Two types of freedom and four dimensions of power

MARK HAUGAARD

In the power literature power and freedom are often related to each other in
apparently paradoxical ways.
The three-dimensional power debate, which runs from Dahl (1957) to Lukes
(2005), was implicitly premised upon a power/freedom opposition. To the extent
to which someone is subject to power they are un-free. The three dimensions of
power constitute more and more complex social processes in which the subject
of power is made un-free. In the first dimension the object of power is un-free
because they are prevailed upon by another actor in decision-making; in the
second, because there is bias against their desired freedoms and; in the third,
their freedom is limited by some hegemonic ideology.
In contrast to the above, Arendt argued that power constitutes a condition of
possibility for the freedoms of citizenship. Following Aristotle, she believed
that humans are only truly free through politics and the essence of politics is
power, which is theorized as the capacity for action people gain from acting in
concert (Arendt 1957, 1970). Similarly, although based upon entirely different
premises, Parsons argued that power is a circulating medium that flows through
the political system, akin to money, which endows political actors with the
capacity to achieve collective goals (Parsons 1963).
More recently, working within the liberal tradition, Morriss argues that the
concepts of power and freedom overlap to a significant extent (2009). Essen-
tially, power is a dispositional concept that constitutes our ability, or capacity,
to act (Morriss 2002). This capacity is a precondition for freedom. A liberal
would not only condemn a society that blocks its members from doing what
they wish (which is what the three-dimensional theorists have in mind) but they
would also be critical of any society which deprives them of the capacity to act,
or power-to (Morriss 2009). The freedom to starve under a bridge is only partial
freedom. Yes, there is absence of limitation of choice through interdiction but
without the power-to realize any desired freedoms.
The relative inadequacy of the concept of negative freedom, with regard to
capacities, has led Pettit to reformulate a more robust view of freedom. Pettit
argues that freedom is not simply the absence of coercion but the capacity to
38 MARK HAUGAARD

act as a citizen (Pettit 2012). This builds upon the ancient Roman concept of
citizenship, in which a citizen was a liber, or freeman, as opposed to a slave
who is subject to the powers of another. The citizen is someone who is not
subject to the arbitrary power of another. As a liber who is equal before the
law, the citizen can look the other in the eye, without fear or deference (Pettit
2012, 2014).
While Pettit’s path is richly suggestive, it develops the concept of freedom
based upon an agent-centred view of power. Consonant with this, Pettit endorses
Dahl’s one-dimensional characterization of power (Pettit 2008). While Pettit’s
positive view of law has affinity with the work of Arendt, Pettit does not concep-
tualize citizenship in terms of power-to or power-with (see Allen 1999). As
suggested by the title of his article ‘Freedom as Anti-Power’, for Pettit power
and freedom are theorized as opposites. Therefore, while Pettit’s image of the
citizen as someone who is empowered by the law is richly suggestive, Pettit’s
republicanism does not provide us with the conceptual tools necessary to over-
come the apparent contradiction between the three-dimensional view of freedom
as the absence of power, and the power-to perspective, which interprets power
as a condition of possibility for freedom.
In Foucault’s work we also find an apparently contradictory account of the
relationship between power and freedom. On the one hand Foucault famously
argues that there is not power without freedom, which is characterized as resist-
ance (Foucault 1982). This suggests that power and freedom are opposites.
However, against that, he also argues that power works through our freedoms.
Power is not simply prohibitive but constitutive of specific modes of being-in-
the-world, which we perceive of as freedom. Yet, that freedom is not something
that we should embrace but is constitutive of a type of subject formation he
invites us to resist (Foucault 1982). As we shall see later, these tensions are
only apparently contradictory: they constitute opposing aspects of the complex
relationship between power and freedom.
In theorizing the relationship between power and freedom, I will begin by
distinguishing between natural freedom and social freedom, then I will analyse
these forms of freedom relative to the four dimension of power. Theoretically
this will entail using sociological theory as a mode of foregrounding normative
conclusions. We will argue that these two forms of freedom are in constant
tension, which means there can never be a state of freedom, in itself. Furthermore,
modern society is one of complex interdependence, which entails a compromise
of natural freedom for social freedom.
 TWO TYPES OF FREEDOM AND FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER 39

Natural freedom and social freedom:

Agency and freedom are inextricably tied concepts. Agency means the capacity
to do something. The most obvious way in which agency can be prevented from
acting is through interdiction. Thus the agent is externally prevented from doing
something. This is the central plank of the liberal concept of negative freedom
(Berlin 2002). What makes a tyranny obnoxious is that it entails normatively
unjustifiable external blocking of agency.
In pre-modern society, the legitimacy of the state was measured in terms of
external referents to the state itself. Thus, the state that created an empire or
accomplished other, so called, ‘glorious acts’, such as monument building, was
considered legitimate relative to these achievements. Within this kind of society
the individual counted only relative to these greater ends. Thus they constituted
a means to a greater end. However, with liberalism, the ordinary life came to
count as an end in itself (Taylor 1989). Therefore, the legitimacy of the state
is judged relative to its capacity to care for the individuals who comprise its
citizens.
As argued by Morriss (2009), a state that fails to provide for the agency of
social actors is normatively objectionable. A social actor who is not interdicted
but has no capacity for action is not free to realize any of their life choices.
Such an actor is only free relative to negative freedom, but their freedom has
only potential value, as they have no power-to. Accordingly, a minimal liber-
tarian state, which maximizes negative liberty, but leaves significant numbers
of its members without the capacity for action, may be considered normatively
reprehensible.
A capacity for action can come from two sources: either natural physical
sources or from society as a whole. An individual who only has physical power
is similar to a person in a hypothetical Hobbesian state of nature. Corresponding
to this state of being, which does not presuppose society, we will develop the
concept of natural freedom. This constitutes an ideal type, in the Weberian sense,
which does not exist in its pure form. Like Hobbes’ account of the state of nature,
it is an analytic concept, not an actual phenomenon. As natural freedom cannot
exist in its pure form the concept of natural freedom only ever exists partially,
in a scalar sense. Actual people have more or less natural freedom. In society,
the pursuit of natural freedom signifies the pursuit of freedom through the less-
ening of structural constraint. In modern societies we never come anywhere
near natural freedom as an end state. However, it is common for actors to seek
to increase their choice of actions by freeing themselves from some social
40 MARK HAUGAARD

constraints. In so doing they do not become more naturally free. In pursuing

natural freedom they decrease their level of mutual dependence based upon
structural constraint. I will take a concrete instance of the pursuit of natural
freedom to explain it.
At this moment of writing (February 2015) a newly elected government in
Greece, lead by Alexis Tsipras, is attempting to re-negotiate the conditions of
an EU backed Greek loan. In his first major speech to the Greek Parliament,
Tsipras said: ‘The bailout has failed. We want to make it clear in every direction
that we are not negotiating. We are not negotiating our national sovereignty.”
(quoted in Papadimas and Maltezou: 2015). The ‘not negotiating’ refers to
the fact that this government refuses to engage with any of the structures set
out under the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and the
International Monetary Fund). Tsipras and his supporters view these structures
as unacceptable restraints upon the actions of government. This rejection of the
mutual constraints agreed (under considerable pressure) by the previous Greek
government constitutes a bid for natural freedom. Of course, the rejection of
these structures does not mean that Greece is suddenly cast into a state of nature,
entirely absent of constraint. It is still in a system of mutual interdependence
with the rest of the EU. However, this can still be regarded, analytically, as
a bid to lessen some specific constraints placed upon Greece. As such, it is an
attempted move along a scale toward natural freedom. In time, this move may
precipitate a Greek exit from the Euro, and even the EU, which again are two
outcomes which constitute a lessening of certain constraints, thus as a move
toward natural freedom. Of course, even an exit from the EU does not mean
that Greece becomes an island unto itself, thus anywhere near approximating
state of nature.
While increasing natural freedom, an exit from the EU may well decrease
Greece’s capacity to act, thus power-to. Hence, the pursuit of natural freedom
has the potential to be at the cost of another form of freedom through agency
and power-to. In societies the levels of natural freedom are directly related to
the level of social integration of social actors. Some societies will entail rela-
tively less mutual dependence, and thus integration of social actors, than others.
Those with comparatively low integration will have a higher level of natural
freedom than societies with high levels of interdependence and mutual regula-
tion. However, high integration, while lowering natural freedom, frequently
delivers significant power-to.
In contrast to the natural powers of the freedom of nature, social power requires
the capacity to interact with another in an ordered way. The theoretical foun-
 TWO TYPES OF FREEDOM AND FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER 41

dation of social power is mutually structured interaction. Following Giddens’

theory of structuration (1984), structures are both enabling and constraining.
The basis of social power is mutually structured interaction. In the moment
of structure interaction, or structuration, there is potential for social power-to.
These constraints confer a capacity for action arising from social integration,
which we will refer to as social freedom. Returning to the example of Greece,
agreements with European partners can also be seen as ways of increasing social
freedom, but these mutual constraints inevitably entail loss of natural freedoms,
some of which are deeply resented by supporters of Syriza.
The structured nature of social freedom implicitly links to the contract tradi-
tion, where the contract constitutes an agreement to mutual self-restraint.
It has to be acknowledged that, following Gellner (1989), from a sociological
point of view there is something decidedly odd about the social contract tradi-
tion of normative political theory. It is odd to base normative theory upon social
contract because there is, sociologically speaking, no such contract underpinning
society. However, I would argue that the social contract constitutes a metaphor
for potentially beneficial qualities of mutual structural constraint.
In Locke’s work (1978) the basis of social contract, and legitimacy of the state
was linked to the concept of private property. According to Locke, humans are
by definition labouring beings. As such, each wishes to enjoy the fruits of their
labour, which requires the certainty that once they have mixed their labour with
land, or whatever, they know that their labour is still theirs. The capacity of the
social subject to mix labour power with something, then enjoy the fruits of their
labour, is premised upon law that precludes theft.
While we may wish to dismiss the essentialism of humans as labouring beings,
or reject the idea of basing the legitimacy of the state upon the protection of
property, the trade-off implicit in Locke’s social contract serves as a metaphor
for a sociological truth, which is that mutual structural constraint is enabling.
The power-to enjoy the fruits of one’s labour is premised upon a society-wide
constraint upon theft. The law prohibiting theft constitutes a constraint upon
freedom of all but is also an instance where constraint delivers social freedom.
Thus, natural freedom is exchanged, through social contract or mutual structural
constraint, for social freedom.
Unlike a philosophical anarchist position, the basis of liberal freedom is
compatible with the imposition of constraint upon self and other. As argued
by Berlin (2002), this is based upon a negative view of law, as something that
constrains. However, that constraint upon self and others contains a freedom-
42 MARK HAUGAARD

enhancing potential. As argued by Locke, in the case of property it makes sense

to compromise the freedom of nature for the greater freedom of society.
Typically, liberals are more comfortable with the idea of trading natural
freedom for social freedom, which is freedom for freedom. However, as observed
by Berlin (2002), there is nothing in the liberal position that precludes a trade of
freedom for another value (such as equality) or some other good (for instance
efficiency).
In contrast to the liberal conceptualization of law as constraint, Pettit has
argued that the negative view is flawed because it does not acknowledge the
positive aspect of law (2012). In the republican tradition, the citizen is someone
who is empowered by the law, which leads Pettit to conclude that law is not
a negative that limits freedom. Rather, it constitutes a condition of possibility for
substantive freedom. However, I would argue that Pettit’s inference is premised
upon a dichotomous either/or view: law is either constraining, thus inimical to
freedom (as argued by Berlin), or law is enabling (as Pettit wishes to argue).
In contrast, I hold that law, which is a form of social structure, is both enabling
and constraining.
The enabling and constraining aspects of structure are not mutually contradic-
tory. It is the very constraint that makes structures enabling. The prohibition
upon theft limits my freedoms, and those of others, and in so doing gives us
the power-to enjoy the fruits of our labours. This duality of structure does not
simply apply to this specific example, which can be construed as overcoming
the collective action problem.
Language constitutes the structured use of sound according to certain rules.
If we could invent words as we went along, or use them in whatever way we
pleased, language would cease to exist. It is the constraints upon language usage
that facilitate communication. Similarly, it is the rules of the road that enable
me to navigate the highway with relative safety. These rules of the road do not
simply apply to others, but also constitute constraint upon self.
The fact that social agency presupposes mutual constraint entails that freedom
is not an absolute or sortal concept, such as apples and oranges. Apples and
oranges are either apples or oranges. For social actors, this means that there is
no such state of being-in-the-world as FREEDOM. The social agent is someone
who is more or less free, according to different measures of freedom.
In the social contract tradition, leaving the state of nature, by way of contract,
constitutes an either/or state. In contrast, I would argue that all social actors
find themselves in an in-between state, which is on a scale. Relative to Carter’s
 TWO TYPES OF FREEDOM AND FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER 43

discussion of freedom (Carter 1999), I hold that there are varieties of freedom.
The two most generic forms of freedom are natural freedom, which implies
the absence of social constraint upon action; and there is social freedom, which
entails the capacity for action (power-to) due to mutually beneficial structural
constraint.
These two freedoms are in constant tension. An essentially libertarian
social order (which is one where there is the contract of property but as few as
possible other constraints) is a social order with a comparatively low density
of constraints. In comparison, a fully-fledged social-democratic welfare state
(which seeks to empower citizens based upon progressive redistributive taxation)
has many more constraints upon the natural freedom of agents. In a socialist
society, with a command economy, the constraints will be higher again. The
libertarian society will be closer than the welfare state to the state of nature. Of
course, a libertarian society will not in any way be a state of nature, it will be
closer to the ideal type of the state of nature.
The libertarian and welfare state represent two comparative levels of the
distribution of two types of freedom. The libertarian society is high in natural
freedom and low in social freedom, while the social-democratic state is lower
in natural freedom and higher in social freedom. In the libertarian society the
density of social integration, thus metaphorical contract, is lower. Consequently,
in that society the level of collective power-with and power-to will be lower.
Hence there will be many for whom freedom means that they are reduced to
sleeping under a bridge. In contrast, in the welfare state social integration and
the metaphysical contract is high, so freedom of the state of nature is lower.
In the welfare state social freedom is higher, so no-one will be sleeping under
bridges. However, to ensure that everyone has power-to, there have to be higher
levels of social integration and interdependency, which entails more constraints
upon everyday social life.
These are two states of being-in-the-social-world: one is high in the freedoms
of nature and the other is high in the freedoms of society. Only if you take a single
criteria of freedom, while ignoring the other (as libertarians and socialists tend
to), can you claim that the one society is FREE and the other is not.
The fact that agency presupposes constraint entails that there are many quali-
tatively different ways of pursuing freedom. In the pursuit of freedom some
actors may wish to lower their levels of social integration, minimizing the
constraints upon them. Alternatively others may wish to integrate further into
society, maximizing their power-to.
44 MARK HAUGAARD

Internally a given social order does not embody uniform levels of freedom.
Often it is the case that high status positions entail great levels of power-to but
relatively lower levels of the freedom of nature. For instance, in a joint interview
Presidents Simon Peres and Barak Obama observed that the office of President
was a gilded cage (Shalev 2014). A gilded cage suggests the office is a position
of very high level of constraint (cage), thus low natural freedom, but simulta-
neously also high in social power (gilded). The un-freedom of Presidents is of
a different order than the un-freedom of those at the bottom rungs of society.
Presidents have high levels of power-to coupled with structural constraint, while
the poor have low levels of power-to, but fewer mutual structural constraints
of the interdictive variety (you must not do this or that). Of course, with regard
to poverty, a lack of capacity for action is a very real constraint, but not of the
structural kind we have in mind when we use the concept of structural constraint
within the theory of structuration. This is not to suggest that the lack of capacity
for action, or power-to, of the poor is not of normative concern. It obviously
is, as it may prevent someone from realizing any meaningful life chances. In
contrast, the structural constraints of Presidents or corporate executives are not
(usually) of normative concern – there need be no human rights campaign to
free Presidents or corporate executives from their gilded cages!
This contrast between two ways of being free is consonant with everyday
usage. Powerful individuals talk meaningfully about leaving high office for the
freedom of alternative lifestyles of subsistence farming, sailing and so on. In
essence, they leave behind the kinds of constraints of the gilded cage of office for
the freedoms of a life with fewer constraints. To them this may appear a move
to FREEDOM. In fact it’s a move from high social freedom to high natural
freedom. Thus there are two contrasting ways to be free, you can be free because
of an absence of constraint, or you can be free because of high level of agency.
In other words, you can either be free by having high social contract and social
integration, or low contract and integration.
In the work of Pettit gradations of freedom are elided. There are simply two
states of being: freedom (citizen) or unfreedom (slave). In this regard, Pettit gives
the example of Nora in Ibsen’s play The Doll’s House (Pettit 2014). Nora is free
to do as she pleases, under the permission of her indulgent husband, Torvald.
Pettit argues that Nora is un-free, even though she does not suffer from much
outside interference. I would argue that Nora is significantly freer than most
women of her time, but not as free as twenty-first century Norwegian women.
Our perception of her as un-free only makes sense when measured relative to
our contemporary freedoms. There is no magical moment in the last hundred and
 TWO TYPES OF FREEDOM AND FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER 45

fifty years of women’s emancipation when women moved from un-freedom to

freedom. Rather, women have become incrementally freer than they were before.
The Manichean either/or contrast trivializes certain forms of domination
by placing everything that does not accord with freedom into the same box
as slavery. Nora is still significantly freer than her contemporary black slave
in the Congo, under the despotic rule of King Leopold. To place the two into
the same box of un-freedom is to trivialize the extraordinary suffering of
the condition of slavery (see Hochschild 1998 for what that form of slavery
really meant).

Freedom and the dimensions of power:

In the above I began by juxtaposing the state of natural freedom with social
freedom. I showed that some constraints, such as the constraints against theft, the
rules of the road, grammar and so on, are empowering, thus freedom enhancing.
Now we will look at the ways in which the different dimensions of power
entail differential relations of power and freedom. As I have argued previ-
ously (Haugaard 2012), we must refrain from assuming that these dimensions
of power are always normatively reprehensible. They have both the potential
to contribute to domination or to freedom. For reasons of brevity I will define
the dimensions in simplified form without significant reference to the minutiae
of the debates from which they sprang (I have summarized these debates in
Haugaard 1997 and 2015).

First dimension of power:

In this dimension of power A exercises power over B to the extent to which
A can get B to do something that they would not otherwise do (Dahl 1968). In
contrast to the other dimensions of power, the actor B1, who is prevailed upon,
is fully aware of their reasons for compliance. They are either aware of being
coerced by A, or they may consider that compliance is in their interests. If the
latter is routinized, the relationship between A and B is based upon shared
a perception of the legitimacy of the exercise of power. If B complies due
to coercion, it is fair to assume that B does not consider compliance benefi-
cial. However, in the case of legitimate social power B complies because they
consider power-over them, which A has, beneficial or otherwise normatively
justified. Typically, the power-over should also deliver power-to for B. So, for

1. The convention is that A is the powerful actor, and B is the less powerful.
46 MARK HAUGAARD

instance, in many organizations, a legitimate leadership will exercise power

over its members, which delivers collective power-to. Thus, the power-over
that A exercises over B enhances the social freedom of B.
The word legitimacy has a different meaning depending upon whether it is
used in a sociological or normative language game context (Haugaard 2010).
Sociologically legitimacy refers to the perceptions of the social actor involved.
However, actor B may well be swayed by influences upon her judgement that
are a product of relations of domination. In contrast, normatively legitimacy
means legitimate relative to normative criteria held by the observing political
theorist. The most subtle forms of domination, involving power in its third
and fourth dimensions, entail that social relations are legitimate sociologically
but normatively illegitimate, or they may be accepted de facto, as unalter-
able constraints. Thus, for instance, a social actor B who has internalized an
essentialist belief in their inferior status and, consequently, willingly obeys
A is obeying for reasons of legitimate social power, in the sociological sense
of the word. However, from the perspective of liberal political theory, the
essentialist belief in an inferior social status cannot be normatively justified. In
this case the sociologically legitimate compliance of B would be normatively
illegitimate. Sometimes I write from a sociologist’s perspective, and at others
from a normative political theorist’s. I will always endeavour to make clear
which language game is being used.
As a political theorist, I would consider B’s compliance normatively legiti-
mate only if that compliance stands up to reasonable justification2 relative to
a calculus of power-to versus constraint and power-over. Thus, for instance, in
an election B may consent to defeat at the hands of actor A because B considers
the democratic process reasonable. This is an instance of legitimate power-over
that is normatively justifiable (Haugaard 2012).
Normatively legitimate compliance with power-over is based upon a conse-
quentialist trade-off between the short-term costs of compliance, and the longer-
term benefits of the reproduction of the system in question. In a democratic
contest there is a calculation that the constraints upon our natural freedom,
constrained by the rules of the game (to use Clegg’s (1989) language), deliver
sufficient power-to in the longer term, that we are willing to forego our short-
term interests, in the longer-term interest of living in a democratic society. This

2. This is loosely based upon an application of the discourse ethics of Forst (2012) to the theory of
this article.
 TWO TYPES OF FREEDOM AND FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER 47

interest includes the social freedom of both being governed and governing in
turn (either ourselves personally or through elected representatives).
From a Kantian perspective, the social freedom of legitimate structures of
power-over presuppose that each actor is considered as an end in themselves:
it is unreasonable to suppose that anyone would trade in their natural freedom,
for social structures that enhance the social freedoms of others, but not their
own social freedoms. In fact, most forms of domination entail precisely this:
that actor B exchanges their natural freedom for the social freedom of others.
In other words, B exchanges their natural freedom and gets nothing, or insuf-
ficient, in return.
While it only makes normative sense to trade in natural freedom for greater
social freedom, the sociological facts of the matter are that social actors
commonly reproduce social structures that entail accepting massive loss of
natural freedom without a significant compensating gain in social freedom.
Often this disadvantageous exchange takes place without much, if any, apparent
coercion. The compliance of the dominated in their own domination is, of course,
the question that preoccupied Gramsci (1979), and has stimulated all those
who hold more radical views of power. Making sense of this counter-intuitive
phenomenon brings us to the other dimensions of power.

The second dimension of power:

The second dimension (2-D from now on) of power concerns institutional bias
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962). In 2-D the bias is known to the actors B, yet they
are compliant. Biases that are unknown, imperceptible, or otherwise accepted
for cognitive or dispositional reasons, by the compliant actor B, entail the third
or fourth dimensions of power.
The most obvious kind of 2-D power is agenda setting, where the interests
of actor B are deliberately excluded from the agenda. In this case B is fully
cognizant of their interests and that these are excluded from the agenda. This
bias may be either the consequence of a direct action by A, or it may result from
structural bias inherited from the past3.
Structural bias can take subtle forms that do not necessitate any action by
A. In Crenson’s (1971) study of the un-politics of air pollution, he found that
in one-company towns the issue of air pollution was never on the agenda in
local politics. The structured asymmetry of power implicit in single company

3. Here I depart from the usual cut between 2-D and 3-D, as set out by Lukes (2005:26). I include
all structural bias under 2-D, while 3-D is reserved for epistemic bias.
48 MARK HAUGAARD

towns ensured that every actor B knew not to challenge the interests of the single
company A, without the latter having to do anything. In short, no one was willing
to attempt to restrict the natural freedom of the company, in the interests of their
social freedom to live with clean air.
As argued by Scott (1990), in systems with routinized structured asymmetries
of power, everyday resistance to domination usually takes a symbolic form,
which is captured in the graphic image of the peasant doffing his hat to the
local Lord, while quietly farting. The silent fart does not change the structured
asymmetries of the system but shows us, from a sociological perspective, that
the compliant subject B does not believe the system to be legitimate: 2-D power
does not entail sociological legitimacy.
While 2-D does not entail sociological legitimacy it can entail a mindset that
makes compliance relatively routine. As Gaventa found in the study of Appa-
lachian mining communities (1983), some of the most compliant communities
were the ones with greatest inequalities of power because powerlessness induced
a feeling of fatalistic hopelessness, which made overt resistance appear pointless.
Scott (1990) termed this kind of resigned compliance thin 3-D power, which
is distinguished from thick 3-D, which entails a deeper normative epistemic
endorsement of relations of domination. Scott did not believe that thick 3-D
was common, while I disagree as will be shown below. So, I will make the
cut between 2-D and 3-D around awareness. In 2-D B is aware that domina-
tion is going on, consequently does not consider the structures legitimate, but
may be resigned to them. In contrast, 3-D entails deeper epistemic reasons
for compliance, whereby B considers the structures of domination legitimate
(sociologically).
The concept of bias presupposes that the gain of some is at the expense
of others. Essentially, the social constraints of a system are more freedom
enhancing to some than to others. At the extreme end of the spectrum, in an
ideal type master-slave relationship, the slave has no natural or social freedom.
The constraints upon the slave exist solely for the greater social freedom for
the master. As the disequilibrium is so extreme in this ideal type, it is hard to
imagine the slave consenting to their domination. So, typically, master-slave
relationships would be episodically 1-D (A would actively coerce B). Although,
over time, as B becomes resigned to their fate, coercion may become less visible,
so the relationship slips into 2-D. Hypothetically one can imagine an ideology
intended to make this relationship non-coercive, thus 3-D. Aristotle’s (not very
convincing) account of naturally born slaves would be one such account (Aris-
totle 1949: 1130).
 TWO TYPES OF FREEDOM AND FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER 49

Most relations of structural bias are not as extreme as this. Therefore the
comparative loss of natural freedom and gain of social freedom is not usually
entirely zero-sum, even when disadvantageous: for this reason, 2-D bias can
be relatively stable.
Typically, traditional societies have gender roles that empower and disem-
power differentially. In a patriarchal society there is an asymmetry of constraints,
whereby men will be more empowered by the system of constraints than women.
However, women usually also gain some social powers from the patriarchal
relations. While women will, typically, be constrained from taking leadership
positions they will be facilitated into various domestic roles with specific powers
and rights. These gender-specific freedoms are often linked to expectations
that their male spouses provide the material and other necessities. Out of this
these gendered actors B will gain significant social empowerment but, in some
societies, it will be of a lower magnitude than the power of men. As long as
the women receive what they consider their entitlements from this structured
context structuration may be relatively voluntary. However, once the social-
freedom enhancing powers are not delivered, the situation becomes unstable,
necessitating overt 1-D coercion.
Harris (2012) provides us with interesting instance of this phenomenon.
The Ugandan Acholi tribe was a cattle-rearing and ranching tribe, which was
gendered according to norms that made men key decision-makers and of higher
status than women. Cattle were not only the main source of food, but also draught
animals used for ploughing. Thus, cattle were key to economic resources within
this traditional society. The cattle were the exclusive preserve of men, which
gave them control over economic production. Therefore, women were mainly
confined to domestic duties. Thus, in exchange for male provision through
agricultural production women’s social power was less, and confined in scope.
However this was not entirely zero-sum as, on the other side, the husbands were
considered under an obligation to provide economic support, which constitutes
a form of social power-to for the women.
War upset this 2-D equilibrium. First cattle were lost, and frequently also land.
Without cattle the male heads of households could no longer till the land without
enlisting the wives and daughters into hard manual agricultural labour. Even
more disempowering for men, with the loss of lands, they found themselves
unemployed. Often their wives, with practical household skills, were more
employable than the men. Once women became bread-winners, they started
to challenge traditional male authority, as head of household. The trade-off of
female un-freedom for male provision no longer made sense, as the husbands
50 MARK HAUGAARD

no longer delivered their side of the bargain. Consent to 2-D without cattle/
land was zero-sum: all loss for women, and gain for men. Typically, once the
equilibrium of 2-D was undermined, the males became much more violent
towards their wives. As they lost social contract based social power, the men
tried to substitute 1-D coercion.
Gendered social powers may render women willing participants in these
structured inequalities. Typically there will be a sacrifice of long-term interests
in a more equitable system for a more short-term desire to gain advantage within
the existing system. Within a stable patriarchal system conformity to gendered
social roles will confer episodic advantage, which will make compliance rela-
tively forthcoming. Also, typical in this regard would be the (so called) freedom
of the labour contract. The compliant labourer may well be a committed socialist
(not subject to 3-D) entering into a disadvantageous contract, but they may
need a wage, and so enter the labour contract. From that exchange they receive
some short-term benefits, thus some social freedom, but in the longer term their
structuration contributes to reproducing a system they consider illegitimate, as
committed socialists.
It is important to emphasize that this consent to structural bias, while legiti-
mate on a sociological level, is not normatively legitimate. From a normative
perspective the fact that structuration entails an asymmetry of power relations,
whereby the sacrifices in the natural freedoms of B are for the benefit of the social
freedoms of A, means that these structures are normatively objectionable. In
2-D the constraints of the less powerful constitute a means to the ends of more
powerful, which is not normatively defensible from a liberal perspective, as it
violates the equal moral worth of individuals.
Overall, the willing consent of 2-D is frequently based upon a problem of
collective action. Basically, those who are dominated, while perceiving their
domination, are compliant because they are organizationally outflanked – a term
coined by Mann (1986). The less powerful may lack skills, knowledge or trust
necessary to organize effective resistance. They may also find themselves in
a position of not wishing to be the first to resist. If everyone wishes to be
a follower, the status quo remains in tact. It may also be the case that the powerful
increase their organizational advantage by creating deliberate divisions among
the less powerful.
2-D domination entails a limiting of the freedom of B through constraints that
deliver differential power-to: one group clearly benefits more from structural
constraints than another. This often produces a sense of resignation among
the dominated to the status quo. However, this falls short of the more active
 TWO TYPES OF FREEDOM AND FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER 51

endorsement of structured asymmetries of power, which characterizes three-

dimensional power.

Three-dimensional power:
Three-dimensional power (3-D) is epistemic power. Essentially those in the
dominated positions consent to the constraints of society because their social
knowledge is so constituted that they willingly structure relations of domina-
tion that are to their disadvantage. They sacrifice their natural freedom for the
social freedoms of others, because that sacrifice makes sense to them, relative
to their knowledge of social life.
The judgement that B is dominated by 3-D suggests that B is suffering from
a cognitive failure when measured against a consequentialist calculus of struc-
tural constraint to social freedom. It is irrational behaviour. It is this aspect of
3-D which is considered controversial by some, as it can have the elitist implica-
tions associated with judgements of false consciousness, which suggests true
consciousness on the part of the observing theorist. In cross-cultural contexts
this can appear ethnocentric. However, as will become obvious, as long as we
specify the sociological mechanisms whereby suboptimal structuration practices
are reproduced, this concern is not intrinsic to 3-D.
Sociologically, outside of their reproduction social structures exist as memory
traces that are imbedded in social actors’ consciousness. As argued by Giddens
(1984), the largest part of our social consciousness is tacit in nature, as a taken-
for-granted social knowledge. However, social actors can also be discursively
aware of the social conventions that bind them. The former is practical conscious-
ness knowledge, the latter discursive consciousness knowledge – p.c. and d.c.
When an actor’s knowledge of structural reproduction is largely p.c., they will
reproduce social structures, as part of the natural order of things. Because these
structures are based upon tacit knowledge, actors will not be aware that their
structuration is relatively disadvantageous to them. P.c. knowledge is a socially
created second nature that makes certain structuration practices appear the
normal and only thing to do. P.c. knowledge of structural practices represent
a local way of life, which could be not be otherwise than it is. As reflections
of tacit knowledge, the structural constraints of everyday life appear part of
the natural-order-of-things in much the same way that it is considered entirely
natural that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. Thus, even if disad-
vantageous when measured normatively, as suggested above, these structures
are sociologically entirely legitimate. 3-D through p.c. is what Weber (1978)
had in mind with traditional action. It is important to note that as theorized here
52 MARK HAUGAARD

this form of action should not be considered particular to, so-called, traditional
societies; it is equally significant in modernity, although the particular ways it
is encouraged and legitimated may be different.
While tacit knowledge underpinning most of everyday social interaction can
remain tacit for the entire life of the social actor, there is always the potential
for it to become discursive. Once discursive, the social actor can evaluate social
structures: subject them to critique. Once discursive, structures that routinely
empower As more than Bs become potentially unstable. In order to combat this,
in order to make social actors compliant to structural practices that are system-
atically to their disadvantage, those who gain advantage from the system have
an incentive seek to reify social structures. Reifying social structures entails
deconventionalizing them. Thus, they become something other than a local set
of social practices which could be done otherwise than they are.
It is important to note that some social structures, when made discursive,
de-reified, thus shown to be ‘mere convention’, may still remain stable because
they pass the test of being beneficial. Turn taking in democratic elections, gram-
matical rules, and the rules of the road, would all be typical. All these rules are
constraints upon our natural freedoms, yet they deliver positive outcomes in
terms of social freedom. Consequently they do not require reification to remain
stable.
In the first volume of The Sources of Power (1986), Mann describes how
the first complex civilizations were largely based upon alluvial agriculture.
This mode of production had huge advantages over hunter-gather societies in
that food production became other than a sporadic activity: it could be spread
over the whole year. However, this required storage of food, which had to be
controlled, and massive labour force that had to be managed. These populations
became hugely mutually interdependent, which meant that opting out of society
became more difficult. Thus webs of mutual-dependence resulted in, what he
terms, caging of large populations (Mann 1986: 80). However, the mutual
dependence of food production was not considered enough in itself to ensure
social and system integration. The centres of power were made into temples,
and the leadership deified. These early civilizations fused their social order with
a complex religious order, which was an attempt to make their structuration
practices sacred. Although a late example, Angkor Wat, which means temple
city, is typical of this kind of civilization. One can imagine that any social
critique by a dissatisfied freedom-seeking Angkor Wat canal digger would be
met by the reifying response that your position in the social order of things is
divinely ordained. The overawing magnificence of the temple city complex
 TWO TYPES OF FREEDOM AND FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER 53

would reinforce this reification: beauty and awe had a 3-D purpose, as indeed
does the Dome of St Peters and the efforts of Michelangelo and Caravaggio.
One of the most significant modes of deconventionalizing social life is reli-
gious belief. As argued by Durkheim (2008), when members of a society worship
God, they are actually worshipping society. Social conventions are projected
upward toward an imaginary being that humans create in their own image but
with added attributes of sacredness and, in the case of the monotheistic faiths,
infinity. Humans are part of the realm of the profane, thus the changeable and
decaying, therefore so are their rules. In contrast, God as a sacred and infinite
being has the status of the permanent and unchanging. Thus, when God is used
to reflect back humanly constructed conventions, these come back as sacred
conventions that are immutable. Thus, by passing through the reifying mill of
the sacred, that which is made cannot be unmade.
Interestingly, most religions preserve some realms for the profane, usually to
do with food production, so the society can adapt to changing circumstances.
Societies that make too much of social life sacred will be unable to adapt. In
functional terms, there is a happy balance between the solidity of the sacred, and
the flexibility of the profane. In that sense, from a functional point of view, the
dictum of rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God what is God’s
represents a balance between rigidity and flexibility that allows for system
change, while preserving reification.
Most traditional societies have strong gender norms. These norms are not
simply presented as an arbitrary convention, which can be changed at will. Typi-
cally these gender norms are attributed to the law of God. Thus, if a particular
culture has a norm to the effect that a women should be modest in their physical
demeanour, as the three monotheistic faiths do, these norms are presented with
reference to the will of God, who embodies the reifications of the mode of social
life as a whole. Because it is the word of God that women should be modest,
the fact that having a modest demeanour is disempowering cannot be contested
using solely these consequentialist criteria. Because of reification, the rules
concerning gender norms are not on a par with the rules of the road, which can
be solely justified relative to their social freedom enhancing qualities, as they
are not reified.
In an interview Foucault argued that the objective of his histories of the present
was to critique the assumption, which is central to the reproduction of social
life, that ‘because this is, that will be.’ His task was ‘to describe that-which-is by
making it appear as something which might not be, or that might not be as it is.’
(Foucault 1988: 36). By using history he was showing ‘how that-which-is has not
54 MARK HAUGAARD

always been; … and that since these things have been made, they can be unmade,
as long as we know how it is that they were made.’ (Foucault 1988: 37). Arguably,
this method is not unique to Foucault. Rather, it informs most forms of history
and anthropology that are informed by the hermeneutic and phenomenological
traditions. Reification works precisely in the opposite way to this method of social
critique. It renders that-which-is permanent, irrefutable, beyond critique.
It has to be acknowledged that the presence of a reifying act does not neces-
sarily mean that the social structure in question cannot be defended in conse-
quentialist normative terms. The prohibition against theft is a constraint that
has an emancipatory function. This prohibition is, of course, one of the Ten
Commandments. The fact that according to biblical lore, Moses received these
from God in the form of stone tablets, given to him on top of a mountain, was
a reifying function intended to make these commandments other than the arbi-
trary conventions of the Jewish people. However, in the case of the command-
ment prohibiting theft, if the theological reification is removed the interdiction
will still remain normatively legitimate. This is in contrast to the prohibitions on
worshipping graven images or other Gods. These commandments were reified
as a will-to-power, so Moses, who was essentially equivalent to a tribal elder,
could maintain a monopoly on the sacred.
The point of the reification of traditional authority through religious belief is to
foreclose reason giving. In this respect I am following Forst (2012) by arguing that
the basis of normative legitimacy lies in the right to justification. What 3-D power
does is to obtain legitimacy on a sociological level, while foreclosing the norma-
tive right to justification. A reified social structure does not require justification
because the actor believes that the structures in question are not social construc-
tions. Reified social structures constitute the essence of social domination. They
are inimical to natural freedom, and their social freedom enhancing qualities are
removed from the language of justification. So, even when they yield miniscule
social freedom compared to the natural freedom that is forfeited, they remain
unchallengeable because they are part of that which is and therefore cannot be
otherwise. Thus they are rigid barriers to freedom – a steel cage.
The history of the twenty-first century has taught us that the reifications of the
sacred do not necessarily disappear with the advance of modernity. Rather than
a supplanting of the sacred, modernity entails the development of new forms of
3-D, which complement the old.
In modern societies foreclosure of reason can also be provided by scientific
expertise. Again, as in the Moses example, the reification of science does not
necessarily make the principles wrong, once the reification is stripped away.
 TWO TYPES OF FREEDOM AND FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER 55

The objective of scientific reification is to make conventions part of the laws of

nature. To return to the gender example, the argument that women are biologi-
cally programmed to nurture performs a reifying function. If gender norms are
a reflection of biological forces, then they are not social conventions. Hence,
these norms cannot be made or unmade at will.
In describing the reifying function of science it is important to distinguish
between dogmatic science and a genuinely open-to-falsification attitude. It is part
of the Geist of our times to rail against ‘positivism’, which does not correspond
to any actual scientific procedure. Rather, it is an empty signifier of disappro-
brium directed against scientific dogmatism. In contrast to dogmatic science,
an open scientific attitude should only contain a single truth-claim: there is no
such thing as truth. Rather than truth, science consists of hypotheses that have
not as yet been falsified (Popper 1992). However, it is open to question how
many of the scientific community actually follow this precept, preferring the
more reifying idea that they are propounding truth.
From the perspective of 3-D, it is almost certainly a fact that most lay people
understand the products of science to be truth. This misperception gives scien-
tific endorsement of decisions an enormous potentially reifying function. The
social sciences are particularly prone to this 3-D usage. By passing decisions
through the mill of expert committees, politicians can reify decisions with natural
freedom limiting implications. Thus, from the perspective of 3-D, scientists
come to perform some of the same functions as the temples of Angkor Wat.
Aside from explicit appeals to reification from theology, everyday life is
characterized by a complex play of sacred and profane. As analysed by Alex-
ander (2009, 2010), the cut and thrust of everyday politics is invested by social
actors competing by attaching themselves to sacred emblems, while making
their opponents appear profane. Alexander shows how Obama attained power
by carefully choreographed performances that reproduced the sacred emblems
of today’s world.
The reason that nationalists tend to find constructivist accounts of nationalism
of the kind offered by Anderson (1983) and Gellner (1983) so threatening is that
the social construction of the nation makes it something that is conventional,
thus can be un-made. In contrast, a primodialist account of nations is a reifying
account of them. The nation is something that is always there, which slumbers
but then is awakened. Politicians trying to associate themselves with the sacred
have a vested interest in reproducing a primodialist reifying view of the nation.
Thus, the cut and thrust of politics reproduces a kind of banal nationalism (Billig
1995), which constitutes a taken-for-granted knowledge. At the end of the day this
56 MARK HAUGAARD

makes social actors willing to make the ultimate sacrifice of natural freedom for
social freedom: dying for your nation. Ironically, this sacrifice of freedom to the
reification of the nation is often (in the USA, at least) presented in term of dying
for freedom and is often done by those with least power-to (the less privileged).
To confront the concerns that some theorists have with regard to 3-D power:
the holding of social knowledge purely at the level of p.c., without d.c. critique
represents a lesser level of reflexivity; and accepting reifications, whereby
certain social conventions are turned into that-which-is and cannot be other-
wise, constitutes a failure to understand that social life is simply local social
construction, thus contingent. There is nothing elitist about these sociological
observations.

Fourth dimension of power:

While 3-D concerns the epistemological level of power, 4-D entails the onto-
logical level. This entails the creation of social subjects or social-beings-in-the-
world with dispositions that incline them toward certain forms of behaviour. In
making this distinction between the epistemological and ontological it has to be
clear that these are analytic distinctions, which do not exists as separate realms
in reality. How social actors interpret the world, and how they are in the world,
are mutually related phenomena, yet it makes analytic sense to distinguish the
two. This is analogous to the way sociologists distinguish between cultural and
economic social phenomena. In practice, everything that is economic presup-
poses acts of interpretation (the meaning of money and so on), therefore are
simultaneously cultural phenomena. Yet, the distinction makes analytic sense.
As with the other dimensions of power, we must not assume that all 4-D
is normatively negative. As domination, 4-D makes social actors willing to
reproduce a social structuring of their being-in-the-world that is inimical to their
freedoms. In contrast, emancipatory subjectivising 4-D gives social actors the
predispositions necessary for social freedom.
Creating social ontologies with certain predispositions is what Foucault had
in mind when he wrote that his objective was to understand ‘the different modes
by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects’ (Foucault 1982:
208). Also, ‘this form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which
categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him
to his identity, …. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects.’
(Foucault 1982: 212).
At the level of 4-D, just as in the other levels, natural freedom and social
freedom are in balance, so there is no such thing as freedom in-it-self. Creating
 TWO TYPES OF FREEDOM AND FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER 57

subjects with certain ontological predispositions can either be inimical to

social freedom or social freedom enhancing. From the normative perspective
of critique, 4-D contains aspects of Berlin’s concerns over positive freedom.
On positive freedom Berlin writes that this ‘freedom is not freedom to do what
is irrational, or stupid, or wrong. To force empirical selves into the right pattern
is no tyranny, but liberation.’ (Berlin 2002: 194). This is the power to create
certain social subjects whose desires are ‘rational’ relative to the demands of
structured relations of domination. What Berlin had in mind was, for instance,
the shaping of social subjects within state socialism who were purged of, what
was considered, ‘bourgeois decadence’ (see Cunha et al 2012 and Chan et al
2015 for empirical examples).
In a similar fashion to Berlin, Foucault finds this form of freedom deeply objec-
tionable. Reminiscent of Berlin, in Madness and Civilization (Foucault 1971)
documents how other ways of being-in-the-world are classified as irrational.
The only escape from confinement is to admit the truth of the one-way judge-
mental monologue of, what is considered, reason about unreason. In essence
this constitutes the exclusion, as irrational, of alternative ways-of-being-in-
the-world. Relative to the idea that respect for the autonomy of others entails
that they deserve justification, the irrational are so socially constructed as to be
incapable of understanding reasoned justification: the irrational other is abject
in a one-way judgemental monologue.
While many forms of 4-D are indeed dominating and inimical to social
freedom, this is not necessarily the case. It is correct that relative to natural
freedom 4-D will implies the removal of choice. However, social freedom
presupposes social integration. Again, this underlines the point that there is no
such thing as freedom-in-itself. While natural freedom, as the absence of mutual
constraint, may have an intuitive appeal, complex modern societies are premised
upon mutual constraint, which necessitates that natural freedom is limited for
the purposes of social freedom. The person whose predispositions are entirely
at variance with the society in which they live loses social power by having an
incommensurable social ontology. To illustrate this point I will use an example
from work of Elias (1994).
Like Foucault and Weber, Elias argues that modernity entails a process
of increasing self-restraint. Unlike Foucault and Weber, Elias attributes
this increased self-restraint to class competition over the norms of, what is
considered, high status culture or civilization. To simplify a subtle theory: the
declining feudal classes tried to distance themselves from the rising bourgeoisie
by adopting more complex manners, which the bourgeoisie then copy within
58 MARK HAUGAARD

a contest over cultural or civilizational capital. The result was that social subjects
became more internally self-restrained, thus less prone to sudden violent behav-
iour. This self-restraint was not solely dominating: it was functional to living
in complex interdependent society.
Imagine a road in the thirteenth century. It is dark, the road is narrow, and
after a long time travelling without seeing anyone, someone appears ahead. The
functionally beneficial behavioural social ontology is to have the quick flight or
fight dispositions of a feudal knight. In contrast, imagine a driver on a modern
highway, dense with other cars and intersections. The dispositions of the feudal
knight would be dysfunctional – they would result in road rage. In contrast, the
modern social subject who is highly self-controlled, will have the appropriate
dispositions for this social context, which is one of high interdependence and
mutual structural constraint between drivers.
To extend the highway analogy, success in modern society is largely linked
to the deferral of gratification, which presupposes high levels of internalized
restraint. The main legitimating ideology of modern capitalism is meritocracy,
and the main vehicle for this is education. The whole process of education is
premised upon rewarding a combination of talent with effort, which presup-
poses internalized self-restraint. The student who studies hard and takes endless
exams has a very different being-in-the-world than the feudal knight. It is this
self-restrained social ontology that enables the student to realize social freedoms
relevant to modern highly interdependent meritocratic society. It is a position
of high social integration (low natural freedom), with high mutual interdepend-
ence, rewarded by power-to and social freedom.
With regard to education, in Discipline and Punish Foucault makes much
of the internalization of discipline in terms of petty routines and punctuality.
While we may acknowledge that discipline limits natural freedom, as it imposes
constraint, it is important to understand (contrary to Foucault’s emphasis) that
this discipline also has the potential to produce social freedom by creating
a social subject who is capable of high levels of self-restraint.
In our analysis of 3-D we saw that one of the reasons that compliant subjects
structure dominating social structures is a consequence of social knowledge
being p.c.. If knowledge of structuration is tacit, critical reflection does not take
place. Thus structuration practices are part of the natural order of things. Our
predisposition to tacit knowledge is a given but can be manipulated to a certain
extent. There are very real cognitive limits to how much d.c. (therefore critical
self-awareness) is possible at any moment in time. In contrast to critical self-
awareness, high routinization decreases reflexivity and discipline is the method
 TWO TYPES OF FREEDOM AND FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER 59

used to increase routinization. A child can be socialized through a strict stimulus

and response regime to react in certain ways without ever reflecting upon the
overall reasons for their reactions. This can be coupled with punishment of
critical reflection, which is characterized as impertinence. Discipline and Punish
(Foucault 1979) describes how early 19th C. education and penitentiaries aimed
at creating a social-being-in-the-world whose responses are largely reflex.
If knowledge is presented as absolute truth (3-D), and then also rehearsed
over and over again (4-D), then knowledge becomes part of the second nature
social ontology of the subject. In many instances learning by rote is accompanied
with physical repetitive behaviour, as exemplified in the Yeshiva and Madrasa
schools. Part of the objective of learning by rote, while shuckling or rocking
back and forth, is to decrease reflexivity, by making the learning process by-pass
discursive consciousness, straight into part of the social subjects deep disposi-
tional being-in-the-world. The repetitive work routines of prisons, psychiatric
institutions and 19th century type schools, as described by Foucault (1979),
similarly attempt to make certain routines second nature.
The discussion of freedom and power relative to the social construction of
social ontology leads us onto another argument concerning freedom, discussed
by Berlin (2002), Pettit (2012) and Arendt (2006). All three argue that the
freedom of the Stoics, which was adapted by Christian mystics, is an illusory
form of freedom that really constitutes a reaction to domination. Essentially
the Stoics and their Christian followers found their lives blocked by tyranny,
so they opted for an existentialist way out of domination, by transforming their
social-being-in-the-world into one in which they cease to desire all the things
that their state of domination precludes them from attaining in the first place
(Berlin 2002: 182). This entails a kind of training of the soul, in which persons
teach themselves not to desire the unattainable.
All three thinkers reject this as freedom by using reductio ad absurdum refu-
tation. For instance, Berlin (2002) proposes a person who has a wound in the
leg, and in order to free themselves of the pain, cuts off the leg, and then wishes
that they never had a leg. Similarly, Arendt (2006) and Pettit (2012) argue that
according to this way of thinking a prisoner could be free, by wishing themselves
not to desire to be outside their cell.
These reductio ad absurdum arguments only have purchase if we think of
freedom as absolute – that you are either FREE or you are not. If freedoms are
always specific freedoms, the constraints that preclude our freedoms, and the
social power-to that enhances our freedom are always relative to specific desires.
In many instances, because of our social ontology, we do not have certain desires,
60 MARK HAUGAARD

thus the absence of certain choices cannot be described as limitations upon our
freedoms. A fish that is precluded by law from driving a car does not have its
freedom reduced. Similarly, to continue with an Elias type example, if we were
in the 13th century and I had the being-the-world of a feudal knight I would, in
all probability, have the desire to go on a crusade to Jerusalem. Thus it would
be meaningful to argue that the preclusion of the right to crusade, by Edict of
the Pope or Emperor, would constitute limitations upon my freedoms. However,
the same preclusions applied to a person with my actual social ontology in the
21st century do not limit my freedom. A prohibition upon crusading would not
constitute an incursion upon my freedom, as going on crusades is not part of
my being-in-the-world. Freedom is directly related to desire, which in turn is
a product of social ontology.
Our social ontology is both something that is a product of society and some-
thing we can control ourselves. The latter is what Foucault had in mind with
the related concepts of ‘care of the self’ and ‘self-legislation’ (Foucault 1990,
2008). This can entail freeing ourselves of desires and dispositions that others
use to dominate us. Possibly the best example of this is resistance to contem-
porary commodity fetishism.
The neo-classical model of economics is based upon the perception of an
asocial rational consumer who consumes goods that best satisfy pre-existing
preferences. Implicit in this perception of supply and demand is the idea that the
consumer dictates what is produced (Trigg 2002). Consistent with this percep-
tion, in 1930 Keynes wrote an essay in which he predicted that by 2030 people
would be working many fewer hours, as increased mechanisation would entail
that it would take less labour time to satisfy a person’s needs (Keynes 1930).
This has not happened and the reason is that needs are not a constant.
After WW II, and increasingly as the century progressed, production of goods
became accompanied with production of new social-being-in-the-world: the
consumer. This new form of social subject is the focus of massive advertising –
estimated at $500 billion a year worldwide. The consumer is a new kind social
subject whose status is dependent upon being more up-to-date relative to other
consumers – a state of being-in-the-world epitomized by the expression ‘keeping
up with the Joneses’. As observed by Vance Packard back in the 1950s, the
solution to a glut of products is to create a nation of gluttons (quoted in O’Brien
2012: 72). His words are prophetic, as we now live in a world in which 1.4 billion
people are clinically obese (WHO 2014). We have now entered the first century
in which the average person is more likely to die from obesity related illness
than from a lack of food (WHO 2014).
 TWO TYPES OF FREEDOM AND FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER 61

From 1970 to 2000 the average house size in the USA increased by over
50%, the yearly increase accelerating the closer we get to 2000 (Schor 2001: 4).
During the same period working hours went up by 18% for working couples and
23% for singles while, simultaneously, 63% of people complained they worked
too many hours (Shor 2001: 8). These figures are symptomatic of social actors
becoming increasing addicted to a kind of hyper-consumption (Botsman and
Rogers 2011 and Kellner 1998).
The point of hyper-consumer culture is to create social subjects with insa-
tiable desires for the latest commodities. At its extreme, it presupposes a desire
that is only realized at the moment of purchase. Once owned, the commodity
ceases to be the object of desire, as it is quickly replaced by another, more
fashionable commodity. To the hyper-commodity-addicted social subject an
increase in power-to is actually the road to serfdom, rather than freedom. For the
hyper-consumer freedom lies in freeing themselves from their insatiable desires,
and therefore not working ever harder to acquire the means to acquire more
commodities. Arguably, a significant aspect of the objective of 1960s counter-
culture was to withdraw from this consumer-oriented being-in-the-world, but
the consumer culture was re-established in the next generation4.
There is a difference between the modern individual who increases their
freedom by freeing themselves of a compulsion to consume and the 5th century
Stoic Christian monk who sits on stone pillar, praying all day long. The latter
form of behaviour is in itself a product of 3-D power, as it is linked to the reifi-
cations of religious faith. The Stoic Christian mystic also makes the mistake
of confounding a single aspect of freedom, with a state of being-in-the-world
called FREEDOM. Therefore, I can agree with Arendt, Berlin and Pettit, that
Stoicism is not real freedom. However, the underlying principle, which entails
self-transformational social ontology, is absolutely a plausible path to increase
natural freedom.
It has to be acknowledged, of course, that the desire for commodities in itself is
not always a road to serfdom, as the purchase of some goods gives social actors
power-to. The tipping-point between the emancipatory and enslaving aspect
is when the object in question moves from being something with use-value to
something that has only status-value. Use-value is satiable – a simple car can
make you mobile, thus enhance your power-to. However, as a commodity of
status-value it is insatiable, because there is always a newer and better model
out there. Thus, the commodity can never satisfy the need. The commodity is

4. I have to thank Jonathan Hearn for this point.

62 MARK HAUGAARD

like the end of rainbow, which promises freedom and happiness, but is always
just beyond reach. Thus the consumer-social-subject is forever enslaved.
In the move from a hypothetical state of nature to society, natural freedom is
being traded for social freedom. In contrast, the person who changes their desires
so as to resist hyper-commodification is moving the other way. In order to free
themselves of 4-D domination, social actors increase their natural freedom at the
expense of constraints that deliver illusory social freedoms. However, in modern
complex society, interdependence means that in many instances the desire for
natural freedom comes at a significant cost to meaningful social freedom. As
society becomes more complex, the need for mutual cooperation increases,
consequently social freedom, and its attendant mutual structural constraints,
becomes more integrally part of the way of life of the social subject.
School of Politics and Sociology, National University of Ireland, Galway.
Mark.Haugaard@nuigalway.ie

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Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Jonathan Hearn for many insightful

comments upon this article.