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Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth FAR: FAR-26395 Filed: 12/13/2018 3:13 AM

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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
FAR-26395

H. CHRISTOPHER STARKEY, & another

Plaintiffs/Respondents

v.

CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC & others

Defendants/Applicants

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF
THE BARNSTABLE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS-APPLICANTS APPLICATION
TO OBTAIN FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW

______________________________________________________

Glenn F. Russell, Jr.
BBO# 656914
Glenn F. Russell, Jr.
& Associates, P.C.
38 Rock Street, Suite 12
Fall River, Massachusetts 02720
Dated: December 13, 2018 (508) 324.4545 (telephone)
(508) 938-0244 (fax)
russ45esq@gmail.com
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION AND PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS
CONCISE STATETMENT OF OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS REQUEST FOR OBTANING
FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW...................1

II. ARGUMENT WHY THE APPLICATION SHOULD BE
DENIED, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, BE TAKEN UP
TO CONSIDER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
“AS APPLIED” APPLICATION OF FIRREA’s
JURISDICTIONAL BAR.........................7

A. Defendants-Applicants Cited Case Law Is
Inapposite..................................7

B. Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d. 93 Is Also
Distinguishable on The Facts...............13

III. CONCLUSION.................................17

RULE 16(k)......................................19

STATEMENT CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE................20
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATE DECISIONS

McLaughlin v. FDIC,
415 Mass. 235 (1993).........................9,10

FEDERAL DECSIONS

Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB,
994 F.Supp. 82 (D.NH 1992).....................9

DeMelo v. U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
727 F.3d 117 (1st. Cir. 2017)..............passim

In re Purcell,
150 B.R. 111 (D.Vt.1993).......................9

Tellado v. IndyMac Mort. Servcs.,
707 F.3d 275 (3rd. Cir. 2013)...............11,12

Willner v. Dimon,
849 F.3d 93 (4th Cir. 2017)........13,14,15,16,17
1

I. INTRODUCTION AND PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS
CONCISE STATETMENT OF OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS REQUEST FOR OBTANING
FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW

Pursuant to Mass. R. App. P., R. 27.1(c),

Plaintiffs-Respondents herein respectfully submit their

Opposition to the Defendants-Applicants Application for

Further Appellate Review regarding the September 11,

2018 decision of the Massachusetts Appeals Court in H.

Christopher Starkey, et. al v. Chase Home Finance, LLC

& others, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 1 (2018).

Indeed, Applicants are required to present

articulable reasons for the extraordinary relief sought

here, see Mass. R. App. P., R. 27.1(a):

“The Application “shall be founded upon
substantial reasons affecting the public interest
or the interests of justice.” Mass. R. App. P.
27.1(a).”

Thus, Defendants-Applicants bear the burden to show that

the case presents extraordinary special factors in order

to warrant further review. Defendants-Applicants have

clearly failed to meet that onerous burden. This matter

has had a long-lived, and extensive history, at the

Barnstable County Superior Court. Indeed, the preceding

is borne out by referencing the superior court docket

sheet, which reveals the fact that this matter was filed
2

with the Barnstable County Superior Court on November

20, 2009.

In its introduction, the Defendants-Applicants

frequently discuss the requirements of the Financial

Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act

(FIRREA). 1 However, while Defendants-Applicants linger

much on the wording of said Federal Statute, and state

that “claims” relating to the “Failed Bank” (Washington

Mutual Bank or WaMu) fall under the jurisdictional bar

of FIRREA, they understandably also do not linger on the

fact that the instant matter raises significant issues

related to whether the Plaintiffs-Respondents note and

mortgage were actually an “owned asset” of WaMu at the

time of its Failure and takeover by the FDIC. Such

examination is critical as to whether Plaintiffs-

Respondents would even be subject to the jurisdictional

bar of FIRREA at all.

1 Indeed, the Defendants-Applicants have enlisted a
blue-ribbon committee of Attorneys from the Firm “of
last resort”, to submit the instant Application,
including two of which clerked for United States Supreme
Court Justices [one having clerked for two different
Justices], another who also has extensive history of
appearing before the United States Supreme Court
(“SCOTUS”), as well as the fourth Attorney who has
extensive history in a support role involving cases
brought before the SCOTUS.
3

Putting the constitutional challenge aside, the

failure to establish the preceding would undeniably

preclude the application of FIRREA’s “jurisdictional

bar” to the instant fact pattern.

The well-reasoned and thoughtfully written opinion

by the Appeals Court makes this critical examination and

related distinction; finding that the proper remedy

would be for remand and discovery to reach these disputed

material factual issues under a fully developed record.

Understandably, Defendants-Applicants also do not

discuss the fact that despite the instant matter having

been litigated for almost five (5) years [at that time],

the same Defendants-Applicants filed a Motion to Dismiss

in September 2014, in which there was never any prior

mention of any claim of defense related to FIRREA, or

its jurisdictional bar. Thus, Plaintiffs-Respondents

were precluded from ever briefing this issue in any

Opposition to the Defendants-Applicants separate

12(b)(6) Motions. For unknown reasons, the trial court

also did not activate the recording system during the

hearing on Defendants-Applicants Motions to Dismiss. 2

Thus, at no time prior to the entry of judgment were the

2
The Trial Court Judge has since retired.
4

Plaintiffs-Respondents allowed to brief this issue, or

indeed competently respond, outside of the few words

associated at the oral argument after being blind-sided

by the handing up of the First Circuit ruling in DeMelo

v. U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 727 F.3d 117 (2013).

Defendants-Applicants completely ignore the 12th Hour

ambush foisted upon Plaintiffs-Respondents, and its

associated impact related to receiving a fair hearing on

the merits.

To this end, FIRREA does not allow for providing a

borrower, such as the Plaintiffs-Respondents, with any

notice that unless they follow the “claims procedure”

under FIRREA through filing the same in Washington D.C.,

they would then become permanently precluded from ever

raising any “claim” against the Failed Bank. Thus, here,

the Superior Court Judge dismissed the Plaintiffs-

Respondents claims on the basis of a “lack of

jurisdiction”, whereby he found that because they did

not exhaust the claim procedure under FIRREA [of which

they had no notice of], the trial court lacked

jurisdiction. 3 Similarly, as they did in the Appeals

Court, Defendants-Applicants, again seek to advance

3 Thus, supplying the necessary state action.
5

different theories under FIRREA for the first time on

appeal they what raised before the trial court, other

than merely handing up the DeMelo case during oral

argument at the trial court Motion to Dismiss. 4 5

Defendants-Applicants aver that FIRREA is a

“critical federal banking statute to which nationwide

uniformity and prompt administration of a failed bank’s

assets are vital.” Indeed, while the preceding may be

true regarding FIRREA, its intersection with a

borrower’s constitutional right to be heard has never

been squarely addressed by the United States Supreme

Court, or by this Court with regard to the Massachusetts

State Constitution. 6 Additionally, the entirety of case

4
Defendants Applicants also completely ignore the fact
that FIRREA was enacted to protect assuming banks from
“claims of creditors”. Thus, at the time of the 1989
enactment of this federal scheme, the “jurisdictional
bar” of FIRREA never contemplated the “doomsday machine”
devised by the financial industry “quants”, whereby
under the “securitization paradigm” the originating
“lender” [of a Failed Bank] was immediately divested of
ownership of the mortgage loan “asset”, but yet remained
the “mortgage servicer
5 For a good review and thorough examination of the

“securitization process”, please review this Courts
opinion in U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass.
637 (SJC 2011), where undersigned successfully argued on
behalf of the borrower mortgagor LaRace family, and
continues to do so presently.
6 Indeed, DeMelo was never afforded such opportunity,

yet this First Circuit ruling stands as a ticket for the
well-heeled counsel of the financial industry to
continue to evade review on this issue in the future.
6

law provided by the Defendants-Applicants in support of

the instant Application is easily distinguishable from

precise fact pattern presented here, and actually

supports the findings made in the well-reasoned opinion

written by the Appeals Court. Additionally, there is

also currently a split of authority relative to claims

raised in defense being subject to the jurisdictional

bar of FIRREA. The reasons above make clear why the

Defendants-Applicants legal team was formed. 7

This Court likewise should Deny the instant

Application, however, should this Court decide to take

this matter up on Further Appellate Review, it would

have to consider the Plaintiffs-Respondents

constitutional claims, as the Appeals Court declined to

reach this issue solely due to the basis of its ruling,

and on the assumption that this matter was being

remanded, [see opinion at n. 4]. 8

7 Indeed, if this matter is taken up by this Court, and
Defendants-Applicants do not receive the result that
they seek, they would then have an avenue to SCOTUS,
with the appropriate legal team to advance such cause
already in place.
8 There are several judicial decisions that have
questioned, and indeed found issue with, the fact that
a borrower is never provided notice under the FIRREA
statutory scheme, but that these decisions are also in
disagreement with other opinions see Plaintiffs Reply
Br., pp. 16-18. Such split of authority between Circuits
7

II. ARGUMENT WHY THE APPLICATION SHOULD BE DENIED, OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, BE TAKEN UP TO CONSIDER THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE “AS APPLIED” APPLICATION
OF FIRREA’s JURISDICTIONAL BAR

A. Defendants-Applicants Cited Case Law Is
Inapposite

Defendants-Applicants state that the Appeals

Court decision “is wrong”, premised upon a

requirement that:

“...courts must follow the plain language of the
statute when it is unambiguous and when its
application would not lead to an absurd result of
contravene the Legislature’s clear intent” Def.
Appl., at p. 19.

Of course, in order for the above to hold true, as

a condition precedent there must be an examination as to

the “legislative clear intent”, and whether the

particular facts presented even apply to the particular

statute under review, i.e. are the litigants presently

before this court actually among the class of

individuals or entities contemplated by congress to be

among the class to be subject thereto. The language cited

to by the Defendants-Applicants instructive, that is the

caveat that the application of a statute cannot lead to

an absurd result.

also creates the very real possibility of SCOTUS
intervention.
8

Here, Defendants-Applicants urge this Court to

allow an “as applied” application of a statute that would

be absurd under the facts presented here. Thus, it is

not an examination of other matters factual posture, but

rather it is the “as applied” statute to the particular

facts of this matter under review. Thus, here such “as

applied” application of the jurisdictional bar to the

instant fact pattern precluded any Notice to be provided

to the Plaintiffs-Respondents “borrowers” whatsoever.

Further, this “as applied” application of statute

facilitates a taking, without ever receiving notice or

hearing. Thus, the trial court ultimately found that

Plaintiffs failure to undertake a “FIRREA claims

procedure” was found to permanently extinguish all of

their rights of ever being heard to defend their title

to real property. 9 Clearly such requested “as applied”

application of FIRREA by Defendants-Applicants to this

matter, would not only represent an “absurd result”, it

would also clearly run afoul of Plaintiffs-Respondents

being afforded due process under both the United States

9
Surely, a former “fairly prominent” attorney from this
Commonwealth and Second President of these United
States, John Adams, along with his former Vice President
and fellow founding father “BFF” Thomas Jefferson, would
be aghast at such proposition.
9

Constitution as well as the Constitution of this

Commonwealth. 10

Defendants-Applicants posit that the Appeals Court

ruling in this matter caused a “split” in the holdings

regarding application of FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar.

Plaintiffs-Respondents state that such argument is a red

herring, and not accurate. Indeed, Defendants-Applicants

clearly seek to place the proverbial cart before the

horse, as unlike their cited case holdings, Plaintiffs-

Respondents have demonstrably pled, with documentary

indicia support, that material issues of fact remain in

dispute relative to whether or not Plaintiffs-

Respondents mortgage loan was a held “asset” of WaMu at

the time of its Failure and take over by the FDIC.

Additionally, Applicants citation of Willner can easily

be distinguished upon the facts. 11

10 Indeed, Plaintiffs made citation to judicial opinions
that have openly queried, and ruled against application
of the jurisdictional bar of FIRREA for this very reason,
[see Open Br. At pp. 32-35, and collecting cases cited
to therein]; In re Purcell, 150 B.R. 111, 113–115
(D.Vt.1993); Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB, 994 F. Supp. 82,
90–91 (D.N.H. 1992); Scott v. RTC (In re Scott), 157
B.R. 297, 310– 312;
11
Thus, references at pp. 18-19 of the FAR related to
FIRREA’s application in Massachusetts is submitted to
confuse the precise issue before this Court, as it
must first be determined whether FIRREA even applies
to this matter at all.
10

Defendants-Applicants further cite approvingly to

McLaughlin v. FDIC, 415 Mass. 235, 237 (1993), for the

proposition that; “plaintiffs failure to participate in

a timely manner in FIRREA’s administrative process is

fatal”. Of course, what Defendants-Applicants fail to

discuss is the fact that this case is also

distinguishable on the facts. McLaughlin involved a

“non-securitized” mortgage loan undertaken in 1993,

where the default occurred involving a loan that

remained as an “owned asset” of the original “lender” at

the time of its failure and was taken over by the FDIC.

Further, unlike the instant fact pattern, there were

already judicial proceedings involving the original

lender, in which after the Bank’s Failure the FDIC

stepped into the shoes of the original lender. Further,

unlike Plaintiffs Applicants fact pattern, McLaughlin

clearly had Notice of the FDIC involvement at the time

of the bank failure, and also had bountiful opportunity

to raise arguments related thereto. Clearly the

McLaughlin fact pattern is inapposite as to what the

Plaintiffs’-Respondents fact pattern before this Court

entails.

In Plaintiffs-Appellants opening brief before the

Appeals Court, they also clearly distinguished DeMelo on
11

the facts where, unlike the instant fact pattern, DeMelo

conceded that his mortgage loan was a held asset of

Downey Savings at the time of its Failure, and therefore

FIRREA applied, see Plaintiff-Resp. Open Br., at pp.13-

14; p. 20; pp. 32-33, and n. 6 12 (last para.). 13

Additionally, in DeMelo, the First Circuit recognized

that it was also “unsurprising” that the only court of

appeals to have squarely addressed the “relatively

novel” proposition advanced by plaintiffs [FIRREAA only

applies to creditors] was Tellado v. IndyMac Mort.

Servcs. 707 F.3d. 275,279-281 (3rd Cir. 2013), [see

Demelo at 727 F.3d. 123]. The DeMelo Court solely relied

upon Tellado in stating that FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar

applies “unreservedly to consumer protection claims”. 14

12 Unlike the instant matter, DeMelo was provided an
opportunity to raise the failure of Notice under FIRREA,
which his failure to do so at the trial court level was
fatal to his appellate claim, see DeMelo, see at 727
F.3d.124. Thus, DeMelo never raised an “as applied”
challenge to the application of the FIRREA
jurisdictional bar, and this federal case would not be
precedential as to this Court’s review of the
constitutionality of such application under the
Massachusetts state constitution, or whether the current
Deutsche Bank claimant met state statutory muster in
order to utilize the Massachusetts extra-judicial
statutory foreclosure process.

Indeed, no court, outside of this Court, could make the
14

ultimate determination as to whether or not the
Plaintiffs-Respondents rights [and similarly situated
12

Reviewing Tellado, we also find that, like DeMelo, there

was no challenge raised that the mortgage loan in

question was owned by the Failed Bank at the time of its

takeover by the FDIC. Additionally, unlike Plaintiffs-

Respondents theory and pleadings for an entitlement to

relief here, Tellado solely relied upon an “unfair and

deceptive business practice” undertaken by the original

lender (IndyMac). Thus, unlike the instant fact pattern,

Tellado was advancing a “claim” directly against the

failed bank in which there was never any challenge or

dispute as to whether the mortgage loan in question was

actually an “owned asset of the Failed Bank”. Thus, the

preceding clearly distinguishes both DeMelo, and

Tellado, on the facts, and also provides grist for the

mill that the constitutionality of FIRREA’s

jurisdictional bar as applied to “borrowers” begs for

first impression judicial review under the facts as

presented here. 15

citizens of Massachusetts] would be abridged under the
Constitution of this Commonwealth regarding the “as
applied” application of jurisdictional bar of FIRREA
advanced by the Defendants-Applicants.
15
FIRREA was enacted in 1989 as a result of the “Savings
and Loan” crisis. When this statute was enacted,
Congress was never confronted, [and therefore never
considered] the mass “securitization” of mortgage loans.
Thus, at the time the statute was enacted, it was solely
intended to myopically apply to “creditors of the failed
13

The Plaintiffs-Respondents fact pattern creates

very real, and live, issues related to whether or not

their particular mortgage loan was actually owned by

WaMu at the time of its Failure. 16 Plaintiffs-Respondents

will also distinguish Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d. 93

below.

B. Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d. 93 Is Also
Distinguishable on The Facts

Defendants-Applicants state that the underlying

Appeals Court decision in this matter is “at odds” with

the Fourth Circuit Opinion in Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d.

93. In fact, the underlying Appeals Court opinion in

this matter discusses, and distinguishes, Willner at n.

7, stating that Defendants rely on Willner “for more

than its worth”. Undaunted, Defendants-Applicants again

raise this case through new appellate counsel. However,

bank”.
Indeed, in 1989, the odds were very high that the
mortgage loan in default was undertaken by a borrower
from the same lending institution that still owned the
loan. Fast forward to September 25, 2008 [the date of
the WaMu Failure], and we find that very few, if any,
mortgage loans were owned by WaMu at the time of its
Failure and takeover by the FDIC, as WaMu’s mortgage
loans were “securitized” immediately after origination
[or prior to].

16 This is exacerbated by the fact that the publicly
available “Purchase and Assumption Agreement” between
the FDIC and JPMC does not include any schedule of
specific assets owned by WaMu at the time of its Failure.
14

for the sake of completeness Plaintiffs-Applicants will

again distinguish Willner below. 17

When actually reviewing the Willner Opinion, like

DeMelo, Tellado, and McLaughlin, it also reveals a

clearly distinguishable fact pattern involving a

completely different claim for relief and application of

FIRREA that what the Plaintiffs-Respondents request

here. As pro-se litigants, Willner also never raised an

“as applied” Constitutional challenge to the

jurisdictional bar of FIRRA regarding its complete

failure of notice to “borrowers”. Again, unlike

Defendants-Applicants cited case law, Plaintiffs-

Respondents had no opportunity for any pre-trial court

decision briefing regarding the application of FIRREA’s

jurisdictional bar, or its “as applied”

constitutionality. 18

17
The Defendants-Applicants also request that this Court
ignore the First Circuit holding in Bolduc, only on the
basis of the Fourth Circuit holding in Willner, where
that Court subjectively declined to follow the First
Circuit finding regarding claims raised defensively
under FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar. Of Course, the
Willner court was not required to follow a holding from
a different Circuit. Bolduc stands as an authoritative
holding from the Circuit Court for Massachusetts, and
thus is due deference, despite Defendant-Applicants
protestations otherwise
18 Only in their post judgment Motion for Reconsideration

were Plaintiffs-Respondents allowed to discuss FIRREA
and distinguish the DeMelo case from the case at bar.
15

Further, only for the first time in their appeal

and Application did the Defendants-Applicants raise a

particular aspect of FIRREA that was never previously

raised at the trial court level. For this reason alone,

the Application should be denied. 19 Willner involved a

pro-se twenty-seven (27) count complaint, in which the

Willner [non-attorney] Plaintiffs alleged a bevy of

counts on appeal that never questioned whether the asset

was owned by the Failed Bank at the time of its Failure,

[see 849 F.3d 102].

The Willner Court examined the above claims and

found the following:

“In particular, the Willners allege that WMB agreed
not to foreclose on the Property, that the Note does
not exist because Mrs. Willner never signed it, and
that the Deed of Trust cannot be used to foreclose on

19
The Defendants-Applicants state that “the flaw” in
the Appeals Court ruling is that it “conflated
assignment of the Starkey’s mortgage note (an asset)with
an assignment of the Starkey’s legal claims (a liability
related to that asset)”; then further stating; “under
the holder in due course doctrine, the sale of the note
does not convey ‘liabilities’ relating to that Note”.
The only liability of Plaintiffs was that as a “borrower
on the Note”. In fact, the above passage represents an
admission by Defendants-Applicants that Plaintiffs’
Respondents note was an asset that was “sold” to the
Defendant Trust prior to the WaMu Failure. The mortgage
is not a “liability” to that asset, as the mortgage
holder is entirely reliant upon the owner of the note.
Of course, a “sale” of a note is governed by U.C.C.,
Article 9, not Article 3, see G.L. c. 106, §9-102(12)(B);
§9-102(28)(B).
16

the Property because the Note to which it refers does
not exist. Because these unexhausted claims are
functionally pleaded against the acts and omissions of
WMB rather than against independent misconduct by
Chase and U.S. Bank, § 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) operates as
a jurisdictional bar [emph. added]”

Clearly, Count I of Plaintiff-Respondents complaint

before this Court advances to no similar direct

allegation under any “claim” related to a WaMu

“misrepresentation” or a WaMu failure to honor any

“agreement not to foreclose”, but merely challenged the

current claimant, Deutsche Bank, N.T. Co, as Trustee for

the named trust’s “standing”, that is whether it was a

current proper party to enforce Plaintiffs-Respondents

note and mortgage [not WaMu]. 20 The preceding challenge

was supported by the publicly available documents,

including the recorded May 2009 assignment of mortgage,

as well as a “pooling and serving agreement” [indicating

20
The Willner Court continues, at p. 104:“Thus, if
FIRREA's jurisdictional bar applies, it's because the
Willners' claims fall within FIRREA's other exhaustion
requirement for "any claim relating to any act or
omission of [an institution for which the FDIC has been
appointed receiver] or the Corporation as receiver." 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii).Section 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii)
bars unexhausted claims against an assuming bank that
relate to an act or omission of an institution for which
the Office of Thrift Supervision appointed the FDIC as
receiver, but a suit "against a third-party bank for its
own wrongdoing ... is not barred by" §
1821(d)(13)(D)(ii).”Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, at
104
17

a sale of a finite grouping of loans to the Defendant

trust in 2006], that was provided by Defendants-

Applicants themselves; and which PSA document was also

included in the underlying trial court record. 21 Again,

the finding by the Willner court requires admission that

the asset in question [Plaintiffs-Respondents mortgage

loan] was actually owned by the Failed Bank at the time

of its Failure, an issue squarely in doubt here.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and cited ratio

decidendi herein, the Plaintiffs-Respondents

respectfully request that this court Deny the Defendant-

Applicants Application. In the alternative, if this

Court decides to take this matter up, Plaintiffs-

Respondents respectfully request that such Application

also include an examination of the constitutionality of

the jurisdictional bar of FIRREA, as applied to

borrowers, under both the U.S. Constitution, as well as

the Constitution of this Commonwealth.

Respectfully Submitted
Plaintiffs

21Thus, creating live issues relative to the claim that
WaMu owned Plaintiffs-Respondents mortgage loan as an
asset of the Failed Bank at the time of its September
25, 2008 takeover by the FDIC.
18

By their Attorney

______________________
Glenn F. Russell, Jr.
BBO#656914
Glenn F. Russell, Jr.
& Associates, P.C.
38 Rock Street, Suite 12
Fall River, MA 02720
Phone: (508) 324-4545
Fax: (508) 938-0244
Email: russ45esq@gmail.com
19

RULE 16(k) STATEMENT

I hereby certify that the foregoing Opening Brief

of the Plaintiffs-Respondents complies, to the best of

my knowledge and belief, with the rules of Court

pertaining to the filing of appellate briefs,

including, but not limited to: Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(6)

(pertinent findings or memorandum of decision);

Mass.R.A.P. 16(f) (reproduction of statutes, rules

regulations); Mass.R.A.P. 16 (h) (length of briefs);

Mass.R.A.P. 18 (appendix to the briefs); and Mass.R.A.P.

20 (form of brief, appendices, and other papers).

_____________________
Glenn F. Russell, Jr
20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Glenn F. Russell, Jr., hereby certify that on

this 12th day of December, 2018, I served a copy of the

Plaintiffs-Respondents; Opposition to the Defendants-

Applicants Application for Further Appellate Review, by

USPS, postage prepaid, and filed through the Court’s

electronic filing system, upon the following counsel

of record:

Counsel for
Defendants-Applicants

Alan E. Schoenfeld(pro hac vice)
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
7 World Trade Center
250 Greenwich Street
New York, N.Y. 10007

Albinas J. Prizgintas(pro hac vice)
Arpit K. Garg (pro hac vice)
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
1875 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Mark C. Fleming
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
60 State Street
Boston, MA 02109

_____________________
Glenn F. Russell, Jr.