final order. It was
P120,000 and that their value increased interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle
once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo the decedents are still being paid. The net
Village lots. The probate court in the exclusion remainder (remanente liquido) of their
incident could not determine the question of conjugal estate has not yet been determined.
title. On the other hand, up to this time, no
separate action has been brought by the
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of appellants to nullify Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles
determining whether a certain property should to the disputed lots or to show that the sale
or should not be included in the inventory, the was in reality a donation.
probate court may pass upon the title thereto
but such determination is not conclusive and In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the
is subject to the final decision in a separate question of collation and to decide whether
action regarding ownership which may be Mrs. Rustia's titles to the disputed lots are
instituted by the parties (3 Moran's Comments questionable. The proceedings below have
on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages not reached the stage of partition and
448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, distribution when the legitimes of the
June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). compulsory heirs have to be determined.

We hold further that the dictum of the Court of WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the
Appeals and the probate court that the two Court of Appeals and the orders of the, lower
disputed lots are not subject to collation was a court dated August 9 and December 14, 1973,
supererogation and was not necessary to the excluding from the inventory of Jose M.
disposition of the case which merely involved Valeros estate the two San Lorenzo Village
the issue of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the lots now registered in the name of Carmen B.
inventory of the testator's estate. The issue of Valero-Rustia, but we delete from that
collation was not yet justifiable at that early decision and the two orders any ruling
stage of the testate proceeding. It is not regarding collation which is a matter that may
necessary to mention in the order of exclusion be passed upon by the probate court at the
the controversial matter of collation. time when it is seasonably raised by the
interested parties, if it is ever raised at all. No
Whether collation may exist with respect to costs.
the two lots and whether Mrs. Rustia's Torrens
titles thereto are indefeasible are matters that SO ORDERED.
may be raised later or may not be raised at all.
How those issues should be resolved, if and METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
when they are raised, need not be touched COMPANY, Petitioner,
upon in the adjudication of this appeal. vs.
ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT
The intestate and testate proceedings for the CORPORATION, Respondent.
settlement of the estates of the deceased
Valero spouses were consolidated, as ordered DECISION
by the lower court on November 21, 1974, so
that the conjugal estate of the deceased BRION, J.:
spouses may be properly liquidated, as
contemplated in section 2, Rule 73 of the
We resolve petitioner Metropolitan Bank &
Rules of Court and Act No. 3176 (Pages 223
Trust Company's (Metro bank's) petition for
and 235-6, Rollo).
review on certiorari1 seeking the reversal of
the decision2 dated August 25, 2005 and the
We have examined the expedientes of the two resolution3 dated November 17, 2005 of the
cases. We found that the proceedings have Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
not yet reached the stage when the question 86336. The assailed decision affirmed the
of collation or advancement to an heir may be order4 dated May 7, 2004 of the Regional Trial
raised and decided. The numerous debts of Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80. The
RTC had denied the admission of Metrobank's and it did not receive any money from the
Fourth-Party Complaint5 against the Estate of latter. AMC also asked the RTC to hold
Jose L. Chua for being a money claim that Metrobank liable for the subject checks in
falls under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of case it is adjudged liable to SHCI.
Court; the claim should have been filed in the
pending judicial settlement of Chua’s estate Metrobank filed a motion for bill of
before the RTC of Pasay City. The CA particulars,12 seeking to clarify certain
affirmed the RTC’s order based on the same ambiguous statements in AMC’s answer. The
ground. RTC granted the motion but AMC failed to
submit the required bill of particulars. Hence,
Factual Antecedents Metrobank filed a motion to strike out the
third-party complaint.13
On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings
Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for In the meantime, Metrobank filed a motion to
sum of money against Absolute Management dismiss14 against AMC on the ground that the
Corporation (AMC). The complaint was latter engaged in prohibited forum shopping.
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42105 and According to Metrobank, AMC’s claim against
was assigned to the RTC of Quezon City, it is the same claim that it raised against
Branch 80.6 Chua’s estate in Special Proceedings No. 99-
0023 before the RTC of Pasay City, Branch
SHCI alleged in its complaint that it made 112. The RTC subsequently denied this
advance payments to AMC for the purchase motion.15
of 27,000 pieces of plywood and 16,500
plyboards in the sum of ₱12,277,500.00, The RTC of Quezon City opted to defer
covered by Metrobank Check Nos. consideration16 of Metrobank’s motion to strike
1407668502, 140768507, 140768530, out third-party complaint17and it instead
140768531, 140768532, 140768533 and granted AMC’s motion for leave to serve
140768534. These checks were all crossed, written interrogatories on the third-party
and were all made payable to AMC. They defendant.18 While Metrobank filed its answer
were given to Chua, AMC’s General Manager, to the written interrogatories, AMC was again
in 1998.7 directed by the RTC, in an order19 dated
August 13, 2003, to submit its bill of
Chua died in 1999, 8 and a special proceeding particulars. Instead, AMC filed a motion for
for the settlement of his estate was reconsideration20 which was denied in an
commenced before the RTC of Pasay City. order21 dated October 28, 2003. AMC still did
This proceeding was pending at the time AMC not file its bill of particulars. The RTC, on the
filed its answer with counterclaims and third- other hand, did not act on Metrobank’s motion
party complaint.9 to strike out AMC’s third-party complaint.22

SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua’s In its answer23 dated December 1, 2003,
death, for allegedly undelivered items worth Metrobank admitted that it deposited the
₱8,331,700.00. According to AMC, these checks in question to the account of Ayala
transactions could not be found in its records. Lumber and Hardware, a sole proprietorship
Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in Chua owned and managed. The deposit was
1998, Chua received from SHCI 18 Metrobank allegedly done with the knowledge and
checks worth ₱31,807,500.00. These were all consent of AMC. According to
payable to AMC and were crossed or "for
payee’s account only."10 Metrobank, Chua then gave the assurance
that the arrangement for the handling of the
In its answer with counterclaims and third- checks carried AMC’s consent. Chua also
party complaint,11 AMC averred that it had no submitted documents showing his position
knowledge of Chua’s transactions with SHCI and interest in AMC. These documents, as
well as AMC’s admission in its answer that it before the RTC as a fourth-party complaint.
allowed Chua to manage AMC with a relative The RTC, acting in the exercise of its general
free hand, show that it knew of Chua’s jurisdiction, does not have the authority to
arrangement with Metrobank. Further, Chua’s adjudicate the fourth-party complaint. As a
records show that the proceeds of the checks trial court hearing an ordinary action, it cannot
were remitted to AMC which cannot therefore resolve matters pertaining to special
now claim that it did not receive these proceedings because the latter is subject to
proceeds. specific rules.

Metrobank also raised the defense of Metrobank responded to the RTC ruling by
estoppel. According to Metrobank, AMC had filing a petition for certiorari28 under Rule 65
knowledge of its arrangements with Chua for before the CA.
several years. Despite this arrangement, AMC
did not object to nor did it call the attention of The CA’s Ruling
Metrobank about Chua’s alleged lack of
authority to deposit the checks in Ayala The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling that
Lumber and Hardware’s account. At this point, Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint should
AMC is already estopped from questioning have been filed in Special Proceedings No.
Chua’s authority to deposit these checks in 99-0023.29 According to the CA, the relief that
Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account. Metrobank prayed for was based on a quasi-
contract and was a money claim categorized
Lastly, Metrobank asserted that AMC gave as an implied contract that should be filed
Chua unbridled control in managing AMC’s under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
affairs. This measure of control amounted to Court.
gross negligence that was the proximate
cause of the loss that AMC must now bear. Based on the statutory construction principle
of lex specialis derogat generali, the CA held
Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for that Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court is
leave to admit fourth-party complaint24 against a special provision that should prevail over the
Chua’s estate. It alleged that Chua’s estate general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the
should reimburse Metrobank in case it would Rules of Court. The latter applies to money
be held liable in the third-party complaint filed claims in ordinary actions while a money claim
against it by AMC. against a person already deceased falls under
the settlement of his estate that is governed
The RTC’s Ruling by the rules on special proceedings. If at all,
rules for ordinary actions only apply
In an order25 dated May 7, 2004, the RTC suppletorily to special proceedings.
denied Metrobank’s motion. It likewise denied
Metrobank’s motion for reconsideration in an The Present Petition
order26 dated July 7, 2004.
In its present petition for review on
The RTC categorized Metrobank’s allegation certiorari,30 Metrobank asserts that it should
in the fourth-party complaint as a "cobro de lo be allowed to file a fourth-party complaint
indebido"27 – a kind of quasi-contract that against Chua’s estate in the proceedings
mandates recovery of what has been before the RTC; its fourth-party complaint was
improperly paid. Quasi-contracts fall within the filed merely to enforce its right to be
concept of implied contracts that must be reimbursed by Chua’s estate in case
included in the claims required to be filed with Metrobank is held liable to AMC. Hence,
the judicial settlement of the deceased’s Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
estate under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules should apply.
of Court. As such claim, it should have been
filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023, not
AMC, in its comment,31 maintains the line that In F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc. v.
the CA and the RTC rulings should be Online Networks International, Inc.,34 Online
followed, i.e., that Metrobank’s claim is a Networks International, Inc. similarly assailed
quasi-contract that should be filed as a claim F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc.’s failure to
under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of attach the transcript of stenographic notes
Court. (TSN) of the RTC proceedings, and claimed
this omission to be a violation of Section 4,
AMC also challenges the form of Metrobank’s Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that warranted
petition for failure to comply with Section 4, the petition’s dismissal. The Court held that
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This provision the defect was not fatal, as the TSN of the
requires petitions filed before the Supreme proceedings before the RTC forms part of the
Court to be accompanied by "such material records of the case. Thus, there was no
portions of the record as would support the incurable omission that warranted the outright
petition." dismissal of the petition.

According to AMC, the petition’s annexes are The Court significantly pointed out in F.A.T.
mostly Metrobank’s pleadings and court Kee that the requirement in Section 4, Rule 45
issuances. It did not append all relevant AMC of the Rules of Court is not meant to be an
pleadings before the RTC and the CA. For this absolute rule whose violation would
reason, the petition should have been automatically lead to the petition’s
dismissed outright. dismissal.35 The Rules of Court has not been
intended to be totally rigid. In fact, the Rules of
Issues Court provides that the Supreme Court "may
require or allow the filing of such pleadings,
briefs, memoranda or documents as it may
The parties’ arguments, properly joined,
deem necessary within such periods and
present to us the following issues:
under such conditions as it may consider
appropriate";36 and "[i]f the petition is given
1) Whether the petition for review on due course, the Supreme Court may require
certiorari filed by Metrobank before the the elevation of the complete record of the
Supreme Court complies with Section case or specified parts thereof within fifteen
4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; and (15) days from notice."37 These provisions are
in keeping with the overriding standard that
2) Whether Metrobank’s fourth-party procedural rules should be liberally construed
complaint against Chua’s estate to promote their objective and to assist the
should be allowed. parties in obtaining a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or
The Court’s Ruling proceeding.38

The Present Petition Complies With Section 4, Under this guiding principle, we do not see
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Metrobank’s omission to be a fatal one that
should warrant the petition’s outright
AMC posits that Metrobank’s failure to append dismissal. To be sure, the omission to submit
relevant AMC pleadings submitted to the RTC the adverse party’s pleadings in a petition
and to the CA violated Section 4, Rule 45 of before the Court is not a commendable
the Rules of Court,32 and is a sufficient ground practice as it may lead to an unduly biased
to dismiss the petition under Section 5, Rule narration of facts and arguments that masks
45 of the Rules of Court.33 the real issues before the Court. Such skewed
presentation could lead to the waste of the
We disagree with AMC’s position. Court’s time in sifting through the maze of the
parties’ narrations of facts and arguments and
is a danger the Rules of Court seeks to avoid.
Our examination of Metrobank’s petition explained that the term "implied contracts," as
shows that it contains AMC’s opposition to its used in our remedial law, originated from the
motion to admit fourth-party complaint among common law where obligations derived from
its annexes. The rest of the pleadings have quasi-contracts and from law are both
been subsequently submitted as attachments considered as implied contracts. Thus, the
in Metrobank’s Reply. A reading of these term quasi-contract is included in the concept
pleadings shows that their arguments are the "implied contracts" as used in the Rules of
same as those stated in the orders of the trial Court. Accordingly, liabilities of the deceased
court and the Court of Appeals. Thus, even if arising from quasi-contracts should be filed as
Metrobank’s petition did not contain some of claims in the settlement of his estate, as
AMC’s pleadings, the Court still had the provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
benefit of a clear narration of facts and Court.41
arguments according to both parties’
perspectives. In this broader view, the Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is
mischief that the Rules of Court seeks to based on quasi-contract
avoid has not really been present. If at all, the
omission is not a grievous one that the spirit of Both the RTC and the CA described
liberality cannot address. Metrobank’s claim against Chua’s estate as
one based on quasi-contract. A quasi-contract
The Merits of the Main Issue involves a juridical relation that the law
creates on the basis of certain voluntary,
The main issue poses to us two essential unilateral and lawful acts of a person, to avoid
points that must be addressed. First, are unjust enrichment.42 The Civil Code provides
quasi-contracts included in claims that should an enumeration of quasi-contracts,43 but the
be filed pursuant to Rule 86, Section 5 of the list is not exhaustive and merely provides
Rules of Court? Second, if so, is Metrobank’s examples.44
claim against the Estate of Jose Chua based
on a quasi-contract? According to the CA, Metrobank’s fourth-party
complaint falls under the quasi-contracts
Quasi-contracts are included in enunciated in Article 2154 of the Civil
claims that should be filed under Rule Code.45 Article 2154 embodies the concept
86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court "solutio indebiti" which arises when something
is delivered through mistake to a person who
In Maclan v. Garcia,39 Gabriel Maclan filed a has no right to demand it. It obligates the latter
civil case to recover from Ruben Garcia the to return what has been received through
necessary expenses he spent as possessor of mistake.46
a piece of land. Garcia acquired the land as
an heir of its previous owner. He set up the Solutio indebiti, as defined in Article 2154 of
defense that this claim should have been filed the Civil Code, has two indispensable
in the special proceedings to settle the estate requisites: first, that something has been
of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other unduly delivered through mistake; and
hand, contended that his claim arises from law second, that something was received when
and not from contract, express or implied. there was no right to demand it.47
Thus, it need not be filed in the settlement of
the estate of Garcia’s predecessor, as In its fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims
mandated by Section 5, Rule 87 of the Rules that Chua’s estate should reimburse it if it
of Court (now Section 5, Rule 86). becomes liable on the checks that it deposited
to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account
The Court held under these facts that a claim upon Chua’s instructions.
for necessary expenses spent as previous
possessor of the land is a kind of quasi- This fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti.
contract. Citing Leung Ben v. O’Brien,40 it First, Metrobank acted in a manner akin to a
mistake when it deposited the AMC checks to the decedent, must be filed within the time
Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account; limited in the notice. [italics ours]
because of Chua’s control over AMC’s
operations, Metrobank assumed that the Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule
checks payable to AMC could be deposited to 86 of the Rules of Court prevail over
Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account. general provisions of Section 11, Rule
Second, Ayala Lumber and Hardware had no 6 of the Rules of Court
right to demand and receive the checks that
were deposited to its account; despite Chua’s Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of
control over AMC and Ayala Lumber and the Rules of Court should apply because it
Hardware, the two entities are distinct, and impleaded Chua’s estate for reimbursement in
checks exclusively and expressly payable to the same transaction upon which it has been
one cannot be deposited in the account of the sued by AMC. On this point, the Court
other. This disjunct created an obligation on supports the conclusion of the CA, to wit:
the part of Ayala Lumber and Hardware,
through its sole proprietor, Chua, to return the
Notably, a comparison of the respective
amount of these checks to Metrobank.
provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 and Section
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court readily shows
The Court notes, however, that its description that Section 11, Rule 6 applies to ordinary civil
of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint as a actions while Section 5, Rule 86 specifically
claimclosely analogous to solutio indebiti is applies to money claims against the estate.
only to determine the validity of the lower The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 x
courts’ orders denying it. It is not an x x must therefore prevail over the general
adjudication determining the liability of Chua’s provisions of Section 11, Rule 6.48
estate against Metrobank. The appropriate
trial court should still determine whether
We read with approval the CA’s use of the
Metrobank has a lawful claim against Chua’s
statutory construction principle of lex specialis
estate based on quasi-contract.
derogat generali, leading to the conclusion
1âw phi1

that the specific provisions of Section 5, Rule


Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint, 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over
as a contingent claim, falls within the the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of
claims that should be filed under the Rules of Court; the settlement of the
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of estate of deceased persons (where claims
Court against the deceased should be filed) is
primarily governed by the rules on special
A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth- proceedings, while the rules provided for
party complaint is its contingent nature – the ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6
claim depends on the possibility that ofthe Rules of Court, merely apply
Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, suppletorily.49
a future event that may or may not happen.
This characteristic unmistakably marks the In sum, on all counts in the considerations
complaint as a contingent one that must be material to the issues posed, the resolution
included in the claims falling under the terms points to the affirmation of the assailed CA
of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court: decision and resolution. Metrobank's claim in
its fourth-party complaint against Chua's
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the estate is based on quasi-contract. It is also a
notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. – All contingent claim that depends on another
claims for money against the decedent, event. Both belong to the category of claims
arising from contract, express or implied, against a deceased person that should be
whether the same be due, not due, or filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and Comi and, as such, should have been so filed
expenses for the last sickness of the in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.
decedent, and judgment for money against
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit.
The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 25, 2005, holding that the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company's motion
for leave to admit fourth-party complaint Is