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Santiago vs.

Civil Service Commissiion

Facts: Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada appointed Santiago from Collector of Customs I to
Collector of Customs III. Respondent Jose, a Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit
Systems Promotion Board against Santiago's promotional appointment mainly on the ground that he
was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. The Board decided to revoke Santiago's
appointment and directed that Jose be appointed in his stead. The Civil Service Commission affirmed
the Board Resolution. The Commission ruled that respondent Jose has far better qualifications in
terms of educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars and training courses
taken. It added that the Commission is empowered to administer and enforce the merit system as
mandated by the Constitution and to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service. Thus, Santiago appealed.

Issue:

Should Santiago's promotional appointment be upheld?

Held:

Yes. There is "no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the Civil Service Law that persons next-
in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would be among
the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the
same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment."

One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy
but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a
vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such
person to the next higher position.

The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as
to who is best qualified for the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a
rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified and
eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems
fit for appointment.

True, the Commission is empowered to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the
appropriate eligibility or required qualification. However, "all the commission is actually allowed to do
is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is
permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on, or as the decree says,
"approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the proper authorities. ...To be sure, it has no
authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was
better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the
appointing authority."

There is no reason to disturb Santiago's promotional appointment. The minimum qualifications and
the standard of merit and fitness have been adequately satisfied as found by the appointing authority.
The latter has not been convincingly shown to have committed any grave abuse of discretion.

DELFIN N. DIVINAGRACIA, JR., AND ALEXIS D. SAN LUIS vs. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS,
RAMON P. ERENETA, JR., and PRESCILLA B. NACARIO

FACTS: Mancita was appointed Municipal Development Coordinator (MDC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, in
a permanent capacity. When the old LGC took effect in 1983, the office was renamed as Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator, to which position, then Municipal Budget Officer Prescilla B.
Nacario was appointed and Mancita relieved from service by Gov. Prila. The local Budget Office, was
nationalized and placed under the DBMand Alexis D. San Luis was temporarily appointed Municipal
Budget Officer of Pili by DBM Secretary Carague and was subsequently appointed to said position in
a permanent capacity, by petitioner Delfin N. Divinagracia, Mayor of Pili. On appeal to the MPSB,
Mancita received judgment ordering her reinstatement after finding her removal to be illegal. The
decision was appealed by Divinagracia to the CSC but was denied. As a result of the denial, Nacario
was terminated from office in order to effect the reinstatement of Mancita. CSC held that the
reinstatement of Mancita was not a valid cause for the removal of Nacario, and since she was the
former Municipal Budget Officer she had the right to return to that position. Sto Tomas denied a
request for reconsideration by Divinagracia. Private respondent claims that she did not voluntarily
apply for transfer from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC but was constrained to "accept" the
new position because of her deference to then Mayor Prila. In fact, according to her, she applied for
the position of Budget Officer with the Department of Budget and Management while she was MPDC
indicating that she did not abandon or relinquish her former position.

ISSUES:

1. WON Sec 13 Rule VI of the IRR of Bk 5 EO 232 is applicable


2. WON the lateral transfer of Nacario was validly made

HELD:

1. No, Sec. 13 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 has the ff requisites: 1 st:
before a public official or employee can be automatically restored to her former position, there must
first be a series of promotions; 2nd all appointments are simultaneously submitted to the CSC for
approval; and 3rd the CSC disapproves the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position.
The essential requisites under Sec. 13 do not avail in the case. The movement of Nacario from the
Budget Office to the Office of MPDC cannot be considered a promotion for the term connotes an
increase in duties and responsibilities as well as a corresponding increase in salary. It was movement
of a lateral transfer.

2. No. The unconsented lateral transfer of Nacario from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC was
arbitrary, amounting to removal without cause, invalid as it is anathema to security of tenure. When
Nacario was extended a permanent appointment and she assumed the position, she acquired a legal,
not merely an equitable right. Such right to security of tenure is protected not only by statute, but also
by the Constitution and cannot be taken away from her either by removal, transfer or by revocation of
appointment, except for cause, and after prior notice. Sec. 5, par. 3, Rule VII, Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 provides that transfer shall not be considered disciplinary when
made in the interest of public service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be informed of the
reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal
his case to the commission. A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of
equivalent rank, level and salary, without break in service." Promotion is the "advancement from one
position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and is usually
accompanied by an increase in salary". A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement
or reduction or a transfer that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent position," cannot
be done without the employees' consent. That would constitute removal from office. No permanent
transfer can take place unless the officer or employee is first removed from the position held, and then
appointed to another position. It could not be said that Nacario vacated her former position as Budget
Officer or abdicated her right to hold the office when she accepted the position of MPDC. The
principle of estoppel cannot bar her from returning to her former position because of the fact that she
reluctantly accepted the second office. The appointment of San Luis is is with a condition: Sa
kondisyon nasa ayos ang pagkakatiwalag sa tungkulin ng dating nanunungkulan, which when
translated means "Provided that the separation of the former incumbent is in order." Considering that
the separation of Nacario who was the former incumbent was not in order, San Luis should relinquish
his position in favor of private respondent Nacario. This is, of course, without prejudice to San Luis'
right to be reinstated to his former position as Cashier II of the DENR, he being also a permanent
appointee equally guaranteed security of tenure.

Chato vs. Natividad


(On Reassignment)
G.R. No. 113843; June 2, 1995
Facts: President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order entitled "Approving the Streamlining of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue." Pursuant to this Order, Commissioner Liwayway Chato issued Revenue
Travel Assignment Order, directing ninety district officers to report to new assignments in the
redesignated and renumbered revenue district offices nationwide. Among those affected by the
reassignment was Salvador Blas. He was transferred as a revenue officer from Pampanga to
Cagayan. He wrote the Commissioner of Internal Revenue requesting a reconsideration of his
transfer, for he felt that his accomplishments and performance had not been taken into consideration
in the reshuffle. He claimed that he was among the top ten examiners for six consecutive years and
was once a model employee. In addition, he mentioned that he was diabetic and that he needed to be
near his doctor, and should not endure long travels, but his letter was unacted upon. So he filed with
the RTC a verified complaint. He alleged that his transfer without his consent to Cagayan which has a
smaller pool of personnel and only one-fourth of the revenue capacity of Pampanga, would cause his
dislocation and demotion or a diminution in rank, status, and span of duties and responsibilities. He
has earned through hard work the position as revenue district officer in Pampanga which has a larger
staff and revenue capacity and is much closer to Manila. Before resolving the issue whether or not
there was a reduction in duties and responsibilities, or whether or not there was a demotion and
dislocation on the part of Salvador Blas, the court, to maintain status quo, issued a preliminary
injunction ordering and directing Commissioner Chato to cease and desist in enforcing the
Assignment Order. The BIR Commissioner not pleased with Hon. Eli Natividad’s ruling and order, filed
a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court asking to annul the order of the RTC judge as there
was an abuse of discretion on his part for issuing the preliminary injunction.

Ruling: The Court found the BIR Commissioner’s petition to be meritorious. They issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent judge to cease and desist from implementing his order. The
Court said that the preservation of the status quo is not alone sufficient to justify the issuance of an
injunction. The plaintiff must show that he has a clear legal right; that such right has been violated;
and that he is entitled to the relief he demands, consisting in restraining the commission of the acts
complained of. Further, they sustained the legality of the reassignment of Blas. The Court found that
Salvador Blas failed to show patent illegality in the action of the BIR Commissioner, saying that to
sustain his contention that his transfer was a demotion simply because the new assignment is not to
his liking would be to subordinate government projects to individual preferences and opinions of civil
service employees; and this would negate the principle that public office is a public trust. Moreover,
the Court ruled that if an employee believes his transfer to be unjustified, he should have questioned
the validity of his transfer by appeal to the Civil Service Commission. So, the lower court in this case
should have dismissed the action for failure of Salvador Blas to exhaust administrative remedies. In
any event, the movement was held to be a reassignment, made in the exigency of the service --- and
not a demotion.

Monsato vs. Factoran

Facts:

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog
City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to
indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a
motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President
Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given
even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer
requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still
vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her
position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the
absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime
which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of
her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to
backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran
denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon
does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:

1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?

3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the
sentence?

Held:

1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of
the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts
for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate,
delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the
Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of
the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for
all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It
does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash
out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no
relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by
judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to
have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would
explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and
benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she
must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding
service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation
of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the
Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of
creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

FLORES V DRILON

FACTS

Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec.
13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations,
the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the
Subic Authority.”

ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts.

(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City
and thus an excepted circumstance.

(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double
compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another
post.

(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.

(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments
which he may have received pursuant to his appointment.

HELD

1. YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible
for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and
CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a
situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in
government, and thus neglect his constitutents.

2. NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to
the Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed”
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not
merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.

3. NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the
Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be appointedto a cabinet post, may
receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.

4. YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman
of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of
choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an
officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and
constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that
the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of
SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify.
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment.
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible
for appointment to another public office.

5. YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He
however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily
null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence,
is entitled to such benefits.
Debulgado vs CSC

Facts:
 Petitioner Mayor Rogelio Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros
Occidental.
 He promoted his wife, petitioner Victoria Debulgado, as General Services Officer, that is, as head
of the Office of General Services of the City Government of San Carlos.
 Before her promotion, petitioner Victoria had been in the service of the City Government for about
thirty-two (32) years and she rose from the ranks by successively occupying different government
offices.
 Public respondent CSC received a letter from Congressman Tranquilino Carmona of the First
District of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner
Mayor in favor of his wife.
 After investigation, the CSC disapproved the promotion of petitioner Victoria to the position upon
the ground that that promotion violated the statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments.
 Petitioners moved for reconsideration, contending that
 The statutory prohibition against nepotism was not applicable to the appointment of Victoria
as General Services Officer since the prohibition applies only to original appointments and
not to promotional appointments
o Petitioners believe that because petitioner Victoria was already in the service of the
City Government before she married petitioner Mayor, the reason behind the
prohibition no longer applied to her promotional appointment.
o Petitioners also affirm that petitioner Victoria deserves to be promoted to General
Services Officer, considering her long and faithful service to the City Government.
 The CSC had deprived petitioner Victoria of her right to due process by unilaterally revoking
her appointment. Petitioners assert that Victoria can no longer be removed from the
position of General Services Officer without giving her an opportunity to be heard and to
answer the charged of nepotism.

Petitioner Mayor denies that he had been motivated by personal reasons when he appointed his wife
to the new post.
 He states that his wife was the most qualified among the candidates for appointment to that
position, she having worked for the City Government for thirty-two (32) years and being highly
recommended by the OIC-Treasurer of San Carlos City.
 It is also claimed by petitioner Mayor that his choice of his wife for the position was concurred
in by the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
 He further avers that he had consulted the Field and Regional Officers of the CSC in Bacolod
City, and raised the question of applicability of the prohibition against nepotism to the then
proposed promotion of his wife in one of the seminars conducted by the Commission's
Regional Office held in San Carlos City. According to petitioner Mayor, one Gregorio C.
Agdon, a supervising personnel specialist in the Commission's Bacolod Office, informed him
that the promotional appointment was not covered by the prohibition.

Issue:
Does the prohibition against nepotism apply to promotional appointments as well? YES.

Held:

FIRST ISSUE

The prohibition against nepotism applies to BOTH original and promotional appointments. Both an
original appointment and a promotion are particular species of personnel action, which must comply
with the prohibition against nepotism.
 The original appointment of a civil service employee and all subsequent personnel actions
undertaken by or in respect of that employee such as promotion, transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment, etc., must comply with the Implementing Rules including, of course, the
prohibition against nepotism
 The purpose is to ensure that all appointments and other personnel actions in the civil
service should be based on merit and fitness and should never depend on how close
or intimate an appointee is to the appointing power.
 The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service is set out in Section 59, Book V of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as EO 292) under Section 59:
 All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any
branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority,
or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate
supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
 As used in this Section the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are
those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.”
 The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular
instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission.
 The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable to the case of a
member of any family who, after his or her appointment to any position in an office or
bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which
event the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.
 In order to give immediate effect to these provisions, cases of previous appointment
which are in contravention hereof shall be corrected by transfer and pending such
transfer, no promotion or salary increase shall be allowed in favor of the relative or
relatives who were appointed in violation of these provisions.
 The prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms.
 Firstly, it explicitly covers "all appointments," without seeking to make any distinction
between differing kinds or types of appointments.
 Secondly, Section 59 covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city and
municipal government, as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all
government owned or controlled corporations.
 Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set out in Section 59 itself, but it is a short
exclusive list: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (b) teachers; (c)
physicians; and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The subsequent marriage of one to the other of petitioners did not retroactively convert the original
appointment of petitioner Victoria into a prohibited nepotic one.
 It is the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor to petitioner Victoria in 1 October
1982 that is at stake.

It is essential to stress, however, that the prohibition applies quite without regard to the actual merits
of the proposed appointee and to the good intentions of the appointing or recommending authority,
and that the prohibition against nepotism in appointments whether original or promotional, is not
intended by the legislative authority to penalize faithful service.
 The purpose of Section 59 is precisely to take out of the discretion of the appointing and
recommending authority the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative.
 In other words, Section 59 insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official
by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested.
 The importance of this statutory objective is difficult to overstress in the culture in which we
live and work in the Philippines, where family bonds remain, in general, compelling and
cohesive.

SECOND ISSUE

The promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria as formerly approved by the CSC did not vest in
her a right to that position, therefore, she was not deprived of due process when she was terminated.
 Victoria was not deprived due process as there were no administrative charges in respect of
which she would have been entitled to notice and hearing.
 The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, only examines the conformity of the
appointment with applicable provisions of law and whether the appointee possesses all the
minimum qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
 At all events, as the Solicitor General has noted, petitioner Victoria was afforded an
opportunity to be heard when she filed an MR with the CSC and there challenged the
disapproval by the Commission.

Since the promotional appointment in favor of petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section 59, it was
null and void from the beginning. A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part
of the holder of such appointment.
 The CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel
actions, e.g., promotions.
 Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of
applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations.
 Section 20 of Rule VI of the Omnibus Implementing Rules makes this clear:
 Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may
be recalled on any of the following grounds:
(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency's Merit
Promotion Plan;
(b) Failure to pass through the agency's Selection/Promotion Board;
(c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and
employees relative to promotion; or
(d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
 The recall or withdrawal by the CSC of the approval which had been issued by one of its Field
Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly lawful and appropriate, the promotional
appointment of petitioner Victoria being void "from the beginning."
 The approval issued by Director Escobia did not, as it could not, cure the intrinsic vice of that
appointment.

CSC V. DACOYCOY

FACTS

Pedro O Dacoycoy was charged of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two
sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under
his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of
Arts and Trades. The Recommendation was made by Mr. Daclag, who was under the supervision of
Respondent Dacoycoy.

Respondent filed motion for reconsideration, anchoring on the the argument that he was not the
appointing or the recommending authority. CA reversed CSC's resolution ruling that the respondent
did not appoint his 2 sons, therefore he is not guilty of nepotism.

ISSUE

1) Whether Respondent Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism?

2) Whether the Civil Service Commission is the property party to appeal the suit.

HELD

1) YES. Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in
favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the
following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office;
and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. (see page 435 of the
case for the exceptions: not really important in the case)
To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in
favor of a relative within the third civil degree f consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the
bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Undoubtedly, Respondent can be held responsible for the appointment of his 2 sons. Mr.
Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school
administrator, He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level
employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended
the appointment of respondent’s two sons and placed them under his immediate supervision
serving as driver and utility worker of the school.
2) YES, SC said that CSC was the proper party to appeal the suit because it was impleaded in
the case and that the exoneration of Dcoycoy by the CA seriously prejudiced the civil service
system. In this case, the SC expressly abandoned the prior rulings that an “aggrieved party”
refers only to government employees adversely affected by the decision. In other words, the
SC overruled prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law “does not contemplate a
review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges”
Summary of opinions MELO, J., Dissenting and Concurring

Rama vs. CA
Case Digest: G.R. No. 131136. February 28, 2001

Conrado L. De Rama, petitioner, vs. The Court Of Appeals (Ninth Division, The Civil Service
Commission), Eladio Martinez, Divino De Jesus, Morell Ayala, Aristeo Catalla, Daisy Porta, Flordeliza
Oriasel, Graciela Glory, Felecidad Orinday, Ma. Petra Muffet Luce, Elsa Marino, Bernardita Mendoza,
Jane Macatangay, Adelfo Glodoviza and Florino Ramos, respondents.

Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de
Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall
of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Justifying his recall request on the
allegation that the appointments of the said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former
mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The
CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack
of merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been
approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure to present
evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.

Issue: whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.

Ruling: No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when
such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil
service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the
Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee
cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect
until disapproved by the Commission.

Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the following
grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion
Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing
collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of
other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.

Erratum: Just read the OCA vs Enriquez the full text. No digest found. Anyway the full case is
short raman..